

## ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 23, 2014

## LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 2

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
101	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	S	4	8/30/64	A
102	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	S	6	8/30/64	A
103	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	S	2	8/29/64	A
104	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	C	8	8/29/64	A
105	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	S	5	8/28/64	A
106	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	C	8	8/28/64	A
107	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	S	3	8/27/64	A
108	cable	Intelligence Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	C	1	8/26/64	A

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**Collection Title** National Security File, Country File, Vietnam**Folder Title** Volume 16**Box Number** 7

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5/22/2014

Initials

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Page 2 of 2

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
109	cable	Intelligence Cable - Sanitized, 8/2000	S	1	8/25/64	A
110	cable	Intelligence Cable - Sanitized, 4/1999	S	2	8/25/64	A
111	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized 4/1999	S	1	8/25/64	A
112	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized 4/1999	C	4	8/25/64	A
113	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized 4/1999	C	3	8/25/64	A
114	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized 4/1999	C	3	8/24/64	A
119	cable	CINCPAC to JCS - Sanitized 7/1976	TS	10	8/29/64	A
189	report	Weekly Report, "The Situation in South Vietnam" - Sanitized, 4/1999	S	25	8/20/64	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

*1 of 19*

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 Cable	State <del>C</del> <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 685 fm Saigon 1 p	8/31/64	A
#4 Cable	State <del>S</del> <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 569 to Saigon 2 p	8/31/64	A
#5 Cable	State <del>S</del> <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 568 to Saigon 1 p	8/31/64	A
#6 Cable	State <del>S</del> <i>Gp 1 State etc. 2/27/78</i> 567 to Saigon 3 p	8/31/64	A
#8 Cable	State <del>S</del> <i>Gp 3 Example, State 2-14-79</i> <del>559 to Saigon</del> <i>open 11-V-97 RAC</i> 1 p	8/31/64	A
#9 Cable	State <del>S</del> <i>sanitized 7-20-79</i> <del>633 fm Saigon</del> 3 p	8/30/64	A
#10 Cable	State <del>S</del> <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 632 fm Saigon 1 p	8/30/64	A
#11 Cable	State <del>C</del> <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 631 fm Saigon 1 p	8/30/64	A
#13 Cable	State <del>C</del> <i>sanitized 7-20-79</i> <del>626 fm Saigon</del> <i>open 11-V-97 RAC</i> 2 p	8/29/64	A
#14 Cable	State <del>S</del> <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 625 fm Saigon 1 p	8/29/64	A

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**2 of 19**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#15 Cable	State S Gp 2 <i>open 7-20-79 inc</i> 622 fm Saigon 1 p	8/29/64	A
#16 Cable	State S <i>sanitized 4-28-81</i> <del>620 fm Saigon</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 2 p	8/29/64	A
#19 Cable	State S <i>sanitized 7-20-79 inc</i> <del>613 fm Saigon</del> 4 p	8/29/64	A
#20 Cable	State S <i>open 8-18-81 inc</i> <del>612 fm Saigon</del> 3 p	8/29/64	A
#21 Cable	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 611 fm Saigon 1 p	8/29/64	A
#24 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 555 to Saigon 3 p	8/29/64	A
#25 Cable	State S <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 607 fm Saigon 1 p	8/28/64	A
#26 Cable	State S <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 599 fm Saigon 1 p	8/28/64	A
#27 Cable	State S <i>open 7-20-79 inc</i> 598 fm Saigon 3 p	8/28/64	A
#28 Cable	State C Gp 3 <i>"</i> 595 fm Saigon 1 p	8/28/64	A

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**3 of 19**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#29 Cable	State C <i>sanitized 7-20-79</i> <del>594 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 2 p	8/28/64	A
#30 Cable	State C Gp 3 <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 595 fm Saigon 1 p	8/28/64	A
#32 Cable	State S <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 544 to Saigon 1 p	8/28/64	A
#34 Cable	State C <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 591 fm Saigon 1 p	8/27/64	A
#35 Cable	State C <i>sanitized 7-20-79</i> <del>590 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 2 p	8/27/64	A
#36 Cable	State C <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 589 fm Saigon 3 p	8/27/64	A
#37 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 584 fm Saigon 2 p	8/27/64	A
#38 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>sanitized 7-20-79</i> <del>578 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 3 p	8/27/64	A
#39 Cable	State S <i>sanitized 7-20-79</i> <del>577 fm Saigon</del> 7 p	8/27/64	A
#40 Cable	State G <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 575 fm Saigon 1 p	8/27/64	A

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4 of 19

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#41 Cable	State S <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 541 to Saigon 2 p	8/27/64	A
#42 Cable	State C Gp 3 <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 533 to Saigon 1 p	8/27/64	A
#43 Cable	State C <i>Exempt - State 2-11-79</i> <del>570 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC 3 p</del>	8/26/64	<del>A</del>
#45 Cable	State C <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 568 fm Saigon 1 p	8/26/64	A
#46 Cable	State S Gp 1 <i>sanitized 7-20-79</i> <del>560 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC 3 p</del>	8/26/64	<del>A</del>
#47 Cable	State S <i>open 8-18-81 ip</i> 559 fm Saigon 2 p	8/26/64	<del>A</del>
#48 Cable	State C <i>Exempt</i> STATE letter FEB 14 1979 <del>558 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC 2 p</del>	8/25/64	<del>A</del>
#49 Cable	State S <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 521 to Saigon 1 p	8/26/64	<del>A</del>
#50 Cable	State S <i>Exempt</i> STATE letter FEB 14 1979 <del>557 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC 5 p</del>	8/25/64	<del>A</del>
#51 Cable	State C <i>Exempt</i> STATE letter FEB 14 1979 <del>553 fm Saigon 2 p</del>	8/25/64	<del>A</del>

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Vietnam Vol.XVI 8/16-31/64

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**5 of 19**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#52 Cable	State S <del>sanitized 7-20-79</del> <del>545 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC 8 p</del>	8/25/64	A
#53 Cable	State S Gp 3 <del>sanitized 7-20-79</del> <del>542 fm Saigon 3 p</del>	8/24/64	A
#54 Cable	State C Gp 3 <del>sanitized 7-20-79</del> <del>519 to Saigon 1 p</del>	8/25/64	A
#55 Cable	State C open 8-18-81 ip <del>517 to Saigon 2 p</del>	8/25/64	A
#56 Cable	State C State ltr. 2/27/78 <del>508 to Saigon 3 p</del>	8/24/64	A
#57 Cable	State S <del>sanitized 7-20-79</del> <del>507 to Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC 3 p</del>	8/24/64	A
#58 Cable	State C State ltr. 2/27/78 <del>529 fm Saigon 1 p</del>	8/23/64	A
#59 Cable	State S Gp 3 Exempt STATE letter FEB 14 1979 <del>528 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC 3 p</del>	8/23/64	A
#62 Cable	State S <del>sanitized 7-20-79</del> <del>522 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC 2 p</del>	8/22/64	A
#63 Cable	State S <del>sanitized 7-20-79</del> <del>520 fm Saigon 3 p</del>	8/22/64	A

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**6 of 19**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#64 Cable	State C <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 516 fm Saigon 1 p	8/22/64	A
#65 Cable	State S <i>Exempt STATE letter FEB 14 1979</i> <del>515 fm Saigon</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 3 p	8/22/64	A
#66 Cable	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 514 fm Saigon 1 p	8/22/64	A
#67 Cable	State C <i>Gp 3 painting 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>508 fm Saigon</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 1 p	8/22/64	A
#68 Cable	State S <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 500 to Saigon 1 p	8/22/64	A
#69 Cable	State C <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 503 fm Saigon 2 p	8/21/64	A
#70 Cable	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 500 fm Saigon 2 p	8/21/64	A
#71 Cable	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 497 fm Saigon 1 p	8/21/64	A
#72 Cable	State C <i>painting 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>506 fm Saigon</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 2 p	8/21/64	A
#75 Cable	State C <i>Gp 3 open 11-18-80 ip</i> <del>494 to Saigon</del> 2 p	8/21/64	A

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7 of 19

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#76 Cable	State S <i>Exempt</i> STATE letter FEB 14 1979 <del>483 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 2 p	8/20/64	A
#77 Cable	State S <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 482 fm Saigon 1 p	8/19/64	A
#78 Cable	State S " 488 to Saigon 1 p	8/20/64	A
#79 Cable	State S <i>open 8-18-81 ip</i> <del>485 to Saigon</del> 1 p	8/20/64	A
#80 Cable	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 483 to Saigon 1 p	8/20/64	A
#81 Cable	State S <i>sanitized 3-23-81 ip</i> <del>481 to Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 5 p	8/20/64	A
#83 Cable	State S Cp 2 <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 469 fm Saigon 2 p	8/19/64	A
#85 Cable	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i> 466 fm Saigon 1 p	8/18/64	A
#87 Cable	State S <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>464 fm Saigon open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 5 p	8/18/64	A
#88 Cable	State C <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>461 fm Saigon</del> 1 p	8/18/64	A

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8 of 19

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#90 Cable	State C <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 445 fm Saigon 1 p	8/17/64	A
#92 Cable	State S <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 454 to Saigon 1 p	8/17/64	A
#93 Cable	State C Gp 3 <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 428 fm Saigon 1 p	8/15/64	A
#94 Cable	State C Gp 3 <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>422 fm Saigon</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 3 p	8/15/64	A
#95 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>419 fm Saigon</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 1 p	8/15/64	A
#96 Cable	State S <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 418 fm Saigon 2 p	8/15/64	A
#97 Cable	State S <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 417 fm Saigon 1 p	8/15/64	A
#98 Cable	State S <i>State etc. 2/27/78</i> 416 fm Saigon 14 p	8/15/64	A
#99 Cable	State S <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 415 fm Saigon 3 p	8/15/64	A
#135 Cable	State S Gp 3 <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>1131 to Paris</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 2 p	8/28/64	A

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9 of 19

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#136 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 Exempt</del> STATE letter FEB 14 1979 <del>940 fm London open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 2 p	8/26/64	A
#138 Cable	<del>State C Gp 3 Exempt</del> STATE letter FEB 14 1979 <del>377 fm Karachi</del> 1 p	8/23/64	A
#139 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 open 6-9-80 ing</del> <del>119 fm Oslo</del> 1 p	8/19/64	A
#140 Cable	<del>State S open 7-20-79 ing</del> <del>90 to Oslo</del> 1 p	8/18/64	A
#141 Cable	<del>State C Gp 3</del> 11 <del>290 fm Belgrade</del> 4 p	8/14/64	A
#143 Memo	<del>State S Gp 1 sanitized 7-20-79 ing</del> <del>INR-33 open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 17 p	8/28/64	A
#146 Cable	<del>State S open 7-20-79 ing</del> <del>1530 to London</del> 1 p	8/31/64	A
#148 Cable	<del>State S Gp 1 Exempt</del> STATE letter FEB 14 1979 <del>612 fm Rome open 11-4-97 RAC</del> 1 p	8/29/64	A
#149 Cable	<del>State S Gp 2 sanitized 7-20-79 ing</del> <del>606 fm Saigon</del> 7 p	8/28/64	A
#150 Cable	<del>State S Gp 3 sanitized 7-20-79 ing</del> <del>1072 fm Paris</del> 6 p	8/26/64	A

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**10 of 19**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#151 Airgram	State C Gp 3 <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>A-418 fm Bonn</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 11 p	8/26/64	A
#152 Cable	State S <i>State Otr. 2/27/78</i> 188 to Madrid 2 p	8/26/64	A
#154 Cable	State C <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>711 fm Bonn</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 3 p	8/24/64	A
#156 Cable	State C <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> 183 fm Copenhagen 3 p	8/23/64	A
#158 Cable	State S Gp 3 " 667 fm Bonn 2 p	8/20/64	A
#160 Cable	State C <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>144 fm The Hague</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 2 p	8/20/64	A
#161 Cable	State C Gp 1 " <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>Polto 279 fm Paris</del> 6 p	8/19/64	A
#162 Cable	State C Gp 1 <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>Polto 271 fm Paris</del> 2 p	8/18/64	A
#163 Cable	State S <i>sanitized 7-20-79 ing</i> <del>920 fm Paris</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> 2 p	8/17/64	A
#165 Cable	State C Gp 3 <i>open 7-20-79 ing</i> Depcirtel 301 4 p	8/15/64	A

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**11 of 19**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#172a Despatch</del>	<del>State C <i>Exempt</i> STATE letter FEB 14 1979</del>	<del><i>agen 11-4-97</i></del>	
	<del>Summary of &amp; Despatch #50 fm Brit.</del>	<del><i>RAC</i></del>	
	<del>Charge d'Affaires, Peking, to FonOff. 8 p</del>	<del>8/11/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#175 Memo	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i>		
	Forrestal to Bundy 1 p	8/24/64	A
#176a Memo	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i>		
	Hilliker to Bundy 2 p	8/21/64	A
#176b Cable	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i>		
	work copy of cable to Saigon 1 p	8/6/64	A
#176c Cable	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i>		
	299 fm Saigon 1 p	8/4/64	A
#176d Memo	State C <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i>		
	Read to Bundy 1 p	8/7/64	A
#176e Cable	duplicates #176b above <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i>	1 p	A
#183 Ltr.	State S <i>State ltr. 2/27/78</i>		
	Forrestal to McNaughton 1 p	8/17/64	A

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12 of 19

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#3 Cable</del>	<del>State TS</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> <del>684 fm Saigon</del> <del>4 p</del>	<del>8/31/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22 Cable</del>	<del>State TS</del> " <del>557 to Saigon</del> <del>1 p</del>	<del>8/29/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#23 Cable</del>	<del>State TS Gp 1</del> " <del>drafting office copy</del> <del>2 p</del>	<del>8/29/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#31 Cable</del>	<del>State TS Gp 3</del> " <del>550 to Saigon</del> <del>1 p</del>	<del>8/28/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#74 Cable</del>	<del>State TS Gp 2</del> " <del>496 to Saigon</del> <del>3 p</del>	<del>8/21/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#84 Cable</del>	<del>State TS Gp 1</del> " <del>467 fm Saigon</del> <del>2 p</del>	<del>8/18/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#86 Cable</del>	<del>State TS</del> <i>open 9-30-99 RAC</i> <del>465 fm Saigon</del> <del>7 p</del>	<del>8/18/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#89 Cable</del>	<del>State TS Gp 1</del> <i>dym per RAC, 10/97</i> <del>457 fm Saigon</del> <del>7 p</del>	<del>8/17/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#164 Cable</del>	<del>State TS</del> <i>open 11-4-97 RAC</i> <del>908 to Paris</del> <del>1 p</del>	<del>8/17/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#181 Memo</del>	<del>State TS</del> " <del>Forrestal to Bundy</del> <del>1 p</del>	<del>8/19/64</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION  
NSF Country File

Vietnam Vol. XVI 8/16-31/64

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13 of 19

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#181a Cable	State TS exempt 4-24 G2 NLS 9-530 fm CANDEL Saigon (Seaborn Mission) 12 p open 11-4-97 RAC	8/15/64	A

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**14 of 19**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#101 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr 6/15/76</i> TDCS DB-315/00578-64 <i>sanitized 5-8-70 RAC</i> 4 p	8/30/64	A
#102 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr 6/15/76</i> TDCS DB-315/00577-64 <i>sanitized 5-8-70 RAC</i> 6 p	8/30/64	A
#103 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr 6/15/76</i> TDCS DB-315/00570-64 2 p	8/29/64	A
#104 Cable	CIA C Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr 6/15/76</i> TDCS-314/02346-64 8 p	8/29/64	A
#105 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr 6/15/76</i> TDCS DB-315/00555-64 5 p	8/28/64	A
#106 Cable	CIA C Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr 6/15/76</i> TDCS-314/02342-64 <i>sanitized 5-8-70 RAC</i> 8 p	8/28/64	A
#107 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr 6/15/76</i> TDCS-314/02219-64 3 p	8/27/64	A
#108 Cable	CIA C Gp 1 <del><i>sanitized 9-30-79 RAC</i></del> TDCS-314/02190-64 <i>same sanitization 5-8-70 RAC; same soni RAC 8/00</i> 1 p	8/26/64	A
#109 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized CIA ltr 6/15/76</i> CIA to WH att. JC Thomson 1 p	<i>same RAC 8/00</i> 8/25/64	A
#110 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>sanitized CIA ltr 6/15/76, Dec 9/8/77</i> CIA to WH SitRoom 2 p	8/25/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File

Vietnam Vol. XVI 8/16-31/64

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**15 of 19**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#111 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr. 6/15/76</i> TDCS-314/02123-64 1 p	8/25/64	A
#112 Cable	CIA C Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr. 6/15/76</i> TDCS-314/02047-64 4 p	8/25/64	A
#113 Cable	CIA C Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr. 6/15/76</i> TDCS-314/02043-64 <i>Sanitized 5-8-76 RAC</i> 3 p	8/25/64	A
#114 Cable	CIA C Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr. 6/15/76</i> TDCS-314/02028-64 3 p	8/24/64	A
#168a Biog.	<del>CIA C Gp 1 <i>CIA ltr. 6/15/76</i></del> <del>Vice Premier, Minister of Finance 1 p</del>	<del>2/10/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#173 Memo	<del>CIA S <i>CIA ltr. 6/15/76</i></del> <del>Watch Office to Cline 1 p</del>	<del>8/25/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#187 Report	<del>CIA S Cp 1 <i>CIA ltr. 6/15/76, State ltr 9/8/77</i></del> <del>OCI No. 1294/64 13 p</del>	<del>8/27/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#188 Memo	<del>CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr. 6/15/76, State ltr 9/8/77</i></del> <del>OCI No. 2220/64 <i>Open RAC 5-7-78</i> 2 p</del>	<del>8/25/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#189 Report	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Sanitized, CIA ltr. 6/15/76, State ltr 9/8/77</i> OCI No. 1293/64 22 p	8/20/64	A

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16 of 19

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#118 Cable	JCS TS Gp 1 <i>JCS la 7/13/76</i> <del>JCS 8172 to CINCPAC</del> 2 p	8/30/64	A
#119 Cable	JCS TS Gp 3 <i>sanitized JCS la 7/13/76</i> CINCPAC to JCS 10 p	8/29/64	A
#120 Cable	JCS TS <i>JCS la 7/13/76</i> <del>COMUSMACV to NMCC</del> 2 p	8/27/64	A
#130 Cable	JCS TS Gp 1 <i>JCS la 7/13/76</i> <del>CINCPAC to JCS</del> 2 p	8/19/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#123 Cable	JCS S <i>JCS ltr. 4/26/76</i> COMUSMACV-16 to JCS 1 p	8/16/64	A
#124 Cable	JCS S <i>JCS ltr. 4/26/76</i> CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC 2 p	8/26/64	A

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*18 of 19*

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#170 Resume	DOD <del>S</del> <i>DOD ltr. 4/23/76</i> Q.&A. Telecon w/Westmoreland 11 p	8/25/64	A
#171 Resume	DOD <del>S</del> <i>DOD ltr. 4/23/76</i> addition to #170 above 2 p	8/25/64	A
#180 Ltr.	DOD <del>S</del> <i>DOD ltr. 4/23/76</i> Blouin to Forrestal 2 p	8/20/64	A
#182a Memo	DOD <del>C</del> <i>DOD ltr 4/23/76</i> Friedman to Bundy 1 p	8/17/64	A
#182b Draft	DOD <del>C</del> <i>DOD ltr. 4/23/76</i> Proposed Vance Statement 3 p	8/17/64	A

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19 of 19

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#176 Memo	NSC C <i>NSC ln 8/3/76</i> <del>Thomson to Bundy</del> 1 p	8/24/64	A

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1



Saigon Cables

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

WH

2

Bundy

31

Action

SS

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:

26148

Rec'd:

AUGUST 31, 1964

9:18 AM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 685, PRIORITY

DATE: AUGUST 31, 8 PM

Cy #3 det

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State ex 2/20/78

002

DEPTEL 557; EMBTEL 684.

By lmq

, NARS, Date 4/6/78

KHANH'S VIEW REPORTED IN EMBTEL 684 THAT HE CAN STRAIGHTEN OUT HIS IMMEDIATE GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS BY THE END OF THE WEEK MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY RELIABLE BUT IS BEST EPIVEY \* AVAILABLE OF TIME REQUIRED TO BRING SOME STABILITY INTO SAIGON PICTURE. AS IT IS AWKWARD TO TRY TO CONDUCT MY BUSINESS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS, I PROPOSE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES TO TAKE 7 SEPTEMBER AS MY DATE OF ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON, RECOGNIZING THAT BECAUSE OF THE HOLIDAY, OFFICIAL BUSINESS MAY HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL 8 SEPTEMBER. SUGGEST NO PUBLICITY UNTIL DAY OF DEPARTURE.

REQUEST CONCURRENCE.

TAYLOR

BAP

\* AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3  
033

31

Action

SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 26203  
RECD: AUGUST 31, 1964 10:38 A.M.

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 684 (SECTION ONE OF TWO) IMMEDIATE

DATE: AUGUST 31, 7 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~ DEPT PASS ACTION WHITEHOUSE 85 DOD 111  
CIA 91 INFO CINCPAC POLAD 345

L I M D I S

WHEN ALEX JOHNSON AND I CALLED ON GENERAL KHANH IN DALAT THIS MORNING (AUGUST 31), WE FOUND HIM SUFFERING FROM HEMORHOIDS, HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE, AND AN OBSESSION OVER THE PREPONDERANT STRENGTH OF THE DAI VIET. AS HIS DOCTOR WAS PRESCRIBING FOR THE FIRST TWO AILMENTS, WE ADDRESSED OURSELVES TO THE THIRD.

KHANH SEEMS TO HAVE COME TO DALAT FROM THE MEETINGS IN SAIGON IMPRESSED WITH THE LUST FOR POWER OF THE DAI VIET AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO ATTAIN THEIR OBJECTIVES. IN SPITE OF THE UNANIMOUS VOTE OF THE GENERALS AT THE MEETING ON AUGUST 27TH URGING KHANH TO REMAIN AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, HE HAS NO ILLUSION OVER THE LONG TERM LOYALTIES OF THE DAI VIET GENERALS. AFTER HIS PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF THE PARTY, HE IS SURE THEY ARE OUT TO GET HIM.

HE WENT OVER THE USUAL LIST OF THOSE WHOM HE CONSIDERED TO BE DAI VIET AND THE AVAILABLE TROOP STRENGTH. HE POINTS OUT THAT MUCH OF THIS STRENGTH IS IN THE SAIGON AREA AND HENCE IT WOULD BE EASY FOR THEM TO STAGE A COUP IN THE CITY. HE HAS IN MIND IN PARTICULAR THE SAIGON POLICE OF COLONEL BEN, THE ARMOR OF COLONEL NGHIA, AND THE 7TH DIVISION OF COLONEL TON.

KHANH IS ALSO AWARE OF A POSSIBLE COUP FROM A GROUP OF UNSPECIFIED YOUNG GENERALS AND COLONELS. HE SAYS THAT HE IS IN CONTACT WITH THIS GROUP WHO ARE GENERALLY ANTI-DAI VIET. HE APPARENTLY CONSIDERS THAT THEY ARE BASICALLY FOR HIM BUT HE STATES THAT HE IS URGING THEM NOT TO MAKE ANY MOVE SINCE, FROM A NATIONAL POINT OF VIEW, A NEW COUP WOULD BE DISASTROUS.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority

RAC 00014850

By uo

NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-684, August 31, 7 P.M. (SECTION I OF II) from Saigon

MEANWHILE, MULLING OVER SUCH THOUGHTS AS THESE, KHANH HAS BEEN DOING NOTHING IN DALAT OTHER THAN RECEIVED MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ENJOY THE SUNSHINE. HE SEEMS OBLIVIOUS TO THE NEED FOR GETTING HIS GOVERNMENT GOING AGAIN AND FOR TAKING THOSE PREPARATORY MEASURES NECESSARY TO OFFSET ANY POSSIBLE MOVE BY THE DAI VIET.

IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, JOHNSON AND I TOOK AS OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE AN EFFORT FOR BESTIR KHANH TO ACTIVITY. FIRST, WE WENT OVER THE LIST OF HIS ENEMIES AND COMPARED THEM TO THE STRENGTH WHICH HE CLAIMS FOR HIS CAUSE. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, HE AGREED THAT HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE BUDDHISTS, CATHOLICS AND THE SECTS. HE CONSIDERS THAT HE HAS THE LARGE MAJORITY OF THE GENERALS TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS, PARTICULARLY THE STRATEGICALLY LOCATED III CORPS COMMANDER IN SAIGON. EVEN A FRAGMENT OF THE DAI VIET FAVORS HIM. THUS, BY ANY METHOD OF EVALUATION, HIS POTENTIAL STRENGTH WELL OUTWEIGHS THAT OF HIS DAI VIET ENEMIES, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAVE SOME ADVANTAGES IN THE LOCATION OF THEIR TROOPS.

HENCE, WE SAW NO REASON FOR HIM TO HIDE OUT IN DALAT WHEN SO MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE IN SAIGON. WE EMPASIZED THE EVIDENCE OF LACK OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY IN SAIGON AND THE CONFUSION OF THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESS. HE FOUGHT BACK RIEBLY\* SAYING THAT KHIEM AND/OR MINH AND PERHAPS FONMIN QUAT WERE WORKING ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PROPOSED COUNCIL OF NATIONAL UNITY. WE TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD SEEN NO SIGN OF SUCH ACTIVITY.

WE ALSO EMPHASIZED THE BAD EFFECT OF THE OANH INTERVIEW WHICH INDICATED THAT OANH WAS REALLY THE HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS AND THAT HE, KHANH, WAS PRACTICALLY A MENTAL CASE. HE LAUGHED THIS OFF AS BEST HE COULD BUT GOT THE POINT THAT HE NEEDED TO SHOW HIMSELF AT AN EARLY DATE IN SAIGON.

TAYLOR

BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 11:18 AM 8/31/64

Passed to White House, DOD, CIA & CINCPAC POLAD 11:30 AM 8/31/64

\*As received, will be serviced upon request.

~~TOP SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45

Action

SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

CORRECTION ISSUED: 032

9/1/64- 1 A.M.-DLW

26209

AUGUST 31, 1964

10:41 AM

FROM: SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY

ACTION: SECSTATE 684, IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE 85,  
DOD 111  
CIA 91

INFO: CINCPAC POLAD 345

DATE: AUGUST 31, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

AT THIS POINT HE ASKED US WHAT WE RECOMMENDED THAT HE DO. WHILE ADMITTING THAT AS FOREIGNERS WE COULD NEVER BE SURE OF OUR JUDGEMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO TIMING, WE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: I URGED HIM TO RETURN TO SAIGON QUICKLY, AT LEAST FOR ONE DAY, THERE TO CONVENE HIS CABINET, ISSUE ORDERS AND BE VISIBLY ACTIVE IN DIRECTING THE GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME HE MIGHT CONSIDER SOME STATEMENT TO OR APPEARANCE BEFORE THE PRESS.

THEREAFTER, IF HE FELT HE HAD TO RETURN TO DALAT TO CONTINUE HIS MEDICAL TREATMENT, HE MIGHT BRING THE TRIUMVIRATE BACK WITH HIM AND HOLD MEETINGS WITH PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL UNITY IN DALAT. I SUGGESTED THAT HE CONSIDER INCLUDING AMONG THESE LABOR LEADERS BUU WHO HAS IMPRESSED US ALL FAVORABLY.

NEXT, WE TALKED TO HIM ABOUT THE NEED FOR PREPARING HIS FENCES AGAINST A POSSIBLE COUP. WHY NOT CALL TO DALAT THE PRINCIPAL NON-DAI VIET GENERALS AND BE SURE THEY ARE READY TO ACT IF THE DAI VIET MOVE? ONCE ALL PREPARATIONS ARE MADE TO DEFEND AGAINST A COUP, KHANH SHOULD CONSIDER CALLING IN GENERAL KHIEM AND ORDERING THE REPLACEMENT OF THE DAI VIET GENERALS WHOM HE CONSIDERS A THREAT TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

WE ASSURED HIM THAT FURTHER INACTIVITY WOULD BE FATAL, THAT HIS ACTIONS WERE BEING WATCHED CLOSELY IN VIETNAM, IN WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 684, AUGUST 31, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM SAIGON

AND OTHER CAPITALS ABROAD TO SEE WHETHER HE COULD REALLY GOVERN THIS COUNTRY. IF HE CAN GIVE SUCH EVIDENCE, THE US IS STILL BEHIND HIM. IF WE EVER BECOME CONVINCED THAT HE CANNOT LEAD HIS COUNTRY TO VICTORY, HE CAN NO LONGER COUNT UPON US.

KHANH INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER WE HAD A SUBSTITUTE GOVERNMENT IF HIS FAILED. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE HAD NO FAVORITE AND WERE NOT LOOKING FOR A SUBSTITUTE AT THIS TIME. HE ASKED FOR THE THIRD OR FOURTH TIME MY OPINION OF GENERAL MINH. I REPEATED WHAT I HAVE USUALLY SAID, NAMELY THAT I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FRIENDLY WITH MINH BUT THAT I CONSIDERED THAT HE LACKED LEADERSHIP AND WAS UNWILLING TO WORK AT ANY HARD TASK. HOWEVER, I WOULD BE INCLINED TO LET HIM REMAIN IN THE KHANH GOVERNMENT AS CHIEF OF STATE PROVIDING THAT HIS ROLE AS A DIGNIFIED FIGUREHEAD WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED IN ADVANCE.

I MENTIONED THAT IN MY MEETING WITH MINH ON AUG 28 HE HAD ADMITTED TO AN AMBITION TO BE EITHER CHIEF OF STATE OR TO HEAD THE ARMY REPLACING GENERAL KHIEM. KHANH DOES NOT LIKE EITHER ALTERNATIVE, STATING THAT IF HE EVER BECAME HEAD OF A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT HE WOULD INSIST UPON OCCUPYING CONCURRENTLY THE PRESIDENCY AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. HE REMINDED US THAT THIS IS THE WAY DIEM HAD RUN THINGS DURING HIS LONG PRESIDENCY.

WE ENDED ON THE NOTE WITH WHICH WE HAD BEGAN —THE NEED FOR ACTIVITY, DECISIVENESS AND A DISPLAY OF INITIATIVE. ALL WE GOT FROM KHANH WAS THE STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD REFLECT ON OUR SUGGESTIONS. HE SAYS THAT HE HOPES TO REAPPEAR IN SAIGON WITHIN A FEW DAYS AND TO GET THINGS IN ORDER THERE BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

TAYLOR

BAP/DLW

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O AT 11:40 AM AUGUST 31ST  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, CINCPAC POLAD AT NOON AUGUST 31ST

NOTE: ADVANCE CORRECTION PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, CINCPAC POLAD  
AT 11:10 P.M., AUGUST 31.

~~TOP SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

53

~~SECRET~~

4  
17172  
Aug 31 8 45 PM '64

Origin

SVN

Info

SS

G

SP

L

H

EUR

FE

P

IOP

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

NIC

IGA

AID

E

FRB

TRSY

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 569 ~~XXXXXXXX~~ IMMEDIATE  
JOINT STATE-AID MESSAGE

SUBJECT: Exchange of VN \$500 notes

Aug 31 8 45 PM '64

GVN announcement exchange of 500 plaster notes

021

within 10-day period caused us apprehension. Section 2 of your 614 re-enforces our misgivings about wisdom such tinkering with currency, which even in best of times is extremely delicate. Times are not the best and have become even less so since exchange was announced. Spectacle of businessmen taking large losses on their personal holdings in midst of governmental uncertainty adds undesirable and unnecessary undercurrent of desperation.

Recent disturbances have undoubtedly hindered people, particularly in the countryside, from changing notes. It is likely that slow-down local administration has made exchange impossible in some areas.

We note that VC have begun to style exchange a plot to rob people of their money. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State la 2/27/78  
By mgj, NARS, Date 4/6/78

Drafted by:

S/VN:Montgomery:ss 8/31/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: S/VN - Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

AID/VN - Mr. Stoneman

S/VN - Mr. Corcoran (draft)

OFE - Miss Milne (SUB.) ~~XXXXXXXX~~

S/S-O - Mr. Williams

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~~SECRET~~

Practical results this effort likely to bear out VC charge.

Suggest you consider approaching GVN and urge them to take steps before expiration deadline correct these conditions. We assume this will require extension of deadline.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

51

Origin  
SS

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 568

Info:

INFO: CINCPAC

Ref Embtel 685

EXDIS

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Although September 7 may be appropriate date your return for planning purposes, we believe your presence Saigon may be desirable for longer period. If situation ~~sh~~ should develop so that your return that date would not repeat not be advisable, you might consider sending Alexis Johnson to give us your appraisal and assist us in developing scenario for actions within and without SVN.

Realize this makes your personal planning extremely complicated. Please let us know if anything we can do to help.this end.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Ltr 2/20/78  
By hmg, NARS, Date 4/6/78

RUSK

Drafted by

S/VN:MVForrestal:pay 8/31/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Bundy (in draft)

S/S - Mr. Tueller

~~SECRET~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

6-17138  
✓ Bundy

51

Origin  
SS  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 567

Aug 31 7 55 PM '64

INFO: CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS.

Authority State Sec 2427/28

By MMG, NAKS, Date 4/6/78

Cy #9 dest

007

Following points raised at high level meeting today for your comment:

1. Urgent necessity is to get Khanh back into action and rehabilitate his prestige if possible. Embtel 684 took exactly right line. We now wonder whether if Khanh remains reluctant it would be useful for you to have

Presidential letter along lines following draft:

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want you to know that I have been following closely the political problems that have arisen in the past week. I appreciate fully the difficulties you have faced, and I admire the restraint with which they have been handled.

Ambassador Taylor tells me you are taking a rest from the strain of recent days and indeed of the past six months. I hope that you will recover rapidly, as it seems to me urgently necessary to have your presence in Saigon just as soon as you possibly can, demonstrably leading your country in its fight against the Viet Cong and meeting the criticism being heard in some quarters that your government and the resolve and unity of your people

Drafted by: FE:WPBundy:mk 8/31/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances: The Secretary - (subs) Secretary of Defense - (subs) S/S - Mr. Tueller  
White House - Mr. Bundy - (subs) S/VN - Mr. Forrestal (draft)

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

have been weakened by recent events. You may be assured that, with such leadership, the US will continue to give its full support to your government.

I am also well aware of your continuing concern that your government be able to plan and consider with us possible stronger actions against the source of the Viet Cong insurgency. This activity too requires your firm presence and leadership.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely yours, .

END QUOTE

Request your comment and re-draft if desired. Consider especially whether inclusion last paragraph desirable. It would preclude release of letter, and this may be desirable.

2. We gather from your reports no evidence province chain of command seriously affected as yet. Can Oanh be persuaded to put out firm directives that would assist in preventing deterioration, or might GVN consider devolving special responsibilities temporarily onto four corps commanders so that they jack up province chiefs? Realize key to problem, if there is one, may be basic doubt who is in charge, but above are samples of things that might help.

3. View general uncertainty, a clear GVN success in one or more key province, especially in area near Saigon, would now be particularly helpful.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Realize you and MACV have given this continuing consideration, and do not mean to suggest occasion warrants undue risk through troop movements.

GP-1.

End.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

7 16979

44

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY 565 565

AUG 31 5 51 PM '64

P  
Info:

FOR ZORTHIAN

SS

SVN

G

SP

CU

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

Secretary on "Meet the Press," August 30, stated US policy RVN simple and well known; US has for past 10 years given large assistance government and people RVN to defend themselves against VC aggression. When VN becomes safe, independent, secure so that people can work out their own future, US military presence will not be required. Deputy Prime Minister Oanh, temporarily in charge of Government. QUOTE General Khanh is taking a few days rest. Just how long we don't know. We do expect him back and the Acting PM has indicated that he will be coming back, (Khanh) remains the PM. UNQUOTE

Demonstrations Saigon have subsided as those in Hue and Da Nang did two days ago. QUOTE What has been happening there has been attempt to work out on long-range basis some changes constitutional situation along lines that General Khanh has been thinking and working on for some time. UNQUOTE.

Khanh wanted to organize government's civilian affairs under civilian authority so he and military could give primary

Drafted by:

P: MCramer: P/ON: RGilllin: pas: 8/31/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

P - James L. Greenfield

Clearances:

S - Mr. Manning --

S/VN -

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16979

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attention to military problems. He also trying to organize <sup>5</sup>QUOTE a more representative group UNQUOTE whether called national assembly or legislative council which would try to bring about the authentic leadership of the different elements in the population to achieve greater degree of unity to get along with war effort.

Present leaders GVN have been leaders GVN for past several months. Adjustments time to time in responsibilities of individuals but QUOTE We do not see here change of government in usual sense. UNQUOTE.

We can say with confidence that we do not see in SVN any group other than VC who seem to turn to Hanoi for their answers. These people want to be free, do not accept leadership Hanoi, want to build in VN own country. This fundamental problem.

We have been urging maximum unity with a moratorium on religious differences and other rivalries until QUOTE this great national victory over the Viet Cong has been achieved. UNQUOTE

Secretary said that some infiltration by the VC and also QUOTE people with very long criminal records UNQUOTE contributed to the agitation between Buddhists and Catholics. Gen. Khanh attempted to be moderating factor between two groups and remove

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religion as an issue. Mentioned recent Buddhist-Catholic leaders' joint appeal for calm and peace. They are moving toward an adjustment of their differences -- both object to what VC are trying to do.

Secretary ruled out US military role as a police force. GVN told us they did not intend use force against demonstrations. Later, when rioting became severe both police and military moved to restore order.

Secretary said US did not have impression any significant element RVN would invite US to get out. Asked whether US would take greater political responsibility if crisis continues, he replied that basic political responsibility rested with GVN.

Leaders of various groups have fundamental common objective against VC. Difference of view exist about how government ought to be organized and relative position as among parties, military and religious groups. QUOTE We have no doubt at all about underlying commitment of all important elements with respect to VC.

UNQUOTE

in  
Problems ~~present~~ in Saigon have not yet affected operations against Viet Cong. Cited unit actions, sorties, etc.

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The problem of broadening the war depends upon North. Said hard to envisage just what negotiations would be about. If North prepared to leave South alone, then no problem. ~~Now~~ Negotiation to register that and to work out consequences would be simple indeed but conference now with North pressing against neighbors in South could do no more than break up in disagreement and leave situation worse than before.

In interview 30 August with General Khanh in Dalat by Beverly Deepe in Herald Tribune 31st, Deepe says Khanh said Ambassador Taylor "has sentiments for 'Big Minh' and wants him to come to power, although he, Khanh, fears Minh might 'become a puppet for the neutralists.'" However, Khanh said he told Minh that if he wanted "to come back to power" he, Khanh, would support him and that he would tell his friends to "support Big Minh." Khanh added he had told Ambassador Taylor this, according article.

Khanh also, in explaining his problems, is quoted by Deepe as follows: "I had so many thing to do. But I do not know what the Americans - I mean the American Embassy (in Saigon) and Washington - I do not know what they want.

"During the first student strike, I was surprised to hear the

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against  
Voice of America announce that the students were/~~again~~ the Khanh government. They were not against my government but against the charter (constitution). That's what it said on the paper I had in my hand - they would like to revise the charter. So I was surprised at the VOA announcement. I talked to the Embassy and said it was not true. Why does VOA campaign against me? So I do not know what the Americans have in mind.X

"Gen. Khanh described himself as 'Prime Minister in name' and said he thought the American government and Ambassador Taylor wanted him to continue in that capacity.

"I will not say like MacArthur, 'I shall return.' But I am ready to. When I come back I cannot have with me some people who betray me."

At noon briefing 31st Press Officer McCloskey when asked about Khanh's status quoted Secretary's "Meet the ~~PRESS~~ Press" statement on Khanh's ~~status~~ return and status as Prime Minister. Department plans to deal with Khanh charge by back-grounding inquiring correspondents as follows: "Contrary to the Herald Tribune report Ambassador Taylor has consistently indicated, in talks with Vietnamese leaders, our belief that Gen. Khanh has considerable qualities of leadership and ~~now~~ enjoys a substantial base of support."

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Unclassified

On General Khanh's statements concerning VOA broadcasts, Department is prepared to state: The Voice news broadcasts which might be involved in the story of General Khanh's recent interview are presumably broadcasts of news reports from Saigon and the US on recent Vietnamese developments, as well as official US government statements. These broadcasts are consistent with the Voice's traditional efforts to carry all important news reports from wire services, newspapers, and other sources on significant developments in the world.

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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

33

Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 559

Aug 31 1 25 PM '64

LIMDIS

Rome's 612 info Saigon 12.

Would appreciate any further information you can elicit 027  
concerning D'Orlandi's estimate regarding possible VC offensive  
against Saigon.

GP-3

End

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 60014851  
By ics, NARA, Date 10-29-97

Drafted by:

S/VN: TJCorcoran/mlg 8/31/64

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: S/VN: Michael V. Forrestal

S/S - Mr. Tueller

FE - Mr. Mendenhall ~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

9

35

Action

SS

Info

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 12A 30/1230Z  
R 301200Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority RAC 00014852

By *ms*, NARA, Date 10-29-97

025748

1964 AUG 30 AM 10 05

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DEPT 633 INFO CINCPAC 343 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 30TH 8PM '36  
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

FOREIGN MINISTER QUAT CAME BY HOME OF POLITICAL COUNSELOR AT LUNCH TIME TODAY AND IMPARTED FOL INFO OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST:

1. WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT DISCOUNT REPORTS THAT DAI VIETS (SOUTHERN FACTION) WERE CURRENTLY MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR A RPT A COUP. QUAT CONVINCED SUCH PREPARATIONS GOING FORWARD AROUND GENERAL THIEN AND UNLESS SITUATION STABILIZED DAI VIETS COULD MAKE THEIR MOVE "WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS".  
CFN 633 343 30TM8PM QUAT DAI VIETS COUP QUAT THIEN DAI VIETS

PAGE TWO DE RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~

2. GEN. MINH CURRENTLY CASTING ABOUT FOR SUPPORT AMONG THE MILITARY BUT QUAT DOUBTED MINH POSSESSED MUCH SUPPORT FROM COMMANDERS OF TROOPS.

3. GEN. KHIEM IS PLAYING BALANCING ACT BETWEEN GENERAL KHANH AND GENERAL MINH. KHIEM MIGHT WELL THROW HIS LOT WITH DAI VIETS IF COUP SET IN MOTION. KHIEM ALSO CAPABLE OF ALLYING HIMSELF WITH MINH SHOULD THIS SUIT KHIEM'S PURPOSES.

4. IN QUAT'S VIEW GEN. KHANH HAD TAKEN CONSIDERABLE DRUBBING IN PAST FEW WEEKS AND HAD RETIRED TO DALAT TO ASSESS HIS PERSONAL PROSPECTS AND FUTURE. QUAT BELIEVED KHANH HAS NOT RPT NOT YET DECIDED WHAT HE WILL DO. (IT IS WITHIN HIS CONTEXT THAT QUAT USED KHANH AND OANH INTERCHANGEABLY IN DISCUSSING FOLLOWING POINTS.)

5. IT IS ESSENTIAL AT THE PRESENT TIME TO AVOID ANY HIATUS IN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY SINCE CERTAIN MINISTERS AND THEIR MINISTRIES, WITHOUT SENSE OF DIRECTION, WERE GRINDING TO

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~~SECRET~~

=2= 633, AUGUST 30, 8 PM, FROM SAIGON

A RPT A HALT. QUAT BELIEVED COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL UNITY "SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED URGENTLY AND PUT TO WORK". IN HIS VIEW U.S. SHOULD NOT RPT NOT ATTEMPT TO GET MILITARY TRIUMVIRATE TO WORK AS A RPT A TEAM SINCE THIS A RPT A PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY; RATHER, THE TRIUMVIRATE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A RPT A SYMBOL OF UNITY AND LEFT ASIDE. COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL UNITY SHOULD BE PRIMARILY CIVILIAN IN

PAGE THREE DE RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~

CAST WITH PROVISION MADE FOR JOINT MEETINGS WITH MILITARY TRIUMVIRATE OR WITH COMMITTEE EXTENDING INVITATION TO KHANH, MINH, AND KHIEM TO MEET WITH THEM WHEN MATTERS OF INTEREST UNDER DISCUSSION. PARALLEL WITH THIS, CONCERTED EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GET THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS OF THE GOVT WORKING. "IF KHANH RETURNS", HE SHOULD DEVOTE PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THIS, STICKING TO THE JOB, MAKING DECISIONS, AND ALLOWING MINISTRIES TO PROCEED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE WITH PROGRAMS IN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

AT THE SAME TIME THE U.S. SHOULD MAKE STRONG EFFORT TO ACHIEVE GREATER DEGREE OF UNITY AMONG THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH GETTING SENIOR COMMANDERS TO DEVOTE THEIR ATTENTION TO MILITARY MATTERS. HE BELIEVED AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AS OUTSTANDING MILITARY FIGURE COULD IMPRESS ON MILITARY LEADERS NECESSITY FOR MILITARY NOT RPT NOT TO ENGAGE IN POLITICS, TO DEVOTE ATTENTION TO ELIMINATING CAUSES FOR POOR MORALE (WHATEVER THE SOURCE) WITHIN THE MILITARY, AND TO RE-CREATING A RPT A SPIRIT AMONG THE MILITARY OF APPROACHING THEIR JOB IN A RPT A PROFESSIONAL MANNER. HE BELIEVED MUCH DISCONTENT AMONG LOWER RANKS IN MILITARY COULD BE ELIMINATED BY CONCERTED CAMPAIGN TO IMPROVE LEADERSHIP AND TO FIGHT THE WAR.

RE HOAN, QUAT SAID HOAN HAD BADLY MISMANAGED HIS AFFAIRS IN

PAGE FOUR DE RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~

RECENT DAYS AND IMPLIED HOAN NO RPT NO LONGER A POLITICAL FIGURE OF CONSEQUENCE. (QUAT HAS NEVER THOUGHT HIGHLY OF HOAN).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 633, AUGUST 30, 8 PM, FROM SAIGON

REMAINDER OF LENGTHY CONVERSATION COVERED MUCH SAME GROUND  
AS THAT OF QUAT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH JOHNSON (EMBTTEL 522).  
TAYLOR  
BT

~~SECRET~~



C345 EUG635IEA789

\*\*\*ZZ RUEPWW

E RUMJIR 05A 30/1005Z

**FLASH**

RECEIVED  
USA

301000Z ZEA

1964 AUG 30 10 41

FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATESWASHDC

RUEPDA/DOD

RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

52723

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 12-20-125  
By mmg, NARS, Date 4/6/78

ACTION FLASH DEPT (632) DOD 109 WHITE HOUSE 83 CIA 89 INFO

CINCPAC PRIORITY 341 FROM SAIGON AUG 30TH, 6PM

EMBTEL 625

OUR PLANE FORCED BACK BECAU E OF WEATHER AND WE UNABLE KEEP  
OUR APPOINTMENT WITH KHANH AT DALAT. ALEX JOHNSON AND I RPT I  
HAVE NEW APPOINTMENT FOR 1000 AM AUGUST 31 AT DALAT. WILL  
REPORT RESULTS UPON OUR RETURN.

TAYLOR.

BT

CFN 632 109 83 89 341 625 BECAUSE OF WEATHER KHANH ALEX JOHN-  
SON HAVE NEW 1000 AM RPT AM AUGUST 31 AT DALAT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35  
Action

SS  
Info

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 06A 30/1030Z  
P 301015Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

025722

1964 AUG 30 AM 8 01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 631 INFO CINCPAC 340 FROM SAIGON AUG 30TH 6:30PM 37

DEPARTMENT. PASS USIA

L I M D I S

ALTHOUGH MY DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL DATES NOT RPT NOT YET FIRM, I RPT I MUST THINK ABOUT PRESS STATEMENTS I RPT I WILL HAVE TO MAKE PLANE-SIDE HAWAII AND WASHINGTON. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE MOST HELPFUL FOR ME TO KNOW WHAT GENERAL LINE U.S. PRESS REPORTS RE RECENT EVENTS SAIGON HAVE TAKEN AND EXPECIALLY WHAT HARMFUL OR ERRONEOUS POINTS I RPT I HAVE TO SPIKE BY FACTUAL DENIALS.

TAYLOR  
BT

CFN 631 340 SPIKE

NOTE: PASSED USIA AT 9:42 AM AUGUST 30TH

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Authority State Co 2/27/78

By img, NARS, Date 4/6/78

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EUC343

VV EUG631JEC336

PP RUEPWW

DE RUABSG 01E 30/0350Z

ZNR

P 300335Z ZEL

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUEPIA/CIA WASHDC

RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

52722

BT

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 627 INFO CIA PRIORITY 59 WHITE HOUSE  
PRIORITY 82 DOD PRIORITY 108 CINCPAC 336 FROM SAIGON THIRTIETH

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE OF RVNAF HIGH COMMAND BROADCAST  
OVER SAIGON RADIO AT 1330 LOCAL AUGUST29:

BEGIN TEXT. THE VIETNAM REPUBLIC ARMED FORCE HIGH COMMAND  
SOLEMNLY ANNOUNCES THAT:

1. IN THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION, SINCE ALL RELIGIONS AND  
ORGANIZATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY HAVE MANIFESTED THEIR DETERMINATION  
CFN 627 59 82 108 336 1330 29

PAGE 2 RUABSG 01E UNCLAS

TO UNITE AND SAVE THE COUNTRY, ALL VIOLENT ACTIONS HARMFUL TO THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY WILL BE CONSIDERED CAUSES OF DISCORD, TREASON, AND ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMUNISTS. THE TASK OF MAINTAINING PUBLIC SECURITY AND ORDER IS THE TASK OF THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE.

BUT IN CASES WHERE THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE IS OVERWHELMED AND UNABLE TO FULFILL ITS TASK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES MUST DEMAND ASSISTANCE FROM THE ARMED FORCES.

2. IN ORDER TO HELP THE POLICE FULFILL THE AGOVE MENTIONED DUTY, THE VIETNAM REPUBLIC ARMED FORCES AGREE TO APPLY EXTREMELY DIRECT AND STRICT ANTI-VIOLENCE TECHNIQUES. THE HIGH COMMAND DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO MENTION SEVERAL PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-VIOLENCE TECHNIQUES SO THAT THE COMPATRIOTS WILL UNDERSTAND AND AVOID POSSIBLE REGRETTABLE INCIDENTS.

IF THE ARMED FORCES ARE ASKED TO RELIEVE A BESIEGED BUILDING WHICH IS BEING RANSACKED BY DEMONSTRATORS OR TO DISPERSE A MEETING WHICH BLOCKS TRAFFIC IN CITIES, THE UNIT COMMANDER MUST ALWAYS APPEAL TO THE COMPATRIOTS TO DISPERSE BEFORE ORDERING HIS MEN TO ADVANCE. HE WILL ORDER HIS MEN TO ADVANCE ONLY WHEN THE DEMONSTRATORS STUBBORNLY REFUSE TO DISPERSE. AT ANY MILITARY BASE OR AT ANY PLACE WHERE DEMONSTRATORS ARE ENGAGING IN VIOLENT ACTIONS, THE RESPONSIBLE UNIT--WHEN THE ARMED FORCES ARE ASKED



PAGE 3 RUABSG 01E UNCLAS

TO COME AND DISPERSE THE DEMONSTRATORS--MUST ALWAYS ESTABLISH  
A BOUNDARY BEYOND WHICH THE DEMONSTRATORS SHOULD NOT REPT NOT  
TRESPASS. THIS BOUNDARY CAN BE A BARBED WIRE BARRIER, A WHITE LINE,  
OR ANY OBVIOUS NATURAL OBSTACLE WHICH THE UNIT COMMAND MUST  
ALWAYS INDICATE AND EXPLAIN TO THE DEMONSTRATORS. IF THE DEMONSTRATORS  
VOLUNTARILY TRESPASS THE LIMIT, THIS MEANS THAT THEY ATTACK THE  
VIETNAM REPUBLIC ARMED FORCES WHICH ARE THEN FORCED TO SHOOT  
AT THE DEMONSTRATORS TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATIONAL  
AUTHORITY. THE HIGH COMMAND HOPES THAT ALL THE COMPATRIOTS WILL  
UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE MENTIONED PRINCIPLES IN ORDER TO AVOID  
POSSIBLE REGRETTABLE INCIDENTS.

AUGUST 28, 1964. SIGNED: LT. GEN. TRAN THIEN KHIEM,  
VIETNAM REPUBLIC ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. END TEXT.

TAYLOR

CFN 28 1964

NNNNE

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

13  
✓ Bundy

43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

025680

Action RSZCZCM JHSTWUJIA631T  
PP RUEHCR  
SS DE RUMJIR 02A 30/0330Z  
P 300305Z ZEA  
Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014853  
By *is* NARA, Date 10-29-97

P R I O R I T Y

1964 AUG 29 PM 11 58

038

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 626 INFO CINCPAC  
335 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 30, 10:30 AM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

OANH ASKED JOHNSON SEE HIM AT HIS HOME LATE YESTERDAY EVENING.

SAID HE DESIRED INFORM US THAT IN ORDER PROVIDE LOCAL BASIS  
FOR USE OF TROOPS IN SAIGON TO BACK UP POLICE IN MAINTENANCE  
LAW AND ORDER CABINET HAD LATE YESTERDAY DECIDED TO DECLARE  
A "STATE OF SIEGE" IN SAIGON. THIS WAS ONE STEP ABOVE PREVIOUSLY  
CFN 626 335 30 10:30

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 02A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EXISTING "STATE OF EMERGENCY" BUT SHORT OF "MARTIAL LAW."  
ADDITIONAL EFFECT OF DECISION WAS THAT SAIGON PREFECT BROUGHT  
DIRECTLY UNDER MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN MAINTENANCE LAW AND ORDER  
RATHER THAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR. FOREGOING PRIMARILY PROCEDURAL  
AND NO CHANGE CONTEMPLATED IN PRACTICE OF POLICE HAVING PRIMARY  
RESPONSIBILITY WITH MILITARY IN SUPPORT AND RESERVE ROLE.

HE SAID CABINET ALSO MOTIVATED TO TAKE THIS DECISION BY FACT  
THAT OF 509 DEMONSTRATORS ARRESTED PREVIOUS DAY, 11 "REGULAR  
VIET CONG" HAD BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND 70 PERCENT  
HAD PREVIOUS CRIMINAL RECORDS.

A SIMILAR DECREE WAS BEING ISSUED COVERING DANANG.

OANH SAID HE HAD PERSUADED HOAN NOT TO ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCE  
LATTER HAD CALLED TODAY (EMBTel 624) SO AS NOT FURTHER TO  
EXACERBATE RELATIONS BETWEEN KHANH AND DAI VIETS.

OANH SAID HE PLANNED TO "LEAD A DELEGATION" TO HUE ON MONDAY  
TO GO INTO SITUATION THERE, STOPPING EN ROUTE AT DALAT TO SEE  
KHANH.

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-2- 626, AUGUST 30, 10:30 A.M. FROM SAIGON

CFN 509 11 70 624

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 02A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
JOHNSON FRANKLY AND AT LENGTH DISCUSSED WITH OANH OUR DIFFERING UNDERSTANDINGS OF HIS POSITION AND POSSIBLE TENURE URGING OANH "NOT TO GO OUT ON A LIMB" AND DESTROY HIS USEFULNESS. OANH WAS FIRM THAT HE HAD DERIVED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF HIS POSITION FROM DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH ALL THREE MEMBERS OF TRI-UMVIRATE AND WAS SMUGLY SATISFIED THAT HE WAS DESTINED TO LEAD VIETNAM OUT OF PRESENT MORASS. SAID HE HAD SUPPORT OF ARMY (THREE MONTHS AGO KHIEM HAD URGED HIM TAKE PRIME MINISTER'S JOB) AND ALSO HAD SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND STUDENTS. ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING HE HAD NO POLITICAL BASE OF HIS OWN SAID THAT IN "FEW HOURS" HE COULD HAVE A HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE ON THE STREETS IN HIS SUPPORT.

JOHNSON ALSO POINTED OUT INTERPRETATION MOST OF PRESS HAD PLACED ON HIS REMARK YESTERDAY ON KHANH'S HEALTH. HE LAMELY REPLIED THAT PERHAPS HE SHOULD HAVE USED PHRASE "MENTAL EXHAUSTION" RATHER THAN "MENTAL ILLNESS" BUT DID NOT SEEM UNDULY DISTURBED. HE REITERATED HIS THEME THAT KHANH IS NOW POLITICALLY FINISHED WITHIN VIETNAM BUT IF HE TOOK SOME TIME OFF AND LET THINGS SETTLE DOWN "PERHAPS HE COULD MAKE A COMEBACK". TAYLOR

DAVKA Date  
KVC  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

14

30

~~SECRET~~

Action

SVN

Info

KQKDKGZCZCMJA4950VZCZCJIA614

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR

SS

DE RUMJIR 33A 29/1837Z

G

Z P 291833Z ZEA

FE

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

IO

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE QLSHDC

NSC

RUEPDA/DOD WASHDC

INR

RUEPIA/CIA WASHDC

NSA

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~

RMR

1964 AUG 29 PM 2 57

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054

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State la 2/27/78

By

NARS, Date 4/6/78

ACTION FLASH DEPT 625 DOD 107 CIA 88 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC  
334 FROM SAIGON AUG 30, 230 AM

RE DOD TEL 984473.

WE HAVE ANSWERED YOUR QUESTION (A) IN EMBTEL 612 SENT DOD AS 100. WE WILL ANSWER YOUR QUESTION (B) MORE DEFINITELY AFTER WE SEE KHANH IN DALAT TODAY (REF EMBTEL 619). SOME OF OUR COMMENTS RE IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS (QUESTION C), ARE ANSWERED IN EMBTELS 612, 615 AND 616. OTHER COMMENTS WILL ENSUE AFTER OUR MEETING WITH KHANH ON WHICH WE WILL CABLE FLASH REPORT.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 625 107 88 334 30 230AM 984473 (A) 612 100 (B) 619

C 612 615 616

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3 PM, AUGUST 29.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 3:08 PM, AUGUST 29.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

15

~~SECRET~~

35  
Action

SS  
Info

NNNNZCZCMJA484  
PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 29A 29/1520Z  
P 291500Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEPDA/OSD  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
STATE GRNC  
BT

025420

1964 AUG 29 AM 11 12

029

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 622 INFO DOD 105 CINCPAC 331  
BANGKOK 67 FROM SAIGON AUG 29, 11 PM

L I M D I S

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EMBTEL 324.

DELAY IN MAKING DECISION ON COMUSMACTHAI MATTER PUTS  
GENERAL WESTMORELAND IN AWKWARD POSITION. ON ADVICE OF  
AMBASSADOR MARTIN HE HAS REFRAINED FROM VISITING THAILAND ALTHOUGH  
HE STILL HAS RESPONSIBILITIES THERE. RECOMMEND EXPEDITING  
DECISION.

GP-2  
TAYLOR  
BT

CFN 622 105 331 67 324

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979  
By inf, NARS, Date 7-20-79

~~SECRET~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

16

35  
Action

SS  
Info

QSWEGMJA473  
OO RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 24A 29/1145Z  
OR 291128Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEPDA/DOD  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~

1964 AUG 29 AM 10 00

036

025330

✓ Bundy

~~SECRET~~ IMMEDIATE ACTION DEPT 620 ROUTINE DOD 104  
CIA 57 INFO CINCPAC 329 FROM SAIGON AUG 29, 7 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

DE SILVA SAW GENERAL KHIEM AGAIN ABOUT NOON 29 AUGUST TO  
INQUIRE ABOUT PRESENT STATE OF GOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS.  
KHIEM RESPONDED VOLUBLY EMPHASIZING THAT MAIN ACTION TO BE  
ACCOMPLISHED WAS RETURN OF GENERAL KHANH TO HIS POSITION AS  
PRIMIN, AND TO HIS RESUMPTION OF WORK IN THAT CAPACITY. HE  
SAID THAT KHANH HAD GONE TO DALAT ON 28 AUG AND WILL BE BACK  
CFN 620 104 57 329 29 7 29 28

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 24 A ~~SECRET~~  
MONDAY 31 AUGUST, AS HE WAS VERY TIRED AND NEEDED FEW DAYS  
REST. HE REMARKED THAT "JACK" OANH WAS FILLING IN UNTIL  
KHANH GOT BACK.

ON BEING ASKED WHAT FORM THIS INTERIM GOVT WOULD ASSUME, KHIEM  
FIRST COMMENTED THAT THEY ARE HAVING MUCH TROUBLE WITH GENERAL  
MINH ON THIS MATTER. HE WARMED TO HIS SUBJECT CRITICIZING  
MINH AT LENGTH FOR HIS HAVING ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATIONS AND PUBLIC  
CRITICISMS AGAINST KHANH, PARTICULARLY IN THE HUE AREA. HE  
STATED THAT MINH WAS BOTH DUMB AND LAZY AND WAS ONLY INTERESTED  
IN HAVING HIGH-SOUNDING TITLE AND AN IMPORTANT SOUNDING JOB  
WITH ABSOLUTELY NO WORK TO DO. HE SAID, "MINH WANTS TO BE LIKE  
BAO DAI", AND HAVE LOTS OF RANK BUT NO RESPONSIBILITY.  
THIS, KHIEM SAID, LAY BEHIND MINH'S INSISTENCE OVER PAST FEW DAYS  
OF AGAIN HAVING TITLE OF CHIEF OF STATE, THEORETICALLY ABOVE  
KHANH BUT WITHOUT ANY REAL OBLIGATIONS. ACCORDING TO  
KHIEM, HE AND KHANH ARE NOW BOTH DEAD SET AGAINST THIS, AND ARE  
DETERMINED THAT KHANH BE HEAD OF GOVT AS PRIMIN WITHOUT OTHER  
PERSONS ABOVE HIM, TO RUN THE COUNTRY DURING THE IMMEDIATE MONTHS  
AND TO SUPERVISE THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF COUNCIL  
WHICH WILL PREPARE FOR THE CREATION OF ASSEMBLY.

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Authority RAC 00014854  
By is NARA, Date 10-29-97

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-2-620, August 29, 7 P.M. from: Saigon

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 24A ~~SECRET~~

KHIEM SAID THAT MINH HAD OPPOSED THIS CONCEPT, SAYING THAT HE WANTED TO BE CHIEF OF STATE. ACCORDING TO KHIEM, HE AND KHANH ON 28 AUGUST BOTH TOLD MINH THAT HE, MINH, COULD HAVE THE JOB AS HEAD OF GOVT, BUT THAT HE MUST THEN TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT THEY INTENDED GO WITH JOB. MINH FLATLY REFUSED, WHEREUPON KHIEM AND KHANH TOLD HIM THAT HE SHOULD THEN STAND ASIDE WHILE KHANH ASSUMED THE OBLIGATIONS AND DISCHARGED THE AUTHORITY.

KHIEM SAID THAT WHEN KHANH RETURNS FROM DALAT HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BEGIN FILLING THE ROLE OF HEAD OF GOVT, BUT THAT KHANH STILL FELT HE NEEDED SOME FURTHER EVIDENCES OF PUBLIC SUPPORT, BEYOND THOSE HE ALREADY ENJOYS. KHIEM SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF CERTAIN PROMINENT PERSONALITIES COULD COME OUT PUBLICLY WITH SOME FORM OF ENDORSEMENT OF KHANH. IN THIS CONTEXT HE NAMED THE FOLLOWING: DOC. LE KHAC QUYEN; LE DINH NAM; PHAM KHAC SUU; TRAN VAN DO; HO VAN NHUT, AND NG THI TRUYEN.

IN CLOSING, KHIEM RETURNED TO THEME OF GENERAL MINH'S OPPOSITION AND OBSTRUCTIONIST ATTITUDES. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD REALLY BE FAR BETTER TO HAVE MINH LEAVE THE COUNTRY, ALONG WITH FOUR DALAT

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 24A ~~SECRET~~

GENERALS, BUT HE REALIZED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE BEST THING AT THIS TIME. HE REPEATED WHAT KHANH HAD SEVERAL TIMES PREVIOUSLY RAISED, THAT IS THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING THE FOUR DALAT GENERALS LEAVE VIETNAM FOR YEAR OR SO, AND WAS TOLD THAT THIS NOW SEEMED POSSIBLE. HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THIS, AND SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS WITH KHANH ON HIS RETURN.

TAYLOR  
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 10:23 AM 8/29/64  
Passed to White House at 10:34 AM 8/29/64

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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P 251880Z

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 616 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 327  
FROM SAIGON TWENTYNINETH

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING IS ACCOUNT OF VICE PREMIER OANH'S PRESS  
CONFERENCE IN VIETNAMESE AS GIVEN BY SAIGON RADIO AT 1400 LOCAL  
AUGUST 29:

BEGIN TEXT IN A PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE VICE PREMIER  
IN CHARGE OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS AND ATTENDED BY  
MANY IMPORTANT PERSONALITIES, SUCH AS INTERIOR MINISTER  
BRIG. GEN. LAM VAN PHAT, JUSTICE MINISTER NGUYEN VAN MAU,  
CFN 616 327 1400 29

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 37E UNCLAS  
MINISTER OF STATE LE VAN HOACH, SAIGON PREFECT BRIG. GEN. DUONG  
NGOC LAM, AND INFORMATION MINISTER PHAM THAI, VICE PREMIER  
NGUYEN XUAN OANH READ THE RESOLUTION OF THE TEMPORARY  
STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE NATION AND THE ARMED FORCES WHICH  
WAS MADE PUBLIC ON 27 AUGUST WHICH SAID THAT AT PRESENT THE  
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IS THE GOVERNMENT SET UP ON 8 FEBRUARY.  
THE RESOLUTION ALSO SAID THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS  
RESPONSIBLE FOR CONVENING A NATIONAL CONGRESS WITHIN TWO MONTHS.

THEN PROFESSOR NGUYEN XUAN OANH ANNOUNCED THAT DURING PREMIER  
NGUYEN KHANH'S ILLNESS, HE IS APPOINTED (AS REPLACEMENT  
FOR PREMIER NGUYEN KHANH). PROFESSOR NGUYEN XUAN OANH STRESSED  
THAT HIS DUTY HAS BEEN CLEARLY DETERMINED--THAT IS TO RUN  
THE GOVERNMENT AND CONVENE THE NATIONAL CONGRESS.

IN ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION BY A VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST,  
PROFESSOR OANH DECLARED THAT DR. NGUYEN TON HOAN IS STILL VICE  
PREMIER IN CHARGE OF PACIFICATION.

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UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 616, AUGUST 29, FROM SAIGON

THIS RADIO STATION'S REPORTER ASKED: "SINCE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAVE PROCLAIMED THEIR DISAPPROVAL OF VIOLENT ACTIONS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS, WHAT MEASURES DOES THE GOVERNMENT PLAN TO TAKE TO COPE WITH THE VIOLENT ACTIONS WHICH MAY OCCUR?"

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 37E UNCLAS

VICE PREMIER OANH REPLIED THAT THE PREFECTORAL AUTHORITIES AND THE NATIONAL POLICE HAVE--SINCE LAST NIGHT--BEEN APPLYING STRONG MEASURES, SUCH AS TEMPORARY DETAINMENT OF PERSONS STROLLING IN THE STREETS ARMED WITH KNIVES OR HAMMERS, THE MAINTENANCE OF CURFEW HOURS, WHICH ARE--IN CONTRADICTION TO THE REPORT BY SOME FOREIGN-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS HERE--FROM 2400 HOURS TO 0400 HOURS, AND SO FORTH. LET US REPEAT FROM 2400 HOURS TO 0400 HOURS.

THE THAN DAN SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT ASKED: "A SENIOR OFFICER HAS CONSOLED THE FAMILIES OF THE PERSONS WHO DIED AT THE DEMONSTRATION BEFORE THE TRAN HUNG DAO BARRACKS; WHAT ABOUT THE PERSONS WHO DIED OR WERE WOUNDED AT OTHER PLACES?"

PROFESSOR OANH REPLIED: "THE GOVERNMENT WILL WHOLEHEARTEDLY HELP THE FAMILIES OF ALL THE PERSONS WHO DIED OR WERE WOUNDED DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS." HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE FAMILIES OF THESE PERSONS WILL BE CONSOLED.

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ASKED: "NOW THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ENTRUSTED BY THE TEMPORARY STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE NATION AND THE ARMED FORCES WITH THE DUTY OF HEADING THE GOVERNMENT, CFN 2400 0400 2400 0400

PAGE 4 RUMJIR EUE UNCLAS

DO YOU THINK THAT THIS COMMITTEE CAN RELIEVE YOU OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY?"

PROFESSOR OANH ANSWERED: "YES."

THE QUESTION WAS ASKED: "WILL MAJ. GEN. NGUYEN KHANH HEAD THE GOVERNMENT AGAIN AFTER HIS ILLNESS?"

PROFESSOR OANH ANSWERED: "VERY PROBABLE." END TEXT  
TAYLOR

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

18

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Action PP RUEHCR  
SVN DE RUMJIR 25A 29/1420Z  
PR 291352Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEPDA/OSD  
SS RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
G RUEPIA/CIA  
SP RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
L RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
H RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
EUR RUFDND/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
FE RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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INR WHITE HOUSE 80 CIA 87 CINCPAC 326 ROUTINE PARIS 67 LONDON 55 MADRID 4  
NSA BANGKOK 68 VIENTIANE 60 FROM SAIGON AUG 29, 10 PM  
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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING IS PORTION OF NGUYEN XUAN OANH'S PRESS CONF. OF AUG 29.

AS FAR AS REMAINDER OF GOVT WAS CONCERNED, OANH SAID THAT DO MAU AND HOAN WOULD STILL SERVE AS DEPPRIMINS, NO RESHUFFLE OF GOVT WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY HIM.

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PAGE TWO RUMJIR 25A

REGARDING BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC ORDER, OANH SAID THAT SECURITY HAD NOW BEEN RESTORED BOTH IN SAIGON AND IN PROVINCES. IN CAPITAL, MIDNIGHT TO FOUR A.M. CURFEW WOULD BE ENFORCED (THIS IS ESSENTIALLY SAME CURFEW ESTABLISHED UNDER KHANH'S EMERGENCY DECREES), POLICE WOULD BE EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND WOULD HAVE ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE NEEDED. AS FOR CATHOLIC DEMONSTRATION PLANNED FOR TOMORROW, OANH SAID THIS WOULD BE FUNERAL RATHER THAN DEMONSTRATION AND AUTHORITIES WOULD COOPERATE TO INSURE THAT IT CARRIED OUT WITH DIGNITY. ON THE SUBJECT OF

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-2- 615, AUGUST 29, 10 PM, FROM SAIGON

RUMORED SECESSION MOVEMENT IN HUE, OANH POINTED OUT THAT ASPIRANT GENERAL THI HAD ISSUED AN APPEAL TO PUBLIC URGING RESTORATION ORDER AND INDICATING THEREBY HIS COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR THE GOVT, DECLARED POSITIVELY THERE NO SECESSION IN HUE.

ASKED IF GVN HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BUDDHIST-CATHOLIC LEADERSHIP IN ITS EFFORTS RESTORE PUBLIC ORDER, OANH CONFIRMED THAT CONSULTATIONS HAD GONE ON, PRAISED LEADERSHIP FOR THEIR COOPERATIVE ROLE.

WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT THE WORKING OF THE TRIUMVIRATE, OANH OPINED THAT ITS DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN UNANIMOUSLY. WHEN ASKED HOW KHANH COULD PARTICIPATE IN WORK OF TRIUMVIRATE IN VIEW HIS ILLNESS, OANH GOT MOMENTARILY LOST, THEN MANAGED TO CONVEY IDEA

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 25A  
THAT KHANH'S INCAPACITY MERELY PREVENTED HIM FROM PERFORMING DAY-TO-DAY DETAIL WORK OF HEAD OF GOVT.

ONE JOURNALIST ASKED WHO WOULD BE CHARGED WITH CEREMONIAL CHIEF OF STATE FUNCTIONS AND OANH GUESSED THAT TRIUMVIRATE WOULD MAKE DECISION ON THIS POINT WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. THEN HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT PRESUME SPECIFY FOR THE TRIUMVIRATE WHAT ITS ORGANIZATION OR "MODUS OPERANDI" SHOULD BE. REGARDING CABINET'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THREE, OANH STATED THAT ALL WERE PLEDGED TO MAKE THE GOVT WORK DURING NEXT TWO MONTHS AND AVOID ANY INTERRUPTION IN WAR EFFORT.

ASKED WHETHER HE HAD TALKED WITH "AMERICAN AMBASSADOR" AS YET, OANH HESITATED AND THEN SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN HIM EARLIER IN THE DAY (PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO JOHNSON'S CALL AS TAYLOR HAD NOT SEEN HIM).

ON QUESTION OF HIS OWN RELIGIOUS AND REGIONAL ORIGINS, OANH SAID THAT HE WAS "BUDDHIST AT BIRTH", NORTHERN-BORN OF NORTHERN FATHER AND SOUTHERN MOTHER. "JUST WHAT I AM IS THE \$64,000 QUESTION."

PRESSED TO PROVIDE DETAIL OF JUST HOW GVN WOULD GO ABOUT ITS WORK FOR NEXT SIXTY DAYS, OANH ADMITTED THAT MANY OF THE DETAILS HAD NOT AS YET BEEN WORKED OUT, WOULD BE IN NEXT SEVERAL DAYS

TAYLOR

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By us, NARA, Date 10-29-97

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CIA 85 CINCPAC 324 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 29, 6 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

FOLLOWING IS MEMO OF CONVERSION OF GENERAL STILLWELL, C/S  
MACV, WITH GENERAL THIEU, RVNAF C/S, EVENING AUGUST 27:

QUOTE:

I REMINDED THEIRU HE HAD TOLD ME TWO DAYS AGO KHANH WOULD BE  
QUICKLY DESIGNATED PRESIDENT; CONSEQUENTLY IT DIFFICULT TO  
UNDERSTAND WHY THAT ELECTION NEVER HELD. THIEU SAID SITUATION ON  
25 AUGUST VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT NOW OBTAINING. MANIFEST-  
ATIONS IN MAJOR CITIES HAD CONVINCED MRC THAT 50 MEN DID NOT SPEAK  
FOR NATION AND THEREFORE COULD NOT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
CFN 613 101 78 85 324 29 6 27 25 50

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 19A ~~SECRET~~  
DESIGNATING PRESIDENT. HE SAID POSITION OF MRC WAS THAT AN  
ELECTION WAS BOTH UNWISE AND UNNECESSARY. IT UNWISE BECAUSE MRC  
REPRESENTED TOO NARROW BASE TO MAKE THIS IMPORTANT DECISION.  
IT UNNECESSARY BECAUSE MERE ABROGATION OF 16 AUG CHARTER  
REESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THAT  
DATE, LEAVING KHANH AS PM (HE NEVER DID CONFIRM THAT IT ALSO LEFT  
MINH AS CHIEF OF STATE).

THIEU SAID THAT FOR SEVERAL HOURS THIS AFTERNOON, MRC, TO A MAN  
URGED KHANH TO REASSUME RESPONSIBILITY AS PRIMIN. KHANH STEAD-

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-2- 613, AUGUST 29, 6 P.M. 1964 FROM SAIGON

FASTLY REFUSED, DESPITE ALL ENTREATIES AND MANY TEARS. (EARLIER, GENERAL CO CONFIRMED THIS POINT). AS QUID PRO QUO FOR KHANH'S ACCEPTANCE, KHIEM VOLUNTEERED TO TAKE OFF ONE OR MORE OF HIS STARS; "BIG" MINH PROMISED TO TAKE ALL HIS STARS OFF AND SERVE AS PRIVATE. KHANH'S ADAMANCY CONTINUED UNTIL END OF MEETING. THIEU SWORE BY ALL THAT'S HOLY THAT KHIEM AND HE ARE PREPARED TO PICK UP AND GO ANY PLACE KHANH WISHES.

I STRESSED URGENCY OF IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS AND IMPORTANCE OF KHANH CONTINUING TO BE CHIEF EXECUTIVE. THIEU AGREED THAT FIRST WAS IMPERATIVE. AS TO SECOND, HE SAID ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF MRC HAD BEGGED KHANH TO STAY ON -- AND FAILED. IT NOW UP TO THE US TO CONVINCE KHANH OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. IN ANY CASE, US COULD BE REASSURED THAT THIEU, KHIEM AND COMPANY WOULD WORK COMPLETELY FOR KHANH, EITHER IN THEIR PRESENT CAPACITY OR IN DIFFERENT ONES.

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 19A ~~SECRET~~

THIEU GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND DEMONSTRATIONS IN HUE, DANANG AND BINH DINH (LAST STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES) HAD HAD CRUCIAL EFFECT ON KHANH AND COLLEAGUES. 25 AUGUST PROCLAMATION HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO ACCOMMODATE SAIGON BUDDHISTS (THIEU TALKED OF CHAU, NEVER MENTIONED TRI QUANG). BUT BUDDHISTS IN CENTER HAD DIFFERENT DEMANDS; NOW CATHOLICS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY WERE BEING HEARD FROM; AND SPECTRE OF RELIGIOUS WAR WAS AT HAND. AS ILLUSTRATION OF DIFFERENT DESIDERATA, THEIU CITED CATHOLIC CROWD OUTSIDE COMPOUND. GROUP WAS ANTI-COMMUNIST AND PRO-ARVN AND MAIN DEMAND WAS THAT MRC CONTINUE TO GUIDE COUNTRY. CROWD EXPRESSED NO RANCOR FOR THEIR DEAD AND WOUNDED, SPURNED MONEY PROFFERED AND STATED MANY MORE CASUALTIES WOULD BE ACCEPTED IF ONLY MRC WOULD NOT DISSOLVE ITSELF. THIS DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO DEMANDS OF SAIGON BUDDHIST FACTIONS WHICH WANT MRC TO DISSOLVE. THEIRU ALSO STRESSED THAT SAIGON BUDDHISTS DID NOT SPEAK FOR EITHER DANANG OR HUE.

IT CLEAR TO ALL MRC( KHANH INCLUDED) THAT KHANH NOW LACKED PRESTIGE TO STAND ALONE IN STRUCTURE OF GOVT - EVEN WITH US SUPPORT. KHANH HAD SAID HE COULD INSURE SUPPORT PLEDGED HIM PERSONALLY BY US COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER CHOICE OF MRC. BUT WHAT MAN? CERTAINLY NO CIVILIAN - NOT SUU, HOAN, MAU OR ANYONE ELSE. ESSENTIAL, IF INTERIM, STEP WAS TO SHOW UNITY OF ARMY AT THIS JUNCTURE. HENCE TROIKA, WHICH WAS KHIEM'S IDEA AND DESCRIBED BY THEIU AS "SOLIDARITY TEAM." TROIKA COULD NOT BE SAID TO BE

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-3- 613, AUGUST 29, 6 P.M. 1964 FROM SAIGON

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 19A ~~SECRET~~  
COLLECTIVE HEAD OF STATE. IT MAINLY WINDOW DRESSING BUT WOULD INSURE THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THREE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ANY GROUP IN SECTION OF COUNTRY.

PLAN IS TO HAVE MINH, KHANH, AND KHIEM EXPLAIN MRC DECISIONS TO SAIGON LEADERSHIP OF BUDDHISTS, CATHOLICS, POLITICAL PARTIES, AS WELL AS TO HOA HAO AND CAO DAI; THIS WILL BE DONE 28 AUGUST AT HIGH COMMAND. (I ASKED IF SAME PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOLLOWED SIMULTANEOUSLY AT DANANG AND HUE. THEIU ANSWERED THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD BE WITHHELD UNTIL SAIGON REACTION DETERMINED.) AIM IS TO GET CONFEREES TO ACCEPT SOLUTION AND AGREE TO STOP ALL FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS. IF THIS ACCOMPLISHED, ALL DEMONSTRATORS WILL CLEARLY BE VC AND CAN BE DEALT WITH ON SPOT. I DON'T BELIEVE THEIU EXPECTS FULL MEASURE OF AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED.

THEIU SAID THAT 16 AUGUST CHARTER HAD BEEN HIS BRAIN CHILD; THAT HE HAD CONVINCED KHANH REAL MILITARY GOVT WAS NEEDED; AND THAT IF IT SURVIVED TWO WEEKS IT WOULD SURVIVE TEN YEARS. TROUBLE WAS THAT KHANH HAD NOT BEEN TOUGH WHEN FIRST CHALLENGE ROSE, DESPITE PLEAS OF PHAT, LAM ET AL. IF SINGLE DEMONSTRATOR HAD BEEN SHOT, DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD HAVE STOPPED FORTHWITH. INSTEAD, STUDENTS AND BUDDHISTS PUT GOVT TO TEST BY DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH STARTED SMALL AND ORDERLY, AND THEN INCREASED IN SCOPE AND VIOLENCE - ALL UNCHALLENGED. KHANH HAD NOT PLAYED HIS CARDS CORRECTLY AND

PAGE FIVE RUM/4 19A ~~SECRET~~  
SO, IN RETROSPECT, CHARTER WAS MISTAKE. AND PERHAPS REAL MISTAKE WAS MAKING KHANH CONCURRENTLY PRESIDENT OF MRC AND PRESIDENT OF NATION. MRC, IN NON-SUBSTANTIVE VOTE, WAS 36-22 AGAINST GRANTING HIM MRC PRESIDENCY - BUT HE WANTED THAT TOO AND THEY ACQUIESCED.

TOWARD END OF MEETING KHIEM JOINED US.

THIEU WAS VIOLENT ON SUBJECT OF PEOPLE POISONING KHANH'S MIND ABOUT KHIEM-THIEU MOTIVES. THERE WERE BUDDHISTS, OF COURSE; BUT THERE ALSO OTHERS. HE SAID KHIEM AWAKENED IN MIDDLE OF LAST NIGHT AND CHARGED WITH EXECUTING COUP D' ETAT, PRESUMABLY IN PROGRESS, AGAINST KHANH. UPSHOT WAS STRAINED RELATIONS AT DAY'S MEETING.

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~~SECRET~~

-4- 613, AUGUST 29, 6 P.M. 1964 FROM SAIGON

REAL TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION WERE KHIEM AND THIEU. CRYPTIC /  
REF MADE TO PLANNING MEETING LAST NIGHT PRESIDED OVER BY THREE  
BUDDHIST LEADERS.

THERE HAD BEEN NO MRC DISCUSSION OF MODE OF SELECTION, SIZE OR  
OVERALL FUNCTIONS OF "PEOPLES ASSEMBLY". THIS WOULD BE RESPONSIBILITY  
OF PRIMIN AND CABINET.

MUCH MADE OF FACT NEITHER TRI QUANG NOR MINH HAD AFFIXED THEIR  
SIGNATURES TO CHAU'S LETTER. THEY CONSIDER ASPIRATION OF BOTH  
RUN COUNTER TO NATION'S FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM. UNQUOTE.  
TAYLOR

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
RUFDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS  
STATE GRNC  
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Authority State 2-14-75, CIA 1-9-81

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~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 612 INFO CIA IMMEDIATE 84  
DOD 100 WHITEHOUSE 77 CINCPAC 323 VIENTIANE 59 PARIS 66  
LONDON 54 BANGKOK 66 FROM SAIGON AUG 29, 7 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

DEPPRIMIN FOR ECONOMY AND FINANCE NGUYEN XUAN OANH HELD LARGE  
PRESS CONF AT 12:30 PM DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS, THE FIRST IN  
VIETNAMESE AND THE SECOND IN ENGLISH FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS.  
THOUGH OANH WAS ONLY SPOKESMAN AND HE FIELDDED ALL QUESTIONS,  
HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LE VAN HOACH, MINSTATE WITHOUT PORTFOLIO  
CFN 612 84 100 77 323 59 66 54 66 29 7 12:30

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 18A ~~SECRET~~

WHO SAT AT HIS RIGHT, PHAM THAI (MININFO), NGUYEN VAN MAU (MIN-  
JUSTICE), GENERAL PHAT (MININTERIOR), GENERAL LAM (SAIGON PREFECT).

ENGLISH CONF OPENED WITH OANH HAVING INTERPRETER READ TWO  
DECISIONS, FIRST BY RECENTLY CREATED TRIUMVIRATE TO EFFECT  
GOVT FORMED FEBRUARY 8 WOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN CARE-  
TAKER STATUS FOR TWO MONTHS WITH NATIONAL COMMISSION TO BE FORMED  
IN THIS TWO MONTH PERIOD; AND SECOND DECREE BY PRIMIN KHANH  
DESIGNATING OANH "TO LEAD GOVT IN REPLACEMENT OF PRIMIN".

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-2- 612, AUGUST 29, 7 PM: FROM SAIGON

IN QUESTION-ANSWER PERIOD OANH SAID THIS WOULD LAST FOR MAXIMUM PERIOD TWO MONTHS. IN REPLY ANOTHER QUESTION SAID THAT TRIUMVIRATE HAD APPOINTED HIM. HOWEVER, THIS WAS STILL A "KHANH GOVERNMENT".

IN SEEKING EXPLAIN REASONS HIS APPOINTMENT OANH REFERRED STRAIN ON KHANH DURING LAST TEN DAYS. OANH SAID BECAUSE OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL STRAIN DURING LAST TEN DAYS "KHANH UNABLE CARRY ON AFFAIRS OF STATE AND I HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED LEAD GOVT WITH MOST POWERS". LATER ON IN REPLY TO QUESTION, HE SAID KHANH "IS QUITE ILL, PERHAPS MENTALLY MORE THAN PHYSICALLY -- MENTAL HEALTH IS INVOLVED -- HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE LONG PERIOD OF MEDICAL TREATMENT". IN REPLY TO QUESTION AS TO WHETHER KHANH RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT, OANH SAID KHANH WAS IN DALAT

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 18A ~~SECRET~~

UNDER "MEDICAL CARE AND OBSERVATION". LATER AND INDISTINCTLY SO THAT HE WAS APPARENTLY NOT HEARD OR UNDERSTOOD BY ALL CORRESPONDENTS HE REPLIED TO QUESTION FOR WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE FULL TEXT BY SAYING "I DO NOT REFER TO MENTAL HEALTH". IN HIS VIETNAMESE PRESS CONF AS REPORTED BY RADIO SAIGON (SEE SEPTTEL) QUESTION OF KHANH'S MENTAL HEALTH APPARENTLY DID NOT ARISE AND GENERAL TONE OF OANH'S ASSUMING FULL CHARGE FOR NEXT 60 DAYS WAS NOT AS DEFINITIVE AS IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE CONF.

OTHER ASPECT OF PRESS CONF FOLLOW BY SEPTTEL. THESE ASPECTS NOT BADLY HANDLED EXCEPT THAT THROUGHOUT OANH USED FIRST PERSON AND TALKED AS THOUGH HE WERE IN FULL CHARGE.

FROM OUR TALKS YESTERDAY WITH KHANH, KHIEM AND MINH, AND TALK DE SILVA HAD AT NOON TODAY WITH KHIEM, IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT MILITARY TRIUMVIRATE HAVE NO NOTION WHATEVER OF PUTTING OANH IN CHARGE OF GOVT FOR NEXT SIXTY DAYS. JOHNSON SAW OANH BRIEFLY JUST BEFORE HIS PRESS CONF (TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE INTENDED ANNOUNCE MARTIAL LAW IN SAIGON) AND WHEN OANH INDICATED HE EXPECTED BE IN CHARGE OF GOVT NEXT SIXTY DAYS JOHNSON POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS HIS CLEAR IMPRESSION FROM TALKS WITH TRIUMVIRATE YESTERDAY THAT HE WOULD ONLY BE "SIGNING PAPERS" ON BEHALF OF THE PRIMIN FOR THE "NEXT FEW DAYS". MOREOVER,

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 18A ~~SECRET~~

OANH CONFIRMED TO JOHNSON THAT IT WAS "KHANH GOVT". THE PURPORT OF HIS SUBSEQUENT REMARKS WERE THAT KHANH WAS POLITICALLY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 612, AUGUST 29, 7 PM: FROM SAIGON

FINISHED INTERNALLY BUT THAT FACADE OF "KHANH GOVT" WAS BEING MAINTAINED IN DEFERENCE TO AMERICAN OPINION AND THAT HE, OANH, WAS ONLY POSSIBLE COMPROMISE LEADER AT THIS STAGE. JOHNSON EXPRESSED SURPRISE BUT AS PRESS CONF WAS WAITING WAS NOT ABLE TO PURSUE MATTER FURTHER WITH OANH AT TIME.

UNLESS WE HAVE BEEN COMPLETEDLY MISLED BY KHANH, KHIEM AND MINH, BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT SHARP REACTIONS BY KHANH OR TRIUMVIRATE TO OANH'S PRETENTIONS WHEN THEY RECEIVE FEED BACK FROM FOREIGN PRESS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT HE EXPECTS TO ACCOMPLISH FOR EITHER HIMSELF OR VIETNAM.

WITH RESPECT KHANH'S HEALTH, PRESUMABLY OANH MEANT TO SAY THAT KHANH WAS PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY EXHAUSTED. ALTHOUGH HE KNOWS ENGLISH PERFECTLY AND WAS GIVEN SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES HE DID NOT CORRECTED HIMSELF AND DUG HIMSELF DEEPER WITH EACH REPLY UNTIL FINAL QUESTION WHEN HE TRIED TO RETRIEVE HIMSELF BY SAYING HE WAS NOT IN FACT INTENDING TO REFER TO "MENTAL HEALTH". WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN TO BRING FINAL ANSWER TO ATTENTION CORRESPONDENTS BUT MOST HAVE APPARENTLY FILED WITHOUT TAKING IT INTO ACCOUNT.

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 8:37 AM, AUGUST 29.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

21

WH

41

Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:

25157

Rec'd:

August 29, 1964

4:39 a.m.

55

Info

FROM: Saigon

ACTION: Secstate 611 Immediate

DATE: August 29, 4 p.m.

cy 1 destroyed

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Ex 2/27/78

Department telegram 544.

By

mg, NARS, Date 4/6/78

006

Now plan to leave Saigon 31 August 2000 local to arrive Washington 1 September 0830 prepared to do business on former schedule beginning as of 31 August if that schedule is still valid. Suggest no publicity until day of departure.

Request concurrence for planning purposes.

TAYLOR

SMD/10

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 4:43 a.m., August 29.  
Passed White House, DOD, CIA 5:00 a.m., August 29.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

22 16527

006

59  
Origin

55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 557 ~~IMMEDIATE~~ FLASH

INFO: CINCPAC

IMMEDIATE

REF: Embtel 544 and 611

EXDIS

✓ Bundy  
Aug 29 4 58 PM '64

cyt# 7 dect

## JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

XXX We do not believe your travel plans should be set at this time since Saigon situation still seems volatile. Pending the time when governmental structure becomes more firmly established and political leadership picture clarified, we can consult daily on time of your return. Meanwhile your aircraft will remain at Clark Field within five hours call to Saigon.

RUSK

## DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014856  
By is NARA, Date 10-29-97

Drafted by:  
S/VN: MVForrestal:ss 8/29/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/VN - M. V. Forrestal

Clearances:

The Secretary (para 1 - subs)  
WH - Mr. Smith  
DOD - Secretary McNamara  
FE - Mr. Bundy

DD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton

Miss Moor

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~~TOP SECRET~~

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM

## DRAFTING OFFICE COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 0001485?By ics, NARA, Date 10-29-97 ~~TOP SECRET~~

23

Ambassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE

INFO : CINCPAC

IMMEDIATE

REF : Embtel 544

EXDIS

File

## JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. We do not believe your travel plans should be set at this time since Saigon situation still seems volatile. Pending the time when governmental structure becomes more firmly established and political leadership picture clarified, we can consult daily on day of your return. ~~MEMO~~ Meanwhile your aircraft will remain at Clark Field within five hours call to Saigon.

X 2. In view probable delay in your visit during which we had expected ~~make~~ definitive decisions next courses of action, believe we should be considering certain interim actions to be taken.

3. We need your comments on the following interim actions both as to their effect on SVN political situation and on Hanoi:

a. Resumption on covert basis of some part of

8/29/64

FE:WFBundy:cj/MVForrestal:ss

FE - William P. Bundy

The Secretary

~~WFI - Mr. Forrestal~~

DOD - Secretary McNamara

DOD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton

S/S -

~~TOP SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM DRAFTING OFFICE COPY

2

Embassy SAIGON

~~TOP SECRET~~

the 34-A operations outlined in MACS CG 8618 for August and September.

b. Resumption of DECOY patrols in a manner which insures that patrols would not be in vicinity any 34-A operation (suggest 50 - 100 miles distance for periods of at least two and preferably three days before and after any individual 34-A operations), and would remain more than twelve miles from DRV coast.

c. Intensification of joint planning with GVN (response to terms of reference outlined Saigon 457 will be completed soonest through military channels).

d. Possible temporary interruption or slow-down of introduction of additional U. S. Military personnel during the period while pacification program may be bogged down as result of GVN reorganization.

GP-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

50

Origin  
FE

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 555

Info:  
SS

INFO: CINCPAC

SVN

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USIA

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DOD

In view tendency many news stories imply Khanh through and perhaps Oanh in, plus indications here some commentators ready to conclude week's events disastrous, we have backgrounded key press here at some length making following points:

1. Oanh probably acting as Prime Minister only for few days till Khanh has time to recover from bad cold and strain. Khanh has no other health problems, is still Prime Minister, and appears likely re-emerge as Prime Minister or at least in major role. (We were not asked whether USG continues to support Khanh but if so would repeat McCloskey formula.)

2. Oanh himself good technician and administrator who is adequate caretaker but unlikely to emerge as top power figure. (This designed shoot down any implication we have new "Oanh government". We recognize it could create difficulties for us if he should emerge as top figure, but our hunch, fortified by your cables, is that he will not.)

3. Events of week to be seen primarily as echo of 1963 political divisions. Buddhists and students saw ~~Aug~~ August 16 charter as opening way

Drafted by:  
FE:WPBundy:mk 8/29/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 2/27/78

By smg, NARS, Date 4/6/78

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

to return Diemism and repression of them. In meeting their demands, Khanh and MRC Executive Committee raised doubts among some generals who only Catholic but to minor degree ~~by~~ sympathetic to Catholic individuals. This plus popular Catholic reaction led to triumvirate decision representing both elements in struggle. Khanh still looks like centerpiece of triumvirate with widest base of support key groups.

4. August 16 charter was not USG idea although we were consulted on specific provisions. (We added off-the-record that we had urged delay and further consultation.)

5. Demonstrations and other events have had only very slightest element of ~~ex~~ anti-Americanism and no discernible element of difference as to basic policy, either "go north" among generals and Catholics or "neutralist" among Buddhists and students. (We in fact think both these elements may be just below the surface, but above is still apparently accurate statement of the facts of this week.)

Net of above is that crisis not yet over or form of government clear, but possibility substantial that a viable government, probably under Khanh, will take over some time next week and be able to carry the war forward. In short, no reason for premature alarm.

We hope stories resulting from this backgrounder will tend to tamp down extreme speculation, but indications are that some of this can be expected and we

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

shall have difficulty holding it at bay for many more days. Sooner Khanh gets back and things get sorted out /the better--which is hardly news to you.

GP-3.

End.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

25

~~SECRET~~

31

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1964 AUG 28 AM 11 59

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\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 40A 28/1559Z  
Z 281553Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ FLASH 607 AUGUST 28 12MID-NIGHT

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY

E X D I S .

REF DEPTTEL 544

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

*State Sec 8/27/78*

By

*mg*

NARS, Date

*4/6/78*

APPROVE YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT THAT TRIP POSTPONED.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 607 28 12 MID-NIGHT 544

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 12:06 PM 8/28/64

Passed to White House at 12:15 PM 8/28/64

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ IMMEDIATE (599) AUGUST 28 - 7PM

DECLASSIFIED

LIMDIS

Authority State la 2/20/78

DEPTTEL 584

By rmg, NARS, Date 4/6/78

CABLES WE ARE NOW SENDING IN RE TODAY'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS  
ARE BEST WE CAN DO BY WAY OF ANALYSIS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
TODAY. YOU WILL SEE FROM READING THEM THAT THEY ARE MOST  
TENUOUS IN THEIR CONCLUSIONS. HOPEFULLY BETWEEN NOW AND SUNDAY  
WE WILL HAVE SOMETHING MORE SOLID TO HELP YOU ON MEET THE PRESS.  
TAYLOR

BT

CFN 599 28 7 584

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 8:30 AM, 8/28/64.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 8:45 AM, 8/28/64.

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

27

33  
Action~~SECRET~~SS  
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\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR RUEPDA RUEPIA RUEPWW RUHLHQ  
DE RUMJIR 26A 28/1107Z  
Z P 281100Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEPDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

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1961 AUG 28 AM 7

~~SECRET~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 598 DOD 94 WHITE HOUSE 72 CIA 79  
INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 312 ROME NINE FROM SAIGON AUGUST 28 7PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DECLASSIFIED

ROME FOR LODGE

Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

L I M D I S

By ing, NARS, Date 7-20-79

THIS CABLE SUMMARIZES THE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS ALEX JOHNSON AND I HAD MORNING AND AFTERNOON 28 AUGUST WITH GENERALS KHANH, MINH AND OTHERS RE CURRENT GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS. A MORE DETAILED REPORT WILL FOLLOW.

GENERAL KHANH HAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAS SUBMITTED HIS CFN 598 94 72 79 312 28 7PM 28.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 26A ~~SECRET~~

RESIGNATION AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT TO THE MRC (NOW ABOLISHED) BUT THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NO REPLY. HE WILL SHORTLY ANNOUNCE THAT HIS RESIGNATION (WHICH HE NOW SAYS WAS BASED ON REASONS OF HEALTH) HAS BEEN REJECTED (PRESUMABLY BY HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE MILITARY TRIUMVIRATE), THAT KHANH WILL REMAIN AS PRIME MINISTER BUT THAT HE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED A SHORT PERIOD OF REST AND RECUPERATION DURING WHICH TIME NGUYEN XUAN CANH WILL SIGN PAPERS IN HIS NAME. HOWEVER, IT WILL BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF THE KHANH GOVERNMENT WHICH DOES NOT LAPSE DURING HIS SHORT LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

KHANH INDICATES THAT HE REALLY DOES NOT EXPECT TO BE AWAY ANY APPRECIABLE TIME ALTHOUGH HE LOOKS BADLY IN NEED OF REST. I MUST

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 598, AUGUST 28, 7 PM, FROM SAIGON

SAY HE WILL HAVE LITTLE TIME FOR LEISURE IF HE STAYS ON INTENDED SCHEDULE.

THE NEXT STEP WILL BE THE FORMATION OF A NEW ORGAN CALLED TENTATIVELY THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL UNITY (CNU). AS PRESENTLY CONCEIVED, IT WOULD CONSIST OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS, THE PARTIES (IF ANY REPRESENTATIVES CAN BE FOUND AFTER KHANH'S PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF THE DAI VIETS) AND NOTABLES, WITH GENERAL MINH AS CHAIRMAN REPRESENTING THE MILITARY. JUST WHAT ROLE OF THE CNU WOULD BE IS STILL UNDER

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 26A ~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSION. AMONG THE POWERS WHICH ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR ATTRIBUTION ARE THOSE OF APPROVAL OF CHANGE FROM A MINISTERIAL TO A PRESIDENTIAL FORM OF EXECUTIVE, APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT, RECALL OF THE PRESIDENT, ADVICE TO PRESIDENT AND APPROVAL OF CERTAIN OF HIS ACTS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. KHANH WANTS AT LEAST TWO THINGS FROM CNU A SEMBLANCE OF NATIONAL INDORSEMENT FOR HIS ASSUMPTION OF PRESIDENCY AND A DIGNIFIED SLOT FOR MINH.

IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT MINH WILL BE SATISFIED WITH THIS DEAL ALTHOUGH KHANH HAD INTIMATED THAT HE EXPECTS NO TROUBLE. IN OUR MORNING SESSION, THERE SEEMED TO BE TWO PROBLEMS: (1) TO GET MINH TO GIVE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO KHANH AND (2) TO GET KHANH TO WITHDRAW HIS RESIGNATION. WE THOUGHT WE HAD AGREEMENT ON BOTH COUNTS BEFORE LUNCH ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECTED THAT MINH MIGHT IMPOSE THE CONDITION OF HIS BEING RETAINED AS CHIEF OF STATE. AFTER LUNCH, KHANH LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CNU WOULD SATISFY MINH BUT WHEN JOHNSON AND I LISTENED TO SOME OF THE DISCUSSION AMONG THE OFFICERS CONFERRING ON THE MATTER (KHANH MINH KHIEM, THIEU, CO) WE GOT CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT MINH IS STILL RESISTING. IF THIS POINT BECOMES A REAL STUMBLING BLOCK, I PROPOSE TO URGE KHANH TO ACCEPT MINH AS CHIEF OF STATE FOR THIS PERIOD OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 26A ~~SECRET~~

KHANH HOPES TO GET CNU GOING IN A COUPLE OF DAYS AND REALIGN HIS GOVERNMENT ON PRESIDENTIAL LINES IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS, WE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 598, AUGUST 28, 7 PM, FROM SAIGON

THINK THIS VERY OPTIMISTIC.

IT IS PREMATURE TO CONSIDER ANY OF THE FOREGOING AS FINAL UNTIL  
OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED BY GOVERNMENT HERE.

TAYLOR

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 8:01 AM 8/28/64

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ Bundy 28

43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR

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DE RUMJIR 22A 28/0910Z

Z 280905Z ZEA

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023956

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

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1964 AUG 28 AM 5 19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FLASH [595] AUGUST 28 5PM

007

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

E X D I S

Authority STATE letter, FEB 14 1979

REF. DEPTTEL 533,

By ing, NARS, Date 7-20-79

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM CABLES WHICH WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY WE ARE STILL FAR FROM HAVING A REAL GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. MUCH WILL DEPEND IN NEXT FEW DAYS ON KHANH-MINH-BUDDHIST RELATIONSHIPS AND KHANH'S SUCCESS IN ORGANIZING A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL UNITY (REPORTED IN SUBSEQUENT CABLE). THERE ARE STILL SO MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHERE WE'RE GOING THAT I WOULD FEEL CFN 595 28 5PM 533

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 22A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MORE USEFUL REMAINING FOR A FEW MORE DAYS DURING WHICH TIME HOPEFULLY SOME OF THE UNCERTAINTIES COULD BE CLEARED UP.

I WOULD SUGGEST HAVING KC-135 PROCEED SAIGON AT ONCE AND STAND BY FOR ME. IN TWO OR THREE DAYS MATTERS MAY HAVE SETTLED TO POINT OF PERMITTING A LESS CONFUSED REPORT THAN ONE I WOULD BE OBLIGED TO MAKE TODAY. HOWEVER, I APPRECIATE YOUR NEED FOR EARLY POLICY REVIEW AND WILL OF COURSE STAY ON ORIGINAL SCHEDULE IF YOU DESIRE.

GP-3. TAYLOR

BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 5:23 a.m. August 28, 1964

Passed White House, DOD at 5:35 a.m. August 28, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 16A 28/0815Z  
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
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RUEPIA/CIA  
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RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
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023941164 AUG 28 AM 4 48

FLASH

018

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 000 14858  
By isa NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION FLASH DEPT [594] WHITE HOUSE 71 CIA 78 DOD 93 INFO IMMEDIATE  
CINCPAC 310 ROME EIGHT FROM SAIGON AUG 28, 4 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ROME FOR LODGE

AFTER MRC ANNOUNCEMENT AUG 27, WHICH ESTABLISHED TRIUMVIRATE AND PROVIDED FOR SIXTY DAY INTERIM REGIME BY "CURRENT GOVERNMENT", I SOUGHT IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH GENERAL KHANH. I WAS INFORMED THAT KHANH HAD LEFT FOR VUNG TAU BUT WOULD RECEIVE ME AT 11:00 A.M. AUG 28. IN ABSENCE KHANH, I SENT REPRESENTATIVES TO SEE KHIEM, THIEU AND VICE PRIME MINISTER OANH. RESULTS THESE INTERVIEWS HAVE BEEN FORWARDED BY SEPARATE TELEGRAMS.

THIS MORNING ALEX JOHNSON AND I MET WITH KHANH AT JGS COMPOUND  
CFN 594 71 78 93 310 28 4PM 27 11:00 AM 28 JSG

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 16A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AT 1100 HOURS. OUR SESSION LASTED NEARLY TWO HOURS AND CONSISTED OF LONG SERIES OF COMPLAINTS BY KHANH CONCERNING PERFDY AND ABSENCE OF SUPPORT WHICH HE HAS ENCOUNTERED AMONG LEADING PERSONALITIES AND GROUPS ASSOCIATED IN HIS GOVERNMENT. PRIMARY VILLAINS, ACCORDING TO KHANH'S STORY, WERE GENERAL BIG MINH ON ONE HAND AND DAI VIET, SPECIFICALLY VICE PRIME MINISTER HOAN ON THE OTHER.

KHANH ADMITTED THAT ALL MEMBERS OF MRC, INCLUDING BIG MINH, HAD PLEADED WITH HIM TO REMAIN AS PRIME MINISTER BUT THAT HE, KHANH, FELT THE QUALITY OF THEIR SUPPORT WAS SO LIMITED THAT HE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 - 594, August 28, 4 P.M. From Saigon

COULD NOT REPEAT NOT DISCHARGE THIS RESPONSIBILITY. THEREFORE HE HAD "SECRETLY" SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION LAST EVENING. HE INTENDED TO ANNOUNCE THIS RESIGNATION PUBLICLY AND TO STIPULATE THAT HE WOULD RESUME HIS POST ONLY IF ALL SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS (MILITARY, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS) PUBLICLY PLEDGED THEIR SUPPORT TO HIM.

WE REASONED AND ARGUED WITH KHANH FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS, FINALLY OBTAINING FROM HIM HIS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO AN ARRANGEMENT BY WHICH HE WOULD ANNOUNCE HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO HEAD GOVERNMENT IF THERE COULD BE DEMONSTRATED A GENERAL PUBLIC CONSENSUS OF SUPPORT FOR HIM. EVENTUALLY THIS BOILED DOWN TO KHANH'S DESIRE TO HAVE BIG MINH OPENLY ENDORSE HIM AS THE LATTER'S CHOICE TO HEAD THE GOVERNMENT.

KHANH THEN LEFT US AND BIG MINH CAME IN. WE WENT OVER MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND WITH MINH AND LISTENED TO HIS COMPLAINTS RE KHANH'S UNPOPULARITY AND INCOMPETENCE. EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, MINH AGREED THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING PUBLICLY TO ENDORSE KHANH. THE CONDITION HE ATTACHED TO THIS ENDORSEMENT WOULD BE THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT, WITH THE ABROGATION OF THE AUG 16 CHARTER, HE, MINH, RESUMED HIS FORMER AS CHIEF OF STATE.

SINCE THIS CONDITION DID NOT APPEAR TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE, WE SUGGESTED THAT WE HAVE AN IMMEDIATE JOINT MEETING WITH KHANH AND MINH. MING SET OUT TO REEXAMINE KHANH BUT RETURNED IN TWO MINUTES TO ANNOUNCE THAT KHANH WAS HOLDING A PRESS CONFERENCE. IN THIS CONFERENCE, REPORTS OF WHICH HAVE PROBABLY ALREADY REACHED WASHINGTON, KHANH REVIEWED THE SUPPORT WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLICS BUT DELIBERATELY DENOUNCED DAI VIETS AND SPECIFICALLY SINGLED OUT HOAN FOR THE HEAVIEST BLOWS.

HE SAID THAT HE HAD SUBMITTED (UNSPECIFIED TO WHOM) LETTER OF RESIGNATION BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED ANSWER. HE THEREFORE LEFT QUITE INDEFINITE HIS CURRENT STATUS AND FINISHED BY ADVISING THAT HE, GENERAL MINH AND GENERAL KHIEM WERE DOING THEIR BEST TO FIND A "SOLUTION".

I ARRANGED WITH BIG MINH THAT ALEX JOHNSON AND I WILL MEET WITH MINH AND KHANH AT 1500 HOURS AND I AM LEAVING NOW FOR THAT ENGAGEMENT. TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:50 A.M. AUGUST 28, 1964

NOTE - HANDLED LIMDIS PER SS-O.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Copy given Bundy*  
30 *F*

43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action \*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR  
SS DE RUMJIR 22A 28/0910Z  
Z 280905Z ZEA  
Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

FLASH

023956

1964 AUG 28 AM 5 19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FLASH 595 AUGUST 28 5PM

009

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY

EXDIS

REF. DEPTTEL 533.

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM CABLES WHICH WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY WE ARE STILL FAR FROM HAVING A REAL GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. MUCH WILL DEPEND IN NEXT FEW DAYS ON KHANH-MINH-BUDDHIST RELATIONSHIPS AND KHANH'S SUCCESS IN ORGANIZING A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL UNITY (REPORTED IN SUBSEQUENT CABLE). THERE ARE STILL SO MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHERE WE'RE GOING THAT I WOULD FEEL CFN 595 28 5PM 533

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 22A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MORE USEFUL REMAINING FOR A FEW MORE DAYS DURING WHICH TIME HOPEFULLY SOME OF THE UNCERTAINTIES COULD BE CLEARED UP.

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GP-3. TAYLOR  
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 5:23 a.m. August 28, 1964  
Passed White House, DOD at 5:35 a.m. August 28, 1964

DECLASSIFIED

STATE letter FEB 14 1979

Authority

By *inf*, NARS, Date *7-20-79*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

MFG. 11-63  
15827  
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51

Origin  
SS  
Info

ACTION: Am Embassy SAIGON 550 PRIORITY  
Am Embassy VIENTIANE 197 PRIORITY

Aug 28 5 17 PM '64

INFO: SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV  
CINCPAC  
JCS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014859

By is, NARA, Date 10-29-97

EXDIS JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE  
Saigon's 485

In event decision is made to conduct air strikes in Laos Panhandle, we believe most desirable first effort would be air attacks by RLAF T-28's which can be spared from North Central Laos, on those targets Embassy Vientiane considers they capable handling.

Request coordinated detailed targeting plan air attacks on Panhandle targets as reported para 6 ref be provided as soon as developed. Plan should indicate targets to be attacked by RLAF T-28s, and those which will require Yankee Team of VNAF/FARMGATE capabilities.

Request Vientiane appraisal RLAF reaction to use RLAF T-28s in Panhandle. We note that General Ma seems favorably inclined <sup>but</sup> ~~by~~ Gen. Kouprasith's reaction still uncertain (Vientiane 347). Handling of Souvanna (particularly if he still in Paris) is separate problem on which Vientiane's views also desired.  
GP-3.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

S/VN:JRD Cleland:ej 8/28/64

Clearances

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: SEA - William C. Trueheart

FE - Mr. Bundy  
DOD - Mr. McNaughton

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal  
S/S - Mr. Davies

~~TOP SECRET~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

15484

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✓

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Info

ACTION:

AmEmbassy SAIGON

FLASH

544

Aug 28 11 06 AM '64

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

EXDIS

Cy # 2 lost

003

In view of instability, at least as seen from here, we recognize merit of your suggestion postpone your Washington visit for limited period. But as soon as you feel you can safely leave, we would appreciate your letting us know. We feel ~~xxxxxx~~ urgent need for your personal appraisal of situation here and consultations on fundamentals of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

When you flash us your approval, we will announce that your projected trip has been postponed.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 2/27/78

By smg, NARS, Date 4/10/78

Drafted by:

S/VN: MVForrestal:caw 8/28

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/VN - Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

McNamara

OSD - Mr. McNamara (in substance)

FE - Mr. Wm. Bundy (in draft)

S/S - Mr. Davies

The Secretary (in substance)

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~~SECRET~~

FORM 8-63 DS-322

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33

UNCLASSIFIED  
Classification

INCOMING TELEPHONE CALL  
S/S-O

Received by: SWO - Mr. Parker

Date/Time : 8/27 - 0430

FROM : MACV-D.O. Saigon via NMCC

SUBJECT : MRC Meeting

The following is reported and is as yet unconfirmed:

1. The MRC dissolves itself effective today
2. The Charter of August 16, 1964 is rescinded
3. There is now a Triumphant Head of State consisting of Generals Minh, Khanh and Thiem
4. The Mission of the present Government is the election of a National Congress within 60 days. The Congress in turn will elect a Head of State.

There is also an unconfirmed report that a crowd of 3000 gathered in front of the JGS compound where the MRC meeting was being held. The crowd tried to rush the compound and soldiers fired over the head of the demonstrators. Two persons were killed and seven wounded including a German newspaper reporter. Other demonstrations of an orderly nature are taking place throughout the city.

UNCLASSIFIED  
Classification



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BSGUSOGSAGRKXBYZME  
TTIH!ZCZCMJA044 IN  
OO RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 41 27/1620Z  
O 271620Z ZFA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

2 3 3 5 5

1964 AUG 27 PM 2 06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE 591 AUG 28 12:30 AM

EXDIS

DEPTTEL 533

WILL BE BETTER ABLE REPLY REFTTEL AFTER SEEING KHANH MORNING  
AUG 28. MEANWHILE, AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM EMBTEL 589,  
SITUATION HERE STILL HIGHLY FLUID. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 591 28 12:30 533 28 589

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:08 PM, AUGUST 27.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 2:25 PM, AUGUST 27.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec #2/27/78

By rmg, NARS, Date 4/10/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 37A 27/1350Z  
R 271340Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1964 AUG 27 AM 11 05 023139

34

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DEPT 590 INFO CINCPAC 309 FROM SAIGON AUG 27, 9 PM  
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

ALEX JOHNSON CALLED IN DAI VIET LEADER NGUYEN TON HOAN THIS AFTERNOON TO IMPRESS UPON HIM OUR VIEW SERIOUSNESS PRESENT SITUATION, INDICATE TO HIM OUR POLICY GIVING SUPPORT KHANH REMAINED UNCHANGED, AND THAT ANY ALTERNATIVES TO KHANH WOULD FORCE US TO RECONSIDER US POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM. WE FOUND INTOLERABLE THE IDEA OF YET ANOTHER TOP-TO-BOTTOM GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE WHICH WOULD FURTHER RETARD THE WAR EFFORT. HE POINTED OUT TO HOAN THAT RECENT EVENTS HAD GRAVELY HARMED COUNTRY  
CFN 590 309 27 9PM

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 37A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AND THAT IN FACT, WHILE MRC DELIBERATING, VIETNAM WAS WITHOUT DE FACTO GOVERNMENT. JOHNSON WENT ON TO STATE THAT ALL ELEMENTS MUST EXERCISE EXTREME FORBEARANCE AND DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT EXACERBATE SITUATION.

HOAN SAID THAT DAI VIET DIFFICULTIES WITH KHANH BROUGHT TO CRISIS POINT BY HIS COMPLETE CAPITULATION TO DEMANDS MADE BY MOB ON TUESDAY. HOAN FEELS THAT KHANH COULD HAVE AVOIDED CONFRONTATION WITH CROWD AND COULD HAVE DISCUSSED DEMANDS WITH SOME ADVISORS. INSTEAD HE BOUND HIMSELF AND MRC TO ACCEPT DEMANDS THAT PRODUCED PRESENT CRISIS: VIZ., NO GOVERNMENT. HE RESTATED RATIONALE FOR DAI VIET OPPOSITION TO KHANH, CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD TRIED TO WORK WITH HIM FOR SIX MONTHS, HAD PUT UP WITH CAPRICES (GOVERNMENT BY "COUP DE THEATRE") AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO CONSULT WITH THEM. BUT NOW HE HAD SOLD OUT TO BUDDHISTS WHO HAD ALREADY INDICATED THEIR ENMITY TOWARD THE DAI VIETS.

JOHNSON TOLD HOAN THAT IN OUR TALKS WITH BUDDHISTS THEY HAD

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Authority RAC 00014860  
By us NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 590, August 27, 9 P.M., from Saigon

INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS ACCEPT CATHOLIC ELEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT AND THAT IT OUR IMPRESSION THAT ANY GOVERNMENT KHANH WOULD NOW FORM MUST CONTAIN ALL ELEMENTS AND NOT BE NARROWLY BASED ON ANY ONE SECT OR PARTY. HOAN WAS HOWEVER ADAMANT IN HIS CFN MRC VIZ

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 37A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OPPOSITION TO KHANH.

HOAN DID DISCUSS ALTERNATIVES TO KHANH. HE SUGGESTED MINH WAS A POSSIBILITY, PROVIDED HE WAS SURROUNDED BY ABLE PEOPLE. MINH'S POPULARITY WAS STILL GREAT ENOUGH, IN HOAN'S VIEW, TO ENABLE HIM TO RETRIEVE SITUATION AT THIS LATE DATE. HE ASKED IF WE HAD CONCURRED IN HIS REMOVAL CHIEF OF STATE AT TIME AUGUST 16 CONSTITUTION WAS PROMULGATED. HE WAS INFORMED THAT WHEN APPRISED OF PROMULGATION CONSTITUTION WE HAD INDICATED OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT TO KHANH AND HAD SO INFORMED MINH AT SAME TIME.

APART FROM MINH, HOAN SUGGESTED KHIEM AS ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE. HE WAS REMINDED THAT BUDDHISTS FOUND HIM UNACCEPTABLE, BUT HE ARGUED THAT KHIEM HAD BEEN IMPORTANT ARCHITECT IN SHAPING NOVEMBER 1 COUP, PROFESSED HIMSELF UNABLE TO SEE WHY BUDDHISTS CONSIDERED HIM CAN LAO AND DIEMIST.

DURING CONVERSATION WORD RECEIVED REGARDING MRC'S DECISION DISSOLVE ITSELF AND ESTABLISH TRIUMVIRATE. HOAN INDICATED SURPRISE AT LINE-UP, BUT RELIEF AS WELL BECAUSE HE FELT THERE NOW HOPE THAT CALM COULD BE RESTORED. WHEN JOHNSON EXPRESSED FEAR CONCERNING WHAT EFFECT SIXTY-DAY PERIOD DURING WHICH "LAME DUCK" GOVERNMENT WOULD FUNCTION MIGHT HAVE ON WAR EFFORT, HOAN  
CFN 16 1

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 37A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM THAT PROGRAMS WOULD MOVE FORWARD AND PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IN PROVINCES. JOHNSON POINTED OUT POLITICAL TURMOIL IN SAIGON WILL INEVITABLY BE REFLECTED IN PROVINCES AND MORALE OF TROOPS.

TAYLOR  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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1964 AUG 27 14 42

**FLASH**

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INFO RUEPWW/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/DOD

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RUHLHQ/CICNPAC

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Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979  
By inf, NARS, Date 7-20-79

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ACTION FLASH DEPT 589 INFO WHITEHOUSE 70 DOD 92 CIA 77

CINCPAC 308 FROMSAIGON AUG 27, 9 PM

LIMDIS

AT OANH'S REQUEST JOHNSON CALLED ON HIM THIS EVENING  
BY NAME MONSIEUR SOUVRAGE SAU DHHE. WAS OCCUPYING SOUTH  
PRACEBAYONG (DEBBLUTION OF THE ROMERATORON BENHCKHANH  
AND KHIEM HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AS THE SUPREME AUTHORITY  
IN THE STATE, TAKING THE POSITION FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY THE  
CFN 58 70 92 77 308 27 9 M 582

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 36A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MRC. <sup>CE</sup>GENERAL KHANH WILL FORMALLY RESIGN AS PRIME MINISTER <sup>E</sup>  
AT 10 O'CLOCK TOMORROW MORNING AND OANH WILL ASSUME  
POSITION TO HEAD A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH HZ 903  
WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY SAME AS PREVIOUS KHANH GOVERNMENT.  
HE SAID IN ADDITION TO HIS POSITION ON TRUMVIRATE, KHIEM  
WILL REMAIN ON AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE. NO ARRANGEMENTS  
WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE EITHER SEEN OR CHIEF OF STATE, ALTHOUGH  
TRUMVIRATE.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN ADDITION TO CARRYING ON NORMAL  
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS, WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY OF CONVENING  
WITHIN TWO MONTHS A NATIONAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COUNCIL  
WHICH WILL HAVE THE TASK OF ELECTING A NEW CHIEF OF STATE,  
A NEW PRIME MINISTER AND APPROVING THE GOVERNMENT OF THAT  
PRIME MINISTER.

;9-, -85 1943&98, & 8 9)7589, 3 - 733, 74&8, - 9, 16

WAY OUT OF IMPASSE AND IS CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE  
TO ALL ELEMENTS CONCERNED. E SAUD FOREGOING WAS "UNOFFICIAL"  
AS OF THIS TIME AND AGREED THAT ANY FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO US  
MUST COME FROM KHANH WHO FOR MOMENT IS STILL CONSIDERED LEGAL  
CFN MRC TEN 0'CLOCK

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 36 A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIM MINISTER. HOWEVER, OANH ASKED FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT AND EXPRESSED INTENTION OF VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF VWAR.

'9 ,9, .-\$3 ,9 :9..85.3,5, STATING ONLY THAT HE WOULD INFORM US BUT DID EXPRESS PERSONAL CONCERN OVER HIATUS THAT WOULD INEVITABLY ENSE DURING 0 DAY PERIOD.

;1943&98,& ; -483 149. -::97,5 \$3 8); - 995-8,3\$ -5 -0049/8.

53)6

SAME TIE FROM GENERAL KHIEM. ACCORDING TO KHIEM THERE WAS NO CONTEMPLATION OF KHANH'S RESIGNATION. INDEED, KHIEM SAID THAT MOST URGENT AND PRESSING MATTER WAS FOR KHANH TO RETURN FROM VUNG TAU WHERE HE HAS GONE TONIGHT) AND CONTINUE HIS FUNCTIONS AS PRIME MINISTER AS BEFORE 16 AUGUST, AND URGENTLY ASKED MY INTERCESSION WITH KHANH TO THIS END.

;3;3, 731943 5 8 8 -\$ -(3\$ 194 -0098,5.3,5 285 ( -,

HOWEVER, SINCE BOMYAI DELINQUENT PLANS TO RETURN TO THE MOUNTAINS. MORNING NEWS WILL RECEIVE ME AT 11 AM IN GENERAL KHIEM'S OFFICE.

HOPE AT THE TIME TO SORT OUT ALL THIS.

TAYLOR

CFN 0 16 11AM

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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OO RUEHCR  
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O 271208Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1964 AUG 27 AM 8 43

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~~SECRET~~ IMMEDIATE 584 AUGUST 27 8PM

L I M D I S

DEPTEL 521

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 2/27/78

By ring, NARS, Date 4/10/78

REPORTED MCCLOSKEY'S STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR KHANH IN VOA AND WIRE SERVICES AUGUST 27 CONFLICTS WITH SECOND PARAGRAPH REFTEL. WIRE SERVICE REPORTS QUOTES MCCLOSKEY AS SAYING US SUPPORTS "GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL KHANH". IN FUTURE, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE ASAP IN ADVANCE PUBLIC BRIEFINGS SUMMARY SPOKEMAN'S INTENDED COMMENTS. SIMILARLY, WE WILL SEEK TO DO SAME FOR OUR INTENDED STATEMENTS ON RECORD.  
CFN 584 27 8PM 521 27

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 32A ~~SECRET~~

TODAY, FOR INSTANCE, ONLY COMMENT WE MADE ON RECORD WAS THAT "WE CONTINUE TO FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY". AND THAT WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF ATTACKS ON AMERICANS OR AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS BEYOND STONE THROWING AT EM BILLET IN DANANG, REPORTED EARLIER. REALIZE DAY-TO-DAY EXCHANGES OF THIS TYPE MAY BE DIFFICULT. THEREFORE, ALSO IMPORTANT WE TRY TO ESTABLISH COMMON GENERAL LINE TO REDUCE POSSIBILITY CONTRACTIONS.

GENERALLY, WE ARE TRYING TO HOLD PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO PERFUNCTORY COMMENT WHILE WE TRY TO PROVIDE MORE SUBSTANCE THROUGH BACKGROUNDEERS. REALIZE THE PRESSURES ON YOU FOR MORE COMMENT ON-THE-RECORD AS WELL AS DETAILED BACKGROUNDING. EVEN IF THIS WORKED OUT, STILL UNRESOLVED WOULD BE METHOD OF INFORMING EACH OTHER WHEN BACKGROUNDER SCHEDULED AND LINE INTENDED IN BACKGROUNDER AS WELL AS POST BACKGROUNDER REPORT ON ACTUAL STATEMENTS. WE CAN DISCUSS THIS FURTHER DURING MY WASHINGTON VISIT BUT IN THE INTERIM ON OUR PART WE COULD INSTITUTE GRID-IRONS OVER SIGNAL CORPS LINES BY VOA AND IPS CORRESPONDENTS TO SUMMARIZE INFORMATION GIVEN. COULD YOU ADOPT SOME SIMILAR

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2-584, August 27, 8 p.m., from Saigon

SYSTEM? BELIEVE THIS IMPORTANT DURING PRESENT DELICATE  
SITUATION.

ADVISE.

GP-3. TAYLOR

BT

CFN GP-3

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O August 27 at 8:58 a.m.  
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 9:25 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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38-32

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VNNNZCZCMJA979  
PP RUEHCR RUFGWP RUFHDN  
DE RUMJIR 23A 27/0950Z  
P 270935Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS  
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH  
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONGKONG  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

022927  
1964 AUG 27 AM 7 32

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 578 INFO PRIORITY PARIS 61  
PHNOM PENH 81 VIENTIANE 54 BANGKOK 60 HONGKONG 84 LONDON 50  
CINCPAC 301 FROM SAIGON AUG 27, 6 PM

FOLLOWING ITEMS FROM PERRUCHE AT 1800 LOCAL AUG 26:

FRENCH CULTURAL CENTER AT DA NANG, EARLIER REPORTED BURNED  
BY MOB, WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY DAMAGED ACCORDING TO REPORT BY  
TELEPHONE 1700 LOCAL. THERE HAD BEEN NO RPT NO ANTI-FRENCH  
DEMONSTRATION, AND FIRE HAD BEEN SET WHEN PART OF MOB BELIEVED  
ENEMIES HAD FLED THERE. TWO ATTENDANTS PUT OUT SMALL FIRE.  
THIS CULTURAL CENTER WILL BE USED AS ASSEMBLY POINT FOR THE  
SOME 80 FRENCH CITIZENS IN DA NANG AREA IF EVACUATION BECOMES  
CFN 578 61 81 54 60 84 50 301 27 6 1800 26 1700 80

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 23A ~~SECRET~~  
NECESSARY.

FRENCH EMBASSY RECEIVED NEUTRALIST TRACT AUG 25 FROM "SAIGON-  
CHOLON-GIA DINH COMMITTEE OF MOVEMENT FOR NEUTRALIZATION  
OF VIETNAM". APPEALS FOR CEASEFIRE BETWEEN FNLSVN RPT FNLSVN  
AND GVN RPT GVN AND "GENEVA CONFERENCE TO RESOLVE ALL PROBLEMS  
OF INDOCHINA". POUCHING TEXT.

FRENCH BELIEVE BEST CHOICE FOR NEW CHIEF IS MINH "BECAUSE  
HE IS SOFT AND FLEXIBLE". EMBOFF DISAGREED, REMINDED PERRUCHE  
MINH WAS INEFFECTUAL AND ANATHEMA TO CATHOLICS, SAID EMBASSY  
STILL BELIEVED KHANH WAS BEST AVAILABLE CANDIDATE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

RACDD 14861

~~SECRET~~

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By UC

NARA, Date 10-29-97



~~SECRET~~

-2- 578 August 27, 6 p.m. from Saigon

PERRUCHE SAID "DO MAU MUST BE HAPPY THAT AUG 16 POWER GRAB BY KHANH HAS BEEN REVOKED, BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE BEEN EXPELLED FROM GOVERNMENT." DO MAU APPEARED VERY SURE OF HIMSELF AT AUG 26 MEETING OF MRC. WHEREAS IN PAST PERRUCHE HAD ATTACKED DO MAU BITTERLY AS MAN BEHIND ANTI-FRENCH DEMONSTRATIONS, TODAY HIS REMARKS WERE DEVOID OF ANY HOSTILITY. HE DESCRIBED DO MAU AS DISLIKED BUT FEARED AND RESPECTED AS FORMER DEUXIEME BUREAU CHIEF. SAID HE WAS PRIMARILY OPPORTUNISTIC AND ONLY SECONDARILY ANTI-FRENCH.

NGUYEN TON HOAN HAD PLAYED HIS CARDS BADLY, COMING OUT WITH CFN 25 16 26

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 23A ~~SECRET~~  
STRONG ANTI-KHANH CIRCULAR LETTER WHEN HE BELIEVED KHANH FINISHED. HE MAY YET REGRET THIS. HOAN RECENTLY SOLD HIS RESTAURANT IN PARIS FOR NINE MILLION OLD FRANCS (\$18,000) AND BOUGHT VILLA IN VALLEY OF CHEVREUSE FOR 25 MILLION (\$50,000). PERRUCHE ADDED THAT "ALL" VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS AND SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE BEEN SENDING AS MUCH MONEY TO FRANCE AS POSSIBLE RECENTLY.

IN EFFORT TO DRAW OUT PERRUCHE AND KNOWLEDGEABLE FIRST SECRETARY MICHEL PERRIN ON FLN-SVN, EMBOFF REMARKED THAT FRONT COULD CAUSE MUCH MORE TROUBLE AT PRESENT IF IT HAD A REALLY POPULAR HEAD INSTEAD OF STRAW MAN NGUYEN HUU THO. PERRIN REPLIED FRONT WAS NOT RPT NOT OBLIGED TO USE ONE OF ITS OWN PEOPLE TO MAKE TROUBLE, WOULD NOT RPT NOT SEEK TO CARRY OFF REVOLUTION AT THIS TIME, WOULD ONLY SEEK MORE "CONCILIATORY" GVN AS FIRST STEP. BOTH BELIEVED WHEN FRONT GOT AROUND TO REACTING TO CURRENT POLITICAL TURBULENCE IT MIGHT STEP UP URBAN TERRORISM TO CREATE CLIMATE MORE LIKELY TO PUSH PEOPLE TOWARDS NEUTRALIST SOLUTION. BOTH BELIEVED RECENT CARAVELLE

BOMB WAS VC RPT  
VC TERRORISM FOR THIS PURPOSE. THIS TERRORISM WOULD CONTINUE AND INCREASE REGARDLESS WHO SUCCEEDED KHANH. PERRUCHE CLAIMED CFN \$18,000 25 \$50,000

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 578 August 27, 6 p.m. from Saigon

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 23A ~~SECRET~~

FRENCH HAD NO RPT NO CONTACTS WITH FRONT IN SAIGON "OR EVEN IN PHNOM PENH AND EVEN LESS IN PARIS". CLAIMED THAT SOME MONTHS AGO WHEN PLANTER WAS KIDNAPPED BY VC, FRENCH EMBASSY HAD QUERIED FRNECH EMBASSY PHNOM PENHAE POSSIBILITIES OF GETTING INFO ON HIS SITUATION THROUGH FRONT REPRESENTATIVES THERE IN PHNOM PENH. REPLY WAS EMBASSY HAD NO RPT NO CONTACT.

FRENCH EMBASSY ESTIMATED THAT KHANH IS FINISHED AFTER HE APPEARED ON TOP OF TRUCK WITH STUDENT LEADER AND SHOUTED "DOWN WITH MILITARY DICTATORSHIP". IF HE SHOULD RESUME POWER AS RESULT OF SOME AMERICAN PREFERENCE OR INFLUENCE, DISTURBANCES WILL RESUME IN MUCH MORE VIOLENT FORM AND NEUTRALIST SOLUTION WILL APPEAR STILL MORE ATTRACTIVE TO URBAN POPULATION. GP-3. TAYLOR

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-O at 8:44 a.m. 8/27/64  
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 9:30 a.m. 8/27/64

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1964 AUG 27 AM 7 13

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PP RUEHCR RUFGWP RUFHDN  
DE RUMJIR 21A 27/0925Z  
P R 270905Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEPDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH  
RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

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Authority RAC00014862

By isa NARA, Date 10-29-97

✓ Bundy  
you have  
seen Sec. one

~~SECRET~~ SEONE OF TWO ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (577) DOD 86 WHITE HOUSE  
65 CIA 71 INFO BANGKOK 59 VTIANE 53 PPHN 80 PARIS 60 LONDON 49  
MANILA 41 TOKYO 10 ROME 7 CINCPAC 300 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 27 5PM

ROME FOR LODGE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

DEPTEL 507

WHILE WE CAN NOT BE SURE THAT WE HAVE ALL THE FACTS NOR THAT  
THE SO-CALLED FACTS WE HAVE ARE FULLY RELIABLE, WE ARE INCLINED  
CFN 577 86 65 71 59 53 80 60 49 41 10 7 300 27 5PM 507

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 21A ~~SECRET~~  
TO VIEW THE EVENTS SINCE ABOUT AUGUST 21 UP TO NOON TODAY IN THE  
FOLLOWING LIGHT:

THE GOVERNMENT WHICH KHANH PUT TOGETHER, AFTER THE COUP  
OF JANUARY 30, 1964 ACHIEVED A TENUOUS EQUILIBRIUM WHICH  
FUNDAMENTALLY SATISFIED NO SINGLE ACTIVIST ELEMENT IN VIETNAM  
POLITICS, BUT WHICH DID NOT DISSATISFY ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- AUGUST 27, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

GROUP ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE OUTBREAK OF INTRACTABLE OPPOSITION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF PROVED TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONALITIES AND AMBITIONS WHICH PROVED UNABLE TO WORK EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER OR TO ADDRESS THEMSELVES CONSISTENTLY TO PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL INTEREST.

KHANH FROM THE START SEEMS TO HAVE LACKED CONFIDENCE IN MOST OF THE POLITICIANS IN HIS CABINET (AS WELL AS THEY IN EACH OTHER) AND TO HAVE REFRAINED FROM ASSIGNING THEM OTHER THAN TOKEN RESPONSIBILITY. HIS INCOMPATIBILITY WITH HIS CABINET DEEPENED AND HE CAME TO RELY TO AN EVER GROWING DEGREE UPON THE INSTRUMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND ESPECIALLY ON GENERAL KHIEM (WHO HAD APPARENTLY PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN BRINGING KHANH TO POWER), TO ACCOMPLISH WHATEVER EFFORTS THE GOVERNMENT WAS ABLE TO MUSTER IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VIET CONG. EVEN IN  
CFN 21 30 1964

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 21A ~~SECRET~~

THIS QUARTER, HOWEVER, HE HAD LESS THAN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE AND RECEIVED LESS THAN WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT. AND, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, HE CAME TO FEEL THAT GENERAL MINH WAS TO SOME EXTENT RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS. HE THEREFORE CONCENTRATED A GREAT MEASURE OF HIS ATTENTION, IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, UPON THE PROBLEM OF GETTING RID OF GENERAL MINH IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD NOT DISRUPT THE ARMY. ALSO, HE DEVELOPED GENERAL FEELING THAT PACIFICATION PROGRAMS WERE TOO SLOW AND ACHIEVED AT HIGH COST IN LIVES, AND SENSED, OR THOUGHT HE SENSED A GENERAL MALAISE DEMANDING DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS ON SOLUTIONS. IN CASTING ABOUT KHANH HIT ON THE "MARCH TO THE NORTH" THEME AND WITH THE AUGUST US ATTACK ON DRV HE SEIZED THE FAVORABLE CLIMATE THUS CREATED TO ATTEMPT EMERGENCY SOLUTION TO PERENNIAL PROBLEMS AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITY HE FELT THIS GAVE HIM TO REMOVE MINH.

THE SCHEME HE HIT UPON TO ELIMINATE MINH ALONG WITH CERTAIN UNWELCOME MINISTERS WAS THE CREATION OF A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION WHICH SIMPLY PULLED MINH'S POSITION OUT FROM UNDER HIM. AS EARLY AS MAY KHANH HAD BEGUN TO TOY WITH THIS PROJECT, TALKING IN TERMS OF A "DE GAULLE-POMPIDOU" SYSTEM AS WELL AS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- AUGUST 27, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 21A ~~SECRET~~

STRAIGHT PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM. HE HAD TALKED TO VARIOUS POLITICIANS SUCH AS TGN VAN DO REGARDING THE FORM IT SHOULD TAKE. IT IS QUITE CERTAIN THAT IT WAS DISCUSSED IN GREAT DETAIL WITH KHIEM, WHO WAS KHANH'S GREATEST ASSURANCE OF MAINTAINING ARMY UNITY. KHIEM'S OWN ROLE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT IS SOMEWHAT OBSCURE AND THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT HE FOUND THE SCHEME ILL-ADVISED, PARTICULARLY THE ELIMINATION OF MINH. HOWEVER, DISREGARDING OUR ADVICE KHANH FAILED TO LAY EITHER THE NECESSARY POLITICAL OR PUBLIC GROUNDWORK AND WHEN THE NEW CHARTER EMERGED UNDER FORCED DRAFT OVER A WEEKEND AND ITS AUTHORS BECAME IDENTIFIED, IT WAS RECOGNIZED BY MANY THAT FORMER CAN LAO ELEMENTS (SUCH FIGURES AS TRAN CHAN THANH, TRAN LE QUANG AND GENERAL CAO) HAD HAD A MAJOR ROLE IN DRAFTING IT. IT ALSO SEEMED PROBABLE THAT MANY OF THESE CAN LAO FIGURES HOPED TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW CHARTER. MOREOVER, AFTER IT EMERGED IN ITS FINAL VERSION FROM THE MRC, IT WAS EVIDENT MRC HAD PUT MORE OF A STRAIT JACKET AROUND KHANH, LIMITING THE INDEPENDENCE OF MRC HE HAD SOUGHT THROUGH HIS OWN FIRST DRAFT. THUS, THOUGH THE CHARTER IN NO WAY CHANGED FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS OF MRC ASSERTING SUPREME POWER WITH

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 21A ~~SECRET~~

KHANH AS LEADER OF GOVERNMENT, THE CHARTER DID PROVIDE FOCAL POINT AND CATALYST IN BRINGING DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS TO SURFACE.

KHANH, THEREFORE, IN HIS CONCENTRATION ON THE PROBLEM OF MINH, HAD CONJURED UP A WHOLE NEW SET OF PROBLEMS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO SOLVE AN IMMEDIATE ONE.

TAYLOR  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 8:47 AM, 8/27/64.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

34  
Action

SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHCR RUFGWP RUFHND  
DE RUMJIR 22A 27/0939Z  
P R 270905Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEPDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH  
RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS  
RUFHND/AMEMBASSY LONDON  
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

023010

1964 AUG 27 AM 8 56

034

~~SECRET~~ SETWO OF TWO ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (577) DOD 86 WHITE  
HOUSE 65 CIA 71 INFO BANGKOK 59 VTIANE 53 PPENH 80 PARIS 60  
LONDON 49 MANILA 41 TOKYO 10 ROME 7 CINCPAC 300 FROM SAIGON  
AUGUST 27 5PM

ROME FOR LODGE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

DEPTTEL 507

THE BUDDHISTS AND STUDENTS, WHO HAVE BEEN FEELING THEIR  
POLITICAL OATS SINCE THEIR SUCCESSES AGAINST DIEM, FELT THEY  
HAD SUFFERED A SET BACK IN THE JANURAY 30 COUP THAT PUT KHANH  
CFN 577 86 65 71 59 53 80 60 49 41 10 7 300 27 5PM 507 30

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 22A ~~SECRET~~

IN POWER AND NOW SAW FURTHER SETBACKS IN PROSPECT. GOADED BY  
THE MILITANT TRI QUANG, THEY SAW THE SPECTER OF DIEMISM IN THE  
COMINATION OF THE PREDOMINANTLY CATHOLIC MRC AND THE OLD CAN LAO.  
IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED IT WAS ONLY A SPECTER AS AT NO TIME  
HAD THERE BEEN ANY EVIDENCE OF A GOVERNMENT POLICY OF  
MISTREATMENT OF BUDDHISTS.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~SECRET~~

-2- 577, AUGUST 27, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

THE STUDENTS, NETTLED BY SUCH PETTY ANNOYANCES AS AN 11:00 PM CURFEW AND CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS, AND FEARING THE PROSPECT OF A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE NATIONAL SERVICE LAW, SAW THE END OF SOME OF THEIR TEA-HOUSE LEISURE AND WERE AMENABLE TO LEADERSHIP OF TRI QUANG AND BUDDHISTS. (THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE OF CONCERT BETWEEN BUDDHISTS AND STUDENTS ALTHOUGH ALL THE POINTS OF CONTACT ARE NOT YET ESTABLISHED).

THE DAI VIET, TROUBLED BY KHANH'S EFFORT TO UPSET THE POST-JANUARY GOVERNMENTAL EQUILIBRIUM WERE PROBABLY UNCERTAIN REGARDING HIS REAL MOTIVES AND INTERPRETED THE CHARTER OF AUGUST 16 AS POSSIBLY DIRECTED AGAINST THEM.

ALL THREE OF THESE GROUPS, PLUS DISSIDENT OUT-POLITICIANS BEGAN TO AGITATE. JUST HOW MUCH AND HOW DEEPLY THE VIET CONG WERE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THESE EVENTS IS DIFFICULT TO SAY; BUT IT CAN BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN VERY BUSY INDEED.  
CFN 11:00 PM 16

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 22A ~~SECRET~~

KHANH, FACED WITH THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, FOUND HIMSELF AT THE VORTEX OF A PERPLEXING MIXTURE OF FORCES. THE TWO MOST EXTREME ELEMENTS HE HAD TO DEAL WITH WERE THE BUDDHIST/STUDENT MILITANTS, PERSONIFIED BY TRI QUANG, AND THE CAN LAO-CATHOLIC MILITARY NOT ENTIRELY LOGICALLY PERSONIFIED BY GENERAL KHIEM. IN BETWEEN WERE A WHOLE ARRAY, SUCH AS HOAN AND THE DAI VIET, GENERALS XUNG AND THI OF I CORPS, AND THE CATHOLIC CLERGY. ALTHOUGH WE POINTED OUT TO HIM THE DANGERS IN APPEARING TO CAPITULATE TO THE ULTIMATUM OF A DEMAGOGIC TRI QUANG WHO REPRESENTED ONLY ONE ELEMENT IN THE COUNTRY, HE SEEMED WILLING TO LET THE BUDDHISTS AND STUDENTS DISPLAY THEIR STRENGTH, PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE KHIEM AND THE OTHER GENERALS THAT THE MRC DID NOT CONTROL ALL OF THE LEVERS OF POWER. IN HIS FIRST MEETINGS WITH THE MRC HE SEEMS, AT LEAST SUPERFICIALLY, TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY THIS FACTOR. AS HE TOLD US, HE FACED THOSE MEMBERS OF THE MRC WHO WERE ASSEMBLED AUG 25 WITH THE CHOICE OF "SHOOTING THEIR OWN YOUNGSTERS" OR MAKING CONCESSIONS TO SATISFY THE FORCES LED BY TRI QUANG. GIVEN THIS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 577, AUGUST 27, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

DECISION, AND KNOWING THAT KHANH SPOKE WITH THE TREMENDOUS ASSET OF CONTINUED TANGIBLE US SUPPORT, THE MRC (REALLY A RUMP VERSION) NOMINALLY ACCEPTED AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY CFN 25

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 22A ~~SECRET~~  
A CAPITULATION TO TRI QUANG'S DEMANDS.

AT THIS STAGE, HOWEVER, A "BACKLASH" SET IN. WHEN THE FULL MRC (WHICH IS PREDOMINANTLY CATHOLIC AND PRO-DAI-VIET) ASSEMBLED IN SAIGON AUG 26, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE GRUMBLING ABOUT THE DECISION ON DISSOLUTION TAKEN BY THE RUMP SESSION ON AUGUST 25. MANY OF THE SENIOR GENERALS, WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE DECISION AUG 25 REVERSED THEMSELVES AND SOUGHT NOT ONLY TO RENEGE ON THE DECISION RE DISSOLUTION BUT ALSO TO OUST KHANH. THE GROUPINGS WITH THE MRC WHO CAME TO THIS PERSUASION WERE NOT REPEAT NOT NOT CLEARLY IDENTIFIED. SOME OBVIOUSLY WERE ASSOCIATED WITH MINH, OTHERS (PERHAPS THE MAJORITY) WERE CLOSER TO KHIEM AND THE CATHOLICS.

AS MATTERS NOW STAND, THE CATHOLIC CROWDS HAVE TAKEN TO THE STREET. WHETHER KHANH WILL BE ABLE TO COPE WITH THIS CONFUSION AND EMERGE AS THE CONTINUING SYMBOL OF AUTHORITY IS QUESTIONABLE. HIS GREATEST SINGLE ASSET - PERHAPS AS OF THE MOMENT A LEAST EQUAL TO ALL THOSE POSSESSED BY HIS POTENTIAL RIVALS FOR POWER - IS THE CONTINUED, TANGIBLE SUPPORT OF THE US FOR HIM PERSONALLY.

THEREFORE, HE REMAINS VERY MUCH A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF FORCE IN THE POWER STRUGGLE. THE OTHER SIGNIFICANT INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS CFN 26 25 25

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 22A ~~SECRET~~  
EMERGED IN TRI QUANG. HE APPEARS TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS POLITICAN IN VIETNAM AND HAVING ACHIEVED THIS NEW VICTORY CANNOT BE EXPECTED NOW TO RETIRE INTO THE SHADE OF BO TREE. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT HE MAY HAVE AMBITIONS EXTENDING BEYOND VIETNAM WITH TALK OF HIS DESIRE TO LEAD A NEUTRALIST BUDEHIST GROUPING IN SEA THAT WOULD ALSO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 577, AUGUST 27, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

HAVE ROOM FOR MOSLEM MALAYA AND INDONESIA.  
WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEARN MUCH MORE ABOUT HIM AND MUST SEE  
WHAT WE CAN DO TO INFLUENCE HIM.

THE GENERALS WHO MAKE UP THE MRC, BECAUSE OF THE BICKERING  
AMONG THEMSELVES, HAVE ALONG WITH KHANH OBVIOUSLY LOST PRESTIGE  
AND IN THEIR DEMONSTRATED UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY  
EFFECTIVELY TO USE THEIR POWER TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER AND KEEP  
THE GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONING. THEIR CONFRONTATIONS WITHIN THE MRC  
WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REINFORCE DIVISIVE TENDENCIES AMONG THE MILITARY  
AND TEND FURTHER TO POLARIZE FACTIONS WHICH PREVIOUSLY EXISTED  
BUT WERE DORMANT. WHO AMONG THEM WILL EMERGE AS THE DOMINANT  
FIGURE IS UNCLEAR AT THIS WRITING.

TAYLOR

BT NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 11 AM, 8/27/64.

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Bundy*  
*40*

43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action  
SS

CONTROL: 22690

Info

RECD: AUGUST 27, 1964, 2:16 AM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 575 IMMEDIATE

DATE: AUGUST 27, 1 PM

*cy #90 det*

007

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

FOR THE SECRETARY

Authority *State Sec 2/27/78*

By *img*, NARS, Date *2/10/78*

EXDIS

IN VIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION HERE I WOULD FEEL EASIER IF I POSTPONED MY TRIP TO WASHINGTON FOR AT LEAST A WEEK. IF YOU CONCUR, SUGGEST SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE WASHINGTON AND HERE 9 AM WASHINGTON TIME AUGUST 28 THAT TRIP IS POSTPONED WITH NEW DATE TO BE ANNOUNCED LATER.

FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE NEW SCHEDULE BASED ON ARRIVING WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 7 WITH FIRST OFFICIAL BUSINESS ON SEPTEMBER 8 (TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EFFECT OF LONG LABOR DAY WEEKEND). CAN APPROXIMATELY SAME SCHEDULE BE WORKED OUT FOR ME AS NOW PLANNED?

IF YOU APPROVE THIS CHANGE, WOULD APPRECIATE IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION OF POSTPONEMENT TO MRS. M. D. TAYLOR AND SON CAPTAIN T. H. TAYLOR, FT. LEWIS, WASHINGTON.

ZFN-9 28 7 8

TAYLOR

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-O at 2:45 a.m., August 27

Passed White House, DOD at 3:38 a.m., August 27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

41

15176

Bundy

See over

50  
Origin  
55  
Info

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SAIGON 541

DECLASSIFIED

Aug 27 6 53 PM '64

LIMDIS

Authority

State 1722778

REF: urtel 584

By *img*

NARS, Date 4/10/78

24

McCloskey's noon briefing comments rigorously adhered to words used in deptel 521 as follows:

"Gen. Khanh is the premier of the Republic of Viet Nam and as we have stated many times in the past we continue fully to support that government."

If wire services and VOA foreshortened language as reported refel, this unfortunate but occasional sloppy performance is beyond department's control. Deptel 521 was designed precisely to accomplish purpose of advising you in advance of proposed line and such procedure will continue whenever possible although frequently department comments not composed until shortly before press briefings. In general we firmly endorse refel's proposal for fullest possible advance exchange of briefing positions together with both advance notice and precise followup of backgrounders.

Drafted by:

S/RJManning:jbunn 8/27/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Robert J. Manning

Clearances:

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal  
USIA - (informed)P - Mr. Greenfield  
FE - Mr. BundyREPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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~~SECRET~~  
*Classification*

Presently Secstate scheduled background selected group diplomatic correspondents Friday 5 p.m. Washington time on general international situation. Saigon situation obviously will get high billing and we solicit your suggestions as to analysis or other comments Secretary should make. Sunday 6:00 p.m. Secretary will appear on Meet the Press, in which Saigon situation will also figure prominently. Department will forward speediest possible unclassified summary of pertinent questions and answers and henceforth will do same for all pertinent press treatments. Your assumption correct that pressure heavy here for daily on-record comments but we share your desire to do as much as possible by backgrounders and other indirection. END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14661

42

*Thompson*

Aug 27 10 32 AM '64

*Cy #2 dist*

03

31

Origin  
SS  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON FLASH 533

~~NOEXX~~ EXDIS.

Personal for Ambassador from Secretary.

Reference your 575.

While we do not yet have your reports on today's events, it does seem possible that triumvirate arrangement will be temporarily stable. We do feel urgent need for over-all policy review and events of week have made this even more critical. These factors would argue for adhering to schedule or at most delaying a day or two if necessary to make clear USG position to triumvirate.

On other hand, if you believe your presence important to guide triumvirate through early days, or that disorders and serious upheaval may still be likely in next ten days, obviously this should weigh heavily.

Could you let us have another flash reading of your views in light of today's events?

GP-3.

RUSK

End.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State ltr 2/21/78*

By *smg*, NARS, Date *4/10/98*

Drafted by:  
FE:WPBundy:mk 8/27/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

The Secretary (substance) DOD - Secretary McNamara (informed)  
White House - Mr. Bundy (substance) S/S - Mr. Davies

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal  
(info)

FE - Mr. Clunan

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43

36-31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014863

By us NARA, Date 10-29-97

Action

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 27A 26/1315Z

SVN

P R 261302Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY/SAIGON

Info

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

SS

STATE GRNC

G

BT

EE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY (570) INFO CINCPAC 296  
FROM SAIGON AUGUST 26 9PM

NSC

INR

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

RMR

TRI QUANG TOLD EMBOFF THIS NOON THAT HE HAD SENT LETTER TO GENERAL KHANH EXPRESSING SUPPORT OF BUDDHISTS. LETTER CONTAINED ONLY TWO "POINTS" WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED CONDITIONS 1) THAT KHANH FIGHT AGAINST BOTH COMMUNISTS AND CAN LAO; 2) THAT NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN ONE YEAR. QUANG FELT KHANH WOULD CERTAINLY BE ABLE TO ABIDE BY THESE POINTS.

QUANG NOTED TAM CHAU HAD HEARD FROM FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCES OF CFN 570 296 26 9PM 1) 2)

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 27A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
COUPS PLANNED BY BOTH 5TH AND 7TH DIVISIONS. COMMANDER OF LATTER REPORTED TO HAVE THREATENED TO ERADICATE THE BUDDHISTS "LIKE CHRISTIANS HAD ELIMINATED JEWS" IN SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES. QUANG FELT GENERAL THIEU WAS MOST LIKELY OFFICER BEHIND POSSIBLE 5TH DIVISION EFFORT.

QUANG SAID HE WAS NOT TOO CONCERNED ABOUT ADDITIONAL STUDENT DEMANDS EMANATING FROM HUE. HE SAID THEY HAD SOME MERIT BUT CONSIDERED THEM OBVIOUSLY IMPRATICAL AT PRESENT. ONLY ONE HE CONSIDERED MIGHT BE APPLICABLE WAS STUDENTS' REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE AS LEGAL MIN'S REPLACEMENT BY KHANH AS CHIEF OF STATE UNDER VUNG TAU CHARTER.

STATED HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT CROWDS IN HUE, AS HUE PEOPLE "HAD DISCIPLINE" AND WOULD KEEP ORDER. SAID HE COULD CONTROL HUE SITUATION EASILY FROM SAIGON. WAS GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT DANANG, HOWEVER, WHERE BUDDHISTS LESS WELL-ORGANIZED AND WHERE LIVES ALREADY BEEN LOST. REQUESTED US AIRCRAFT TRANSPORT HIM THERE AS HE DID NOT TRUST VNAF OR AIR VIETNAM. (NOTE: EMBOFF DEMURRED PENDING FURTHER INFORMATION ON DANANG SITUATION. QUANG NOW CONSIDERING ATTERNATE METHODS OF COMMUNICATING WITH FOLLOWERS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 570, AUGUST 26, 9 PM, FROM SAIGON

IN CENTER, WHICH IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE HE FEELS HE CANNOT  
CFN 5TH 7TH 5TH

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 27A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRUST TELEPHONE OR TELEGRAPH, AND EVEN PERSONAL EMISSARY COULD  
NOT ACCOMPLISH JOB WHICH QUANG BELIEVES DEPENDS ON HIS  
PERSONALITY ALONE.)

QUANG NOTED FOR SAKE OF UNITY IN ARMY IT WAS GOOD THING THAT 4  
GENERALS DON, KIM, DINH, AND XUAN WERE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN  
MRC MEETING. FELT THEY WERE ACTUALLY GOOD SOLDIERS BUT POLITICALLY  
IN-EXPERIENCED. SAID HE COULD "GUARANTEE" THEY WERE NOT REALLY  
PRO-FRENCH. ALSO STATED NO OBJECTION IF MINH WERE ELECTED CHIEF  
OF STATE, AS LONG AS HE HAD LITTLE MORE THAN SYMBOLIC DUTIES.  
(NOTE: QUANG HAS OFTEN DEPRECATED MINH'S ABILITY  
OUTSIDE THE PURELY MILITARY FIELD.)

IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION LATE IN AFTERNOON WITH EMBOFF, TRI  
QUANG AND TAM CHAU MADE FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) REPEATED REPORT  
TO EFFECT THAT COMMANDERS OF ARVN 5TH AND 7TH DIVISIONS WERE  
PLANNING COUP IN FAVOR OF BIG MINH AND DALAT GENERALS AND  
BUDDHISTS WERE CONCERNED AT DEVELOPMENT. ASKED IF THEIR ATTITUDE  
TO THIS REPORT MEANT THAT THEY WOULD BE UNHAPPY IF BIG MINH  
WERE ELECTED CHIEF OF STATE BY CURRENT MEETING OF MRC, CHAU  
NODDED AFFIRMATIVELY (NOTE QUANG'S OPPOSITE ATTITUDE THIS NOON).  
(B) EMISSARY FROM TAY NINH PROVINCE CHIEF LE VAN TAT INFORMED  
CFN 4 5TH 7TH

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 27A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHAU THAT TAT HAD BEEN URGENTLY INVITED TO RETURN TO SAIGON FOR  
CONFERENCE WITH NGUYEN TON HOAN. TAT WANTED CHAU TO KNOW THAT  
HE HAD REFUSED AND INTENDED TO TOLD ALOOF FROM POLITICAL  
MACHINATIONS; TAT WOULD SUPPORT ANY MAN WHO COULD UNITE  
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND DID NOT HAVE UNSAVORY RECORD. BUDDHISTS SAW  
NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS REPORTED INTRIGUE AND THAT INVOLVING  
5TH AND 7TH DIVISIONS. (C) NGUYEN TON HOAN HAD INVITED TAM CHAU  
TO MEETING; BUT CHAU HAD REFUSED. (D) ARCHBISHOP BINH HAD WRITTEN  
BUDDHISTS LETTER RECOMMENDING APPOINTMENT OF TWO BONZES AND TWO  
PRIESTS TO SERVE IN LIAISON ROLE AND HELP ELIMINATE MISUNDERSTANDING  
BETWEEN FAITHS. BUDDHISTS PLANNED ACCEPT. EMBOFF EXPRESSED GREAT  
SATISFACTION AT THIS DECISION. (E) BUDDHISTS WERE MENDING TELEGRAMS  
TO FOLLOWERS IN HUE AND DANANG URGING THEM TO BE CALM AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 570, AUGUST 26, 9 PM, FROM SAIGON

PEACEFUL. IPBF VICE PRESIDENT PHAP TRI HAD LEFT FOR DANANG AT NOON TO ATTEMPT TO CALM FOLLOWERS. ALL BUDDHIST LEADERS PRESENT (HUYEN QUANG AND QUANG DO AS WELL AS QUANG AND CHAU) APPEARED VERY GREATLY CONCERNED BY SITUATION IN DANANG.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 5TH 7TH

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:25 PM 8/26/64

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 1:40 PM 8/26/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

44  
DECLASSIFIED

37 00 RUEHCR Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)  
Action DE RUMJIR 26A 26/1155Z ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By TB, NARS, Date 11 MAR 76  
O 261143Z ZEA 2 1 7 9 9  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON 1964 AUG 26 AM 8:38  
SVN TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
Info STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ IMMEDIATE 569 AUGUST 26 8PM

REF: DEPTTEL 519

MACV PIO RELEASED FOLLOWING TEXT TO NEWS MEDIA MORNING AUGUST 25 IN RESPONSE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FROM NEWSMEN ON FIRING BY AMERICANS (TEXT TRANSMITTED SAME DATE IN MACV SUPPLEMENTARY PRESS TRENDS 201-A):

"WHEN THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE PASSING THE DANANG HOTEL EM BILLET YESTERDAY MORNING, SOME OF THE DEMONSTRATORS STARTED STREAMING INTO THE COURTYARD OF THE BILLET AND THOSE AT THE HEAD OF THE GROUP ACTUALLY ENTERED THE BUILDING. AT THAT, CFN 569 26 8PM 519 25 201-A

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 26A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
TIME, TWO SHOTS WERE FIRED INTO THE AIR BY US MILITARY PERSONNEL STANDING ON THE ROOF OF THE BUILDING.

"IT IS REPORTED THAT AFTER THE SHOTS WERE FIRED, LEADERS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS CAME INTO THE COURTYARD AND PREVAILED UPON THE DEMONSTRATORS TO RETURN TO THE STREET AND REJOIN THE MARCH.

"THE TWO SHOTS WERE NOT FIRED BY PERSONNEL ON GUARD DUTY AND THE ACTION WAS TAKEN WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION. THE MATTER IS UNDER INVESTIGATION BY US AUTHORITIES IN DANANG."

MACV CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE TRANSMITTED TODAY (ETG 261045A) STATES IN PART:

"BOTH (SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS AND HIS DEPUTY) STATE THAT AFTER TALKING WITH PERSONNEL WHO WERE IN EM BILLET AT TIME OF SHOOTING THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE HEADED TOWARD NEARBY CATHOLIC VILLAGE FROM OUTSET AND WOULD HAVE GONE THERE EVEN IF SHOTS HAD NOT BEEN FIRED. ALSO THAT ROCKS THROWN AT EM BILLET BY DEMONSTRATORS WERE AIMED AT HOUSE-MAIDS STANDING ON BALCONIES AND LEANING OUT OF WINDOWS, ALL OF WHOM LIVE IN CATHOLIC VILLAGE AND WERE KNOWN TO WORK IN BILLET. (NOTE: INITIAL REPORTS INDICATED ROCKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN THROWN BECAUSE US PERSONNEL WERE TAKING PICTURES OF DEMONSTRATION.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 569, August 26, 8 P.M., from Saigon.

"MACV INFO LIAISON OFFICER AT DANANG SAYS THAT IT WOULD HAVE CFN (DTG 261045Z)

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 26A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR DEMONSTRATORS TO INADVERTENTLY APPROACH CATHOLIC VILLAGE AS RESULT OF FLEEING FROM SHOTS IN AIR BECAUSE BILLET AND VILLAGE ARE SEPARATED BY LARGE PARKING LOT BOUNDED BY CONCERTINA WIRE. FURTHER STATED THAT IT WAS AT LEAST 30 RPT 30 MINUTES AFTER SHOTS WERE FIRED BEFORE DEMONSTRATORS WALKED AROUND CONCERTINA WIRE AND REACHED VILLAGE WHERE FIGHTING BROKE OUT."

SEVERAL HOURS AFTER RELEASE STATEMENT BY MACV, UPI HERNDON REQUESTED COMMENT ON PURPORTED CHARGE BY DANANG STUDENT THAT SHOTS BY AMERICANS HAD TRIGGERED DANANG RIOTING AND CASUALTIES. MACV PIO STUCK TO ORIGINAL ANNOUNCEMENT BUT NOTED THAT ON DEPARTURE FROM EM BILLET COURTYARD DEMONSTRATORS HAD STARTED RUNNING AND KNOCKED DOWN YOUNG VIETNAMESE GIRL WHICH IN TURN HAD UPSET CATHOLIC VILLAGERS. QUOTATION FROM UPI STORY THAT AMERICAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN "CONFIRMED AMERICAN SERVICEMAN FIRED SHOTS WHICH CAUSED PREDOMINANTLY BUDDHIST CROWD....." IS PURE HERNDON WHO SEEMED DETERMINED TO MAKE NEGATIVE STORY OUT OF EXTREMELY UNRELIABLE REPORT. SOME OF DANANG PARTICIPANTS MIGHT LIKE TO SEE US BLAMED FOR VIOLENCE BUT READINESS OF HERNDON TO LEND UPI CHANNELS TO THIS TYPE OF CHARGES EXTREMELY  
CFN 30

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 26A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
IRRESPONSIBLE. AMERICAN OBSERVERS ON SCENE CONVINCED DEMONSTRATORS WERE NOT TRIGGERED BY FEW SHOTS FIRED BY AMERICANS. SUGGEST THAT EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN DEPARTMENT CORRECTIVE STATEMENT THAT US NOT RELEASE PUBLICLY STATEMENT IN MACV CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE THAT DEMONSTRATORS WERE DELIBERATELY HEADED TOWARD CATHOLIC VILLAGE FROM OUTSET. THIS WOULD PUT US IN POSITION OF CHARGING RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BRING ABOUT STRONG BUDDHIST REACTION IN DANANG AND PERHAPS HUE. SUGGEST OUR PUBLIC POSITION SHOULD BE TO CONFIRM AMERICAN FIRING BUT THAT FROM INVESTIGATION WE CONVINCED FIRING DID NOT TRIGGER VIOLENCE. IF QUERIED AS TO WHY WE SO CONVINCED, SUGGEST DEPARTMENT CITE TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS (SEE ABOVE) WHICH INDICATE THERE COULD BE NO RPT NO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO EVENTS.

GP-4. TAYLOR  
BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 9:10 A.M., 8/26/64;  
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 8:55 A.M., 8/26/64.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45

36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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Info

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\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR RUFGWP RUFHDN

DE RUMJIR 23A 26/1125Z

Z R 261119Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 568 INFO BANGKOK 58  
LONDON 47 PARIS 59 CINCPAC 295 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 26 7PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EMBTTEL 566

MRC MEETING ADJOURNED AT 1800. COLONEL THAO, PRESS OFFICER,  
DISMISSED PRESS STATING NO RPT NO ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE  
UNTIL TOMORROW.

COMMITTEE REPORTEDLY DISCUSSED FOLLOWING TOPICS: SEATING OF  
DALAT GENERALS, FUTURE OF MRC, AND CHOICE OF NEW PRESIDENT.

GENERAL THANG (J-3) MENTIONED IN CORRIDOR THAT MRC WOULD  
CFN 568 58 47 59 295 26 7PM 1800 (J-3)

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 23A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROBABLY RECONVENE TOMORROW AT 9 A.M. BUT THIS CANNOT BE TAKEN  
AS FIRM.

ON WAY OUT OF BUILDING GENERAL KHANH TOLD EMBOFF AND PRESS AIDE  
SIMPSON TO TELL AMBASSADOR THAT ISSUE WAS AS YET UNDECIDED,  
MAIS JE CROIS QUE CAN VA. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY REFERRING  
TO HIS BID FOR REELECTION.

DALAT GENERALS WERE SENT BACK TO DALAT THIS AFTERNOON.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 9 A.M.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 7:48 A.M. 8/26/64

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 8:05 A.M. 8/26/64

021728

1964 AUG 26 AM 7 42

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46

~~SECRET~~

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031

42

Action PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 08A 26/0614Z  
SS P 260606Z ZEA

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

Authority RAC 00014864  
By ica NARA, Date 10-29-97

021564

1964 AUG 26 AM 3 19

~~SECRET~~ PRIORITY 560 AUG 26 - 2PM

PRIORITY

L I M D I S

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF HUE'S 48 TO SAIGON:

1. SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS REGARDING GEN NGUYEN CHANH THI INTENTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD IN LAST FEW DAYS. THEY INTERPRET HIS LACK OF RESPONSE AS SUPPORTING STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. BOTH VIS CHIEF NGUYEN DUC MAI AND ONE OF STUDENT LEADERS HAVE INTERPRETED THE LACK OF CROWN CONTROL BY CIVIL POLICE AND ABSENCE OF ANY MILITARY IN DEMONSTRATION AREA AS PROOF OF THIS. ERIC WULFF, MEMBER GERMAN MEDICAL TEAM, AFTER CONVERSATION WITH THI, SAID "HE WILL NOT ACT BECAUSE HE IS THEIR (THE STUDENTS) FRIEND".

CFN 560 26 2 48 1

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 08A ~~SECRET~~

2. THIS MORNING SEC GEN OF HUE UNIVERSITY CAME TO MY HOME TO ASK THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVT TOWARD KHANH. I REPLIED THAT WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GOVT; AND THAT I FELT THE STUDENTS HAD NOT GIVEN HIM ENOUGH TIME TO KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD BE GOOD CHIEF OF STATE.

HE REPLIED THAT MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING HIMSELF AND FATHER LUAN WERE VERY CONCERNED, ABOUT THE SITUATION BUT HAD NO GUIDANCE FROM SAIGON. HE STATED THAT GEN THI WAS THE ONLY MAN WHO COULD CONTROL STUDENTS, BUT HE WAS ON THEIR SIDE AND WOULD DO NOTHING TO STOP THEM. HE FURTHER ALLEGED THAT: A. THI HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO ARREST SEVERAL PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE DEMONSTRATION (NAMES NOT KNOWN), BUT HAS NOT DONE SO. B. THI HAS FREQUENT PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH LE GUYEN (LEADER LAP TRUONG MAGAZINE AND PROBABLE MEMBER LEADERSHIP GROUP FOR DEMONSTRATIONS).

3. I CALLED ON PROVINCE CHIEF LATE MORNING TO ASK ASSURANCES AMERICAN PROPERTY WOULD BE PROTECTED FROM DEMONSTRATORS. HE ASSURED ME HIS INFO INDICATED THAT DEMONSTRATORS WOULD NOT

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-2- 560, AUGUST 26, 2 PM FROM SAIGON

VIOLATE AMERICAN PROPERTY. I TOLD HIM AMERICANS WOULD SEEK TO AVOID AREA OF DEMONSTRATIONS. HE THEN GAVE BRIEF EXPLANATION HIS POSITION, AS FOLLOWS: A. HE HAS BEEN SENDING REPORTS TO SAIGON DAILY SINCE DEMONSTRATIONS BEGAN, BUT HAS RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM SAIGON. B. HE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS FROM XUNG, I CORP COMMANDER. XUNG REPLIED HE HAD RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS SO

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 08A ~~SECRET~~  
CAN ISSUE NONE. C. GEN GHI IS DOING NOTHING. D. HE IS POWERLESS TO ACT BECAUSE GEN THI HAS POWER IN HUE. E. STUDENTS ARE WAITING FOR A "BLOODY INCIDENT" TO CREATE ATMOSPHERE FOR MORE EXTREME ACTIVITIES IN ALL PROVINCES. F. IF THEY DON'T GET BLOODY INCIDENT THEY MAY ESCALATE EFFORT BY ATTEMPTING ENTER GOVT BUILDINGS IN EFFORT TO GET ONE.

4. LATE AFTERNOON I VISITED GEN THI TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION AND SECURITY AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY. THI STATED HE CONVINCED PROTEST GROUP HAS NO ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS. HE STATED GROUP DIRECTED BY RESPONSIBLE WELL ORGANIZED COMMITTEE OF STUDENTS, PROFESSORS, OTHERS. HE CLAIMED BE IN INDIRECT CONTACT WITH LEADERS AND HAVE GIVEN ORDERS NO FOREIGN PERSONS OR PROPERTY BE TOUCHED. THI BELIEVES ORDERS WILL BE OBEYED BUT REALIZES POSSIBILITY OF EXPLOITATION CROWDS BY VC OR OTHERS. HE PROMISED ASSIGN ONE COMPANY PLAIN CLOTHES SECURITY FORCES GUARD AMERICAN HOMES, OFFICES, BEGINNING THIS DATE. (I HAVE AFTER, CONSULTATION WITH DIVISION SENIOR ADVISOR, DISTRIBUTED MESSAGE REMINDING AMERICAN COMMUNITY GREY ALERT STATUS STILL IN EFFECT AND REQUESTING THEY STAY AWAY FROM DEMONSTRATION AND HOLD NO HOLD NO LARGE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS).

THI THEN STATED HE WISHED MAKE "INTIMATE" COMMENTS TO ME. ESSENCE OF THESE WAS: A. GOVT REORGANIZATION OF AUG 16 IMPRUDENT AND ACCOMPLISHED TOO HASTILY. B. PROTEST GROUP INCLUDES STUDENTS, TEACHERS, PROFESSORS, POLITICAL PARTIES ALL OVER COUNTRY. C. GOVT MUST ACT QUICKLY TO MOLLIFY PROTEST GROUP. D. SITUATION

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 08A ~~SECRET~~  
MIGHT BE SAVED IF KHANH OR MINH SPOKE TO POPULACE, BUT SUCCESS IMPROBABLE ALTHOUGH "PEOPLE" WOULD LISTEN TO MINH. E. HE HAS REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS REPEATEDLY BUT HAS RECEIVED NO ORDERS FROM SAIGON FOR THREE DAYS.

COMMENT: IT SEEM / RENT THAT THI WILL DO NO NG TO PHYSICALLY CONTROL ACTIVITIES IN HUE UNTIL SPECIFICALLY ORDERED TO DO SO;

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~~SECRET~~

-3- 560, AUGUST 26, 2 PM FROM SAIGON

AND EVEN IF SO ORDERED IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER OR NOT HE WOULD ACT. HE SEEMS STRONGLY TO FEEL THAT PRESENT GOVT HAS LOST SUPPORT OF PEOPLE AND PROBABLY DOES NOT WANT TO GO DOWN WITH IT IN THE DEFEAT HE SEES IS INEVITABLE. THE ACCUSATION THAT HE HAS DISOBEYED ORDERS IS PROBABLY UNTRUE. HIS RELATIONSHIP, WHATEVER IT MAY BE, WITH THE DEMONSTRATORS CAN PROBABLY BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS THAT IT ALLOWS SOME CONTROL IN AN OTHERWISE UNCONTROLLABLE SITUATION. HIS GUARANTEE OF SECURITY FOR AMERICAN PROPERTY SOMEWHAT TARNISHED BY OWN ADMISSION OF POSSIBLE COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION SITUATION.

THI HAS ALWAYS APPEARED AS PATRIOT WHO DISLIKES POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND IS TREMENDOUSLY POPULAR WITH STUDENTS, BUDDHISTS AND OTHER SEGMENTS POPULATION. HIS PRESENT ATTITUDE MAY BE SHARED BY OTHERS IN MILITARY. UNLESS GOVT DECIDES TO MAKE ACCEPTABLE CONCESSIONS TO STUDENTS DEMANDS OR SUCCESSFULLY RELIEVES THI IT MAY FIND ITSELF WITH SECESSION NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES. GP-1.

SIGNED THOMSEN

TAYLOR

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 26, 3:42 A.M.  
PASSED THE WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AUGUST 26, 4:16 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*47  
Bundy~~SECRET~~

41

Action

NNNNZCZCMJA659

OO RUEHCR

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Info

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUEPWW/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPDA/DOD WASHDC

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

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I M M E D I A T E

1964 AUG 26 AM 12 16

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~~SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 559 INFO WHITEHOUSE 60 -IA  
65 DOD 81 CINCPAC POLAD 289 FROM SAIGON AUG 26 - 11AM

EXDIS

AFTER EVENTS AUG 25, AND DESPITE FACT THAT MRC PUBLICLY ENDORSED KHANH'S CAPITULATION TO BUDDHIST DEMANDS, IT BECAME SOON CLEAR THAT MAJOR ELEMENTS OF MRC WERE HAPPY WITH OUTCOME AND WISHED UPSET RESULTS. THOSE OFFICERS CENTERED AROUND KHIEM AND THIEU IMMEDIATELY BEGAN POLITICKING DURING EVENING AND NIGHT OF AUG 25 WITH PRIMARY PURPOSE OF OUSTING KHANH FROM PRESIDENCY. KHANH, IN MEANTIME, HAD GONE TO VUNG TAU IN ORDER "GET SOME SLEEP" AND PRESUMABLY TO WITHDRAW HIMSELF FROM CENTRAL ARENA OF BARGAINING.

(IN EARLY EVENING AUG 25, KHIEM AND THIEU SOUGHT OUT BIG MINH, GAVE HIM A SOMEWHAT BIASED ACCOUNT OF DAY'S EVENTS AND APPARENTLY LEFT MINH WITH IMPRESSION THAT HE, MINH, WOULD BE A STRONG CANDIDATE IN AUG 26 MRC ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT. OTHER PRO-KHIEM ELEMENTS OF MRC, ESPECIALLY LAM, WERE BUSY MAKING CONTACT WITH MRC MEMBERS, REPORTEDLY SOUNDING THEM OUT ON VOTING POSSIBILITIES. I HAD SENT WESTMORELAND TO SEE KHIEM AND SENT STILWELL TO SEE THIEU DURING EVENING TO SOUND OUT THEIR STATE OF MIND. DURING NIGHT, LAM HAD INSISTENTLY SOUGHT INFO FROM HIS MACV ADVISER, WISHING TO KNOW US GOVT OPINION OF POSSIBLE CHANGE FROM KHANH TO SOME OTHER GENERAL AS PRESIDENT. I HAD ALSO SENT A NOTE TO BIG MINH ENCOURAGING HIM TO ATTEND MRC MEETING AND CAST HIS VOTE THERE.

ON MORNING AUG 26, I RECEIVED WORD THAT MINH WISHED SEE ME AT 9:00 AM (ELECTIONS WERE SCHEDULED FOR 10:00 AM). I ALSO HAD RECEIVED REPORTS RE POLITICKING ACTIVITIES DURING NIGHT OF AUG 25. I THEREFORE DECIDED UPON AND TOOK FOLLOWING ACTIONS.

(1) I WENT TO SEE MINH (DETAILED REPORT BY SEPTTEL) AND TOLD HIM US WANTED NO REPEAT NO CHANGE IN GOVT. OUR CANDIDATE WAS KHANH.

(2) I SENT DE SILVA TO SEE KHIEM TO COMVEY SAME MESSAGE TO HIM.

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 559, AUGUST 26, 11 A.M., FROM SAIGON

(3) I SENT GEN LAM'S MACV ADVISER TO SEE LAM AND TELL HIM WE HAD NO REPEAT NO ALTERNATE CANDIDATE TO KHANH.

(4) AFTER THESE EVENTS(AT ABOUT 9:40) I TELEPHONED KHANH, REPORTED MY CONVERSATION WITH MINH, ASSURED HIM OF OUR SUPPORT, AND WISHED HIM GOOD LUCK IN ELECTIONS.

IT WAS MY CONVICTION, IN TAKING THESE ACTIONS, THAT US COULD NOT REPEAT NOT POSSIBLY AFFORD CONFUSION THAT WOULD RESULT FROM LOSS OF KHANH, THAT INTERNAL MANEUVERS HAD TO BE STOPPED SOMEWHERE, AND THAT KHANH IS INDEED THE BEST BET WE HAVE IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. I AM NOW AWAITING REPORT ON RESULTS OF ELECTION.  
TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 12:27 A.M., 8/26/64

TO: S/S-O, 12:27 A.M., 8/26/64  
FROM: TAYLOR  
SUBJECT: KHANH  
ACTION: IMMEDIATE DELIVERY  
PRIORITY: HIGH

TO: S/S-O, 12:27 A.M., 8/26/64  
FROM: TAYLOR  
SUBJECT: KHANH  
ACTION: IMMEDIATE DELIVERY  
PRIORITY: HIGH  
TO: S/S-O, 12:27 A.M., 8/26/64  
FROM: TAYLOR  
SUBJECT: KHANH  
ACTION: IMMEDIATE DELIVERY  
PRIORITY: HIGH  
TO: S/S-O, 12:27 A.M., 8/26/64  
FROM: TAYLOR  
SUBJECT: KHANH  
ACTION: IMMEDIATE DELIVERY  
PRIORITY: HIGH

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELETYPE Department of State



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

42

Action

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Info

00 RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 03A 26/0220Z  
O 260200Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOMPENH  
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1964 AUG 25 PM 11 00  
021496

I M M E D I A T E

040

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE (558) INFO  
CINCPAC 288 BANGKOK 56 PPNH 78 VIENTIANE 52 FROM SAIGON  
AUGUST 26, 10 AM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

LAST NIGHT TRI QUANG TOLD EMBOFF HE WAS PLEASED WITH KHANH'S  
ACCEPTANCE OF BUDDHIST AND STUDENT DEMANDS. NOTED THAT BUDDHISTS  
WOULD NOW SUPPORT KHANH AND GVN FULLY. WHEN ASKED WHAT FORM  
THIS SUPPORT WOULD TAKE, QUANG REPLIED INITIALLY WORD WOULD  
BE PASSED DOWN INFORMALLY TO BUDDHIST FAITHFUL THAT GVN NOW  
HAS INTERESTS OF "PEOPLE" IN MIND AND SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY  
CFN 558 288 56 78 52 26 10

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 03A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ALL GOOD BUDDHISTS. SAID HE THOUGHT IT UNWISE FOR BUDDHIST  
ASSOCIATION OR HIMSELF TO ISSUE OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AT THIS  
TIME BECAUSE OF CATHOLIC REACTION.

QUANG ALSO SAID HE WOULD ISSUE AN ANTI-COMMUNIST STATEMENT IF  
AND WHEN IT BECAME NECESSARY, THOUGH HE MUCH PREFERRED TO WORK  
AGAINST COMMUNISTS BEHIND SCENES TO PRESERVE HIS CREDIBILITY  
AND PREVENT RUMORS THAT HE HAD BEEN BOUGHT OFF BY GVN AND  
AMERICANS. CLAIMED HE WAS NOW COMPILING LIST OF ATROCITIES  
COMMITTED BY VC AGAINST BUDDHIST PAGODAS, BELIEVERS, ETC.  
AND INTENDED TO CIRCULATE IT WHEN COMPLETED.

QUANG SAID THE BUDDHISTS MIGHT "RECOMMEND" SOME GOOD MEN TO  
KHANH FOR GOVERNMENT POSTS, THOUGH OF COURSE HE HIMSELF DID  
NOT INTEND TO PARTICIPATE NOR TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE ANY  
CANDIDATES.

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Authority

RAC 00014865

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By isa, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 558, AUGUST 26, 10 A.M., FROM SAIGON

EMBOFF EMPHASIZED NECESSITY OF PRESERVING UNITY OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND ALLAYING FEARS OF OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS PARTICULARLY CATHOLICS. NOTED VIOLENCE IN DA NANG BETWEEN BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLICS STILL REPORTED OCCURRING. QUANG SAID THE DA NANG

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 03A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INCIDENT HAD HIM WORRIED AND ASKED FOR FURTHER DETAILS SO HE COULD TAKE ACTION TO PREVENT FURTHER TROUBLE (NOTE: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON DA NANG INCIDENTS AND CONTINUED STUDENT UNREST IN HUE PASSED ON TO QUANG LATER IN EVENING.) QUANG STATED POSSIBLY VC OR CAN LAO ELEMENTS STIRRING THINGS UP AND HE WANTED TO SEE GUILTY PARTIES PUNISHED SEVERELY.

QUANG CLAIMED VOA BROADCASTS DEPLORING STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND "SLANDERING" BUDDHISTS HAD CAUSED SOME ANTI-US FEELING. BUT HE HAD QUIETED THIS BY EXPRESSING HIS OWN OPINION THE US HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH KHANH DURING THE CRISIS AND PERHAPS HAD GIVEN HIM GOOD ADVICE ALONG THE WAY. EMBOFF PROTESTED US CERTAINLY NOT INVOLVED DIRECTLY IN KHANH'S DECISION AS THIS WAS STRICTLY INTERNAL VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS, THOUGH OF COURSE EMBASSY MAINTAINED CLOSE CONTACT WITH GVN AS USUAL. QUANG CLAIMED HE WAS CAREFUL TO NOTE HE HAD EXPRESSED OWN OPINION ONLY, WHICH WAS NOT OFFICIAL BUDDHIST LINE.

QUANG EXPRESSED FEARS OF COUP AGAINST KHANH BY CAN LAO-DAI VIET ELEMENTS. SAID BBC BROADCAST PREDICTED COUP. (NOTE: THIS SOMEHOW PROVED TO QUANG LACK OF BRITISH GOOD-WILL, AND SHOWS HIS SENSITIVITY TO FOREIGN NEWS BROADCASTS.) STATED AS SAFETY MEASURE HE WAS NOT SLEEPING IN HIS USUAL ROOM AT AN QUANG PAGODA. SAID IF KHANH OVERTHROWN OR NOT ELECTED BY MRC TODAY, BUDDHISTS WOULD OPPOSE HIS SUCCESSOR.

QUANG STATED HE INTENDED TO GO ABROAD SOON TO EXPLAIN VIETNAMESE BUDDHIST POLICIES TO OTHER BUDDHIST NATIONS.

COMMENT: QUANG IN RELAXED, CONFIDENT MOOD, BUT OBVIOUSLY HAD NO INTENTION OF SHARING IN RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNING COUNTRY. HIS POSITION OF POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY REMAINS DISQUIETING. TAYLOR  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 11:07 P.M. AUGUST 25, 1964

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 8/25/64 - 11:50 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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Origin

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Info

ACTION:

Amembassy SAIGON 521 ~~FLASH~~ FLASH

Aug 26 10 42 AM '64

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

031

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 2/20/78

Ref embtels 561 and 564

By img, NARS, Date 4/10/78

Fully concur line supporting Khanh you have privately taken with generals. You should continue efforts along this line so long as you deem them appropriate.

We do not repeat not intend make any public statement here today on the subject of whom we favor unless you feel this would be useful to you. We will say that it would not be appropriate for US to comment while MRC is still in session. In answer to questions, we will point out that Khanh is still head of GVN and, as we have stated many times in past, we continue to support GVN.

RUSK

Drafted by: 8/26/64  
S/VN: MVForrestal:pay

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/VN: Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:  
OSD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton  
(in sub.)

FE - Mr. Bundy (in draft)

P - Mr. Manning (in draft)

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