

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 23, 2014

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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019a	cable	Saigon 312 - Sanitized 8/2012	TS	3	8/5/64	A
081	cable	PFOCO-S-64-1376	S	9	8/10/64	A
085	cable	Intelligence Cable - Exempt, 8/2000	S	4	8/4/64	A
086	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	C	3	8/6/64	A
087	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 9/99	C	2	8/7/64	A
088	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 9/99	C	2	8/8/64	A
089	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt, 8/2000	C	2	8/8/64	A
090	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	S	2	8/7/64	A
091	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt, 8/2000	S	2	8/7/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File, Vietnam

Folder Title Volume 15

Box Number 7

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092	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt, 8/2000	S	2	7/8/64	A
093	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	S	2	8/11/64	A
094	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt, 8/2000	S	4	8/13/64	A
130	report	Radio Propaganda Report - Sanitized, 9/99	C	16	8/7/64	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#143-Cable	Taylor in Saigon to SecState re travel with Khanh open 1/30/12 3 pp	8/3/64	CA

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 15

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National Security Files
Country File

Vietnam.

Vol. XV

Cables

Saigon Cables

- ~~1~~ 07/31/64 State S (...) 2pp. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-219~~
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- ~~2~~ 08/01/64 State TS (Gp 1) 2pp. *open 10-14-82 NLS 82-218*
~~Embtel 275 (Saigon); Mekong River traffic~~
- ~~3~~ 08/02/64 State ~~C~~ (...) 5pp. in two sections *State ltr 3/14/75*
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- ~~4~~ 08/02/64 State C (...) 2pp. *sanitized 11-23-82 NLS 82-219*
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- ~~5~~ 08/03/64 State TS (...) 2pp. *State ltr 6/9/75*
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- ~~7~~ 08/03/64 State ~~C~~ ((Gp 4) 2pp. *open 8-26-76*
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- ~~8~~ 08/04/64 State ~~U~~ 1p.
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- ~~10~~ 08/04/64 State S (...) 1p. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-219~~
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- ~~13~~ 08/04/64 State ~~C~~ (...) 1p. *State ltr 3/14/75*
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- ~~20~~ 08/05/64 State U 3pp.
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- ~~21~~ 08/05/64 State S (Gp 3) 2pp. ~~open 11-23-82 in NLS-82-219~~
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- ~~22~~ 08/06/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. ~~open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219~~
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- ~~23~~ 08/06/64 State C (...) 1p. ~~open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219~~
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- ~~24~~ 08/06/64 State S (Gp 3) 1p. *State ltr 3/14/75*
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- ~~26~~ 08/06/64 State C (...) 1p. ~~open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219~~
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- ~~31~~ 08/07/64 State TS (Gp 1) 1p. ~~open 10-14-82 NLS 82-218~~
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- ~~32~~ 08/07/64 State C (...) 2pp. *State ltr 3/14/75*
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- ~~33~~ 08/07/64 State C (...) 1p. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-219~~
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- ~~34~~ 08/07/64 State C (...) 4pp. *open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219*
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- ~~35~~ 08/07/64 State C (Gp 4) 1p. *open 7-8-82*
~~Embtel 337 (Saigon); Cambodia-Vietnam problem~~
- ~~36~~ 08/07/64 State S (...) 2pp. *open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219*
~~Embtel 338 (Saigon); lists of key provinces~~
- ~~37~~ 08/07/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. *open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219*
~~Embtel 343 (Saigon); report from Asian News Service~~
- ~~38~~ 08/07/64 State U 7pp. in two sections
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- ~~39~~ 08/08/64 State C (Gp 3) 4pp. *open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219*
~~Deptel 381 (Saigon); Bundy TV interview~~
- ~~40~~ 08/08/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. *open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219*
~~Deptel 382 (Saigon); Philippine Vice Pres. Pelaez visit to Saigon~~
- ~~41~~ 08/08/64 State TS (Gp 1) 4pp. *Sanitized State 11-6-75*
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- ~~42~~ 08/08/64 State U 1p.
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- ~~43~~ 08/09/64 State U 2pp.
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- ~~44~~ 08/08/64 State C (...) 1p. *State ltr 3/14/75*
~~Embtel 351 (Saigon); Taylor on destroyer patrols~~
- ~~45~~ 08/08/64 State U 1p.
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- ~~47~~ 08/08/64 State C (Gp 4) 2pp. *open 8-26-76*
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- ~~49~~ 08/08/64 State S (...) 1p. *Exempt per NLS 82-219*
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- ~~50~~ 08/08/64 State C (Gp 3) 2pp. *open 11-23-82 in NLS 82-219*
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- ~~51~~ 08/09/64 State C (...) 2pp. *open 11-23-82 in NLJ 82-219*
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- ~~66~~ 08/12/64 State ~~S~~ (...) 3pp. *State ltr 3/14/75*
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- ~~67~~ 08/12/64 State S (...) 4pp. *State Ltr 3/14/75*
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- ~~69~~ 08/12/64 State C (Gp 3) 2pp. *open 11-9-82 NLS 82-220*
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- ~~70~~ 08/12/64 State S (...) 1p. *State Ltr 3/14/75*
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- ~~71~~ 08/13/64 State S (Gp 4) 1p. *OLN 8-26-76*
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- ~~74~~ 08/14/64 State TS (Gp 1) 11pp. *State Ltr 6/9/75*
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- ~~75~~ 08/14/64 State TS (...) 1p. *Exempt per NLS 82-218*
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- ~~78~~ 08/05/64 JCS TS (Gp 3) 1p. *JCS memo 6/9/75*
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- ~~79~~ 08/05/64 State U 1p.
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- ~~80~~ 08/06/64 JCS S (Gp 4) 1p. *open 8-27-76*
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- ~~81~~ 08/10/64 JCS TS (Gp 3) 9pp.
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- ~~82~~ 08/12/64 JCS S (Gp 4) 2pp. *open 8-27-76*
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- ~~83~~ 08/13/64 JCS S (Gp 4) 1p. *open 8-27-76*
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- ~~84~~ 08/14/64 JCS TS (Gp 4) 3pp. *open 8-27-76*
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- 85 08/04/64 CIA S (Gp 1) 5pp. *Exempt CIA Ltr 5/9/75*
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- 86 08/06/64 CIA C (Gp 1) 3pp. *Sanitized CIA Ltr 5/9/75*
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- 87 08/07/64 CIA C (Gp 1) 2pp. *Sanitized 9-27-99 RAC*
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- 88 08/08/64 CIA C (Gp 1) 2pp. *Sanitized 9-27-99 RAC*
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- 89 08/08/64 CIA C (Gp 1) 2pp. *exempt 12-4-97 RAC*
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- 90 08/07/64 CIA S (Gp 1) 2pp. *exempt 12-4-97 RAC*
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- 91 08/07/64 CIA S (Gp 1) 2pp. *exempt 12-4-97 RAC*
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- 93 08/11/64 CIA S (Gp 1) 2pp. *Sanitized CIA Ltr 5/9/75*
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- 94 08/13/64 CIA S (Gp 1) 4pp. *exempt 12-4-97 RAC*
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- ~~96~~ 08/03/64 State C (...) 4pp. *Sanitized per NLS 82-220*
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- ~~97~~ 08/05/64 State C (Gp 4) 2pp. *open 8-27-76*
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~~103~~ 08/05/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. *open 11-9-82 NLS 82-220*
~~Deptel 885 (London); protest note to Hanoi~~

~~104~~ 08/05/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. *open 11-9-82 NLS 82-220*
~~Embtel 382 (Moscow); travel plans~~

~~105~~ Undated State U 2pp.
Embtel 262 (Karachi); editorial comment re Tonkin incident

~~106~~ 08/05/64 State U 1p.
Embtel 74 (Budapest); Hungarian reaction

~~107~~ 08/05/64 State U 1p.
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~~108~~ 08/06/64 State C (...) 1p. *Exempt per NLS 82-220*
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~~109~~ 08/06/64 State U 2pp.
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~~111~~ 08/06/64 State U 2pp.
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~~114~~ 08/07/64 State S (Gp 1) 2pp. *Exempt per NLS 82-220*
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~~116~~ 08/10/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. *Exempt per NLS 82-220*
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- ~~117~~ 08/11/64 State-U 1p.
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- ~~118~~ 08/12/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-220~~
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- ~~119~~ 08/13/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-220~~
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- ~~120~~ 08/14/64 WH S (...) 1p. ~~Exempt per NLS 83-232~~
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- ~~120a~~ 08/13/64 State C (Gp 3) 3pp. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-220~~
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- ~~120b~~ " 08/13/64 State C (Gp 3) 2pp. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-220~~
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- ~~121~~ 08/14/64 State TS (Gp 1) 3pp. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-218~~
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- ~~122~~ 08/14/64 State S (Gp 3) 1p. ~~Exempt per NLS 82-220~~
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- ~~123~~ 08/05/64 CIA ~~S~~ (Gp 1) 19pp. *State Ltr 6/3/75, Defense Ltr 6/9/75, CIA Ltr 5/9/75*
OCI No. 1291/64; Weekly Report -
- ~~124~~ 08/13/64 CIA ~~S~~ (Gp 1) 17pp. *State Ltr 6/3/75, Defense Ltr 6/9/75, CIA Ltr 5/9/75*
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- ~~125~~ 08/05/64 CIA ~~C~~ (...) 2pp. *Open 1-20-98 RAC*
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- ~~126~~ 08/06/64 ~~State C (Gp 3) 2pp.~~ *Open 11-9-82 NLS 82-220*
~~Intelligence Note;~~
- ~~127~~ 08/06/64 ~~State U~~ 1p.
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- ~~128~~ 08/06/64 ~~State U~~ 3pp.
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- ~~129~~ 08/07/64 ~~State C (...) 1p.~~ *Open 11-9-82 NLS 82-220*
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- ~~129a~~ 08/06/64 ~~U~~ 1p.
Transcript of Wm. Bundy interview over ABC
- ~~129b~~ Undated ~~NY Times U~~ 1p.
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- ~~129c~~ 08/07/64 ~~State C (Gp 3) 1p.~~ *Open 11-9-82 NLS 82-220*
~~Embtel 343 (Saigon); news report questioned~~
- 130 08/07/64 CIA C (Gp 1) 12pp. *Sanitized 9-27-99 RAC*
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- ~~131~~ 08/06/64 ~~State U~~ 7pp.
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- ~~132~~ 08/07/64 ~~USIA U~~ 14pp.
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- ~~133~~ 08/07/64 ~~USIA U~~ 1p.
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- ~~134(1)~~ 08/1/64 CIA ~~S~~ (Gp 1) 5pp. *State Ltr 6/3/75, Defense Ltr 6/9/75, Treasury Ltr 6/18/75, CIA Ltr 5/9/75*
CIA/RR CB 64-53; Money Supply and the Price Level in South VN
- ~~134(2)~~ 08/12/64 ~~WH U~~ 1p.
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- ~~134(2)a~~ 08/08/64 ~~State C (...) 3pp.~~ *Open 11-10-97 RAC*
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~~135~~ 08/13/64 WH TS (...) 1p. NSC ltr 7-10-75
 135a 08/13/64 State TS (...) 13pp. NSC ltr 7-10-75
 Wm. Bundy draft "Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia"

~~136~~ 08/13/64 State U-2pp.
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 136a 08/12/64 State U 8pp.
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~~137~~ 08/10/64 State S (Gp 1) 10pp. in five sections open 11-9-82 NLS 82-220
 Embtel 377 (Saigon); U.S. Mission Report for the President
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~~138~~ 08/10/64 Identical to Item 137

Show Their Flag

~~139~~ 08/07/64 State C (Gp 3) 1p. Exempt per NLS 82-220
 open 11-10-97 RAC Embtel 256 (Manila); "Phil Aid to Vietnam"

140 08/14/64 State C (Gp 4) 6pp. open 8-27-76
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Cross Border Ops.

~~141~~ 08/04/64 State TS (Gp 1) 1p. (Also JCS) open 12-27-82
 Embtel JCS 7715; policy NLS 82-218
 (Note this cable to MACV, this copy for State Dept.)

Senator Humphrey's Speech

142 08/10/64 Senate U 1p.
 John E. Reilly to Mr. Bundy, transmittal letter
 142a 08/16/64 Senate U 26pp.
 Draft for speech (Note that date is when speech
 to be delivered. This draft sent 08/10/64).

143 8/3/64 STATE S 3pp
 Embtel 286 (Saigon) Taylor-Khanh Conversation
 open 1/30/12 A + C

1-1

Saigon Cables

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Bundy

36

Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

Control:

25458

Rec'd:

JULY 31, 1964

11:47 A.M.

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 270

INFO: CINCPAC POLAD 123
VIETIANE 13
PHNOM PENH 42

031

DATE: JULY 31, 7 P.M.

LIMDIS

FONMIN QUAT SPOKE WITH JOHNSON MORE THAN HOUR JULY 29 ON LAOS
SETTING FORTH CONCEPT FOR GVN ACTIVITIES THERE ON WHICH HE
SOUGHT OUR "PRELIMINARY VIEWS".

AFTER NOTING THERE ARE SOME 50,000 VIETNAMESE IN LAOS AND OUTLINING
THE ORIGINS AND LOYALTIES OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS TO WHICH
VIETNAMESE HAVE TIES, HE SAID HE BELIEVED GVN SHOULD OPEN AN
ECONOMIC MISSION IN LAOS TO SERVE AS COVER FOR PERSONS ASSIGNED
THERE TO EXPLOIT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNITY FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND OPERATIONAL PURPOSES. SAID HE BELIEVED GVN COULD THUS
MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO COMMON CAUSE IN LAOS,
PARTICULARLY IN PANHANDLE AREA.

QUAT OFFERED FOLLOWING "BACKGROUND INFO", MUCH OF WHICH APPARENTLY
CAME FROM HIS DIRECTOR OF CABINET HOI WHO RECENTLY VISITED
LAOS. GEN SIHO IS SUPPORTED BY A VIETNAMESE OF THAI ORIGIN, AND
THIS MAN IS CHANNEL FOR THAI AID TO SIHO AND THEREFORE TO
PHOU SANONIKONE GROUP. BOUN OUM IS SUPPORTED BY THE KHA TRIBE WITH
WHOM VIETNAMESE HAVE EXPERIENCE. MANY OF THE VIETNAMESE IN LAOS
ARE DESCENDANTS OF VIETNAMESE CIVIL SERVANTS WHO WORKED IN
LAOS BEFORE WORLD WAR II. SINCE NORTH VIETNAM AMB ARRIVE,
ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNITY HAS GONE OVER TO VC
SIDE. THICH TAM CHAU WILL SEND A BONZE SUPERIOR TO LAOS TO
ORGANIZE LAO BUDDHIST CIRCLES.

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Authority RAC 00014808
By us, NARA, Date 10-29-97

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-2- 270, JULY 31, 7 P.M., FROM SAIGON

QUAT WOULD PROPOSE THAT ECONOMIC MISSION BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM VIETNAMESE EMB AT VIENTIANE. TO BE SUCCESSFUL WHOLE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE "FULL AMERICAN SUPPORT". INCIDENTALLY HE ALSO HOPES TO GET KHANH'S APPROVAL TO SEND A GOOD AMB THERE.

TIME DID NOT PERMIT JOHNSON TO COMMENT TO QUAT ON PROPOSAL AND MATTER WAS LEFT FOR LATER DISCUSSIONS.

QUAT IS UNDOUBTEDLY CONVINCED THAT GVN COULD AND SHOULD DO MORE THAN IT HAS WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAMESE IN LAOS, PARTICULARLY IN PANHANDLE AREA. HE IS ALSO SEEKING WAYS TO ENGAGE HIMSELF MORE MEANINGFULLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY IN GVN AFFAIRS. AS HE IS ONE OF THE MOST ABLE CIVILIANS IN CABINET, WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE HIM IN THIS.

THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS OF VIENTIANE AND DEPT, WE WOULD PROPOSE GIVE HIM ENCOURAGING REPLY ON OUR WILLINGNESS ASSIST AND SUPPORT A SMALL GVN ECON MISSION IN PANHANDLE AREA, PERHAPS SAVANNAKHET, IF HE IS ABLE OBTAIN APPROVAL OF GVN. WE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE COMMIT OURSELVES TO ANY OPERATIONS, FEASIBILITY OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DETERMINED AFTER THE MISSION WAS ON THE GROUND, HAVE OBTAINED SUFFICIENT INFO CONCERNING VIETNAMESE IN AREA TO REACH SOME JUDGMENTS, AND IN LIGHT OF SITUATION AT TIME IN LAOS. EVEN IF NOTHING BUT INTELLIGENCE RESULTED FROM PROJECT, IT SHOULD, FROM OUR STANDPOINT, HAVE BEEN A WORTHWHILE VENTURE. WE WOULD ENVISAGE SUPPORT SUCH AN OPERATION PROBABLY BEING CHanneled THROUGH CAY.

WOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS.

TAYLOR

MV

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INCOMING TELEGRAM. *Department of State**Val Nam*²

30-32

~~TOP SECRET~~Control:
Rec'd:74
AUGUST 1, 1964
5:26 AMSVN
Info

FROM: SAIGON

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 275

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INFO: PHNOM PENH 46
CINCPAC 126

DATE: AUGUST 1, 3 PM

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PASS OSD AND CIA

MEKONG RIVER TRAFFIC

DEF 979228 JOINT STATE/DEFENSE/OSD 232348Z JUL 64.

1. WE ARE IN FULL ACCORD IN NECESSITY STRICTER REGULATION
MEKONG RIVER.

2. HOWEVER, BEFORE ENTERING INTO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH
GVN ON OCEAN GOING VESSELS TRANSITING MEKONG TO AND FROM
CAMBODIA, WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ON WHAT ACTION WE BELIEVE
GVN MIGHT LEGITIMATELY TAKE UNDER EXISTING TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW WHILE ALSO HAVING REGARD FOR STATE OF
INSURGENCY IN SVN. PRESENT PRACTICE IS FOR VESSELS BOUND FOR
CAMBODIA TO TAKE ON PILOT AND TWO CUSTOM OFFICIALS FOR TRANSIT
VIETNAMESE PORTION OF RIVER. WE ARE LOOKING INTO WAYS THIS
PROCEDURE CAN BE STRENGTHENED TO ASSURE CARGO IS NOT ILLEGALLY
DISCHARGED WITHIN VIETNAM.

3. OUR QUESTION RELATES PRIMARILY TO WHAT CONTROLS GVN COULD
ESTABLISH OVER CARGOS DESTINED FOR CAMBODIA. WE ASSUME GVN
COULD DEMAND MANIFESTS AND COULD MAKE WHATEVER INSPECTION
OF CARGO MAY BE FEASIBLE TO DETERMINE ACCURACY OF MANIFEST.
THIS ACTION WOULD IN ITSELF BE MINOR HARASSMENT OF SHIPPING
AND MANIFEST MIGHT PROVIDE USEFUL INTELLIGENCE. IF INSPECTION
DISCLOSED CARGO NOT DECLARED ON MANIFEST, PRESUME GVN COULD
DENY PASSAGE UNTIL SUCH CARGO OFF-LOADED.

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Authority

NLS 82-218

By

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NARS, Date

10-14-82

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 275, AUGUST 1, 3 PM, FROM SAIGON

4. QUESTION OUR MIND IS TO WHAT DEGREE AND BY WHAT MEANS COULD GVN DECLARE CARGO "CONTRABAND" EVEN THOUGH PROPERLY MANIFESTED. WE HAVE IN MIND UNDOUBTED ARMS SHIPMENTS FROM COMMUNIST BLOC, AND EVEN FROM NON-BLOC COUNTRIES SUCH AS FRANCE, GENUINELY DESTINED FOR RKG ARMED FORCES. NOT LIKELY BY INSPECTION OF MANIFEST AND CARGO MATERIEL EVENTUALLY DESTINED FOR VC COULD BE SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED OR ISOLATED FROM GENERAL BULK GOODS DESTINED FOR CAMBODIAN CONSUMPTION. WE ARE THUS INCLINED AT THIS TIME TOWARD SEEKING TO IMPLEMENT STEPS IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. THIS WOULD ALSO DELAY TRAFFIC AND BE USEFUL REMINDER TO CAMBODIA OF ITS DEPENDENCY ON GVN KEEPING THIS ROUTE OPEN. EVEN THIS STEP WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE EXPANSION AND RE-ORGANIZATION OF ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES AS INFORMATION HERE INDICATES THAT SUCH TRAFFIC RUNS AT RATE OF APPROXIMATELY 600 VESSELS A YEAR.

5. WOULD WELCOME WASHINGTON'S VIEWS, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHAT FORM OF NOTIFICATION TO MARITIME NATIONS SHOULD BE MADE BY GVN RE MEASURES ADOPTED.

GP-1.

TAYLOR

BAP

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Authority STATE 3/14/75

By KR, NARS, Date 3/24/75

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PR 020812Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
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1964 AUG 2 AM 7 30

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SEONE OF TWO ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 278 INFO
PRIORITY PPENH 47 USUN 27 ROUTINE CINCPAC 127 FROM SAIGON AUG 2 4PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: DEPTTEL 299

WE RECOGNIZE THAT SIZE OF OG CURRENTLY ENVISAGED AND RESTRICTIONS
RKG WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO PLACE ON ITS OPERATIONS WILL MILITATE
AGAINST OG SERVING OUR INTERESTS SIGNIFICANTLY AND IN FACT COULD
WORK AGAINST OUR INTERESTS. FINAL JUDGEMENT IN THIS REGARD
WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE WHEN OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF OG HAVE BEEN
WORKED OUT.

CFN SEONE OF TWO 278 47 27 127 2 4PM 299

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 03A/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A. FROM POLITICAL STANDPOINT, HOWEVER, AND SUBJECT TO COMMENTS IN
B AND C BELOW ON OPERATIONAL DETAILS, WE SEE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES
TO GVN AND U.S. SUPPORT FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF OG:

1) SUCH POSITION WOULD DEMONSTRATE SINCERITY OF GVN AND U.S. IN
SEEKING SOLUTION TO BORDER PROBLEM;

2) HOPEFULLY, SUCH POSITION WOULD CONTRAST WITH NEGATIVE POSITION
OF RKG, WHICH BROUGHT MATTER TO SC IN FIRST PLACE, AND OF USSR,
OTHER COMMUNIST POWERS ON SC, AND POSSIBLY FRANCE, THEREBY
PLACING ONUS FOR SC FAILURE TO ACCEPT MISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THESE NATIONS AND NOT ON GVN AND U.S.;

3) ESTABLISHMENT OF EVEN SMALL AND RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE OG WOULD
INTRODUCE UN PRESENCE AS NEW ELEMENT IN SEA PICTURE. THERE OF
COURSE NO GUARANTEE THAT THIS WOULD SERVE U.S. INTERESTS IN LONG

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-2- 278, AUGUST 2, 4 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

RUN, BUT IT PROVIDES NEW ELEMENT OF FLEXIBILITY IN TERMS INTERNATIONAL FORUM AS ALTERNATIVE TO GENEVA ACCORDS-ICC MACHINERY.

B. ABOVE ADVANTAGES COULD BE MORE THAN OFFSET BY OG WITH MEMBERSHIP HOSTILE TO GVN, RESPONSIVE ONLY TO SIHANOUK'S WILL BE RENDERED IMPOTENT TO TROIK-LIKE COMPOSITION A L*ICC. ACCORDINGLY, BELIEVE GVN AND U.S. SHOULD INSIST ON OG:

1) WHOSE MEMBERSHIP IS POLITICALLY IMPARTIAL AND EQUALLY
CFN 1) 2) 3) 1)

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 03A/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACCEPTABLE TO RKG AND GVN AND IS WILLING TO MOVE AROUND IN BORDER AREA UNDER REASONABLE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY;

2) WHOSE MOVEMENTS NOT RPT NOT SUBJECT TO RKG CONTROL;

3) TO WHICH GVN HAS DIRECT ACCESS, EITHER THROUGH OG LIAISON OFFICER POSTED IN SAIGON, GVN LIAISON OFFICER ATTACHED TO OG HQ, OR DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK WITH OG.

BELIEVE WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT OG WHICH ANSWERS ABOVE DESCRIPTION WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO SIHANOUK OR, IF HE AGREES TO ITS ESTABLISHMENT, WILL SOON BE OBJECT HIS WRATH. AS LONG AS GVN AND U.S. CAN PROVIDE CONTRAST IN TERMS SWEET REASONABLENESS AND COOPERATION WITH OG, OUR POSITION SHOULD BE PROTECTED. FURTHER, IF SIHANOUK RENDERS OG POSITION COMPLETELY UNTENABLE OR EXPELS IT, GVN AND U.S. MIGHT EVEN CONSIDER BRINGING BACK TO SC FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

C. FROM MILITARY STANDPOINT, AS INDICATED IN EMBTEL 2231, SMALL INVESTIGATIVE FORCE OF TYPE CONTEMPLATED MIGHT PRODUCE LIMITED RESULTS, ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT ~~PREVENT VC~~

INCURSIONS FROM CAMBODIAN BASES OR VC UNITS FROM SEEKING REFUGE IN CAMBODIA WHEN PURSUED BY GVN FORCES. MOREOVER, IT DOUBTFUL THAT REACTION OF OG COULD BE SWIFT ENOUGH TO ARRIVE OFTEN ON
) 3) 2231

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 03A/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SCENE OF VIOLATION IN TIME TO ACQUIRE FIRST-HAND EVIDENCE THAT VIOLATION HAD ACTUALLY OCCURRED OR WHO WAS AT FAULT.

NEVERTHELESS, IF OG OF 100-150 PERSONNEL ESTABLISHED ON CAMBODIAN SOIL, FOLLOWING POINTS IN ADDITION TO THOSE UNDER B ABOVE ARE KEYS TO WHATEVER SUCCESS IT MIGHT ACHIEVE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3- 278, AUGUST 2, 4 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

A) ADEQUATE TRANSPORTATION - BOTH GROUND AND AIR - TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL MOBILITY. GIVEN DISTANCES INVOLVED FROM OG LOCATIONS (SEE BELOW) TO BORDER AND CONDITIONS OF ROADS IN CAMBODIA, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO OG'S SUCCESS THAT EACH DETACHMENT BE EQUIPPED WITH HELICOPTER AND ADEQUATE NUMBER OF OVERLAND, JEEP-TYPE VEHICLES.

B) EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS WITH RKG AND GVN AND WITHIN OG. RADIO EQUIPMENT FOR OG MUST BE ADEQUATE TO ALLOW GVN AND RKG LIAISON GROUPS TO CONTACT CLOSEST OBSERVER DETACHMENT WHENEVER SUSPECTED BORDER VIOLATION OCCURS. SINGLE SIDE BAND RADIOS OF TYPE NOW AVAILABLE IN U.S. MILITARY INVENTORY WOULD PROVIDE RANGE AND DURABILITY REQUIRED. OG MUST HAVE ITS OWN INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WHICH WILL PROVIDE RADIO CONTACT BETWEEN CHIEF OF GROUP AND SEPARATE DETACHMENTS AS WELL AS GROUND-TO-AIR AND AIR-TO-GROUND VOICE CONTACT WITHIN EACH DETACHMENT.

C) LOCATION OF OG DETACHMENTS NEAR KNOWN OR EXPECTED TROUBLE
CFN 100-150

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 03A/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SPOTS. BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE HERE, FOLLOWING LOCATIONS, LISTED IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, ARE GENERAL LOCATIONS WITHIN CAMBODIA WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE OG DETACHMENTS POSTED:

(1) SVAY RIENG (WT8826) - CENTRALLY LOCATED IN "PARROT'S BEAK" WHICH IS SUSPECTED OF BEING MAJOR AREA OF VC FOOD SUPPLY AND SANCTUARY. LIVING ACCOMMODATIONS ADEQUATE. ACCESS TO BORDER AREAS BY WHEELED VEHICLE IS RELATIVELY EASY.

(2) SNOUL (XU5533) - REPORTED VC LOGISTICAL INSTALLATION IN VICINITY. LIVING ACCOMMODATIONS MORE THAN ADEQUATE IF FRENCH PLANTATION OWNERS/MANAGERS WILL COOPERATE.

(3) MINNOT (XU3007) - SAME AS (2) ABOVE.

(4) TAKEO (VT7514) - LOCATED IN CENTER OF AREA SUSPECTED CONTAINING VC LOGISTICAL, TRAINING, HOSPITAL AND REST INSTALLATIONS. ACCESS TO BORDER AREAS FAIRLY EASY DURING DRY SEASON; DIFFICULT DURING RAINY SEASON. LIVING CONDITIONS ADEQUATE.

(5) CAMP ROLLAND (YV5766) - LOCATED NEAR VC INFILTRATION ROUTE WHICH PARALLELS INTERNATIONAL BORDER WITHIN RVN. LIVING CONDITIONS ADEQUATE IF FARK ELEMENTS PRESENT. ACCESS TO CAMP IS LIMITED.

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-4- 278, AUGUST 2, 4 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

(6) KEP (VS2659) - LOCATED NEAR AREA SUSPECTED OF CONTAINING VC
SANCTUARY. LIVING CONDITIONS EXCELLENT.

BT

CFM (1) (WT8826) (2) (XU5533 (3) (XU3007 (2) (4) (VT7514)
(5) (YV5766 (6) (VS2659)

*AS RECEIVED: WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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1964 AUG 2 AM 7 29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (SETWO OF TWO) ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 278 INFO
PRIORITY PPHN 47 USUN 27 ROUTINE CINCPAC 127 FROM SAIGON AUG 2 4PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: DEPTTEL 299

ACCESS TO BORDER BY ROAD FAIRLY EASY; BY BOAT FAIRLY EASY.

OPPORTUNITY EXISTS TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION CONCERNING SUSPECTED
WATER BORNE INFILTRATION OR SMUGGLING OF WAR MATERIAL.

MACV IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION OR COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT FROM WITHIN ITS OWN RESOURCES, AND IT DOUBTFUL THAT GVN
CFN SETWO OF TWO 278 47 27 127 2 4PM 299

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 04A/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COULD DO SO. HOWEVER, INTERESTED WASHINGTON AGENCIES MAY WISH
CONSIDER DESIRABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF PROVIDING SUCH
EQUIPMENT FROM U.S. SOURCES. PERHAPS U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO COSTS
OF OG COULD BE MADE IN THIS FORM, ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZE SIHANOUK
MAY VETO SUCH OFFER EVEN THOUGH HE SEEKS SUPPORT FOR OG FROM
"RICH COUNTRIES".

IN SUM, FROM MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, ALTHOUGH PROPOSED OG DOES
NOT OFFER MUCH HOPE FOR ELIMINATING OR EFFECTIVELY DELAYING WITH
BORDER VIOLATIONS, IT MIGHT DIMINISH OR AT LEAST COMPLICATE VC
ABILITY TO CROSS BORDER AT WILL. ESTABLISHMENT OF OG SHOULD
IN NO WAY HINDER GVN WAR EFFORTS.

D. ABOVE VIEWS HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH GVN. WE
WILL DO SO IF DEPARTMENT AGREES.

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 9:04 AM 8/2/64
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 11:30 AM 8/2/64

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Viet Nam
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1964 AUG 2 AM 7:29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 279 INFO CINCPAC 128
FROM SAIGON AUG 2 4PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD.

REF: DEPTTEL 323.

AP ITEMS ARE BASED ON LETTER DATED JULY 28 FROM VN ICC LIAISON MISSION TO ICC PROTESTING CAI BE ATTACK (EMBTTEL 259). LETTER, COPIES OF WHICH HAVE BEEN POUCHED DEPT, STATES: "ACCORDING TO WITNESSES FORCES MAKING ATTACK ON SUNG HIEU (CAI BE) WERE 261 AND 514 BATTALIONS OF REGULAR ARMY OF NORTH VN, AND DECAPITATED BODIES (LETTER STATES 42 VC BODIES, 8 DECAPITATED, DISCOVERED IN CFN 279 128 2 4PM 323 28 259 261 514 42 8

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 05A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TRENCH 200 METERS FROM CAI BE) WERE THOSE OF OFFICERS WHO COMMANDED THESE BATTALIONS AND OF CERTAIN CHICOM ADVISORS KILLED DURING ATTACK. PRESENCE OF LATTER WITH VC RANKS REVEALED BY ORDERS IN CHINESE HEARD DURING ASSAULT. VC COMMANDER APPARENTLY DECAPITATED BODIES TO PREVENT THEIR IDENTIFICATION."

COL. AN, HEAD VN MISSION, INFORMED EMBOFFICER LETTER BASED ON INFO FROM WITNESSES WHO INTERROGATED BY ICC FIXED TEAM, PARTICULARLY 2 VC PRISONERS AND DISTRICT CHIEF. AN SAID VC PRISONERS STATED "AUTUMN CADRES" (APPARENTLY SENT FOR VC AUTUMN CAMPAIGN) FROM DRV HAD "TRAINED AND DIRECTED" 261 BN. NOT CLEAR WHETHER PRISONERS MADE SAME STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO 514TH. AN SAID HE HAD INTENDED HIS LETTER TO INDICATE THAT THESE WERE REGULAR DRV TROOPS ATTACKING UNDER COVER THAT THEY LOCAL "LIBERATION" FORCES. HE SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE WERE REGULAR PAVN BATTALIONS WHICH HAD ENTERED SVN AS UNITS. AN EXPLAINED HE WAS OBLIGED TO PHRASE HIS LETTER TO SHOW STRONG LINK BETWEEN DRV AND ATTACK SINCE OTHERWISE POLES WOULD HOLD THAT THESE WERE INTERNAL VN FORCES WHOSE ACTIONS DID NOT FALL UNDER GENEVA ACCORDS. AN SAID HE MUST MAKE STRONG ACCUSATION IN ORDER OBTAIN ICC ACTION, AND HE WISHED FOLLOW UP ON FIXED TEAM INVESTIGATION.
CFN 2 261 514TH

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Authority RAC00014809

By *us* NARA, Date 10-29-97

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-2- 279, AUGUST 2, 4 PM, FROM SAIGON

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 05A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON PRESENCE OF CHICOM ADVISORS, AN QUOTED DISTRICT CHIEF WHO PARTICIPATED IN DEFENSE CAI BE AS SAYING THAT HE SAW CHINESE WHO DISTINGUISHABLE BECAUSE THEY WERE TALLER THAN VIETNAMESE AND SHOUTED ORDERS IN CHINESE. AN SAID SOME OF DECAPITATED CORPSES WERE TALL MEN, AND THAT REPORTS OF CHICOM ADVISORS PARTICIPATING IN RECENT BEN CAT BATTLE HAS ALSO BEEN RECEIVED. AN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NATURE OF EVIDENCE HE CITED IF TRUE INDICATED ONLY PRESENCE CHINESE AND THAT SOME CHINESE FROM SVN WERE KNOWN TO BE IN VC UNITS. STATED HOWEVER THAT FACT THEY GIVING ORDERS LED TO PRESUMPTION THEY CHICOM AND SPECULATION THAT EITHER DRV HAS ASKED FOR CHINESE ADVISORS BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE LEADERS, OR CHINESE HAD SENT SUCH ADVISORS TO DIRECT RECENTLY STEPPED UP ATTACKS.

MACV HAS ACCEPTED EXISTENCE SINCE 1962 OF 261 AS MAIN VC BATTALION AND 514 AS PROVINCIAL VC BN BOTH OF WHICH FREQUENTLY OPERATE IN AREA NEAR CAI BE. ALSO ACCEPTS PRESENCE CADRE FROM NORTH IN 261ST. NEITHER MACV NOR GVN HIGH COMMAND HOWEVER ACCEPT PARTICIPATION ANY PAVN UNITS AS SUCH IN ATTACK ON CAI BE. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN NUMBER UNCONFIRMED REPORTS ALLEGED PARTICIPATION CHICOM ADVISORS WITH VC UNITS, ACCORDING MACV THERE NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH REPORTS, INCLUDING ALLEGED CFN 1961 261 514 261ST

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 05A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CHICOM PARTICIPATION ATTACK ON CAI BE. MACV HAS ARRANGED FOR DIRECT ACCESS TO CAI BE POW'S IN ORDER OBTAIN ALL POSSIBLE INFO ON UNITS PARTICIPATING IN CAI BE ATTACK. WILL REPORT FINDINGS AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONFINE OUR COMMENTS ON THESE GVN ALLEGATIONS TO FACT WE HAVE NOT SEEN EVIDENCE REFERRED TO WHICH WE UNDERSTAND BEING INVESTIGATED BY ICC AND REFERRING QUESTIONS TO GVN. WE WILL ALSO SUGGEST COL. AND HE SEEK IN FUTURE AVOID MORE SENSATIONAL CHARGES UNLESS SUBSTANTIATED IN ORDER AVOID EMBARRASSMENT POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT DENIAL BY U.S. AND QUESTIONING OF GVN CREDIBILITY.
TAYLOR

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Origin

ACTION:

AmEmbassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE

Info:

NODIS

FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR

Ref Embtel 282

We have been very sensitive here to the considerations you raise reftel. We would hope that part of the problem has been met by President's public statement today, which you have already received. We have asked JCS to insure that you receive copies of the implementing orders to the appropriate commanders through military channels.

Suggestions made in B, C and D reftel are currently being considered in context OPLAN 34A. Significant additions have been made to list of targets for marine operations and these will be transmitted to you shortly.

We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi, and MADDUX incident is directly related to their effort to ~~discourage~~ resist these activities. We have no intention yielding to pressure.

Drafted by:

S/VN:MVForrestal:caw

8/3/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Christensen

TOP SECRET

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Classification

In your discretion you may pass these thoughts along to Gen. Khanh. You may also reiterate to him, but only if you believe it appropriate, our concern that actions against the North be limited ^{for the present} to the OPLAN 34A type. We do not believe that SVN is yet in a position to mount larger actions so long as the security situation in the near vicinity of Saigon remains precarious. We are impressed with the fact that a battalion-sized attack could have occurred within 4 miles of Saigon without any advance warning.

We would welcome your further comments on Saigon reaction to today's announcement, as well as your continuing assessment of the political temperature there.

END

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Info

CONTROL 726
 RECD AUGUST 3, 6:11 AM 1964
 FROM SAIGON
 ACTION SECSTATE 285 PRIORITY
 INFO CINCPAC 132
 WHITE HOUSE 17
 JCS 12
 DEFENSE 19
 DATE AUGUST 3 5 PM

Thomson
Cy#3 det

~~TOP SECRET~~

E X D I S

FOR SOME TIME WE HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERATION HERE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INTRODUCTION INTO NVN OF JET AIRCRAFT, EITHER INTERCEPTORS OF MIG-17 TYPE, LIGHT BOMBERS OF IL-28 TYPE OR BOTH. SEVERAL COMBINATIONS ARE POSSIBLE, THE INTERCEPTORS APPEARING WITH THE BOMBERS, WITHOUT THE BOMBERS (WHICH ARE NOW IN BETTER POSITION ON HAINAN ISLAND THAN THEY WOULD BE ON NVN FIELDS), OR WITH THE BOMBERS STAGING IN AND OUT. WHILE THE PLANES WOULD PROBABLY BEAR DRV MARKINGS, PILOTS MIGHT INCLUDE CHICOMS.

SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS FOR US IN SVN. THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE ALARM BOTH REAL AND SIMULATED IN GVN OVER THE AIR DEFENSE OF URBAN TARGETS IN SVN WHICH COULD LEAD TO URGENT REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL US HELP IN FORM OF JET INTERCEPTORS, CIVIL DEFENSE AND JET BOMBERS FOR VNAF. THERE COULD BE AN UPSURGE IN THE PROPAGANDA TO "MARCH NORTH" IN ORDER TO WIPE OUT THE NEW THREAT.

AS TO THE ACTUAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE EFFECT ON NIGHT AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN SUCH AS THOSE CONDUCTED UNDER PLAN 34A. IN THE CASE OF DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS, WE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE INCREASED CAP FOR US RECCE MISSIONS OVER LAOS. BUT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT EFFECT WOULD BE TO VOID THE USE OF VNAF A A-H'S IN DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS OVER NVN WITHOUT PRIOR ELIMINATION OF THE MIG THREAT OR WITHOUT A CAP OF US FIGHTERS. IN OTHER WORDS, ASSUMING AS WE MUST THAT VNAF NIGHT BOMBING WOULD BE VERY

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Authority RAC 00014810
 By jis, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 285, AUGUST 3, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON

INACCURATE, NO EFFECTIVE AIR ATTACK AGAINST NVN TARGETS COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT INVOLVING US COMBAT AIRCRAFT FROM OUTSET. THE VNAF-FARMGATE OPTION FOR BOMBING NVN TARGETS WITHOUT OVERT US PRESENCE WOULD BE LOST.

IT SEEMS IMPORTANT HERE TO THINK THROUGH THIS SCENARIO OF POSSIBLE EVENTS AND REACH SOME GENERAL AGREEMENT AS TO THE RESPONSE USG SHOULD MAKE IF THIS CONTINGENCY ARISES. FROM VIEWPOINT SAIGON, IT APPEARS THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DO FOLLOWING:

- A. INTRODUCE US INTERCEPTORS AND POSSIBLY HAWK MISSILES INTO SVN.
- B. INITIATE HEAVILY ESCORTED US RECCE OVERFLIGHTS OF NVN. MIG'S WOULD HAVE TO STAY DOWN IN HUMILITATION OR RISE TO BE DESTROYED.
- C. ATTACK DRV AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND OR IN AIR AS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT APPROVED AIR MISSIONS.

GP-1.

QV 285 132 17 12 19 MIG-17 IL-28 34A 1-H'S GP-1

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

TELEGRAM Department of State

7

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Rec'd:

795

AUGUST 3,

8:29 AM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 8/26/76

FILE COPY

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 288, PRIORITY

INFO: PHNOM PENH 48, PRIORITY
USUN 28

DATE: AUGUST 3, 6 PM

REF: DEPTTEL 324; USUN 271 TO DEPARTMENT

UN WORKING PAPER ON OG FOR CAMBODIA REMARKABLY CLOSE TO VIEWS
EMBTTEL 272, SUBJECT FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

1) POSTS: ACCEPT TAKEO, SVAY RIENG, KOMPONG CHAM NEAR MIMOT).
PREFER SNOUL AND CAMP ROLLAND (IN THIS ORDER) TO MONDOL KIRI
(NEAR SRE KHTUM) FOR REASONS CITED EMBTEL 272 BUT SRE KHTUM
AREA, WHICH LOCATED BETWEEN SNOUL AND CAMP ROLLAND, WOULD BE
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE. WE SEE NO RPT NO MILITARY ADVANTAGE TO
RATANAK KIRI AND WOULD MUCH PREFER KEP.

2) HEADQUARTERS: BELIEVE PHNOM PENH SHOULD BE AVOIDED IF AT ALL
POSSIBLE. HEADQUARTERS NEAR BORDER (E.G., SVAY RIENG) WOULD
BE MUCH BETTER FROM STANDPOINT OG REACTION TIME AND WOULD
PERHAPS REDUCE AVAILABILITY OG TO SIHANOUK'S DIRECT INFLUENCE
AND OBSTRUCTIONISM.

3) TRANSPORT: WORKING PAPER CONSISTENT WITH OUR VIEWS.

4) COMMUNICATIONS: WORKING PAPER CONSISTENT WITH OUR VIEWS.

5) LIAISON WITH GVN: FROM STANDPOINT OF OG REACTION TIME
BELIEVE GVN LIAISON OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS
WITH INDIVIDUAL OG POSTS.

6) FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATIONS AND MOVEMENT: WORKING PAPER

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-2- 288, AUGUST 3, 6 PM, FROM SAIGON

CONSISTENT WITH OUR VIEWS.

7) PERSONNEL: WORKING PAPER RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE.

8) RE NATIONALITIES OF PERSONNEL, "IMPARTIAL" OR "NEUTRAL" WOULD BE BETTER QUALIFIER THAN "NEUTRALIST." LATER, IF INTERPRETED AS COMMONLY USED, COULD LOAD OG WITH NATIONALITIES UNSYMPATHETIC TO GVN SINCE RKG ALL MNEUTRALIST. FRENCH LANGUAGE CAPABILITY WOULD APPEAR TO BE NEARLY INDISPENSABLE.

9) WOULD HOPE EACH INDIVIDUAL POST WOULD HAVE AT LEAST SOME REPRESENTATION WITH MILITARY EXPERIENCE.

10) COST: SEE THIRD FROM WST * PARAGRAPH EMBTEL 272.

GP-4.

TAYLOR

BAP

*AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC

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AUGUST 4, 1964

1:21 A.M.

F L A S H

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FLASH (292) AUGUST 4 - 1 PM

DEPTEL 335

ASSUME RELEASE CONTAINED REFTTEL WILL BE MADE WITHOUT ANY
REFERENCE TO OUR GIVING COPY TO ICC FOR DELIVERY TO HANOI
REGIME. INTEND DISCUSS TRANSMITTAL OF TEXT WITH SEABORN
(CANADIAN ICC) THIS AFTERNOON BUT WE NOT SURE HE OR INDIAN
CHAIRMAN WOULD BE WILLING UNDERTAKE TASK. SHOULD THEY SHOW
RELUCTANCE SUGGEST WE SEND CONFIRMATION COPY OUR PROTEST TO
HANOI THROUGH BRITISH CONSUL HANOI. TAYLOR

BO

CFN 292 4 1 335

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 4, 1:23 A.M.; PASSED
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AUGUST 4, 1:38 A.M.

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9

~~SECRET~~

33
Action

Control: 1824
Rec'd: AUGUST 4, 1964
9:22 AM

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FROM: SAIGON

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ACTION: SECSTATE 293, PRIORITY

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INFO: VIENTIANE 17,
CINCPAC 136,

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DOD 21,

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JCS 14,

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CIA 18,

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DATE: AUGUST 4, 5PM

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-295

By ing, NARA, Date 3-19-87

RMR

1. WESTMORELAND REPORTS THE FOLLOWING:

2. IN A CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 3, GENERAL THIEU TOLD STILLWELL THAT A SENIOR ARVN OFFICER HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A PROFITABLE TRIP TO LAOS. THE OFFICER, A COLONEL THIEU, HEJS A SPECIAL BUREAU, DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO GENERAL KHIEM, FOR SENSITIVE LAOTIAN MATTERS. GENERAL THIEU SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY GEN KHIEM TO PASS ON THE FOLLOWING:

A) THE LAOTIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES DESIRED MUCH STRONGER LIAISON WITH THE GVN MILITARY FOR COORDINATION OF FUTURE JOINT AND/OR SUPPORTING MILITARY OPERATION. TO THIS END, IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT A SENIOR COLONEL WOULD BE ACCREDITED TO VIENTIANE AS MILITARY ATTACHE. THE ATTACHE WOULD, IN ADDITION, HEAD A SMALL GVN PLANNING/COORDINATION GROUP. HE WOULD HAVE DIRECT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH SAIGON AND, PRESUMABLY, I AND II ARVN CORPS.

B) MOREOVER, A GVN LIAISON TEAM, SUBORDINATE TO THE MILITARY ATTACHE, WOULD BE POSITIONED IN SAVANNAKET. TEAM WOULD WEAR LAOTIAN UNIFORMS AND WOULD BE PROVIDED HOUSE, CAR AND ESCORT BY THE LAOTIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES. TEAM WOULD ALSO HAVE RADIO CONTACT WITH GVN.

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-2- 293, AUGUST 4, 5 PM., FROM SAIGON.

C) THE GVN MILITARY ATTACH WOULD PROBABLY BE COLONEL LAM SON, RECENTLY RELIEVED FOR UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES, BUT KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT LAOS.

3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, THIEU SAID THAT THE ARRANGEMENT HAD BEEN MADE DIRECT WITH GENERAL KOUPRASITH THAT SOUVANNA PHOUMA WAS WILLING AND HAD CONCURRED; AND THAT PHOUMI HAD BEEN ONLY TANGENTIALLY INVOLVED SINCE HE WAS PRIMARILY OCCUPIED WITH POLITICAL MANEUVERING. THIEU SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF THESE BASIC ARRANGEMENTS WAS TO PROVIDE FIRM BASE FOR THE COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS PRIMARILY IN THE PANHANDLE, BUT ALSO ELSEWHERE IN LAOS AS JOINTLY AGREED WITH THE LAOTIAN AUTHORITIES.

4. THIEU STRESSED THE FACT THAT KOUPRASITH AND COMPANY WANTED GVN ASSISTANCE THE LAOTIAN AUTHORITIES HAD A LONG LIST OF REQUIREMENTS -- TO INCLUDE CLOTHING, ARMS AND MUNITIONS-- FOR THEIR PARAMILITARY FORCES (LATER DEFINED AS MEO AND KHA TRIBAL GROUPINGS IN THE MAIN). HE SAID THAT WHILE THE REQUIREMENTS HAD NOT BEEN DEFINITIZED, THEY WOULD PATENTLY EXCEED THE VIETNAMESE CAPABILITY TO SUPPLY. THIEU THEN ADVANCED A SIMPLE SOLUTION, IN TONGUE-IN-CHEEK MANNER: SINCE THE US HAD A PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR BOTH SVN AND LAOS, THE US COULD AUGMENT ITS GVN AID PROGRAM TO EXTENT NECESSARY TO MEET THESE SPECIAL LAOTIAN REQUIREMENTS. THIEU SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO THE LAOTIAN/VIETNAMESE PARTNERSHIP FOR THIS AID TO BE CHanneled THROUGH THE GVN.

5. STILWELL REQUESTED THAT MACV WOULD BE KEPT PERIODICALLY INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS ON LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID THE US CONSIDERED IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS NATURE BE CONCERTED WITH THE DULY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT OF LAOS. ON THE LARGER ISSUES RAISED BY THIEU, NO COMMENT WAS PROFFERED.

6. COMMENT: GENERAL THIEU TALKED FROM A PAPER WRITTEN IN FRENCH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 293, AUGUST 4, 5 PM., FROM SAIGON.

FRENCH, WHICH MIGHT WELL HAVE ORIGINATED IN VIENTIANE. SINCE THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL TRIPS TO VIENTIANE AND OTHER PARTS OF LAOS BY VIETNAMESE OFFICERS IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, IT IS QUITE PROBABLE THAT LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS OF THE SCALE DESCRIBED HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN CONCERTED. WHILE GENERAL THIEU'S PURPOSE MAY HAVE BEEN TO TEST FOR REACTION, HE DID NOT PROBE WITH QUESTIONS.

WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS VIENTIANE MAY HAVE.

TAYLOR.

MCA & DHP

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

36

~~SECRET~~

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RQLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
SWTE GRNC
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ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (295) INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 137 VIENTIANE
19 FROM SAIGON AUG 4 7 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CANADIAN ICC COMMISSIONER SEABORN INFORMED EMBASSY TODAY
ICC UNANIMOUSLY AGREED THIS MORNING TO INVESTIGATE DRV
CHARGES WHICH HANOI HU RECENTLY BROADCAST ACCUSING US AND
GVN OF ATTACKS AGAINST DRV TERRITORY. CANADIANS SUGGESTED ICC
FIXED TEAM VINH MAKE INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS RE TWO ISLANDS
REPORTEDLY SHELLED FROM SEA. POLISH COMMISSIONER, HOWEVER,
DEMURRED AND ASKED DELAY UNTIL HE COULD OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS.
WILL FOLLOW PROGRESS CLOSELY AND REPORT.

TAYLOR.

BT

CFN 295 137 19 4 7PM ICC ICC DV US GVN ICC

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 9:10 AM, 8/4/64.
PASSED USUN AT 9:20 AM, 8/4/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 9:35 AM, 8/4/64.

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Authority RAC 00014811
By ics, NARA, Date 10-29-97

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46-48

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Control:
Rec'd:

2273
AUGUST 4, 1964
2:18 PM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 299

INFO: CINCPAC 139

DATE: AUGUST 4, 8 PM

JOINT EMBASSY-MACV-USIS MESSAGE

FILE COPY

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ACCORDING PRESENT PLANS, MACV WILL INSTALL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS TERMINAL AT SAIGON LAST WEEK IN AUGUST, MAKING POSSIBLE DIRECT VOICE AND TELETYPE COMMUNICATIONS WITH HAWAII, POSSIBLY WITH CALIFORNIA. ESTIMATE SYSTEM WILL BECOME OPERATIONAL ABOUT SEPT 1, AND WILL REMAIN ACTIVE UNTIL REPLACED BY SUBMARINE CABLE IN JAN 1965. IN VIEW PUBLICITY VALUE INHERENT IN SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, SUGGEST THAT SYSTEM BE INAUGURATED BY CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIMIN KHANH AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON, WITH AMB TAYLOR AND GEN WESTMORELAND ALSO ON HAND HERE. BELIEVE THIS COULD HELP IN BUILDING UP KHANH'S STATURE DOMESTICALLY AND WOULD EMPHASIZE TO ALL INCREASING CLOSENESS OF PHYSICAL US-GVN TIES PARALLELING MUTUALITY OF NATIONAL INTERESTS. PROJECT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL FOR PLANNING PURPOSES BUT WILL BE DECLASSIFIED WHEN INSTALLED. NOT REPEAT NOT ABLE FORECAST AT THIS STAGE HOURS OF DAY DURING WHICH COMMUNICATION FEASIBLE, BUT IF DEPT APPROVES IN PRINCIPLE WE WILL SUBMIT DETAILED PROPOSAL. BELIEVE PRECEDENTS EXIST IN SIMILAR CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND NIGERIAN PRIMIN AND IKEDA OF JAPAN.

TAYLOR

PLH/22

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Authority NLS 82-219

By ics, NARS, Date 11-23-82

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of S*

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R 041217Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PPESL
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
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FILE COPY

2275
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 300 INFO USUN 29 PPNH 50
CINCPAC POLAD 140 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 4 - 8PM

USUN'S 31

FULLY AGREE WITH USUN'S RECOMMENDATION THAT USE SC FORUM TO
CONTRAST SVN AND US WILLINGNESS AND RKG UNWILLINGNESS TO
ACCEPT PROPOSALS MADE BY MISSION WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED BY
SC IN REPOSE TO COMPLAINT BROUGHT BY RKG ITSELF. FURTHERMORE,
WE MIGHT SEIZE OCCASION TO QUESTION PW POSE OF NUMEROUS
RECENT CHARGES OF VIOLATIONS CAMBODIA BY GVN FORCES FOR WHICH
RKG HAS OFFERED NO PROOF AND WHICH ON BASIS OUR INVESTIGATIONS
THUS FAR SEEM TO BE WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN FACT. GP-3.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 300 29 50 140 4 8 31 3

Note: Reftel sent Dept as USUN's 286.

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Authority NLJ 82-219

By ies, NARS, Date 11-23-82

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Authority STATE 3-14-75
By KR, NARS, Date 3-24-75

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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RUEPDA/DOD WASHDC
STATE GRNC
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041

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 301 CIA
20 DOD 23 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 5 - 9AM

LIMDIS

IN AUG 4 DISCUSSIONS PREPARATORY TO US MISSION COUNCIL - GVN
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIL MEETING NOW SCHEDULED FOR AUG 6,
COPCAO INFORMED SULLIVAN THAT GVN WAS IN PROCESS EXAMINING
MORE "RATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION" OF MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS. CAO
SAID THAT TRAN LE QUANG HAD ASSUMED "UNOFFICIAL" RESPONSIBILITIES
AS HEAD OF "BRAIN TRUST" WORKING BEHIND SCENES IN PRESIDENCY.
THIS REDISTRIBUTION WOULD BE GEARED TO GREATER EFFICIENCY IN
GVN OPERATION, RATHER THAN DIRECTED TOWARDS A NEW POLITICAL BALANCE.
CFN 301 20 23 5 9 4 6

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 01A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MISSION COMMENT: DESPITE APPARENTLY TECHNICAL NATURE TRAN LE
QUANG'S PROJECT, HIS IS ONE MORE STRAW IN WIND SUGGESTING THAT
KHANH IS SERIOUSLY PLANNING CHANGES IN GOVT. IN VIEW FACT THAT
TRAN LE QUANG IS KNOWN TO BE PERSONA NON GRATA TO DAI VIET,
THIS IS ALSO ANOTHER INDICATOR THAT PLANNING MAY BE MOVING
TOWARDS ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVT OF TECHNICIANS AND ELIMINATION
OF DAI VIET POLITICAL FIGURES.

TAYLOR
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 9:59 PM, 8/4/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 10:25 PM, 8/4/64.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

36

Origin

ACTION: SAIGON IMMEDIATE 346
INFO CINCPAC

Aug 5 5 52 AM '64

FE
Info

Ref: Saigon 306

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Since British Consul assigned Hanoi is returning
Hanoi tomorrow from Saigon, you should give him text
of protest to take back to Hanoi for possible delivery
Hanoi regime. Meanwhile we considering whether to
contact London with view to its having British
Consul seek deliver this protest to Hanoi authorities.

End.

RUSK

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Authority NLS 82-219
By is NARS, Date 11-23-82

Drafted by:

Marshall Green: cw:8/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

M. Green

Clearances:

S/S-O E. R. Williams

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02303

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

59

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 353

IMMEDIATE

Aug 5 9 21 PM '64

IO
Info:INFO: USUN NEW YORK 292
CINCPAC

PRIORITY

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Authority NLS 82-219

G

By us, NARS, Date 11-23-82

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SC Viet-Nam.

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OSD

1. SC decided August 5 to consult tomorrow on inviting representatives GVN and DRV take part in its consideration US complaint against North Vietnamese attacks on US naval vessels in international waters and our report on response thereto.

2. ~~and~~ If for some reason DRV declines appear before Council, we believe GVN should follow suit and leave debate to Council members only. If, however, DRV comes to NY, we consider it imperative that GVN also participate, since we wish avoid appearance that current situation is one of confrontation between US and Hanoi alone. Stevenson in speech today stated DRV attacks made no sense in isolation but were on other hand easily explainable as part of larger pattern of North Vietnamese aggression throughout Southeast Asian peninsula, and in particular against GVN. President Johnson in speech at Syracuse University August 5 said re North Viet-Nam:

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:PMByrne:rsw 8/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/VN - Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

IO - Harlan Cleveland (in draft)
UNP - Mr. Buffum

FE - William P. Bundy

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QUOTE To the South, it is engaged in aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam. To the West, it is engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos. To the East, it has now struck out on the high seas in an act of aggression against the United States of America. UNQUOTE. Thus, absence South Vietnamese if DRV present in Council would be detrimental to public image and our joint cause.

3. Request Saigon urge Foreign Office accept any SC invitation decided upon if Hanoi does so and thereupon accredit Duc immediately. Request also that Duc be instructed concert closely with USUN, which is ready assist in preparing GVN case. You should add we would expect DRV answer US charges by countercharging American-Vietnamese hostilities against the North and by broadening debate to accusations of general US aggression against people of both Viet-Nams. In reply, we would suggest GVN again recount ~~xxxxx~~ story of DRV terror, as it did in May during consideration Cambodian complaint, and stress these themes:

(a) US forces are in South Viet-Nam only in response GVN request for help to survive DRV onslaught.

(b) DRV has systematically and cynically violated Geneva Accords for entire ten years their existence with objective of taking over South.

(c) Geneva Agreements in essence ask only that neighbors leave each other alone; Communist adherence to this simple requirement would result

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in achievement GVN and US goal of peace in area.

4. GVN must also be prepared with rebuttal to inevitable DRV as accusations re July 30-31 attacks against offshore islands above 17th parallel.

5. In presenting foregoing to Foreign Office, request you discreetly get across idea we most willing aid Vietnamese in planning speech content, strategy, and tactics for SC action.

GP-3

END

RUSK

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Wild**16*

31

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CONTROL: 2725

Cy #3

RECEIVED: AUGUST 5, 4:01 AM

FROM: AMEMBASSY SAIGON

002

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC 305

DATE: AUGUST 5, 1 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS

DEPTEL 160

SEABORN INFORMED SULLIVAN THAT ICC HAS VOTED HOLD ITS NEXT MEETING HANOI AUGUST 10. HIS CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO GATHER, BUT NOT SOLICIT, COMMENTS FROM SENIOR DRV OFFICIALS RELATIVE TO DISCUSSIONS HELD DURING HIS PREVIOUS VISIT. HE HAS READ BOTH ICC RPT ICC NOTE OF MAY 20, 1962 AND JULY 10 CIA PUBLICATION. HE IS THOROUGHLY PUZZLED BY DRV MOTIVATION IN INITIATING ATTACKS ON US RPT US DESTROYERS ON HIGH SEAS AND WILL ATTEMPT SEEK SOME ENLIGHTMENT DURING COURSE HIS THREE DAY STAY.

CFN 160 10 20 1962 10

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Authority RAC 00014812
By uo, NARA, Date 10-29-97

TAYLOR

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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW
STATE GRNC
BT

002755

1964 AUG 5 AM 4 43

109

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DEPT 307, INFO CINCPAC 144, LONDON 21, NEW DELHI 8,
OTTAWA 5, WARSAW 6 FROM SAIGON, AUGUST 5, 4 P.M.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FONMIN QUAT TOLD JOHNSON AUGUST FOURTH THAT HE HAD BEEN
WORKING ON VARIOUS PLANS TO GET ICC RPT ICC TO BE MORE
ACTIVE ON NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATIONS IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE.
VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE HAD RECENTLY TRIED TO GET OBLIQUE
PHOTOGRAPHS OF CONTROL POSTS RUNNING APPROXIMATELY ALONG
CFN 307 144 21 5H 3:30PM

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 17A ~~SECRET~~
THE WESTERN HALF OF THE DEMARCATION LINE, IN ORDER TO SHOW
CHANGES AND THEREFORE PRESUMABLY VIOLATIONS. EFFORT
UNSUCCESSFUL DUE FOLIAGE AND FACT VIETNAMESE PILOTS CAREFUL
NOT RPT NOT OVERFLY LINE AS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GET
VERTICAL PHOTOGRAPHS.

AFTER STATING THIS, QUAT SAID MUCH MORE IMPORTANT DE-
VELOPMENT WAS RECENT EVOLUTION IN ATTITUDE OF ICC RPT ICC.
COMMISSIONER RAHMAN RPT RAHMAN HAD TOLD QUAT HE WAS WILLING
TO PRESS FOR MORE STUDY OF WESTERN PART OF DMZ RPT DMZ AND IF
NECESSARY WOULD BORROW HELICOPTERS FROM LAOS ICC TO DO JOB,
INCLUDING PHOTOGRAPHY. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSION OF USE
OF ICC MARKED GVN RPT GVN AIRCRAFT. INDIANS AND CANADIANS WERE
NOW RPT NOW WILLING TO FLY IN SOUTHERN HALF DMZ RPT DMZ AND

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014813

~~SECRET~~

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By is NARA, Date 10-29-57

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-2- 307, AUGUST 5, 4 P.M. FROM SAIGON.

PHOTOGRAPH. THIS NEW WILLINGNESS WOULD ENABLE GVN RPT GVN TO PROVE NVN RPT NVN HAS VIOLATED GENEVA ACCORDS WITH RESPECT DMZ RPT DMZ AND THUS JUSTIFY GVN RPT GVN TAKING COUNTER MEASURES AGAINST VIET CONG TARGETS IN DMZ RPT DMZ. RAHMAN HAD GONE SO FAR AS TO SAY ICC RPT ICC WOULD CLOSE ITS EYES TO ANY GUN ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT AGAINST SUCH TARGETS IN MDZ RPT DMZ. QUAT EMPHASIZED FORGOING VERY CONFIDENTIAL FOR

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 17A ~~SECRET~~

TIME BEING. CANADIAN COMMISSIONER SEABORN, IN CALL ON AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AUGUST FOURTH, CONFIRMED THAT RAHMAN SHOWED MUCH MORE VIGOROUS ATTITUDE THAN HIS PREDECESSOR AND THAT ACTION WAS IN PROCESS TO PUSH FOR INVESTIGATION IN SOUTHERN PORTION DMZ RPT DMZ, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN REACHES. ALSO STATED THAT RAHMAN, WHO HAS SERVED IN IRON CURTAIN ASSIGNMENTS, TAKES FAR MORE ACTIVE INTEREST THAN PREDECESSOR RE EVENTS IN DRV RPT DRV. HE TRAVELS BACK AND FORTH TO HANOI AT LAST TWICE A MONTH.

AUGUST THIRD, DEPUTY CHIEF OF POLISH ELEMENT STAWICKI RPT STAWICKI (SEE EMBASSY A-617, NOT RPT NOT SENT OTTAWA) OLD EMBOFF POLISH ELEMENT WAS CLOSING ITS EYES TO MANY ABUSES BY CANADIANS AND INDIANS, NOTABLY RPT NOTABLY TO THEIR PRACTICE OF BRINGING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DOWN FROM NORTH VIETNAM. POLE THEN SAID THAT AS REGARDS PROCEDURAL MATTERS WITHIN COMMISSION, POLES COULD NOT RPT NOT AFFORD TO BE SO TOLERANT, AND WOULD TAKE STRONG MEASURES TO RESIST CURRENT WILPNGNESS OF OTHER TWO MEMBER NATIONS "TO DO THE BIDDING OF THE GVN RPT GVN". HE MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS REFERRING MAINLY TO COMMISSION'S RECENT ACCEPTANCE OF GVN RPT GVN INVITATION TO INVESTIGATE

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 17A ~~SECRET~~

INCIDENT OF VC RPT VC TERRORISM IN SVN RPT SVN. STAWICKI RPT STAWICKI ADDED THAT COMMISSION WOULD MEET IN HANOI AUGUST TENTH, AND TOWARDS END OF AUGUST COMMISSIONER SPASOWSKI RPT SPASOWSKI PLANNED TO RETURN TO WARSAW FOR REASSIGNMENT. TAYLOR
BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

FILE COPY

18

48

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

Control:

2707

Rec'd:

AUGUST 5, 1964

FE

3:58 AM

Info

FROM: SAIGON

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 306 IMMEDIATE

SVN

G

INFO: CINCPAC 143 PRIORITY

SP

DATE: AUGUST 5, 3 PM

EUR

NEA

IO

AID

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

USIA

DEPTTEL 339

(NSC)

INR

NSA

RNR

CANADIAN ICC COMMISSIONER INFORMED US THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD CHECKED OUT ICC DELIVERY OF OUR PROTEST NOTE TO HANOI REGIME AND IS CONVINCED NOTHING ICC COULD DO WITHOUT ENDLESS AND PROBABLY INCONCLUSIVE DEBATE. IF DEPARTMENT DESIRES DELIVERY TO HANOI REGIME THROUGH BRITISH IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN OFFICE TO SO INSTRUCT BRITISH EMBASSY HERE.

(BRITISH CONSUL, WHO ONLY ACCREDITED TO MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES HANOI, CURRENTLY IN SAIGON AND EXPECTED RETURN HANOI TOMORROW). HOWEVER, APPEARS DELIVERY THIS TEXT OVERTAKEN BY LATER EVENTS AND PERHAPS WE COULD STAND ON OUR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

TAYLOR

HC

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:09 AM, AUGUST 5, 1964

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 8/5/64, 5:15 AM

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PRESERVATION COPY

I. T. Hanson

J. Ret. BMS

19
—

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CIA REVIEWED 07-Jun-2012: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

19a
Thomson
W H

51 REFER TO CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

002

Action

CONTROL: 3184

SS

DOS REVIEWED 05-Jun-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

Info

RECEIVED: AUGUST 5, 11: A.M. 1964

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE

312

INFO: BANGKOK 20

VIENTIANE 20

DATE: AUGUST 5, 6 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPT REPEAT INFO CINCPAC 148 DOD 26 CIA 23 FROM SAIGON

E X D I S

1. ON VISIT TO BANGKOK AND VIENTIANE THIS WEEKEND ALEX JOHNSON TENTATIVELY DEVELOPED POSSIBILITY OF SOME CONCEPTS RE OPERATIONS IN LAOS CORRIDOR THAT I THINK ARE WORTH FURTHER EXPLORATION.

2. FIRST FROM JOHNSON'S TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR MARTIN, JANTZEN AND THANAT IN BANGKOK, IT IS HIS IMPRESSION THAIS WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE FURTHER IN CAREFULLY MEASURED AND CONTROLLED ACTIONS IN LAOS. (IN ADDITION TO PARIS, RANGERS REPRESENT POSSIBLE THAI ASSET).

3. IN VIENTIANE SOUVANNA IS UNDERSTANABLY NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS IN CORRIDOR WHICH HE FEELS COULD NOT BE DECISIVE IN SVN AND, IN TOUCHING MOST SENSITIVE VIETMINH NERVE, WOULD JEOPARDIZE PRESENT DELICATE BALANCE IN LAOS BY POSSIBLY TRIGGERING PATHET LAO/VIETMINH REACTIONS BEYOND ABILITY FAR TO HANDLE. SOUVANNA REPEATED TO JOHNSON HIS VIEW THAT WAR IN SVN CANNOT BE WON UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, OPERATIONS IN CORRIDOR COULD AT BEST HAVE ONLY MARGINAL VALUE IN REDUCING INFILTRATION AND ONLY WAY OUT IS TO "STRIKE AT ORIGIN" IN NVN. (STRANGE TO NOTE "NEUTRALIST" SOUVANNA GENERAL KHANH NOW ON SAME TACK). HOWEVER, SOUVANNA'S ATTITUDE HOPEFULLY WOULD NOT PRECLUDE SOME LIMITED ADDITIONAL ACTION IN CORRIDOR,

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-002R-7-1-1
By *ch* NARA, Date 4-25-14

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 312, AUGUST 5, 6 PM, FROM: SAIGON

PARTICULARLY IF DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OF INTEREST TO SOUVANNA.

4. AS HARD NOSE IS ALREADY IN QUIET OPERATION PRESENTLY WITH INTELLIGENCE MISSION IN GENERAL AREA OF CORRIDOR AND IS OF ETHNIC LAOS COMPOSITION, THERE APPEAR TO BE POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR MEANINGFULLY ASSOCIATING THAIS WITH OPERATION AND THUS RELATING THEM WITH SVN PROBLEM IN POLITICALLY USEFUL WAY BOTH FROM STANDPOINT OF GVN AND OURSELVES. BECAUSE OF RACIAL AND LANGUAGE FACTORS THAIS SHOULD BE ABLE OPERATE BETTER IN THIS ENVIRONMENT THAN VIETNAMESE. THERE IS ALSO POSSIBILITY OF RELATING THAIS TO KHA OPERATIONS FURTHER SOUTH. IN VIEW OF HIS FAVORABLE EXPERIENCE THUS FAR WITH THAI AND HIS GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD GVN, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO GET FURTHER WITH SOUVANNA ON OPERATIONS INVOLVING ONLY HIS OWN PEOPLE AND THAI THAN WITH GVN CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD CEASE OUR PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS FOR GVN CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS BUT ONLY THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO ADD AS MANY ARROWS AS WE CAN TO OUR QUIVER. LAO T-28 OPERATION COULD ALSO BE PERTINENT.

5. TO DO SO WILL FIRST REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLORATION AMONG OURSELVES, THEN IF THIS OR POSSIBLE OTHER CONCEPTS SEEM TO WARRANT, LAYING GROUNDWORK WITH GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. (HERE I WOULD THINK IN SOME WAY RELATING TO OUR JOINT PLANNING WITH GVN). ANY CONCEPT WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF REALITIES OF SITUATION IN LAOS. IF TOO SUCCESSFUL THEY COULD WELL TRIGGER PL/VM REACTIONS THAT WOULD FACE US WITH GRAVE DECISIONS IN LAOS. ON THE OTHER SIDE WE GENUINELY NEED TO EXPLORE EVERY POSSIBLE AVENUE FOR DEALING WITH CORRIDOR PROBLEM AS WELL AS MEETING OUR POLITICAL SITUATION HERE.

6. WE DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE DIFFICULTIES.

25x1

WOULD APPRECIATE BNAGKOK'S COMMENTS AND DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS, AS WELL AS ANY COMMENTS VIENTIANE MAY HAVE ON FOREGOING ANALYSIS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 312, AUGUST 5, 6 PM, FROM: SAIGON

NOTE: FOREGOING WAS DRAFTED BEFORE EVENTS OF AUGUST 4 AND 5 AND MAY WELL BE OVERTAKEN BY THEM. IT IS NEVERTHELESS BEING TRANSMITTED IN EVENT SITUATION UNFOLDS IN SUCH MANNER THAT CONSIDERATION WOULD STILL BE PERTINENT.

CFN 148 26 23 1 2 3 4 T-28 5 6 18 4 5

TAYLOR

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 1:56 PM, 8/5/64.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USUN 4:35 PM, 8/5/64.

PASSED CINCPAC 11:00 AM, 8/5/64.

EUC438VV EUH481CEB486

Thomson 20

OO RUEPWW

DE RUABSG 19E 05/1205Z

RECEIVED
WHASA

ZNR

1964 AUG 5 16 05

O 051150Z

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUEPIA/CIA WASHDC

48149

RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC

RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

STATE GRNC

Bundy 9

BT

UNCLAS ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 316 INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 151

DOD 27 CIA 24 WHITE HOUSE 22 FROM SAIGON FIFTH

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

JOINT EMBASSY-USIS MESSAGE

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY GENERAL
KAHNH OVER RADIO W 1900 LOCAL AUGUST 5.

BEGIN TEXT MY DEAR FELLOW VIETNAMESE, DURING THE PAST YEARS
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, HENCHMEN OF THE RED CHINESE,
HAVE BEEN SECRETLY INFILTRATING TROOPS AND WEAPONS INTO FREE
VIETNAM. THEY HAVE BEN MURDERING INNOCENT PEOPLE, AND HAVE
CFN 316 151 27 24 22 1900 5

PAGE 2 RUABSG 19E UNCLAS

CREATED A WAR SITUATION IN WHICH VIETNAMESE ARE KILLING VIETNAMESE.

THEY ERRONEOUSLY THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO EASILY SWALLOW THIS FERTILE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY SO THAT THEY MAY ROB THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RICE AND WEALTH AND OFFER THESE TO THEIR MASTERS.

BUT THIS MACHIAVELIAN SCHEME HAS MET WITH THE DETERMINED OPPOSITION OF OUR ENTIRE PEOPLE, AND AT PRESENT THEY ARE IN AN IMPASSE FROM WHICH THEY HAVE TO FIND A WAY OUT.

THE INCREASE IN THEIR SABOTAGE AND TERRORISTIC ACTIVITIES AGAINST THEIR FELLOW VIETNAMESE IN THE SOUTH, AS WELL AS THE RECENT EVENTS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN, HAVE PROVED THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST TRAITORS IN THE NORTH, ON ORDERS FROM THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, HAVE OPENLY COMMITTED AGGRESSION, AND HAVE OPENED THE WAY FOR AN AGGRESSIVE WAR IN SOUTH EAST ASIA WITH FREE VIETNAM AS THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE.

THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNMENT HAVE THE DUTY TO INFORM THE ENTIRE POPULATION ON THESE EVENTS, AND ESPECIALLY ON THE URGENT NATURE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY.

AS CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT, I HEAVILY CALL ON YOU, MY FELLOW VIETNAMESE, TO KEEP CALM SO AS TO CLEARLY SEE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FACE OF EVENTS, BRUSH ASIDE PRIVATE

PAGE 3 RUABSG 19E UNCLAS

DIFFERENCES, WILLINGLY SUBMIT YOURSELVES TO THE NATIONAL DISCIPLINE, AND UNITE INTO A BLOC WITH ONE PURPOSE TO SUPPORT THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GOVERNMENT.

AT THIS TIME OF GRAVEST EMERGENCY, THE GOVERNMENT UNDER MY LEADERSHIP WILL SPEEDILY TAKE SUITABLE MEASURES TO EFFICIENTLY PROTECT YOUR LIVES AND PROPERTIES, AND LEAD THE ENTIRE PEOPLE TO FINAL VICTORY.

END TEST.

TAYLOR

BT

SD-620

PP RUEPWW

DE RUEHCR 3126 05/1548Z

RECEIVED
WHASA

P 051456Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

1964 AUG 5 15 54

TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

RUEPIA/CIA

PR 051234Z ZEA

48145

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUKDA/DOD

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~

Bundy

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 317 INFO DOD 28 CINCPAC 152

FROM SAIGON AUGUST 5 8PM

YOU WILL RECOGNIZE EXTREME PRESSURES ON US FROM SAIGON BASED
PRESS FOR INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND PRESENT DEVELOPMENTKPM WE HAVE
BEEN HOLDING FIRMLY TO POSITION THAT ANNOUNCEMENT AND DETAILS ON
7TH FLEET ACTIONS MUST COME FROM CINCPAC AND WASHINGTON AND THAT
WE ARE CONCERNED ONLY WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR AREA OF JURISDICTION
BUT PRESS REPRESENTATIVES MAKE POINT THAT THEIR EDITORS TAKE
POSITION STORY IS IN VN AREA AND EXPECT COPY FROM THIS POINT.
WHILE WE WOULD NOT PROPOSE TO VIOLATE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
CFN 317 28 152 5 8PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-219

By ind, NARS, Date 11-23-82

PROX FROM OFFICE COPY

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 23A ~~SECRET~~

OR DEPART FROM LOGIC OF HAVING NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON 7TH FLEET INITIATED FROM HONOLULU MERELY TO SATISFY CORRESPONDENTS DESIRE TO GET SAIGON DATELINE, THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE PRESS COVERAGE RESULTING FROM FRUSTRATIONS OF SAIGON BASED PRESS WHICH IN TURN COULD CLOUD IMPACT OF OUR FIRM ACTIONS ON BOTH AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE PUBLIC OPINION. IN ORDER TO COUNTER THIS POSSIBILITY AND ALSO TO PROVIDE AS KNOWLEDGEABLE COVERAGE AS POSSIBLE, I PROPOSE AS SOON AS FACT OF AIR STRIKE IN NORTH VIETNAM CONFIRMED AND PICTURE CLEARER, TO UNDERTAKE BACKGROUND BRIEFING ATTRIBUTABLE TO "AMERICAN OFFICIALS" ON NATURE OF OUR PRECAUTIONARY STEPS WITHIN SVN AREA. WOULD ALSO TOUCH ON BROADER MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF SITUATION IN GENERAL, INCLUDING SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN WEIGHING ACTIONS AGAINST NVN. IN ADDITION, IF

THERE ARE PROSPECTS FOR NEWSMEN TO BOARD ANY OF THE 7TH FLEET CARRIERS WHILE IN THIS AREA, I WOULD URGE THAT PRIORITY BE GIVEN SAIGON BASED CORRESPONDENTS, FOR BOTH PRACTICAL REASONS OF LIMITED DISTANCE INVOLVED AND AS MEANS OF OFFSETTING SOME OF THEIR LACK OF INFORMATION. IF THIS POSSIBILITY MATERIALIZES, WE COULD WORK OUT DETAILS WITH CINCPAC TO PERMIT PICK-UP IN DANANG. WHILE NEWSMEN ARE WITHIN 7TH FLEET JURISDICTION, NATURE AND CONTENT OF INFORMATION PROVIDED THEM WOULD, OF COURSE, BE 7TH FLEET RESPONSIBILITY.

~~SECRET~~

GP-3. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 7TH WKUTH 7TH GP-3

UNFOY: BROW: CHICK: COLA

02379

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34-31

Origin

ACTION:

Amembassy, SAIGON

Immediate

354

FE

Info:

Amembassy, LONDON

Immediate

889

INFO CINCPAC

Ref: Saigon's 323 Info London 23

Nov 6 9 56 AM '64

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USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

In view of ICC refusal to handle delivery of our protest note to Hanoi and in view of British reluctance (reftel as well as Ericson-Montgomery telcon), we consider it best at this late stage simply to leave the note with ICC. Although ICC will presumably refuse to take further action, our protest note has been broadcast by VOA and published in press. Meanwhile events of August 4 and 5 completely overshadow this question of delivery. END

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NLS 82-219

By ies, NARS, Date 11-23-82

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE:MGreen:mlc 8/6/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

~~EDMONTON~~

The Secretary

Clearances:

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal
FE:RA - Mr. Mendenhall

S/S - Mr. Davies

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

23

Viet Nam

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

00 RUDTLN RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 04A 06/0800Z

FE

OR 060746Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

IMMEDIATE

Info

TO RUHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

003980

SS

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

1964 AUG 6 AM 4 38

SVN

STATE GRNC

G

BT

SP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (323) INFO LONDON 23
CINCPAC 154 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 6 4PM

L

H

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EUR

DEPTEL 346

NEA

IO

AID

P

USIA

NSC

INR

NSA

RMR

AS INDICATED EMBTEL 306 BRITISH CHARGE TOOK POSITION THAT HE
WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN OFFICE BEFORE HE
COULD AGREE SERVE AS CHANNEL FOR DELIVERY US PROTEST TO HANOI
REGIME. ON BASIS OUR INFORMAL APPROACH HE REQUESTED SUCH
INSTRUCTIONS AND WAS INFORMED THIS MORNING THAT FOREIGN OFFICE
DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT BRITISH CONSUL HANOI WOULD
CFN 323 13 154 6 4PM 346 306

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 04A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BE THE "APPROPRIATE CHANNEL" FOR DELIVERY OUR PROTEST.
IN MEANTIME, COPIES OF PROTEST HAD BEEN GIVEN TO BRITISH CONSUL
TO TAKE BACK TO HANOI WITH UNDERSTANDING HE WOULD AWAIT FURTHER
INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING POSSIBLE DELIVERY.

ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS POSSIBILITY USING FRENCH CHANNELS TO
GET MESSAGE DELIVERED HANOI. DEPARTMENT WILL APPRECIATE
HOWEVER THAT NONE RPT NONE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF POTENTIAL
COURIERS IN SAIGON WILL BE ABLE CARRY OUT DELIVERY ON OWN AUTHORITY
SUCH AUTHORITY WILL INEVITABLY HAVE TO COME FROM CAPITALS.

AS WE SEE IT, DEPARTMENT CAN (A) ASK LONDON REVISE ITS CURRENT
INSTRUCTIONS (B) APPROACH FRENCH IN PARIS (C) APPROACH INDIANS
IN DELHI, OR (D) EVEN APPROACH SOVIETS. SINCE COPY OF NOTE ALREADY
WITH BRITISH, WE WOULD SUGGEST (A) AS MOST FEASIBLE.

TAYLOR

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:41 AM, 8/6/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 4:55 AM, 8/6/64.

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Authority NLS 82-219

By is, NARS, Date 11-23-82

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46
Action

SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

24
032

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 18A 06/0855Z
P 060839Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEKDA/DOD
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

004016
1964 AUG 6 AM 5 23

P R I O R I T Y

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 324 INFO PRIORITY DOD 30
BANGKOK 21 CINCPAC 155 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 6 5PM

L I M D I S

I CONCUR IN PROPOSED CHANGE IN MACV/MACTHAI RELATIONSHIPS
SET FORTH IN BANGKOK'S 120. GENERAL WESTMORELAND WILL COMMENT
SEPARATELY.

GP-3. TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 6:12 a.m., August 6.

Passed White House, CIA, at 6:18 a.m., August 6.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

STATE 3.14.75

By

KR

NARS, Date

3.24.75

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

25

W/D

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 4255
Rec'd: August 6, 1964
8:58 a.m.

FROM: Saigon

ACTION: Secstate 326 PRIORITY

DATE: August 6, 7 p.m.

Thomson

003

Cy#2 dest

EXDIS

Seaborn called on Sullivan August 6 afternoon to compare views recent events DRV. He is personally delighted (perhaps more so than Ottawa) by US air strikes against targets in DRV.

He has received no reports from his ICC representative in Hanoi since air strikes. Indian Signal Service, which handles ICC communications, informs Seaborn that all its traffic since evening August 5 has been heavily jammed.

Canadian element fixed team at Vinh has sent brief cryptic message August 6 reporting that air attack had taken place. No details.

Seaborn has sent 2 senior Canadian representatives on August 6 ICC flight to Hanoi via Vientiane. He has some doubts ICC plane will be permitted land Hanoi at this time.

Seaborn himself still plans travel Hanoi August 10 if ICC is permitted hold its scheduled meeting there. He has, however, sent message to Ottawa pointing out that his trip will take him out of communication for 5 days. He hopes not receive orders to remain Saigon and Sullivan encouraged him to carry out his projected Hanoi trip as planned.

Trip itself as well as US air action DRV were discussed in ICC meeting August 6. All 3 commissions agreed trip should proceed. US air action was discussed obliquely and indecisively. Commission agreed to text of cable to DRV agreeing investigate DRV complaints

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014815
By no, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

re off-shore
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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 326, August 6, 7 p.m. from Saigon

re off-shore bombardment which allegedly occurred July 30-31.

Seaborn reports he has received no additional instructions from Ottawa since recent Tonkin Gulf and US air strikes. If Washington has any suggestions for Seaborn's next Hanoi visit, they should be conveyed Canadians soonest.

GP-1.

TAYLOR

JGG/6

Passed White House 8/6/64, noon

Passed DOD 8/6/64, noon

Passed CIA 8/6/64, noon

Advance delivery to S/S-O 8/6/64, 11:00 a.m.

END

DATE: 8/6/64

ACNO: 326/64

MO: 11/10/64

8:28 a.m.
11/10/64
11/10/64

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELETYPE

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

26

36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

IO

Info

SS

SVN

G

SP

EUR

FE

NSC

INR

RMR

O 061230Z
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

004240

1964 AUG 6 AM 8 54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 327 INFO USUN
IMMEDIATE 32 INFO CINCPAC 156 FROM SAIGON AUG 6, 8 PM

DEPTTEL 353 SC - VIET-NAM.

JOHNSON SAW FONMIN QUAT THIS AFTERNOON WHO, AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, AGREED TO DEPT'S PROPOSAL.

QUAT FIRST TOOK POSITION THAT WHILE THEY SHOULD ATTEND IF DRV ATTENDED, THEY SHOULD LOBBY IN NEW YORK AGAINST DRV ATTENDANCE BECAUSE OF FEAR THAT IF BOTH DRV AND GVN ATTENDED, FRENCH AND SOVIETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO MANEUVER SC PROCEEDINGS TOWARD GENEVA TYPE CONFERENCE. JOHNSON POINTED OUT THAT CONTEXT OF SC CFN 327 32 156 6 8 353

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 34A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONSIDERATION BEING OUR COMPLAINT AGAINST DRV, WE COULD NOT SUCCESSFULLY OPPOSE DRV ATTENDANCE AND THERE SHOULD NOT BE TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY IN BLOCKING ANY SOVIET-FRENCH MOVES TOWARD GENEVA TYPE CONFERENCE. POINTED OUT ADVANTAGES TO GVN OF OUR BEING ABLE USE SC FORUM FOR FOCUSING WORLD ATTENTION ON DRV AGGRESSIONS. ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE MUCH PULLING AND HAULING BETWEEN HANOI, MOSCOW AND PEIPING AS TO WHETHER DRV WOULD ACTUALLY ATTEND AND THIS TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O AT 9:07 AM AUGUST 6TH
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 9:30 AM AUGUST 6TH

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Authority NLS 82-219

By is, NARS, Date 11-23-82

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Thomson

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1964 AUG 6 12 57

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OO RUEPWW

DE RUEHCR 4222 06/1255Z

O 061246Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

48356

TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

RUEPCR/DOD

RUEPIA/CIA

O 061215Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHK

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPA

STATE GRNC

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 90-142
By inf NARA, Date 10-30-90

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~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 328 INFO CINCPAC 159

FROM SAIGON AUG 6, 8 PM

UNBOY. ESON. ONICA. COLA

L I M D I S

IN DISCUSSING DEPTTEL 353 WITH FONMIN QUAT (EMBTTEL 327),
JOHNSON DID NOT RAISE WITHQUAT NUMBERED PARA 4 OF REFTTEL
AS QUAT IS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ALL ASPECTS THIS MATTE. WE
HAVE ALSO BEEN CONFIDENTIALLY INFORMED BY SEABORN, ICC HAS
AGRED TO UNDERTAKE INVESTIGATION, BUT THIS NOT YET
COMMUNICATED TO GVN. IF MATTER SHOULD BE RAISED IN SC DEBATE,
WOULD HOPE THAT BY THAT TIME FACT OF ICC INVESTIGATION WILL HAVE
CFN 328 159 6 8 353 327 *C

0-83 529 471R 35A ~~SECRET~~

BECOME KNOWN AND WOULD THUS BE POSSIBLE TO HANDLE BY REFERRING
TO THIS FACT AND TAKE POSITION THAT SC SHOULD NOT SEEK
DUPLICATE WORK ICC.

TAYLOR

BT

~~SECRET~~ ~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

NNNN

EXPOY. ESOM. ONIC. COB. X

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

28

33

Action

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

STATE 3-14-75

Authority

By KR

NARS, Date 3-24-75

1964 AUG 6 AM 11 39

004404

RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 37A 06/100Z
R 061244Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO JUHCR/SCSTA WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT. (330) INFO CINCPAC 158
FROM SAIGON AUG 6, 8 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

AT MEETING TODAY ON ANOTHER SUBJECT FONMIN QUAT, WHO HAD JUST COME FROM CABINET MEETING, SAID THAT AT REQUEST OF SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES HE WANTED TO RAISE WITH JOHNSON QUESTION AS TO WHAT WE SAW "COMING NEXT" WITH RESPECT NVN. JOHNSON REPLIED THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM WE WERE NOW IN EXCELLENT POSITION BOTH PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY RE DRV AND NEXT MOVE, IF ANY, WAS UP TO THEM. HANOI AND PEKING RADIOS WERE THUS FAR PLAYING CFN 330 158 6 8

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 7A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VERY CAUTIOUSLY AND THEY OBVIOUSLY FACED WITH SERIOUS DILEMMA WHICH WE SHOULD NOT ASSIST THEM IN RESOLVING. THEY HAVE TAKEN HEAVY BLOW PRESTIGE UNDER SITUATION BROUGHT ABOUT DIRECTLY BY THEM AND U DIRECT RESULT THEIR ACTIONS WE HAD BEEN ABLE SUBSTANTIALLY REINFORCE OUR MILITARY POSITION THROUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA. IF THEY TOOK NO ACTION, NOT ONLY DRV BUT VC WOULD HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW, AND IN FACE OUR MILITARY STRENGTH IN AREA DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT ACTION THEY COULD TAKE.

QUAT EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT. SAID THAT PEOPLE OF SVN HAD RECEIVED GREAT LIFT. HE HOPED THIS WOULD ALSO BE EXPLOITED BY PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR AGAINST NVN. JOHNSON ASSURED HIM THIS WAS BEING DONE.

HE SAID HE HAD EXPRESSED TO KHANH THIS AFTERNOON FEAR THAT VC MIGHT TRY TO OFFSET BY SOME SPECTACULAR ACTION IN SAIGON OR IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS. JOHNSON SAID HE AGREE. FELT SATISFIED MACV AND ARVN WERE ALERT TO THIS POSSIBILITY/?
TAYLOR
BT

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29

34

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Control:

4336

Rec'd:

August 6, 1964

SVN

10:44 a.m.

Info

FROM: Saigon

SS

ACTION: Secstate 331, Priority

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INFO: CINCPAC 160,

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DATE: August 6, 9 p.m.

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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Certain amount of student activity has occurred today (August 6):

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1. Over 100 students (ages 5-11) this morning began marching from Chu Van An School in Cholon reportedly to join other student groups at Student Union Center in Saigon. Police turned them back with persuasion, but arrested two ringleaders; one law faculty student and another senior Chu Van An student.

2. Later in morning group of about 100 students gathered at Student Union to protest earlier arrests. Group reportedly led by students who related to one of those arrested. Police were out in force, barricaded area (which is near former French war memorial recently desecrated by students); also heavily barricaded area around French Embassy. Student group, rapidly dwindling to about 50, then engaged in sit-down in middle of street and circulated anti-French leaflets (one of which called for break in relations) and called for other students to join them. This hard core reportedly prepared engage in five day hunger strike but by late afternoon group had dwindled to handful (afternoon rain may have helped). Police sources claim reason group has been unable drum up much support is split among student leaders regarding desirability to demonstrate against arrests.

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-2-331, August 6, 9 p.m., from Saigon

Police now have report that students may be planning further activity tonight. According police, students' enthusiasm attributable to US attack on DRV facilities August 5. Students allegedly desire express their dissatisfaction with slow GVN moves against French and its indecision regarding "march north."

TAYLOR

MCA

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O August 6 at 10:57 a.m.
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 1:10 p.m.

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☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57

Origin
IO

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 376

Info

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INFO: Amembassy PHNOM PENH 83
USUN NEW YORK 322

REF: Saigon's 313

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-219

By is, NARS, Date 11-23-82

Aug 7 7 48 PM '64

DEPT recognizes investigation by US and GVN agencies Saigon of each RKG charge of border violation or overflight is time consuming exercise. We believe it very much in US interests in UN, however, to be able reply quickly and emphatically to RKG charges re American personnel, as we have done in case mentioned EMBTEL 313.

Mission

Suggest ~~Embassy~~ for time being continue check out promptly all charges RKG might submit formally to SC President concerning border crossings involving US personnel on ground. We trust this procedure will enable DEPT respond adequately to SC Pres regarding such charges.

RKG has now sent another letter alleging US participation in attack on Cambodian territory (USUN 317 info Saigon 39), which DEPT wishes rebut insofar feasible. However, should RKG unduly increase number its letters this subject, we would consider desirability other approaches to problem of investigating each charge. END

GP-3

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:JWKimball:eu 8/7/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/VN - Mr. Corcoran

Clearances:

UNP - Mr. Buffum (draft)

SEA - Mr. Trueheart

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☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

51

Origin
SS

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 379 IMMEDIATE

Info:

04045

✓ Bundy
~~Fl...~~

Aug 7 10 30 PM '64

Cy #6 dist

007

EXDIS

Embtel 332

1. All here agree we should hold off further OP 34A operations and review situation early next week. Meanwhile we will be reviewing whole gamut operations against NVN with particular view to those most justifiable in terms of activity against South Viet-Nam. Would welcome any recommendations you have under this rough guideline.

2. Assume you know photography 6 August revealed six MIG 15/17 at Phuc Yen Airfield. MACV should consider whether this affects risk factor any planned air ops.

GP-1

RISK

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-218

By ics, NARS, Date 10-14-82

Drafted by:

FE:WFBundy:sub:ej 8/7/64

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

The Secretary (subs)

S/S - Mr. Moose

White House - Mr. Bundy (subs)

DOD - Secretary McNamara (subs)

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal

3/8

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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DE RUMJIR 03A 07/0400Z
OP 070340Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEKDA/DOD
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPIA/CIA
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RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
STATE GRNC
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1964 AUG 7 AM 12 54

I M M E D I A T E

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Authority STATE 3-14-75

By KR, NARS, Date 3-24-75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 333 INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 161 DOD 33
WHITE HOUSE 25 CIA 27 INFO PRIORITY PARIS 28 LONDON 24
BANGKOK 22 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 7, 1130AM
AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN EMBTELS 286, 213, 184, GENERAL
KHANH HAS BEEN GIVING THOUGHT FOR SOME TIME TO THE DECLARATION
OF A CONDITION OF WAR OR OF EMERGENCY. HE FEELS THAT SOME
SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO ENERGIZE THE COUNTRY AND SNAP
THE PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY IN SAIGON, OF THEIR APATHY
TOWARD THE WAR. HE ALSO FEELS THE NEED FOR BETTER LEGAL MEANS
CFN 333 161 33 25 27 28 24 22 7 1130 286 213 184 KHANH

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 03A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO COPE WITH TERRORISM, SABOTAGE AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA.
YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, AUGUST SIXTH, HE TELEPHONED ME THAT HE
INTENDED TO PROCLAIM A CONDITION OF EMERGENCY(URGENCE) TODAY.
I ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE US AT ONCE WITH A TEXT OF THE PROPOSED
DECLARATION SO THAT WE COULD UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
AN ACTION WHICH, IN THE PAST, HAD OFTEN BEEN MENTIONED BUT
NEVER DEFINED. AN EMBOFF PICKED UP A COPY OF THE VIETNAMESE
TEXT AND FURNISHED ALEX JOHNSON AND ME A TRANSLATION LATER
IN THE EVENING.

THE DOCUMENT TURNED OUT TO BE TWO DECREES. ONE A SHORT DEC-
LARATION OF EMERGENCY BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MRC RPT MRC
AND THE SECOND, A DECREE OF THE PRIME MINISTER LISTING MEASURES
TO BE CARRIED OUT TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE DECLARATION OF
EMERGENCY. IT REQUIRED ONLY A GLANCE AT THEIR DRACONIAN
CHARACTER(CANCELLATION OF ALL ELECTIONS, CONTROL OF MOVEMENT
OF FOREIGNERS, SUMMARY ARREST AND EXECUTION OF TERRORISTS,

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-2-333, AUGUST 7, 11:30 AM, FROM SAIGON.

ETC.) TO IMPRESS US WITH NEED FOR SOME ATTENUATION OF LANGUAGE AND CONSIDERABLE PREPARATION OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PUBLIC FOR SUCH DECREES. I TELEPHONED KHANH, COMMUNICATED SOME OF MY CONCERN. AND GOT AGREEMENT TO HOLD EVERYTHING UNTIL JOHNSON AND I COULD SEE HIM THIS MORNING.

WE CALLED ON HIM AT HIS OFFICE AT 0830 THIS MORNING AND FOUND THAT HE HAD WORKED HARD OVERNIGHT TO MEET THE CRITICISMS WHICH I HAD INTIMATED BY TELEPHONE THE PREVIOUS EVENING. THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DECREE WHICH CONTAINED THE TOUGH LANGUAGE HAD BEEN MODERATED CONSIDERABLY. GONE WERE THE REFERENCES TO CANCELLATION OF ELECTIONS AND CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF FOREIGNERS. OTHER PARAGRAPHS WERE CONSIDERABLY MODIFIED IN LANGUAGE.

KHANH WENT OVER EACH PARAGRAPH GIVING US A FRENCH TRANSLATION OF THE VIETNAMESE TEXT. IN EFFECT HE IS TRANSFERRING TO TRIAL BY MILITARY COURT MANY OFFENSES NOW RPT NOW UNDER CIVIL JURISDICTION. THE FULL EFFECT OF THE DECREE WILL NOT RPT NOT BE CLEAR UNTIL A MASS OF SUPPORTING REGULATIONS ARE PUBLISHED. NONETHELESS, KHANH HOPES TO PUT THE DECREE IN EFFECT AT ONCE.

WE POINTED OUT THE GREAT SENSITIVITY OF THE PARAGRAPH ANNOUNCING CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, HE APPARENTLY AGREED TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD MAKE THE PROVISION INOPERATIVE UNTIL THE PUBLICATION OF SUPPORTING REGULATIONS.

THE NEW TEXT OF THE DECREE IS STILL TOUGH BUT, AS WE UNDERSTAND THE LANGUAGE, IS TOLERABLE IF ACCOMPANIED BY AN AMPLE EXPLANATION OF THE PURPOSE AND INTENTION OF THE GVN RPT GVN. KHANH INTENDS TO PUBLISH THE DECREE OF THE CHAIRMAN MRC RPT MRC THIS MORNING AND THAT OF THE PM RPT PM LATER IN THE AFTERNOON. HE WILL MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT EXPLAINING HIS ACTION PRIOR TO THE RELEASE OF THE PM RPT PM DECREE. HE HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE HELP OF ZORTHIAN RPT ZORTHIAN IN PREPARATION OF THE PUBLIC STATEMENT.

WE BROUGHT BACK A COPY OF THE REVISED DECREES IN VIETNAMESE WHICH WE WILL CABLE SEPARATELY AS SOON AS TRANSLATED. MEANWHILE, WORK ON THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS IS PROCEEDING IN CONSULTATION WITH BRITISH ADVISORY MISSION (DRAWING ON MALAYAN EXPERIENCE), PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTOR USOM RPT USOM AND APPROPRIATE OFFICERS OF EMBASSY AND MACV RPT MACV. BY THIS MEANS WE HOPE TO BRING FURTHER INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON END PRODUCT.

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:02 AM, 8/7/64.

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Viet Nam

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Action PP RUDTLN RUEHCR RUEHDT RUEHOT RUSBAE
DE RUMJIR 10A 07/0900Z

SVN P R 070859Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

5296

1964 AUG 7 AM 7 13

Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

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Authority RAC 00014816

By jis NARA, Date 10-29-97

SS RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY SSWDELHI

G RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

SP RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK

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ACTION PRITY DEPT (334) INFO LONDON 25 MOSCOW 6 NEWDELHI 10
OTTAWA 7 WARSAW 8 USUN 32 FROM SAIGON AUG 7, 5:05 PM

CANADIAN ICC COMMISSIONER SEABORN AND POLAD HATHEWAY HAVE
INFORMD EMBASSY OF FOLLOWING:

CABLE BEING SENT PAVN LIAISON MISSION HANOI WITH UNANIMOUS
AGREEMENT ICC MEMBERS ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: ICC TAKES
NOTE REPORTS SERIOUS EVENTS INCLUDING ARMED ATTACK IN BAY OF
TONKIN AND TERRITORY OF DRV.

CFN 334 25 6 10 7 8 32 8 6

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 10 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN EXPRESSING ITS CONCERN AT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND IN ORDER
TO CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENING OF TENSION, ICC WISHES COMMUNICATE
ITS IMMEDIATE READINESS TO GIVE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE WITHIN
ITS POWER, AND IN LIGHT OF ANY INFO WHICH PAVN LIAISON MISSION
MAY WISH TO FURNISH.

CANADIANS ALSO CLARIFIED TO EMBOFF STATUS POSSIBLE ICC INVESTIGATION
PAVN ALLEGATIONS THAT TWO ISLANDS OFF COASTINGHE AN PROVINCE
WERE SHELLED BY US/GVN SHIPS JULY 30. (EMBTCL 295) ON AUGUST
4 MESSAGE SENT WITH UNANIMOUS CONSENT OF COMMISSION TO PAVN
MISSION HANOI REFERRING TO THESE PAVN CHARGES AND PROPOSING
IMMEDIATE ON-THE-SPOT INVESTIGATION BY ICC TEAM. ACCEPTANCE
INVESTIGATION NOW UP TO PAVN WHICH CAN REQUEST IT FROM FIXED
TEAM WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO COMMISSION. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 336295

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 7:52 AM, 8/7/64/

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 8:50 AM, 8/7/64.

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Action 00 RUDLTN RUEHCR RUFGWP
SVN DE RUMJIR 21A 07/0820Z
O P 070805Z ZEA
Info FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
SS INFO RUEKDA/DOD
G RUEPWW/WHITEHOUSE
SP RUEPIA/CIA
L RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
H RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
EUR RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
FE RUMTKB/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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1964 AUG 7 AM 6 20

I M M E D I A T E

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Authority NLS 82-219

By ics, NARS, Date 11-23-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 336 INFO DOD IMMEDIATE 34 WHITEHOUSE
IMMEDIATE 26 CIA IMMEDIATE 28 CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 162 PARIS
PRITY 29 LONDON 27 BANGKOK 23 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 7, 4:20 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EMBTel 333

FOLLOWING ARE INFORMAL TRANSLATIONS OF TEXTS OF DRAFT DECREES
DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY HANDED TO ME THIS MORNING BY
KHANH. FURTHER REVISION OF LANGUAGE OF "DECREE OF PRIME MINISTER"
LIKELY BEFORE PUBLICATION THIS AFTERNOON AND OFFICIAL ENGLISH
TRANSLATIONS MAY WELL VARY.

CFN 336 34 26 28 162 29 27 23 333

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 21A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR CONVENIENCE KHANH'S COMMENTS AT OUR MEETING THIS MORNING
CONCERNING CERTAIN ARTICLES HAVE BEEN INSERTED IN
PARENTHESES FOLLOWING THE ARTICLE:

BEGIN TEXT. DECREE OF CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEE.

BASED ON TEMPORARY DECREES #1 OF NOVEMBER 11, 1963 AND #2
OF FEBRUARY 7, 1964.

BASED ON THE DECISION OF JANUARY 30, 1964 OF THE MRC
DESIGNATING MAJOR GEN NGUYEN KHANH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE MRC.

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-2- 336, August 7, 4 p.m., from Saigon

BECAUSE OF THE PRESENT INTERNAL EMERGENCY AND IN ORDER TO PROTEST ALL THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AGAINST THE MENACE OF OVERT INVASION BY THE IMPERIALIST COMMUNISTS

IT IS DECREED:

1. THE PRESENT DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY THROUGHOUT ALL OF VIETNAM WILL BE VALID FROM THE TIME IT IS PROMULGATED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A NEW DECREE IS ISSUED.

2. IF IT IS CONSIDERED THAT ANY EXISTING LAW OR REGULATION SHOULD CEASE TO BE CARRIED OUT IT SHALL BE ORDERED THAT THE REGULATION BE TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED.

CFN 1 11 1963 2 7 1964 30 19641 2

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 21A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. THE PRIME MINISTER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING OUT MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE NATION.

THIS DECREE WILL BE PROMULGATED BY URGENT PROCEDURES

DECREE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

ARTICLE 1 - IN THE PRESENT STATE OF EMERGENCY, THE FOLLOWING MEASURES WILL BE APPLIED FROM THE DATE OF PROCLAMATION OF THIS DECREE:

CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOODSTUFFS;

SEARCH ANY PRIVATE RESIDENCES DAY OR NIGHT; (KHANH SAYS PUBLIC SECURITY AUTHORITIES WILL BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN SEARCH WARRANTS AS IS NOT THE CASE).

ARREST OF FIX THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF ELEMENTS JUDGED TO BE DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY: (KHANH SAYS THIS WILL PERMIT MOVING VC SYMPATHIZERS OR UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS FROM VICINITY OF KEY INSTALLATIONS REQUIRING MAXIMUM SECURITY.)

PROHIBIT ALL STRIKES; (KHANH SAYS HE DOES NOT INTEND PROHIBIT ALL STRIKES BUT MOSTLY THOSE LIKELY AFFECT MOVEMENT OF CRITICAL COMMUNITIES).

PROHIBIT ALL DEMONSTRATIONS OR MEETINGS HARMFUL TO PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 336, August 7, 4 p.m., from Saigon

CENSOR NEWS, THE PRESS, BROADCASTING, FILMS, THEATER, AND PUBLISHING; (KHANH SAYS THIS APPLIES ONLY TO VIETNAMESE PRESS, NOT TO FOREIGN PRESS, AND WHAT IS BROUGHT IN AND PRINTED LOCALLY. THIS PROVISION WILL NOT BECOME OPERATIVE UNTIL PUBLICATION OF SUPPORTING REGULATION.)

PROHIBIT CONCEALMENT AND CARRYING OF PRINTED MATERIAL AND BROCHURES JUDGED TO BE HARMFUL TO PUBLIC SECURITY;

CONTROL AND RESTRICT COMMUNICATIONS AND TRAVEL ACCORDING TO SECURITY NEEDS;

ANNOUNCE A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION.

ARTICLE 2 - ALL SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION WILL BE MOBILIZED AND NATIONAL RESOURCES REQUISITIONED ACCORDING TO THE NEEDS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. (KHANH NOTES THAT THIS ARTICLE PROVIDES BASIS FOR FILLING UP RANKS OF REGULAR MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES AND FOR RESOURCES CONTROL).

ARTICLE 3 - ALL VIOLATORS OF PUBLIC ORDER AND NATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS FALL UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL TO BE JUDGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCTY PROCEDURES. (THIS WOULD TRANSFER TO MILITARY COURTS MANY OFFENSES NOW TRIED BY CIVIL COURTS).

ARTICLE 4 - PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO TERRORIST AND SABOTEURS AND SPECULATORS DAMAGING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY CAUGHT IN THE ACT, THE CULPRITS WILL BE CONDEMNED TO DEATH. EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED.

THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL MUST DECIDE SUCH CASES WITHIN A MINIMUM PERIOD WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF PRIOR INSTRUCTION. (E.G. THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE CONDUCTED BY A JUGE D'INSTRUCTION UNDER FRENCH LAW.)

THE OFFENDER DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF APPEAL TO A HIGHER COURT NOR MAY HE REQUEST CLEMENCY. (KHANH POINTS OUT THIS WILL PERMIT GVN DISPENSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST CULPRITS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANT DELICTO AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHERS. IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD NOT APPLY TO POW'S OR TO VC CAPTURED AS RESULT ARMED ENGAGEMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 336, August 7, 4 p.m., from Saigon

WITH GVN ARMED FORCES, NOR WOULD IT BE APPLIED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO UNDERCUT THE CPEU HOI PROGRAM)

ARTICLE 5 - THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, SECRETARIES OF STATE, MINISTER, DEPARTMENT HEADS, MAYORS, (ETC), WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES, WILL CARRY OUT THIS DECREE.

THIS DECREE WILL BE PROMULGATED URGENTLY. END TEXT. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 4 5

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:34 AM, 8/7/64.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

32

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DE RUMJI

Q24A 07/0915Z

R 070900Z ZA

FM EMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
RUDLTN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUF GWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJNO/AMMBASSY PHNOMPENH
RUHLHQ/CONCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

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ACTION DEPT (337) INFO USUN 33 LONDON 28 PARIS 30 PHNOMPENH 52
CINCPAC 163 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 7, 5:16 PM

CINCPACFOR POLAD

REF: USUN'S 295

WHENEVER EVENTS PERMIT FOCUSING AGAIN ON RKG-GVN
PROBLEM, COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED IN REFTTEL WOULD SEEM TO
US TO BE EMINENTLY, SENSIBLE. GP-4 TAYLOR

BT

CFN 337 33 28 -C 52 163 295

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-C, 10:47 A.M., 8/7/64.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By DCH, NARS, Date 7-8-82

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~~SECRET~~

089

45
Action

SVN RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 28A 07/0955Z
R 070945Z ZEA
Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEKDA/DA WASHDC
SS RUEPIA/CIA
G RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
SP STATE GRNC
L BT
FE ~~SECRET~~
AID

1964 AUG 7 PM 4040 6007

94

P
USIA
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ACTION DEPT 338 INFO DOD 35 CIA 29 CINCPAC 164 FROM SAIGON
AUG 7 6:00 PM

DEPT PASS AID AND USIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

MISSION MESSAGE

1. OVER PAST TEN MONTHS, U.S. MISSION AND WASHINGTON COMMUNITY
HAVE EMPLOYED SEVERAL LISTS OF SO-CALLED KEY PROVINCES.
CFN 338 35 29 164 1

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 28A ~~SECRET~~
LISTS HAVE CHANGED FROM TIME TO TIME BOTH IN MEANING AND IN
PACE WITH ALTERED CIRCUMSTANCES. FOLLOWING TRANCES EVOLUTION
OF THESE LISTS AND SUGGESTS STANDARD DEFINITIONS TO BE EMPLOYED
HERE AND BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

2. INITIAL LIST OF SO-CALLED CRITICAL PROVINCES WAS DEVELOPED
BY U.S. MISSION AT WASHINGTON DIRECTION FOR DISCUSSION AT 0
NOVEMBER HONOLULU MEETING. THAT LIST INCLUDED THIRTEEN PROVINCES
WHICH, IN MISSION ESTIMATE, WERE MOST HEAVILY DOMINATED OR
CONTESTED BY VC. THEY WERE: QUANG NGAI, QUANG TIN, BINH DINH,
PHUOC THANH, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, DINH
TUONG, KIEN HOA, KIEN TUONG, CHUONG THIEN, AN XUYEN.

3. CONFERENCE PRINCIPALS DIRECTED THAT MISSION PLACE MAJOR
ATTENTION ON THESE THIRTEEN PROVINCES IN ITS PERIODIC REPORTS.
BY SUBSEQUENT JCS DIRECTIVE, THESE PROVINCES (INCREASED TO

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Authority NLS 82-219
By ms, NARS, Date 11-23-82

~~SECRET~~

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-2- 33, AUGUST 7, 6 PM, FROM: SAIGON

FOURTEEN WHEN DINH TUONG SPANNED GO CONG) WERE THEREAFTER SPOTLIGHTED IN MACV WEEKLY MILREP.

4. SDURING SAME CONFERENCE, SECDEF WAS BRIEFED ON MACV VIEWS OF PACIFICATION STRATEGY AS COMMUNICATED TO GVN IN CONNECTION WITH DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW NATIONAL PLAN. SECDEF WELCOMED FOCUS OF EFFORT ON AREA SURROUNDING SAIGON AND INDICATED THAT CRUCIAL PROVINCES WERE THOSE ON LIST OF THIRTEEN WHICH WERE CLOSEST TO SAIGON.

CFN 2 20 3 4

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 28A ~~SECRET~~

THIS WAS ORIGIN OF SECDEF PHRASE "SEVEN CRITICAL DELTA PROVINCES". THE SEVEN (WHICH BECAME EIGHT WHEN GO CONG WAS CREATED) WERE: BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, DINH TUONG, (GO CONG), KIEN HOA, KINN TUONG.

5. PUBLISHED CHIEN THANG PLAN FAITHFULLY REFLECTED US GUIDANCE BY ALLOCATING NATIONAL PRIORITY OF EFFORT TO PROVINCES ADJACENT TO SAIGON, PRECISELY BECAUSE THOSE PROVINCES WERE CITITCAL TO GVN. AT THISPOINT, "PRIORITY" AND "CRITICAL" BECAME SYNONYMOUS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION. FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, US MISSION, WHILE APPRECIATING THAT GIA DINH SHOULD GET PRIORITY IN SUPPORT, HAD REFRAINED FROM DESIGNATING THAT PROVINCE AS CRITICAL. COMPLETE LISTING OF MOST STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT, NATIONAL FIRST PRIORITY PROVINCES IN CHIEN THANG PLAN ARE: GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, TYA NINH, HAU NHGIA, LONG AN, DING TUONG, GO CONG, KUN HOA. INFERENTIALLY, THE SOUTHWESTERN PORTION OF PHUOC THANH AND PORTIONS OF BIEN HOA BORDERING ON GIA DINH ARE ALSO INCLUDED.

6. ON 26 JUNE, US MISSION REPRESENTATIVES MET WITH PRIME MINISTER AND HIS PRINCIPAL MINISTERS TO DISCUSS JOINT DIRECTION OF PACIFICATION. AT THAT MEETING, US MISSION PROPOSED AND GVN ACCEPTED, A MODIFIED LIST OFPRIORITY PROVINCES.

CFN 5 6 26

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 28A ~~SECRET~~

KIEN HOA WAS DROPPED AS A PRIORITY PROVINCE BECAUSE OF TIS DETACHED POSITION, ALTHOUGH ITS NORTHERN DISTRICTS RETAIN PRIORITY STATUS. VINH LONG AND QUANG NGAI WERE ADDED TO GIVE

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 33, AUGUST 7, 6 PM, FROM: SAIGON

NATIONAL PRIORITY STATUS TO AN ADDITIONAL PROVINCE IN SOUTH AND ONE IN NORTH RESPECTIVELY. THUS, JOINT US/GVN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON FOLLOWING NINE PRIORITY PROVINCES: QUANG NGAI, GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, GO CONG, DINH TUONG, VINH LONG.

7. SUBSEQUENTLY, US MISSION AND GVN'S NSC HAVE AGREED ON CONCEPT OF PICA I (HOP TAC). THIS IS A PACIFICATION PLAN WHICH STRATS FROM ASSUMPTION THAT SAIGON-CHOLON CONSTITUTE NATION'S LARGEST "OILSPOT" AND CALLS FOR EXPANDING CLEARING, HOLDING AND DEVELOPING OPERATIONS BUILDING OUTWARD FROM THAT BASE. BY VIRTUE OF SPECIAL EFFORT TO BE GIVEN HOP TAC, THESE PROVINCES ENCOMPASSED THEREIN HAVE TOP PRIORITY AMONG THE NINE. THESE ARE: GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN.

8. MISSION PROPOSES FOLLOWING AS DEFINITIONS FOR USE HERE AND THROUGHOUT EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

A. PRIORITY PROVINCES ARE DEFINED AS THOSE WHOSE PACIFICATION HAVE BEEN JUDGED TO BE OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. THERE ARE NINE SUCH PROVINCES AND ELEMENTS OF THREE OTHERS.

CFN 7 I

PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 28A ~~SECRET~~

THEY ARE: QUANG NGAI, GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, DINH TUONG, GO CONG, VINH LONG, PLUS ELEMENTS OF: (A) SOUTHWEST PORTION OF PHUOC THANH, (B) PORTIONS OF BIEN HOA CONTIGUOUS TO GIA DINH, (C) NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF KIEN HOA.

B. WITHIN GROUP OF PRIORITY PROVINCES, FOUR ARE CENTRAL TO SECURITY OF SAIGON AND TO SUCCESS OF ENTIRE PACIFICATION EFFORT. THESE ARE DEFINED AS TOP PRIORITY PROVINCES AND ARE GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN.

C. THE TERM "CRITICAL PROVINCES SHOULD BE ABANDONED.

TAYLOR
BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SVN

Info

SS

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INR

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 36A 07/1235Z
P 11230Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATEXNRC
BT

5 4 2 8

1964 AUG 7 AM 9 15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 343 AUGUST 7, 8:35 PM

FOLLOWING HAS APPEARED ON ASIAN NEWS SERVICE UPI DATELINED
WASHINGTON, AUGUST 7 (UPI)

BEGIN TEXT. A HIGH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGED
THURSDAY NIGHT THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE GUNBOATS MAY HAVE ATTACKED
TWO NORTH VIETNAMESE ISLANDS A DAY OR TWO BEFORE THE FIRST
COMMUNIST ASSAULT ON THE U.S. DESTROYER MADDOX.
CFN 343 7

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 36A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BUT HE SAID THE AMERICAN WARSHIP WAS AT LEAST 60 MILES AWAY
AT THE TIME AND "HAD NO PART ~~WHATEVER~~ IN ANY SUCH ACTION."

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. BUNDY DID NOT DIRECTLY
CONFIRM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS, WHICH HANOI CLAIMED TOOK
PLACE LAST FRIDAY. HE DID HOWEVER, THAT "ASSUMING THE REPORT
WAS CORRECT, THE SUBSEQUENT COMMUNIST TORPEDO BOAT ASSAULT ON
THE MADDOX DID NOT COME FOR AT LEAST 24 HOURS AFTERWARD."
END TEXT.

REQUEST GUIDANCE.

GP-3 TAYLOR

BT

CFN 60 2

(GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 10:40 AM, 8/7/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 11 AM, 8/7/64.

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Authority NLJ 82-219

By is, NARS, Date 11-23-82

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33

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Action PP RUDSC RUEHC RUFJC
DE RUMJIR 41A 07/1310Z

SVN ZNR

P 071255Z

Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

SS INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

G RUEPDA/DOD

SP RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

L RUEPIA/CIA

H RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS

EUR RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

FE RUMJBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

IO STATE GRNC

AID BT

UNCLAS ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 344 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 166
DOD 37 WHITE HOUSE 28 CIA 31 PARIS 31 LONDON 29 BANGKOK 24

P FROM SAIGON SEVENTH

NSC (FIRST OF TWO TAKES)

TNR CINCPAC FOR POLAD

RMR

IN PRESS CONFERENCE DIEN HONG HALL SAIGON 3 P.M. TODAY, PRIME
MINISTER KHANH READ TEXT OF TWO DECREES. FIRST ONE, SIGNED BY
KHANH IN CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN MRC DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY
THROUGHOUT REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. SECOND, IN CAPACITY AS PRIME
MINISTER, SETS FORTH MEASURES TO BE FOLLOWED DURING STATE OF
EMERGENCY.

CFN 344 166 37 28 31 31 29 24

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 41A UNCLAS
OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL,

CONSIDERING THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ACTS NO. 1 OF
NOVEMBER 4, 1963 AND NO. 2 OF FEBRUARY 7, 1964;

CONSIDERING THE DECISIONS OF JANUARY 30, 1964 OF THE MILITARY
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL APPOINTING MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL;

CONSIDERING THE PRESENT URGENT INTERNAL SITUATION AND IN ORDER
TO SAFEGUARD THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN
THE FACE OF THE DANGER OF OPEN AGGRESSION OF COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM.

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-2- 344, August 7, From Saigon

ARTICLE 1. THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IS HEREBY PROCLAIMED ALL OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FROM THE DATE OF PROMULGATION OF THIS DECREE-LAW UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

ARTICLE 2.-ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS, THE SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION OF WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE NECESSARY WILL BE PROCLAIMED TO TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED.

ARTICLE 3. THE PRIME MINISTER IS CHARGED WITH TAKING APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD PUBLIC SECURITY AND TO PROTECT NATIONAL TERRITORY.

CFN 1 4 1963 2 7 1964 30 1964 1 2 3

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 41A UNCLAS

THIS DECREE-LAW WILL BE PROMULGATED ACCORDING TO URGENT PROCEDURE.

THE PRIME MINISTER,

CONSIDERING THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANF NO. 1 OF NOVEMBER 4, 1963;

CONSIDERING THE DECISIONS OF FEBRUARY 7, 1964 OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTION COUNCIL DESIGNATING MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN-KHANH TO FORM THE GOVERNMENT;

CONSIDERING THE DECREE-LAW NO. 215-SL/CT OF AUGUST 7, 1964 OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL PROCLAIMING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY,

ARTICLE 1.-DURING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND FROM THE DATE OF PROMULGATION OF THIS DECREE-LAW ONWARDS, THE FOLLOWING MEASURES WILL BE APPLIED:

- CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD.
- SEARCH PRIVATE HOUSES AT ANY HOURS IF NEED BE.
- DECIDE THE DETENTION OF OR ASSIGN RESIDENCE TO THOSE ELEMENTS WHO ARE CONSIDERED AS DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY.
- BAN ALL STRIKES.
- BAN ALL DEMONSTRATIONS OR MEETINGS CONSIDERED AS HARMFUL TO PUBLIC ORDER.

CFN 1 4 1963 7 1964 215 7 1964 1

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-2- 344, August 7, From Saigon

- APPLY CENSORSHIP TO ALL PRESS REPORTS, RADIO PROGRAMS, MOVIE PICTURES, THEATRES, PUBLICATIONS.
- FORBID THE DETENTION AND THE CIRCULATION OF ALL PUBLICATIONS, DOCUMENTS, LEAFLETS, CONSIDERED AS HARMFUL TO PUBLIC ORDER.
- CONTROL, RESTRICT ALL TRAVEL DEPENDING ON SECURITY NEEDS.
- PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW DEPENDING ON THE SECURITY SITUATION OF EACH REGION.

ARTICLE II.-ACCORDING TO THE NEED OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER AND REQUISITION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES WILL BE APPLIED.

ARTICLE III.-STRENGTHEN TO THE MAXIMUM THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL DEFENSE- TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND PROPERTIES OF THE POPULATION ESPECIALLY TO FACE WITH EVENTUAL AERIAL ATTACKS FROM THE ENEMY.

ARTICLE IV.-ANY VIOLATION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND NATIONAL SECURITY WILL FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ~~THE~~ MILITARY COURT AND WILL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO URGENT PROCEDURES.

ARTICLE V.-TERRORISTS, PEOPLE WHO INDULGE IN SABOTAGE, SPECULATORS HARMFUL TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, CAUGHT RED-HANDED, WILL BE SENTENCED TO DEATH AND WILL NOT BENEFIT FROM ATTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

ALL THESE CASES MUST BE TRIED BY THE MILITARY COURT IN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE AND WITHOUT PREVIOUS HEARINGS.

THE DEFENDANT IS ALLOWED NO RIGHT TO APPEAL THE SENTENCE OR APPLY FOR LENIENCY.

ARTICLE VI.-THE DEPUTIES PRIME MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF STATE, THE MINISTERS, THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, THE UNDER-SECRETARIES OF STATE, THE GENERAL COMMISSIONERS AND SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS WILL BE CHARGED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PRESENT DECREE-LAW.

THIS DECREE-LAW WILL BE PROMULGATED ACCORDING ~~TO~~ URGENT PROCEDURES.

END TEXT.

TAYLOR

NOTE: PASSED USUN AT 2:45 P.M., 8-7-64.

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2:30 P.M., 8-7-64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

42

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Action

SVN

PP RUDSC RUEHC RUFJC
DE RUMJIR 42A 07/1310Z
ZNR

CONTROL: 5892

RECD: AUGUST 7, 1964
1:13 PM

Info

P 071255Z

SS

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

G

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

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RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

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RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS

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RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

IO

RUMJBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AID

STATE GRNC

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USIA

UNCLAS ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (344) INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 166
DOD 37 WHITE HOUSE 28 CIA 31 PARIS 31 LONDON 29 BANGKOK 24

NSC

FROM SAIGON SEVENTH

INR

SETWO OF TWO

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

AFTER READING DECREES, KHANH READ PROCLAMATION PROVIDING
RATIONAL FOR THEIR ISSUANCE:

BEGIN TEXT. PROCLAMATION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

MY DEAR FELLOW VIETNAMESE, DURING THE PAST YEARS THE USUALLY
COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM, ON ORDERS FROM THEIR CHINESE

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 42A UNCLAS
COMMUNIST MASTERS HAVE CONTINUALLY IGNORED THE NATIONAL SENTIMENTS
AND HAVE RUTHLESSLY BROUGHT THE CALAMITIES OF WAR INTO FREE AND
PEACEFUL SOUTH VIETNAM. WITH THEIR AGGRESSIVENESS AND
PARTISANSHIP THE COMMUNISTS OF THE NORTH HAVE BLATANTLY
VIOLATED THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS WHICH THEY THEMSELVES
HAD SIGNED. THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS THIS FACT AND THE ICC
ITSELF HAS CONFIRMED IT.

THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE VC ARMY INFILTRATED INTO THE SOUTH
HAS REACHED THOUSANDS IN THE LAST FEW YEARS AND AT PRESENT HAS
REACHED A NUMBER LIABLE TO HARM THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

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-2- 344 AUGUST 7 FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

HOWEVER THEY HAVE MET WITH THE DETERMINED OPPOSITION OF OUR ENTIRE FREEDOM AND PEACE LOVING PEOPLE, AND OUR ARMED FORCES HAVE VALIANTLY DEALT WITH THE INFILTRATIONS ACROSS THE BORDER TO PROTECT OUR FELLOW VIETNAMESE, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE REMOTE COUNTRYSIDE.

THAT IS WHY THE PLAN OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR HENCHMEN IN THE NORTH AIMING AT SWALLOWING THE SOUTH CANNOT MATERIALIZE.

NOW THE COMMUNIST IMPERIALISTS ARE TURNING TO A NEW METHOD WHICH IS TO BE BLANTANTLY AGGRESSIVE AND OPENLY TAKE OVER THE WHOLE OF

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 42A UNCLAS
SOUTH EAST ASIA WITH THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AS THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AS WELL AS THE EVENTS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN ARE CONCRETE EVIDENCES OF THE COMMUNIST SCHEME FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND OF THE OTHER SMALL COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA.

TO EFFICIENTLY DEAL WITH THE CALAMITIES OF INTERNAL WAR AND EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, TO SAFEGUARD THE LIVES AND PROPERTIES OF THE POPULATION, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN ALL MEASURES SUITABLE WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF EMERGENCY.

THE FIRM MEASURES PUT INTO APPLICATION AIM ONLY AT ELIMINATING THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR NEUTRALIST SYMPATHISERS, AS WELL AS SPEEDILY BRINGING ABOUT FINAL VICTORY. THUS REDUCING THE HARDSHIPS OF THE COUNTRY PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHO HAVE BEEN SUFFERING FROM THE CALAMITIES OF WAR FOR MORE THAN 20 YARS.

AS FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTH VIETNAM, WE ARE READY TO EXTEND OUR ASSISTANCE FOR THEM TO STAND UP AND OVERTHROW THE DICTATORIAL PARTY RULE OF THE COMMUNISTS AND EXTERMINATE THE TRAITORS WHO WANT TO OFFER OUR COUNTRY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS.

WE HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT THIS YEAR WAS A DECISIVE YEAR. NOW WE

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-3- 344 AUGUST 7 FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 42A UNCLAS
CAN SAY THAT THE COMING WEEKS WILL DECIDE THE DESTINY OF OUR
ENTIRE PEOPLE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO BUILD UP A POWERFUL NATION,
FREE AND INDEPENDENT, AND WE DON'T ACCEPT BECOMING A MINOR
PROVINCE OF RED CHINA.

THE CRUCIAL HOUR OF HISTORY HAS STRUCK.

THE MRC ONCE MORE CALLS FOR THE ASSISTANCE AND THE RESPECT OF THE
NATIONAL DISCIPLINE FROM THE ENTIRE PEOPLE, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION
AS TO RELIGION, PARTY OR RACE.

WE ARE READY TO UNITE WITH ALL FRIENDLY NATIONS AS WELL AS ALL
CITIZENS WHO SHARE OUR IDEALS OF DESTROYING THE COMMUNISTS AND
SAVING THE COUNTRY. ON THE CONTRARY WE CANNOT CONDONE THOSE WHO
WANT TO UNDERMINE THE VALIANT STRUGGLE OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE
TH PURPOSE OF WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN LIBERTY, INDEPENDENCE AND
UNIFICATION.

REALIZING GRAND NATIONAL UNITY, SCRUPULOUSLY RESPECTING THE
NATIONAL DISCIPLINE, WITH SPIRIT OF SACRIFICE WHICH WE READILY
HAVE WE ARE SURE TO ACHIEVE TOTAL VICTORY. END TEXT.

AT CONFERENCE, KHANH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ALL THREE DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTERS, DEFMIN KHIEM, FONMIN QUAT, MINJUSTICE MAU, MININFO PHAM
THAI. CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY APPROXIMATELY 250 LOCAL AND FOREIGN

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 42A UNCLAS
PRESSMEN.

CONFERENCE OPENED WITH MILITARY BRIEFING. KHANH THEN MADE
BRIEF STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT IT WAS TIME TO TELL VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE ABOUT CURRENT SITUATION OF COUNTRY. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS
COMMUNIST ARMY IN SVN OF ABOUT 150,000 TROOPS OF WHICH 30,000 ARE
REGULARS. HE SAID THAT SIHANOUK'S STATEMENTS AND ATTITUDES SHOW
THAT CAMBODIAN FRONTIER IS MENACE TO SOUTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL
SECURITY. HE REFERRED TO INFORMATION THAT CHICOMS HAVE "FAIRLY
SIZABLE" ARMY IN VARIOUS PROVINCES OF SOUTH CHINA AND HAVE TROOPS
STATIONED IN DRV. FOR THESE REASONS, HE SAID, WE MAY BE ATTACKED
OR INVADDED AT ANYTIME. KHANH THEN READ ABOVE DECREES AND PROCLAMATION.

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-4- 344 AUGUST 7 FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

BEFORE DEPARTING FROM CONFERENCE, KHANH APOLOGIZED TO NEWSMEN FOR NOT HAVING TIME FOR QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD, STATED HE WAS "LEAVING IMMEDIATELY TO JOIN HIS TROOPS IN THE PROVINCES." KHANH WAS APPLAUDED AS HE LEFT THE ROOM.
TAYLOR

ADVANCE COPY S/S-O 5:27 PM 8/7/64
NOTE: PASSED USUN 5:44 PM 8/7/64

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57
Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON PRIORITY 381
SVN
Info: INFO: CINCPAC
SS
G CINCPAC FOR POLAD
SP
H Embtel 343
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OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
NIC

Aug 8 1 23 PM '64

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 82-219
By *is* NARS, Date 11-23-82

There follow pertinent excerpts from Asst. Secy. Bundy
TV
ABC interview 6 August:

QUOTE: Q. Mr. Bundy, how about these Communist reports that they attacked our destroyers because our destroyers were escorting, protecting, or backing up in some way South Vietnamese warships that attacked the North Vietnamese coast?

A. Well, the North Vietnamese assert that South Vietnamese small boats of some sort attacked two islands off the coast of North Vietnam, I think on the night of the 31st. (The attack actually took place midnight 30-31st and, strangely, DRV asserted that it occurred at noon of 30th.)

However, the key point here is that even if such an attack took place, our destroyer had no part whatsoever in any such action, and was a very substantial distance away at the time, at least ~~yx~~ 60 miles away from the two islands in

Drafted by:
S/VN: MVForrestal:caw 3/7/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: The Undersecretary

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Bundy

DOD/ISA - Mr. John McNaughton
(insubstance)

S/S - Mr. Moose

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question, and steaming in another direction. (In fact, MADDOX was 120 miles south, steaming along the 17th Parallel.)

And then, in addition, of course, assuming this took place on the night of the 31st, the attack on the MADDOX, the destroyer involved, didn't come for at least 24 hours afterward. (In fact, the attack on the MADDOX took place more than two days later.)

We believe that Hanoi knew, should have known perfectly well where that destroyer was, and that it would have no connection with these attacks on those islands if they took place.

Q. So you believe that charge then to be false?

A. I am confident that it is false, and I am sure that they realize this too. END QUOTE

Secretary McNamara's press conference remarks on subject alleged South Vietnamese ~~vessels~~ attacks August 6 follow:

Q. Have there been any incidents that you know involving the South Vietnamese vessels and the North Vietnamese?

A. No, none that I know of, although I think that I should mention to you the South Vietnamese naval patrol activities that are carried on to prevent the infiltration of men and materiel from the North into the South. INFO: (11/15/61)

In the last seven months of 1961, for example, about 1,400 men were infiltrated across the 17th ~~Parallel~~ Parallel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. To prevent further infiltrations of that kind, the South Vietnamese with our assistance have set up a naval patrol which is very active in that area which continues to inspect and examine junks and their personnel.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In one eight-month period that I can recall they discovered 140 Vietcong infiltrators. END QUOTE

Our judgment is we cannot categorically deny any GVN action against North Vietnamese islands nor generally GVN harrassing activities against North Vietnamese coast. We are pointing out that heavy NVN infiltration men and equipment by sea over a considerable period has required defensive measures, including patrols by small SVN craft, searching of junks, and action against known infiltration bases. We have not, and do not intend, give specific detail. Nevertheless, would be helpful if GVN spokesmen emphasized extent of sea infiltration and generally described type of limited responsive action which has been forced upon GVN.

If debate

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If debate develops in UN, we assume that among other charges, Communist Bloc will attempt paint picture provocation by SVN-US harrassment of islands and DRV coast. Would be useful for Saigon authorities counter this, not by denying all activity, but by describing massive sea infiltration by NVN which has forced GVN to take limited defensive action over the past several years.

We, of course, have categorically denied any connection between these activities and U.S. forces generally and DeSoto patrols in particular.

GP-3

End

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

50

Origin ACTION: AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 222
FE " SAIGON PRIORITY 382 ✓
Info:

Aug 8 2 10 PM '64

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NSA

Manila's 261 sent Saigon 38
Provided Embassy Saigon agrees,
/Dept has no objections Phil Vice President Pelaez visiting Saigon.
Agree with Embassy Manila re domestic political motivations of visit, ~~which~~
which if anything appear understated in reftel, but this should not obscure
value which we and Vietnamese could get from trip. Pelaez is ~~rather~~ talented
(against Macapagal)
orator, actively campaigning/at present. He may be expected to spread word
in Phils of anti-communist effort in Vietnam on his return.

Suggest Embassy Saigon give him high-level treatment but avoid giving
impression US is behind visit.

FYI Saigon: Captain Albert, who may be with Pelaez, is Annapolis
graduate, served as Phil Naval Attache Washington. Intelligent and well
disposed to US. He is capable of exercising constructive influence on
Pelaez and, through occasional newspaper articles, on wider circle of
Filipinos. End FYI.

GP-3

End.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-219

By us, NARS, Date 11-23-82

RUSK

Drafted by:

SPA:RJBallantyne/rjb

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE:SPA: Robert J. Ballantyne

Clearances:

SPA-D.C. CUTHELL (subs)

SVN- Mr. Roberts 2 (subs)

FE-Mr. Green (subs)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

04173

002

✓ Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy OTTAWA
Amembassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE

169
383

Aug 8 4 41 PM '64

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014817

By *iss*, NARA, Date 10-29-97

EXDIS

Following message was handed directly to Canadian Embassy here for transmittal to Seaborn by fastest channel. This is for your information only.

QUOTE Canadians are urgently asked to have Seaborn during August 10 visit make following points (as having been conveyed to him by US Government since August 6):

A. Re Tonkin Gulf actions, which almost certainly will come up:

1. The DRV has stated that Hon Ngu and Hon Me islands were attacked on July 30. It should be noted that the USS MADDOX was, all of that day and into the afternoon of the next day, over 100 miles south of those islands, in international waters near the 17th parallel, and that the DRV attack on the MADDOX took place on August 2, more than two days later. Neither the MADDOX or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV islands.

2. Regarding the August 4 attack by the DRV on the two

US

Drafted by:

FE:WFBundy:hst 8-8-64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

DOD - Secretary McNamara (draft)
U - Mr. Ball (draft)
White House - Mr. Bundy (draft)

S/S - Mr. Moose

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

US destroyers, the Americans were and are at a complete loss to understand the DRV motive. They had decided to absorb the August 2 attack on the grounds that it very well might have been the result of some DRV mistake or miscalculation. The August 4 attack, however--from the determined nature of the attack as indicated by the radar, sonar, and eye witness evidence both from the ships and from their protecting aircraft--was, in the American eyes, obviously deliberate and planned and ordered in advance. In addition, premeditation was shown by the evidence that the DRV craft were waiting in ambush for the destroyers. The attack did not seem to be in response to any action by the South Vietnamese, nor did it make sense as a tactic to further any diplomatic objective. Since the attack took place at least 60 miles from nearest land, there could have been no question about territorial waters. About the only reasonable hypothesis was that North Viet-Nam was intent either upon making it appear that the United States was a ^{INNER}paper tiger/^{END INNER}UNQUOTE or upon provoking the United States.

3. The American response was directed solely to patrol craft and installations acting in direct support of them. As President Johnson stated: ^{INNER}/QUOTE Our response for the present will be limited ^{END INNER}and fitting./ UNQUOTE

4. In view of uncertainty aroused by the deliberate and unprovoked DRV attacks this character, US has necessarily carried out precautionary deployments of additional air power to SVN and Thailand.

B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

B. Re basic American position:

5. Mr. Seaborn should again stress that US policy is simply that North Viet-Nam should contain itself and its ambitions within the territory allocated to its administration by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He should stress that US policy in South Viet-Nam is to preserve the integrity of that state's territory against guerrilla subversion.

6. He should reiterate that the US does not seek military bases in the area and that the US is not seeking to overthrow the Communist regime in Hanoi.

7. He should repeat that the US is fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controls and directs the guerrilla action in South Viet-Nam and that the US holds Hanoi directly responsible for that action. He should similarly indicate US awareness of North Vietnamese control over the Pathet Lao movement in Laos and the degree of North Vietnamese involvement in that country. He should specifically indicate US awareness of North Vietnamese violations of Laotian territory along the infiltration route into South Viet-Nam.

8. Mr. Seaborn can again refer to the many examples of US policy in tolerance of peaceful coexistence with Communist regimes, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. He can hint at the economic and other benefits which have accrued to those countries because their policy of Communism has confined itself to the development of their own national territories and has not sought to expand into other areas.

9.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. Mr. Seaborn should conclude with the following new points:

a. That the events of the past few days should add ^{INNER} credibility to the statement made last time, that ^{INNER} QUOTE US public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely ^{END INNER} thin. / UNQUOTE

b. That the US Congressional Resolution was passed with near unanimity, strongly re-affirming the unity and determination of the US Government and people not only with respect to any further attacks on US military forces but more broadly to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary means, DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South Viet-Nam and Laos.

c. That the US has come to the view that the DRV role in South Viet-Nam and Laos is critical. If the DRV persists in its present course, it can expect ^{delete} [to continue] to suffer the consequences.

d. That the DRV knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored.

e. That the US has ways and means of measuring the DRV's participation in, and direction and control of, the war on South Viet-Nam and in Laos and will be carefully watching the DRV's response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them. UNQUOTE.

GP-1.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

SD-943

OO RUEPWW

DE RUEHC 6302 08/0555Z

ZNR

O 080550Z

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

O 080220Z

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCTTLLLLLLAS IMMEDIATE 345 EIGHTH

? ?
HENRY AND SARIDAKIS AND I DEPARTING SAIGON SUNDAY NINE AUGUST
AT 0900 VIA MATS. ARRIVING TRAVIS ON 9 AUGUST AT 1855 AND HOPE
TO ARIVE WASHINGTON SAME EVENING VIA SAM FLIGHT.

YOU WILL RECEIVE PROGRESS REPORT CABLE SATURDAY MORNING
AUG 8 YOUR TIME.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 345 0900 9 1855 8

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 AUG 8 05 54

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42
Try Foubat
call S/S -

pub service on it
to Saigon -

File

The "I" referred to is JK Mansfield,
an IG attached to State -

WMM PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43

UNCLASSIFIED

Action
SVN

006841

1964 AUG 9 AM 12 55

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RMR

RR RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 15A 08/1650Z
ZNR
R 081340Z
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS ACTION DEPT 349 INFO BANGKOK 26 LONDON 30 MOSCOW 7
PARIS 32 PHNOMPENH 53 VIENTIANE 23 HONGKONG 48 CINCPAC 167
FROM SAIGON EIGHTH

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

HANOI RADIO REPORTS INDICATE DRV REGIME UNDERSTANDABLY
ATTEMPTING TO CREATE IMPRESSION TO OUTSIDE WORLD AND PARTICU-
LARLY TO NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT EVENTS SINCE AUGUST 2 HAVE
RESULTED IN VICTORIES AGAINST US. REGARDING INITIAL ENCOUNTER
BETWEEN MADDOX AND TORPEDO BOATS, PEOPLE'S ARMY STATEMENT
CFN 349 26 30 7 32 53 23 48 167 7 2

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 15A UNCLAS
INDICATED THAT THREE NORTH VIETNAMESE PATROL BOATS MET US
DESTROYER IN "OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS" AND "IN FACE OF PROVOCA-
TIONS OUR BOATS WENT INTO ACTION TO PROTECT TERRITORIAL WATERS
AND OUR PEOPLE AND TO CHASE ENEMY SHIP OUT OF OUR WATERS."
IMPLYING THESE ACTS ACCOMPLISHED, STATEMENT SAID BOATS LATER
RETURNED TO BASE, AND MADE NO REFERENCE TO ANY DAMAGE TO THEM.
LOSS OF BOATS IN SECOND ENCOUNTER WITH US DESTROYERS OF COURSE
ALSO IGNORED IN DRV CLAIM THAT INCIDENT PURE FABRICATION BY US.

WITH REFERENCE TO RESULTS OF AUGUST 5 RETALIATORY AIR STRIKES
HANOI HAS PLAYED NUMBERS GAME, PROGRESSIVELY INCREASING NUMBER OF
US PLANES ALLEGEDLY SHOT DOWN. AT AUGUST 5 PRESS CONFERENCE WHEN

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-2- 349, August 8, from Saigon

HANOI FIRST REVEALED ATTACKS, REPRESENTATIVE OF PEOPLE'S ARMY STATED TWO PLANES HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN AND THREE OTHERS DAMAGED IN STRAFING OF NGHE AN AND HON GAY. LATER IN DAY HANOI RADIO CARRIED ITEM DESCRIBING THANH HOA DEMONSTRATION AT WHICH PARTICIPANTS ALLEGEDLY CARRIED SIGNS PRAISING ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS FOR HAVING SHOT DOWN FIVE PLANES AND DAMAGING THREE OTHERS. THE NEXT DAY IN PEOPLE'S ARMY COMMUNIQUE FIGURE RAISED TO EIGHT PLANES DESTROYED AND THREE DAMAGED. PEOPLE'S ARMY PRESS CONFERENCE SAME DAY UPPED NUMBER OF PLANES HIT AND DAMAGED TO "ABOUT 30." IN

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 15A UNCLAS

LETTER FROM FONMIN XUAN THUY TO GENEVA CO-CHAIRMEN, DRV CLAIMED FIVE CITIZENS WOUNDED AND HOMES AND OTHER PROPERTY DESTROYED BY US ATTACK, BUT HANOI HAS THUS FAR MADE NO MENTION OF MILITARY LOSSES.

HANOI DOMESTIC SERVICE INDICATES REGIME ATTEMPTING TO DRUM UP PATRIOTIC RESPONSE TO ATTACKS BY HOLDING RALLYS IN HANOI AND ELSEWHERE. IN ONE SUCH RALLY DIKE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS REPORT-EDLY HAILED VICTORY OF DRV ARMED FORCES AND ADOPTED RESOLUTION ASKING ICC TO FORCE US TO STOP ITS PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THE NORTH. IN ADDITION TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS HANOI RADIO ALSO ATTEMPTING TO MAKE HEROES OF RADIO PERSONNEL IN BOTH QUANG NINH AND NGHE AN WHO ALLEGEDLY PROTECTED THEIR EQUIPMENT AND CON-TINUED BROADCASTING DESPITE AIR STRAFING.
TAYLOR

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

44

45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 6402
Rec'd: AUGUST 8, 1964
6:35 AM

SVN

FROM: SAIGON

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 351 PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE 29 PRIORITY
DOD 38 PRIORITY
CIA 32 PRIORITY

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INFO: PARIS 33 PRIORITY
CINCPAC 168 PRIORITY
MOSCOW 8 PRIORITY

DATE: AUGUST 8, 5 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS USIS

TO COUNTER SOVIET AND POTENTIAL FRENCH STATEMENTS THAT US DESTROYER PATROLS IN TONKIN GULF ARE "HOSTILE", DEPT MIGHT CONSIDER HAVING SPOKESMAN, EITHER OPENLY OR ON BACKGROUND, POINT OUT THAT USSR NAVAL VESSELS CONFIGURED AS TRAWLERS OPERATE CONSISTENTLY ALONG US AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COASTS AT TIMES MOVING MUCH CLOSER TO SHORELINE THAN HAVE TONKIN GULF PATROLS.

TAYLOR

KEA

NOTE: PASSED USUN PER S/S-O, 8-8-64, 6:49 AM.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 8-8-64, 6:43 AM.

NOTE: PASSED USIA, 8-8-64, 6:55 AM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

36

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Action

SVN

RR RUEHCR RUFGWP
DE RUMJIR 11A 08/0935Z

Info

R 080920Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RUMJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG

SP

RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

EUR

RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOMPENH

FE

RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

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RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS

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RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

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STATE GRNC

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NSC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION DEPT (352) INFO HONGKONG 49 VIENTIANE
24 PPENH 54 BANGKOK 27 PARIS 34 CINCPAC 169 MOSCOW 9 FROM SAIGON
AUG 8, 5:40 PM

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ARMY

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NAVY

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NIC

DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION CALLED TO AUGUST 6 LIBERATION BROADCAST-
ING STATION BROADCAST CARRYING MESSAGE FROM "HIGH COMMAND OF
ARMED FORCES FOR LIBERATION OF SVN TO HIGH COMMAND DRV ARMED
FORCES."

RMR

MESSAGE PRAISES DRV ARMED FORCES FOR HAVING "DEALT HEAVY BLOW
TO ADVENTUROUS ACTIVITIES OF US IMPERIALISTS," WHICH IS SAID
TO REVEAL VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S ARMY DETERMINATION TO SAFEGUARD
SOVEREIGNTY DRV PEOPLE. GOES ON TO PLEDGE: "ARMED FORCES FOR
LIBERATION OF SVN CONSIDER THEMSELVES RESPONSIBLE FOR STEPPING
UP ATTACK AGAINST AND ANNIHILATION AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY
ON ALL BATTLEFIELDS TO CONTRIBUTE TO PROTECTION OF NORTHERN
PART OF FATHERLAND. THIS IS SACRED MISSION OF ALL PEOPLE IN
WHOLE COUNTRY." US WARNED THAT IF IT CARRIED OUT FURTHER ACTS
OF "AGGRESSION AGAINST DRV, THEY WOULD HAVE TO FACE ARMED
FORCES AND PEOPLE OF WHOLE COUNTRY."

COMMENT: WHILE VC PROPAGANDA PAST FEW MONTHS HAS BEGUN TO
RELATE WAR IN SVN WITH DEFENSE OF NVN, THIS STATEMENT IS BY
FAR STRONGEST EXPRESSION YET OF THIS THEME. TAYLOR
BT

006462
1964 AUG 8 AM 8 13

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

46

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:

Rec'd:

6812

AUGUST 8, 1964

9:25 PM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 355

INFO: CINCPAC 171

DATE: AUGUST 8, 8 PM

033

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-219By is, NARS, Date 11-23-82

WHEN DISCUSSING PROPOSED EMERGENCY DECREES WITH POLITICAL COUNSELOR, PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT HE INTENDED, IF IT PROVED POLITICALLY POSSIBLE, TO PROMULGATE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION WITHIN FEW WEEKS, (A DRAFT OF WHICH IS APPARENTLY ALREADY IN HAND) AND TO ESTABLISH A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. KHANH SEES THIS AS LOGICAL FOLLOW-UP HIS ASSUMPTION EXTRAORDINARY POWERS UNDER TERMS OF EMERGENCY DECREE.

THIS WOULD MEAN, HE ADMITTED, ABANDONMENT OF ANY PLANS FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. KHANH SAID THAT LEGISLATIVE BODY IS PROVIDED FOR IN PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION CONSISTING OF TWO-FIFTHS MILITARY REPRESENTATION (THE MRC WOULD BE ABOLISHED), TWO-FIFTHS PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATION (PRESUMABLY CHOSEN BY PROVINCIAL COUNCILS), AND ONE-FIFTH REPRESENTATION DRAWN FROM SAIGON POLITICIANS (MANNER THEIR SELECTION UNSPECIFIED). KHANH IS CONVINCED IN OWN MIND THAT HE CAN CONTROL ASSEMBLY SO CONSTITUTED. HE VIEWS THE MILITARY BLOC AS SOLIDLY UNDER HIS CONTROL (BECAUSE, HE PRESUMABLY WOULD HAND-PICK ITS MEMBERS), AS WELL AS THE MAJORITY OF THE PROVINCIAL BLOC. HE SEEMED WILLING TO LET SAIGON GROUP AND PERHAPS FRACTION OF PROVINCIAL BLOC OPERATE AS OPPOSITION MINORITY. AS FOR PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, KHANH DID NOT ELABORATE ON WHAT FORM IT MIGHT TAKE OR WHETHER ITS FORM WOULD BE SPELLED OUT IN THE NEW PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/KHANH INDICATED
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 355, AUGUST 8, 8 PM, FROM SAIGON

KHANH INDICATED THAT TIMING THESE MOVES WOULD DEPEND ON PUBLIC REACTION TO EMERGENCY DECREES. HE SEEMS INTERESTED IN MOVING AHEAD WITH THIS PLAN IN NEAR FUTURE, THEREBY ELIMINATING FURTHER TALK AND SPECULATION ABOUT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS.

KHANH OBVIOUSLY CONVINCED THAT POPULARLY-ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY MIGHT PROVE TO BE AS TROUBLESOME AND UNWIELDY AS COUNCIL OF NOTABLES PROVED TO BE, HAS DECIDED ON THIS DEVICE TO GET HIMSELF OFF THE HOOK, YET AT SAME TIME AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION HE RENEGING ENTIRELY ON PROMISE TO PROVIDE SOME FORM LEGISLATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AT AN EARLY DATE.

TAYLOR

LM

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 10:19 PM, AUGUST 8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

CONFIDENTIAL By JB

NARS, Date 8-26-76

45

Action

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 33A 08/1455Z

P R I O R I T Y

SVN

P R 081445Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

006811

Info

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

1964 AUG 8 PM 9 26

SS

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SP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY (356) INFO CINCPAC
172 FROM SAIGON AUG 8, 10:45 PM

L

H

FE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

AID

IMMEDIATELY AFTER KHANH'S PRESS CONFERENCE (EMBTTEL 344)

P

SAIGON JOURNALISTS WERE INFORMED THAT PRESS CENSORSHIP MEASURE

USIA

WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY ENFORCED. ISSUES APPEARING AFTERNOON

NSC

AUGUST 8 WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO MININFO PRIOR TO 8 AM. AS CONSEQUENCE,
TWO ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILIES WHICH NORMALLY APPEAR ON STREETS
AT 0700, APPEARED 1000 (SAIGON DAILY NEWS), AND 1600 (SAIGON
POST).

INR

CFN 356 172 344 8 8 0700 1300 1600

NSA

OPR

RMR

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 33A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ELEVEN PM TO FOUR AM CURFEW WAS IMPOSED IN SAIGON AUGUST 7,
WAS TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. NEWS OF CURFEW CIRCULATED BY
RADIO VIETNAM LATE AFTERNOON, EARLY EVENING AND DESPITE LATE
NOTICE, CURFEW WAS WIDELY OBSERVED WITH FEW VIOLATIONS NOTED.
ENFORCEMENT APPARENTLY IN HANDS OF POLICE AND NO TROOPS EVIDENT.

ALSO, EVENING AUGUST 7, MINISTRY NATIONAL ECONOMY ISSUED
COMMUNIQUE REMINDING MERCHANTS THAT NEW REGULATIONS PROVIDED
DEATH PENALTY FOR SPECULATORS AND HOARDERS OF MERCHANDISE.
COMMUNIQUE POINTED OUT THAT STOCKS IN SAIGON WERE PLENTIFUL
AND THAT THEREFORE SPECULATORS AND HOARDERS WOULD BE ULTIMATELY
RUINED AS MINISTRY COULD DECIDE TO LOWER PRICE WITHOUT WARNING.

PUBLIC REACTION TO KHANH'S ASSUMPTION EMERGENCY POWERS STILL
DEVELOPING. ON BASIS OF SMALL, QUITE INCOMPLETE SAMPLE EMBOFFS
HAVE FOUND CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR MOVE. PEOPLE SEEM AGREED
THAT GRAVE SITUATION DEMANDS AND DESERVES STRONG MEASURES ON
PART OF GOVERNMENT TO GUARANTEE SECURITY. BUDDHIST LEADER
TRI QUANG, IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, NOT CONCERNED WITH DICTATORIAL
THREAT DECREES POSED, SEEMED INCLINED TO ACCEPT THEM.
HIS MOST INTERESTING OBSERVATION WAS EXPRESSED DOUBT AS TO WHETHER
KHANH ACTUALLY POSSESSED ENOUGH POWER ENFORCE THEM.

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-2- 356, AUGUST 8, 11 P.M., FROM SAIGON

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 33A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THICH QUANG LIEN (SOUTHERNER) IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF DECREES AS NECESSARY STEPS IN VIEW OF SITUATION. DIRECTOR, MINORITIES OFFICE, WHICH COMES ADMINISTRATIVELY UNDER DEPPRIMIN HOAN, WAS HEARTILY IN FAVOR OF DECREES, SAW THEM AS EVIDENCE OF STRENGTHENED LEADERSHIP. THIS CONTRASTS WITH RECENT OPINION IN WHICH SAME MAN FELT KHANH HAD TO GO IF PROGRESS WERE TO BE MADE IN WAR AGAINST VC.

ONLY NEGATIVE NOTE HEARD TO DATE WAS FROM PHAM DANH LAM, FORMER FONMIN. WHILE HE DID NOT SEEM OBJECT TO PRINCIPLE OF ALERT DECREES, HE FEARED THEY, AND ESPECIALLY CURFEW, WOULD INDUCE ALARM AMONG GENERAL POPULACE. FOR THIS REASON, HE FELT KHANH'S DECLARATIONS UNWISE. AT SAME TIME, SOME VIETNAMESE WHO EXPRESSED FAVORABLE REACTION TO DECREES ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN AT POPULAR ATTITUDE IF FIRM US RPT US RESPONSE TO DRV PROVOCATION AND GVN EMERGENCY DECREES WERE NOT FOLLOWED UP BY ENERGETIC POSITIVE STEPS TO PROSECUTE WAR.

EMBASSY COMPILING ATTITUDES OF KEY GROUPS REGARDING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH WILL BE REPORTED WHEN AVAILABLE. GP-4

TAYLOR

BT

CFN GP-4

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 10:23 P.M. AUGUST 8, 1964

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 8-8-64 - 11:25 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

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Action

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By JB NARS, Date 8-26-76

SVN
Info

NNNNQUZCZCMJA412
RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 34A 08/1515Z
R 081500Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

006810

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1964 AUG 8 PM 9 29

USIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 357 INFO VIENTIANE 25
PPENH 55 BANGKOK 28 CINCPAC 173 FROM SAIGON AUG 8, 11:15 PM
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
NIC
RMR

FIRST REPORTS FROM CANADIAN OBSERVERS INDICATE HANOI RELATIVELY CALM IN WAKE OF EVENTS IN GULF OF TONKIN. SOME WESTERNERS IN CITY THOUGHT THEY DETECTED AIR OF TENSION AFTER NEWS OF ALLEGED SHELLING OF HON NGU AND HON ME HAD BROKEN AUGUST 1. HOWEVER, THEY ADMITTED THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN MORE ALERT FOR SIGNS OF CONCERN THAN NORMALLY. WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON (AFTER STRIKES) STREETS OF HANOI WERE ALMOST DESERTED, A RARE PHENOMENON.
CFN 357 25 55 28 173 1

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 34A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BUT THURSDAY IT WAS BUSINESS AS USUAL, EXCEPT THAT SOME MILITIA UNITS WERE DRILLING IN STREETS AND CROWDS WERE SHOWING ABNORMAL INTEREST IN NEWS BEING BROADCAST OVER GOVERNMENT LOUD SPEAKERS. CANADIANS BICYCLING THROUGH STREETS OF HANOI OBSERVED NO SIGNS OF ANTI-WESTERN RESENTMENT ON PART OF POPULACE. TWO CANADIAN OFFICERS WHO JOURNEYED BETWEEN DONG HOI AND DMZ ON THURSDAY NOTED NOTHING UNUSUAL EXCEPT DIGGING OF TRENCHES FOR AIR RAID SHELTER AT ONE OR TWO PLACES. AT GIA LAM AIRPORT AUGUST 6 THERE WERE FEWER TRANSPORTS THAN USUAL AND THOSE REMAINING HAD BEEN SCATTERED MORE WIDELY AND CAMOUFLAGED WITH FRESHLY CUT FOLIAGE, AS HAD SEVERAL MILITARY VEHICLES MOVING IN AREA.

CANADIAN ICC EXPECTS TO DEBRIEF OFFICERS ARRIVING FROM TEAM SITES IN DRV AUGUST 11. GP-4 TAYLOR
BT
CFN 11 GP-4

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 8-8-64, 10:50 P.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

33

~~SECRET~~

059

Action
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Info

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RMR

RR RUEHCR
 DE RUMJIR 29A 08/1"45Z
 R 081330Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
 47#) #1/CINCPAC
 STATE GRNC
 BT

006574

1964 AUG 8 AM 10 53

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT (358) VIENTIANE 26 INFO BANGKOK 29
 CINCPAC 174 FROM SAIGON AUG 8, 9:45 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

VIENTIANE'S 255 TO DEPT

CANADIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO DEBRIEFED TUCKER AFTER HIS ARRIVAL
 HERE IS SKEPTICAL ABOUT REPORT TRAIN ARRIVED HANOI FILLED WITH
 CHINESE TROOPS. POINTS OUT TUCKER DOES NOT HAVE DETAILS,
 BASES HIS VERSION ON SHORT CONVERSATION WITH ACTUAL OBSERVER.
 CANADIANS HAVE SENT CABLE HANOI REQUESTING CLARIFICATION AND
 WILL KEEP US INFORMED RESULTS. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 358 26 29 174 255

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 12:38 PM, 8/8/64.
 PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 3 PM, 8/8/64.

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Authority RAC 00014818
 By ms, NARA, Date 10-29-97

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45
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UR V

RR RUDTLN RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFGWP

DE RUMJIR -5A 08/1525Z

R 081520Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

RUMJBT/AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS

RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK

RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG

STATE GRNC

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NAVY

AIR

RMR

CONFIDENTIAL ACTION DEPT 359 INFO PPHH 56 DJAKARTA
FIVE VIENTIANE 27 LONDON 31 PARIS 36 USUN 35 HONGKONG 50 FROM
SAIGON AUG 8, 11 PM

IN BRIEFING WHICH PRECEDED KHANH'S PRESENTATION OF EMERGENCY
DECREE (EMBT 344) REPRESENTATIVE OF RVNAF HIGH COMMAND INCLUDED
FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT ON GVN MILITARY VIEW OF CAMBODIAN POLICIES.
CFN 359 56 27 31 36 35 50 344

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 35A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT, WHICH CARRIED IN YESTERDAY'S VIETNAM PRESS, SAID
RKG MOVING CLOSER AND CLOSER TO COMMUNIST CAMP AND IS IN COLLUSION
WITH VC WHOSE PRESENCE IT TOLERATES IN BORDER AREA THUS CREATING
GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THIS REGION.
ADDED THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST 5 IMPORTANT ZONES IN CAMBODIA WHICH
VC USE AS BASES. KHANH PICKED UP THIS THEME IN HIS REMARKS SAYING
THAT IN ADDITION TO THREAT FROM ACROSS SEVENTEENTH PARALLEL
AND FROM SOUTHERN LAOS, THREAT FROM CAMBODIA CONSTITUTES ANOTHER
DANGER TO GVN SECURITY BECAUSE OF RKG'S CURRENT POLICY AND ATTITUDE
OF ITS CHIEF-OF-STATE.

COMMENT: EMBOFF WHO ATTENDED PRESS CONFERENCE NOTED THAT
REMARKS ON CAMBODIA WERE NOT TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH FOR BENEFIT
OF FOREIGN REPORTERS. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT, WHILE MUCH OF WHAT

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Authority NLJ 82-219

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By NLS NARS, Date 11-23-82

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-2- 359, AUGUST 8, 11 P.M. FROM SAIGON

WAS SAID PREPARATORY TO READING OF EMERGENCY DECREE WAS WINDOW DRESSING TO PROVE NECESSITY FOR STERN MEASURES, ASSESSMENT OF CAMBODIAN POLICY BY HIGH COMMAND BRIEFED REPRESENTS ATTITUDE OF MOST GVN MILITARY INCLUDING KHANH HIMSELF. ALTHOUGH GVN PUBLIC STANCE HAS BEEN ONE OF REASONABLENESS IN DEALING WITH RKG-GVN PROBLEM, JUST BENEATH SURFACE THERE IS STRONG FEELING THAT RKG IS BASICALLY HOSTILE REGIME.
CFN 5

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 35A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IN THIS CONNECTION, IF SIHANOUK UNDERTAKES TO CONCLUDE BORDER GUARANTEE WITH CHICOMS, DRV, AND NFLSVN DURING INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATIONS (AS REPORTED DJAKARTA'S 230 TO DEPT) HARDENING OF GVN ATTITUDE MUST BE EXPECTED. GP-3
TAYLOR
BT
CFN 230 GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 8-8-64, 10:45 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DE RUMJIR 09A 09/0920Z
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE SVC

1964 AUG 9 AM 5 08

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Authority NLJ 82-219

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unnumbered, August 9

By *ies*, NARS, Date 11-23-82

HEREWITH REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO HUE'S 28 TO SAIGON
AUGUST 8, 2 PM

"PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN KHANH VISITED NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND HUE CITY THIS MORNING. PRIME MINISTER ARRIVED DONG HA AIRFIELD, QUANG TRI PROVINCE, ABOUT 15 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF DM, WITH LARGE CONTINGENT VIETNAMESE AND FOREIGN PRESS AT ABOUT 0720. AFTER BRIEF CEREMONY HE WENT TO GIA LINH OBSERVATION POST JUST SOUTH OF DM. (HQ 2ND REGIMENT AND TWO CFN 28 8 2 15 0720

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 09A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PLATOONS ARTILLERY HAD MOVED IN DURING NIGHT). ARTILLERY THUS POSITIONED IN ENTRENCHED IN MEMORY AMERICANS HERE. HE AND PRESS RECEIVED BRIEFING WHICH INCLUDED VAGUE STATEMENT THAT COMMUNIST REGIMENT WAS IN DM. ALL PRESENT WERE REQUIRED WEAR STEEL HELMETS AND CAUTIONED THAT AREA VERY DANGEROUS.

FOLLOWING BRIEFING KHANH PROCEEDED HUE BY HELICOPTER, LANDING ABOUT 0900. IN HUE HE ADDRESSED MILITARY OFFICERS, OFFICIALS, AND NOTABLES AT FORMER DELEGATES HOUSE. SUMMARY OF SPEECH AS FOLLOWS: 1) RECENT EVENTS PLACE US IN CRITICAL SITUATION. THERE ARE NOW ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND VC, THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND OF THE REGULAR TROOPS. THE CHINESE HAVE BROUGHT AIRCRAFT INTO NVN. DANANG AND HUE COULD BE IN DANGER OF BOMBING.

2) ALL MUST UNITE AND SACRIFICE IN CRUCIAL HOUR.. NOT ENOUGH TO TALK ABOUT BAC TIEN, MUST ALSO PREPARE. 3) ACTIONS WERE BEING TAKEN: A) PRICE CONTROLS B) PRESS CENSORSHIP C) STRIKES FORBIDDEN D) COMMUNIST INSPIRED DEMONSTRATIONS NOT ALLOWED.

4) MARTIAL LAW NOT A PLOT BUT FOR PURPOSE OF DEFEATING VC
5) FOLLOWING WEEKS WILL BE DECISIVE. EVERYONE MUST ACCEPT DISCIPLINE AND BE STRONG TO HELP GOVERNMENT BRING VICTORY, PROSPERITY AND PEACE. PRESS LAOS AT MEETING. KHANH SPEECH NOW BEING BROADCAST.

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-2- Unnumbered, August 9 from Saigon

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 09A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FOLLOWING MEETING KHANH EMERGED FROM BUILDING TO FACE NOT
ENTIRELY FRIENDLY CROWD OF ABOUT 1500, AMIOLY(RECEIVED GARBLED)
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS. MIMEOGRAPHED PETITION DATED AUGUST 9
HAD BEEN DUGIBUTED TO CROWD DURING MEETING INSIDE. PETITION
CALLED FOR GOVERNMENT REFORMS AND WARNED AGAINST USING MARTIAL
LAW AS DIEM HAD USED IT AUGUST 63. BANNERS CALLED FOR SOLUTION
OF "DUY XUYEN CASE" IN EVIDENCE.

CROWD WOULD NOT GIVE WAY TO FIRST DISORGANIZED ATTEMPT TO
ALLOW OFFICIAL CARS DEPART. POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND POLITICALLY
EXPLOSIVE SITUATION AVOIDED WHEN KHANH LEFT VEHICLE, SHOOK
HANDS WITH MANY IN VICINITY, MOUNTED CAR ROOF, AND GAVE ANOTHER
SPEECH. STUDENTS LOUDSPEAKER ALLOWED HIM TO BE HEARD OVER
CROWD NOISE. HE PROMISED GO IMMEDIATELY TO DUY XUYEN AND RESOLVE
PROBLEM, ALSO CALLED "BAC TIEN", WHICH BROUGHT BIGGEST CHEERS.
GENERAL TRI 1ST DIVISION COMMANDER BESIDE CAR WAS SUCCESSFULLY
QUIETING NOISY INDIVIDUALS IN IMMEDIATE AREA. AFTER KHANHS
SPEECH STUDENT LEADER ADDRESSED KHANH AND CROWD. KHANH
LISTENED ATTENTIVELY WHILE SITTING ON CAR ROOF, THEN SHOOK
HANDS AND RE-ENTERED CAR. BY THIS TIME POLICE ORGANIZED AND
CROWD EASIER TO MOVE. KHANH DEPARTED HUE ABOUT 1030 ENROUTE
DANANG BY HELICOPTER.

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 09A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COMMENT: INITIALLY FACED SOMEWHAT UNFRIENDLY CROWD; HE MANAGED
WIN SOME SMILES AND CHEERS FROM AUDIENCE. MIMEOGRAPHED
PETITION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR DEMONSTRATION
SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW AND PROBABLY DOES NOT INDICATE ADVANCE
KNOWLEDGE OF KHANHS ARRIVAL. ONE SOURCE SAYS PEOPLE AT MARKET
WERE TOLD AT 0830 TO GO TO TU DAM PAGODA TO WORSHIP. AT PAGODA
WERE RE-DIRECTED TO DELEGATES HOUSE. CROWD WAS SMALL, MUCH
SMALLER THAN BUDDHIST COULD HAVE ARRANGED FOR PETITION PRE-
SENTATION, GIVEN ADVANCE WARNING. ON BALANCE KHANH'S ACTIONS
WERE POLITICALLY SOUND. FIRST ATTEMPT DEPART COULD HAVE
RESULTED IN POLICE ACTION INCLUDING VIOLENCE.

KHANH INSTEAD WALKED AMONG PEOPLE WITH MINIMUM SECURITY,
WINNING SOME RESPONSE. HOWEVER, NUMBER OF KOM BRISIONS
(RECENVED GARBLED WILL SERVICE IF REQUESTED) WITH MINH TRIP
IN JUNE LEAVE KHANH BAD SECOND PLACE IN POLITICAL RACE.

GP-3 SIGNED THOMSEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1- Thomson
2- rtn BKS

52

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

43

Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

FLASH 389

INFO: Amembassy OTTAWA

PRIORITY 172

EXDIS

003

REF Saigon 362, repeated Info as Saigon 8 to Ottawa

We Agree. In view time element, request you immediately
contact Seaborn with view to deleting two words QUOTE to continue
from
UNQUOTE ~~from~~ last sentence paragraph 9 c.

END

RUSK

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Authority RAC DDD 14819
By isa, NARA, Date 10-29-97

Drafted by:

FE-Marshall Green :djh

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: FE-Marshall Green

Clearances:

S/VN-Mr. Forrestal

S/S-O-J. P. Parker

~~TOP SECRET~~

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FORM
8-63 DS-322

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 6836
Rec'd: August 8, 1964
11:55 p.m.

FE

FROM: Saigon

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 360 Priority

SVN

G

INFO: Manila 22 Priority

SP

NSC

DATE: August 9, 11 a.m.

INR

RMR

051
56

Reference: Manila's 261 to Department

I see no objection and some advantage from our standpoint to visit by Pelaez. I will, of course, be glad to see him.

TAYLOR

JVC/9

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Authority NLS 82-219By ics, NARS, Date 11-23-82~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45
Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SVN
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SS
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RMR

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 04A 09/0500Z
P 090440Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEKDA/DOD
STATE GRNC
BT

006889
1964 AUG 9 AM 3 20

P R I O R I T Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY CINCPAC 175 INFO
DEPT 361 DOD 39 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 9, 1 PM

FEEL SURE THAT KHANH WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF INVITATION
TO VISIT TICONDEROGA AND/OR CONSTELLATION. IF STATE PERCEIVES
NO OBJECTION, SUGGEST CINCPAC EXTEND INVITATION. I WOULD LIKE
TO ACCOMPANY HIM. TAYLOR

BT
CFN 175 361 239 9 1

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By ics NARS, Date 11-23-82

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55

1- ~~F. H. Mason~~

2- rta BKS

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

55a
Thompson
WH

43
Action
SS

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 6891
Rec'd: August 9, 1964
4:51 a.m.

Info

FROM: Saigon
ACTION: SecState 362 Flash
INFO: Ottawa 8 Flash
DATE: August 9, 4 p.m.

Cy#2 dist

003

EXDIS

Department telegram 383

Because of possible confusion inherent in the last sentence of paragraph 9C, I recommend that two words "to continue" be deleted from this sentence.

GP-1

TAYLOR

LM

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 4:58 a.m., August 9
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 5:07 a.m., August 9

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Authority RAC 0001482D
By ius, NARA, Date 10-29-97

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