

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Copy given Bundy
Thomson*

56

54
Action

~~SECRET~~

006992

1964 AUG 9 AM 10 51

SS
Info

CSWXMJA468JIA410
PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 12A 091325Z
PR 091255Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

055

NJ 86-295

By sig, NARA, Date 3-19-87

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 363 INFO VIENTIANE 28 BANGKOK.
30 CINCPAC 176 FROM SAIGON AUG 9, 9 PM

L I M D I S

REF: DEPTEL 378

FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT WE CAN SEE POSITIVE DISADVANTAGES TO
OUR POSITION IN SEA IN PURSUING COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED REFTEL.

1. IN FIRST PLACE RUSH TO CONFERENCE TABLE WOULD SERVE TO
CONFIRM TO CHICOMS THAT US RETALIATION FOR DESTROYER ATTACK WAS
TRANSIENT PHENOMENON AND THAT FIRM CHICOM RESPONSE IN FORM OF
COMMITMENT TO DEFEND NVN HAS GIVEN US "PAPER TIGER" SECOND
CFN 363 28 30 176 9 9 378 1.

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~
THOUGHTS. MOREOVER, MUCH OF BENEFICIAL EFFECTS ELSEWHERE RESULTING
FROM OUR STRONG REACTION TO EVENTS IN GULF OF TONKIN WOULD BE
SWIFTLY DISSIPATED.

2. IN VIET-NAM SUDDEN BACKDOWN FROM PREVIOUS STRONGLY HELD US
POSITION ON PDJ WITHDRAWAL PRIOR TO CONF ON LAOS WOULD HAVE
POTENTIALLY DISASTEROUS EFFECT. MORALE AND WILL TO FIGHTN
PARTICULARLY WILLINGNESS TO PUSH AHEAD WITH ARDUOUS PACIFICATION
TASK AND TO ENFORCE STERN MEASURES OF KHANH'S NEW EMERGENCY
DECREE, WOULD BE UNDERMINED BY WHAT WOULD LOOK LIKE EVIDENCE
THAT US SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN
NON-COMMUNIST POSITION AS EXCUSE FOR EXTRICATING ITSELF FROM
INDOCHINA VIA CONF ROUTE. THIS WOULD GIVE STRENGTH TO PROBABLE
PRO-GAULLIST CONTENTION THAT GVN SHOULD THINK ABOUT FOLLOWING

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2-363, August 9, 9 p.m., From Saigon

LAOTIAN EXAMPLE BY SEEKING NEGOTIATED SOLUTION BEFORE ADVANTAGE OF TEMPORARILY STRENGTHENED ANTI-COMMUNIST POSITION RECEDES.

3. GENERAL LET DOWN IN VIET-NAM, WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM SOFTENING OF OUR STAND IN LAOS JUST AFTER WE HAD MADE GREAT SHOW OF FIRMNESS VIS-A-VIS COMMUNISTS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ERODE KHANH'S PERSONAL POSITION, WITH PROSPECTS OF INCREASED POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND COUP PLOTTING.

4. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT OUR RETALIATORY ACTION IN GULF OF TONKIN IS IN EFFECT AN ISOLATED US-DRV INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH THIS
CFN 2. 3. 4.

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~

HAS RELATION, AS AMB STEVENSON HAS POINTED OUT, TO LARGER PROBLEM OF DRV AGGRESSION BY SUBVERSION IN VIET-NAM AND LAOS, WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET COME TO GRIPS IN A FORCEFUL WAY WITH DRV OVER THE ISSUE OF THIS LARGER AND MUCH MORE COMPLEX PROBLEM. INSTEAD, WE ARE ENGAGED, BOTH IN VIET-NAM AND LAOS, IN PROXY ACTIONS AGAINST PROXY AGENTS OF DRV. IF, AS BOTH KHANH AND SOUVANNA HOPE, WE ARE TO PARLAY THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR RECENT CLASH WITH THE DRV

INTO ACTIONS WHICH SPECIFICALLY DIRECT THEMSELVES AGAINST DRV VIOLATIONS OF THE 1954 AND 1962 AGREEMENTS, WE MUST AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED IN POLITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WHICH WILL TIE OUR HANDS AND INHIBIT OUR ACTION. FOR EXAMPLE, ANY EFFORT TO UNDERTAKE CREDIBLE JOINT PLANNING OPERATIONS WITH GVN RE INTERDICTORY AIR STRIKES UPON INFILTRATION NETWORK IN SOUTHERN DRV AND ESPECIALLY IN PANHANDLE WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNDERCUT IF WE WERE ENGAGED IN CONF DISCUSSING THE LAOS TERRITORY IN QUESTION.

5. SIMILARLY, IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT SOUVANNA'S WILLINGNESS TO HOLD FAST ON PRE-CONDITIONS OR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BEARS DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO HIS ASSESSMENT OF US WILLINGNESS TO MEET THE PROBLEM WHERE IT ORIGINATES - IN NORTH VIETNAM ITSELF. THIS FACT SHINES CLEARLY THROUGH HIS RECENT BRIEF LETTER TO PRES JOHNSON. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO ASSUME THAT KHANH, CFN 1954 1962 5.

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~

WHO IS NOW IN FAIRLY EUPHORIC STATE AS RESULT OF OUR GULF OF TONKIN ACTION, WOULD DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN SLUMP INTO DEEPEST FUNK IF WE SOUGHT TO PERSUADE HIM TO SEND GVN DEL TO CONF. EMB

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-363, August 9, 9 p.m., From Saigon

PREDICTION IS THAT HE WOULD RESIGN RATHER THAN SEND SQAN DEL.

6. INTENSIFIED PRESSURES FOR GENEVA-TYPE CONF CITED IN REFTEL WOULD APPEAR TO US TO BE COMING ALMOST ENTIRELY FROM THOSE WHO ARE OPPOSED TO US POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SEA (EXCEPT POSSIBLY UK WHICH SEEMS PREPARED JUMP ON BANDWAGON). UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SEE VERY LITTLE HOPE THAT RESULTS OF SUCH CONFERENCE WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO US. MOREOVER, PROSPECTS OF LIMITING IT TO CONSIDERATION OF ONLY LAOTIAN PROBLEM APPEAR AT THIS TIME JUNCTURE TO BE DIMMER THAN EVER. EVEN THOUGH PRIOR AGREEMENT REACHED TO LIMIT CONF, WE DO NOT SEE HOW IN ACTUAL PRACTICE WE COULD LIMIT DISCUSSION SOLELY TO LAOS IF OTHERS INSIST ON RAISING OTHER ISSUES. TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE, WE NEVER "WITHDREW" FROM ROOM WHEN DRV ATTEMPTED RAISE EXTRANEIOUS ISSUES DURING 1961-1962 CONF. INSTEAD, WE INSISTED TO CHAIR ON POINT OF ORDER AND HAD DRV RULED OUT OF ORDER. PROSPECT OF INFORMAL CORRIDOR DISCUSSIONS WITH PL, DRV AND CHICOMS IS JUST WHAZJGVN WOULD FEAR MOST AND MAY WELL INCREASE PRESSURES ON GVN TO UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATED SOLUTION SO AS TO AVOID THEIR FEAR OF BEING FACED WITH "FAIT ACCOMPLI" BY US.

7. RATHER THAN SEARCHING FOR "SAFETY VALVE" TO DISSIPATE CURRENT "GENERALIZED PRESSURES" SEA, IT SEEMS TO US WE SHOULD BE LOOKING FOR MEANS WHICH WILL CHANNEL THOSE PRESSURES AGAINST DRV;. SEEMS TO US "SAFETY VALVE", IF NEEDED (FOR EXAMPLE BY SOVIETS), EXISTS IN CURRENT UNSC DISCUSSION. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO FOCUS ATTENTION IN ALL FORUMS ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AS ROOT CAUSE OF TENSION IN SEA AND REINFORCE OUR CURRENT STANCE. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THIS STANCE WOULD BE MORE VALID DETERRENT TO ESCALATION BY PL/VM THAN ATTEMPT SEEK ACCOMMODATION WITHIN CONTEXT LAOS PROBLEM ALONE.

WHILE NOT RPT NOT SPECIFICALLY WITHIN OUR PROVINCE, WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT PL/VM APPEAR TO HAVE CAPABILITY OF RETAKING TERRITORY REGAINED BY RLG IN OPERATION TRIANGLE AT ANY TIME OF THEIR CHOOSING AND THAT THEREFORE "TERRITORIAL SWAP" ENVISAGED IN DEPTTEL MAY BE HIGHLY ILLUSORY. MOREOVER, ANY TERRITORIAL DEAL WHICH SEEMS TO CONFIRM PERMANENT PL/VM CONTROL OVER CORRIDOR AS AN ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO US WOULD BE ANATHEMA TO GVN AND INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS ACCEPT INFILTRATION NETWORK AS TOLERABLE CONDITION ON GVN FRONTIERS. SUCH SITUATION WOULD IN THEIR AND US MISSION OPINIONS VITIATE AGAINST ANY HOPE OF SUCCESSFUL PACIFICATION OF GVN TERRITORY.

GP-2

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 7.

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 2:44 pm 8/9/64

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 6:35 pm 8/9/64

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Bundy 57
WHL

~~TOP SECRET~~

56
Action

55
Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 364 PRIORITY
DOD 40 PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE 30 PRIORITY
CIA 33 PRIORITY

CONTROL: 6993 002
RECD: August 9, 1964
11:07 a.m.

INFO: CINCPAC 177

DATE: AUGUST 9, 10 PM

original filed in
Southwest Asia
Meeting folder -
Aug. 14
Cy# 3

REFERENCE: DEPTTEL 379; EMBTEL 285

E X D I S

1. WE WILL SUSPEND ALL OP 34-A ACTIONS UNTIL WE RECEIVE WORD FROM WASHINGTON FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF REVIEW OF SITUATION PLANNED FOR EARLY THIS WEEK. MIG 15/17 DEPLOYMENT NORTH VIETNAM WILL ADD SOME RISK TO AIR AND SEA OPERATIONS BUT, IN VIEW OF LACK OF ANY KNOWN NIGHT INTERCEPT CAPABILITY, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT RISK FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS AND DAY-LIGHT ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

2. LANGUAGE OF REF DEPTTEL INTERPRETED HERE TO INVITE RECOMMENDATIONS BEYOND SCOPE OF 34-A OPERATIONS. ON THAT ASSUMPTION, WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. MAINTAIN DESTROYER PATROLS IN GULF OF TONKIN AND EXECUTE CONTINUING AIRSWEEPS INTERNATIONAL WATERS WITH AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE DRV BOATS AND AIRCRAFT UNDER RELAXED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RECENT ATTACKS OF THE DRV ON US VESSELS. REVIEW FOR POSSIBLE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
B. AND C. OF EMBTEL 285.

B. AFTER TALK WITH KHANH EARLY THIS WEEK, BEGIN US ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS IN LAOS PANHANDLE, PROGRESSIVELY ATTACKING MOST CLEARLY IDENTIFIED INFILTRATION INSTALLATIONS. THESE MISSION SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY TO STRIKE SPECIFIED FIXED TARGETS, TO ATTACK ROAD TRAFFIC IN SPECIFIED AREAS AND TO CONDUCT FIRE-SUPPRESSIVE ATTACKS WITH APPROPRIATE ORDNANCE AGAINST ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES AS NJDED. ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT REGARDING FLIGHTS WOULD STRESS THE NEED TO PROTECT OUR RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND AVOID ANY OTHER COMMENT ON OPERATIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority STATE 6-9-75
By MIE, NARS, Date 6-17-75

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 364, AUGUST 9, 10 AM. FROM: SAIGON.

C. EXECUTE APPROPRIATE INCREMENTS (PARTICULARLY AGAINST TARGETS RELATED TO INFILTRATION) OF CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN AFTER COMPLETING FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

(1) SET FORTH PUBLICLY AND EFFECTIVELY THE EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED INFILTRATION AND CONTROL FROM NVN.

(2) COMPLETE NECESSARY JOINT PLANNING WITH KHANH.

(3) ESTABLISH EVIDENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION OF PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON TO WARRANT UNDERTAKING NEW MILITARY COMMITMENT.

IF THESE THREE CONDITIONS ARE MET, IT PROBABLY MEANS TARGET DATE FOR BEGINNING 37-64 OPERATIONS ABOUT 1 JANUARY 1965.
GP-1 . TAYLOR

GN 40 30 33 177 379 285 1. OP 34-A MIG 15/17 2. 34-A A.
B. C. 285 B. C. 37-64 (1) (2) (3) 37-64 1 1965 GP-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*~~SECRET~~

54

Action

SS

Info

NNNNZCZCMJA471ZCZCMJA*ZCZCMJA471JIA411

PP RUDTLN RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFGWP

DE RUMJIR 14A 091340Z

PR 091334Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS

RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG

RUEHDT/USJN

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY (365) INFO VTINE 29 LONDON 32
 PARIS 37 BANGKOK 31 OTTAWA 9 NEWDELHI 11 MOSCOW 10 PPHH
 57 HONKONG 51 USUN 36 CINCPAC 178 FROM SAIGON AUG 0,9 PM

006994
1964 AUG 9 AM 11 31 49

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

IN OUR REPLY TO DEPTTEL 378 WE ARE TAKING HIGHLY NEGATIVE
 POSITION ON COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED THEREIN. SINCE OUR REASONING
 IS BASED IN LARGE MEASURE ON CONSIDERATIONS OF EXTREMELY SENSITIVE
 NATURE, WHICH CLOSELY HELD, OUR REPLY NOT RPT NOT BEING SENT
 ALL ADDRESSEES OF DEPT TEL.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 365 29 32 37 31 9 11 10 57 51 36 178 9 9 9 10 378

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 2:42 pm 8/9/64
 Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 6:50 pm 8/9/64

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Authority NLS-82-220

By is, NARS, Date 11-9-82~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ *Bundy* 59

38-39

~~SECRET~~

Control: 7286
Rec'd: AUGUST 10, 1964
7:29 A.M.

126

Action

SVN
Info

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 366

SS

INFO: PARIS 38

G

SP

CINCPAC 179

L

SAL

PHNOM PENH UNNUMBERED

E R

VIENTIANE UNNUMBERED

FE

LONDON UNNUMBERED

NEA

MOSCOW UNNUMBERED

IO

HONG KONG UNNUMBERED

AID

NEW DELHI UNNUMBERED

P

OTTAWA UNNUMBERED

USTIA

WARSAW UNNUMBERED

NSC

NEW YORK UNNUMBERED

INR

DATE: AUGUST 10, 3 PM.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 00014821
By is, NARA, Date 10-29-97

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

CINCPAC FOR POLAD.

REF: DEPTTEL 179 TO PARIS.

RMR

RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PERRUCHE AND HIS STAFF ON ANTI-FRENCH DEMONSTRATIONS AND ON TONKIN GULF ACTION HAVE OFFERED GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW THEM OUT ON SUBJECTS SUGGESTED IN LAST THREE PARAS OF REFTEL.

FRENCH EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAMESE SITUATION IS THAT IT IS, IN ONE WORD, HOPELESS. FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICERS CLAIM TO KNOW FROM FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE AND FROM THEIR CONSIDERABLE RANGE OF VIETNAMESE SOURCES THAT GVN EFFECTIVENESS AND AUTHORITY ARE DECLINING RAPIDLY WITH NO POSSIBILITY OF REVERSING TREND. WHILE SITUATION IN COUNTRYSIDE SUPPLIES MOST ALARMING EXAMPLES OF GROWING GVN DECAY AND INEFFECTIVENESS AND VC GAINS, MINISTRIES IN SAIGON ARE MUCH LESS EFFECTIVE THAN EVEN FEW MONTHS AGO.

FRENCH USUALLY

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-2- 366, AUGUST 10, 3 PM., FROM SAIGON.

FRENCH USUALLY DESCRIBE GVN LEADERS AS INEPT, INEXPERIENCED, TOO YOUNG, CORRUPT, AND, MOST IMPORTANT, LACKING IN UNITY AND ALL TOO INCLINED TO FIGHT ONE ANOTHER. FRENCH REGARD VIETNAMESE ARMY AS HOPELESSLY WAR-WEARY, LACKING IN COMBATIVITY, BUT NONETHELESS THE ONLY ORGANIZED FORCE IN SV, FROM THIS FOLLOWS THE THOUGHT THAT SOME DAY SOON ARMY WILL LEAD THE COUNTRY OUT OF HOPELESS STRUGGLE TOWARDS SOME POLITICAL SOLUTION.

FRENCH REACTION TO RECENT INCREASE IN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR GVN AND PACIFICATION PLANS IS THAT THEY WILL CHANGE NOTHING. WHILE FRENCH ACKNOWLEDGE THE SOUNDNESS AND LOGIC OF AMERICAN PLANS AND FREQUENTLY VOLUNTEER HIGH PRAISE FOR COURAGE AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES OF AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISERS AND USOM PROVINCIAL REPS, THEY INSIST THAT THE "PATIENT" VIETNAM IS TOO NEAR DEATH TO BE SAVED. THIS APPRAISAL DOES NOT SEEM TO BE BASED ON NOTION THAT WE CANNOT SUCCEED WHERE FRANCE FAILED; FRENCH EMBASSY AND BUSINESS COMMUNITY PERSONNEL FULLY AWARE THAT FRENCH AND AMERICAN EFFORTS NOT COMPARABLE. ONLY OUTWARD SIGN OF RECRIMINATION IS SUGGESTION THAT AMERICANS, HOWEVER GREAT THEIR MEANS AND ENTHUSIASM AND DETERMINATION, SIMPLY HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN SEA LONG ENOUGH TO APPRECIATE EXTENT OF DECAY AND HOPELESSNESS.

WHEN ASKED IF HE REGARDED NFLSVN AS CONTAINING IMPORTANT NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS, PERRRUCCHE SAID HE REGARDED IT AS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF COMMUNISTS EXCEPT FOR FEW UNIMPORTANT FRONT MEN. HE COMMENTED THAT WHEREAS HE EQUATED NFLSVN TO VIET CONG IN HIS REPORTING, QUAI HAS REMINDED HIM THEY TWO DIFFERENT THINGS. HE ADDED THAT MOST FRENCH PLANTERS ALSO SEEM TO REGARD NFLSVN AS INCLUDING IMPORTANT NUMBERS OF NON-COMMUNISTS. HE ATTRIBUTES THIS TO ROUTINE VIET CONG BRAIN WASHING OF PLANTERS BEING HELD FOR RANSOM.

WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE PRESUMED QUAI AND ESPECIALLY DE GAULLE WERE THINKING OF NFLSVN OR HANOI AND PEIPING AS THE "VALID INTERLOCUTOR" FOR ANY NEGOTIATIONS TO END VIETNAM CONFLICT, PERRUCHE REPLIED DEFINITELY NFLSVN. HE RECALLED THAT DE GAULLE HAD INDICATED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 366, AUGUST 10, 3 PM., FROM SAIGON.

HAD INDICATED TO AMBASSADOR MILLET HIS SCORN FOR HANOI, AS REPORTED IN EMBTEL 1666 TO DEPT (NOTAL), AND HIS IMPATIENCE WITH PEIPINGS'S EFFORTS IN SEA. HE BELIEVED DE GAULLE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG NFLSVN, GVN, AND CERTAIN RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN SVN. PERRUCHE SAID FRENCH THINKING COUNTS HEAVILY ON ASSUMPTION THAT IF NFLSVN WERE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SERIOUS POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD MANIFEST LOCALISM AND REFLECT COCHIN-CHINESE POLITICAL PARTICULARISM MORE THAN MARXISM. SAID FRENCH LONGER-TERM THINKING AND PROGNOSTICATIONS ALSO DRAW HEAVILY ON THE DIVERSITY AMONG NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH VIETNAMS, AND REGARDS THESE REGIONAL DIFFERENCES AS MORE IMPORTANT AND MORE LASTING AND BASIC THAN SUCH DIFFERENCES AS THOSE BETWEEN GVN AND VC.

PERRUCHE SAID HE COULD EASILY IMAGINE VICE PREMIER DO MAU ATTEMPTING FEELERS TO NFLSVN. DESCRIBED DO MAU AS RESEMBLING THE CLASSICAL TYPE OF CHAUVINISTIC COMMUNIST. ADDED HE COULD NOT FORGET DO MAU HAD BEEN WITH VIET CONG (OR VIET MINH) LONG TIME. PERRUCHE SAID HE WOULD HARBOR NO SUCH SUSPICIONS OF VICE PREMIER NGUYEN TON HOAN, WHO HOWEVER ANTI-FRENCH HE WAS HAD LONG HISTORY OF ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE.

PERRUCHE COMMENTED THAT FRENCH NO LONGER REGARD DAI VIET AS BROADLY-BASED PARTY, WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED IT ONCE HAD BEEN, BUT RATHER AS A CLIQUE OF SELF-SEEKERS.

PERRUCHE EMPHASIZED FRENCH WERE MERELY OBSERVING AND ANALYZING ALL THIS AND WERE DEFINITELY AVOIDING ANYTHING RESEMBLING POLITICAL ACTION OR INTRIGUE. EMBOFF SEVERAL TIMES NOTED FIRMNESS OF AMERICAN POSITION AND COMMITMENT TO GVN AND TO BLOCKING ANY EXTENSION COMMUNIST POWER SEA.

GP-3.

NOTE: REFERENCE BELIEVED TO BE INCORRECT.

TAYLOR

DHP

~~SECRET~~

05549

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

55
Origin
55
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE

405

130

Aug 11 7 51 PM '64

INFO: CINCPAC

LIMDIS

Ref Embtel 388

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE 3.14.75
By KR, NARS, Date 3.24.75

Agree your conclusion removal Quat and Oanh from GVN.
Our main concern here is effect reorganization on U.S.
opinion. Quat only recently visited Washington and made
rather good impression. Oanh is, of course, well known in
both domestic and international economic community, and his
removal bound to have some adverse effect on confidence in
management GVN economic problems. Realize risks in U.S.
intervening too directly in support of individuals, but
nevertheless you may wish draw on these points when you see
Khanh as well as emphasize need for type of public explanation
which best maintains impression of stability.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:
S/VN:MVForrestal:caw 8/11/64
Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Michael V. Forrestal - S/VN

FE - Wm. Bundy (in substance)

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

MFG. 11-63

05580

034

53
Origin

SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON - PRIORITY 406

Aug 11 8 21 PM '64

INFO: Amembassy VIENTIANE 149
Amembassy BANGKOK 214
Amembassy PARIS 786
Amembassy LONDON 1048
AmConGen HONG KONG 174

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 82-220

By is, NARS, Date 11-9-82

Your 386.

LIMDIS

Your understanding is correct that Souvanna and Souphanouvong first have agreed to discuss ~~new~~ composition of Lao delegation. Souvanna has included in "first item" discussion of conditions which would permit convening of a Geneva conference (Vientiane's 275 and 276). We do not know whether Souphanouvong will balk at this or whether he may find some other reason for not agreeing to tripartite meeting.

Assuming tripartite meeting takes place, we agree with your analysis probable PL tactics on representation and with your judgment that Souvanna more likely to stand firm on pride than geography.

In answering queries from GVN, there is no objection to using arguments which you have advanced. You should also point out that we are not rpt not keen to have a 14-nation conference and, as is clear from septel to Vientiane on negotiating tactics at possible Three Prince' meeting, we would hope that

Drafted by: 8/11/64
FE:SEA:WCTrueheart:mas
Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy

FE - Mr. Green

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal

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that latter would be strung out over period of months.

Vientiane may have additional comments.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ Bundy 62

57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SVN

008727

Info

1964 AUG 11 PM 12 45

SS

G

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USIA

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CIA

NSA

DOD

NIC

RMR

VZCZCJIA545
PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 18A 11/0915Z
PR 110900Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BKGKOK
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (383) INFO CINCPAC
PRIORITY 186 VIENTIANE 34 BANGKOK 36 FROM SAIGON AUG 11, 5 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

VIENTIANES 255 TO DEPT.

CANADIAN DEL/ICC HAS RECEIVED REPORT DIRECTLY FROM CANADIAN
OFFICER WHO TOLD MAJOR TUCKER HE HAD SEEN CHICOM SOLDIERS IN
HANOI. THIS LATEST INFO INDICATES INITIAL REPORT, AS REFLECTED
REFTEL, HIGHLY EXAGGERATED. NUMBER OF CHICOM MILITARY SEEN WAS
NO MORE THAN 10-15. SOURCE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THEIR BRANCH OF
SERVICE OR GIVE OTHER PERTINENT DETAILS. GP-3

TAYLOR
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Authority RAC 00014822
By isa NARA, Date 10-29-97

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

63

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cy 2 abt

32
Action

SS
Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 8421

RECEIVED: AUGUST 11, 8:00 A.M.

Thomson

FROM: SAIGON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE 6-8-75

By MIE, NARS, Date 6-17-75

ACTION: DEPARTMENT 387

INFO: WHITE HOUSE 31

DOD 41

CIA 34

CINCPAC 188

DATE: AUGUST 11, 6 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

003

E X D I S

AM DISAPPOINTED TO NOTE FROM JCS 7328 TO CINCPAC THAT PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER PATROL IN GULF OF TONKIN NOT APPROVED AT THIS TIME. AS NOTED EMBTEL 364, WE FEEL THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE THESE PATROLS AT FREQUENT INTERVALS.

ALTHOUGH WE KNOW IN PAST SUCH PATROLS HAVE ONLY BEEN ON WIDELY SPACED PERIODIC BASIS, ARE CONCERNED THAT BOTH DRV/CHICOM

AS WELL AS GVN WILL INTERPRET PRESENT ACTION AS RETREAT IN FACE DEPLOYMENT OF MIGS TO DRV. FROM STANDPOINT COMMUNISTS, THIS MAY ENCOURAGE THEM TO RESUME ATTACKS WHEN PATROLS BEGIN AGAIN AT LATER DATE. FROM STANDPOINT GVN AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES HERE, IT WILL TEND TO HASTEN AND ACCENTUATE DROP IN MORALE WHICH RECEIVED MAJOR LIFT FROM AUGUST 5 ACTION.

INSOFAR AS "NORMAL REQUIREMENTS" ARE CONCERNED, IT SEEMS TO US PRESENCE OF MIGS IN DRV HAS RAISED PREVIOUSLY EXISTING REQUIREMENTS FOR PATROLS, INCLUDING NECESSITY CLOSELY FOLLOWING BY ELINT/DEVELOPMENT OF GCI CAPABILITIES IN DRV.
GP-1

CTN 38731 41 34 188 7328 364 5

TAYLOR
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*AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:46 PM 8/11/64

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~1. THOMPSON~~

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J. Ret.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

36
Action

Control: 8400
Rec'd: AUGUST 11, 1964
8:01 AM

55
Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 388, PRIORITY
INFO: CINCPAC 189, PRIORITY
DATE: AUGUST 11, 7PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE 3-14-75
By KR, NARS, Date 3-24-75

L I M D I S

034

COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO (NOW "PRESS OFFICER" FOR PM) CALLED ON JOHNSON TODAY AND WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF GOVT (EMBTel 355) SAID IT WAS NOW PROPOSED CARRY OUT THE REORGANIZATION WITHIN THE NEXT TEN DAYS. MINH WOULD BE OFFERED AMBASSADORSHIP LONDON, KHANH WOULD ASSUME POSITION CHIEF OF STATE AND PRIMIN OR PRESIDENT (IT HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED WHICH), PRESENT VICE PRIME MINISTERSHIPS WOULD BE ABOLISHED. TRAN THIEN KHIEM WOULD BE MADE DEPUTY PRIMIN FOR ALL MILITARY MATTERS AND VU VAN MAU DEPUTY PRIMIN FOR ALL CIVIL MATTERS. NGUYEN TON HOAN WOULD BE OFFERED MINISTERSHIP OF SOME KIND, NGUYEN XUAN OANH (JACK OWEN) IS NOT IN GOOD FAVOR AND IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE WOULD BE OFFERED ANY JOB! DO MAU WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BUT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE OUT. REPLACEMENT IS BEING SOUGHT FOR FONMIN QUAT, GENERAL DON WOULD BE RETAINED AND GIVEN JOB AS HEAD OF "MILITARY HOUSEHOLD". OTHER THREE DALAT GENERALS WILL BE SENT ABROAD AND GENERAL VY WILL BE SENT TO STATES FOR SEVERAL MONTHS TOUR IN ORDER ACQUAINT HIM WITH "THINGS AMERICAN" IN HOPE THAT HE CAN RETURN TO IMPORTANT JOB HERE. COLONEL TON WILL BE RELIEVED AS COMMANDER 7TH DIVISION. TRI, GC SECOND CORPS, HAS BEEN OFFERED POSITION AS DEPUTY TO KHIEM BUT HAS TURNED IT DOWN AND WILL PRESUMABLY REMAIN IN SECOND CORPS. APPARENTLY, NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO FOREGOING, EITHER GENERAL THI, GC FIRST DIVISION OR GENERAL XUNG, CG FIRST CORPS, WILL BE RELIEVED BECAUSE MISHANDLINGS HUE DEMONSTRATION ((EMBTel 378).

APPROACH WAS TO BE MADE TO MINH THIS AFTERNOON AND THAO PROBED

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-2-388, AUGUST 11, 7PM, FROM SAIGON

JOHNSON FOR OUR ESTIMATE OF MINH'S REACTIONS. IN REPLY TO JOHNSON'S QUESTIONS, THAO SAID KHANH HAD GIVEN UP HOPE OF WORKING WITH MINH AND LAST FEW DAYS ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY HAD BEEN RESTRAINED FROM ARRESTING SOME OF THOSE AROUND MINH AND UNDERTAKING "PUBLIC PROPAGANDA" AGAINST MINH. JOHNSONS CAREFULLY AVOIDED OFFERING ANY OPINION ON MINH'S REACTIONS OR VOLUNTEERING TO HELP PERSUADE MINH ACCEPT LONDON WHICH WAS APPARENT PURPOSE THAO'S PROBINGS AS WELL AS TO TEST WHETHER WE WOULD COME UP WITH ADVERSE REACTION TO REMOVING MINH. THAO SAID MINH WILL BE TOLD THAT IF HE WILL GET OUT OF WAY AND GIVE KHANH YEAR TO "STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT" MINH WILL BE INVITED BACK AND GOVERNMENT TURNED OVER TO HIM IF KHANH NOT SUCCESSFUL.

JOHNSON DID QUESTION REMOVAL OF QUAT AND OANH SAYING OUR IMPRESSIONS BOTH MEN WERE FAVORABLE. THAO SAID OTHERS ALSO FAVORABLE TO QUAT BUT KHANH FELT THAT HE "WORKED MORE FOR HIMSELF THAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT". HE SAID OANH DID NOT KNOW HOW WORK WITH OTHER MINISTRIES AND IMPLIED HE HAD BAD PERSONAL REPUTATION. ALSO SAID TRI DID NOT HAVE GOOD PERSONAL REPUTATION BUT WAS "A GOOD SOLDIER".

THAO SAID THAT TRAN LE QUANG IS WORKING ON CONSTITUTION. ALTHOUGH PROVISION WILL BE MADE EVENTUALLY FOR AN ASSEMBLY, NONE WILL BE FORMED AT THIS TIME.

CAS HAS SIMILAR REPORT FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THIS MORNING (FVS 10589).

BESIDES DISPOSING OF PROBLEM OF MINH, KHANH'S OBVIOUS PURPOSE IS TO CUT DAI VIET DOWN TO SIZE AND CONTROL POSSIBILITY THEIR HOSTILE REACTION BY NAMING KHIEM TO MORE SENIOR POST. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER KHANH CAN GET AWAY WITH IT. VU VAN MAU WOULD BE REAL ADDITION GOVT, BUT REMOVAL QUAT AND OANH WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE LOSS. IF HOAN REFUSES TO ACCEPT MINISTERSHIP HE WOULD BE NO GREAT LOSS BUT COULD BE UPSETTING INFLUENCE IN OPPOSITION.

ALEX JOHNSON AND EYE EXPECT TO SEE KHANH TOMORROW (AUG 12) AND WILL TRY TO GET DIRECTLY FROM HIM STATEMENT OF INTENTIONS. IF WE FIND THE FACTS ESSENTIALLY AS SET FORTH ABOVE (AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-388, AUGUST 11, 7PM, FROM SAIGON

THAO'S ACCOUNT IS CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INDICATIONS OF KHANH'S THINKING), I WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE KHANH FROM THIS KIND OF REORGANIZATION. I WOULD TRY, HOWEVER, TO SALVAGE QUAT AND OANH WHO WOULD BE BADLY MISSED AND TO STRESS NEED FOR CAREFULLY PREPARED PUBLIC EXPLANATION OF CHANGES AS REALIGNMENT OF GOVT MADE NECESSARY BY THE CONDITION OF EMERGENCY. OUR REAL CONCERN HERE IS OVER THE INEVITABLE SET-BACK TO STABLE GOVT WHICH ANY SUCH CHANGE WILL ENTAIL.

GP-3.

TAYLOR

MCA

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AUGUST 11 AT 9:55 AM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 9:55 AM

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06362

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Origin

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ACTION: **Ambassy SAIGON** 418INFO: **USUN NEW YORK** 372**CINCPAC****Ambassy LONDON** 1085**Ambassy PARIS** 822**CINCPAC FOR POLAD**REF: **USUN's 358****SC Viet-Nam**

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-82-220By is, NARS, Date 11-9-82

Aug 12 8 04 PM '64

DEPT has ~~member~~ concluded that if DRV did not attend or submit information in accordance "general understanding," there should be no more SC sessions on Tonkin Gulf situation. We made our points August 5 and 7, we had no desire for formal SC action, and statements standing on record leave us in good position. Resumption SC debate would have all drawbacks cited REFTEL, and the only advantage of renewed meeting, i.e., propaganda exploitation of DRV contempt for UN, can be utilized just as effectively outside Council as within. We therefore concur in USUN's recommendation REFTEL:

We assume from Saigon's 327 that GVN's agreement to proposal contained REFTEL 353 would, by extension, mean Vietnamese would be prepared let matters rest as they are with respect SC meetings per se. We also assume they would be eager get full value out of DRV stance vis-a-vis UN and therefore ready address letter to SC President along lines numbered paragraph 6 REFTEL; and we estimate such move would not stimulate resumption formal SC consideration Tonkin Gulf situation.

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:PMByrne:eu 8/12/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/VN - Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

S/VN - Mr. Coreoran

UNP - Mr. Buffum

IO - Mr. Sisco

FE - Mr. ~~Bundy~~ Mendenhall

P - Mr. Wright

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Authority STATE 3.14.75

032

By KR, NARS, Date 3.24.75

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 6A 12/0745Z
P R 120735Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 9 6 0 5

RECD: AUGUST 12, 1964
7:57 a.m.

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 392 INFO CINCPAC 192 FROM SAIGON AUG 12 2 PM
LIMDIS

REF. A EMBTEL 189

REF. B EMBTEL 171

SPENT AN HOUR WITH KHANH THIS MORNING DEVOTED
LARGELY TO A DISCUSSION OF PENDING CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL. I INTRODUCED THE SUBJECT BY
MENTIONING THAO'S VISIT YESTERDAY TO ALEX JOHNSON
(EMBTEL 189) AND EXPRESSING AN INTEREST IN HIS PLANS IF
THEY WERE READY FOR DISCUSSION.

HE INDICATED SOME ANNOYANCE THAT THAO HAS RAISED
THESE MATTERS BEFORE HE HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO
CF 393 192 12 2 PM A 189 B 171 189

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 6A ~~SECRET~~
BUT THEN PLUNGED INTO A DISCUSSION OF HIS INTENTIONS
USING NOTES WHICH HE HAD PREPARED FOR THE OCCASION.

A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION IS BEING DRAFTED, A COPY
OF WHICH WILL BE FURNISHED US ON FIRDAY. IT WILL PROVIDE
FOR A GOVERNMENT GENERALLY AS REPORTED IN EMBTEL 171,
CONSISTING OF INDEPENDENT LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND
JUDICIAL BRANCHES WITH THE MRC REMAINING AS THE CAPSTONE OVER
THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY WILL BE COMPOSED
OF 60 APPOINTED MILITARY OFFICERS (ALL OR MOST RETIRED), 60
MEMBERS ELECTED BY PROVINCIAL COUNCILS, AND 30 APPOINTED FROM
POLITICIANS, NOTABLES AND CONFESSONAL REPRESENTATIVES. OUT
OF THE 150 MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY, KHANH RECKONS THERE WILL

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-2- 392, AUGUST 12, 2 P.M. FROM SAIGON.

BE ABOUT 60 ANTI-GOVERNMENT MEMBERS TO FORM A LOYAL OPPOSITION. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH WILL NOT HAVE SOLE LAWMaking AUTHORITY SINCE THE EXECUTIVE WILL HAVE THE CONCURRENT POWER TO ISSUE DECREES IN TIME OF WAY OR EMERGENCY.

THE EXECUTIVE WILL BE HEADED BY A PRESIDENT (KHANH) AND A VICE-PRESIDENT (KHIEM) IN CHARGE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE APPOINTMENT OF VU VAN MAU (SZE EMBTEL 189) TO A SIMILAR POSITION FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, BUT THIS MAY STILL CFN 171 MRC 60 60 30 150 60 VU VAN MAU 189

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 06A ~~SECRET~~

BE IN THE CARDS. THE PRESENT MINISTRIES WILL BE ALIGNED AS DEPARTMENTS UNDER THE PRESIDENCY. KHANH IS PLANNING SOME CHANGES AMONG PRESENT MINISTERIAL INCUMBENTS TO OBTAIN GREATER UNITY AND COMPETENCE BUT WAS NOT INCLINED TO DISCUSS PERSONALITIES. NONETHELESS, I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO PUT IN PLUG FOR QUAT ALONG LINE OF DEPTTEL 388. HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY KEEP QUAT ALTHOUGH HE HAS TOO MUCH OF A PARTISAN DAI VIET FOR KHANH'S LIKING.

KHANH'S ONLY REMARK ON THE JUDICIARY WAS THAT IT WOULD BE INDEPENDENT AS IN US.

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-3- 392, AUGUST 12, 2 P.M. FROM SAIGON.

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 06A ~~SECRET~~
BUT THIS SOLUTION IS PROVING UNACCEPTABLE TO CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED
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CFN US XUAN I 378 TRI 88 TRI

PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 06A ~~SECRET~~
JACQUES.FOLLOWING THAT MEETING KHANH WANTS TO DISCUSS WITH US
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SUMABLY HAVE SEEN BY THAT TIME.

TAYLOR

BT

NOTE: ADVANCED DELIVERY TO S/S-O at 10:25 a.m., AUGUST 12, 1964
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA at 10:50 a.m. AUGUST 12, 1964

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SD425

PP RUEPWW RUEPIA

DE RUEHCR 9605 12/1450Z

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

RUEPCR/DOD

RUEPIA/CIA

P R 120735Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 393 INFO CINCPAC 192 FROM SAIGON AUG 12 2 PM

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1964 AUG 12 74 57

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Authority STATE 3.14.75
By KR, NARS, Date 3.24.75

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cc - Thompson 67

✓ Bundy

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 6A ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE THREE RUMJIR 06A ~~S Z C R E T~~

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PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 06A ~~SECRET~~

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~~GEN US XUAN I 378 TRI 88 TRI~~
~~PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 06A SECRET~~

JACQUES. FOLL

OWING THAT MEETING KHANH WANTS TO DISCUSS WITH US THE TEXT OF THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION WHICH WE WILL PRE-
^{SUMABLY}
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Control:
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AUGUST 12, 1964
11:49 A.M.

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FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 3991

INFO: BANGKOK 40
HONG KONG 60
LONDON 36
MOSCOW 12
PARIS 45
PHNOM PENH 63
VIENTIANE 38
CINCPAC 195

DATE: AUGUST 12, 7 P.M.

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REPORT FROM PERMANENT CANADIAN ICC REP. HANOI, JACKSON,
DATED AUGUST 10 INCLUDES FOLLOWING PARA:

QTE WHILE OUTWARD ASPECT OF HANOI REMAINS REMARKABLY CALM, THERE IS NOW EVIDENCE OF WIDER REACTION TO EVENTS OF AUGUST 5. TRENCH-DIGGING PROGRAM HAS BEEN STEPPED UP AND VIRTUALLY EVERY HOUSEHOLD WITHOUT A TRENCH SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BUILD ONE. HAVING BEEN DUG PARTLY UNDERGROUND OR COVERED WITH ROOFING MATERIAL, SOME NEW TRENCHES ARE QUITE ELABORATE. IN THE DENSELY POPULATED AREA OF "FLEA MARKET" THERE APPEAR TO BE UNDERGROUND NETWORKS OF TRENCHES. INSTRUCTIONAL PERIODS IN DISTRICT MEETING HALLS ARE TAKING PLACE EVERY EVENING AND ARE REPORTEDLY DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO CIVIL DEFENSE AND GENERAL ALERT. UNCONFIRMED BUT CONVINCING REPORTS SUGGEST THAT POPULATIONS HAS BEEN NOTIFIED THAT ATTACK ON HANOI IS IMMINENT AND THAT AUTHORITIES ARE CONSIDERING PLAN OF EVACUATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES ARE APPARENTLY TO BE MOBILIZED FOR THIS PURPOSE AND POLICE ARE TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT OUT OF CITY. SIMILAR REPORTS ARE EMANATING FROM PROVINCIAL URBAN CENTERS. REPORTS ALSO SUGGEST THAT SUCH UNRELIABLE ELEMENTS OF

DECLASSIFIED

THE POPULACE
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Authority RAC 00014823
By ica, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-399, AUGUST 12, 7 P.M., FROM SAIGON

THE POPULACE AS FORMER MEMBERS OF THE NATIONALIST ARMED FORCES AND TO LESSER EXTENT DISPOSSESSED ENTREPRENEURS HAVE BEEN ROUNDED UP IN LARGE NUMBER AND INCARCERATED. RUMOR HAS IT THAT SOME ELEMENTS UNDER SUSPICION HAVE SOUGHT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO SLIP INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE WHEN SURVEILLANCE MAY BE LESS EFFECTIVE. LOYAL CITIZENS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SHARPEN THEIR VIGILANCE AGAINST SUSPECTED ENEMIES OF THE REGIME. MILITIA UNITS ARE BEING DRILLED ON AN EXTENSIVE SCALE THROUGHOUT THE CITY AND PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS ARE IN FULL SWING. FOR FIRST TIME IN TWO YEARS HANOI BUREAU OF THE ICC HAS BEGUN TO RECEIVE PETITIONERS FROM LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL CONCERNS. UNQTE.

JACKSON GOES ON TO **NOTE** THAT PRESS HAS CONCENTRATED ON REGIME'S COUNTER-PROPAGANDA **AND** HAS CARRIED LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION ABOUT SITUATION. **BUREAUCRATIC** APPARATUS IS TAKING SOME TIME TO SET ITSELF IN MOTION. JACKSON **BELIEVES** THERE IS ELEMENT OF CONFIDENCE **IN** PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE **ATTRIBUTABLE** PARTIALLY TO IGNORANCE **AND** PARTIALLY TO PRE-CONDITIONING **FOR** SUCH AN EVENTUALITY OVER PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. (CUBAN AMBASSADOR WHO WITNESSED ACTION AT HON GAI WAS IMPRESSED BY **CALM** METHODICAL MANNER IN WHICH BOTH MILITARY UNITS AND CIVILIANS **REACTED** TO ATTACK.)

LITTLE SPECIFIC INFORMATION HAS BEEN REVEALED ON RESULTS OF U.S. **ATTACKS** OR NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS. HOWEVER, SEVERAL PRESS ACCOUNTS HAVE NOW APPEARED CONTAINING EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF HON GAI ACTION WHICH IMPLY THAT CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED. COL. HA VAN LAU, CHIEF OF NVN LIAISON MISSION TO ICC, HAS ALSO ADMITTED IN PRIVATE THAT THERE WERE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE AND THAT A VESSEL WAS SUNK, BUT SAID IT WOULD TAKE TIME BEFORE DAMAGES COULD BE ACCURATELY ASSESSED.

AS FOOTNOTE, JACKSON INCLUDED FOLLOWING OBSERVATION: "LATEST MOVE **IN HANOI'S** GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY IS REVIVAL ON LOCAL CIRCUIT OF A **TWO**-YEAR OLD CHINESE FILM **RELATING** EXPLOITS OF HEROIC CHINESE GUNBOAT IN ACTION GAINST **VICIOUS** IMPERIALIST WARSHIP."

GP-3.

TAYLOR

NAR/22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Handwritten signature: Ben Clifton
for info

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SS
Info

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 22A 12/1320Z
P 121112Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

1964 AUG 12 009706 AM 11 28 6

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY (402) AUGUST 12 6:30PM

REF: AIDTO 747

L I M D I S

US MISSION TAKING FOLLOWING STEPS RE VC CAPTURE GRAINGER AND ASSOCIATES:

1. ON BASIS IMMINENT FIELD INVESTIGATION, AND SUBJECT TO CONSULTATION APPROPRIATE SAIGON AND PROVINCIAL GVN AUTHORITIES, PLAN TO PREPARE AND REQUEST GVN DISSEMINATE LEAFLET ON URGENT BASIS EMPHASIZING THAT USOM EMPLOYEE'S JOB IS CIVILIAN, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IN NATURE, DIRECTED AT HELPING IMPROVE LIFE OF RURAL POPULATION, LEAFLET WILL ALSO OFFER REWARD (AS HAS BEEN DONE ON OCCASION IN PAST) FOR INFORMATION LEADING TO PRISONERS' RELEASE AND, IF POSSIBLE, WILL CONTAIN PHOTOGRAPH OF GRAINGER
CFN 402 12 6:30PM 402 747 1

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 22A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ENGAGED IN CIVILIAN ACTIVITY.

2. USOM AND CAS WILL CANVASS LOCAL ASSETS TO ENSURE THAT ALL AVAILABLE OVERT AND COVERT ASSETS ARE EMPLOYED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION REGARDING PRISONERS'S WHEREABOUTS, AS WELL AS INFORMATION RELEVANT TO POSSIBLE MEANS OF LIBERATING PRISONERS. (FOR EXAMPLE, GVN WILL BE APPROACHED FOR PERMISSION TO INTERROGATE TWO RECENT VC RETURNEES IN PHY YEN.)

3. MISSION IS PREPARING SOP'S FOR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES IN FIELD SETTING FORTH CONDUCT DESIGNED REDUCE RISKS OF CAPTURE AND CONDUCT AS POW. IN LATTER CONNECTION, WE ARE REVIEWING EMBASSY AND MACV REPORTS BASED ON ARTHUR KRAUSE'S EXPERIENCE AS VC PRISONER FOR FIVE MONTHS LAST YEAR, BUT WOULD WELCOME WASHINGTON AGENCIES' GUIDANCE RELATED TO ANY OTHER PERTINENT EXPERIENCES.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-82-220
By ics, NARS, Date 11-9-85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 402, AUGUST 12, 7 PM, FROM: SAIGON

4. IN CONNECTION ABOVE, IT OCCURS TO US THAT OUTPUT FROM WASHINGTON REGARDING ANTI-GUERRILLA TRAINING AT FORT BRAGG BEING GIVEN 23 NEW USOM EMPLOYEES (WHICH BEING GIVEN SOME PLAY HERE) MIGHT UNDERMINE OUR EFFORTS EMPHASIZE CIVILIAN CHARACTER OF USOM PROVINCE REPRESENTATION.

REGARDING REFTEL'S SUGGESTION FOR APPROACH TO ICRC, AGREE SUCH APPROACH DESIRABLE, EMPHASIZING CIVILIAN, ECONOMIC AND
CFN 2 3 4 23

IUE 3 RUMJIR 22A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SOCIAL NATURE OF USOM EMPLOYEE'S WORK. WE ARE ALSO SUGGESTING
THAT GVN PROTEST TO ICC AS THEY DID ON THREE CAPTURED
MISSIONARIES.
GP-3. TAYLOR
BT
CFN GP-3.

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 12:45 PM, 8/12/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 4:50 PM, 8/12/64.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

70

041

53
Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 9725
Rec'd: AUGUST 12, 1964
11:30 A.M.

55
Info

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 404 PRIORITY

INFO: CINCPAC 198

DATE: AUGUST 12, 8 P.M.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE 3-14-75
By KR, NARS, Date 3-24-75

EBTEL 393.

L I M D I S

AT GENERAL MINH'S INVITATION I CALLED ON HIM, EXPECTING HIM TO RAISE SOME ASPECT OF THE PENDING GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES REPORTED IN EMBTEL 393. INSTEAD HE SEEMED TO BE LONESOME AND WANTING TO FIND OUT WHAT IS GOING ON ABOUT TOWN. HE, TOO, HAS HEARD MANY RUMORS WHICH ARE ABOUT AND SENSES SOMETHING IS UP BUT IS NOT SURE WHAT.

HE HAD IN FRONT OF HIM A NUMBER OF FOREIGN PRESS NOTICES, SOME SPECULATING ABOUT HIS FUTURE. ONE WAS TO EFFECT HE WAS ABOUT TO BE CAHSIERED, ANOTHER THAT HE WAS TO BE MADE AN AMBASSADOR AND A THIRDS THAT HE WOULD BE RETAINED AS CHIEF OF STATE UNDER A NEW GOVERNMENT. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD HEARD SOME OF THESE RUMORS, INCLUDING ONE THAT HE WOULD BE APPOINTED AMBASSADOR. HE REPLIED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT IN TIME OF WAR HE WOULD NOT LEAVE THE COUNTRY. IF ANYONE WANTED HIS PRESENT JOB HE WOULD GLADLY EXCHANGE IT FOR A GUN TO USE AGAINST THE VC.

AT ONE POINT, HE STATED THAT AS US REPRESENTATIVE I WAS ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTING KHANH AS AN INDIVIDUAL RATHER THAN AS PM. I REPLIED THAT USG WAS INTERESTED IN PRINCIPLES AND PROGRAMS NOT INDIVIDUALS AS SUCH. RIGHT NOW OUR PREOCCUPATION WAS TO AVOID FURTHER CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND TO AHCIEVE SOME POLITICAL STABILITY.

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 2:25 pm 8/12/64
Passed White House, DOD, CIA 4:57 pm
NAR/22

TAYLOR

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

07063

Bundy

AUG 13 7 05 PM '64

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 432

Info

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

DOD has asked for names of persons in your party in flight from Saigon to Washington and on return flight. Although there has been some low-level press speculation concerning your return, no official announcement has been made to date. Unless story breaks earlier, we would defer official announcement until Monday, August 24, but would appreciate your views on timing in light Saigon situation.

END

GP-4

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 8-26-76

RUSK

Drafted by:

MVForrestal:caw:S/VN 8/13/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

FE - Wm. Bundy

WH - McG. Bundy (in substance)

S/S - Mr. Davies

SECRET

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FORM 8-63 D5-322

Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ Bundy 72

36
Action

55
Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:
Rec'd:

10718
AUGUST 13, 1964
9:08 AM

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 408
INFO: CINCPAC 200
DATE: AUGUST 13, 6 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE 3-14-75
By KR, NARS, Date 3-24-75

033

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

EMBTEL 393

QUAT ASKED POLITICAL COUNSELOR TO COME BY FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING FOR PRIVATE TALK. QUAT HAD UNDOUBTEDLY HEARD SPATE OF RUMORS REGARDING IMPENDING CHANGES WITHIN THE GVN AND WISHED PUSH A FEW OF HIS IDEAS AND INDICATE HIS WILLINGNESS REMAIN IN REVAMPED GOVERNMENT.

QUAT COMMENTED THAT GVN NOT NOW FUNCTIONING SMOOTHLY DUE ON ONE HAND TO KHANH'S SUSPICION OF CIVILIANS, PARTICULARLY POLITICIANS, AND ON OTHER HAND BY PARTISAN APPROACH OF MANY CIVILIANS TO CURRENT PROBLEMS AND THEIR PENCHANT FOR STERILE INTRIGUES. QUAT EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS ALL FOR KHANH, ADDING THAT HE PERSONALLY STRONGLY SUPPORTED KHANHS RECENT EMERGENCY DECREES. HOWEVER, IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION WAS HOW THESE STARK DECREES WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AND IN THIS KHANH COULD USE CONSIDERABLE HELP FROM HIS CIVILIAN ADVISORS. HE STRESSED THAT KHANH NEEDED GROUP OF SELFLESS POLITICAL ADVISORS IN HIS IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE WHO COULD HELP DEVELOP AND EXECUTE BROAD DN PROGRAMS. HE SUGGESTED CREATION SMALL GROUP AROUND KHANH WHO WOULD WORK FOR COUNTRY AND NOT PARTISAN INTERESTS, IMPLYING THAT CURRENT INNER GROUP DID NOT FIT THIS DESCRIPTION. QUAT OBVIOUSLY WISHED TO GET ACROSS THE POINT THAT HE WAS MOTIVATED /BY CONSIDERATIONS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 408, AUGUST 13, 6 PM, FROM SAIGON

BY CONSIDERATIONS OF WELFARE OF THE COUNTRY AND REPEATEDLY INDICATED HE HELD NO PERSONAL AMBITIONS AND WAS CURRENTLY WORKING AT ABOUT SFYAQMSSTZ# SPEED. HE STRESSED THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK IN HARNESS WITH KHANH PROVIDED THERE WAS MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO.

THE MAIN BURDEN OF HIS COMMENTARY WAS THAT IF KHANH HAS DECIDED TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT, HE SHOULD DO SO AT ONE FULL SWEEP AND NOT ON PIECEMEAL BASIS. FURTHER, KHANH SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT HIS NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD REMAIN RELATIVELY UNCHANGED FOR AT LEAST A YEAR AND THE CHIEF PURPOSE OF A CHANGE WAS TO INJECT AN ELEMENT OF GREATER STABILITY INTO THE ADMINISTRATION. QUAT OBSERVED THAT HE WAS DISTURBED BY STATEMENTS THAT THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT WOULD BE "PROVISIONAL" AND LAST FOR ONLY A FEW MONTHS. HE FELT THIS WOULD BE A MISTAKE AND THAT KHANH SHOULD AVOID THE TRADITIONAL VIETNAMESE TECHNIQUE OF MANEUVERING BEHIND THE SCENES TO ELIMINATE ONE MAN AT A TIME. QUAT SAID "IF KHANH FEELS MINH MUST GO, THEN MINH SHOULD GO. KHANH SHOULD LAY HIS CARDS ON THE TABLE".

QUAT HAD MANY UNKIND THINGS TO SAY ABOUT NGUYEN TON HOAN BOTH AS REGARDS HIS BASIC INTELLECT AND DISCHARGE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES. HE BELIEVED HOAN WAS INCAPABLE OF APPROACHING HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES IN A NON-PARTISAN MANNER AND THAT HIS DEPORTMENT TO DATE VERGED ON STUPIDITY. HE CONTRASTED THIS WITH HIS OWN REJECTION OF ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITY WITH ORGANIZED GROUPS. HE BELIEVED THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION IN WHICH THE INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICANS WORKED AT WINNING THE WAR. AFTER THE VC WERE UNDER CONTROL, THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME TO INDULGE IN NORMAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

COMMENT: QUAT QUITE CLEARLY WISHED HIS VIEWS TO BE PLAYED BACK TO KHANH. HE HAS BEEN ENGAGED FOR SOMETIME IN MAKING HIMSELF /MOST

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 408, AUGUST 13, 6 PM, FROM SAIGON

MOST ACCESSIBLE TO AMERICANS AND INDICATING AT THE SAME TIME THAT HE HOLDS NO STRONG POLITICAL TIES WITH THE DAI VIETS. IT IS AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER QUAT WILL ESCHEW POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BUT IT IS QUITE CLEAR HE IS MOST WILLING TO REMAIN IN A REVAMPED GOVERNMENT, PREFERABLY IN A POSITION CLOSER TO THE SEAT OF POWER.

GP-3.

TAYLOR

AD

AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

07366

73

~~SECRET~~

57

7366

Origin
SVN

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 437

Aug 14 12 59 PM '64

Info:

REF : A-65

SS

G

JOINT STATE/AID

SP

H

FE

E

IGA

AID

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

We are pleased that GVN showing initiative in vital land reform area. We concerned, however, that GVN's position not yet fully thought out and is perhaps beyond its present capacities, particularly those of stagnant Ministry of Rural Affairs. Diem's biggest broken promise to countryside was his land reform effort. Headlong rush into over-ambitious unworkable program could result in dreary repetition.

106

We are convinced that (1) GVN must face up to land question; (2) It must come through on its promises; and (3) We must offer every feasible assistance.

Suggest you approach GVN at highest levels and make following points in strongest terms:

(1) U. S. approves of GVN initiative in this vital area;

(2) We concerned that program not go beyond GVN capabilities and that it be grounded in local realities.

Drafted by:

S/VN: JMMontgomery: ss 8/14/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/VN - M. V. Forrestal

Clearances:

S/VN - Mr. Corcoran (draft)
AID/VN - Mr. Cody (draft)
AID/FE - Mr. Poats (draft)

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~~SECRET~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

Authority NLJ 82-220

By ms, NARS, Date 11-9-82

~~SECRET~~

It is absolutely essential that GVN lives up to its promises;

(3) We strongly urge that appropriate GVN officials avail themselves of expert advice which we can provide. FYI At moment we suggest Vernon Ruttan, but our minds open, You authorized request his TDY from Manila if you desire. End FYI

(4) We realize proper implementation may place heavy requirements on GVN's technical and financial resources. If such becomes evident in joint discussions, USG stands ready to provide appropriate assistance, including meeting import demand stimulated by further increase in GVN deficit.

FYI We believe above is consonant with concern on Land Reform expressed in RAND report, and in subsequent staff discussions here, in light of current GVN pronouncements on subject. END FYI

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

74-1

Defense Cables

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

51

8009

106

Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 439 IMMEDIATE
Amembassy VIENTIANE 157 IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

14 7 50 PM '64

EXDIS EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS AND ADMIRAL SHARP.
DECLASSIFIED

State/Defense Message

Authority STATE 6.9.75

Saigon pass Johnson, Westmoreland, and Sullivan only.

By MIE, NARS, Date 6.17.75

CINCPAC for selected senior staff only.

Following are key points tentative high level paper on next courses of action in Southeast Asia. Request addressee comments by Tuesday morning for further review and refinement.

SUMMARY

I. INTRODUCTION

The next ten days to two ~~week~~ weeks should be short holding phase in which we would avoid actions that would in any way take onus off Communist side for escalation.

We will not send ~~the~~ DESOTO patrol back, will hold up on new 34A operations (continuing only essential re-supply of air-dropped missions, plus relatively safe leaflet ~~the~~ drops), but will continue intensive reconnaissance of DRV and Panhandle (PDJ if necessary). Within Laos,

Drafted by:

FE: WPBundy/bmm/8/14

Clearances:

The Secretary (substance)

DoD: Secretary McNamara (substance); ISA-Mr. McNaughton; JCS-Gen. Wheeler

White House: McGeorge Bundy (substance)

s/s -

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

W. P. Bundy

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal

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~~TOP SECRET~~

attempt secure Phou Kout ~~just~~ would continue (napalm use discretion of Unger) as would T-28 operations and consolidation Triangle gains, but no further military action would be done or indicated. In view possible Communist moves in Laos, road watch and other intelligence efforts should be intensified ~~accepting~~ accepting some greater risks.

We not yet sure what Communist side may do in this period. They have introduced aircraft into North Vietnam and may well send in at least token ground forces. VC activity could step up markedly any moment. Although volume Chicom propaganda and demonstrations ominous, it does not yet clearly suggest any further moves; if they were made, we would act accordingly. This paper assumes Communist side does not go beyond above.

II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN SITUATION

rpt not

A. South Vietnam not/going well. Mission's monthly report (Saigon 377) expresses hope significant gains by end of year. But also says Khanh's chances of staying in power are only 50-50, that leadership (though not so much people or army) has symptoms defeatism and hates prospect of slugging it out within country, that there will be mounting pressures for wider action "which, if resisted, will create frictions and irritations which could lead local politicians to serious consideration negotiated solution or local ~~X~~ soldiers to military adventure without US consent."

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In other words, even if situation in our view does go bit better, we have major problem maintaining morale. Our actions of last week lifted that morale temporarily, but also aroused expectations, and morale could easily sag back again if VC have successes and we do nothing further.

B. Laos on other hand has shown real military progress -- so much so ~~that~~ that Communist retaliatory move is real possibility. If Phou Kout can be secured, present military areas of control are if anything better for Souvanna than line of last April. T-28 operations have been major factor and really hurt PL morale. Souvanna's internal position also stronger, though right-wing generals and colonels could make ~~fools~~ fools of themselves any time.

C Laos negotiations may start to move in near future whatever we do. Souvanna has accepted tripartite meeting in Paris, and suggested August 24. With gains in hand, he already indicated he likely not insist on previous precondition of Communist withdrawal from PDJ before agreeing to 14-nation conference. USSR (at least publicly), India, and France -- and UK and Canada only slightly less so -- pressing for conference or at least clear motion toward one. Souphanouvong's silence and other indicators suggest Communist side may still not accept early tripartite meeting or push for conference but we must recognize that, if they do accept tripartite, it

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it will be real step toward eventual conference. We can and will urge Souvanna go slow, but our control limited.

D. Hanoi and Peiping as of now certainly not persuaded they must abandon efforts in South Vietnam and Laos. US response to North Vietnamese naval attacks undoubtedly convinced Communist side we will act strongly where US force ^{units} ~~units~~ directly involved -- as they have previously seen in our handling Laos reconnaissance. But in ~~in~~ other respects Communist side may not be so persuaded we prepared take stronger actions, either in response infiltration into SVN or VC ~~and~~ activity. Communists probably believe we might counter air action in Laos quite firmly but we would not wish be drawn into ground action there.

III. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF US POLICY

A. South Vietnam still main theater. Morale and momentum there must be maintained. This means:

1. There advantage devising best possible means of action that for minimum risks get maximum results in terms of SVN morale and pressure on DRV.

2. We must continue oppose any Vietnam conference and must play prospect of Laos conference very carefully. We must particularly avoid any impression rushing to Laos conference ~~and~~ and must show posture

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general firmness into which eventual Laos conference might fit without serious loss.

3. We particularly need keep our hands free for at least limited measures against Laos infiltration ~~xxxx~~ areas.

B. It is in our interest stabilize Laos situation as between Government forces and Communist side, and reduce chances of Communist escalating move on this front. (If such move comes, we must meet it firmly. We should also be stepping up Thai support deter and prevent any Communist nibbles.) However, Souvanna should not give up his strong cards, particularly T-28 operations, without getting full price for them. Moreover, we must seek reduce as much as possible inhibiting effect any Laos talks on actions against Panhandle.

C. Basically solution in both South Vietnam and Laos will require combination military pressure and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peiping) eventually accept idea of getting out. Negotiation without continued military action will not achieve our objectives in foreseeable future. But military ~~po~~ pressures could be accompanied by attempts communicate with Hanoi and perhaps Peiping -- through third-country channels, through side conversations around Laos negotiations of any sort-- provided always that we make clear both to Communists and South Vietnam

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that military pressure will continue until we have achieved our objectives. After, but only after, we have established clear pattern pressure hurting DRV and leaving no doubts in South Vietnam of our resolve, we could even accept conference broadened to include Vietnam issue. (UN now looks to be out as communication ~~forum~~ forum though this could conceivably change.)

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IV. TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS

A. Limited Pressures (late August tentatively through December)

There are a number of limited actions we could take that would tend to maintain our initiative and morale of GVN and Khanh, but that would not involve major risks of escalation. Such actions could be such as to foreshadow stronger measures to come, though they would not in themselves go far to change Hanoi's basic actions.

1. 34 A Operations could be overtly acknowledged and justified by GVN.

Marine operations could be strongly defended on basis of continued DRV sea infiltration, and successes could be publicized. Leaflet operations could also be admitted and defended, again on grounds of meeting DRV efforts in South, and their impunity (we hope) would tend to have its own morale value in both Vietnams. Air-drop operations are more doubtful; their justification is good but less clear than other operations, and successes have been few. With the others admitted, they could be left to speak for themselves--and of course security would forbid any mention of specific operations before they succeeded.

2. Joint US/GVN planning already covers possible actions against DRV and the Panhandle. It can be used in itself to maintain morale of GVN leadership, as well as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves. With 34A surfaced, it could be put right into same planning framework. We would

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not ourselves publicize this planning, but it could be leaked (as it probably would anyway) with desirable effects in Hanoi and elsewhere.

3. Stepped-up training of Vietnamese on jet aircraft should now be undertaken in any event in light of presence of MIG's in North Vietnam. JCS are preparing a plan, and existence of this training could be publicized both for its morale effect in GVN and as a signal to Hanoi of possible future action.

4. Cross-border operations into Panhandle could be conducted on a limited scale. To be successful, ground operations would have to be so large in scale as to be beyond what GVN can spare, and we should not at this time consider major US or Thai ground action from Thai side. But for air operations there are at least a few worthwhile targets in infiltration areas, and these could be hit by GVN air. US reconnaissance missions in Panhandle would of course continue in any event; suppressive missions might be considered at some point, but not until after GVN has acted in this area. (Our Panhandle reconnaissance does not have the justification of a request from Souvanna, as our PDJ operations do.) Probably we should avoid publicity on air operations so as not to embarrass Souvanna; Communist side might squawk, but in past they have been silent on this area.

5. DESOTO patrols could be reintroduced at some point. Both for present purposes and to maintain credibility of our account of events of last

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week, they must be clearly dissociated from 34A operations both in fact and in physical appearance. In terms of course patterns, we should probably avoid penetrations of 11 miles or so and stay at least 20 miles off; whatever the importance of asserting our view of territorial waters, it is less than international drawbacks of appearing to provoke attack unduly. The 20-mile distance would not appreciably change chances of a North Vietnamese reaction, while it would deprive them of a propaganda argument (since a great many other countries also assert a 12-mile territorial waters limit.)

6. Specific tit-for-tat actions of opportunity ~~xxx~~ could be undertaken for any special VC or DRV activity. As Saigon 377 points out, VC have "unused dirty tricks" such as mining (or attacks) in Saigon River, sabotage of major POL stocks, and terrorist attacks on US dependents. First two, at least, would lend themselves to prompt and precise reprisal, e. g., by mining Haiphong channel and attacking Haiphong POL storage.

7. US Dependents. This has two aspects. If there were substantial terrorism against our dependents, we should consider some specific reprisal against DRV; however, this has disadvantages in that it might appear that we were reacting only when US nationals were hit, and ignoring regular pattern of terrorism against South Vietnamese. Second aspect, whether or not there are terrorist attacks, is possible withdrawal of our dependents. If situation should

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reach another intense point, withdrawal might be useful in itself as signal to Hanoi that we were really getting ready for business.

8. Sequence and mix of US and GVN actions needs careful thought. At this point, we should emphasize both the GVN role in actions and rationales directly relating actions to what is being done to GVN. Overt 34A actions should be the first moves, and GVN would go first in air attacks against Panhandle. But there are advantages in other respects to actions related to US forces. If we lost an aircraft in Panhandle, we could act hard and fast, and of course similarly for any attack on DESOTO patrols. Probably sequence should be played somewhat by ear, with aim of producing a slightly increased tempo but one that does not commit us prematurely to even stronger actions.

Summary. Above actions are in general limited and controllable. However, if we accept--as of course we must--necessity of prompt retaliation especially for attacks on our own forces, they could amount to at least a pretty high noise level that might stimulate some pressures for a conference. New DRV air and AA capability may also produce incidents.

These actions are not in themselves a truly coherent program of strong enough pressure either to bring Hanoi around or to sustain a pressure posture into some kind of discussion. Hence, we should continue absolutely opposed to any conference.

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B. More Serious Pressures

All above actions would be foreshadowing systematic military action against DRV, and we might at some point conclude such action was required either because of incidents arising from above actions or because of deterioration in SVN situation, particularly if there were to be ~~clear~~ clear evidence of greatly increased infiltration from the north. However, in absence of such major new developments, we should be thinking of a contingency date for planning purposes, as suggested by Ambassador Taylor, of 1 January 1965.

End Summary

Among key questions above program are:

1. What is Saigon's best judgment whether it would maintain morale GVN leadership?
2. What is Vientiane's judgment how much Panhandle action Souvanna could accept without danger right-wing problems or his general position? Would it help to establish early pattern suppressive strikes and GVN air operations so that noise from this area became familiar background music, or would such early actions impair Souvanna's position? How much would Saigon like to see done in Panhandle to help GVN morale and achieve useful military results?
3. CINCPAC views on military aspects and specific action sequence should be conveyed JCS. Your general comments also welcome.

GP-~~2~~ 1.

End.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

51

8010

Origin

ACTION:

AmEmbassy SAIGON 440 PRIORITY

Aug 14 7 51 PM '64

SS

Info:

INFO

AmEmbassy BANGKOK 239
AmEmbassy VIENTIANE 158 158
CINCPAC

006

EXDIS

Ref Saigon's 312, 413

Department approves confidential meeting
proposed reftels. Would hope meeting could sort
out various programs mentioned reftels and ~~may~~
pave way for coordinated U.S. effort and effective
cooperation between GVN, RLG and RTG, and would be
follow-up your comments requested Deptel 439

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014824
By lis, NARA, Date 10-29-97

Drafted by:

S/VN: MVForrestal:caw 8/14/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Michael V. Forrestal *MVF*

Clearances:

FE - Wm. Bundy (in substance)

S/S - Mrs. Davis

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

76

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31

Action

Control: 11789

Rec'd: August 14, 1964
7:08 a.m.

SS

Info

FROM: Saigon

ACTION: Secstate 413 PRIORITY

INFO: Bangkok 41
Vientiane 40
CINCPAC 200
DOD 43
CIA 36

DATE: August 14, 6 p.m.

002

EXDIS

Re EMBTEL 312, Vientiane's 263 and Bangkok's 164.

Am awaiting views of Department before proceeding with meeting which still appears to us to be desirable and useful. Johnson would attend along with one representative each MACV and CAS from here. Assuming Department's approval in principle would appreciate present views of Bangkok and Vientiane on dates.

From standpoint here August 20 would be convenient.

TAYLOR

REE

Note: Advanced delivery to S/S-O at 9:02 a.m., 8/14/64.
Passed White House at 9:10 a.m., 8/14/64.
Passed USUN New York at 9:20 a.m., 8/14/64.

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Authority NLS 82-218By ics, NARS, Date 10-14-82

INFO FOR U KKK

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DR RUMSMA 093 01235Z

Z 051229Z

FM COMUSMACV & US EMBASSY

48210

TO RUHPA/CINCPAC

RUEKDA/JCS

RUEHC/STATE

RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ WAC J00 7425

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND MET AT 1130, 5 AUGUST, WITH GENERAL KHANH, GENERAL KHIEM, GENERAL THIEU, COLONEL THONG J3, JOINT GENERUP STAFF, GENERAL KY, COMMODORE CANG AND AND COLONEL KHANG, COMMANDERS OF VNAF, VNN AND VNMC RESPECTIVELY.

2. GENERAL WESTMORELAND EXPLAINED THE FIRST ATTACK OF PT BOATS AGAINST THE MADDOX AND THE ATTACK LAST NIGHT AGAINST THE MADDOX AND TURNER JOY, AND OUTLINED RETALIATORY ACTION BEING TAKEN BY THE 7TH FLEET AGAINST PT AND SWATOW BASES IN NORTH VIETNAM.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By JB, NARS, Date 8-27-76

Bundy F S

PAGE 2 RU1SMA 093 ~~TOP SECRET~~

3. GENERAL WESTMORELAND STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THE VIET CONG WOULD RETALIATE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT SECURITY AND OTHER MEASURES COULD BE TAKEN, SPECIFICALLY, MAXIMUM SECURITY SHOULD BE PUT ON PORTS AND AIRFIELDS, COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER VITAL INSTALLATIONS INCLUDING THE CHANNEL INTO SAIGON, AND POL STORAGE SITES. HE FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT THE R AF MOUNT A MAXIMUM EFFORT AGAINST THE VC TO THROW THEM OFF BALANCE AND DISRUPT VC RETALIATORY PLNS AND OPERATIONS.

4. GENERAL KHAN AGREED WITH THESE MEASURES AND STATED THAT *FORCES IN THE 1ST* ~~SUCCESS OF THE~~ 1ST CORPS AND THE TWO NORTHERN *PROVINCES OF THE* 2ND CORPS, AS WELL AS THE VIETNAMESE NAVY AND AIRFORCE HAVE BEEN PLACED ON MAXIMUM ALERT STATUS WHICH MEANS 100 PER CENT OF TROOPS CONFINED TO QUARTERS, TROOPS ON LEAVE TO RETURN TO UNITS, ALL ARMY UNITS STAND BY WITH ONE UNIT OF AMMUNITION AND TWO DAYS RATIONS AND BE READY TO MOVE IN 30 MINUTES. REACTION TIME FOR AIR FORCE 25 PER CENT OF AIRCRAFT ALL WINGS READY FOR TAKE OFF IN 30 MINUTES, THE REMAINING 75 PER CENT READY FOR TAKE OFF IN 45 MINUTES. NAVY-SMALL BOATS AND NAVAL CRAFT PREPARE FOR MOVEMENT IN 30 MINUTES. THE REST OF THE COUNTRY IS ON ALERT CONDITION NUMBER TWO WHICH

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 093 ~~TOP SECRET~~

MEANS ALL ARMY UNITS ON STAND BY READY TO MOVE IN 60 MINUTES, 25 PER CENT OF THE AIRCRAFT OF ALL WINGS READY FOR TAKE OFF IN 45 MINUTES, THE REMAINING 75 PER CENT READY FOR TAKE OFF IN ONE HOUR. THE NAVY - SMALL BOATS READY FOR MOVEMENT IN ONE HOUR AND NAVAL CRAFT READY FOR MOVEMENT IN 3 HOURS.

5. GENERAL KHANH STATED THAT HE WAS NOW ESTABLISHING A FIELD COMMAND POST AT CAP SAINT JACQUES. GENERAL WESTMORELAND EXPLAINED THAT A FIELD COMMAND POST AT NHA TRANG WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE TROPO SCATTER SYTEM BUT THAT HE WOULD HAVE HIS STAFF STUDY THE COMMUNICATION PROBLEM AND IN ANY EVENT MACV WOULD SEND A STAFF ELEMENT TO BE COLOCATED WITH THE HIGH KOMMAND OF THE RVNAF AT CAP SAINT JACQUES. GENERAL KHANH STATED THAT HE WAS ON THE VERGE OF ESTABLISHING A WAR CABINET AND A CIVIL CABINET SO THAT THE WAR CABINET AT CAP SAINT JACQUES WOULD BE FREED FROM THE DAY TO DAY ROUTINE BUSINESS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

5. GENERALL KHANH THEN STATED THAT DOCTRINE OF THE VC GUERRILLA INVOLVES PREPLANNING FOR A MAXIMUM EFFORT CAPABLE OF BEING TRIGGERED BY THE TRANSMISSION OF A CODE WORD. HE EXPECTS THAT SUCH A SIGNAL HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT FROM HANOI AND

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 893 ~~TOP SECRET~~

PROBABLY INVOLVES MASS SABOTAGE AND THE ASSASSINATION OF HIGH VIETNAMESE OR U. S. OFFICIALS. IN THIS CONNECTION HE STATED THAT GENERAL KHIEM IS HIS NUMBER TWO MAN FOR ALL MATTERS BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL AND THAT HE AND GENERAL KHIEM WOULD ENDEAVOR NOT TO BE TOGETHER AT THE SAME PLACE AT THE SAME TIME.

7. GENERAL KHANH STATED THAT WE COULD EXPECT A CURFEW TO BE IMPOSED IN SAIGON - CHOLON WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

8. AT THIS POINT GENERAL KHANH STATED AND TEHEN REPEATED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT IF EITHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OR THE CHICOMS ATTACK DA NANG, SAIGON OR ANY OTHER PART OF SOUTH VIET A. IN THIS EVENT HE STATED THAT GVN WOULD RETALIATE IMMEDIATELY BY AIR ATTACK AT TARGETS OF ITS OWN CHOOSING AND THAT HE DID NOT REQUIRE A GREEN LIGHT FROM WASHINGTON.

9. GENERAL WESTMORELAND SUGGESTED THAT GENERAL KHANH DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND CAUTIONED AGAINST A QUICK REACTION ON THE BASIS OF INCOMPLETE INTELLIGENCE. GENERAL KHANH RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF AIR ATTACK FROM CAMBODIA AND SAID THAT IN SUCH AN EVENT HE WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST PHNOM PENH. GENERAL WESTMORELAND SUGGESTED THAT IT

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 093 ~~TOP SECRET~~

WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT IN THE EVENT OF ANY ATTACK AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM TO COORDINATE GVN AND U.S. REACTION AND WE EXPECTED HIM TO INFORM THE UNITED STATES BEFORE TAKING UNILATERAL ACTION. GENERAL KHANH APPEARED TO AGREE BUT REITERATED FOR THE THIRD TIME WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT ON RETALIATION.

10. GENERAL KHANH GRANTED PERMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES TO BRING ADDITIONAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT INTO VIETNAM. SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED WERE B-57'S AND F-102 INTERCEPTERS.

11. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS CONVERSATION AMBASSADOR TAYLOR CALLED ON KHANH, DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHICH UNDERLINED NEED FOR CLOSEST BILATERAL CONSULTATION, AND KHANH TOLD AMBASSADOR TAYLOR THAT WE ACCEPTED FULLY THIS REQUIREMENT.

(EMBTEL 3#)

GP-4

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1964 AUG 5 22 59

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TO RUHPA/CINCPAC

INFO RUEKC/ANMCC

RUEKVDA/NECPA

RUEKMIJ/NEACP

RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPCR/NSA

BT ~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority JCS 6.9.75
By MIE, NARS, Date 6.17.75

Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS 7760 JCS SENDS.

SUBJECT: ARMED RECCE OF DRV PT BOATS (TS)

REFS: A. TELCON MGEN MILTON CINCPAC STAFF, AND COL STEAKLEY,
JOINT STAFF, JCS, B. JCS 7720 DTG 042119Z; C. JCS 7700 DTG
041433Z.

1. APPRECIATE YOUR DESIRE FOR MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION DRV PT
BOATS, HOWEVER, INTENT OF REF B WAS TO MAKE ONE-TIME EFFORT.
CONTINUATION THESE AND OTHER UNRESTRICTED OPERATIONS WOULD SERVE
TO PLACE US IN POSITION OF VIOLATING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND RIGHT OF
PASSAGE ON HIGH SEAS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL CAUSE.

2. UNTIL FURTHER DIRECTED, STRIKES AGAINST BOATS WILL BE TAKEN
ONLY IN SELF DEFENSE UNDER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTAINED IN REF C.

GP-3

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

79

44

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

Control: 2779
Rec'd: AUGUST 5, 1964
5:10 AMFE
Info

FROM: COMUSMACV

ACTION: CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

SS

SVN

G

SP

P

USIA

NSC

INR

INFO: OASD/PA PRIORITY
SECSTATE PRIORITY
PAO SAIGON PRIORITY

DATE: MAC 01 7395, DTG 050615Z AUGUST

MEDIA REQUESTS TO JOIN TONKIN FLEET

RMR

1. REQUESTS OF MEDIA REPS TO GO ABOARD UNITS OF 7TH FLEET IN TONKIN GULF PHONED TO YOU 03 AUG NOW GREATLY MAGNIFIED AS RESULT PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND RETALIATORY ACTION.

2. BARRY ZORTHIAN ASSURED MEDIA REPS AT MEETING 051200H AUG THAT REQUESTS WOULD BE REPEATED TO CINCPAC. SOME HAVE SEEN ACFT OF 7TH FLEET ON RUNWAY DA NANG SO CANNOT SELL ON BASIS THAT NOT FEASIBLE.

3. MOST IMPORTANT DECISION BE RECD SOONEST. OTHERWISE CAN EXPECT FLOOD OF CABLES TO OASD/PA ON SUBJECT.

HC

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 5:28, AUGUST 5, 1964

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80

INCOMING
MESSAGE

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SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
ROUTINE	ROUTINE

R 080133Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

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By JB, NARS, Date 8-27-76

~~SECRET~~

REWARDS FOR VIET CONG INFORMATION (U)

A. JCS 7517 DTG 222327Z JULY

B. SAIGON 322 TO STATE AUG 6, 5 PM

1. REF A STATED VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE WASHINGTON WOULD APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW PLAN FOR REWARDS LEADING TO APPREHENSION VIET CONG LEADERS PRIOR TO FINALIZATION.

2. CONCUR WITH RAF B WHICH REPORTS CONSENSUS OF U.S. MISSION COUNCIL THAT ENCOURAGEMENT SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT.

3. DOD IS REF B ADDEE.

GP-4.

BT

ACT.....J3-6

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J4-2 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2
CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 OSD-15 WHITE HOUSE-3 RRA-1
STATE-8 FILE-1 (82)TWG

DUTY OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		CITE NO.	DTG
WU/JKD	1 1		080133Z AUG 64

FORM NO
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

57

SECRET

Action

Info

55-21

CRF 318
PP RUEHCR
DE RUEPCR 80 12/1457Z
P 121456Z
FM JCS

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1964 AUG 12 AM 11 16

INFO STATE

P 112040Z

FM CINCPAC

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By JB, NARS, Date 8-27-76

TO RUMJIR/AMAMB SAIGON
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUHPG/CG FMFPAC
BT

~~SECRET~~ LINDIS

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, INFO GENERAL WHEELER,
GENERAL WESTMORELAND, ADMIRAL MOORER AND LT GEN
KRULAK FROM ADMIRAL SHARP

VISIT TO DANANG (U)

A. SAIGON 183 TO CINCPAC

1. BGEN DAVIS, CG NINTH MEB, DID ARRIVE DANANG 6 AUGUST
WITH A SMALL PLANNING GROUP. HE DID SO WITH COMUSMACV'S
KNOWLEDGE. PURPOSE WAS PRUDENT RECONNAISSANCE OF THE AREA IN

PAGE 2 RUHLHQ 1329 ~~SECRET~~ LINDIS

EVENT NINTH MEB WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ORDERED TO LAND. ALTHOUGH
MESSAGE TRAFFIC INDICATED HE ESTABLISHED A CP IN THE MARINE COMPOUND,
THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF EXERCISING COMMAND OR OF EXPANDING THE
VISIT BEYOND THE INTENDED PURPOSE. IN THIS CONNECTION THE TERM CP
INDICATED CONTACT POINT FOR BGEN DAVIS DURING HIS VISIT RATHER THAN
COMMAND POST. BGEN DAVIS AND HIS GROUP ARE ABOUT TO DEPART AND
EMBARK IN EL DORADO.

2. IN ADDITION TO ABOVE VISIT TO DANANG, COMUSMACV
REQUESTED CG III MEF TO PROVIDE REPRESENTATIVES FOR A LIAISON VISIT
ASAP IN ORDER THAT COMUSMACV WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSUME
OPERATIONAL COMMAND/CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IF AND WHEN
THEY DEPLOYED TO RVN.

3. APPEARANCE OF MARINE CORPS GENERAL OFFICERS IN DANANG IS
NOT UNUSUAL AND INVARIABLY FOLLOWS COMUSMACV CONCURRENCE. SUCH
VISITS OCCUR ON THE ORDER OF ABOUT ONE EVERY TWO WEEKS IN VIEW OF

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2- 112040Z, AUGUST, FROM: CINCPAC

THE FACT THAT MARINE CORPS UNITS AND PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED TO AND OPERATE WITHIN COMUSMACV'S AREA. WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU HOWEVER THAT MY MARINES ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR RECENTLY ASSIGNED ALERT AND DEPLOYMENT MISSIONS AND I AM QUITE CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL ACCORD THEM APPROPRIATE SECURITY. GP-4.
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 1:52 PM, 8/12/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 4:14 PM, 8/12/64.

SECRET

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42

~~SECRET~~

Action

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Info

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By JB NARS, Date 8-27-76

CRF 452

RR RUEHCR

DE RUEPCR 175 13/2036Z

R 132022Z

FM JCS

TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUHLKM/CINCPACAF

RUEHCR/STATE DEPT

BT

~~SECRET~~ JCS 7909 SACSAS SENDS.

SUBJ: PAN AMERICAN FLIGHTS INTO SAIGON (U)

REF: CINCPAC DTG 122252Z AUG 64

1. APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS REGARDING NECESSITY FOR CONTINUATION OF PAN AMERICAN FLIGHTS INTO SAIGON AND SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER THE ADVERSE EFFECT THAT CANCELLATION OF PAN AMERICAN FLIGHTS WOULD HAVE ON THE OVERALL US EFFORT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

2. THESE VIEWS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED INFORMALLY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND, AT WORKING LEVELS, ALL CONCERNED

PAGE 2 RUEPCR 175 ~~SECRET~~

AGREE THAT CONTINUATION OF PAN AMERICAN FLIGHTS ESSETIAL.

3. THE MATTER IS SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE VITENAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE EARLY NEXT WEEK. YOU WILL BE INFORMED AS TO OUTCOME.

GP-4

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 10:55 PM, 8/13/64.

HANDLED LIMDIS PER S/S-O.

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INCOMING
MESSAGE

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84
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PRECEDENCE (INFO)

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

P R 140319Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPHR/CINCUSARPAC
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 8-27-76

~~TOP SECRET~~

AIR AUGMENTATION SEASIA (C)

A. JCS 7853 DTG 112144Z NOTAL

B. CINCPAC 080154Z

C. CINCPAC 082205Z NOTAL

D. CINCPACAF PFOCO-S-64-1376 DTG 100300Z PASEP

E. CINCPAC 120320Z

1. REF A REQUESTED CINCPAC STUDY ON PACOM AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM AND COMMENTS THEREON. IN ADDITION, REF A REQUESTED ASSESSMENT REGARDING IMPLICATION ON PACOM AIR DEFENSE IN EVENT TWO F-104 SQUADRONS AND C&E PACKAGE REQUESTED BY REFS B AND C ARE NOT PROVIDED AT THIS TIME.

2. REF D IS DETAILED STUDY CONDUCTED BY CINCPACAF IN COORDINATION WITH CINCPACFLT AND CINCUSARPAC. THIS STUDY IS ACCURATE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT CAPABILITIES WITH MINIMUM CONUS AUGMENTATION. FORCES PRESENTLY AVAILABLE FOR AIR DEFENSE IN PACOM ARE NOT ADEQUATE TO MEET POSTULATED SINO-SOVIET THREAT. CLEAR WATER ACTIONS THAT WITHDRAW AIR DEFENSE ELEMENTS FROM PACOM, PLUS CERTAIN GOLD FLOW

63

ACT.....J3-6(1-6)

CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(9-11) SJCS-3(12-14) J1-1(15) J4-2(16-17)
J5-1(18) SACSA-5(19-23) DIA-4(24-27) NMCC-2(28-29)
CSA-2(30-31) CSAF-2(32-33) CNO-2(34-35) CMC-10(36-45)
OSD-15(46-60) WHITE HOUSE-3(61-63) STATE-2(64-65) RRA-1(66)
FILE-1(67) (67) TWG

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PAGE OF PAGES

MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

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CITE NO.

DTG

140319Z AUG 64

FORM NO
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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INCOMING
MESSAGE

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TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
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RESTRICTIONS HAVE DEGRADED OUR AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY. AS STATED IN STUDY, WEAPON SYSTEM BASING RECOMMENDED DOES NOT REPRESENT OPTIMUM POSTURE, BUT RATHER OPTIMUM DEPLOYMENT OF IN-THEATRE DEFENSE FORCES AND FORCES INDICATED AS BEING AVAILABLE FROM CONUS. IT DOES, HOWEVER, INDICATE WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR MINIMUM AIR DEFENSE OF US FORCES IN SEASIA. CINCPAC CONCURS WITH REPORT WITH COMMENTS LISTED BELOW:

A. PARA 7 OF REF D RECOMMENDS DEPLOYMENT OF ONE RP TO DONG HA, ONE CRP TO NAKOM PHANOM, AND ONE CRP TO QUI NHON. DEPLOYMENT TO PACOM OF COMPLETE C&E PACKAGE RECOMMENDED BY REF C WILL PROVIDE CRP AT NAKOM PHANOM. TO FULFILL REQUIREMENT FOR RP AT DONG HA AND CRP AT QUI NHON WILL REQUIRE DEPLOYMENT FROM CONUS. BELIEVE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL CRP AND RP BACKUP TO CLARK AS BATTLE DAMAGE REPLACEMENTS AS REQUESTED REF C IS PREMATURE. WHEN US AND/OR CHICOM INTENTIONS CRYSTALIZE THIS ADDITIONAL BACKUP CAN BE CONSIDERED FOR POSITIONING.

B. DEPLOYMENT OF RADARS IN RVN WOULD PLACE AN ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANT REQUIREMENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS IN BACK PORCH SYSTEM. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REALLOCATE SOME EXISTING CIRCUITRY TO SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.

C. PARA 1E OF PART V OF REF D STATES THAT US MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN ALL RTAF AC&W SITES ON A 24 HOUR BASIS. DO NOT RPT NOT CONCUR THAT THIS IS NECESSARILY APPROPRIATE SOLUTION. THAIS ARE OPERATING ONLY 13 HOURS A DAY DUE PRIMARILY TO SHORTAGE OF FUNDS. BELIEVE WE SHOULD INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING RTG OPERATE 24 HOURS A DAY DURING CRISIS.

3. WITHDRAWING F-104'S FROM RECOMMENDED FORCE DEPLOYMENT WOULD DICTATE SHIFTING OUR F-102'S SSUTHWARD WHICH WOULD DENUDE WESTPAC NORTH AIR DEFENSE REGION, REDUCE DEFENSIVE PRESSURE ON NORTHERN CHICOM PERIPHERY AND ENCOURAGE SHIFTING OF ENEMY FORCES SOUTHWARD. THIS WOULD BE IN FACE OF MOST RECENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WHICH INDICATE THAT SUCH A MOVEMENT MAY HAVE BEGUN. AT TIME OF LAST TAIWAN CRISIS IN 1958, F-104'S AND FLEET UNITS DEPLOYED TO TAIWAN CONTRIBUTED WITHOUT QUESTION TO FACT THAT CRISIS WAS MET WITHOUT NEED TO FIRE A US SHOT OR SUFFER US LOSS. WE FEEL THAT F-104'S WOULD PROVIDE A COMPARABLE CONTRIBUTION NOW & WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER AGAINST DRV/CHICOM MIG TYPE AIRCRAFT.

4. VALUE OF HAVING IN-PLACE AIR DEFENSE WAS VIVIDLY DEMONSTRATED BY OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE IN SEASIA. IT TOOK CONSIDERABLE

DUTY OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		CITE NO.	DTG
	2 3		140319Z AUG 64

JCS FORM NO
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INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

TIME FOR CHICOM'S TO DEPLOY DEFENSIVE FIGHTERS TO NVN, SO THAT US AIR STRIKES WERE COMPLETED BEFORE FIGHTERS WERE READY. WE COULD FIND OURSELVES IN SAME POSITION IN RELATION TO ENEMY STRIKES IF WE NEEDED TO AWAIT DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES FROM CONUS. ONLY FORCES IN PROXIMITY CAN RESPOND RAPIDLY IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS.

5. CRP AT NAKOM PHANOM IS REQUIRED TO FILL LOW ALTITUDE GAP AND HIGH ALTITUDE CLEARAGE BETWEEN UDORN AND DANANG RADARS. THIS ADDITIONAL US MAINTAINED AND OPERATED RADAR IN THAILAND WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY RELIABILITY IN THE TACS TO DEFEND AND CONTROL US FORCES IN RVN AND THAILAND WHEN COMMITTED TO OFFENSIVE AND/OR DEFENSIVE COMBAT AIR OPERATIONS.

6. IN SUMMARY, BELIEVE AIR DEFENSE POSTURE PROPOSED IN REF D (WITH EXCEPTIONS AS NOTED) IS MINIMUM RPT MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE POSTURE IN LIGHT OF NUMBER OF US AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED IN SEASIA. REQUEST DEPLOYMENT OF TWO SQDNS F-104 INTERCEPTORS, THREE HAWK BNS, AND C&E PKG. REFS B, E AND C PERTAIN.

GP-4
BT

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PAGE OF PAGES

MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

CITE NO.

DTG

3

3

140319Z AUG 64

FORM NO
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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86-1

CIA Cables

Viet Nam MFG 11-63 81
86

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM

TDCS -314/01346-64

DATE OF INFO. 6 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 6 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

SOUTH VIETNAMESE REACTION TO AMERICAN RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: AMERICAN OBSERVERS (B). APPRAISAL: THE REACTIONS WERE PROBABLY AS REPORTED.

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. SUMMARY. OPINIONS IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CIRCLES IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE AMERICAN RETALIATORY AIR STRIKE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ON 5 AUGUST 1964 WERE ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY FAVORABLE. MANY FELT THAT THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE WAS THE PRELUDE TO A FULL SCALE WAR, AND MOST EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AMERICAN COUNTERACTION WOULD BE EXTENDED TO HIT MILITARY TARGETS AND SUPPLY ROUTES TO SOUTH VIETNAM IN NORTH VIETNAM AND IN THE BORDER AREA.

2. TWO SAIGON BUSINESSMEN QUESTIONED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WAS FULLY PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA.

3. A SAIGON NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER OFFERED THE OPINION THAT GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH'S POLITICAL POSITION WAS DEFINITELY STRENGTHENED BY THE AMERICAN ACTION, ESPECIALLY WITH THE "INTELLECTUAL" GROUP.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO DDI

EX0

IMMEDIATE TO:

WH SIT ROOM	DIRNSA(PROD WO)	STATE (RCI)
CNO(OP922Y)	DFI/ACSI	NIC
DIA/CIIC	JCS	AFSSO

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ002-007-1-4
By 39/504, NARA, Date 5-23-74

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4. ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OFFICERS IN THE IV CORPS AREA REPORTEDLY WERE EXCITED BY THE NEWS, AND BELIEVED THAT IT MEANT THE BEGINNING OF A WAR (DRV) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM/IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD SURELY BE VICTORIOUS. THE WAR IN THE SOUTH WOULD THUS END FAVORABLY. A FIELD GRADE OFFICER OF THE VIETNAMESE SECURITY SERVICE SAID THAT HE BELIEVES NORTH VIETNAM WOULD SURELY REPEAT ITS ATTACKS ON AMERICAN SHIPS IF THE SHIPS REMAIN IN THE GULF OF TONKIN.

5. [REDACTED] STATED THAT NO FURTHER BOMBINGS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL NORTH VIETNAM REACTED. THEY ALSO REPEATED A RUMOR, CIRCULATING WIDELY IN SAIGON ON 6 AUGUST, THAT LE DUAN IS REPLACING (OR HAS REPLACED) HO CHI MINH IN THE DRV HIERARCHY. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THERE IS NO KNOWN BASIS FOR THIS RUMOR.)

6. GENERAL LE VAN TAT, CAO DAIST CHIEF OF TAY NINH PROVINCE, REACTED GLEEFULLY TO THE NEWS. WHEN HE INFORMED A GROUP OF FIFTY CAO DAI ELITE, GATHERED FOR THE DEDICATION OF A NEW GUEST HOUSE, THE ENTIRE ASSEMBLAGE, INCLUDING OLDER WOMEN, APPLAUDED AND CHEERED WILDLY.

7. A VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES STAFF OFFICER STATED THAT THE MORALE OF THE OFFICERS AND OF THE MEN ROSE ONE HUNDRED PERCENT AS THE RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTS. ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OFFICERS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE AMERICAN ACTION AND VIEW IT AS AN EARNEST INDICATION OF UNITED STATES DETERMINATION TO SEE THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THEY ALSO SAID THAT THEY WERE RELIEVED THAT THE POSITIVE MEASURES END THE MOOD OF UNCERTAINTY OF RECENT WEEKS.

8. FIELD COMMENT. THE VIETNAMESE GENERALLY DO NOT SEEM TO GRASP THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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TDCS-314/01346-64 PAGE 3

UNITED STATES ACTION AS LIMITED RESPONSE, BUT HOPEFULLY REGARD IT AS THE BEGINNING OF CONTINUOUS AMERICAN ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. THEY WILL ACCORDINGLY FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND IF, ON THE BASIS OF POSSIBLE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CONCESSION, THE UNITED STATES DISCONTINUES DIRECT MILITARY PRESSURES ON NORTH VIETNAM AND RETURNS TO FIGHTING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT RULES OF THE ENGAGEMENT. IN THE LATTER EVENT, THE EVIDENT BOOST IN NATIONAL MORALE RESULTING FROM THE AIR STRIKE MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY EQUALLY DRAMATIC SAG WHICH COULD HAVE SERIOUS PORTENT.

9. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

87

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE OF INFO. 6 AND 7 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 7 AUGUST 1964

POSITIVE REACTION TO U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
ON PART OF ARVN PSYWAR DIRECTORATE

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (7 AUGUST 1964)

REF 25X1A29

SANITIZED

Authority RAC 14828
By ics, NARA, Date 9-2-77

1. THE CHIEF OF THE PRESS SECTION, ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYWAR DIRECTORATE, CAPTAIN NGUYEN DAT THINH, SAID ON 6 AUGUST THAT THE NEWS OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAS RAISED MORALE OF ARVN 100 PERCENT. PRIOR TO THE NEWS, HE SAID, JUNIOR OFFICERS OF HIS ACQUAINTANCE WERE TALKING ABOUT JOINING THE HOA HAO BEFORE THE COUNTRY FELL TO THE VIET CONG (VC). THIS MEANS THESE OFFICERS WERE PREPARED TO GO INTO THE JUNGLES AND PREPARE FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE. THINH THEN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT A

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FALSE STORY BROADCAST BY RADIO VIETNAM TO THE EFFECT THAT HO CHI MINH HAS BEEN REPLACED BY LE DUAN AS PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) WOULD AFFECT ARVN MORALE ADVERSELY AND HE DEPLORED THE STORY'S PUBLICATION.

2. ARVN PSYWAR HAS PRINTED A LEAFLET, INTENDED TO PLAY ON VC FEARS, WHICH GIVES DETAILS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR STRIKE. THE LEAFLET STRESSES THAT THE AIR STRIKE MEANS VC SUPPLIES WILL BE CUT OFF; THE VC IN THE SOUTH WILL GET LESS SUPPORT SINCE THE NORTH WILL BE COPING WITH ITS OWN PROBLEMS. THE LEAFLET WILL BE AIRDROPPED OVER VC AREAS ON 7 AUGUST.

3. ~~DISSEM~~: STATE USMACV USIS USOM 2ND AIR DIV
9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM

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SANITIZED

Authority RAC 14829

DATE OF
INFO.

7 AUGUST 1964

By W

NARA, Date 9-2-99

AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

FURTHER SOUTH VIETNAMESE REACTION TO AMERICAN
RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

VIETNAM, SAIGON (7 AUGUST 1964)

SOURCE
AND

APPRAISAL:

AMERICAN OBSERVERS (B). APPRAISAL: THE REACTIONS WERE PROBABLY AS
REPORTED.

1. OPINIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE AMERICAN RETALIATORY AER STRIKE
— AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ON 5 AUGUST 1964 CONTINUED TO BE GENERALLY FAVORABLE
ON 7 AUGUST 1964, ALTHOUGH A NOTE OF CAUTION HAD EMERGED OVER THE POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM OF WHAT THE VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO REGARD
AS THE BROADENING OF THE WAR.

2. BIEN HOA PROVINCE CHIEF STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES STRIKES WERE
RIGHT AND PROPER, COMMENTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM CANNOT GO NORTH
WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES' HELP BECAUSE THE SUPPLY LINES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
ARE NOT SECURE; AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE THEREFORE ULTIMATELY
ABANDONED THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. HOWEVER, THE STRIKES IN THE NORTH HAVE
EASED THESE FEARS.

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18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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PAGE 2

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EXPRESSED HIS APPROVAL OF THE AMERICAN ACTION, AND NOTED THAT EVEN HIS BARBER WAS OVERJOYED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NOW SHOWN IT IS NOT A "PAPER TIGER." HE EXPRESSED SOME DISQUIETUDE, HOWEVER, OVER POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS IN THE FORM OF A WIDER WAR.

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THE DIFFERING OPINIONS OF THE EDUCATED ELITE AND THE MAN IN THE STREET ARE RUNNING TRUE TO FORM. THE CAUTIONARY NOTE REGARDING POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS REFLECTS SOBER SECOND THOUGHTS FOLLOWING THE INITIAL BOUYANCY. A FURTHER SOBERING OF OPINION CAN BE EXPECTED FOLLOWING PREMIER NGUYEN KHANH'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW, STRINGENT SECURITY MEASURES.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE USMACV AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

•PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

90

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM/SOVIET BLOC

25X1A

DATE OF INFO. 25X1C

DISTR. 7 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

COMMENTS OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE DIPLOMATS
CONCERNING UNITED STATES BOMBING OF NORTH
VIETNAM BASES

25X1A

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

25X1X

25X1X

1.

ON 5 AUGUST 1964, A MEDIUM-LEVEL SOVIET
DIPLOMAT AND TWO EASTERN EUROPEAN (SATELLITE) DIPLOMATS EXPRESSED
THE OPINION THAT THE UNITED STATES' BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
BASES ON 5 AUGUST 1964 WAS NOT AN UNPROVOKED ACT. THESE DIPLOMATS
ASSERTED THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW THE MOTIVE BEHIND NORTH VIETNAM'S
ATTACK ON UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN.

25X1A 2. COMMENT: THE STATEMENTS OF THE SOVIET BLOC
DIPLOMATS REPORTED ABOVE ARE PROBABLY EXPRESSIONS OF THEIR
PERSONAL OPINIONS BEFORE RECEIVING THE OFFICIAL LINE FROM THEIR

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : NLJ-002-007-1-6-8

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 002-007-1-6
By OP NARA, Date 4-1-03

~~SECRET~~

25X1A

PAGE

GOVERNMENTS. THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE SIMILAR STATEMENT OF MIRKO MILUTINOVIC, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TO BURMA, REPORTED [REDACTED]

25X1A

[REDACTED] 6 AUGUST 1964. THE OPINION OF LAZAR ZIVULJ (COUNSELOR OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN BEIRUT), HOWEVER, MAY BE CLOSER TO THE OFFICIAL YUGOSLAV LINE; [REDACTED] (DATE 25X1A OF INFORMATION--2 JULY 1964) WHICH DESCRIBES PRESIDENT TITO'S DESIRE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST CAMP AGAINST THE THREATENED SPLIT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA.

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: NONE.

25X1A

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : NLJ-002-007-1-6-8

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

TDCS -314/01579-64

DATE OF INFO: 11 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 11 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

PLANNED CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF VIETNAM IN THE NEXT TEN DAYSPLACE &
DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (11 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN 48090

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 10,589

APPRAISAL:

APPRAISAL:

IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH IS CONTEMPLATING CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT AIMED LARGELY AT PURGING SOUTHERN DAI VIETS FROM POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP, THE CURRENT MOOD OF SAIGON WOULD SEEM SUCH AS TO ALLOW HIM TO DO SO WITH A MINIMUM OF FUSS. THERE MAY, HOWEVER, BE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF DAI VIET GRUMBLING AND INTRIGUE AGAINST THE NEW KHANH GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED WILL ACCEPT THE POSTS.

1. GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN), HAS DECIDED TO MAKE EXTENSIVE CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS. AT 1600 HOURS ON 11 AUGUST CHIEF OF STATE GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WILL BE ASKED TO BE AMBASSADOR TO EITHER WASHINGTON OR LONDON.

2. OTHER CHANGES TO TAKE PLACE IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS ARE AS FOLLOWS: KHANH WILL NAME HIMSELF CHIEF OF STATE. IT IS AS YET UNDECIDED WHETHER HE WILL ALSO RETAIN HIS POSITION AS PRIME MINISTER. TRAN THIEN KHIEM, RECENTLY PROMOTED TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND NOW THE SENIOR OFFICER IN THE ARMED

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declassificationSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
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SANITIZED

Authority NLS 002-007-1-9
By SP/504, NARA, Date 5-23-14

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(When Filled In)

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TDCS-314/01579-64

IN 48090

PAGE 2

FORCES, WILL BE NAMED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS. VU VAN MAU, PRESENTLY AMBASSADOR TO LONDON, WILL BE RECALLED TO BE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR ADMINISTRATION. NGUYAN TON HOAN, CURRENTLY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR PACIFICATION, WILL BE GIVEN A MINISTRY (WHICH ONE AS YET UNDECIDED). NGUYEN XUAN OANH, CURRENTLY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR ECONOMY AND FINANCE, WILL BE GIVEN A MINISTRY. GENERAL DO MAU, AT PRESENT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR CULTURAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, WILL BE SENT TO A POST OVERSEAS (EXACT POSITION UNDECIDED.) COLONEL HUYNH VAN TON, COMMANDER OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND A DAI VIET MEMBER, WILL BE RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV USOM USIS 2ND AIR DIVISION
9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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(15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION I RT

95-1

USUN, Cables

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Harlan Cleveland

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Origin ACTION:USUN NEW YORK 291

IO INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 352
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DEPT concurs USUN assessment (reftel) that little chance remains recommendations UNSC Mission Report, especially that on Observer Group, can be implemented in view Sihanouk's back-pedaling and negative indications received from SOVS and French. However, we still want to see effective ^{UN} presence established. We believe best way of exploring further possibilities is to continue work on problem through quiet consultations ^{such as} ~~which~~ Narasimhan will be holding during his SE Asian trip.

Under circumstances, we would not wish to have SC meeting on Report in near future. For one thing, this would come on heels SC consideration Gulf of Tonkin incidents. Secondly, we still need clearer picture SC Members' attitudes towards Mission Report. Decision on whether SC should meet after several weeks could await results further discussions in New York and Narasimhan's trip. Ultimately, we would like in some manner to bring home fact of RKG intractability on recommendations impartial

Drafted by: IO:UNP:JWKimball:jk

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: IO - Harlan Cleveland

Clearances: UNP - Mr. Buffum
~~DOUGLAS M. BUCKLEY~~

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal
FE:SEA - Mr. Trueheart

(all draft)
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Authority NLS-82-220 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322 By iso, NARS, Date 11-9-82

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UN XIX Mission growing out of complaint registered by RKG itself.
We recognize disadvantages in SC meeting as outlined para 3 reftel.

For moment, suggest USUN inform Narasimhan our reaction to SC Mission report along following lines, prior his departure:

1. USG believes recommendations establish basis for constructive negotiations not only to reduce ~~it~~ likelihood incidents (subject original RKG complaint) but also to point up underlying cause these incidents;

2. We prepared give serious thought any concrete proposals for establishment OG or border demarcation/^{unit}~~unit~~ which may be exaggerated stemming from Mission's recommendations. We feel OG of composition and functions now being discussed by Secretariat working group is minimum which could be effective.

3. We also agree with recommendation that SYG best qualified to engage in soundings with interested parties and believe Narasimhan's trip to Phnom Penh (and hopefully to Saigon) will be useful to this end.

4. In view foregoing, SC Meeting on Mission report would not appear necessary or useful for time being.

END

GP- 3

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1552

Aug 3, 1964

1:30 a.m.

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Origin

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK 282

IO

Info:

AMBASSADOR

FOR/ STEVENSON ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~*Bundy*

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AIR

SUBJECT: Security Council Meeting on Torpedo
Boat Incidents

Following is general guidance and suggestions for SC meeting Wednesday morning. Additional memo on legal aspects in septel.

1. We are coming to the SC to report a threat to the peace, and to report the action we have felt necessary to take as a responsible member of the world community. Although an attack on a U.S. destroyer in international waters is clearly an armed attack on our nation within the meaning of Article 51, our case for UN concern rests more broadly on Charter doctrine that all governments have responsibility to refrain from aggression and armed attack. We are not angry, but sorrowful. It is not, (as one TV commentator tonight called it) "a drastic retaliatory action", but rather a measured response fitted precisely to the challenge

Drafted by:

IO:HCleveland:pq

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

S/S - Mr. Christensen

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Authority RAC 00014836

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8-63DS-322 By *is*, NARA, Date *10-29-97*

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that produced it. Above all, it is not repeat not beginning of some/general operation against DRV, but a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that U.S. can not be diverted by military action from its obligation to help its friends establish ~~their~~ and protect their independence.

2. We hope you can encourage other friendly members of SC to make appropriate statements of support. It seems to us that there are five clear votes (US, UK, GRC, Brazil and Bolivia) against any unsatisfactory proposition, but that seven votes are probably lacking for condemnatory res. French, who as usual are swing vote, may take occasion to plug for Geneva Conference; desire to heat up atmosphere in order to get a Geneva Conference may indeed be one of ~~DRV~~ DRV Hanoi and Peking motivations in this affair.

3. In the event ~~the~~ North Viet-Nameese ask to be ~~heard~~ heard, suggest you not oppose but try to arrange so that they are heard under Rule 39 (under which SC "may invite...persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence".) In these circumstances,

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believe Government of South Viet-Nam should also be invited to
appear, not under Rule 2 39 but as government of non-member state/
concerned.

4. As in Cambodian border case, every occasion should be taken to emphasize (a) general context of Geneva Agreements violated by communists ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ and (b) our desire for enforceable peace and assured independence as only motive our military assistance to SVN and our military activity in the area.

5. We do not see any need for seeking formal action of SC and would be satisfied to have SC conclude with no resolution. However, following is suggested draft resolution for possible tactical use in event hostile resolution proposed by Soviets or some other SC member. It is too early to make any definitive judgment as to whether, in absence of hostile resolution, it would be politically desirable to put forward such a resolution, since this would depend in part on amount of support we could get from other Council members as well as what counter-measures, if any, other side may take in response to our retaliation.

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We recognize that resolution put forward by others would undoubtedly include even handed appeal to both sides to refrain from any action which might exacerbate situation. For this reason, we have included in suggested resolution paragraph along these lines which would be acceptable to us and avoids fixing blame on United States.

Text of resolution follows:

QUOTE The Security Council

Having considered the complaint of the United States, ~~against the~~

~~Democratic Republic of Vietnam;~~

North Vietnamese have

Noting that the ~~DRV have~~ launched unprovoked attacks on American naval vessels in international waters,

Noting further the ~~measures~~ measures taken by the United States,

Concerned that the continuation of the present situation could lead to a serious threat to peace in the area,

Condemns the attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. ships;

Calls on the Hanoi regime to respect the freedom of use of the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations, and to cease and desist from any further hostile and provocative acts;

Calls on all concerned to refrain from any actions which might further exacerbate the situation. UNQUOTE

END

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
STATE GRNC
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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By TB, NARS, Date 8-27-76

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 304 INFO SAIGON 37 FROM USUN
AUG 5, 9:35 PM

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SUBJ: PARTICIPATION OF DRV AND GVN IN SC PROCEEDINGS

1. IN DISCUSSION AFTER SC MTG, NIELSEN (NORWAY, SC PRES)
INDICATED INTENTION CONSULT INFORMALLY WITH SC MEMBERS RE ISSUE
OF HAVING REPS OF DRV OR GVN PARTICIPATE IN SC DEBATE RE NORTH
VIETNAM ATTACKS ON US NAVAL UNITS.
CFN 304 37 5 9:35 1

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PAGE TWO RUEHDT 393 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2. NIELSEN, WHO CLEARLY PREFERS NOT INVITE GVN PARTICIPATE AT
THIS POINT, HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH MOROZOV (USSR) AND SEYDOUX
(FRANCE) AFTER MTG. THEREAFTER, NIELSEN SUGGESTED TO US FORMULA
WHEREBY DRV WOULD BE INVITED NOW PARTICIPATE IN SC PROCEEDINGS,
WHILE INVITATION TO GVN WOULD REMAIN OPEN AND LIVE QUESTION
BEFORE SC, TO BE DECIDED UPON ON BASIS OF COURSE THAT DEBATE
TAKES IN FUTURE. WE SAID TELECON WITH DEPT THIS AFTERNOON MADE US
DOUBT DEPT WOULD ACCEPT THIS; BUT IN RESPONSE NIELSEN REQUEST,
AGREED TO PUT IT TO DEPT ANYWAY.

RMR

3. MOROZOV, NIELSEN SAID, HAD IMPLIED TO HIM THAT SOVS DO NOT
REALLY EXPECT DRV WOULD ACCEPT INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN SC
PROCEEDINGS. MOROZOV SUGGESTED TO NIELSEN THAT HE CONSULT MEMBERS
SC INDIVIDUALLY, AND THEN TALK TO MOROZOV AGAIN.

4. WE KNOW FROM MEMBER NORWEGIAN DEL THAT DRAFT SOV RES UNDER
WHICH SC WOULD INVITE DRV REP TO TAKE PART SC MTGS ORIGINALLY
CONTAINED ADDITIONAL PROVISION (DROPPED FOR UNKNOWN REASONS)
CALLING FOR "REP OF SAIGON REGIME" TO PARTICIPATE SC MTGS ALSO.

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-2- 304, August 5, 10 p.m., from New York

5. WE INFORMALLY RAISED WITH NIELSEN ANOTHER POSSIBLE APPROACH WHICH HE FOUND QUITE ATTRACTIVE, NAMELY; IN REPORTING TO SC AFTER HIS CONSULTATIONS, NIELSEN WOULD SAY THAT ALL MEMBERS INSISTED SC
CFN 2 3 4 5

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 393 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RECEIVE ALL POSSIBLE INFO ~~ON~~ ISSUE BEFORE COUNCIL, AND THAT SC HOPES IT WILL BE PROVIDED. NIELSEN WOULD THEN NOTE IT HAS NOT BEEN SC PRACTICE TO INVITE REPS OF INTERESTED PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN SC PROCEEDINGS, BUT RATHER TO APPROVE ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS REQUESTS FROM SUCH PARTIES; THEREFORE, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO LEAVE INITIATIVE TO INTERESTED PARTIES. APPROACH OF THIS NATURE WOULD LEAVE DOOR OPEN FOR PARTICIPATION BY BOTH DRV AND GVN. BEFORE SUPPORTING IT, OF COURSE, WE WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE GVN WOULD NOT SEEK PARTICIPATION UNLESS DRV DID. OTHERWISE RESULT MIGHT BE GVN BUT NOT DRV PARTICIPATION WHICH, HOWEVER ATTRACTIVE TO US, WOULD HARDLY SIT WELL WITH COUNCIL IN VIEW OF NATURE OUR COMPLAINT.

COMMENT: INFO NOTED PARA 4 INDICATES SOVS MAY BE WILLING GRANT GVN PARTICIPATION WITHOUT TOO MUCH OF A BATTLE, AND WE HOPE BUTTRESS SUPPORT FOR IMMEDIATE GVN PARTICIPATION DURING INFORMAL TALKS WITH DELS OF SC MEMBERS TONIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, OUR FEELING SO FAR IS THAT CASE FOR GVN PARTICIPATION IN SC DEBATE AT THIS POINT IS NOT VERY CONVINCING TO MANY SC MEMBERS. IF IT BECOMES CLEAR WE CANNOT EXPECT SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION (I.E. HAVING BOTH GVN AND DRV REPS INVITED NOW), WE WOULD LIKE AUTHORIZATION FROM DEPT TO ACCEPT EITHER NIELSEN'S SUGGESTION (PARA 2) OR APPROACH OUTLINED PARA 5.

GP-4
STEVENSON

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-O at 2:47 a.m., August 6
Passed White House at 3:08 a.m., August 6 (per S/S-O)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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4 AUG 1964 AUG 5 PM 10 25

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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SVN

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

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By JB, NARS, Date 8-27-76

SP

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 304 INFO SAIGON 37 FROM USUN
AUG 5, 9:35 PM

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SUBJ: PARTICIPATION OF DRV AND GVN IN SC PROCEEDINGS

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1. IN DISCUSSION AFTER SC MTG, NIELSEN (NORWAY, SC PRES)
INDICATED INTENTION CONSULT INFORMALLY WITH SC MEMBERS RE ISSUE
OF HAVING REPS OF DRV OR GVN PARTICIPATE IN SC DEBATE RE NORTH
VIETNAM ATTACKS ON US NAVAL UNITS.
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PAGE TWO RUEHDT 393 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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AIR

2. NIELSEN, WHO CLEARLY PREFERS NOT INVITE GVN PARTICIPATE AT
THIS POINT, HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH MOROZOV (USSR) AND SEYDOUX
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WHEREBY DRV WOULD BE INVITED NOW PARTICIPATE IN SC PROCEEDINGS,
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BEFORE SC, TO BE DECIDED UPON ON BASIS OF COURSE THAT DEBATE
TAKES IN FUTURE. WE SAID TELECON WITH DEPT THIS AFTERNOON MADE US
DOUBT DEPT WOULD ACCEPT THIS; BUT IN RESPONSE NIELSEN REQUEST,
AGREED TO PUT IT TO DEPT ANYWAY.

RMR

3. MOROZOV, NIELSEN SAID, HAD IMPLIED TO HIM THAT SOVS DO NOT
REALLY EXPECT DRV WOULD ACCEPT INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN SC
PROCEEDINGS. MOROZOV SUGGESTED TO NIELSEN THAT HE CONSULT MEMBERS
SC INDIVIDUALLY, AND THEN TALK TO MOROZOV AGAIN.

4. WE KNOW FROM MEMBER NORWEGIAN DEL THAT DRAFT SOV RES UNDER
WHICH SC WOULD INVITE DRV REP TO TAKE PART SC MTGS ORIGINALLY
CONTAINED ADDITIONAL PROVISION (DROPPED FOR UNKNOWN REASONS)
CALLING FOR "REP OF SAIGON REGIME" TO PARTICIPATE SC MTGS ALSO.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 304, August 5, 10 p.m., from New York

5. WE INFORMALLY RAISED WITH NIELSEN ANOTHER POSSIBLE APPROACH WHICH HE FOUND QUITE ATTRACTIVE, NAMELY; IN REPORTING TO SC AFTER HIS CONSULTATIONS, NIELSEN WOULD SAY THAT ALL MEMBERS INSISTED SC CFN 2 3 4 5

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 393 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
RECEIVE ALL POSSIBLE INFO ON ISSUE BEFORE COUNCIL, AND THAT SC HOPES IT WILL BE PROVIDED. NIELSEN WOULD THEN NOTE IT HAS NOT BEEN SC PRACTICE TO INVITE REPS OF INTERESTED PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN SC PROCEEDINGS, BUT RATHER TO APPROVE ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS REQUESTS FROM SUCH PARTIES; THEREFORE, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO LEAVE INITIATIVE TO INTERESTED PARTIES. APPROACH OF THIS NATURE WOULD LEAVE DOOR OPEN FOR PARTICIPATION BY BOTH DRV AND GVN. BEFORE SUPPORTING IT, OF COURSE, WE WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE GVN WOULD NOT SEEK PARTICIPATION UNLESS DRV DID. OTHERWISE RESULT MIGHT BE GVN BUT NOT DRV PARTICIPATION WHICH, HOWEVER ATTRACTIVE TO US, WOULD HARDLY SIT WELL WITH COUNCIL IN VIEW OF NATURE OUR COMPLAINT.

COMMENT: INFO NOTED PARA 4 INDICATES SOVS MAY BE WILLING GRANT GVN PARTICIPATION WITHOUT TOO MUCH OF A BATTLE, AND WE HOPE BUTTRESS SUPPORT FOR IMMEDIATE GVN PARTICIPATION DURING INFORMAL TALKS WITH DELS OF SC MEMBERS TONIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, OUR FEELING SO FAR IS THAT CASE FOR GVN PARTICIPATION IN SC DEBATE AT THIS POINT IS NOT VERY CONVINCING TO MANY SC MEMBERS. IF IT BECOMES CLEAR WE CANNOT EXPECT SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION (I.E. HAVING BOTH GVN AND DRV REPS INVITED NOW), WE WOULD LIKE AUTHORIZATION FROM DEPT TO ACCEPT EITHER NIELSEN'S SUGGESTION (PARA 2) OR APPROACH OUTLINED PARA 5.

GP-4
STEVENS

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 2:47 a.m., August 6
Passed White House at 3:08 a.m., August 6 (per S/S-0)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57

Origin
IO

Info:
SS
SVN
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L
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FE
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK 332

INFO: Ambassador PHNOM PENH 85
Ambassador SAIGON 387

REF: USUN;s 218, Saigon's 313 Info USUN 51

Aug 8 6 13 PM '64

Mission requested deliver SC Pres for distribution as SC document letter containing following substantive text in reply RRG letter circulated as S/5829 of July 23.

BEGIN TEXT: In a letter addressed to Pres SC dated July 22, the Permanent Representative of Cambodia alleged, inter alia, that soldiers of the United States crossed the border from Viet-Nam into Cambodia on June 15, 1964 for the purpose of taking photographs.

My government has completed a thorough investigation of this charge, which was presented completely without substantiation, and it has been confirmed that neither United States personnel nor landing craft (LCMs) were operating in the area in question on or about June 15.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-82-220
By isa, NARS, Date 11-9-82

Drafted by: ID:UNP:WCLamb:JWKinball:eu 8/7/64		Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ID - Harlan Cleveland
Clearances: S/VN - Mr. Corcoran (in draft) FE - Mr. Trusheart (in draft)		UNP - Mr. Buffum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

UNCLASSIFIED

45
Action

RR RUEHCRUMJIR RUDSC RUFJC RUHPA

DE RUEHDT 24 15/0035Z

1964 AUG 14 PM 8 55

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IO
Info

ZNR

R 150028Z

FM USUN NY

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS

RUHPA/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT 421 INFO SAIGON 52 LONDON 110 PARIS 70
CINCPAC 44 FROM USUN FOURTEENTH

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

GVN LETTER TO SC PRESIDENT

1. TEXT OF GVN OBSERVER'S LETTER TO SC PRES OF AUG 13
AS FOLS (UNESSENTIAL WORDS OMITTED):

QUOTE

RE SC DECISION OF AUG 7 AND YOUR TELEGRAM OF SAME DATE
TO RVN FONMIN, IN WHICH YOU EXPRESSED DESIRE OF SC TO WELCOME
FROM RVN INFORMATION RELATIVE TO US COMPLAINT AGAINST HANOI
REGIME, I HAVE HONOR INFORM YOU IN BEHALF MY GOVT THAT RVN
IS READY OFFER TO SC ITS FULL COOPERATION, AND TO PROVIDE ANY
INFORMATION WHICH COUNCIL MAY NEED CONCERNING UNPROVOKED
ATTACKS BY VIET-CONG TORPEDO BOATS AGAINST US SHIPS IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN GULF TONKIN.
CFN 421 52 110 70 44 1 13 7

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 24 UNCLAS

THESE ATTACKS ON THE HIGH SEAS ONCE MORE EVIDENCE AGGRESSIVE
POLICY OF HANOI REGIME AND ITS UTTER
DISREGARD FOR WELL-ESTABLISHED RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
THEY THEREFORE HAVE TO BE EXAMINED IN GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF
VIET-CONG AGGRESSIONS IN SEA.

THESE AGGRESSIONS HAVE BEEN FOR YEARS DIRECTED AGAINST RVN,
BUT IN NO WAY LIMITED TO VIET-NAM ALONE.

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-2- 421, August 14, from New York

IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT VIET-CONG, ABETTED BY PEIPING REGIME, HAVE FOR MANY YEARS VIOLATED NEUTRALITY AND ENCROACHED UPON INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LAOS, BY SUPPORTING AND DIRECTING PATHET LAO, AND BY INTRODUCING THEIR OWN CADRES AND MILITARY UNITS INTO LAOS.

IN RECENT ATTACKS AGAINST US VESSELS ON HIGH SEAS IN GULF TONKIN, VIET-CONG HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY HAVE NOW DECIDED EXTEND THEIR BELLICOSE ACTIONS TO OTHER AREAS AS WELL.

UNDOUBTEDLY, PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN SEA ARE SERIOUSLY ENDANGERED BY SUCH AGGRESSIVE ACTS AND GROSS VIOLATIONS INTERNATIONAL LAW.

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 24 UNCLAS
OF NO SMALL SIGNIFICANCE IS ATTITUDE OF HANOI REGIME TO INVITATION THAT SC EXTENDED TO ANSWER COMPLAINT OF US BEFORE COUNCIL.

REFUSAL BY HANOI REGIME TO APPEAR BEFORE COUNCIL, OR EVEN PROVIDE FACTUAL INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER AS REQUESTED BY THE COUNCIL, SHOWS THAT HANOI REGIME IS AWARE THAT ITS ATTACKS ON HIGH SEAS AGAINST US SHIPS ARE NOT DEFENDABLE.

IT INDICATES ALSO DISREGARD THAT HANOI REGIME HOLDS FOR UN'S ROLE IN MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. ATTITUDE OF HANOI REGIME VIS-A-VIS UN CAN SURPRISE NO ONE BECAUSE OF ITS SUBSERVIENCE TO PEIPING REGIME, WHICH STILL STANDS INDICTED OF AGGRESSION BY UN.

AFTER EACH AGGRESSION WHICH IT COMMITTED, AND EACH SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH IT CREATED, HANOI REGIME INVARIABLY ADVOCATES CONVENING OF NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE, ALLEGEDLY TO RESTORE PEACE AND SECURITY IN SEA, WHICH IT HAS ITSELF DISTURBED AND ENDANGERED. FACT THAT HANOI REGIME AGAIN DEMANDS CONVENING OF ANOTHER GENEVA CONFERENCE AFTER ITS ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AGAINST US SHIPS IS INDICATIVE OF ITS MOTIVES IN CREATING THESE INCIDENTS. USEFULNESS OF SUCH CONFERENCES, HOWEVER, CAN BE EVALUATED IN LIGHT OF REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954 AS TESTIFIED BY THE CFN 1954

UNCLASSIFIED

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-3- 421, August 14, from New York

PAGE FOUR RUEHDT 24 UNCLAS
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION IN ITS SPECIAL REPORT OF JUNE
2, 1962, AND GROSS VIOLATIONS BY VIET-CONG OF GENEVA
AGREEMENTS OF 1962 ON LAOS.

RVN ONCE MORE EXPRESSES ITS ADHESION TO PRINCIPLES OF UN
CHARTER, ITS HOPE AND TRUST IN UN FOR MAINTENANCE OF PEACE
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

UNQUOTE

2. THERE IS SOME DISPUTE WITHIN SECRETARIAT RE PRECISE MEANS
FOR CIRCULATING LETTER AS SC DOCUMENT. DISPUTE SHOULD BE
SETTLED TO PERMIT CIRCULATION AUGUST 17. IN MEANTIME,
CONTENTS LETTER HAVE BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. STEVENSON
BT
CFN 2 1962 1962 2 17

UNCLASSIFIED

101-1

Circular's

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

48

Origin
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Info
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ACTION: Circular FLASH 210 Aug 5 12 19 AM '64
ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS (Additional addressess page 3)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
made by
Following is statement by the President ~~(see instructions)~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

QUOTE As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty
to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions
against U.S. ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have
today required me to order the military forces of the United
States to take ~~immediate and determined~~ action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2,
was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two
U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers, and supporting
aircraft, acted at once on the orders ~~given~~ I gave after the initial
act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking
boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement
is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy.

But repeated acts of violence against the armed forces
of the

Drafted by: Text rec'd from White House	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
Clearances: S/S - Mr. Christensen	

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air ~~DEF~~ ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ action is now in execution against gun boats and certain supporting facilities ~~in and near four ports of~~ in North Vietnam which have been used in support of these hostile operations.

In the larger sense, this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, ~~again brings~~ again brings home to all of us ~~in the United States~~ in the United States the importance ~~of the struggle for peace and security~~ of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and ~~to the~~ to the government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage.

Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. Americans We know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict--we still seek no wider war.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position and totally clear to friends/ to adversaries, and indeed to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

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~~SECRET~~

~~NNNNNN~~ UNCLASSIFIED

I
Finally, ~~W~~/have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States, and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom, and in defense of peace, in Southeast Asia. I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support.

And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight.

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of America. But it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace. That firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace. END.

RUSK

PARIS PASS USRO _____
CONGEN HONG KONG _____
CONGEN SINGAPORE _____

CINCPAC for POLAD _____ CINCSOUTH for POLAD _____
CINCEUR for POLAD _____ CINCMEAFSA for POLAD _____
CINCLANT for POLAD _____

UNCLASSIFIED

102-1

Misc, Cables

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

00858

102

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

31

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy DJAKARTA

PRIORITY

127

Aug 4 10 51 AM '64

FE

Info

INFO : Amembassy SAIGON

338

SS

SVN

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USIA

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ARMY

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AIR

NIC

Despite your conversation with Subandrio on recognition of North Viet-Nam reported your 189, believe you should find early opportunity raise subject with him again along lines Deptel 118. You might put substance presentation either as QUOTE under instruction UNQUOTE or as message to him from Ambassador Jones following first week consultations and reading of Washington feeling.

GP-3.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE 3-14-75
By KR, NARS, Date 3-24-75

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

FE:SPA:FTUnderhill:hst 8-3-64

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

S/VN - Mr. Corcoran (substance)

SPA - Mr. Cuthell

~~SECRET~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NIC

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 351
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

AUG 5 7 44 PM '64

Since we have already announced text protest in expectation that it would be delivered at early date, we are most interested in having text placed on record with Hanoi and would appreciate British help. We recognize British Consul Hanoi does not normally have much access to Central Government officials in Hanoi but believe our purposes would be served if he could get it to an official at some level of this regime.

GP-3.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLI-82-220

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

By us

NARS, Date 1
Telegraphic transmission and

FE/RA:JAMendenhall:avm 8/5/64

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal

7/11/71 - 10:00 - 11:00
BNA - Mr. Glazer

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SD649

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DE RUEHCR 3377 05/1747Z

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

48180

1964 AUG 5 17 51

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

STATE GRNC

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION SECSTATE 382, AUG 05, 6 P.M. SIGNED KOHLER.

FOR SECRETARY, THOMPSON AND TYLER

IN VIEW DEVELOPMENTS NORTH VIETNAM, I CONSIDERED WHETHER CANCEL DEPARTURE DESPITE FACT USAF AIRCRAFT ALREADY HERE, SOVIET CREW READY AND CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF STAFF PREPARING TO LEAVE WITH US, INCLUDING TWO MEDICAL EVACUEES.

HOWEVER, SEEMED TO ME UNDESIRABLE LEAVE IMPRESSION WE EXPECTING ADVERSE SOVIET REACTION AND I HAVE RESPONDED TO INQUIRIES LOCAL CORRESPONDENTS NO RPT NO CHANGE IN PLANS. ACCORDINGLY WILL LEAVE 10 AM LOCAL, AUG 6, BUT WILL BE PROMPTLY AVAILABLE THROUGH USAF WIESBADEN, EMBASSY BONN AND CONSULATE FRANKFURT.

GO-3.

CFN 10 AM 6 3
UNQTE RUSK

BT

UNQTE RUSK UNQTE RUSK

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority NLS-82-220

By us, NARS, Date 11-9-82

BT

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 262 INFO LONDON 67 BANGKOK EIGHT
FROM KARACHI SIXTH

e/k

VIET NAM

Bundy

REF: USITO CIRCULAR 58

JOINT EMBASSY-USIS MESSAGE

1. EDITORIAL COMMENT RE US RETALIATORY ACTION VIET NAM SO FAR
LIMITED PAK TIMES LEAD EDITORIAL AUGUST 6, WHICH CRITICAL
BUT MILDLY EXPRESSED.

2. ENTITLED "DARK PORTENTS" EDIT BEGAN WITH FAIRLY ACCURATE
REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS VIET NAM. WHILE CONCEDING LEGITIMACY US
ACTION IN TAKING CRISIS TO UNSC, EDIT QUESTIONED "WISDOM"
MOUNTING SIMULTANEOUS "RETALIATORY OFFENSIVE." RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PRESENT CRISIS REGARDED AS "UNIMPORTANT" COMPARED OVERALL
CFN 262 67 58 1. 6 2.

PAGE TWO RUFJKP 322 UNCLAS

VN-SEA QUESTION. SPECULATED WHETHER RECENT WIDESPREAD DISCUSSION RE EXTENSION WAR TO NORTH VIET NAM BEGINNING BEAR FRUIT. STATED THAT DESPITE LIMITED US INTENTIONS DANGER CHINESE INVOLVEMENT SIMILAR KOREA HIGHLY POSSIBLE.

3. SECOND HALF EDIT SLID INTO GENERAL CRITICISM US INTENTIONS.

"UNFORTUNATELY, MANY THINGS HAVE HAPPENED LATELY WHICH CONFIRM VIEW US HAS NO INCLINATION CALL OFF ITS MILITANT ADVENTURE IN REGION." RECENT COMPLAINTS BY DRV LISTED TOGETHER WITH INDICATIONS CONTINUING BUILDUP US FORCES IN AREA. CITES THREAT TO WORLD PEACE THROUGH US DETERMINATION WIN VN WAR.

4. CONDEMNED "BRINKMANSHIP" AND DECLARED "ONLY HOPE OF LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA LIES IN POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING." CALLED FOR US TO "COME TO GRIPS WITH REALITIES." MCCONAUGHY

BT

CFN 3 4.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

106
B. Hungary

30

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Action

Control:
Rec'd:

3282
August 5, 1964
12:06 PM

SVN
Info

FROM: Budapest

SS

ACTION: Secstate 74 Priority

G

SP

DATE: August 5, 4 PM

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USIA

NSC

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CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

After extended silence Hungarian radio mentioned US action re NVN torpedo boats in noon broadcast August 5. Quoted President Johnson saying action "an answer" to NVN action during past few days. Announced meeting NSC called today. Also announced arrival US jet bombers in Saigon from Taiwan. The one afternoon paper published Budapest carried story of "fire battle in VN." Quoted NVN news agency saying American ships "aggressors" and American statements of attack by NVN "a complete forgery." Article also quoted excerpts from President's address. No editorial comment.

SHELTON

RMR

AD

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36

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1964 AUG 5 AM 11 54

Action

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DE RUFHOL 512 05/1518Z
O 051515Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
BT

SVN

Info

SS

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OSD

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE IMMEDIATE 453

AUG-5, 4PM

JOINT STATE/USIS MESSAGE

FOREIGN OFFICE AND EMBASSY PRESS SPOKESMEN BY AGREEMENT ARE CONFIRMING TO PRESS THAT AMBASSADOR MCGHEE TODAY DELIVERED A MESSAGE TO MINISTER WESTEICK AND STATE SECRETARY LAHR ON DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

FOREIGN OFFICE HAS ISSUED FOLLOWING "SEMI-OFFICIAL" STATEMENT FOR ATTRIBUTION TO "POLITICAL CIRCLES";

" IN POLITICAL CIRCLES IN BONN, THE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS OBSERVED WITH CONCERN. THE LIMITED ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE A JUSTIFIED ANSWER TO ACTIONS OF AGRESSION WHICH VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW. THERE IS POSITIVE HOPE THAT THE SITUATION IN THAT AREA SOON WILL RETURN TO NORMAL, AND PEACE BE ESTABLISHED AGAIN."
MCGHEE
BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 12:22 P.M., PASSED USIA 12:15 P.M., 8/5/64; ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 12:05 P.M., 8/5/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*10839
Action

35

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONTROL: 4591
RECD: AUGUST 6, 1964
1:40PM

FROM: THE HAGUE

ACTION: SECSTATE 110

DATE: AUGUST 6, 6PM

035

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF: EXDIS EMBTEL 101

PIERCE ARROW

LIMDIS RPT LIMDIS

OFFICIAL DUTCH REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AS OF NOON AUGUST 6 CONFINED TO TELEPHONE CALL LATE AUGUST 5 FROM FONOFF SECGEN VAN TUYLL EXPRESSING ON BEHALF OF PRIMIN APPRECIATION FOR MESSAGE AND EXPLAINING THAT FONOFF (A) HAD AUTHORIZED PRESS TO SAY GON STUDYING VIETNAM SITUATION WITH GREAT INTEREST, AND (B) HAD DENIED AUTHORITY FOR PRESS TO SAY GON STUDYING WITH QTE CONCERN UNQTE.

PRIMIN AND ONLY HALF OF CABINET IN TOWN WITH FONMIN LUNS IN INDIA. GON PROBABLY AWAITING DEVELOPMENTS AND PARTICULARLY REACTION OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND NOTABLY NATO ALLIES. EMBASSY ESTIMATES GON WILL SOON AND PUBLICLY ENDORSE U.S. ACTION.

CFN: 101 5

HOWE

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Authority RAC 000 14837By js, NARA, Date 10-29-97~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Hong Kong
dit name

42

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

FE PP RUEHC
DE RUMJDH 02 1/0245Z
Info ZNR
P R 060236Z
SS FM AMCONSUL HONGKONG
SVN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
G INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
SP RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
L RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
H STATE GRNC
EUR BT
UNCLAS

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1964 AUG 6 AM 1 48

P R I O R I T Y

IO ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 144 INFO BANGKOK 21 VIENTIANE 16
P SAIGON 45 FROM HONG KONG SIXTH

USIA
NSC FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY STATEMENT BY:

INR (RADIO PEKING OVERSEAS SERVICE IN CANTONESE 1000 HRS HK TIME)
NSA
NIC

RMR THE US SUDDENLY ATTACKED THE DRV ON 5 AUGUST. BY DOING SO US
IMPERIALISM HAS GONE BEYOND THE VERGE OF WAR AND EMBARKED ON
THE FIRST STEP IN EXPANDING THE WAR IN INDO-CHINA, AND THE
SITUATION IS EXTREMELY GRAVE. THE CPR GOVT "COMPLETELY
CFN 144 21 16 45 1000 HRS HK US DRV 5 US CPR

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 02 UNCLAS
SUPPORT" THE DRV'S STERN PROTEST AGAINST THE US.

THIS SECOND INCIDENT IN THE GULF OF TONKIN IS COMPLETELY
PREMEDITATED AND FABRICATED IN ORDER TO EXPAND THE WAR IN
INDO-CHINA AND TO SEND ARMED FORCES TO AREAS NEAR THE DRV
FROM TAIWAN AND HK.

SINCE 3 AUGUST THE US HAD COMMITTED A SERIES OF AGGRESSION
AGAINST THE DRV. "THE CPR GOVT SOLEMNLY STATE THAT THE AGGRESSION
AGAINST THE DRV IS STARTED BY THE US. SINCE THE US DOES THIS,
THE DRV HAS GAINED THE RIGHT TO RESIST AGGRESSION, AND ALL
COUNTRIES SUPPORTING THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS HAVE ALSO OBTAINED
THE RIGHT TO SUPPORT THE DRV'S ACTION AGAINST AGGRESSION....
THE DRV IS A CLOSE NEIGHBOR OF CHINA'S AND THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE ARE BROTHERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. ANY US AGGRESSION
AGAINST THE DRV IS AN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE CPR. THE CHINESE

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-2- 144, AUGUST 6, FROM HONG KONG

PEOPLE WILL NEVER SIT IDLY BY WITHOUT ASSISTANCE. THE US'S BLOOD DEBT TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MUST BE REPAID. THE US GOVT MUST IMMEDIATELY STOP ITS ARMED AGGRESSION AND PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THE SACRED TERRITORIAL LAND, SEA, AND AIR OF THE DRV, OR THE US GOVT MUST BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL GRAVE CONSEQUENCES CAUSED BY THIS /AGGRESSION AND PROVOCATIONS/".

RICE

BT

CFN DRV'S US TONKIN DRV TAIWAN HK 3 US DRV CPR DRV US US DRV
DRV'S DRV US DRV CPR US'S US DRV US

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:30 A.M. AUGUST 6, 1964

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, DOD 8-6-64 - 3:00 A.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

110

30

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Action

SVN

CONTROL: 4551
RECD: AUGUST 6, 1964
1:27PM

Info

SS

FROM: MOSCOW

G

SP

ACTION: SECSTATE (387) PRIORITY

SAL

EUR

INFO: PARIS 51
LONDON 61
SAIGON 7

FE

IO

P

VIENTIANE 10

USIA

HONG KONG 3

NSC

DATE: AUGUST 6, 5 PM

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

RMR

REACTION MOSCOW PRESS AND RADIO TV TO EVENTS IN GULF TONKIN CAUTIOUS THUS FAR. PRAVDA AUG 6 CARRIED TEXT MILD TASS AUGUST 5 STATEMENT, DRV MINISTRY DEFENSE AUG 5 STATEMENT AS WELL AS NUMBER SHORT, FACTUAL NEWS ITEMS. PRELIMINARY SAMPLING SOVIET BROADCASTS BY EMBASSY INDICATES, HOWEVER, THAT MEDIA TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN AUDIENCE CONSIDERABLY SHARPER THAN DOMESTIC TREATMENT.

IZVESTIYA AUG 5, IN ADDITION DRV MD AUG 5 STATEMENT, CARRIED ARTICLE BY IZVESTIYA WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT WHICH STRESSED "UNKNOWN" IDENTITY ATTACKING PT BOATS AND QUOTED ALLEGED SPECULATION OF CERTAIN WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS THAT WHOLE AFFAIR MAY BE SAIGON ATTEMPT TO "PULL US DEEPER INTO MILITARY ADVENTURE".

EARLIER EDITIONS PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA AND OTHER CENTRAL PAPERS ONLY CARRIED FEW, SHORT, FACTUAL NEWS ITEMS AS SITUATION DEVELOPED.

COMMENT: SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY STILL RESPONDING TENTATIVELY TO DEVELOPMENT (KHRUSHCHEV'S CABSENCE VOLGA REGIONS MAY BE CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR). THIS CLEARLY INDICATED BY TASS AUG 5 STATEMENT WHICH, IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CONSIDER EXTREMELY MILD. STATEMENT A) BEGINS IMMEDIATELY WITH SUBSTANCE WITHOUT SAY IT "AUTHORIZED"; B) STATES MERELY THAT US AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS ARE BEING CONDEMNED IN "AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET CIRCLES"; AND C) MAKES NO MENTION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSE. OUR IMPRESSION FURTHER CONFIRMED BY WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY SOVIET UN REP WHO FAILED DENOUNCE US CASE OUT OF HAND. FURTHER STRIKING CONFIRMATION PROVIDED LAST NIGHT'S MOSCOW TV NEWS PROGRAMS. EVENING NEWS HAD ONE ANNOUNCER READ US

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-2- 387, AUGUST 6, 5 PM FROM MOSCOW

RELEASES IN UNUSUALLY BALANCED TONES, THE OTHER READ HANOI. RELEASES -THUS GIVING BOTH SIDES WHAT COULD BE CONSIDERED FAIR AND EQUAL TREATMENT. MOSCOW "NEWS OF WORLD" TV PROGRAM WAS DEVOTED IN LARGE PART TO SOVIET DESALINIZATION EXPERTS EXTOLLING VIRTUES OF SOVIET-US FRIENDSHIP AND OF RECENT DESALINIZATION AGREEMENT. PROGRAM ENDED WITH SHORT, ALMOST EMBARRASSED, NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT OF SITUATION IN GULF OF TONKIN.

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Action

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JOINT EMBASSY-USIS MESSAGE

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PASS TO USIA

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BRITISH PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION, WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, HAS SUPPORTED US RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AS LIMITED, BUT FIRM, ACTION NEEDED IN CIRCUMSTANCES. PAPER GAVE PROMINENT PLAY TO PRESIDENTS SPEECH IN SYRACUSE, PARTICULARLY NOTING HIS REMARK THAT NEITHER FRIEND NOR FOE NEED THINK US WILL BE DIVIDED IN ELECTION YEAR. GOLDWATERS ENDORSEMENT OF PRESIDENTS ACTION WAS ALSO FEATURED IN MOST NEWS ACCOUNTS.

CIA

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AIR

RMR

TODAYS EVENING STANDARD QUOTES PRIME MINISTER AS SAYING: 'THIS WAS AN UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION AGAINST US WARSHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THEREFORE THE UNITED STATES HAS THE PERFECT RIGHT TO RETALIATE, AND IT IS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO DECIDE WHAT FORM THAT RETALIATION TAKES

'PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS IN TOUCH WITH ME AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK, AND GAVE WARNING THAT IF THE FIRST ATTACK WAS REPEATED HE FELT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACTION TO STOP THE AGGRESSION, BECAUSE UNLESS SUCH ACTION IS STOPPED WAR MAY EASILY RESULT.'

LAST NIGHT, ON BB C TELEVISION PROGRAM 'ENCOUNTER,' FOREIGN SECRETARY BUTLER SAID UK HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON BY TELEPHONE AND ADDED: 'I WOULDNT SAY THIS LAST AMERICAN INCIDENT WAS NECESSARILY DICTATED BY POLITICS. I THINK IT WAS AN ATTACK ON THE HIGH SEAS - AN AGGRESSION - AND IT IS NATURAL TO REPLY.'

OFFICIAL FONOFF SOURCES WERE ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACK ON HIGH SEAS WAS INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 51 OF UN CHARTER.

DIPLOMAT CORRESPONDENTS HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY EXPLAINING NORTH VIETNAMESE RASHNESS IN FACE OF GIANT US POWER. DAILY HERALD MAN DECIDED INTENTION WAS TO PROVOKE CRISIS IN UN TO HELP BUILD PRESTIGE OF CHICOMS. A FEW THOUGHT NORTH VIETNAMESE MIGHT HAVE MISCALCULATED TO POINT OF ACTUALLY BELIEVING THEIR 'PAPER TIGER' PROPAGANDA.

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-2- 609, AUGUST 6. FROM: LONDON.

VICTOR ZORZA IN THE GUARDIAN NOTED THAT SOVIET UNION DENOUNCED US IN 'TERMS LESS SEVERE THAN HEARD FROM MOSCOW AT TIMES OF TENSION IN THE PAST.' HE SAID LANGUAGE WAS 'CAREFULLY CHOSEN TO AVOID ANY HINT OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT.'

THE TIMES, DAILY EXPRESS, DAILY TELEGRAPH GAVE STRONG SUPPORT TO US. THE TIMES NOTED: 'IT HAS BEEN AN OPERATION CONDUCTED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF MEASURED RESPONSE WELL IN MIND: AN ACTION 'LIMITED AND FITTING,' IN PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WORDS.' DAILY EXPRESS URGED UK TO 'LET HER COMRADELY UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMERICAN POSITION NOW BE TRANSLATED INTO FULL MEASURE OF MORAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.' DAILY TELEGRAPH SAID: 'IT FOLLOWS THAT NOT ONLY THE ALLIES OF US BUT ALL NATIONS TO WHOM THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSED HIS SPEECH YESTERDAY SHOULD GIVE HIM THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING FOR WHICH HE APPEALED.'

ALEXANDER MACLEOD, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT OF THE SCOTSMAN THINKS KHRUSHCHEV IS PLACED IN EMBARRASSING POSITION; HE WILL NOT WANT TO APPEAR WEAK KNEED, BUT IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE FOR WEST IF HE FELT OBLIGED, FOR REASONS OF PERSONAL PRESTIGE, TO SIDE FULLY WITH PEKING.

DAILY WORKER ACCUSED US OF COMMITTING 'COLD-BLOODED AGGRESSION.' UNLIKE OTHER NATIONAL DAILIES, THE GUARDIAN STRUCK QUERULOUS NOTE, RAISING QUESTION AS TO US STRAIGHTFORWARDNESS IN REPORTING NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS AND ASKING QUESTION; WHY HAS THE REACTION BEEN SO EXAGGERATED? THE GUARDIAN SAID WAR IN VIETNAM MUST BE WON IN THE SOUTH, NOT NORTH, AND CONCLUDED; 'BY LARGE-SCALE ACTIONS LIKE THE AIR STRIKE THE US ADMINISTRATION IS DANGEROUSLY STAKING ITS PRESTIGE ON VENTURES DOOMED TO FAILURE, AND IN AN EFFORT TO REDEEM IT IS GETS SEDUCED INTO STILL LARGER-SCALE MISTAKES NEXT TIME.'

LENGTHY EXTRACTS FROM BRITISH EDITORIALS SENT VIA SIGNALS, WITH REQUEST COPIES BE PASSED TO STATE AND DEFENSE. OSHAUGNESSY
BT

Note: Passed USIA 8/6/64-3:40PM

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Bundy 5

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NNNNVV EUB044DEA585

Info

RR RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUFGWP 253 06/1950Z
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INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

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IO

SAIGON 30 CANBERRA 02 USUN 30 FROM PARIS AUG 6, 7PM

P

IN DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS ON TONKIN BAY
CRISIS AUSTRALIAN AND UK EMBASSIES HAVE DETECTED CERTAIN
SKEPTICISM THAT INFORMATION FROM US SOURCES NECESSARILY
ACCURATE. QUAI SYG DE CARBONNEL TOLD UK AMBASSADOR IT ENTIRELY
POSSIBLE US HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF DRV ERROR. CARBONNEL
ALSO THEORIZED THAT CHINESE TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY DRV ACTION
SINCE CPR REACTION QUITE RESTRAINED, THEIR STATEMENT IN

USIA

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PAGE 2 RUFGWP 253 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EFFECT SAID ONLY US HAD BETTER NOT GO ANY FURTHER.
UK EMBOFF TELLS US HE INFORMED BY SENIOR QUAI OFFICIAL THAT
QUAI HAD HAD CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY PERSUADING DE GAULLE NOT TO
ISSUE STATEMENT CRITICAL OF US ACTIONS AND DRAWING CONCLUSION
HIS CONFERENCE PROPOSAL MORE NECESSARY THAN EVER. INFORMATION
FROM BRITISH ON OCCASION MUST BE TAKEN WITH GRAIN OF SALT.
GP-3. LYON
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8:13 PM, 8/6/64.

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By isa, NARA, Date 10-29-97

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ~~XXX~~ BRUSSELS 176 IMMEDIATE

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Info

EXDIS FOR HARRIMAN

Staff Summary No. 1

1. Viet-Nam - Italian Prime Min Moro told Chamber U.S. action simple act of self defense and that liberty of conspicuous number of Asian states depends on outcome this conflict and firm position U.S. Malaysian Premier has sent message to President wholeheartedly endorsing U.S. action as necessary if peace is to be restored in SEA. UK and Australian Embassies in Paris have detected Quai skepticism over accuracy U.S. sources, feeling U.S. has taken advantage DRV error, and belief Chinese taken by surprise by DRV action. Senior Quai official told UK Emboff Quai experienced considerable difficulty persuading deGualle not to issue statement critical of U.S. action.

2. Cyprus - Replying to Stikker Plan proposals Greek rep told informal group NATO reps GOG doing all it can to reach agreement at Geneva, can only give assurance on avoidance of hostilities if Turkey renounces intervention, unable as yet to respond to

Drafted by:

S/S-O Norman Getsinger

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/S-O N. C. McManus

Clearances:

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By jis, NARA, Date 10-21-97 ~~SECRET~~

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proposes UN controls on importation arms and men, and regards ~~XXXXXX~~ reduction existing forces under UN control as impracticable and dangerous. Following presentation group decided that despite negative replies Greek and Turk reps, NATO efforts should continue.

Makarios message to SYG promises UNFICYP full freedom of movement except certain localities connected with defense where access possible after consultation between GOC and UNFICYP Commander. Gen Thimayya expects have UN post on Limassol docks.

3. Laos - Petty family feuding in coup atmosphere during night of August 4-5 appears temporarily at end. Primin's office statement Aug 6 said Phoumi and generals called on Primin after his return from Luang Prabang, told him of peaceful settlement of misunderstanding and renewed their unswerving devotion to head of government.

According French Mil Att, after visit to Khang Khay Russian Mil Att reported PL morale very low as result T-28 strikes and PL feared other military moves by RKG forces.

END

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GP-1

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ACTION: Amembassy STOCKHOLM 117

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Info:

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 380

Nov 8 9 35 AM '64

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USIA
JOINT STATE-AIR MESSAGE

Ref Stockholm 119 and Saigon 1 to Stockholm rptd info Dept 341.

Thank you for understanding 137. Following for attribution to "well informed US sources." Answers keyed to numbered paragraphs.

1. During late 1962 and the first half 1963 Diem's strategic hamlet program was showing some signs of success particularly in Central Viet-Nam. This was tragedy of Buddhist crisis in that Diem's poor handling of it interrupted the nation's ^{progress} and set back whole rural effort. This crisis beginning May 1963 did not substantially affect operations in countryside until after August 21 GVN raid on Buddhist pagodas. With this a general demoralization of political circles in Saigon began to set in and was reflected by a slowdown in military activity against the Communists.

2. There is no denying that the Buddhist movement was at the outset a religious conflict that had its basis in a long history of favoritism to the Vietnamese Catholics which rankled

Drafted by:
S/VN:JMMontgomery:mbd 8/7/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: S/VN - M. V. Forrestal

Clearances:

P - Mr. Wright

USIA - Mr. Price

S/VN - Mr. Corcoran

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rankled the predominantly non-Catholic population. Many Vietnamese Catholics frankly recognize this fact. In early May of 1963 the Buddhists gathered in the town of Hue to protest an ill-advised government ruling against the flying of the Buddhist flag on Buddha's birthday. During the demonstration over-zealous security officials fired into the crowd and killed nine people, some women and children. Some of the bodies were then mutilated under the treads of the armored cars. Buddhist anger was high and natural. An immediate show of conciliation might have saved the Diem regime. In the face of all evidence, however, the GVN chose to brand this regrettable incident a Communist plot. Buddhist patience was at an end and many of the natural frustrations of nine years of authoritarian rule found their focus in the Buddhist protest. The Buddhist leaders genuinely tried to work out an accommodation with the Diem regime but each time an accommodation was in the offing Madame Nhu would exacerbate the situation with vicious and provocative statements. Nascent Buddhist distrust of the Diem regime was reinforced by such statements. The Buddhists then became convinced ~~that they could not~~ ~~afford to~~ stop their protest, short of Diem's overthrow, lest they be destroyed when the glare of publicity died down. While there was some sympathy demonstrated for the movement on the part of local American correspondents, no Americans were involved in initiating this genuine

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this genuine protest movement. The horrible self-sacrifice on the part of the monks and nuns who burned themselves speaks for itself as eloquent testimony to the depth of feeling aroused by the regime's poor handling of this situation.

3. It is true that the Diem regime only attacked and closed three pagodas. These pagodas however were the headquarters of the protest movement and contained most of the leaders. In light of this, Madame Nhu's numerical comparison is irrelevant. Perhaps Madame Nhu does indeed believe that Diem's policy in particular toward the Buddhists was not "hard." This probably led her to make disruptive incendiary statements every time an agreement between Diem and the Buddhists appeared imminent.

4. There was a UN fact-finding mission sent to Viet-Nam which published a voluminous report containing the testimony of people from both sides. It drew no conclusions.

5. The coup d'etat against Ngh Dinh Diem was organized and executed by Vietnamese only.

6. There are two distinct societies in Viet-Nam--rural and urban. Just prior to the Buddhist crisis Diem was increasing his control over the rural areas. In time this could have led to increased support as this ~~control~~ control led to greater security--a primary peasant desire. ~~In the urban areas however for various reasons the~~ In the urban areas however for various reasons the politically aware, the students and the intellectuals became increasingly

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increasingly disenchanted over the years with the Diem regime. There was the paradoxical situation in which Diem was succeeding in the countryside but failing in the cities. The disaffection among the urban politicians was not decisive until the disaster of the Buddhist crisis. Diem's efforts to repress the Buddhist movement led to greater and greater disenchantment with and his eventual overthrow. ~~There was no~~
~~any sign of a public opinion which would support the overthrow~~

END

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54

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Action

CONTROL: 7766

EUR

RECD: AUGUST 10, 1964
252PM

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 430
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DATE: AUGUST 10, 6PM

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CANADIAN AMB FORD TOLD ME HE SAW GROMKYO AUG 8 TO CONVEY MESSAGE TO KHRUSHCHEV CONCERNING RE-UNITING FAMILIES AND ISSUANCE VISAS. FOLLOWING BRIEF DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT, GROMYKO LAUNCHED INTO DISSERTATION REGARDING RECENT ACTIONS IN TONKIN GULF, STRONGLY CRITICIZING US ACTIONS ALONG LINES HIS TELEGRAM TO DRV FOREIGN MINISTER. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO RANG ALL THE CHANGES, FORD HAD IMPRESSION HE WAS ILL AT EASE AND HIS HEART NOT REALLY IN PRESENTATION.

AT ONE POINT GROMYKO ASKED RATHER PLAINATIVELY WHY CANADA ALWAYS BELIEVES US VERSION OF DEVELOPMENTS AND HE RECALLED US "DUPLICITY" IN U-2 INCIDENT. WHEN FORD NOTED DANGER TO WORLD PEACE INVOLVED IN ATTACK BY NORTH VIETNAM AGAINST US AND SPECULATED THAT NORTH VIETNAM MAY HAVE ACTED ON ITS OWN WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE COMMUNIST CHINA, GROMYKO ASKEJ SARCASTICALLY: "DO YOU REALLY THINK CHINESE DIDN'T KNOW?". GROMYKO THEN DROPPED SUBJECT.

BEFORE FORD DEPARTED, GROMYKO ALSO TOOK OCCASION COMPLAIN OF US ACTIONS IN BUZZING SOVIET SHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, RECITING MAIN POINTS MFA NOTE TO US AUG 3.

FORD COMMENTED INTERVIEW HAD NOT BEEN ONE OF HIS MOST PLEASANT SESSIONS WITH GROMYKO. PROTECT SOURCE.

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED.

GP-3.

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G FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
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FE STATE GRNC

P BT
USIA UNCLAS ACTION WASHINGTON 781 INFO LONDON, SAIGON, MOSCOW UNN 7 51
FROM PARIS ELEVENTH.

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1964 AUG 11 AM 7 51

NSC IN CONTRAST UNFRIENDLY OR SKEPTICAL NOTES IN PRESS HERE RE
INR VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENTS, FIGARO PRINTED AUG. 10 FRONT PAGE
CIA EDITORIAL BY FRANCOIS-PONCET. LATTER POINTS OUT THAT GREATER
NSA AMERICAN SENSE RESPONSIBILITY AND DESIRE AVOID WAR SHOULD
DOD RESOLVE ANY DOUBTS IN FAVOR US VERSION OF EVENTS. WHILE CHINESE
MAY CALCULATE WELL, MAO AND COMPANY ARE PRONE TO VIOLENCE AND
RMR COMPLETE CYNICS WHO HOODWINKED GOF AT TIME RECOGNITION. PRESENT
CHINESE MANEUVERS OBVIOUSLY AIMED AT PUSHING KHRUSHCHEV INTO
CORNER WHERE HE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN RENEWING COLD WAR OR
APPEARING MORALLY SOFT TO ASSEMBLED CP'S OF WORLD. CHINESE
HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE IN EITHER CASE.

FRANCOIS-PONCET MAKES FAVORABLE COMPARISON BETWEEN PRES.
JOHNSON HANDLING CRISIS AND PRES. KENNEDY IN CUBAN CRISIS.
HE ALSO QUESTIONS WHETHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CAN
PRODUCE GUARANTEED SOLUTION WHICH WOULD STOP SOUTH ASIA DONINO
EFFECT OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER SVN ANY BETTER THAN AMERICAN
PROTECTION. ARTICLE POINTS OUT THAT EXPERIMENT OF NEGOTIATED
ACCORDS ALREADY TRIED IN 1954 AND HAS FAILED. FINALLY, FP
CALLS FOR DEMONSTRATION ALLIED SOLIDARITY FOR PEKING BENEFIT
AS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS. BOHLEN

BT
CFN 781

When can I see this?
my B

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Coups de canon au Tonkin

par André FRANÇOIS-PONCET

QUI des Nord-Vietnamiens ou des Américains a tiré les premiers coups ? Quels sont les provocateurs ? Chacun des deux prétend naturellement que c'est l'autre.

Pour nous, le plus vraisemblable est que ce sont les Nord-Vietnamiens, animés et poussés par les Chinois de Pékin. Non pas qu'américanophiles de principe nous soyons portés à donner toujours raison aux Etats-Unis, mais parce que les Américains sont plus conscients de leurs responsabilités parce qu'ils se rendent mieux compte des suites que peuvent entraîner trois coups de canon ; qu'ils n'ont pas besoin de faire une démonstration de force et que, s'ils sont décidés à se faire respecter, ils ne veulent pas, pour autant, déclencher la guerre, même si celle-ci devait demeurer locale.

Au moment de la crise de Cuba, c'est ainsi qu'ils ont agi. Leur état d'esprit n'a pas changé. Johnson n'est pas, du moins en l'espèce, différent de Kennedy.

Il y a beaucoup plus de chances pour que les casse-cou soient du côté de la Chine populaire et de son satellite nord-vietnamien. Car, sur la mentalité de Mao Tsé-toung et de ses acolytes, il n'y a aucun doute ; l'homme est un calculateur mais aussi un violent. Quand la France a reconnu la république de Pékin, nous avons pensé, en songeant à ceux qui approuvaient hautement cette mesure : « Vous dédouanez les Chinois ? Vous n'allez pas tarder, mes bons amis, à découvrir à qui vous aurez désormais affaire et qui sont ces gens auxquels vous tendez la main. Ils sont des maîtres, non seulement en matière de duplicité et de ruse, mais aussi sous le rapport du cynisme, de la hardiesse dans la conception et de l'audace dans l'exécution. Lorsqu'ils seront devenus membres de l'O.N.U., ils ne resteront pas longtemps tranquilles et si, un jour, l'institution doit sauter, ce sera par leurs soins. »

Dans le cas présent, leur intention n'est pas, malgré leurs rodemontades, de provoquer une guerre générale, ou seulement une guerre asiatique, et ils ne se soucient pas d'affronter dans une guerre ou-

verte la puissance infiniment supérieure des U.S.A. Leur manœuvre est dirigée contre Khrouchtchev et elle est d'une habileté raffinée. Notre ami J. M.-J. Ogliastro l'a parfaitement saisi et clairement expliqué.

L'initiative sino-vietnamienne place, en effet, M. K. dans le plus cruel embarras ; s'il ne soutient pas le Nord-Vietnam, Pékin l'accusera de trahison et dénoncera en lui un lâche, un révisionniste, un bourgeois asservi à l'impérialisme et au capitalisme occidental. Et la situation morale de Moscou s'en trouvera affaiblie quand aura lieu le grand rassemblement des partis communistes dans le monde.


S'il se porte, au contraire, à l'aide de Hanoï et de Pékin, Khrouchtchev mécontentera les Etats-Unis. Il annulera ou compromettra les patients efforts auxquels il se livre et qui visent à consolider la coexistence pacifique. Les progrès acquis par lui dans une voie qui devrait aboutir, un jour, au désarmement s'évanouiront.

De toute façon, Khrouchtchev perdra sur un tableau sans gagner beaucoup sur l'autre. Pékin, au contraire, est assuré de gagner sur les deux. Que Khrouchtchev le suive ou ne le suive pas, il se déconsidérera en quelque manière. Le prestige de la République populaire s'accroîtra, en revanche, du fait qu'elle aura osé tenir tête aux Etats-Unis, qu'elle n'aura pas eu peur des Américains et ordonné de tirer sur leurs destroyers. Elle apparaîtra plus que jamais comme la grande puissance de l'Asie.

L'Amérique aura, pour sa part, donné le spectacle d'autant de fermeté que de prudence. Johnson, en face de Hanoï et de Pékin, n'aura pas été inférieur à Kennedy en face de Cuba, et, dans la perspective électorale, son action aura été bénéficiaire puisque Goldwater, lui-même, l'a approuvée et que l'unanimité nationale s'est rangée derrière le Président.

André FRANÇOIS-PONCET
de l'Académie française.

(Suite page 3, col. 1)



NATATION : Sept records de



Le Dunkerquois Francis LUYCE a gagné hier le 400 m en améliorant le 17 ans il représentera la France aux Jeux olympiques de Tokyo.
(Lire en rubrique sport le commentaire de

RESERVATION COPY

dans la capitale américaine que la crise est passée. De toute façon, on est paré. Sur le plan intérieur, d'abord, vendredi par 88 voix contre 2, le Sénat a voté la résolution accordant au président Johnson les pleins pouvoirs militaires dans le Sud-Est asiatique. La Chambre des Représentants l'avait adoptée auparavant par un vote unanime.

Sur le terrain ensuite, des renforts ont été et ne cessent d'être acheminés. Et, selon les services de renseignements américains, aucun mouvement militaire laissant présager une intensification

riaux à 12 milles est un point de vue communiste. Les Etats-Unis ne tiennent compte que des limites reconnues par le droit international, c'est-à-dire trois milles. Toutefois, les deux attaques contre les navires américains ont été effectuées bien au-delà des 12 milles.

On peut honnêtement suppo-

gnent que la riposte contre les bases du Nord-Vietnam était inévitable. Si les Etats-Unis n'avaient pas réagi avec fermeté et rapidité, leur attitude aurait été interprétée par les communistes comme une preuve de faiblesse et la sécurité de leurs navires dans les eaux internationales n'aurait pas pu être assurée.

COUPS DE CANON AU TONKIN

Suite de la première page

Localement, le Sud-Vietnam sera content de la leçon infligée à Hanoi. Il appréciera plus justement la valeur de la protection américaine.

Les événements conduiront-ils à cette grande conférence que préconise la France et qui installerait en Indochine la neutralité et la paix ?

Un premier point est à souligner. L'importance stratégique de la péninsule indochinoise ne saurait être exagérée. Elle est d'ordre vital. Abandonner le Vietnam du Sud et laisser le Nord-Vietnam s'en emparer serait ouvrir les portes à l'invasion, par les Chinois, du Cambodge, du Laos, de la Thaïlande, de la Birmanie et les amener aux portes de l'Inde ; ce serait livrer des positions capitales à l'appétit d'expansion et de domination de Mao.

Les Américains le comprennent et aident, tant bien que mal, le Sud-Vietnam à garder verrouillées ses portes. Un régime de neutralité garantie, émanant d'une conférence internationale, serait-il plus efficace ?

On dit communément que le problème de l'Indochine n'a pas d'issue militaire et que, dans ces conditions, il faut trouver une solution pacifique et négociée. Mais on l'a déjà essayé. Les accords conclus n'ont pas été respectés. La neutralité pacifique n'a pas été observée hier ; le sera-t-elle demain ? On le souhaite. On souhaite que la bonne foi ne soit pas la dupe de la mauvaise.

On souhaite aussi que la solidarité des grandes puissances se manifeste et signifie à la Chine de Pékin qu'il n'y a rien à attendre de leurs divisions.

André FRANÇOIS-PONCET
de l'Académie française.

Avertissement ferme, mais modéré M. KHROUCHTCHEV :

« Si les impérialistes déclenche celle-ci s'achèvera par la destruction »

Moscou, 9 août (A.F.P.). — M. Khrouchtchev a enfin réagi personnellement hier aux incidents du golfe du Tonkin dans un discours prononcé à Ordjonikidze, dans le Caucase. Cette prise de position est conçue dans un langage ferme mais elle est considérée comme relativement modérée et ne contient aucun engagement précis à

les « impérialistes » ne pourrait s'achever que par la « destruction totale du capitalisme ».

M. Khrouchtchev n'a toutefois pas précisé ce qui constituerait, à ses yeux, le déclenchement d'une véritable guerre ni à partir de quel stade « les peuples de l'Union soviétique sauraient se dresser pour leur patrie et pour les autres Etats socialistes ».

Du fait qu'il émane de M. Khrouchtchev lui-même, qui jette ainsi son prestige dans la balance, cet avertissement n'en a

Bonne récolte soviétique cette année

Moscou, 9 août (A.F.P.). — Dans le discours qu'il a prononcé à Ordjonikidze, M. Khrouchtchev a annoncé que la récolte serait bonne cette année en U.R.S.S., et il a laissé entendre que son pays ne procéderait plus à des achats de blé.

M. Khrouchtchev a annoncé qu'il allait maintenant se rendre dans la région des terres vierges « où les travailleurs ont fourni de gros efforts cette année ».

l'égard de la République démocratique du Vietnam.

Les observateurs mettent l'accent sur le fait que le chef du gouvernement soviétique, qui avait prononcé, au cours de la tournée d'inspection agricole qu'il effectuait actuellement, plusieurs discours la semaine dernière, a attendu que la situation ait perdu, du point de vue militaire, son caractère aigu avant d'adresser cette mise en garde, assez générale, aux Etats-Unis.

On pense généralement que M. Khrouchtchev qui, en dépit des attaques idéologiques chinoises, demeure officiellement le « chef de file du camp socialiste », au moins vis-à-vis de sa propre opinion publique, ne pouvait faire moins que d'exprimer publiquement son appui à un membre de ce camp. Mais, contrairement à ce qu'il avait fait dans d'autres occasions, notamment lorsqu'il s'était agi de Cuba, il n'a pas cette fois agité l'« épouvantail nucléaire » et s'est contenté de rappeler le dogme, toujours valable à Moscou comme à Pékin, suivant lequel une guerre déclenchée par

M. « K »

Le président du Conseil soviétique a dénoncé les « actions agressives commises contre la République démocratique du Vietnam » et a accusé les navires de guerre américains d'avoir « pénétré dans les limites du Vietnam et tenté de provoquer les actions militaires ».

Bien que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis tente d'affirmer que ce n'est pas lui qui a commis une agression mais que les navires de guerre américains ne faisaient que se défendre, il est difficile à toute personne sensée de comprendre de quelle manière la République démocratique du Vietnam a pu être l'agresseur. Car ce n'est pas la flotte de la République démocratique du Vietnam qui a pénétré dans les eaux territoriales des Etats-Unis mais au contraire les navires des Etats-Unis d'Amérique qui, à des milliers de kilomètres de leur pays, ont pénétré dans les limites du Vietnam et tenté de provoquer des actions militaires.

Les peuples ne veulent pas vivre comme par le passé ; ils ne veulent pas être des esclaves du capitalisme, des esclaves du colonialisme. Ils luttent et lutteront pour leur indépendance et aucune force d'agression, aucune action de gendarme des Etats-Unis d'Amérique et des autres puissances impérialistes ne pourront les arrêter. Nous voudrions prévenir tous ceux à qui cela s'adresse de comprendre et de bien assimiler cette vérité.

Organisant la lutte idéologique et politique contre la politique agressive de l'impérialisme, le parti communiste et le pou-

DU JOUR

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AUGUST 12, 6 PM

QUAI INFORMS US THAT CHICOM AVBASSADOR HUANG CHEN CALLED
ON FONMINISTER COUVE DE MURVILLE AUGUST 10. HUANG CHEN
EXPRESSED PLEASURE TRIPARTITE LAO MEETING WOULD TAKE
PLACE IN PARIS AND REPEATED CHINESE THESES ON TONKIN GULF

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INCIDENTS AND AFTERMATH. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY COUVE,
HE DENIED THAT CHINESE SENDING VOLUNTEERS TO VIET NAM. @
SESSION REPORTEDLY CLOSED WITH BOTH MEN AGREEING GENEVA
CONFERENCES RATHER THAN UN HAD APPROPRIATE COMPETENCE IN
SETTLING INDOCHINESE DIFFICULTIES. GP-3 BOHLEN

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