

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

50

020940

~~SECRET~~

1964 AUG 25 AM 11 31

35  
Action

SS

Info

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 27A/1 25/1348Z  
P R 251328Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014866  
By isa NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~SECRET~~ SEONE OF TWO ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 557 INFO CINCPAC  
287 HUE UNN FROM SAIGON AUGUST 25 9PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

045

EMBTel 528

POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND EMBOFFS MET EARLY THIS MORNING (PRIOR EVENTS REPORTED EMBTELS 547 & 554) WITH TRI QUANG AND QUANG DO. TAM CHAU PUT IN VERY BRIEF APPEARANCE, IN EFFECT DISASSOCIATING HIMSELF FROM CONVERSATION.

BEFORE CHAU JOINED GROUP, QUANG OPENED DISCUSSION BY ASKING CFN SEONE OF TWO 557 287 25 9PM 528 547 554

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 27A/1 ~~SECRET~~

WHAT GENERAL KHANH HAD SAID OF QUANG, AND SPECIFICALLY WHETHER KHANH REFERRED TO QUANG AS LEADER OF BUDDHIST MOVEMENT. RESPONSE WAS AVOIDED AS CHAU APPEARED.

MANFULL DREW OUT QUANG ON BUDDHIST DISCUSSIONS WITH KHANH YESTERDAY. ACCORDING TO QUANG, PERSONAL EMISSARY OF KHANH SAW BUDDHIST LEADERS YESTERDAY MORNING TO INVITE THEM TO MEET WITH KHANH AT VUNG TAU, AND HEAR KHANH EXPLAIN HIS POSITION. QUANG RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD MEET KHANH ONLY UNDER TWO CONDITIONS: (1) THAT KHANH MEET WITH THEM IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRIME MINISTER RATHER THAN PRESIDENT, AND (2) THAT MEETING BE HELD IN SAIGON RATHER THAN VUNG TAU, WHICH QUANG REGARDED AS PLACE OF RECENT MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETING. (NOTE: IN EFFECT THESE TWO CONDITIONS INDICATED QUANG'S NON-ACCEPTANCE OF NEW GVN CHARTER AND OF GVN RESHUFFLE.)

MEETING ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE EARLY YESTERDAY EVENING AFTER KHANH'S RETURN TO SAIGON. QUANG, TAN CHAU, AND THIEN MINH MET WITH KHANH. THEY PRESENTED HIM WITH STATEMENT OF DEMANDS DESCRIBED IN REFTel. (NOTE: THIS STATEMENT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN PUBLICLY DISTRIBUTED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 557, August 25, 9 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Saigon.

OVER SIGNATURES OF QUANG AND TAM CHAU; EMBTEL 548.) QUANG (WHO CONVEYED IMPRESSION, PROBABLY ACCURATELY, THAT HE WAS CFN (1) (2) 548

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 27A/1 ~~SECRET~~  
SPOKESMAN FOR CHAU AND MINH) THEN TOLD KHANH THAT BUDDHISTS WISHED KHANH TO BE "HERO OF PEOPLE", AND TO ELIMINATE CAN LAO AND DAI VIET ELEMENTS AROUND HIM. IF KHANH WERE TO DO THIS, BUDDHISTS WOULD SUPPORT HIM. ON OTHER HAND, IF KHANH WERE TO CONTINUE COOPERATING WITH THESE MEN AND TO CONTINUE CURRENT POLICY OF SLANDERING AND PERSECUTING BUDDHISTS, BUDDHISTS WOULD OPPOSE HIM. (NOTE: THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION QUANG USED "BUDDHISTS" AND "THE PEOPLE" AS SYNONYMOUS TERMS.) ACCORDING TO QUANG, KHANH AGREED COMPLETELY WITH THIS ANALYSIS, AND APPEARED AGREE WITH IDEA OF MOVING AGAINST MRC COLLEAGUES TO GAIN SUPPORT OF BUDDHISTS. QUANG STATED THAT IF KHANH DID THIS, ALL THOSE WHO PRESENTLY OPPOSING KHANH WOULD THEN FULLY SUPPORT HIM AND KHANH WOULD RECEIVE WHAT HE HAS HITHERTO LACKED - A BASE OF MASS SUPPORT. QUANG STATED THAT HE HIMSELF, CHAU, MINH, AND KHANH THEN PROCEEDED TO DRAFT STATEMENT AT KHANH'S REQUEST WHICH KHANH MIGHT ISSUE AND WHICH WOULD MEET BUDDHIST REQUIREMENTS (NOTE: QUITE PROBABLY STATEMENT AS THAT REPORTED IN EMBTEL 542 WHICH KHANH SHOWED AMBASSADOR). QUANG SAID KHANH SPECIFICALLY PROMISED TO BROADCAST STATEMENT OVER RADIO THIS MORNING. BUDDHISTS WERE THUS VERY DISSATISFIED AT FACT THAT KHANH DID NOT ISSUE THIS STATEMENT, CFN 542

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 27A/1 ~~SECRET~~  
BUT RATHER SUBSTITUTED ONE WHICH THEY REGARDED AS INADEQUATE. QUANG BELIEVED THAT KHANH DESIRED BUDDHISTS TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC PRESSURE, SINCE THIS PROVIDED KHANH WITH LEVERAGE IN DEALING WITH MRC AND CAN LAO/DAI VIET ELEMENTS. (NOTE: AT ANOTHER POINT IN CONVERSATION QUANG VOICED DOUBTS AS TO KHANH'S GOODWILL AND INDICATED THAT BUDDHISTS PRESSURE WOULD, IN EFFECT, PREVENT KHANH FROM DOUBLECROSSING BUDDHISTS.)

MANFULL ASKED WHAT POSITION QUANG HAD IN MIND FOR MEN LIKE KHIEM, THIEU, ETC., IN VIEW OF FACT THAT QUANG HAD STATED ON SATURDAY NIGHT (CONVERSATION DESCRIBED EMBTEL 528) THAT HE BELIEVED SUCH MEN SHOULD BE USED IN POSITIONS WHERE THEIR TALENTS COULD BE EMPLOYED; HE ONLY DID NOT WANT THEM IN POSITION TO OPPRESS BUDDHISTS. HOWEVER, QUANG DUCKED THIS QUESTION.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 557, August 25, 9 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Saigon.

QUANG STATED HIS BELIEF THAT BUDDHIST INTERESTS AND US INTERESTS WERE FUNDAMENTALLY SAME, AND HE SUGGESTED THAT EMBASSY SUPPORT PROPOSED BUDDHIST/KHANH ALLIANCE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS COULD NOT RPT NOT BE DONE OPENLY, BUT THOUGHT IT COULD BE DONE IN CLANDESTINE MANNER.

MANFULL POINTED OUT THAT VIETNAM REQUIRED NATIONAL UNITY AMONG ITS PEOPLE AND THAT OTHER ELEMENTS OF POPULATION BESIDES BUDDHISTS CFN 528

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 27A/1 ~~SECRET~~  
WERE INVOLVED. QUANG HAD PRESENTED KHANH WITH ULTIMATUM AND WAS PREPARED TO KEEP PRESSURE ON UNLESS ALL POINTS WERE SATISFIED. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT OF UNIFIED COUNTRY REQUIRED THAT DISCUSSION AND COMPROMISE TAKE PLACE TO INSURE THAT ALL GROUPS HAD THEIR INTERESTS CONSIDERED. MANFULL CAME DOWN HARD ON DANGER WHICH BUDDHIST PRESSURE REPRESENTED. RELIGIOUS FRICTION HAD ALREADY SHOWN ITSELF IN INCIDENTS YESTERDAY IN HUE, DANANG, QUI NHON, AS WELL AS SAIGON WHERE BUDDHISTS APPEARED TO BE SEEKING OUT CATHOLICS ON WHOM TO VENT THEIR GRIEVANCES. THESE FRICTIONS COULD QUICKLY ESCALATE BEYOND CONTROL OF LEADERS AND LEAD TO CONDITION OF RELIGIOUS STRIFE WHICH WOULD MAKE NATIONAL UNITY IMPOSSIBLE, AND COUNTRY ITSELF UNGOVERNABLE. ONLY GAINERS FROM THIS SITUATION WOULD BE COMMUNISTS (AND PERHAPS FRENCH NEUTRALISTS). LOSERS WOULD BE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE INCLUDING BUDDHISTS. FURTHERMORE, QUANG HAD HIMSELF VOICED CONCERN AT POSSIBILITY OF US WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM; ONE THING WHICH COULD SOUR US PUBLIC OPINION AND LEAD TO SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WAS OUTBREAK OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AMONG VIETNAMESE.

EARLIER IN CONVERSATION, QUANG HAD STATED THAT HE COULD CALL OFF DEMONSTRATIONS ALL OVER VIETNAM IN ONE HOUR, AND THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION HE IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT STUDENTS WERE DOING.

TAYLOR  
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 11:35 PM 8/25/64  
Passed to White House, DOD & CIA at 1:40 PM 8/25/64

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

35  
Action

SS  
Info

PLUZCZCMJA610  
PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 28A/2 25/1410Z  
P R 251328Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 2 0 9 1 7  
RECD: AUGUST 25, 1964  
11:05 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ SETWO OF TWO ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 557 INFO CINCPAC 045  
287 HUE UNN FROM SAIGON AUGUST 25 9PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

HE VOICED NO REGRET THAT LAW WAS BEING BROKEN, SINCE HE DID NOT CONSIDER NEW CONSTITUTION VALID AS LAW ANYWAY. MANFULL NOTED THAT IF QUANG DESIRED TO DETERMINE LAW FOR HIMSELF HE MUST LOGICALLY CONCLUDE THAT LEADERS OF OTHER GROUPS COULD DO SAME. WHILE TRI QUANG MIGHT BE ABLE CONTROL BUDDHISTS, HE COULD NOT CONTROL CATHOLICS. HEREIN LAY DANGER OF RELIGIOUS STRIFE.  
CFN SETWO OF TWO 557 287 25 9PM

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 28A/2 ~~SECRET~~

QUANG STATED THAT HE ASKED NOTHING FOR SELF NEITHER WEALTH, NOR POWER NOR POSITION. MANFULL POINTED OUT THAT BUDDHISTS HAD PRESENTED DEMANDS ON KHANH AND WERE PREPARED CONTINUE PRESSURE UNLESS THEY WERE ACCEPTED IN FULL AND WITHOUT POSSIBILITY FOR COMPROMISE. THIS WAS IN EFFECT TO GVN TO ACCEPT ORDERS FROM BUDDHISTS; IN OTHER WORDS TO PUT TRI QUANG IN POSITION OF POWER WITHOUT CORRESPONDING SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY.

ASKED IF HE WERE PREPARED TO MEET WITH KHANH TO DISCUSS MATTERS FURTHER, QUANG STATED HE WOULD MEET KHANH AT ANY TIME PROVIDED THAT KHANH "WAS A GOOD LEADER" (NOTE: PRESUMABLY IMPLYING HE WOULD MEET KHANH IF LATTER CAME TO TERMS).

CONVERSATION WAS HEATED AT TIMES AND QUANG CLAIMED THAT THE US POSITION OF SUPPORTING THE NEW KHANH GOVERNMENT WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE. HE CITED VOA BROADCASTS AS EVIDENCE OF US BAD FIATH WITH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND SAID US GOVERNMENT WAS BEING "DECEIVED" AGAIN AS UNDER DIEM. MANFULL POINTED OUT VOA ONLY REPEATING ARTICLES WRITTEN BY US JOURNALISTS FROM HERE, ALSO

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~SECRET~~

-2- 557, AUGUST 25, 9 P.M. FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

NOTED MANY AMERICANS INCLUDING JOURNALISTS DO NOT VIEW BUDDHIST STRUGGLE THIS TIME WITH AS MUCH SYMPATHY AS LAST YEAR, THEN GRIEVANCES SEEMED MORE REAL.

MANFULL ALSO STRESSED THROUGHT CONVERSATION THAT BUDDHISTS

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 28/A/2 ~~SECRET~~

MUST ACCEPT SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE EVEN IF NON-VIOLENCE WAS THEIR OFFICIAL POLICY. QUANG SEEMED UNCONCERNED ABOUT VIOLENCE AND EVEN SHRUGGED OFF PARTICULARS OF OF ANTI-CATHOLIC INCIDENTS WITHOUT COMMENT. PREDICTED FURTHER VIOLENCE IF KHANH DOES NOT MEET "ASPIRATIONS OF PEOPLE."

COMMENT: QUANG SHOWED HIMSELF ADAMENT ON CONTINUING PRESSURE UNTIL ALL HIS DEMANDS SATISFIED, AND THESE DEMANDS ESSENTIALLY CALLED FOR KHANH TO ALLY HIMSELF WITH BUDDHISTS. BELIEVE THAT RECENT EVENTS HAVE EFFECTIVELY VESTED CONTROL OF BUDDHIST MOVEMENT IN QUANG, AND THAT TAM CHAU EITHER HAS NOT MADE ATTEMPT TO BLOCK QUANG (AS HE DID IN MAY), OR HAS CEASED EFFORTS, OR HAS HIMSELF BECOME PERSUADED TO ACCEPT QUANG'S POSITION.

AT MEETING THIS MORNING QUANG GAVE NO INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT TYPE OF COMPROMISE WHICH MIGHT TEND TO ALLEVIATE SITUATION OR TO AVERT A POSSIBLE COUNTERACTION BY CATHOLICS. ONCE AGAIN TRI QUANG SHOWED HE IS A CONSUMERATE POLITICIAN AND INFINITELY MORE CONCERNED WITH POLITICS THAN RELIGION. HE APPEARED TO BE RIDING HIGH TODAY AND CONFIDENT HIS DEMANDS WOULD BE MET. HIS CONFIDENCE WAS APPARENTLY JUSTIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.

TAYLOR

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O at 11:10 A.M., AUGUST 25, 1964  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA at 11:55 A.M., AUGUST 25, 1964

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

51

35  
Action

SS

Info

NNNNZCZMJA605  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 21A 25/1130Z  
R 251117Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014867  
By ics NARA, Date 10-29-97

032

020857

1964 AUG 25 AM 9 37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 553 INFO CINCPAC 285 FROM  
SAIGON AUGUST 25 7PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

DEPTTEL 520.

ACTING DEPPRIMIN FOR PACIFICATION, NGUYEN TON HOAN, ASKED TO SEE ALEX JOHNSON THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. HE SAID THAT YESTERDAY BUDDHIST REPRESENTATIVES HAD MET WITH HIM AND OTHER DAI VIETS, HAD IN EFFECT TOLD HIM THAT THEY WOULD OPPOSE HIS PARTICIPATION IN ANY NEW GOVERNMENT. HE PRODUCED CFN 553 285 25 7PM 520

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 21A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PHOTOCOPY OF DIAGRAMMED ULTIMATUM ALLEGEDLY PRESENTED BY THICH TRI QUANG IN WHICH KHANH OFFERED CHOICE OF COOPERATING WITH "THE PEOPLE" OR STAYING WITH DISCREDITED ELEMENTS OF FORMER REGIME AND OTHER UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS. FIALURE ON KHANH'S PART ACCEPT THIS ULTIMATUM WILL RESULT IN THREE PART BUDDHIST REACTION: CALL FOR NON-COOPERATION WITH THE GVN BY BUDDHIST FAITHFUL, FIRST OF ALL AMONG CIVILIANS, SECONDLY IN THE BUREAUCRACY, AND THIRDLY IN THE ARMY. THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH KHANH MUST PURGE TO SATISFY QUANG'S DEMAND (AS INDICATED IN DIAGRAM): GENERALS KHIEM, THIEU, LAM (SAIGON PREFET), BEN (CHIEF OF POLICE), CAO (KHANH'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT), PHAT (MININTERIOR), COL. HUYEN (DEPUTY MININFO), AS WELL AS HOAN. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY SAME ULTIMATUM REPORTED IN REFTEL.

ON BASIS HIS TALKS WITH BUDDHIST LEADERS AND TRI QUANG DIAGRAM, HOAN CLAIMS HE CONVINCED THAT BUDDHISTS WANT COMPLETE TAKEOVER, ARE MORE INTERESTED IN REMOVING CATHOLIC ELEMENTS FROM GOVERNMENT THAN IN OPPOSING COMMUNISTS. HOAN SAID HE AMAZED AT HOSTILITY DIRECTED TOWARD HIMSELF, PERSONALLY. HE SAID THE HAD WORKED TOWARD FORMING SOME FORM OF INTER-SECT COMMITTEE FOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 553, AUGUST 25, 7 P.M. FROM SAIGON.

SETTLING AMICABLY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS FAITHS, THAT

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 21A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HE HAD TALKED TO BOTH BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLICS TO HEAD OFF ANY RELIGIOUS CONFRONTATION ON OCCASION ANNIVERSARY OF BUDDHA, AND ALLEGED THAT YESTERDAY HE HAD PERSONALLY INTERVENED TO DISCOURAGE SEVERAL THOUSAND CATHOLIC REFUGEE ELEMENTS FROM MARCHING INTO CITY. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD, FROM EXILE, WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTED LAST YEAR'S BUDDHIST MOVEMENT AND THAT IT HAD ALSO ENJOYED THE FULL SUPPORT OF HIS DAI VIET SUPPORTERS WITHIN VIETNAM. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT HE CLEARLY COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED AS A CAN LAO ELEMENT IN VIEW FACT HE HAD BEEN IN EXILE FOR ENTIRE DIEM PERIOD.

JOHNSON REPLIED THAT IN OUR TALKS WITH BUDDHIST LEADERS, WE HAD GAINED IMPRESSION THEY FEARFUL ABOUT FUTURE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IN VIEW TENSE SITUATION CREATED BY RECENT MANIFESTATIONS IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT REASONABLE ELEMENTS NOT BE MOVED TO COUNTERACTIONS WHICH WOULD ADD TO CONFUSION. HE ASSURED HOAN THAT US FAVORED NO PARTICULAR FACTION, WE FELT IT IMPORTANT FOR ALL TO SUPPORT KHANH AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ENUNCIATE THIS POLICY IN OUR TALKS WITH ALL FACTIONS.

HOAN PREDICTED THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT ACCEDES COMPLETELY TO BUDDHIST WISHES, A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION WILL BE

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 21A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ULTIMATE RESULT. HE REFERRED TO REGION-SIDE STIRRINGS AMONGST BUDDHISTS OF SEA TOWARD PACIFISM AND NEUTRALISM (SIMILAR TO POINT MADE TO US BY KHANH IN VUNG TAU YESTERDAY - EMBTEL 545) AND NOTED THAT BONZES NOW SEEM TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN THEIR POLITICAL POTENTIAL THAN WITH MATTERS OF FAITH.

COMMENT: BEYOND HOAN'S OBVIOUS SELF-CENTERED CONCERN ABOUT HIS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE HE SEEMED GENUINELY DEPRESSED BY PRESENT TREND OF EVENTS.

TAYLOR

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

52

45  
Action  
SS  
Info

00 RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 09A 25/0600Z  
O 250545Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEPDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014868  
By js, NARA, Date 10-29-97

020567

1964 AUG 25 AM 5 01

049

~~SECRET~~

I M M E D I A T E

SEONE OFTRE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 545 ROUTINE DOD 78  
WHITE HOUSE 58 CIA 63 INFO CINCPAC 280 FROM SAIGON AUGUST  
25TH 1:30PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS REPORTED EMBTEL 542,  
FOLLOWING IS MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT MEETING WITH KHANH SUMMARIZED  
EMBTEL 541. ACCOMPANIED BY JOHNSON AND MANFULL I RPT I  
MET WITH KHANH AFTERNOON AUG 24 AT VUNG TAU. KHANH MET WITH  
US ALONE AND WAS SERIOUS BUT RELAXED.  
CFN SEONE OFTRE 545 DOD 78 58 CIA 63 280 25TH 1:30PM RPT PM  
542 541 JOHNSON AND MANFULL 24 VUNG TAU KHANH

PAGE TWO /RUMJIR 09A ~~SECRET~~

I RPT I LED OFF BY OBSERVING THAT HE APPEARED TO BE  
FACED WITH A RPT A CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE FROM BUDDHISTS AND  
STUDENTS AIMED AT INFLUENCING MAKE-UP HIS NEW GOVT AND  
FORESTALLING DANGERS THEY THINK THEY FORESEE. THIS PRESSURE  
CAMPAIGN MAY BE FED ALSO BY CERTAIN CARETAKER MINISTERS AND  
POLITICIANS AND EXPLOITED BY VC RPT VC. KHANH AGREED  
CHARACTERIZING SITUATION AS SERIOUS BUT NOT RPT NOT GRAVE.

I RPT I THEN ENUMERATED SERIES OF INCIDENTS SINCE AUG 21  
INVOLVING DESTRUCTION PUBLIC PROPERTY AND SCUFFLING BETWEEN  
BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLIC ELEMENTS WHICH, THUS FAR UNCHECKED,  
COULD GET PROGRESSIVELY OUT OF HAND. KHANH AGREED BUT  
STRESSED (AS HE DID REPEATEDLY THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION)  
NECESSITY FOR AVOIDING OPEN CLASH WITH STUDENTS WHICH LIKELY  
INVOLVE DEATHS OR INJURED. THIS WAS PRECISELY WHAT STUDENTS  
(WHOM HE THOUGHT MERELY INSTRUMENT OF BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP)  
HOPED TO PROVOKE.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~SECRET~~

-2- 545, August 25, 1:30 p.m., (SECTION I OF III) from Saigon

KHANH BELIEVED GVN RPT GVN WOULD HAVE FACED CONFRONTATION WITH BUDDHISTS WHETHER PROVISIONAL CHARTER ANNOUNCED OR NOT RPT NOT SINCE BUDDHISTS HAD LAID GROUNDWORK FOR SUCH CONFRONTATION IN HUE RPT HUE AND CENTRAL PROVINCES. HE CITED SPECIFICALLY: A) BUDDHIST CHARGES IN CONNECTION DUY XUYEN RPT CFN AUG 21

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 09A ~~SECRET~~

DUY XUYEN INCIDENT (QUANG NAM); B) PREARRANGED RECEPTION HE RECEIVED FROM STUDENTS IN HUE RPT HUE WHEN ARRIVED TO HELP SOLVE DUY XUYEN RPT DUY XUYEN AFFAIR; C) BUDDHIST PRESSURE FOR MORE MINISTERS OF BUDDHIST FAITH IN HIS GOVT EVEN BEFORE PROVISIONAL CHARTER BEING CONSIDERED.

ALTHOUGH DEMONSTRATIONS HAD ACCOMPANIED EVERY RECENT CHANGE OF GOVT, ISSUANCE OF THE NEW CHARTER HAD BROUGHT THINGS TO A RPT A HEAD BECAUSE THE NEW CHARTER: 1) AIMS AT MAKING IT MOST DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO FOLLOW THE NEUTRALIST LINE; AND 2) POSTPONED GENERAL ELECTIONS INDEFINITELY. KHANH SAYS HE HAD NO RPT NO INFORMATION TO INDICATE THAT GENERAL MINH RPT MINH HAD NEUTRALIST LEANINGS BUT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT, BEING DISENCHANTED WITH THE SITUATION, HE PROVIDED A RPT A NAME FOR READY USE BY DISAFFECTED ELEMENTS.

KHANH STATED THAT THE NEW PROVISIONAL CHARTER OBVIOUSLY HAS SOME DEFECTS. THESE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING HIS RECENT MEETING WITH THE STUDENTS. HE HAD INDICATED TO THE STUDENTS THAT FURTHER AMENDMENTS WERE POSSIBLE SUCH AS SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. HOWEVER, CURRENT CRISIS WAS MORE SERIOUS SINCE THE BUDDHISTS CLAIM THAT THEY WERE THE AUTHORS OF THE REVOLUTION OF NOVEMBER ONE AND THAT HIS TAKEOVER OF CFN QUANG NAM B)

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 09A ~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 30 RPT 30 RESTORED CATHOLIC ELEMENTS TO ASCENDENCY. THE CURRENT BUDDHIST ATTITUDE DISTURBED HIM DEEPLY SINCE HE HAD DISCUSSED DRAFT CHARTER WITH THICH TAM CHAU AND THICH THIEN MINH AT SOME LENGTH. WHILE HE DOES NOT RPT NOT ACCUSE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT OF NEUTRALISM, THE RELIGION BASICALLY TENDS TO BE PACIFIST AND TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE. DANGER IS THAT SHOULD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 545, August 25, 1:30 p.m., (SECTION I OF III) from Saigon

BUDDHISTS DECIDE NOT RPT NOT TO COOPERATE WITH GOVT THIS COULD HAVE DEBILITATING EFFECT ON EVERY SEGMENT OF THE NATION, INCLUDING MILITARY. BUDDHISTS HAVE EMPHASIZED TO HIM THAT THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY BUT HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR FEARS CONCERNING CERTAIN PEOPLE AROUND HIM. FOR EXAMPLE, GENERAL GAO, HIS CHEF DE CABINET, PERFORMS EXTREMELY WELL IN HIS JOB; GENERAL THIEU IS AMONG THE BEST GENERALS AVAILABLE. FACT THAT THEY MAY BE CATHOLICS IS NOT RPT NOT HIS FAULT; IT IS NECESSARY TO USE WHAT TALENT IS AVAILABLE. FURTHER, BUDDHISTS STRONGLY DESIRE REMOVAL OF GENERAL DO CAO TRI, COMMANDER II CORPS. GENERAL TRI HAS AGREED TO BE ASSIGNED TO SAIGON YET HE IS AMONG BEST COMBAT GENERALS IN ARMY. BEHIND BUDDHIST DEMANDS IS REALLY EXTREME ANTIPATHY BETWEEN TRI QUANG AND GENERAL TRI.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 30 RPT 30 THICH TAM CHAU THICH THIEN MINH GENERAL CAO  
CHEF DE CABINET GENERAL THIEU GENERAL DO CAO TRI II CORPS  
GENERAL TRI TRI QUANG AND GENERAL TRI

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 5:25 a.m., August 25, 1964

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

45  
Action 0 250600Z ZEA

SS  
Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUEPDA/DOD

RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPIA/CIA

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~

02056'2

1964 AUG 25 AM 5 01

049

IMMEDIATE

SETWO OFTRE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 545 ROUTINE DOD 78  
WHITE HOUSE 58 CIA 63 INFO CINCPAC 280 FROM SAIGON  
AUGUST 25TH 1:30PM RPT PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LINDIS

CURRENT DISTURBANCES STEM FROM VARIETY OF FACTORS. STUDENTS, WHO ARE BUT INSTRUMENT OF BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP, WISH TO CREATE INCIDENTS IN WHICH STUDENT KILLED OR INJURED. THIS WOULD PROVIDE PRETEXT FOR BUDDHIST STAND ASIDE IN CURRENT CONFLICT. ALSO, EX-CABINET MINISTERS ARE CREATING DIFFICULTY, PARTICULARLY CFN 545 78 58 63 280 25TH 1:30PM

PAGE TWO DE RUMJIR 10A ~~SECRET~~

DAI VIETS. NGUYEN TON HOAN FALLS IN THIS CATEGORY. WHILE KHANH WOULD LIKE TO USE HIM IN THE ASSEMBLY SINCE HE IS CATHOLIC AND LEADER OF FACTION OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTY, THE BUDDHISTS WILL NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT HOAN. OTHER EX-MINISTERS DO NOT RPT DO NOT WISH LOSE THEIR POSTS AND HAVE REACTED SHARPLY TO PUBLICATION PROVISIONAL CHARTER. FOR EXAMPLE, MINISTER SOCIAL WELFARE THUAN REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST CHARTER BUT ADMITTED NEXT DAY HE DID SO BECAUSE HE THOUGHT HE WOULD LOSE HIS JOB AND PROGRAMS HE HAD INITIATED WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE CARRIED OUT.

AT ONE POINT, KHANH VOLUNTEERED THE ADMISSION THAT THE PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM IN SUPPORT OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE CHARTER HAD SLIPPED IN EXECUTION. HE CONCEDED THAT WE HAD EMPHASIZED ITS IMPORTANCE TO HIM AND THAT HE HAD RECOGNIZED THE VALIDITY OF THE POINT BUT THAT THOSE CHARGED WITH THE PUBLIC INFORMATION PREPARATIONS HAD NOT PERFORMED. THUS KHANH WAS NOW RPT NOW FACING PUBLIC RELATIONS DIFFICULTIES WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED OR ATTENUATED.

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 545, AUGUST 25, 1:30 P.M. FROM SAIGON

KHANH SAID TODAY'S GATHERING (AUGUST 25) AT THE CENTRAL MARKET WHICH WILL CONSIST OF BOTH BUDDHIST FAITHFUL AND CFN DAI VIETS NGUYEN TON HOAN KHANH HOAN THUAN KHANH KHANH (AUGUST 25)

PAGE THREE DE RUMJIR 10A ~~SECRET~~

STUDENTS COULD BE MOST EXPLOSIVE GATHERING TO DATE. HOWEVER, CARE MUST BE TAKEN THAT NO RPT NO INCIDENT OCCURS BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS AND POLICE.

I RPT I POINTED OUT THAT IF POLICE DO NOTHING IN FACE OF RECENTLY PUBLISHED EMERGENCY DECREES AND NEW PROVISIONAL CHARTER, HIS GOVERNMENT TAKES ON THE APPEARANCE BOTH HERE AND ABROAD OF WEAKNESS AND BEING UNABLE TO CONTROL SITUATION. NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WHETHER STRONGER MEASURES WILL NOT RPT NOT BE REQUIRED LATER IF MATTERS ALLOWED TO DRIFT. JOHNSON POINTED OUT THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ONE THING, BUT DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY WAS ANOTHER, TO WHICH I RPT I ADDED THAT WE WISHED TO AVOID INCIDENTS BUT CURRENT DEMONSTRATIONS MUST BE HANDLED WITH DUE REGARD FOR LAW AND ORDER. KHANH AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROTECT PUBLIC PROPERTY. JOHNSON OBSERVED THAT POLICE APPARENTLY DO NOT RPT NOT HAVE SUCH ORDERS AT THE MOMENT. KHANH AGREED BUT EMPHASIZED NECESSITY AVOIDING OPEN CLASH WITH DEMONSTRATORS.

I RPT I NOTED THAT PART OF CURRENT PROBLEM WAS THAT NO RPT NO GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED AND GROUPS FELT FREE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION. I RPT I EMPHASIZED NECESSITY TO

PAGE FOUR DE RUMJIR 10A ~~SECRET~~

COMPLETE ARRANGEMENTS AND ANNOUNCE NEW GOVT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I RPT I ASKED KHANH WHETHER HE COULD ANNOUNCE HIS SCHEDULE FOR FORMING NEW GOVT, PREFERABLY WITHIN 48 HOURS, AND INVITE THE BUDDHISTS AND OTHER GROUPS TO HELP HIM IN THE FORMATION HIS GOVT. KHANH REPLIED THAT HE HAD INVITED TAM CHAU, THIEN MINH AND TRI QUANG TO SPEND THE NIGHT AT VUNG TAU AND OFFERED THEM AN AIRCRAFT. AS OF THE MOMENT THEY HAD NOT RPT NOT FORMALLY ACCEPTED HIS INVITATION. KHANH STATED THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FORM HIS GOVT SOONEST. HOWEVER, VU VAN MAU WOULD NOT RPT NOT ARRIVE UNTIL WEDNESDAY. IF VU VAN MAU ACCEPTS THE VICE PRESIDENCY, KHANH WOULD HOPE TO ANNOUNCE HIS GOVT ON THURSDAY. I RPT I THEN INQUIRED WHETHER HE COULD

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 545, AUGUST 25, 1:30 P.M. FROM SAIGON

ANNOUNCE BARE BONES OF SCHEDULE HE IS NOW RPT NOW FOLLOWING AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD REQUESTED BUDDHISTS TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS. KHANH SAID HE WOULD PREFER NOT RPT NOT TO ANNOUNCE HIS OFFER TO BUDDHISTS UNTIL THEY WERE ACTUALLY ON THE SCENE AT VUNG TAU, HOWEVER, HE COULD ANNOUNCE THIS EVENING STEPS HE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE TO MEET CERTAIN CONCERNS OF THE STUDENTS SUCH AS RELAXING CENSORSHIP AND CURFEW, FIRST OF WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE AMENDMENT OF CHARTER.

CFN KHANH 48 405 48 HOURS TAM CHAU, THIEN MINH AND TRI QUANG VUNG TAU KHANH VU VAN MAU VU VAN MAU KHANH VUNG TAU RY

PAGE FIVE DE RUMJIR 10A ~~S E C R E T~~

I RPT I THEN INQUIRED WHETHER KHANH HAD CONSIDERED CALLING INTO THE MILITARY SERVICE CERTAIN OF THE "BAD ACTORS" AMONG THE STUDENTS. KHANH SAID A RPT A MAJOR REASON FOR STUDENT AGITATION AT THE MOMENT IS THAT THEY ARE AWARE THAT NEW MOBILIZATION DECREES ARE IN THE OFFING WHICH WILL DIRECTLY AFFECT THEM. MOST OF THEM FEAR BEING CALLED INTO MILITARY SERVICE AND THE MOST DISCOURAGING ASPECT IS THAT THEY ARE AGAINST "DICTATORSHIP BUT NOT RPT NOT AGAINST THE VC RPT VC" KHANH CONTINUED THAT HE HAD A RPT A SOFT SPOT FOR THE STUDENTS AND THE STUDENTS HAD TO BE LED IN MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PURSUITS. I RPT I OBSERVED THAT WE HAVE A RPT A SAYING TO EFFECT IF YOU SPARE THE ROD YOU SPOIL THE CHILD. KHANH NODDED AND MENTIONED REPORTS OF FIST FIGHTS BETWEEN BUDDHIST AND CATHOLIC ELEMENTS IN DANANG AND QUI NHON. TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 25, 5:35 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

45  
Action

00 RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 11A 25/0715Z  
O 250545Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEPDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

SS  
Info

020560

25 AUG 25 AM 5 01

049

I M M E D I A T E

~~SECRET~~

SETRE OFTRE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 545 ROUTINE DOD 78  
WHITE HOUSE 58 CIA 63 INFO CINCPAC 280 FROM SAIGON  
AUGUST 25TH 1:30PM RPT PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

KHANH SAID HE HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ASSIST THE  
BUDDHISTS AS A RPT A MEMBER OF BUDDHIST RELIGION BUT  
BUDDHISTS NOW RPT NOW CLAIM KHANH'S TAKEOVER PLACED CATHOLICS  
IN POSITION OF POWER. HE ADMITTED THERE WAS SOME VALIDITY  
CFN 545 78 58 63 280 25TH 1:30PM

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 11A ~~SECRET~~

TO BUDDHIST CLAIMS AND SOMETHING WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE  
ABOUT IT. HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT RPT NOT PERSONALLY KEEP  
HIS FINGER ON EVERY ASPECT OF THE SITUATION. GENERAL KHIEM,  
WHO IS IN CHARGE OF MILITARY MATTERS, HAD PUT INDIVIDUALS LIKE  
COLONEL PHUOC (MSS) IN KEY POSITIONS WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE  
KNOWN THAT IT WOULD INVOKE A RPT A REACTION FROM BUDDHISTS.  
KHANH SAID THAT MRC RPT MRC ELECTION, WHICH HAD IN FACT  
PROVIDED MRC MEMBERS WITH AN OPEN CHOICE FOR THE PRESIDENCY,  
HAD HELPED HIM A RPT A GOOD DEAL. HE OBSERVED THAT WE HAD  
UNDOUBTEDLY NOTICED THAT THERE HAD BEEN LESS COUP TALK RECENTLY.

IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION AS TO HOW WE MIGHT HELP IN THE CURRENT  
SITUATION, KHANH INDICATED THAT WE COULD: A) TELL AMERICANS  
TO BE CALM AND DISPLAY AN AIR OF CONFIDENCE; AND B) TO MAKE  
IT CLEAR TO THE BUDDHISTS THAT US DOES NOT RPT NOT SYMPATHIZE  
WITH THEIR ACTIVITIES AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT CREATE  
TROUBLE.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~SECRET~~

- 2 - 545, August 25, 1 P.M. From Saigon (SECTION III OF III)

IN RESPONSE QUESTION ASTO THE REAL POWER OF THE BUDDHIST LEADERS TO ENFORCE A RPT A POLICY OF NON-COOPERATION ON THE BUDDHIST FAITHFUL, KHANH SAID THERE WAS A RPT A GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BUDDHISTS OF THE CENTER AND THOSE OF THE SOUTH. TRI QUANG COULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE ON THE BUDDHISTS IN THE CENTER BUT MUCH LESS SO IN THE SOUTH. A RPT A CURRENT PROBLEM IS THAT BUDDHIST LEADERS ARE MORE PRE-OCCUPIED WITH POLITICS AND ATTRIBUTES OF POSITION THAN THEY ARE WITH RELIGIOUS MATTERS. THEY ARE TENDING TO GET FURTHER AWAY FROM THE PEOPLE. KHANH BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A RPT A

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 11A ~~SECRET~~

GENERAL MOVEMENT IN THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AND SOUTH EAST ASIA TOWARD NEUTRALISM. HE CITED EVIDENCE OF THIS IN BURMA, CAMBODIA, CEYLON, AND SAID HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT RULE OUT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN TRI QUANG AND HIS FORMER MENTOR WHICH TRI DO IN HANOI ON THIS BROAD MOVEMENT.

IN SUMMING UP, THE COURSE OF ACTION SET FORTH EMBTEL 541 WAS AGREED. KHANH ADDED THAT HIS STRONG PREFERENCE WAS FOR A RPT A CIVILIAN VICE PRESIDENT. IF VU VAN MAU AGREES TO ACCEPT THE VICE PRESIDENCY, KHANH WILL DEVOTE HIS PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THE MILITARY SIDE. HOWEVER, IF HE IS UNABLE TO FIND A RPT A CIVILIAN VICE PRESIDENT, HE WILL TURN TO THE MILITARY AND THE MILITARY INCUMBENT WILL DEVOTE HIS PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THE MILITARY SIDE. KHANH ALSO INDICATED HE WOULD CONSIDER APPOINTING A RPT A MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO TO BE PRIMARY CONTACT IN RELIGIOUS AND MINORITY QUESTIONS. IN RESPONSE TO A RPT A QUESTION HE SAID HE HAD NOT RPT NOT YET SELECTED HIS MINISTERS, THAT HE HAD REQUESTED LISTS FROM VARIOUS GROUPS INCLUDING THE BUDDHISTS. HOWEVER, HE WAS CONSIDERING GIVING VU VAN MAU, IF HE ACCEPTS, THE ADDITIONAL PORTFOLIO OF FOREIGN MINISTER IN ADDITION TO HIS DUTIES AS VICE PRESIDENT.

SEPTTEL FOLLOWS ON. ADDITIONAL ITEMS DISCUSSED.

TAYLOR  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 5:37 A.M. AUGUST 25, 1964

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Captain Bundy**53 F S*~~SECRET~~

020356

57  
ActionFM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC

1964 AUG 24 PM 7 38

55  
InfoBT  
~~SECRET~~ IMMEDIATE ACTION DEPT 542 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 278  
FROM SAIGON AUGUST 25, 4AM

L I M D I S

044

KHANH REQUESTED THAT JOHNSON, MANFULL AND I MEET WITH HIM AT 1 AM THIS MORNING TO INFORM US OF HIS MEETING WITH BUDDHIST DEL. KHANH SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO MEET WITH BUDDHIST DEL AT VUNG TAU AND RETURNED TO SAIGON. THE BUDDHIST DEL, COMPOSED OF TAM CHAU, THINH MINH, AND TRI QUANG, FILED WITH HIM WRITTEN PREPARED STATEMENT OF THEIR DEMANDS SUBSTANCE OF WHICH FOLLOWS:

1. THE AUG 16 CHARTER TO BE ANNULLED OR AT THE MINIMUM ITS APPLICATION IMMEDIATELY SUSPENDED.

2. THE CHARTER TO BE REPLACED BY PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION DRAFTED BY "JURIDICAL AUTHORITIES."

3. THE MRC TO ELECT THE PRES (UNDER NEW PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION) AND THEN MRC TO DISBAND ITSELF, THE PRES TO FORM PROVISIONAL GOVT FROM "PATRIOTIC AND CAPABLE ELEMENTS".

4. THE PRES TO APPOINT COMMITTEE TO DRAFT PERMANENT CONSTITUTION AND ELECTORAL LAW TO GO INTO EFFECT BY NOV 1, 1965.

5. THE PRES TO CALL FOR NATIONAL RELIGIOUS COUNCIL THAT WOULD INCLUDE ALL RELIGIOUS GROUPS.

6. COUNCIL FOR PRESS CENSORSHIP TO BE FORMED OF MININFO AND REPS OF THE PRESS.

7. ALL THOSE GUILTY OF CRIMES TO BE SEVERELY PUNISHED.

8. ALL CAN LAO ELEMENTS TO BE DISMISSED "EVEN IF WEARING DAI VIET LABELS".

BUDDHIST STATEMENT CONCLUDED BY STATEMENT THAT IF ABOVE DEMANDS NOT MET BUDDHISTS WOULD EMBARK ON CAMPAIGN OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE "WITHOUT COLLABORATING WITH ANY OTHER GROUP". IN PRESENTING STATEMENT, BUDDHISTS ASKED KHANH TO MAKE PROCLAMATION ACCEPTING THEIR DEMANDS WHICH BUDDHIST LEADERS COULD REFER TO AT DEMONSTRATION AT CENTRAL MARKET SCHEDULED FOR 0800 AUG 25.

KHANH STATED THAT HE HAD INFORMED BUDDHISTS THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE THEM IMMEDIATE ANSWER. SUBSEQUENTLY HE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH GENERAL KHIEM. ACCORDING TO KHANH, KHIEM SAID IT WAS KHANH'S

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"Authority RAC 00014869By ies, NARA, Date 10-29-97



DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-2- 542, AUGUST 25, 4AM, FROM SAIGON

DECISION BUT SUGGESTED KHANH DISCUSS PROBLEM WITH AMERICANS, AND IF AMERICANS AGREED THAT KHANH SHOULD GO ALONG WITH BUDDHIST DEMANDS, THEN KHIEM WOULD SUPPORT HIM. KHANH SAID HE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BUDDHISTS NOT PUBLISH THEIR WRITTEN STATEMENT. KHANH APPEARED DISPOSED TO ACCEPT BUDDHIST DEMANDS.

KHANH THEN REQUESTED MY VIEWS AS TO HOW HE SHOULD PROCEED. IN RESPONSE I STRESSED WE WERE IN NO POSITION GIVE HIM ANY ADVICE IN ANY OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BUT AS INTERESTED THIRD PARTY COULD GIVE HIM MY TENTATIVE PERSONAL VIEWS. IT WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE HIS COURSE OF ACTION. ON THIS BASIS I SAID I THOUGHT A MISTAKE TO GIVE IN TO PRESSURE FROM MINORITY GROUP ON AN ISSUE OF THIS IMPORTANCE, PARTICULARLY TO AN ULTIMATUM WITH SHORT DEADLINE. TO DO SO MAY ONLY CREATE FURTHER DEMANDS. I SUGGESTED HE INFORM BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THEIR DEMANDS CAREFULLY ALONG WITH IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER MINORITY GROUPS. I ADDED THAT HE COULD ASSURE BUDDHISTS THAT HE WAS WILLING TO SIT DOWN WITH THEM AND ATTEMPT RECONCILE POINTS OF VIEW OVER NEXT FEW DAYS BUT FINAL DECISION MUST ALSO ACCOMMODATE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS AND CONCERNS OF OTHER GROUPS. I SAID IT APPEARED TO ME USEFUL FOR HIM TO EMPHASIZE THROUGHOUT THAT CHARTER WAS PROVISIONAL IN NATURE, WAS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION OR AMENDMENT WITH EXPERIENCE AND NOT FINAL DEFINITIVE CONSTITUTION. HE SHOULD STRESS THAT IN TIME OF WAR IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT GOVT BE FORMED QUICKLY.

I INFORMED KHANH THAT I INTENDED TO RETURN TAM CHAU'S CALL ON AUG 25 AND, WITHOUT REF TO CURRENT CONVERSATION, INFORM CHAU THAT US WAS AGAINST SHORTSIGHTED ACTIONS BY ANY GROUP WHICH PROMOTED DISUNITY AND DIVISIONS WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

KHANH EMPHASIZED THROUGHOUT HIS FEAR OF RELIGIOUS WAR OR FAILING THIS EXTREME DEVELOPMENT, AN EXTENDED CONFLICT BETWEEN BUDDHIST AND CATHOLIC GROUPS WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY SAP THE MORALE OF ARMED FORCES. HE ALSO SEEMED ATTRACTED BY POSSIBILITY OF ELIMINATING THE MRC FROM THE PICTURE. IN REPLY TO QUESTION, HE SAID THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY AMBIGUITY IN IDENTIFYING "CAN LAO" ELEMENTS, THEY BEING WELL KNOWN.

IN CONCLUSION KHANH SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH INFORMAL COMMENTS WE HAD MADE AND THAT HE HAD IN FACT DRAFTED HIS OWN PROCLAMATION ALONG FOLLOWING LINES, PRIOR TO SEEING BUDDHISTS, WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO ASSUAGE CERTAIN CONCERNS OF BOTH STUDENTS AND BUDDHISTS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 542, AUGUST 25, 4 AM, FROM SAIGON

1. HE IS NOW IN PROCESS OF CONSULTING RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND POLITICIANS FORM GOVT OF CAPABLE HONEST MEN.
2. HE INTENDS TO EASE RESTRICTIONS ON CENSORSHIP AND TO MODIFY EXISTING CUREFEW (NOTE: TO MEET STUDENT DEMANDS).
3. HE IS WILLING TO MODIFY PROVISIONAL CHARTER AS NECESSARY(NOTE: KHANH MADE POINT THAT THIS WAS TO "MODIFY" BUT NOT TO "SUSPEND" PROVISIONAL CHARTER AS DEMANDED BY BUDDHISTS).
4. CRIMES INCLUDING TERRORISM WILL BE QUICKLY PUNISHED BY MILITARY COURT (NOTE: KHANH CONSIDERS THIS ANOTHER NOD TO THE BUDDHISTS).
5. RECENT INCIDETNS AND DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE DESTROYED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY AND HAVE KILLED INNOCENT PEOPLE. THESE ACTIVITIES MUST CEASE.
6. ONLY VC AND NEUTRALISTS PROFIT FROM ACTIVITIES WHICH CREATE DISUNITY AND DIVISIVE FORCES AMONG THE PEOPLE.
7. CURRENT CRITICAL SITUATION DOES NOT PERMIT PEOPLE TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES WHICH AID THE VC AND HE APPEALS TO PATRIOTISM OF VIETNAMESE TO RALLY BEHIND GOVT.

IN SUM KHANH BELIEVED THAT SUCH PROCLAMATION WOULD MEET CERTAIN CONCERNS OF STUDENTS AND SOME OF THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF THE BUDDHISTS. HOWEVER IT WAS STILL CLEAR THAT HE FOUND CERTAIN ATTRACTIONS IN THE BUDDHIST DEMANDS.

GP-3

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8/24/64, 7:45 PM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 8/24/64, 8:20 PM

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

13717

54

56

Origin  
SVN

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY 519

Aug 25 7 35 PM '64

Info:

SS

G

SP

FE

P

NSC

INR

UPI ticker dated August 25 states American military spokesman in Saigon "confirmed American servicemen fired shots which caused predominantly Buddhist crowd of demonstrators to stampede into Roman Catholic village smoldering with religious tension . . . . setting off rioting that continued into darkness" at Danang August 24, whereas CAS SITREP as of 1500 hours, August 24 (TDCS-314,02028-64) indicates Vietnamese guards on EM messhall roof fired into air in attempt to ~~disperse~~ <sup>disperse</sup> mob stoning messhall and when this failed guards fired near group and scattered mob.

IF UPI report untrue, Dept would like deny at noon briefing August 26. Please advise.

GP-3

End

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 000/4870

By is NARA, Date 10-29-97

Drafted by:

S/VN:GAFurness/mlg 8/25/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by S/VN: Thomas J. Corcoran

Clearances:

FE/P - Mr. Reed(substance)

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~53  
Origin55  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON LIMDIS 517

Aug 25 8 42 PM '64

Your 543. Paper was written February 19, 1964, by Willard Matthias, staff member of the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency. At that time it was classified **SECRET** and was given the "general approval" of the Board of National Estimates, though this did not imply complete agreement by the Board with every point in it, as its present cover sheet points out. The paper was not submitted to the US Intelligence Board or, at that time, to other members of the intelligence community. On June 9, 1964, the paper was reclassified **OFFICIAL USE ONLY** circulated within the Government. We do not yet know if it circulated and/~~was available for the purposes of study and discussion to the Bureau outside the Government at this time.~~ ~~of Intelligence and Research in the State Department.~~ At no time was the paper/~~submitted to~~ approved or cleared by any policy officers of the Department of State or the White House, or ~~to~~ the US Intelligence Board. ~~It was read by individuals in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, but no attempt was made to gain their concurrence with the analysis or views expressed~~ ~~therein.~~ At no time did the paper become an agreed intelligence community "estimate", and no attempt was made to make it such.

Sometime recently Chicago Tribune correspondent Willard Edwards acquired a copy of the February 19 paper (marked **SECRET**). An article

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 2-14-79, CIA 1-9-81

by

Drafted by:

By LS, NARS Date 8-18-81

P - FSieverts:he 8/25/64

classification approved by:

P - James L. Greenfield

Clearances:

INR - Hughes

SVN - Corcoran

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS  
COPY IS PROHIBITED  
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

by him containing long quotations from the document was written for the Sunday Tribune of August 23. On Friday, August 21, the Department was apprised of this fact. In view of the paper's present low classification, and in light of the somewhat polemic account of it that was to appear in the Tribune and in some of the up to fifty other papers that subscribe to its news service, agreement was obtained ~~by the~~ <sup>from</sup> ~~Secretary of State from General Guevara~~ /CIA to make the document available to the press with an explanation of how it came into being and its present status. This was done and resulted in the articles that appeared Sunday morning. The New York Times editorial of Monday, August 24 is inaccurate when it suggests that release of the document was in the nature of a trial balloon.

This entire subject, in particular ~~since~~ the source of the leak, is receiving careful study, and we will keep you informed of any additional developments or information.

RUSK

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

12800

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

56

57

Origin  
SVN

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY 508

Aug 24 6 16 PM '64

Info:

SS

G

SP

H

EUR

FE

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

1. There follows text two paragraphs on Viet-Nam from Matthias paper "Trends in the World Situation" reported and other papers New York Times/ Sunday August 23.

"48. Of all the underdeveloped areas of the world, that in which the major world powers are now most critically engaged is Southeast Asia -- an immense area extending from the Indian subcontinent to Melanesia. The two major problems in the area, the future of Indochina and of the great island areas to the south, involve China, the USSR, Britain, the US, France, and Australia. The problems of this area have loomed large in world affairs since the end of World War II; they are now reaching critical proportions. The major change of the past few years has been the growing inability of the great powers to control the situation. Local leaders and local political movements have become increasingly powerful -- in large part as a result of the receipt of military material from foreign sources -- and less disposed to follow the dictate or advice of others.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 2/27/78  
By smg, NARS, Date 4/10/78

Drafted by:

S/VN: TJCorcoran/mlg 8/24/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: S/VN: Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

P - Mr. Sieverts

S/S - Mr. Davies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

frequently written within the government. The present document, written by a staff member of the Office of National Estimates in the CIA, deals with the world situation generally and devotes two paragraphs out of a total length of 45 pages to the situation in Southeast Asia, including Viet Nam. Such a paper is not, nor does it purport to be, a statement of policy or the view of the U.S. government on any of the subjects which it discusses. This particular paper was not cleared, discussed, or even read by the Viet Nam task force, the U.S. Intelligence Board, or any principal officers of the Departments of State or Defense, or the White House.

Full text of paper being pouched.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014871  
By iss, NARA, Date 10-29-97

MFG. 11-63

57

12871

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

57

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 507 IMMEDIATE

SVN

Info

INFO: CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SS

MUNICH PASS AMEMBASSADOR LODGE

G

Although probably too early make accurate assessment 085

SP

L

H

EUR

FE

IO

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

significance past two days events, following is our  
current thinking which we are using on background basis  
in answer official and press inquiries:

1. This is end academic year lycées and universities  
when students under pressure examinations are not attend-  
ing classes. As in past they tend to let off steam in  
demonstrations at this time. So far size and scope  
demonstrations do not equal those of last year.

2. Buddhists still wrangling over assault on  
pagodas last August and have picked anniversary date to  
revive old fears oppressive government actions, but their  
activities are still more restrained and under control  
than was case last year.

3. Although certain elements among both students and  
Buddhists have made anti-Khanh and anti-U.S. statements,  
this does not appear to be widespread. GVN has not

Drafted by  
S/VN: MVForrestal:caw 8/24

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by S/VN: ~~SECRET~~ Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances

FE - W<sub>m</sub>. Bundy

DOD/ISA - J. McNaughton (info only)

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

reacted violently to demonstrations, and appears to be undertaking discussions with leaders student and Buddhist factions.

We note that you are indirectly in touch Tri Quang, Chau, and Hoan; and are no doubt making point violent activities could lead to complete breakdown resistance aggression from North, and thus make it extremely difficult U.S. maintain its stepped up efforts bring pacification program to early conclusion. Report Embtel 541 that Khanh plans early announcement members new government including Vu ~~My Van Mau~~ Van Mau seems excellent step. You might consider suggesting early establishment National Assembly, where prominent Buddhist personalities could let off steam in debate rather than on streets.

In view of attacks by students on Catholic villagers in Da Nang area, would it be possible to cast <sup>any</sup> police action there in terms of protecting innocent peasants?

We have no plans for USG statement on merits dispute, but we stand ready to give quick and favorable consideration any suggestion you may make as situation develops.

Finally, we unable determine here whether these

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

political disturbances could in any way reflect Hanoi or  
VC campaign mounted as reaction Tonkin Gulf incident. Would  
appreciate your comments.

END.

Group Number 3

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

58

43  
Action

SS  
Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNNQEGMJA238  
PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 895A 24/0145Z  
P 240130Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

P R I O R I T Y

019537

032

1964 AUG 23 PM 11 35

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 529 AUG 24 9:45 AM

LIMDIS

DEPTEL 494.

CONCUR IN PROPOSED SCHEDULE. ALTHOUGH I HOPE TO GET AWAY AT  
TIME INDICATED, IF NECESSARY I CAN EXTEND SLIGHTLY TIME IN  
WASHINGTON. TAYLOR

BT  
CFN 529 494

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State In 2/20/08

By pmg, NARS, Date 4/10/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

59  
*[Signature]* 5

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

36  
Action

55  
Info

NNNNZCZCMJA207JIA793  
RR RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 10A 23/1428Z  
R 231416Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RHLHQ/CINCPA  
STATE GRNC

Authority RAC 00014872  
By iss, NARA, Date 10-29-97

019482

039

1964 AUG 23 PM 1 06

BT  
~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 528 CINCPAC POLAD 268 FROM SAIGON  
AUGUST 23 - 10PM

LINDIS

EMBTCL 520

POL COUNSELOR AND EMBOFFS MET LAST NIGHT WITH TAM CHAU, TRI QUANG, AND QUANG DO (CHAU'S LIAISON MAN WITH EMB). TRI QUANG SERVED AS MAJOR SPOKESMAN, STATING HE WAS PRESENTING OFFICIAL BUDDHIST POSITION, AND CHAU ASSOCIATED SELF WITH STATEMENTS.

BUDDHIST POSITION ESSENTIALLY THAT REPORTED REFTEL. BUDDHISTS FEAR GOVERNMENTAL TAKEOVER BY CAN LAO CATHOLICS OPERATING THROUGH DAI VIET PARTY. KEY MEN ARE THOSE LISTED REFTEL WITH CFN 528 268 23 10 520

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 10A ~~SECRET~~

ADDITION THREE PLANNERS: : TRAN CHANH THANH, NGUYEN PHUONG THIEP (FORMER NATIONAL ASSEMBLYMAN), AND NGUYEN VAN BONG (DEAN OF NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ADMINISTRATION). LATTER THREE HAVE DEVELOPED PLAN FOR ENLISTING ALL VIETNAMESE RELIGIONS IN UNIFIED EFFORT, EFFECT OF WHICH WOULD BE TO DOWNGRADE IMPORTANCE OF BUDDHIST MOVEMENT. ANOTHER IMPENDING MOVE TOWARD CAN LAO/DAI VIET CONSOLIDATION WILL COME THROUGH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY - THIEU WILL APPOINT 50 MILITARY MEMBERS AND PHAT WILL NAME 50 CIVILIAN DAI VIETS, FOR TOTAL OF 100 MEMBERS WHO WILL CONTROL ASSEMBLY AND NAME NGUYEN TON HOAN ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT.

TOTAL EFFECT THESE MOVES WILL BE TO CONSOLIDATE POWER IN HANDS OF MEN INTENDING TO INSTITUTE EVEN MORE STRINGENT FORM OF DIEMIST REPRESSION. AT ONCE POINT QUANG STATED BUDDHISTS COULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT GOVT BY CHRISTIANS; AT ANOTHER POINT HE STATED THAT ANY GOVT ACCEPTABLE IF IT ONLY LEFT BUDDHISTS UNDISTURBED.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 528, AUGUST 23, 10 PM FROM SAIGON

WAR AGAINST COMMUNISTS HAD GONE ON LONG TIME, AND BUDDHISTS HAD TAKEN EIGHT TIMES AS MANY CASUALTIES AS HAD CATHOLICS (CHAU SAID FIGURE WAS TEN TIMES). THEY DID NOT RPT NOT ASK SPECIAL POSITION OR REWARDS FOR THIS (CHAU EXPLAINED THAT NAME "NATIONAL PAGODA" DID NOT IMPLY BUDDHISTS WISHED THEIR FAITH TO BE

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 10A ~~SECRET~~  
REGARDED AS STATE RELIGION). ON OTHER HAND, THEY COULD NOT TOLERATE PERSECUTION EITHER. THEY WOULD PREFER WITHDRAW FROM STRUGGLE LEAVING CATHOLICS AIDED BY AMERICANS TO FIGHT COMMUNISTS. THEY HAD ACCORDINGLY MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS INTENDED TO FORCE KHANH TO CHOOSE BETWEEN "PEOPLE" (I.E. THEMSELVES) AND "RULERS" (I.E. ALLEGED CAN LAO/DAI VIET COALITION). IF BUDDHISTS RECEIVED NO SATISFACTION IN THIS, THEY WOULD INSTITUTE POLICY OF NON-COOPERATION WITH GVN. QUANG DISTINGUISHED THIS POLICY FROM THAT OF NON-VIOLENCE EMPLOYED AGAINST DIEM REGIME, BUT DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT DIFFERENCE WOULD BE (PRESUMABLY PHASED WITHDRAWAL DESCRIBED REFTEL. HE DISTINGUISHED KHANH (WHO WAS ACCEPTABLE FIGURE) FROM CAN LAO FIGURES WHO WERE REAL ENEMY OF BUDDHISTS IF THESE MEN RETAINED BIG POSITIONS, ANY COMPOSITION OF NEW CABINET WOULD BE MERE FACADE AND WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE.

MISCELLANEOUS POINTS MADE BY QUANG INCLUDED FOLLOWING:

(1) BUDDHISTS UNDERSTOOD US POSITION AND GOODWILL TOWARD VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND SUBSTANTIAL US AID, BUT FELT US WAS BEING "CHEATED" BY KHIEM-THIEU CLIQUE WHO PURSUING OWN PERSONAL INTERESTS AT EXPENSE OF WAR EFFORT AND INTERESTS OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

(2) BUDDHISTS KNEW BETTER THAN AMERICANS WHAT LIFE UNDER COMMUNISM WAS LIKE AND WERE STRONG ENEMIES OF COMMUNISM. DESPITE THIS FACT, THEY SAW NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING OPPRESSED BY COMMUNISTS OR OPPRESSED BY CATHOLICS AND SELF-SEEKING CAN LAO CLIQUE.

(3) SEEMINGLY PARADOXICALLY, QUANG VOICED CONCERN THAT US PLANNING WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM, DESPITE OUR ASSURANCES TO CONTRARY. (COMMENT: POINT PROBABLY IS THAT US PRESENCE PROVIDES BULWARK AGAINST COMMUNISM WHICH LEAVES BUDDHISTS FREE TO PURSUE CONTEST WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF NON-COMMUNIST VIETNAM).

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 528, AUGUST 23, 10 PM FROM SAIGON

(4) ALTHOUGH KHANH HAD PUBLICLY APPEARED AT PAGODAS, HE WAS NOT REGARDED AS REAL BUDDHIST. NEVERTHELESS, HE WAS ACCEPTABLE FIGURE. ON OTHER HAND, KHIEM WAS NOT REALLY CATHOLIC, HAVE BECOME SO ONLY UNDER PRESSURE FROM DIEM. KHIEM WAS OF COURSE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE FIGURE TO BUDDHISTS AS WAS THIEU.

POL COUNSELOR STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF UNITY AMONG ALL VIETNAMESE NON-COMMUNISTS IF STRUGGLE TO BE WON, AND ASKED IF BUDDHISTS HAD MADE EFFORTS TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS WITH KHANH AND WITHIN MRC. CHAU STATED HAD HELD MANY DISCUSSIONS WITH KHANH, AND WAS CONTINUING TO DO SO, BUT GAVE IMPRESSION THAT THESE WERE NOT PROVIDING PARTICULARLY USEFUL RESULTS. IDEA OF HAVING DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS RAISED WITHIN MRC WAS DISMISSED FOR VARIETY OF REASONS (NO WISH PARTICIPATE IN GOVT, NO POINT IN ATTEMPTING DISCUSSION WITH ENEMIES, WHO WOULD ONLY TURN FACT OF DISCUSSION TO OWN ADVANTAGE BY PRESENTING PUBLIC IMAGE OF CONCILIATION WHILE CONTINUING PURSUE HOSTILE POLICIES.) TRI QUANG SAID NO USE IN MEETING WITH KHANH AND OTHERS. POL COUNSELOR REFERRED TO GRAVITY OF SITUATION IN VIETNAM, POINTED OUT THAT DISUNITY BENEFITED ONLY COMMUNISTS (AND THOSE SEEKING NEUTRAL SOLUTION SUCH AS FRENCH) AND WAS IN FACT IN INTEREST OF VC TO SOW DISCORD AND CREATE POLITICAL INSTABILITY. FOR BUDDHISTS TO DRAW RAPID CONCLUSIONS AND LAUNCH DESCRIBED CAMPAIGN BEFORE THEY HAD ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF PERSECUTION THEY FEARED WAS THEREFORE TO PLAY INTO HANDS OF COMMON ENEMY. FURTHER THEIR CAMPAIGN INTERPRETED BY FOREIGN PRESS AND MANY VIETNAMESE AS AN ATTACK ON KHANH AND NOT "BAD ELEMENTS" AS BUDDHISTS VIEW THEM. IN A DEMOCRACY GOVT HAD RESPONSIBILITY HELP RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG MAJOR GROUPS BUT BY SAME TOKEN THESE GROUPS MUST BEHAVE RESPONSIBLY. NOTED THAT FURTHER DIALOGUE WITH GVN LEADERS APPEARED NECESSARY AND URGED BUDDHISTS MEET WITH KHANH AND SEEK SOLUTION THEIR PROBLEMS.

EMBOFFS ALSO STRESSED UNFORTUNATE EFFECT ON US AND WORLD OPINION OF CONTINUED EVIDENCE OF DIVISIVE ACTIONS AND LACK OF UNITY AMONG VIETNAMESE, PARTICULARLY AT TIME AMB LODGE ATTEMPTING EXPLAIN IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM TO EUROPEAN NATIONS AND ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT. IN CONCLUSIONS, EMBOFFS EMPHASIZED DUTY BUDDHISTS DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THEIR GOVT ON THEIR COMPLAINTS AND NOT STAND ASIDE OR ADOPT STERILE STANCE OF NON-COOPERATION.

DISCUSSION WAS FORECLOSED BY 11 L'CLOCK CURFEW. WE PLAN MEET FURTHER WITH BUDDHIST LEADERS TO CONTINUE EFFORTS AT DISUASION.

GP-3 TAYLOR

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8/23/64, 3:18 PM

NOTE: PASSED DOD, CIA, WHITE HOUSE 8/23/64, 5:53 PM

PASSED USUN 8/23/64, 6:14 PM

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

60

34

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

PP RUEHCR

SVN

DE RUMJIR 06A 23/1057Z

Info

P 231048Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

G

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

SP

STATE GRNC

L

BT

H

FE

IO

P

CU

USIA

NSC

INR

NSA

NIC

AID

O

SY

A

PER

OPR

RMR

019449

1964 AUG 23 AM 8 18

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 526 INFO PRIORITY  
HUE 57 ROUTINE CINCPAC POLAD 267 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 23 - 7PM

APPROXIMATELY 500 STUDENTS MET AT UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SCIENCE AFTERNOON AUGUST 22 TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION. THERE WERE TEN SPEAKERS, TWO OF WHOM WERE SHOUTED DOWN (ONE WAS LEADER OF RECENT ANTI-FRENCH DEMONSTRATIONS AND SECOND WAS STUDENT WHO ASKED AUDIENCE TO EXPLAIN WHY KHANH WAS DICTATOR). ONE SPEAKER STATED "WE HAD TO BEAR FOR NINE YEARS DICTATORSHIP OF DIEM APPOINTED BY US, AND NOW WE ARE ASKED TO BEAR ANOTHER DICTATORSHIP APPOINTED BY US."

CFN 526 57 267 23 7 500 22

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 06A

SUBJECTS DISCUSSED CENTERED ON HOW TO MARSHALL SUPPORT FROM GREATER NUMBER OF STUDENTS (MEETINGS, LEAFLET DISTRIBUTION, SEEKING SUPPORT FROM WITHIN MILITARY) AND ON PLANS FOR DEMONSTRATION AUG 25 AT MARKET SQUARE. AT END OF MEETING, FOUR-POINT "DECISION" UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED: 1) REPEAL OF VUNG TAU CHARTER, 2) RETURN OF GENERALS TO MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES, 3) CANCELLATION OF EMERGENCY AND CURFEW, AND 4) EJECTION OF ALL CAN LAO MEMBERS FROM GVN. ADDITIONAL MEETINGS PLANNED FOR AUGUST 23, 24 AND 25.

VIETNAM PRESS MORNING AUG 23 DESCRIBED BRIEFLY KHANH'S MEETING WITH STUDENT LEADERS AUG 22 AND INDICATED HE HAD MET WITH STUDENT DELGATION FROM DALAT AT VUNG TAU BEFORE RETURNING TO SAIGON. REGARDING SAIGON MEETING, VIETNAM PRESS QUOTED COL. THAO, KHANH'S PRESS OFFICER, AS SAYING KHANH AFFIRMED THAT HE, GVN AND MRC ARE DETERMINED TO IMPLEMENT REAL DEMOCRACY; HOWEVER, AT PRESENT EFFORTS MUST BE DIRECTED AT ESTABLISHING NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD BETTER REGIME. THAO ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING STUDENTS "NOT (RPT NOT) ENTIRELY SATISFIED BUT THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CHIEF OF STATE AND VISITORS." MEETING HELD IN FRONT OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-526, August 23, 7 p.m., from Saigon  
PAGE THREE RUMJIR 06A

ALSO MORNING AUG 23, SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS MET AT FACULTY OF MEDICINE UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP TWO PROFESSORS. DISCUSSION AGAIN STRONGLY ANTI-KHANH, INCLUDING THEME THAT JAN 30 REVOLUTION WAS JUST PRETEXT TO COVER UP DICTATORSHIP AND RETURN TO POWER OF MEMBERS OF DIEM REGIME. MEETING BROKE UP AROUND NOON AND STUDENTS MARCHED TO SAIGON RADIO STATION TO DEMAND RETRACTION OF EARLIER NEWS BROADCAST THAT KHANH AND STUDENTS HAD REACHED SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT. RADIO DIRECTOR LINH SPOKE TO THEM OVER LOUDSPEAKER FROM INSIDE, OFFERED TO MEET INSIDE WITH DELEGATION. STUDENTS REFUSED, DEMANDED LINH COME OUT TO SEE THEM. IT THEN BEGAN TO RAIN AND POLICE, WHO WITHOUT RAINCOATS, LEFT BARRICADES TO SEEK SHELTER. STUDENTS BROKE THROUGH BARRICADES, STORMED INTO RADIO STATION AND RANSACKED SEVERAL OFFICES (BROADCAST FACILITIES UNTOUCHED). GROUP THEN RETURNED TO FACULTY OF MEDICINE AND DISPERSED. POLICE REPORTEDLY ARE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEALING WITH STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, DESPITE EMERGENCY DECREES. ANOTHER STUDENT MEETING BEGAN AT 1600 AT FACULTY OF PHARMACY.

AS INDICATION OF STUDENTS' STATE OF MIND, TWO STUDENTS CALLED ON EMBOFF EVE AUG 22 IN HIGHLY AGITATED MOOD. BOTH SPOKE ALONG LINES THOSE ESPOUSED IN RECENT MEETINGS: MENACE OF DICTATORSHIP, CAN LAO ELEMENTS IN GVN (THEY ALSO MENTIONED TRAN LE QUANG BY NAME), CIVILIAN GOVT URGENTLY NEEDED, ABSOLUTE FREEDOM MUST BE RESTORED. WHEN EMBOFF SUGGESTED THEY GIVE KHANH A CHANCE, STUDENTS REPLIED THAT THAT WOULD PERMIT HIM TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER. TAYLOR  
BT

NOTES: Advance copy to S/S-O August 23 at 9:30 a.m.  
Passed White House, CIA, DOD at 10:25 a.m.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

61  
✓ Bundy

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

46

Action

OTUSWEGMJA193

P

RR RUEHCR

DE RUMJIR 04A 23/0948Z

Info

R 230943Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

19431

AUGUST 23, 1964

6:20 A.M.

SVN

G

FE

USIA

NSC

O

A

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 523 AUGUST 23 - 4PM

GREENFIELD FROM ZORTHIAN

DEPTEL 486

RMR

AMB AGREEABLE TO PRESS CONFERENCE WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2.  
CONCUR THAT ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE WITHHELD UNTIL AFTER  
ARRIVAL. WE ARE PREPARING BRIEF ARRIVAL STATEMENT WHICH  
WE HOPE TO SEND TO YOU IN ADVANCE OF ARRIVAL. WILL THERE  
BE ANY DEMANDS OR DESIRE FOR TV APPEARANCES DURING  
AMBASSADOR'S VISIT. TAYLOR  
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

62

34  
Action

SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

KZCZCMJA1380VZCZCJIA738

011911016

1964 AUG 22 PM 9 30

OO RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 33A 22/1300Z  
O 221246Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014 873  
By us NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~SECRET~~ IMMEDIATE 522 AUGUST 22 9PM

035

L I M D I S

MORNING AUGUST 22 QUAT SOUGHT APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR TAYLOR "TO DISCUSS POLITICAL PROBLEM OF GREATEST URGENCY." AS AMBASSADOR WAS OUT OF SAIGON JOHNSON MET QUAT FOR HOUR AND HALF DISCUSSION OF GRAVITY OF POLITICAL SITUATION AND HOW QUAT THINKS IT MIGHT BE SOLVED.

QUAT BEGAN BY SAYING VIETNAMESE POPULATION IN STATE OF EFFERVESCENCE OVER RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES MAINLY BECAUSE IT FEARED A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP. NOTED THAT HOWEVER CFN 522 22

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 33A ~~SECRET~~

MUCH WE MAY APPROVE OF CONSTITUTION AND ELEVATION OF KHANH TO PRESIDENCY, AND HOWEVER LITTLE THESE MEASURES MODIFIED THE PREVIOUS REALITIES OF LOCUS OF POWER, PEOPLE FEAR THIS IS MILITARY POWER GRAB THAT WILL LEAD TO ANOTHER DICTATORSHIP LIKE DIEM.

QUAT BELIEVED SITUATION WAS MADE ADDITIONALLY EXPLOSIVE BY INTRIGUES OF PEOPLE AROUND KHANH AND KHIEM, ESPECIALLY TRAN CHANH THANH AND COLONEL THAO. HE THOUGHT THESE TWO WERE DELIBERATELY URGING KHANH AND KHIEM TO TAKE STEPS WHICH EXACERBATED CURRENT POLITICAL TENSIONS, AND SUGGESTED JOHNSON ARRANGE HAVE CAS COVER THEIR ACTIVITIES.

QUAT THEN SAID WE MUST STUDY WAYS OF GIVING KHANH REGIME GREATER STABILITY. FIRST HE MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF DELAYING PROMULGATION OF NEW CONSTITUTION, OR OF IMPLEMENTING IT IN WAYS CALCULATED TO AVOID OFFENDING PUBLIC OPINION. ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LITTLE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS AREA. THEN SUGGESTED ACCEPTABILITY OF REGIME COULD BE ENHANCED BY JUDICIOUS CHOICE OF MEMBERS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. PERHAPS A COUNCIL OF WISE MEN

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 522, AUGUST 22, 9 PM: FROM SAIGON

COULD HELP WITH THIS. REMARKED THAT AIR FORCE WAS TO SUPPLY 5 OF THE TOTAL OF 50 MILITARY MEMBERS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. CLAIMED TO HAVE HEARD ON GOOD AUTHORITY THAT WHEN APPROACHED TO SERVE, ALL SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICERS FLATLY REFUSED TO HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. REMARKED THAT ONE SOLUTION MIGHT BE TO CFN 5 50

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 33A ~~SECRET~~

REMOVE MILITARY MEMBERS OF ASSEMBLY FROM ACTIVE LISTS OF ARMED FORCES DURING THEIR MANDATES.

QUAT FINALLY SUGGESTED THAT ONLY CHANCE OF MAKING SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN ACCEPTABILITY OF REGIME WAS TO BOLSTER KHANH WITH AN ABLE AND RESPECTED CIVILIAN POLITICAL FIGURE, A "POMPIDOU". HE SUGGESTED AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AND JOHNSON PROPOSE THIS TO KHANH AND KHIEM, EMPHASIZING THAT THE SITUATION WAS GRAVE AND TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. USG SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WHILE THE MILITARY WERE STILL CONCERNED ABOUT WHETHER THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POWER; ONCE THEY HAD DONE SO AND WERE NO LONGER WORRIED ABOUT OPPOSITION, IT WOULD BE LATE, JUST AS IT HAD BEEN TO LATE WITH DIEM.

JOHNSON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A POMPIDOU-LIKE FIGURE WOULD BE USEFUL BUT ASKED HOW HE MIGHT BE CHOSEN. JOHNSON REPLIED THAT HE DOUBTED AMBASSADOR TAYLOR WOULD FEEL HE KNEW ENOUGH ABOUT VIETNAM SITUATION OR PERSONALITIES TO SEEK TO IMPOSE AN INDIVIDUAL ON KHANH. FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR ANY SUITABLE POMPIDOU WAS TO BE PERSONALLY AND POLITICALLY ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE TO KHANH. FURTHER, FOR ANY POLITICAL SOLUTION TO BE LASTING AND VALID, IT WOULD HAVE TO EMERGE FROM VIETNAMESE AND THEIR POLITICAL CURRENTS AND ASPIRATIONS AND PERSONALITIES.

QUAT AND JOHNSON THEN DISCUSSED THE OTHER QUALITIES THE "POMPIDOU" MUST HAVE -- ACCEPTABILITY TO ALL MAJOR OPINION GROUPS, NATIONAL REPUTATION FOR PATRIOTISM AND INTEGRITY, ETC. BY EXAMINING RECOLLECTIONS FROM HIS POLITICAL PAST, QUAT ALLOWED IT TO EMERGE THAT HE WOULD BE SUITABLE CANDIDATE AND WOULD NOT BE UNAVAILABLE.

JOHNSON SIAD HE WOULD DISCUSS ALL THIS WITH AMBASSADOR TAYLOR. TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 9:46 AM, AUGUST 22.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 10:30 AM, AUGUST 22.

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

63

36  
Action  
SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHCR R  
DE RUMJIR 31A 22/1320Z  
R 221305Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1964 AUG 22 AM 11 24

019227

031

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT (520) INFO CINCPAC 264 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 22 8PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

EMBASSY CONTACT CLOSE TO BOTH TRI QUANG AND NGUYEN TON HOAN CAME TO EMBASSY YESTERDAY TO REPORT ON RECENT CONVERSATIONS THESE PERSONALITIES. CLAIMED HE WAS ACTING AS EMISSARY FOR BOTH. IN CONVEYING SUBSTANCE HIS CONVERSATION WITH TRI QUANG, SOURCE REVIEWED LINE OF REASONING BEING PUSHED BY BUDDHISTS THAT GEN KHANH IS IN FACT CAPTIVE OF OTHER GENERALS AT PRESENT TIME. SOURCE BELIEVES TRI QUANG SINCERE IN HIS BELIEF THAT APPARATUS EXISTS CFN 520 264 22 8PM

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 31A ~~SECRET~~

WITHIN GOVERNMENT INIMICAL TO BUDDHIST INTERESTS--THIS GROUP LED BY GENERALS KHIEM AND THIEU AND COMPRISED OF EN/CAN LAO MEMBERS, CATHOLICS, AND CERTAIN KEY DAI VIETS. ACCORDING TO SOURCE TRI QUANG BELIEVES CATHOLICS IN FACT CONTROL DAI VIET PARTY. TRI QUANG MENTIONED FOLLOWING PERSONALITIES AS MEMBERS CAN LAO-CATHOLIC-DAI VIET COMBINE: GENERALS KHIEM, THIEU, LAM, PHAT (INTERIOR), CAO (KHANH'S CEF DE CABINET), DZU (EX-COMMANDER SECOND DIVISION), COL. BEN (CHIEF OF POLICE), COL. PHUOC (CHIEF MSS), COL. HUYEN (INFORMATION), XUONG (HEAD POPULAR FORCES) AND DR. TRUONG (MINISTER OF HEALTH). TRI QUANG FEELS BUDDHIST MUST NEUTRALIZE OR DESTROY THIS ORGANIZATION.

ACCORDING TO SOURCE TRI QUANG HAS INFORMED GEN. KHANH THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES THAT GEN. KHANH HAS CHOICE TO THROW IN HIS LOT WITH ABOVE GROUP OR WITH THE "BUDDHISTS AND THE PEOPLE". TRI QUANG BELIEVES THAT WITH BUDDHIST SUPPORT KHANH WOULD BE ABLE TO NEUTRALIZE OR ELIMINATE THE KHIEM/THIEU FACTION. HOWEVER, IF KHANH DOES NOT OPT FOR BUDDHISTS, TRI QUANG INTENDS LAUNCH CAMPAIGN OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE. TRI QUANG WOULD NOT RESORT TO DEMONSTRATIONS OR TO VIOLENCE BUT WOULD CALL ON BUDDHIST

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority RAC 00014874  
By me NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-520, August 22, 8 p.m., from Saigon

FAITHFUL NOT TO COOPERATE WITH GOVERNMENT. NON-COOPERATION CAMPAIGN ON PART OF BUDDHIST FAITHFUL WOULD PROCEED IN THREE

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 31A ~~SECRET~~

PHASES: 1) IN GENERAL POPULATION; 2) IN CIVIL SERVICE AND BUREAUCRACY; AND 3) IN ARMY. NO TIMING WAS INDICATED BY TRI QUANG AS TO WHEN HE EXPECTED REPLY FROM KHANH TO BUDDHIST DEMANDS, NOR DID HE INDICATE NATURE HIS SPECIFIC DEMANDS.

ACCORDING TO SOURCE, HOAN SHARES VIEW THAT KHANH MERELY FRONTMAN FOR KHIEM AND THIEU. HOAN INFORMED SOURCE THAT KHIEM AND THIEU WERE REAL LEADERS OF, AND HAD DAI VIET SUPPORT FOR, JANUARY COUP AND AT LAST MOMENT DECIDED PUSH KHANH FORWARD AS "LEADER". HOAN CLAIMS KHANH HAS SOUGHT DESTROY DAI VIET ORGANIZATION SINCE THAT TIME AND THIS IS WHY HOAN HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED KHANH SINCE HIS RETURN TO SVN. HOAN FEARS THAT KHANH, WITH BUDDHIST SUPPORT, WILL SEEK CONSOLIDATE HIS PERSONAL POSITION, NEUTRALIZE KHIEM/THIEU GROUP AND DESTROY DAI VIET PARTY AT THE SAME TIME. HOAN BELIEVES KHIEM CONTENT TO HAVE KHANH SERVE AS LIGHTNING ROD AND PICK UP PIECES AFTER KHANH IS BROUGHT DOWN.

SOURCE CLAIMED HOAN HAD COMMISSIONED HIM TO TRY ARRANGE MEETING WITH TRI QUANG SOONEST TO EXPLAIN BASIC DAI VIET POSITION AS NOT ANTI-BUDDHIST NOR PRO-CATHOLIC. SOURCE SAYS HOAN WOULD BE PREPARED ACCEPT POSITION PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IF OFFERED. HOWEVER, IF MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP AND HOAN'S FACTION OF DAI VIETS SHOULD ENSUE, HOAN WOULD LIKELY LEAVE COUNTRY.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 31A ~~SECRET~~

IN SUBSEQUENT MEETING LAST NIGHT WITH EMBOFF, TRI QUANG CONFIRMED ALL ABOVE POINTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM, ALTHOUGH DENYING SOURCE HAD BEEN COMMISSIONED AS HIS EMISSARY. TRI QUANG UNWILLING INDICATE PRECISELY WHAT HE IS AFTER BEYOND DESTRUCTION OF ABOVE "CABAL" OF CAN LAO CATHOLICS-DAI VIETS. TRI QUANG ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT PERSONALLY AGAINST KHANH PER SE NOR WAS HE PERSONALLY IN FAVOR OF GENERAL "BIG" MINH. WHOM HE STILL CONSIDERS TO BE OF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-520, August 22, 8 p.m., from Saigon

LITTLE CAPACITY.

TODAY, THICH TAM CHAU'S LIAISON OFFICER WITH EMBASSY INVITED POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND EMBOFFS TO JOINT MEETING TONIGHT AT AN QUANG PAGODA WITH TAM CHAU, TRI QUANG, AND THIEN MINH. WILL PROBE INTENTIONS AND AT SAME TIME ATTEMPT STEER BUDDHISTS TOWARDS LESS NEGATIVE PURSUITS AND TOWARDS MORE POSITIVE SUPPORT OF KHANH, MAKING IT CLEAR WE DO NOT INTEND TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN HIM AND KHANH.

TAYLOR

BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 August 22 at 1:04 p.m.

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43  
Action

ZMZCZCMJA096VCZCJIA680

0118936  
1964 AUG 22 AM 2 18

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 13A 22/0440Z  
P R 220435Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

P R I O R I T Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (516) INFO ROUTINE  
CINCPAC 263 FROM SAIGON AUG 22 12:45 PM

DECLASSIFIED

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Authority Note 2-27-78 + OSD 5-4-78

LIMDIS

By ing, NARS, Date 7-20-79

MACV SECURITY PERSONNEL AND VIETNAMESE POLICE WORKING IN COOPERATION LAST NIGHT CARRIED OUT ARRESTS OF 8 VIETNAMESE NATIONALS AND 4 USAF ENLISTED PERSONNEL UNDER CHARGES OF SMUGGLING PIASTRES AND OTHER CURRENCY TO HONG KONG AND THE RETURN OF GOLD WATCHES AND JEWELS TO SAIGON. APPROXIMATELY 3 MILLION PIASTRES, 25,000 DOLLARS US CURRENCY, 165,000 HONG KONG DOLLARS, SEVERAL THOUSAND WATCHES WERE SEIZED AT TIME OF ARREST.

CFN 516 263 8 4 3 25,000 165,000

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 13A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIETNAMESE ARE EXPECTED TODAY TO ISSUE PRESS RELEASE WHICH HAS BEEN WORKED OUT WITH MISSION. 4 USAF ENLISTED PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN FLOWN TO CLARK AIR BASE WHICH EXERCISES GENERAL COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION THIS AREA FOR AIR FORCE. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS WE WILL STATE HERE THAT THEIR NAMES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL AFTER FORMAL INVESTIGATION MATTER HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND CHARGES HAVE BEEN PREFERRED. FULL TEXT GVN PRESS RELEASE WILL BE TRANSMITTED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. INFORM MANSFIELD IGA. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 4

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 22, 2:48 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

65

~~SECRET~~

42  
Action

018960

SS

ZCZCMJA109VZCZCJIA689

1964 AUG 22 AM 3 13

Info

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 20A 22/0520Z  
R 220505Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 515 INFO CINCPAC 262 FROM SAIGON AUG  
22, 1:25 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

MINISTER OF EDUCATION HUAN WHO ALSO INFLUENTIAL BUDDHIST OF  
TRI QUANG FACTION, ASKED POLITICAL COUNSELOR COME BY HIS OFFICE  
TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION. HUAN CHARACTERIZED SITUATION  
AS SERIOUS AND CLAIMED PROMULGATION PROVISIONAL CHARTER SET  
GVN ON ROAD TO MILITARY DICTATORSHIP.

SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED SITUATION WITH THICH TRI QUANG, THICH  
THIEN NINH AND HAD AGREED TO BUDDHIST DEMANDS OF GENERAL KHANH.  
HE THEN OUTLINED DEMANDS IN SAME SENSE AS TRI QUANG (EMBT  
480) AND SAID THICH THIEN NINH HAD BEEN BUDDHIST EMISSARY TO  
KHANH TO EXPLAIN BUDDHIST POSITION. CLAIMED GENERAL KHANH  
"PROMISED" CONSIDER BUDDHIST DEMANDS, BUT ADDED THAT BUDDHIST  
PUT LITTLE STOCK IN KHANH'S PROMISES, SINCE HE HAD PROMISED  
TO GET RID OF GENERAL DO CAO TRI REPEATEDLY OVER PAST FEW  
MONTHS WITH NO ACTION ENSUING.

HUAN SAID KHANH IS MERELY PUPPET OF GENERALS KHIEM, THIEU,  
AND "THE OTHERS" AND THAT KHANH DISPOSES OF NO REAL POWER OR  
CONTROL OVER OTHER GENERALS. WHILE BUDDHIST HAVE NO STRONG OBJECTIONS  
TO KHANH PER SE THEY FELT HE WAS WEAK AND INCAPABLE CONTROLLING  
SITUATION. THEIR MAJOR CONCERNS WERE CERTAIN "BAD ELEMENTS AROUND  
KHANH" WHICH INCLUDED THOSE MENTIONED EMBTEL 480. HUAN ADDED  
GENERALS DUC AND TAM TO LIST NOT NECESSARILY AS ARDENT CAN LAO  
BUT AS INCOMPETENTS. HUAN CLAIMED THESE GENERALS AND CIVILIAN  
CAN LAO ELEMENTS DETERMINED TO "REVENGE" BUDDHIST ACTIVITIES  
LEADING TO OVERTHROW DIEM REGIME AND THAT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST  
BUDDHISTS STILL BEING CARRIED OUT BY THIS GROUP AND LOWER LEVEL  
PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS.  
CFN 480 480

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

RAC 00014875

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

By

io, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~SECRET~~

-2- 515, AUGUST 22, 1:25 PM FROM SAIGON

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 20A ~~SECRET~~

HE UNWILLING TO SUBMIT PROOF ON THIS SCORE OR ON ALLEGED GROSS CORRUPTION, MERELY INDICATED THAT THIS COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND READILY AVAILABLE TO US RPT US SECURITY SERVICES IF THEY CARE INVESTI.

HUAN BELIEVED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RENDERED KHANH MORE ELIGIBLE THAN EVER FOR ASSASSINATION OR ANOTHER COUP. HE BELIEVED THAT KHANH CURRENTLY BALANCING ON A TIGHT ROPE AND THAT FOR THE SHORT TERM US RPT US SHOULD SUPPORT KHANH STRONGLY, AS SHOULD BUDDHISTS. AT THE SAME TIME US SHOULD TAKE HARDLINE WITH THE GENERALS ON NECESSITY FOR INSTALLING AND OPERATING AN HONEST ADMINISTRATION. HE BELIEVED IT INCUMBENT ON US INSIST THAT KHANH DIVEST HIMSELF OF CAN LAO AND OTHER BAD ELEMENTS AROUND HIM AND CHECK CAREFULLY AT EVERY LEVEL TO INSURE US AID ACTUALLY REACHED PEOPLE AND WAS NOT DIVERTED TO PERSONAL BENEFIT RANKING MEMBERS OF REGIME.

HUAN CLAIMED BUDDHISTS WOULD SUPPORT KHANH PROVIDED HE GAVE THEM SATISFACTION ON THEIR DEMANDS. POLITICAL COUNSELOR POINTED OUT THAT BUDDHISTS APPEARED TO BE CRYING BEFORE THEY WERE HURT AND EXERTING PRESSURE ON KHANH WHO HAD BEEN IMPARTIAL OR HAD SUPPORTED THEIR POSITION IN THE PAST. THEY APPEARED BE DOING LITTLE AS REGARDS EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS TO SO-CALLED "BAD ELEMENTS". HUAN MERELY SHRUGGED AT THIS AND SAID IT USELESS ATTEMPT CONVINCE THESE INDIVIDUALS TO CHANGE THEIR WAYS.

HUAN COMPLAINED REPEATEDLY THAT US POSSESSED GREAT LEVERAGE BUT DID NOT APPLY IT. FOR EXAMPLE US SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON RETENTION GENERAL "BIG" MINH, WHO ALTHOUGH INEFFECTUAL, WAS SYMBOL OF NOVEMBER 1 REVOLUTION. HE CLAIMED THAT "MOST BUDDHISTS" BELIEVED PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION CONSOLIDATING ALL POWER IN HANDS OF MILITARY PLUS ENHANCED INFLUENCE OF EX-DIEMISTS HAD FIXED ANOTHER DICTATORSHIP, NOW OF INDEFINITE DURATION, ON VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. POLITICAL COUNSELOR POINTED OUT THAT DURATION OF EMERGENCY DIRECTLY RELATED TO WILLINGNESS OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO UNITE AND EFFECTIVELY PROSECUTE WAR AGAINST VIET CONG. CIVILIAN LEADERS, POLITICIANS, AND INTELLECTUALS WERE MARKED BY THEIR DISUNITY RATHER THAN WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR COMMON GOOD. HUAN BRUSHED ASIDE SAIGON POLITICIANS AND INTELLECTUALS AS BENEATH CONSIDERATION AND SAID ONLY ORGANIZATIONS CAPABLE EFFECTIVELY PERSECUTING WAR AGAINST VC WERE RELIGIOUS GROUPS WHICH COULD DIRECTLY REACH AND DIRECT PEOPLE. POLITICAL COUNSELOR POINTED OUT THIS OPTION HAD BEEN OPENED TO THE BUDDHISTS AND

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

(-3- 515, AUGUST 22, 1:25PM FROM SAIGON

OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS SINCE NOVEMBER 1 REVOLUTION AND WAS STILL OPEN. ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED WAS FOR THESE GROUPS TO GET BEHIND THEIR GOVERNMENT. HUAN DID NOT RESPOND.

PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 20 A ~~SECRET~~

WITH RESPECT TO STUDENT ACTIVITIES HUAN SAID STUDENTS ACTIVE IN CURRENT MEETINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS COMPRISED ONLY 200-250, ALMOST ALL OF WHOM BEING PAID TO BE ACTIVISTS. HUAN STATED THAT STUDENTS CURRENTLY BEING PAID BY VARIOUS GENERALS AND MINISTERS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND VARIOUS POLITICIANS BUT BY FAR THE GREATEST NUMBER WERE BEING PAID BY THE FRENCH. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY HAD COUNSELLED BUDDHIST STUDENTS NOT TO HOLD PROTEST MEETINGS OR DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION SINCE IT WOULD ONLY GIVE GOVERNMENT PRETEXT TO CLAMP DOWN ON STUDENT ACTIVITIES.

COMMENT: BUDDHISTS, PARTICULARLY TRI QUANG FACTION, CLEARLY STIRRED UP BY ABRUPT ANNOUNCEMENT NEW PROVISIONAL CHARTER AND THEIR UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW IT WILL EFFECT THEM. THEY CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN EXERTING PRESSURES PROTECT THEIR POSITION AND ELIMINATE FROM GOVERNMENT INDIVIDUALS THEY CONSIDER DANGEROUS TO BUDDHIST CAUSE. DIFFICULT TO ASSESS REAL DEPTH THEIR FEAR THAT EX-DIEMISTS REGAINING POWER TO "REVENGE" BUDDHIST ACTIONS LEADING TO FALL OF DIEM. IT COULD BE PRETEXT AND TACTICAL MANEUVER TO ACHIEVE THEIR OWN ENDS BUT IS NONETHELESS WIDELY BELIEVED AND PROBABLY FED BY NEGATIVE REPORTING BY BUDDHIST MINISTERS, SUCH AS HUAN AND MINSOCIAL ACTION HUAN, ON NEW PROVISIONAL CHARTER.

PAGE SIX RUMJIR 20 A ~~SECRET~~

APPARENTLY NEGATIVE REACTION OF CIVILIAN MINISTERS TO PROVISIONAL CHARTER STEMS IN LARGE PART FROM A LACK OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS ON FORM, CONTENT, AND TIMING FOR LAUNCHING NEW CHARTER. THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT CONSULTED IN ADVANCE AND ARE NOW SERVING IN A CARETAKER CAPACITY HAS LEFT MANY FRAYED NERVES. TAYLOR

BT

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43  
Action

SVN

Info

SS

G

SP

L

H

FE

P

USIA

NSC

INR

NSA

CAB

COM

FAA

MR

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 14A 22/0500Z  
P R 220459Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY **SAIGON**  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

018948

1964 AUG 22 AM 2 44

P R I O R I T Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT **514** INFO MANILA  
33 CINCPAC 261 FROM SAIGON AUG 22, 1:00 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

MANILA FOR FAA

REF EMBTEL 423, DEPTTEL 401.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 2/27/78  
By bmj, NARS, Date 4/10/78

EMBASSY, MACV AND FAA REP FROM MANILA HAVE CONDUCTED INTENSIVE STUDY SECURITY SITUATION SAIGON AIRPORT AND SAFETY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS. FAA REP VISIT COINCIDENTAL WITH BUT INDEPENDENT OF PAA AIRLINES PILOTS COMPLAINT. HE WILL RECOMMEND CONTINUANCE FLIGHT OPERATIONS U.S. CARRIERS FROM SAIGON BASED ON MACV ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY SITUATION AND ESTABLISHMENT ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES.

TWO FAN-SHAPED APPROACH CORRIDORS HAVE BEEN DEFINED ALONG NE AND SW RUNWAYS OUT TO LIMIT OF 10 MILE SAFE CIRCLE AROUND AIRPORT. MACV REPORTS SINCE DECEMBER 1963 ARVN HAS PROVIDED SPECIAL SECURITY TO AREA COVERED BY FAN-SHAPED CORRIDORS. FOR GROUND PROTECTION U.S. MILITARY GUARDS TO BE INCONSPICUOUSLY POSTED NEAR PAA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT DURING STOPOVER AS NOW CASE WITH PAA MATS CHARTER AIRCRAFT CARRYING PERSONNEL. COMMUNICATION CHANNEL NOW EXISTS BETWEEN COC, MACV AND PAA AIRPORT MANAGER WHICH WILL ENSURE IMMEDIATE WARNING OF ANY INCIDENTS AIRPORT VICINITY WHICH MIGHT AFFECT FLIGHT OPERATIONS. ALSO WILL **ENABLE** PAA LOCAL REP KEEP HOME OFFICE PROMPTLY AND FULLY INFORMED OF INCIDENTS WHICH SOMETIMES RECEIVE EXAGGERATED PRESS COVERAGE. PAA AIRPORT MANAGER FULLY SATISFIED AND SO ADVISING NEW YORK OFFICE WITH RECOMMENDATION CONTINUE PRESENT FLIGHT SCHEDULE. FAA REP RETURNED MANILA FRIDAY TO FILE REPORT. EMBASSY POUCHING TEXT MINUTES OF MACV MEETING WITH FAA REP WHICH HE USING AS BASIS RECOMMENDATION CONTINUE OPERATIONS. TAYLOR

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 2:55 a.m., August 22  
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 3:05 a.m., August 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

67

43  
Action 00 RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 05A 22/0251Z  
SVN 0 220245Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
Info TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

0189113

1964 AUG 22 AM 12 13

SS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE 508, AUG 22, 11 AM

SP DEPTTEL 466; USUN 56 (DEPT 443); USUN 58 (DEPT 456).

L  
H  
FE  
IO  
P  
IOP  
NSC  
INR  
NSA  
MACV CONFIRMS THAT NO RPT NO HERBICIDE OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY US RPT US OR RVNAF RPT RVNAF AIRCRAFT IN AREAS ADJACENT RATANAKIRI RPT RATANAKIRI OR SVAY RIENG RPT SVAY RIENG PROVINCES IN PERIOD JULY 1-AUG 19. MACV REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT NO RPT NO OTHER US RPT US OR RVNAF AIRCRAFT ENTERED CAMBODIAN AIRSPACE DURING SAME PERIOD, BUT EXHAUSTIVE STUDY OF OPERATIONS AND RADAR LOGS BEING MADE. NO RPT NO CAS RPT CAS OPERATIONS LINKED TO WHITE OR YELLOW POWDERS, AND NEITHER CAS NOR RPT NOR MACV J-2 HAS ANY REPORT OF CLANDESTINE GVN RPT GVN OPERATIONS OF THIS NATURE.

RMR THUS WE ARE UNABLE ACCOUNT FOR EXISTENCE WHITE POWDER EXHIBITED BY FRENCH MILATT IN PHNOM PENH.

IN THIS ENTIRE EPISODE, STRIKES US AS CURIOUS THAT CAMBODIANS, WHOSE T-28'S REPOSTED SWIFTLY AT TIME OF CHANTREA INCIDENT IN MARCH, SHOOTING DOWN L-19 IN WHICH AMERICAN DIED, AND WHO NOW RPT NOW HAVE MIG RPT MIG CAPABILITY, MAKE NO RPT NO CLAIMS OF HAVING ATTEMPTED TO DEFEND AGAINST ALLEGED REPEATED INCURSIONS OF POWDER PLANES, STRENGTHENING OUR BELIEF THAT IN THIS INSTANCE WE ARE DEALING WITH KHMER RPT KHMER CHIMERA RPT CHIMERA.

WE SEE NO RPT NO ADVANTAGE IN CONVOKING NEW SC RPT SC MEETING ON RKG CHARGES. HOWEVER, INASMUCH AS CAMBODIANS AND OTHERS CONTINUE LINK HERBICIDE OPERATIONS HERE WITH POWDERS IN RKG, WE PROPOSE SUGGESTING THAT GVN INVITE RKG TO SEND DELEGATION TO RVN TO INSPECT DEFOLIATED AREAS. WE DO NOT RPT NOT ANTICIPATE CAMBODIANS WILL ACCEPT OFFER, BUT BID WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH GENERAL AIR OF SWEET REASONABLENESS WHICH WE URGING ON GVN AND MIGHT HELP DISPEL SUSPICIONS FROM MINDS OF AFRO-ASIAN MEMBERS OF UN. GP-3. TAYLOR

BT  
CFN J-2 T-28'S L-19

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:17 AM AUGUST 22ND.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 12:35 AM AUGUST 22ND.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014876  
By lis, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

1 2 3 1 1

68

34  
Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 500

Aug 22 2 31 PM '64

SS  
Info

INFO: CINCPAC

SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV

019

Ref: Saigon's 457 and Deptel 488

DECLASSIFIED

LIMDIS

Authority State Lt 2/20/78

By bmj, NARS, Date 4/10/78

As indicated reftel 488 the entire range military planning and deployments suggested by COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and you are under intensive study here. Instructions and guidance will be forthcoming to include points raised reftel 457.

RUSK

Drafted by:

S/VN:JRDCleand;PP 8/21/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/VN - Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

DOD:OSD/ISA - Lt.Col. Miller(draft)

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

69

33

Action

SVN

Info

SS

G

SP

FE

P

USIA

NSC

INR

NSA

RMR

NNNN RZCZCMJA881VZCZCJIA573

PP RUEHCR

DE RUMJIR 17A 21/0800Z

P 210740Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

0179116  
1964 AUG 21 AM 6 35

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 503 INFO CINCPAC  
257 HUE HONG KONG UNN FROM SAIGON AUGUST 21, 3 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

HONG KONG FOR GARD

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

By 128, NARS, Date 7-20-79

AP REPORT ON TAM CHAU'S SPEECH

AP REPORT BY MALCOLM BROWNE ON AUGUST 20 STATES THAT THICH TAM CHAU "SHARPLY CRITICIZED PRESIDENT NGUYEN KHANH THURSDAY IN A FIERY SPEECH BEFORE 4000 BUDDHIST YOUTHS." REPORT INDICATES THAT CHAU PRAISED GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, AND DENOUNCED KHANH'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER. REPORT ALSO STATES CHAU "SPECIFICALLY CFN 503 257 21 3 4000

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 17A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DENOUNCED INTERIOR MINISTER LAM VAN PHAT AND INFORMATION MINISTER PHAM THAI."

TAM CHAU STATES THAT THIS REPORT "ABSOLUTELY FALSE", THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO PREPARED TEXT, HIS SPEECH DID ATTACK CAN LAO ELEMENTS, BUT VOICED "WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT" FOR KHANH GOVERNMENT ON CONDITION THAT PROBLEM OF CAN LAO BE SOLVED. CHAU SAYS HE MADE NO RPT NO REFERENCE TO GENERAL MINH. HE ALSO SAYS HE MADE NO RPT NO PERSONAL REFERENCE TO MINISTERS PHAT OR THAI, ALTHOUGH HE DID OBSERVE THAT MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HAD DONE NOTHING TO INTERFERE WITH CIRCULATION OF HANDBILLS ACCUSING BUDDHIST LEADERS OF BEING PRO-COMMUNIST, AND THAT MINISTRY OF INFORMATION HAD ORDERED NEWSPAPERS TO REPORT SMALLER CROWD THAN ACTUALLY PRESENT AT RECENT BUDDHIST SENDOFF FOR BONZE DEPARTING FOR U.S. (NOTE: MUCH MORE PROBABLE THAT IMPLICIT TARGET OF CHAU'S REFERENCE TO MININFO WAS DEPUTY MINISTER TRAN NGOC HUYEN THAN PHAM THAI, ESPECIALLY SINCE LATTER IS CHAU SUPPORTER).

CHAU PLANNING TO ISSUE CORRECTION TO ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-503, August 21, 3 P.M. from: Saigon

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 17A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
COMMENT: BELIEVE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE ALERTED TO OVERLY  
DRAMATIC REPORTING ON PART OF BROWNE, TO POSSIBILITY THAT  
HE SEES PARALLEL BETWEEN PRESENT SITUATION AND BUDDHIST/DIEM  
CONFRONTATION, AND THAT HIS REPORTS WILL CONVEY THIS IMPRESSION.  
WHILE TAM CHAU'S SPEECH OBVIOUSLY CONTAINED ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL  
CRITICISM, HIS COMMENTS DID NOT REPRESENT A FRONTAL ATTACK  
ON KHANH AS BROWNE CLAIMS THEY DID. WE CAN ANTICIPATE VARIOUS  
BUDDHIST SOURCES WILL FEED INFORMATION TO BROWNE AS IN PAST  
WITH INTENTION GETTING FOREIGN ATTENTION AND WITH KNOWLEDGE  
THAT CENSORSHIP HERE WILL LIMIT LOCAL PLAY AND AVOID CONFRONTATION  
WITH GVN AUTHORITIES. TAYLOR

BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 7:11 AM 8/21/64  
Passed to White House, DOD & CIA at 9:00 AM 8/21/64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

*Bundy* 9

46

Action

SS

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:

Rec'd:

17814

AUGUST 21, 1964

2:31 A.M.

70

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 500

INFO: CINCPAC 254

DATE: AUGUST 21

033

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

*State let 2/20/78*

By

*img*

NARS, Date

*4/10/78*

ON AUG 17 MACV WAS PRESENTED WITH DRAFT OF PROPOSED DECREE FOR COLLECTIVE CALL-UP FOR MILITARY SERVICE OF ALL MALE CITIZENS FROM 20 TO 40 YEARS OF AGE. ALL PHYSICALLY FIT RESERVISTS OF ALL GRADES WOULD BE RECALLED AND ALL DISCHARGES SUSPENDED. DEFERMENTS WOULD BE LIMITED TO REASONS OF FAMILY, PHYSICAL, EDUCATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS. ALL OTHER DEFERMENTS WOULD BE RESCINDED.

GOVERNMENT PUBLIC AGENCIES AND IMPORTANT ECONOMIC SERVICES NECESSARY FOR NATIONAL REQUIREMENT WOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETAIN ONLY THOSE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL SUFFICIENT TO HANDLE THEIR ACTIVITY. MACV OFFICIALS WERE INFORMED THAT PROMULGATION OF DECREE WAS IMMINENT.

IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT TRAINING, ENFORCEMENT, EQUITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH DRASTIC ACTION HAD NOT BEEN CONSIDERED FULLY. MISSION INFORMED GVN THAT IT WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT EXTRAORDINARY ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STRENGTHS REQUIRED BY MUTUALLY AGREED FORCE OBJECTIVES, BUT RECOMMENDED THAT PROPOSED DECREE BE DISCUSSED IN COMBINED SESSION OF GVN COUNCIL FOR MANPOWER AND MOBILIZATION AND US MISSION PERSONNEL AND MANPOWER COMMITTEE. MISSION URGED RIGID AND VIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT OF CURRENT MILITARY SERVICE REGULATION PROCEDURES IN INTERIM.

/GVN

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM SAIGON

BE USED IN NEXT FEW DAYS.  
 THIS CARTRIDGE WILL WORK BETTER BE DISCARDED IN CASE OF  
 ANY PROBLEMS.

AND MANPOWER MOBILIZATION EXPERTS REQUESTED EMPLOYEES TO:

TAYLOR

DLW  
 DEWEET AV2 INH/HEM/



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

71

43  
Action

SS  
Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PP RUEHCR  
BF RUMJIR 09A 21/0645Z  
P 210640Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

017786

045

P R I O R I T Y

1964 AUG 21 AM 1 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 497 AUG 21, 12:40 PM

LIMDIS

DEPTEL 483.

FOR ACCURACY, SUGGEST CHANGE SECOND SENTENCE TO READ QUOTE  
AMBASSADOR TAYLOR IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON ON SUNDAY.  
AUGUST 30 AND WILL LEAVE FOR SAIGON THE FOLLOWING WEDNESDAY  
UNQUOTE. OTHERWISE CONCUR IN DEPARTMENT PLAN. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 497 483 30

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dep 2/20/28

By bmj, NARS, Date 4/10/28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

72

018305

1964 AUG 21 PM 12 36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

38  
Action  
SVN  
Info  
SS  
G  
SP  
L  
H  
EUR  
FE  
IO  
P  
USIA  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
NSA  
DOD  
NIC  
RMR

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 29A 21/1048Z  
R 211041Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014877  
By isa, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION (506) INFO CINCPAC POLAD 258  
FROM SAIGON AUGUST 21 - 6PM

EMBTel 501

AUGUST 20 EDITORIAL ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SAIGON DAILY NEWS TRANSMITTED REFTel ARTICULATEDLY EXPOSED GROWING FEELING AMONGST CERTAIN GVN OFFICIALS AND WELL-EDUCATED CLASS SOUTH VIETNAMESE. ARGUMENT RUNS SOMETHING LIKE THIS: WAR AGAINST THE VC HAS BEEN LONG AND DIRTY. NO END CURRENTLY IN SIGHT AND VICTORY, IF ACHIEVED, CAN COME ONLY AFTER LONG DRAWN OUT PACIFICATION EFFORT. ESSENTIALLY, STRUGGLE HERE IS REALLY ONE BETWEEN THE US ON ONE HAND AND CHICOMS ON THE OTHER. SOUTH VIETNAM IS MERELY THE BATTLEGROUND FOR THIS CONFRONTATION. EACH SIDE HAS PARTICIPATED IN THE EXTENSIVE MASSIVE INPUTS OF AID AND ADVISORY.  
CFN 506 258 21 6 501 20

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 29A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PERSONNEL. FROM NARROW POINT OF VIEW OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL INTEREST, WOULDNT IT BE BETTER ESCALATE WAR RAPIDLY AND ACHIEVE QUICK VICTORY?

YESTERDAY NEWS PUBLISHER TOLD EMBOFF THAT PURE NATIONAL INTEREST WAS BEHIND HIS EDITORIAL. RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN GVN HAD HEIGHTENED FEELING OF NECESSITY THAT SOMETHING BE DONE AND SOON. HE FEARS THAT NEITHER KHANH NOR ALTERNATIVES CAN EVER RALLY POPULACE AND PRODUCE VIKTORY, THUS SOMETHING MUST BE DONE QUICKLY IN WAY OF ESCALATION IF ANY SATISFACTORY RESULT TO BE ACHIEVED. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS NOT UNFRIENDLY TO THE US, STATED SIMPLY THAT "I AM VIETNAMESE FACING A VIETNAMESE PROBLEM"

ON BASIS SEVERAL ENCOUNTERS EMBOFFS HAVE HAD RECENTLY WITH OFFICIALS IN AND OUT OF SAIGON (PROVINCIAL REPORTERS HAVE OBTAINED SIMILAR REACTION), OPERATION PIERCE ARROW IN TONKIN GULF HAS PRODUCED UNDESIRABLE BY-PRODUCT WHICH MIGHT BE BOILED DOWN SIMPLY TO "LET UNCLE SAM DO IT." PRECISION OF OUR ATTACK,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
-PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 506, August 21, 6 P.M., from Saigon.

LACK OF ANY DRV OR CHICOM RETALIATION SEEM TO MANY TO INDICATE SIMPLE SOLUTION TO WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS FOR US TO TAKE WAR TO THE DRV. ON BASIS THIS SINGLE STRIKE, MANY VIETNAMESE NOW

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 29A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BLITHELY DEDUCE THAT DRV INCAPABLE OF REPLYING, CHICOMS WILL NOT DARE. RUSSIAN REACTION THEY DISMISS AS NOT EVEN A FACTOR IN VIEW OF MOSCOW-PEIPING SPLIT. BUT MOST ATTRACTIVE ASPECT TO VIETNAMESE OF THIS PERSUASION IS THAT IF WAR TAKEN TO DRV IT NO LONGER VIETNAMESE PROBLEM.

EXTENSION OF WAR AND CONSEQUENT ANTICIPATED REMOVAL OF PRESSURE FROM SOUTH, IS POWERFULLY ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE FOR KHANH GOVT. ONE NEED ONLY RECALL KHANH'S MARCH NORTHWARD THEME ENUNCIATED JULY 19 AT UNITY RALLY AND ECHOED SUBSEQUENTLY BY OTHERS IN GVN, MOST NOTABLY BY VNAF CHIEF ASPIRANT GENERAL KY. (NOTEWORTHY, BY THE WAY, THAT KY WAS ELEVATED TO NRC STEERING COMMITTEE VACANCY AT VUNG TAU MEETING AUG 16,) FACT THAT NEWS' EDITORIAL APPEARED WITHOUT WORD CHANGE DESPITE GVN CENSORSHIP IMPOSED ON ALL PUBLICATIONS SINCE ISSUANCE OF EMERGENCY DECREES, GIVES IT ADDED SIGNIFICANCE.

IN VIEW OF FOREGOING, JUDGMENT PROVIDED EMBOFFS YESTERDAY BY DEPUTY DEAN FACULTY OF SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF SAIGON, TAKES ON PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE. SOURCE, WHO IS NORTHERN REFUGEE CATHOLIC PRIEST, STATED THAT ATTRACTION OF NEUTRALIST SOLUTION IS NOW VERY STRONG BOTH IN STUDENT AND INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 29A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SAIGON. WHEN ASKED WHETHER SUCH INDIVIDUALS HAD CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THIS INVOLVED, HE REPLIED THAT MOST HAD NOT BOTHERED TO THINK IT THROUGH, WERE DRAWN TO IT MERELY BECAUSE IT HELD OUT THE PROMISE OF EARLY PEACE.

AS YET TOO EARLY JUDGE FULL IMPORTANCE THESE VARIOUS INDICATORS. TREND THEY REPRESENT COULD, OF COURSE, BE REVERSED BY SERIES OF DRAMATIC VICTORIES AGAINST VC, DYNAMIC ACTION OF KHANH GOVT IN RALLYING PUBLIC, OR IMPORTANT EVENT OUTSIDE VIETNAM'S BORDERS.  
TAYLOR  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

73 ✓

36

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

018105

SVN

Info

RR RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 06E 21/0700Z  
ZNR

1964 AUG 21 AM 9 48

SS

R 210644Z

G

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

SP

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

H

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

EUR

STATE GRNC

FE

BT

P

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT 501 INFO CINCPAC 255 FROM SAIGON TWENTYFIRST

USIA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NSC

THERE FOLLOWS THE COMPLETE TEXT OF AN EDITORIAL WHICH APPEARED IN  
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE SAIGON DAILY NEWS OF AUGUST 20, 1964:  
BEGIN TEXT. COMPLEMENT AND SUBSTITUTE

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

NIC

IN THE SAME DAY, TWO PROMINENT AMERICANS EMPHASIZED WHAT IS THE  
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE UNDERLYING THE VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN  
VIEWS OF THE WAR, DIFFERENCE WHICH WILL SURELY GROW WITH TIME.

RMR

SPEAKING IN WASHINGTON, MR. WILLIAM P. BUNDY SAID ON AUGUST 17  
THAT THE PRINCIPAL TASK WAS PURSUING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM ITSELF  
CFN 501 255 20 1964 17

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 06E UNCLAS

AND THAT ANYTHING BEYOND THAT WOULD BE AT BEST 'A COMPLEMENT, NOT  
A SUBSTITUTE'. ON THE SAME DAY, SENATOR HUBERT HUMPHREY, SPEAKING  
ALSO IN WASHINGTON, SAID THAT THE INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF  
SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY IN A HARD STRUGGLE WHICH  
WOULD BE WAGED 'CHIEFLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM', AND THAT THE WAR  
WOULD BE WON OR LOST IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH REMAINED 'THE  
PRINCIPAL BATTLEFIELD', 'THE SCENE OF VICTORY OR DEFEAT'.

THE UNITED STATES SEEKS NO WIDER WAR. WE HAVE HEARD THIS  
REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST WEEKS. THE REASON FOR IT WAS  
GIVEN BY MR. DEAN RUSK RECENTLY: A WIDER WAR WOULD MEAN MORE  
CASUALTIES, MEANING AMERICAN CASUALTIES.

BUT A SMALL WAR, FOUGHT IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS THE PRINCIPAL  
BATTLEFIELD AND ON A GREATER SCALE, MEANS MORE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION  
FOR US, AND THE VIETNAMESE WHO LOVE THEIR COUNTRY AND THEIR  
PEOPLE DO NOT LIKE TO SEE THIS HAPPEN.

UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 501, AUGUST 21, FROM SAIGON

THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN VIEWED BY MANY OUTSIDE VIETNAM AS A CIVIL WAR FOUGHT BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND NON COMMUNISTS. THIS IS TRUE BUT NOT ENTIRELY, FOR THERE ARE TWO WARS BEING FOUGHT IN THIS COUNTRY: A WAR BETWEEN VIETNAMESE AND A WAR BETWEEN COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES (NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 06E UNCLAS  
SEEMS TO HAVE BECOME LESS INTERESTED IN A CHINESE VICTORY). IT IS A TRAGEDY THAT FOR THIS SECOND WAR SOUTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN CHOSEN AS THE PRINCIPAL BATTLEFIELD. BUT IF THIS SHOULD REMAIN SO WITHOUT THE PROSPECT OF THE BATTLEFIELD BEING SHIFTED ELSEWHERE, AND IN PARTICULAR, TO NORTH VIETNAM, THEN ONE THING IS CERTAIN: IN THE LONG RUN, SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE THE SCENE OF DEFEAT RATHER THAN VICTORY.

THE REASON FOR THIS OBVIOUS. NO SENSIBLE AND PATRIOTIC VIETNAMESE LIKES TO SEE HIS COUNTRY TURNED INTO A HEAP OF RUINS. HE THEREFORE WOULD PREFER TO VIEW THE WAR BEING FOUGHT IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS A COMPLEMENT, AND ANYTHING BEYOND AS A SUBSTITUTE. THIS IS ONLY A NATURAL REACTION ON HIS PART. AND THIS REACTION SEEMS ALL THE MORE NATURAL TO HIM WHEN HE REMEMBERS THAT DURING WORLD WAR II, THE AMERICAN COMMAND VIEWED JAPAN AS THE SCENE OF VICTORY, AND CARRIED THE WAR THERE. THE FIGHTING IN OTHER THEATRES OF THE SOUTH SEAS WAS VIEWED AS SECONDARY, AND MAIN LANDING FORCE, JUST AS THE ATOM BOMBS WERE DISTINED FOR JAPAN.

WE SHOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THAT IN THE COMING YEARS, IF NOT MONTHS, THE CONVICTION WILL GROW AMONG OUR PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY AMONG THOSE LIVING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE REAL SCENE OF FIGHTING,

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 06E UNCLAS  
DEATH AND SUFFERING, THAT TO CONTINUE THE WAR UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IS SHEER NONSENSE, EVEN MORE, AS NATIONAL SUICIDE, A KIND OF SELF INFLICTED GENOCIDE, AND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THEM TO SEEK AN END TO THE WAR, BY ANY MEANS.

NO VIETNAMESE SHOULD ACCEPT WITHOUT QUALMS OF CONSCIENCE THE VIEW THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAM MUST REMAIN INDEFINITELY THE PRINCIPAL BATTLEFIELD OF A WAR, ANY WAR, CIVIL OR INTERNATIONAL. HE IS ENTITLED TO DEMAND A QUICK VICTORY, OR A PEACE SETTLEMENT, OR THE SHIFTING OF THE WAR ELSEWHERE. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, AND OUR GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY, SHOULD BEAR THAT IN MIND. END TEXT. EMBASSY COMMENT TO FOLLOW.

TAYLOR  
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

11542

74

076

57

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 496

Aug 21 3 58 PM '64

L

Info

INFO : Amembassy PHNOM PENH 102  
CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014878

By iso, NARA, Date 10-29-97

SS

SVN

G

SP

H

FE

IO

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

E

Mekong River Traffic - Embtel 275.

Question of what action GVN can legitimately take with respect Mekong River traffic must take into account applicable treaty as well as general legal principles.

1. December 29, 1954 Convention regulating maritime and inland navigation on the Mekong and inland navigation on the approach to the Port of Saigon. This agreement, signed by Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam purports to guarantee free navigation throughout the course of the Mekong throughout the territory of the contracting parties. This obligation remains binding on Viet-Nam and Cambodia even though there has been a severance of diplomatic relations. (The requirement to take concerted action under Article V and to participate in the Commission set up under Article VI may be obviated by virtue of the severance of relations).

The freedom of navigation on the Mekong is not absolute. The annexed Protocol makes it clear that navigation must conform to the requirements prescribed by the state through which the Mekong flows, particularly in sanitary,

Drafted by:

L/I/FE: Hoover, Jr.; mab

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/VN - Michael Forrestal

Clearances:

L/FE - Mr. Salans

L/SFP - Mr. Yingling

S/VN - Mr. Coreoran

SEA - Mr. Trueheart

DOD/ISA - Mr. Kamens (info)

DOD/GC - Mr. Rubin (info)

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~TOP SECRET~~

sanitary, police and customs matters and with respect to the maintenance of general security. (Article II - Protocol.) Article III of the Protocol goes on to recognize the right of each sovereign state to subject the transportation of persons and goods to certain conditions so long as these conditions respect the equality of treatment provisions (apparently a nondiscrimination guaranty as to the contracting parties or to parties adhering to the convention).

2. General legal principles. Though freedom of navigation is not a clearly established principle of customary international law, conventional or QUOTE treaty UNQUOTE law provides for freedom of navigation on many international rivers in time of peace. The US Government has often identified itself with this principle on policy grounds. The reason for lack of international recognition of this principle stems from the concept of sovereignty or the right of a riparian owner to exercise exclusive jurisdiction and control over that part of the system of international waters in his territory. This is true even in peacetime.

In time of insurgency the riparian owner naturally has an even greater interest in asserting its sovereignty to defend itself against hostile forces. Therefore riparian states might be expected to exercise their right to board merchant vessels passing through the waterway in order to determine whether such vessels are carrying supplies or otherwise assisting the hostile forces and to ~~would~~ seize and condemn ships and cargoes in conformity with law. Of course, the authority of the territorial sovereign should be exercised reasonably and with due regard to the degree of seriousness of the danger anticipated.

3. It

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. It would thus appear that neither the Convention nor general principles of international law would prohibit restrictions on Mekong River traffic so long as they are consistent with principles set forth above. The Department prefers not to comment on the specific hypotheticals contained in reftel. Embassy urged to use guidance contained herein to advise GVN as to feasibility of any restrictions which GVN may propose.

4. Re paragraph 5 reftel, no special notification to maritime nations required so long as special measures appropriately promulgated as domestic law.

END

GP-2

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

11390

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION:

Amembassy SAIGON 494

INFO:

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

Ref SAIGON's 444 and 289

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 2-27-80, OSD 5-4-78, NSC 7-25-80  
By inf, NARS, Date 11-18-80 035

Aug 21 12 59 PM '64

Following is tentative schedule for your visit, taking into consideration your desires stated reftel:

Sunday, 30 August:

Press statement at airport, with remainder of day free for personal affairs.

Monday, 31 August:

Meeting with Secretary Rusk and possibly the President during the morning. During afternoon hours, following schedule laid on:

1200 hours -- Meet with Secretary McNamara at his office.

1230 hours -- Working lunch with Secretary Mr. Vance, and Mr. McNaughton McNamara/and General Wheeler.

1330 hours -- Meet with General Wheeler at his office.

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/VN: JRDCleland:pay 8/20/64

S/VN: Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy (substance)

DOD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton (substance)

FE-Mr. Clunan (substance)

S/S-Mr. Davies

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1400 hours -- Attend meeting of JCS.

1430 hours -- Secretary McNamara joins JCS and  
Ambassador Taylor.

Tuesday, 1 September:

Morning -- Reserved interdepartmental conferences.  
(See Deptel 481, Inter alia)

1200 hours -- National Security Council meeting.

1300 hours -- Working lunch with President, Secretary  
Rusk and Secretary McNamara.

Afternoon -- Unscheduled.

Wednesday, 2 September:

Morning -- Appear before Congressional Committees.

Afternoon - Unscheduled except for late afternoon  
Press Conference or background briefing.

END

GP-3

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

*Bundy*

33

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

Control:

16697

Rec'd:

AUGUST 20, 1964

2:40 AM

76

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 483

INFO: DOD 69  
CIA 57  
CINCPAC 246

031

DATE: AUGUST 20, 1 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014879

By ice, NARA, Date 10-29-97

LIMDIS

ON AUGUST 18 I HAD A CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT KHANH DURING WHICH HE RAISED THE MATTER OF THE FOUR GENERALS IN DALAT: TRAN VAN DON, LE VAN KIM, TON THAT DINH AND MAI HUU XUAN. ON AUGUST 19 I HAD THE CAS STATIONS CHIEF, DE SILVA, FOLLOW UP ON THIS CONVERSATION SINCE HE HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD SOME CONTACTS WITH KHANH ON THIS MATTER. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT KHANH'S REQUESTS TO US IN THIS CONNECTION HAVE VARIED WIDELY FROM TIME TO TIME. THEY NOW SEEM TO HAVE SETTLED INTO THE FOLLOWING FORM:

A) HE WISHES THESE FOUR TO LEAVE VIET-NAM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ATTEND CIVILIAN UNIVERSITIES IN THE US.

B) HE IS UNABLE TO MEET THE EXPENSES INVOLVED IN EITHER THE TRANSPORTATION, EDUCATION, OR LIVING COSTS OF THESE FOUR, AND ASKS OUR HELP IN THIS REGARD.

C) THE FOUR WILL GO WILLINGLY AND COOPERATIVELY IF THEIR FAMILIES CAN ACCOMPANY THEM.

D) AFTER APPROXIMATELY A YEAR'S ABSENCE PROFITABLY FILLED BY APPROPRIATE STUDY IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD, KHANH HOPES TO BRING THEM BACK TO SERVE AT SENIOR LEVELS IN THE GVN, ALTHOUGH SUCH UTILIZATION IS PRESENTLY OPPOSED BY THE MRC.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 483, AUGUST 20, 1 PM, FROM SAIGON

THE FAMILIES OF THESE OFFICERS ARE MADE UP AS FOLLOWS:

TRAN VAN DON, WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN (AGES 17 AND 8); LE VAN KIM, WIFE AND ONE CHILD (AGE 16); TON THAT DINH, WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN (AGES 8, 7, 5 AND 3), AND MAI HUU XUAN, TWO DAUGHTERS (WITH WIFE AND THREE CHILDREN TO FOLLOW LATER).

I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS GENERAL TOPIC HAS HAD SOME DEVELOPMENT IN TRAFFIC BETWEEN CAS STATION CHIEF AND HIS HEADQUARTERS, TO THE WHERE IT WAS FELT THAT APPROPRIATE EDUCATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND INVITATIONS COULD BE EFFECTED. THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOW ASKED TO SUPPORT ALL COSTS FOR THIS ENTERPRISE IS ONE WHICH MIGHT GIVE PAUSE, BUT I FEEL THAT THE SAFE DISPOSITION, AND THE POSSIBLE REHABILITATION AS KHANH SUPPORTERS, OF THESE FOUR, WOULD BE WORTH THE PRICE. IF YOU AGREE, REQUEST YOU CONSULT WITH CAS ON THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SCHEME. KHANH, BY THE WAY, REMARKED THAT THE STYLE OF LIVING FOR THESE FOUR SHOULD BE COMFORTABLE BUT BY NO MEANS LUXURIOUS. HE ALSO PREFERS THAT KIM AND DON BE SENT TO THE SAME UNIVERSITY, AND THAT DINH AND XUAN BE TREATED AS A PAIR, BUT SEPARATED FROM THE FIRST TWO.

TAYLOR

BAP

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

77

~~SECRET~~

44  
Action

SS

Info

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 2-27-78 + DSD 5-4-78

By inf, NARS, Date 7-20-79

016620

045

1964 AUG 19 PM 10 48

PP RUEHCR RUEKDA RUHLHQ.  
DE RUMJIR 07A 20/0220Z  
P 200130Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC  
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE-GRNC  
BT

P R I O R I T Y

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 482 INFO DOD 68 CINCPAC 245  
FROM SAIGON AUGUST 20, 11 AM

LIMDIS

CINCPACFLT IS IN CONTACT WITH COMUSMACV WITH REGARD TO A POSSIBLE MARINE LANDING EXERCISE IN THE DANANG AREA USING MARINES OF NINTH MEB PRESENTLY AFLOAT OFF CENTRAL VIETNAM. GENERAL WEST-MORELAND CONSIDERS THAT THE ADVANTAGES OF HOLDING SUCH AN EXERCISE OUTWEIGH THE DISADVANTAGES.

IN A CALL ON GENERAL KHANH ON EVENING AUGUST 18, I UNDERTOOK TO SOUND HIM OUT ON THE SUBJECT, ASKING WHAT HE WOULD THINK OF SUCH AN EXERCISE IF IT COULD BE ARRANGED. HE ASKED TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT AND CALLED ME BACK AUGUST 19 SAYING THAT HE WOULD FAVOR SUCH AN EXERCISE PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF ITS MORALE-BUILDING VIRTUES, ALTHOUGH I SEE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF THE INTIMATIONS OF INTENT WHICH SUCH AN EXERCISE MIGHT CONVEY, I CONSIDER THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE EFFECT HERE, IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO HOLD THE MANEUVER PROVIDED ITS CONCEPT, PRESENTLY UNDER DEVELOPMENT, CONTAINS NOTHING TO SUGGEST US COLLABORATION IN MARCHING NORTH. WASHINGTON IS BETTER QUALIFIED TO EVALUATE THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WE RECOGNIZE MAY BE OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE. TAYLOR

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-O at 11:34 p.m., August 19  
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 12:10 a.m., August 20

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

11167

78

030

55

Origin

55  
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 488

INFO: CINCPAC ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

JOINT/STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

LINDIS

Ref Embtel 482

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 2-27-78 + OSD 5-4-78

By ing, NARS, Date 7-20-79

Nov 20 7 23 PM '64

We appreciate advantages of having marine landing exercise in Danang area from the point of view morale in SVN and training effect. Nevertheless we are concerned whether operation could be managed such a way as to avoid creating confusion U.S. intentions, not only in DRV and Peking, but also in U.S. domestic and world opinion.

Entire range military planning and deployments including this exercise, suggested by COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and you are currently under intensive study here, and we wish defer decision on moving marines until study completed.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: S/VN:MVForrestal:caw 8/20

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton (in draft) FE - Mr. Green (in substance)  
S/S - Mr. Davies

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

57

Origin  
SVN

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON DEPTEL 485

Info:  
G

INFO : CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SP

REF : Secstate 322

H

FE

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

JOINT STATE/AID/DOD/USIA Message

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 2-14-79, ICA 8-6-79, AID 11-8-79, OSD 8-8-79, CIA 6-22-81  
By inf, NARS, Date 8-18-81

Aug 20 6 31 PM '64

059

Your reply was discussed by the Forrestal Committee and it was felt that the scope of the original proposal was misinterpreted. A low input program was intended, the returns from which would be largely psychological.

We fully concur that a bounty for quote capturing and killing VC leaders unquote should not be supported by the U.S. and should not in any way be tied to the Chieu Hoi program.

A bounty-type program used in the Philippines offered rewards for the capture or liquidation of notorious criminals, identifying their crime, mentioning their position in the Huk (communist guerrillas) as an aid to identification.

We believe that a similar program, closely controlled, limited to specific individuals readily identifiable, conducted by the police or military might be useful.

Publicity for efforts to capture criminals repeat criminals would be very helpful, both positively and in sowing mutual distrust among the VC.

Drafted by:

CBohannon/Tluhe:FE/VN 8/19/64

Clearances:

P.Cody, FE/VN:AID

W.G.Stoneman, AA/FE:AID

Maj.Gen.Anthis, DOD (subs)

Adm. Blouin, DOD/ISA (subs)

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: M.V. Forrestal, S/VN

Col.Arthur, DOD/JCS (subs)

Mr. Truehart, STATE (subs)

Mr. Bunze, USIA (subs)

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

80 10968

042

55  
Origin  
55  
Info:

ACTION:

AmEmbassy SAIGON

PRIORITY 483

Aug 20 5 58 PM '64

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
XODIX LINDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State ltr 2/27/78

By

rmg, NARS, Date 4/10/78

Subject your comments, Department plans make following statement at noon briefing tomorrow:

QUOTE - The Department of State announced today that Ambassador Maxwell Taylor is tentatively scheduled to return to Washington for a brief round of consultations and to attend to personal affairs.

Ambassador Taylor is scheduled to arrive in Washington on Sunday, August 29th and will return to Saigon the following Wednesday. Mrs. Taylor will accompany him on his return. END QUOTE

H -  
Mr. Lee  
  
DOD - Mr.  
Sylvester

White  
House -  
Mr. Reedy

In answer to questions whether you will be seeing the President, we will reply affirmative. We have no objection your making simultaneous ~~xxxxxx~~ parallel statement Saigon.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

S/VN:MVForrestal:caw 8/20

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

WH - McG. Bundy

DOD/ISA - J. McNaughton

FE - M. Green

P - J. Greenfield

Sjs Mr. Davies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

1 0 7 3 4 030

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

*Bundy*

81

55  
Origin  
55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

481

AUG 20 4 02 PM '64

INFO: CINCPAC

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014880

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE By ilo, NARA, Date 10-29-97

Believe it would be useful for you and your party to have following list of questions which in mind officials various departments and agencies here. Not intended as fixed agenda, and we realize you will not personally be able to cover such detail in time you will have available. Nevertheless, you may wish to make following questions available to appropriate members of your party. You may also wish consider making one or two additions to your party. Your comments welcome, to include additional items for discussion.

## I. PACIFICATION

1. What is status of GVN pacification program, Chien Thang, Hop Tac, corps, division and province pacification plans, to include: chain of command; Joint US/GVN Committees/Operations Centers at each level; role of popular forces, regional forces, RVNAF and police; division and province reaction plans and forces

Drafted by:

S/VN: JRDCleland; 8/20/64

TSCorcoran; JMontgomery

classification approved by:

S/VN: Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton

CIA - Colby

JCS/SACSA - Gen. Anthis

AID - Mr. Cody

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

for hamlet and post defense; border control/surveillance operations; population and resources control; new rural life hamlet program; role of CAS and Special Forces in programs to accelerate and expand operations against the Viet Cong including plans for continued administration and operation of Montagnard program; extent of night offensive operations; and 24-hour Sector Operations Intelligence Centers.

2. What is status securing operations currently in effect, their relationship to search and destroy operations, and possibility of increasing number securing operations at expense search and destroy operations such as Chinh Nghia 45? How can Viet Cong main base areas be disrupted or neutralized?

3. What is program for the status of combined US/GVN planning and implementation at various levels, national, JGS, corps, province and district; US to GVN; GVN civil/military; and US to US?

4. What influence will the US have on the newly formed RVNAF Political Warfare Department? Will advisors be appointed?

5. What is need to reach new or different understanding with GVN on advisor/counterpart relations?

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

## II. MILITARY

1. What more can be done to influence effectiveness of American military advisory effort to include possibility of extending length of tour on voluntary or involuntary basis?

2. What are plans for use of recently approved additional US personnel, units and equipment and what is concept for employment of additional advisors at battalion and district level and with RVNAF Special Forces?

3. What if any steps need to be taken to ensure security of recently deployed US operational units (Ref MACV 150123Z Aug)?

4. Next course of action SEA. Considerations of field responses to State/Defense 439.

5. What is status US/GVN planning for cross border operations (ref Saigon's 457)? What is status of contingency plans for possible 1 January 65 implementation of 37-64 and/or 99-64? Is this a realistic date? (Ref Saigon's 364.)

6. What is assessment of effect of OP Plan 34-A operations to date and what actions should be planned for future?

7. Need for and timing of 5th and 6th VNAF A-1 fighter squadrons, and need for and timing of phaseout for FARMGATE A-1E squadrons.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8. Results of 19 August conference at Udorn.
9. Are MAP procedures responsive to situation requirements existing in Viet Nam?
10. Mission view as to DRV and VC reaction to US 5 August reprisal.
11. Best way to phase recent air deployments out of SVN and Thailand.

### III. POLITICAL

1. What are the prospects for achievement of a genuine land reform?
2. What are the prospects for achieving the support or at least the acquiescence of generals, politicians and religious groups in the foreseeable future?
3. What is status contingency planning in event Khanh government falls?
4. Current personality sketches on Khanh, Minh, Don, Hoach, and other key figures.

### IV. ECONOMIC

1. What is the concept for the employment of additional USOM personnel in rural areas? Where will they be stationed?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

How are they related to the various pacification programs?

2. What is the status of program for:

A. Increasing the contrast between areas under GVN control and those under VC control.

B. Urban development.

C. Selective aid to the rural areas.

D. Economic impact projects in selected area ref.

Deptel 254.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



UNCLASSIFIED

36

Action

Control:

17898

Rec'd:

AUGUST 21, 1964

6:18 AM

SVN  
Info

FROM: SAIGON

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 478 PRIORITY

G

INFO: CINCPAC 241

SP

EUR

DATE: AUGUST 19

FE

P

CU

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

USIA

NSC

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF GENERAL KHANH'S APPEAL TO YOUTH OF VIETNAM  
BEING MADE TODAY:

INR

NSA

NIC

BEGIN TEXT.

RMR

THE LAST FEW WEEKS HAVE BROUGHT A QUICK SUCCESSION OF EVENTS  
WHICH AT TIMES HAVE CAUSED YOU UNEASE AND CONCERN OVER THE  
COUNTRY'S FUTURE.

UNEASE BECAUSE, ANIMATED WITH ARDENT PATRIOTISM, YOU ARE  
CONSTANTLY THINKING OF THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE.

CONCERN BECAUSE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TRAITORS NOT ONLY ARE  
INCREASING THEIR SUBVERSIVE WAR IN THE FREE SOUTH, BUT ARE STOOGING  
FOR THEIR RED CHINESE MASTERS TO OPEN THE ROAD TO THE INVASION  
OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

PRECISELY TO HELP DISPEL THIS UNEASE AND CONCERN, WHICH THE  
WHOLE PEOPLE ALSO FELT, THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL  
IMPLEMENTED A WHOLE SERIES OF MEASURES GRAVELY NEEDED IN THIS STATE  
OF EMERGENCY TO STABILIZE THE INTERNAL SITUATION AND COPE WITH  
ANY EVENTUALITY.

AS YOU KNOW, THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS JUST PRO-  
MULGATED A CHARTER, SETTING FORTH THE ROLE AND ACTIVITIES OF ALL  
BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT AT THIS GRAVE TIME WITH THE AIM OF HELPING

UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS

-PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 478, AUGUST 19, FROM SAIGON

CONSOLIDATE AND STRENGTHEN THE FIGHTING POTENTIAL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE REST OF THE PEOPLE IN THE STRUGGLE TO WIPE OUT THE COMMUNISTS, SMASH ALL DEFEATIST SCHEMES OF NEUTRALIZATION AND LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ON WHICH TO BUILD VIET NAM INTO AN INDEPENDENT, UNIFIED AND POWERFUL NATION.

THE PRESENT STAGE IS THE MOST DIFFICULT IN OUR HISTORY. NEVER BEFORE HAVE WE HAD TO COPE WITH SO CRITICAL A SITUATION AS THE ENEMY BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT. BUT THIS STAGE IS ALSO THE TIME OF AN INDOMITABLE UPSURGE OF THOSE WHO KNOW HOW TO TAKE UP THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES AND CLEARSIGHTEDLY CARRY THEM OUT.

AS THE YOUTH OF VIET NAM, YOU MUST REFLECT THE UNBOWING SPIRIT OF YOUR RACE, YOU MUST EMBODY THE CLEARSIGHTED AWARENESS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

A LARGE NUMBER OF YOU ARE FIGHTING IN THE RANKS OF THE REPUBLICAN ARMED FORCES. THEY COURAGEOUSLY ACCEPT ALL HARDSHIPS, FACE DANGER IN BATTLE AND ARE READY TO SACRIFICE EVEN THEIR LIVES FOR THE HOMELAND. YOU MAY BE PROUD OF YOURSELVES AS MEN IN THE VANGUARD, AND SO MAY THE PEOPLE BE PROUD OF YOU. SOME OTHERS OF YOU ARE STILL SEEKING A WAY, AWAITING A CALL. THE HOMELAND IS NOW MAKING THAT CALL AND YOU MUST RISE UP AND ANSWER "PRESENT!" TO DEMONSTRATE YOUR HERITAGE OF SERVICE TO THE COUNTRY. SEE THAT WHEN THE HOMELAND IS IN DANGER, THERE IS ONLY ONE WAY, THE WAY OF STRUGGLE. BUT NOT FIGHTING IN A CONFUSED UNDISCIPLINED AND DISORDERLY WAY. THE ARMED FORCES IS THE RIGHT PLACE FOR ALL WHO ARE DETERMINED TO FIGHT FOR THE HOMELAND, FOR THE PEOPLE'S FREEDOM.

SOME OF YOU ARE STILL IN SCHOOL, INCREASING YOUR KNOWLEDGE SO YOU MAY SERVE THE HOMELAND LATER.

YOU MUST STUDY HARD AND AT THE SAME TIME SHOW DISCIPLINE AND AWARENESS OF RESPONSIBILITY -- THEY ARE THE MOST ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EDUCATION OF THE GENERATION WHICH IN FUTURE WILL HOLD THE COUNTRY'S DESTINY.

YOU MUST BE ON GUARD AGAINST ALL PLOTS OF DISSENSION AND EXTREMISM, AND ALL THE MALICIOUS PROPAGANDA OF THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE.

CALMNESS, CLEARSIGHTEDNESS AND DISCIPLINE ARE THE NECESSARY VIRTUES OF THE FIGHTING MEN ON THE FRONT AS WELL AS FOR US IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-3- 478, AUGUST 19, FROM SAIGON

THE REAR. AND THUS, YOU ALSO CAN CONTRIBUTE NO SMALL PART TO THE FIGHT AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS TO SAVE THE COUNTRY.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOUTH, BEING EAGER, WANTS EVERYTHING TO BE FINISHED RIGHT NOW AND COMPLETELY. BUT IN REALITY IT IS NOT THAT EASY. A TREE OR PLANT ONLY BEARS FLOWERS AND FRUIT WHEN THE TIME COMES; IF WE GIVE IT TOO MUCH WATER AND FERTILIZER TO FORCE ITS GROWTH, WE MAY ONLY KILL IT. IN THE SAME WAY, IT IS NOT SURPRISING OUR STRUGGLE HAS HAD TO BE SO LONG. THE MAIN THING IS THAT WE KNOW HOW TO PERSEVERE AND STRIVE UNTIL THE FINAL VICTORY.

YOUTH IS THE AGE OF PURITY, OF THIRST FOR JUSTICE AND RIGHTNESS. YOU SHOULD ALWAYS CULTIVATE THESE VIRTUES AND NOT LET YOURSELF BE DRAGGED INTO DARK AND EVIL PLOTS. THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE STILL STUDYING, FINISH SCHOOL TO PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE. YOU WHO WANT TO PARTICIPATE IMMEDIATELY IN THE NATION'S GALLANT FIGHT, THE ARMED FORCES ARE READY TO WELCOME YOU.

DEAR YOUNG PEOPLE AND STUDENTS,

THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE IS IN YOUR HANDS. BUT THAT FUTURE IS BEING DETERMINED RIGHT NOW.

I HOPE AND PRAY YOU WILL ALWAYS DO YOUR DUTY, THUS YOU BUILD A GLORIOUS FUTURE FOR OUR BELOVED HOMELAND.

TAYLOR

JWG-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8/21/64 6:28 AM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 8/21/64 8:15 AM

UNCLASSIFIED



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

83

45  
Action ZCZCMJA386JIA300  
SS  
Info PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 05A 19/0315Z  
PR 190300Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEPDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUHLQH/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
P R I O R I T Y  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979  
By *inf*, NARS, Date 7-20-79  
032  
~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 469 DOD 66 WHITE HOUSE 51 CIA 55  
INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC 238 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 19 11AM

L I M D I S

I CALLED ON GENERAL KHANH ON 18 AUGUST TO PRESENT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WITH REGARD TO THE MOON PROBE AND THE ACCOMPANYING PHOTOS. KHANH WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE AND HAD A FULL TURN-OUT OF PHOTOGRAPHERS FOR THE PRESENTATION.

AFTER THE CEREMONY, WE DISCUSSED THE CURRENT ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION. KHANH THINKS THAT IN ABOUT TEN DAYS HE WILL HAVE THE NEW SHOW ON THE ROAD. NEXT WEEK HE WILL ANNOUNCE HIS STATE SECRETARIES AND THERE WILL BE COMPARATIVELY FEW CHANGES. ABOUT FIVE OR SIX MINISTERS WILL BE DROPPED BUT SOME OF THESE SIMPLY BECAUSE THEIR JOBS NO LONGER EXISTS. KHANH IS APPARENTLY TRYING TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS (THE OLD MINISTRIES) IF ONLY TO SIMPLIFY THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATION.

WITH THE ELIMINATION OF HIS THREE VICE PREMIERS UNDER THE NEW PLAN, THIS PROBLEM OF COORDINATING THE DEPARTMENTS IS CAUSING HIM TROUBLE. HE IS THINKING OF GIVING HIS VICE PRESIDENT SOME ROLE IN THE COORDINATION OF DEPARTMENTS AND ASKED ME HOW WE DID THIS IN THE US--A QUESTION WHICH I HAD TROUBLE IN ANSWERING. TO MY SURPRISE, KHANH TOLD ME THAT KHIEM WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE THE VICE PRESIDENT; HE IS CONSIDERING A CIVILIAN FOR THE POSITION IF HE CAN FIND ONE WITH THE PROPER QUALIFICATIONS.

THE JUDICIARY, HE SAYS, CAUSES HIM NO PROBLEMS. THERE WILL BE A FEW SENIOR APPOINTMENTS TO MAKE BUT THE GOING SYSTEM WILL BE LITTLE AFFECTED.

SIMILARLY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY WILL SOON BE OPERATING. IT WILL START WITH A NUCLEUS OF MEMBERS WHICH WILL GRADUALLY EXPAND TO THE FULL MEMBERSHIP OF 150.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 469, AUGUST 19, 11 A.M., FROM SAIGON

KHANH, KNOWING MY CONCERN OVER THE EFFECT OF THESE CHANGES ON THE STABLE EXECUTION OF OUR COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAMS, WENT TO CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO EXPRESS HIS VIEW THAT LITTLE WILL BE CHANGED OUTSIDE OF SAIGON. THERE WILL BE NO PURGE OF THE MILITARY AND PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP AS OCCURRED AFTER THE COUPS OF LAST NOVEMBER AND JANUARY. EVEN IN SAIGON, THE PERSONNEL SHIFTS WILL BE MINIMAL. THIS IS GOOD NEWS IF TRUE.

IN CLOSING, I ASKED ABOUT MINH--HOW WAS HE TAKING ALL OF THIS? KHANH EXPLAINED THAT MINH HAD VACATED GIA LONG PALACE AND WAS HOME "OFFICIALLY" SICK. KHANH WAS ABOUT TO PUT ON CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND PAY HIM A VISIT. WAS MINH TAKING THE CHANGE QUIETLY? YES, SAID KHANH, HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ABIDE BY THE DECISION OF THE MCR.

GP-2. TAYLOR

BT

CFN GP-2

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, AT 1:48 A.M., 8/19/64

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC 528 FROM SAIGON 0802Z 19 AUG 64  
INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC 528 FROM SAIGON 0802Z 19 AUG 64

BT

210100Z

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

INFO ROUTINE CINCPAC

BA 7-13 INVS DOW 3-30-34

210100Z FEB 14 1964

DECLASSIFIED

EX 101111

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELETYPE Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

84

WH  
copy 3 destroyed

51

Action

SS

CONTROL: 15160

Info

RECD: AUG 18, 1964 2:07 PM

2

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE (467) PRIORITY

DATE: AUG 18, 7 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS

DEPTEL 383

SEABORN CALLED ON SULLIVAN AUGUST 17 TO SHOW HIM COPIES HIS REPORTS (WHICH PRESUMABLY DEPT HAS SEEN) CONCERNING HIS RECENT VISIT TO HANOI. AS DEPT PROBABLY AWARE, SEABORN WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS OMIT LAST TWO POINTS REFTTEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH PHAM VAN DONG, BUT OTHERWISE FEELS HE MADE ALL POINTS PRACTICALLY VERBATIM.

PRINCIPAL OBSERVATION WHICH SEABORN EXPRESSED RE HIS CONVERSATION WAS SENSE SATISFACTION THAT PHAM VAN DONG, DESPITE HIS ANGRY REACTION TO SEABORN PRESENTATION, WAS UNHESITATING IN HIS STATEMENT THAT CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO US SHOULD STAY OPEN AND THAT SEABORN SHOULD CONTINUE TO BEAR US MESSAGES, NO RPT NO MATTER HOW UNPLEASANT THEY MAY BE.

SECOND SEABORN OBSERVATION OF INTEREST WAS HIS FEELING THAT DRV FULMINATIONS TO ICC WERE LARGELY FOR THE RECORD. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THEY WISHED NO REPEAT NO INVESTIGATIONS MADE OF THEIR CHARGES, ONLY CONDEMNATIONS OF US AND GVN. POLISH MEMBER OF ICC, IN ANY EVENT, IS STALLING ANY ACTION FOR INVESTIGATION, EVEN INTO ISLAND SHELLING CHARGES, BY LEGALISTIC OBSTRUCTION. E IS TAKING LINE THAT 1954 AGREEMENTS APPLY TO ANY US ACTIONS AGAINST DRV, EVEN IF MOUNTED FROM HIGH SEAS. INDIAN AND CANADIAN INSIST ICC COMPETENCE FOR INVESTIGATION EXTENDS ONLY TO ACTIONS MOUNTED FROM WITHIN TERRITORY OF VIETNAM OR ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS. HE INSISTS ON SETTLEMENT THIS ISSUE BEFORE HE WILL MOVE ON TO ANYTHING ELSE. THUS, WITH DRV HAVING FORECLOSED

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC DDD14881

By iso, NARA, Date 10-21-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



BA

NAVY Data

Unofficial

KVC

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 467, AUGUST 18, 7 PM, FROM: SAIGON

RESORT TO UN, AND WITH ICC EFFECTIVELY FORECLOSED BY POLE FOR INVESTIGATING PURPOSES, DRV REACTIONS TO US AND GVN ACTIONS WOULD SEEM CURRENTLY CONFINED EITHER TO PROPAGANDA OR TO MILITARY FIELD.

GP-1

GN 383 17 1954 GP-1

TAYLOR

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 5:12 PM, 8/18/64.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 5:20 PM, 8/18/64.

ELDER 222

ENDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE: AUG 18, 1964

CLASS: SECRET (S) (U) (C) (R) (A) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q) (R) (S) (T) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y) (Z)

FROM: SAIGON

RECD: AUG 18, 1964 3:21 PM

ADMIN: 1212

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELETYPE Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ 85  
Bundy

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SVN NNNZCZC MJ A339  
Info 'P RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 36A 18/1615Z  
P 181600Z ZEA  
SS FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
G TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
FE STATE GRNC  
CPR BT

015138

1964 AUG 18 PM 1 35

P ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 466 AUGUST 18 11:55 PM

USIA ASSUME DEPARTMENT IS RECOMMENDING TO PRESIDENT APPROPRIATE  
NSC MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS TO KHANH ON HIS ELECTION TO PRESIDENCY.  
TAYLOR  
CFN 466

RMR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr 2/27/78  
By mmg, NARS, Date 4/10/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

86

~~TOP SECRET~~

32  
Action  
55  
Info  
CONTROL: 14893  
RECD: AUGUST 18, 1964  
11:09AM

002

FROM: SAIGON  
ACTION: SECSTATE 465 (SECTION ONE OF TWO) IMMEDIATE  
INFO: VIENTIANE 47  
DOD 64 IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE 49 IMMEDIATE  
CIA 53 IMMEDIATE  
CINCPAC 236

DATE: AUGUST 18, 7 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

VIENTIANE FOR AMBASSADOR UNGER

LIMDIS

DEPTEL 439.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014882

By isa, NARA, Date 10-27-97

THIS IS A US MISSION MESSAGE.

IN PREPARING OUR REPLY, WE HAVE FOUND IT SIMPLER TO PRODUCE A NEW PAPER WHICH UNDERTAKES TO STATE THE PROBLEM IN SOUTH VIET NAM AS WE SEE IT IN TWO POSSIBLE FORMS AND THEN TO PROVIDE COURSE OF ACTION RESPONDING TO EACH STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

UNDERLYING OUR ANALYSIS IS THE APPARENT ASSUMPTION OF DEPTEL 439 (WHICH WE BELIEVE IS CORRECT) THAT THE PRESENT IN-COUNTRY PACIFICATION PLAN IS NOT ENOUGH IN ITSELF TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL MORALE OR TO OFFER REASONABLE HOPE OF EVENTUAL SUCCESS. SOMETHING MUST BE ADDED IN THE COMING MONTHS.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM - A. THE COURSE WHICH US POLICY IN SOUTH VIET NAM SHOULD TAKE DURING THE COMING MONTHS CAN BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF FOUR OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE IS TO GAIN TIME FOR THE KHANH GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP A CERTAIN STABILITY AND TO GIVE SOME FIRM EVIDENCE OF VIABILITY. SINCE ANY OF THE COURSES OF ACTION CONSIDERED IN THIS CABLE CARRY A CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF RISK TO THE US, WE SHOULD BE SLOW TO GET TOO DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THEM UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER FEEL OF THE QUALITY OF OUR ALLY. IN PARTICULAR, IF WE CAN AVOID

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 465, AUGUST 18, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

IT, WE SHOULD NOT GET INVOLVED MILITARILY WITH NORTH VIET NAM AND POSSIBLY WITH RED CHINA IF OUR BASE IN SOUTH VIET NAM IS INSECURE AND KAHNH'S ARMY IS TIED DOWN EVERYWHERE BY THE VC INSURGENCY. HENCE, IT IS TO OUR INTEREST TO GAIN SUFFICIENT TIME NOT ONLY TO ALLOW KHANH TO PROVE THAT HE CAN GOVERN, BUT ALSO TO FREE SAIGON FROM THE VC THREAT WHICH PRESENTLY RIGNS IT AND ASSURE THAT SUFFICIENT GVN GROUND FORCES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE MEASURE OF DEFENSE AGAINST ANY DRV GROUND REACTION WHICH MAY DEVELOP IN THE EXECUTION OF OUR PROGRAM AND THUS AVOID THE POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR A MAJOR US GROUND FORCE COMMITMENT.

A SECOND OBJECTIVE IN THIS PERIOD IS THE MAINTENANCE OF MORALE IN SOUTH VIET NAM, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE KHANH GOVERNMENT. THIS SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT IN THE CASE OF THE GOVERNMENT IF WE CAN GIVE KHANH ASSURANCE OF OUR READINESS TO BRING ADDED PRESSURE ON HANOI IF HE PROVIDES EVIDENCE OF ABILITY TO DO HIS PART. THIRDLY, WHILE GAINING TIME FOR KHANH, WE MUST BE ABLE TO HOLD THE DRV IN CHECK AND RESTRAIN A FURTHER BUILDUP OF VIET CONG STRENGTH BY WAY OF INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH. FINALLY, THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD, WE SHOULD BE DEVELOPING A POSTURE OF MAXIMUM READINESS FOR A DELIBERATE ESCALATION OF PRESSURE AGAINST NORTH VIET NAM, USING JANUARY 1, 1965 AS A TARGET D-DAY. WE MUST ALWAYS RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT EVENTS MAY FORCE US TO ADVANCE D-DAY TO A CONSIDERABLY EARLIER DATE.

COURSE OF ACTION - A. IF WE ACCEPT THE VALIDITY OF THE FOREGOING STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, WE THEN NEED TO DESIGN A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WILL ACHIEVE THE FOUR OBJECTIVES ENUMERATED ABOVE. SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION WOULD CONSIST OF THREE PARTS: THE FIRST, A SERIES OF ACTIONS DIRECTED AT THE KHANH GOVERNMENT; THE SECOND, ACTIONS DIRECTED AT THE HANOI GOVERNMENT; THE THIRD, FOLLOWING A PAUSE OF SOME DURATION, INITIATION OF AN ORCHESTRATED AIR ATTACK AGAINST NORTH VIET NAM.

IN APPROACHING THE KHANH GOVERNMENT, WE SHOULD EXPRESS OUR WILLINGNESS TO KHANH TO ENGAGE IN PLANNING AND EVENTUALLY TO EXERT ~~INTENSE~~ PRESSURE ON NORTH VIET NAM, PROVIDING CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET IN ADVANCE. IN THE FIRST PLACE BEFORE WE WOULD AGREE TO GO ALL OUT AGAINST THE DRV, HE MUST STABILIZE HIS GOVERNMENT AND MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN CLEANING UP HIS OPERATIONAL BACKYARD. SPECIFICALLY, HE MUST EXECUTE THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE HOP TAC PLAN SUCCESSFULLY TO THE EXTENT OF PUSHING THE VIET CONG FROM THE DOORS OF SAIGON. THE OVERALL PACIFICATION PROGRAM, INCLUDING HOP TAC, SHOULD PROGRESS SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW EARMARKING AT LEAST THREE DIVISION EQUIVALENTS FOR THE DEFENSE IN I CORPS IF THE DRV STEP UP MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA.

FINALLY, WE SHOULD REACH SOME FUNDAMENTAL UNDERSTANDINGS WITH KHANH AND HIS GOVERNMENT CONCERNING WAR AIMS. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 465, AUGUST 18, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

THAT WE WILL ENGAGE IN ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIET NAM ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSURING THE SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIET NAM WITHIN THE TERRITORY ASSIGNED BY THE 1954 AGREEMENTS; THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT JOIN IN A CRUSADE TO UNIFY THE NORTH AND SOUTH; THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT EVEN SEEK TO OVERTHROW THE HANOI REGIME PROVIDED THE LATTER WILL CEASE ITS EFFORTS TO TAKE OVER THE SOUTH BY SUBVERSIVE WARFARE.

WITH THESE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED, WE WOULD BE READY TO SET IN MOTION THE FOLLOWING:

(1) RESUME AT ONCE 34A (WITH EMPHASIS ON MARINE OPERATIONS) AND DESOTO PATROLS. THESE COULD START WITHOUT AWAITING OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS WITH KHANH.

(2) RESUME U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OVER ALL NVN.

(3) INITIATE AIR AND GROUND STRIKES IN LAOS AGAINST INFILTRATION TARGETS AS SOON AS JOINT PLANS NOW BEING WORKED OUT WITH THE KHANH GOVERNMENT ARE READY. SUCH PLANS WILL HAVE TO BE RELATED TO THE SITUATION IN LAOS. IT APPEARS TO US THAT SOUVANNA PHOUMA SHOULD BE INFORMED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME OF THE FULL SCOPE OF OUR PLANS AND ONE WOULD HOPE TO OBTAIN HIS ACQUIESCENCE IN THE ANTI-INFILTRATION ACTIONS IN LAOS. IN ANY CASE WE SHOULD ALWAYS SEEK TO PRESERVE OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE LAOTIAN CORRIDOR.

BY MEANS OF THESE ACTIONS, HANOI WILL GET THE WORD THAT THE OPERATIONAL RULES WITH RESPECT TO THE DRV ARE CHANGING. WE SHOULD PERHAPS CONSIDER MESSAGE TO DRV THAT SHOOTING DOWN OF U-2. WOULD RESULT IN REPRISALS. WE SHOULD NOW LAY PUBLIC BASE FOR JUSTIFYING SUCH FLIGHTS AND HAVE PLANS FOR PROMPT EXECUTION IN CONTINGENCY TO SHOOT DOWN.

ONE MIGHT BE INCLINED TO CONSIDER INCLUDING AT THIS STATE TIT-FOR-TAT BOMBING OPERATIONS IN OUR PLANS TO COMPENSATE FOR VC DEPREDATIONS IN SVN. HOWEVER, THE INITIATION OF AIR ATTACKS FROM SVN AGAINST NVN IS LIKELY TO RELEASE A NEW ORDER OF MILITARY REACTION FROM BOTH SIDES, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT. THUS, WE DO NOT VISUALIZE INITIATING THIS FORM OF REPRISAL AS A DESIRABLE TACTIC IN THE CURRENT PLAN BUT WOULD RESERVE THE CAPABILITY AS AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN NEEDED.

CFN 64 49 53 236 439 439 A. 1, 1965 D-DAY A. HOP TAC HOP TAC  
I DRV (1) 34A (2) U-2 (3) U-2 TIT-FOR-TAT

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:30 PM 8/18/64

HANDLED AS EXDIS PER SS

~~TOP SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

32

Action

SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

CORRECTION ISSUED:  
8/19/64 MEC  
14993  
AUGUST 18, 1964  
12:20 PM

FROM: SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY

ACTION: SECSTATE 465, IMMEDIATE  
DOD 64, IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE 49, IMMEDIATE  
CIA 53, IMMEDIATE

002

INFO: VIENTIANE 47,  
CINCPAC 236,

DATE: AUGUST 18, 7PM (SECTION 11 OF 11),

VIENTIANE FOR AMBASSADOR UNGER

LIMDIS

DEPTTEL 439.

BEFORE PROCEEDING BEYOND THIS POINT, WE SHOULD RAISE THE LEVEL OF PRECAUTIONARY MILITARY READINESS (IF NOT ALREADY DONE) BY TAKING SUCH VISIBLE MEASURES AS INTRODUCING US HAWK UNITS TO DANANG AND SAIGON, LANDING A MARINE FORCE AT DANANG FOR DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD AND BEEFING UP MACV'S SUPPORT BASE. BY THIS TIME (ASSUMED TO BE LATE FALL) WE SHOULD HAVE SOME READING ON KHANH'S PREFORMANCE.

ASSUMING THAT HIS PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN SATISFACTORY AND THAT HANOI HAS FAILED TO RESPOND FAVORABLY, IT WILL BE TIME TO EMBARK ON THE FINAL PHASE OF COURSE OF ACTION A, A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED BOMBING ATTACK ON NVN, DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT INFILTRATION AND OTHER MILITARY TARGETS. AT SOME POINT PRIOR THERETO, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO OPEN DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH HANOI IF THIS NOT BEEN DONE BEFORE. WITH ALL PREPARATIONS MADE, POLITICAL AND MILITARY, THE BOMBING PROGRAM WOULD BEGIN, USING US RECONNAISSANCE PLANES, VNAF/FARMGATE AIRCRAFT AGAINST THOSE TARGETS WHICH COULD BE ATTACKED SAFELY IN SPITE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE MIG'S, AND

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-465, AUGUST 18, 7PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM SAIGON

ADDITIONAL US COMBAT AIRCRAFT IF NECESSARY FOR THE EFFECTIVE EXECUTION OF THE BOMBING PROGRAMS.

PROS AND CONS OF COURSE OF ACTION - A. IF SUCCESSFUL, COURSE OF ACTION A WILL ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH AT THE OUTSET AS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUPPORT OF US POLICY IN SOUTH VIET NAM. I WILL PRESS THE KHANH GOVERNMENT INTO DOING ITS HOMEWORK IN FACIFICATION AND WILL LIMIT THE DIVERSION OF INTEREST TO THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY VENTURES IT GIVES ADEQUATE TIME FOR CAREFUL PREPARATION ESTIMATED AT SEVERAL MONTHS, WHILE DOING SUFFICIENT AT ONCE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL MORALE. IT ALSO PROVIDES AMPLE WARNING TO HANOI AND PEKING TO ALLOW THEM TO ADJUST THEIR CONDUCT BEFORE BECOMING OVER-COMMITTED.

ON THE OTHER HAND, COURSE OF ACTION A RELIES HEAVILY UPON THE DURABILITY OF THE KAHNH GOVERNMENT. IT ASSUMES THAT THERE IS LITTLE DANGER OF ITS COLLAPSE WITHOUT NOTICE OR OF ITS POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT BY A WEAKER OR MORE UNRELIABLE SUCCESSFUL. ALSO, BECAUSE OF THE DRAWN-OUT NATURE OF THE PROGRAM, IT IS EXPOSED TO THE DANGER OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PRESSURE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE NVN IS REALLY HURTING FROM THE PRESSURE DIRECTED AGAINST IT.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM - B. IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE PROBLEM OF US POLICY IN SVN IS MORE URGENT THAN THAT DEPICTED IN THE FOREGOING STATEMENT. IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR AT THE PRESENT MOMENT THAT THE KHANH GOVERNMENT CAN LAST UNTIL JANUARY 1, 1965, ALTHOUGH THE APPLICATION OF COURSE OF ACTION A SHOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT INTERNALLY AND OF SILENCING DOMESTIC SQUABBLING. IF WE ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT WE DO NOT HAVE THE TIME AVAILABLE WHICH IS IMPLICIT IN COURSE OF ACTION A (SEVERAL MONTHS), WE WOULD HAVE TO RESTATE THE PROBLEM IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. OUR OBJECTIVE AVOID THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A COLLAPSE OF NATIONAL MORALE. TO ACCOMPLISH THESE PURPOSES, WE WOULD HAVE TO OPEN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE DRV WITHOUT DELAY, SEEKING TO FORCE HANOI AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TO RESIST FROM AIDING THE VC AND TO CONVINCE THE DRV THAT IT MUST COOPERATE IN CALLING OFF THE VC INSURGENCY.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 465, AUGUST 18, 7 P.M. (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM SAIGON

COURSE OF ACTION - B. TO MEET THIS STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, WE NEED AN ACCELERATED COURSE OF ACTION, SEEKING TO OBTAIN RESULTS FASTER THAN UNDER COURSE OF ACTION A. SUCH AN ACCELERATED PROGRAM WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

AGAIN WE MUST INFORM KHANH OF OUR INTENTIONS, THIS TIME EXPRESSING A WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN MILITARY PRESSURES AGAINST HANOI AT ONCE, PROVIDING THAT HE WILL UNDERTAKE TO PERFORM AS IN COURSE OF ACTION A. HOWEVER, US ACTION WOULD NOT AWAIT EVIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE.

AGAIN WE MAY WISH TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY ON THIS SUBJECT WITH HANOI OR AWAIT THE EFFECT OF OUR MILITARY ACTIONS. THE SCENARIO OF THE TENSUING EVENTS WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS UNDER COURSE A BUT THE EXECUTION WOULD AWAIT ONLY THE READINESS OF PLANS TO EXPEDITE, RELYING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON US MILITARY MEANS.

PROS AND CONS OF COURSE OF ACTION - B. THIS COURSE OF ACTION ASKS VIRTUALLY NOTHING FROM THE KHANH GOVERNMENT, PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT IS ASSUMED THAT LITTLE CAN BE EXPECTED FROM IT. IT AVOIDS THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUDDEN COLLAPSE OF THE KHANH GOVERNMENT AND GETS UNDERWAY WITH MINIMUM DELAY THE PUNITIVE ACTIONS AGAINST HANOI. THUS IT LESSENS THE CHANCE OF AN INTERRUPTION OF THE PROGRAM BY AN INTERNATIONAL DEMAND FOR NEGOTIATION BY PRESENTING A FAIT ACCOMPLI TO INTERNATIONAL CRITICS. HOWEVER, IT INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF US INVOLVEMENT IN GROUND ACTION, SINCE KHANH WILL HAVE ALMOST NO AVAILABLE GROUND FORCES WHICH CAN BE RELEASED FROM PACIFICATION EMPLOYMENT TO MOBILE RESISTANCE OF DRV ATTACKS.

CONCLUSION: IT IS CONCLUDED THAT COURSE OF ACTION A OFFERS THE GREATER PROMISE OF ACHIEVEMENT OF US POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SVN DURING THE COMING MONTHS. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ALWAYS BEAR IN MIND THE FRAGILITY OF THE KHANH GOVERNMENT AND BE PREPARED TO SHIFT QUICKLY TO COURSE OF ACTION B IF THE SITUATION REQUIRES. IN EITHER CASE, WE MUST BE MILITARILY READY FOR ANY RESPONSE WHICH MAY BE INITIATED BY NORTH VIET NAM OR BY COMMUNIST CHINA.

MISCELLANEOUS; AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE THAT 34A OPERATIONS SHOULD RESUME AT ONCE AT MAXIMUM TEMPO, STILL ON A COVERT BASIS. SIMILARLY, DESOTO PATROLS SHOULD BEGIN AT ONCE, OPERATING OUTSIDE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4- 465, AUGUST 18, 6 P.M. (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM SAIGON

12-LIMIT. WE CONCUR THAT A NUMBER OF VNAF PILOTS SHOULD BE TRAINED ON B-57'S BETWEEN NOW AND FIRST OF YEAR. THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE NOW WITH REGARD TO POLICY ON EVACUATION OF US DEPENDENTS.

RECOMMENDATION: IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT USG ADOPT COURSE OF ACTION WHILE MAINTAINING READINESS TO SHIFT TO COURSE OF ACTION B.

TAYLOR

MEC

FROM EVACUATION EMPLOYMENT TO MOBILE RESISTANCE. DVA ATTACKS WILL HAVE AT MOST NO AVAILABLE GROUND FORCES WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED THE TIMELINESS OF US INVOLVEMENT IN GROUND ACTION SINCE KHANH A WILL ACCOUNT TO INTERNATIONAL CRITICS. HOWEVER IT INCREASES PROBABLY AN INTERNATIONAL DEMAND FOR NEGOTIATION BY PRESENTING HANOI THAT IT LESSENS THE CHANCE OF AN INTERVENTION OF THE US UNDERWAY WITH MINIMUM DELAY THE INITIAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUDDEN COLLAPSE OF THE KHANH GOVERNMENT AND IT IS ASSUMED THAT LITTLE CAN BE EXPECTED FROM IT. IT AVOIDS AIRLIFTING NOTHING FROM THE KHANH GOVERNMENT. ESTIMATING BECAUSE PROS AND CONS OF COURSE OF ACTION - B. THIS COURSE OF ACTION ASKS US TO EXPEDITE. RELYING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON US MILITARY MEANS. COURSE A BUT THE EXECUTION WOULD WAIT ONLY THE READINESS OF OF THE ENSUING EVENTS WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS UNDER HANOI OR WAIT THE EFFECT OF OUR MILITARY ACTIONS. THE SCENARIO AGAIN WE MAY WISH TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY ON THIS SUBJECT WITH PERFORMANCE. ACTION A. HOWEVER, US ACTION WOULD NOT WAIT EVIDENCE OF ONCE. PROVIDING THAT HE WILL UNDERTAKE TO PERFORM AS IN COURSE OF A WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN MILITARY PRESSURES AGAINST HANOI AT AGAIN WE MUST INFORM KHANH OF OUR INTENTIONS. THIS TIME EXPRESSING PROGRAM WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: RESULTS FASTER THAN UNDER COURSE OF ACTION A. SUCH AN ACCELERATED NEED AN ACCELERATED COURSE OF ACTION. SEEKING TO OBTAIN COURSE OF ACTION - B. TO MEET THIS STATEMENT OF THE PROGRAM WE

-3- 465, AUGUST 18, 1 P.M. (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM SAIGON

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

87

~~SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED  
8/21/64 5:40 AM  
14714  
AUGUST 18, 1964  
8:40 AM

Action

Control:  
Rec'd:

SS

Info

FROM: SAIGON - CORRECTED PAGES 1 & 2

ACTION: SECSTATE 464 IMMEDIATE

032

INFO: DOD 63  
CINCPAC 235

DATE: AUGUST 18, 7 PM

*Orig pg 1+2 dest 124  
(Bundy saw orig.)*

DOD FOR VANCE AND MC NAUGHTON

LIMDIS

DEPTEL 454

1. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO WEEKEND'S EVENTS WILL BE SLOWDOWN WITHIN GVN. BY ANNOUNCING THEIR COLLECTIVE RESIGNATION (EMBTel 454), KHANH HAS TURNED ALL OF HIS MINISTERS INTO 'LAME DUCKS'. THEY WILL STAY ON IN A "CARETAKER" STATUS, BUT UNTIL THEIR FUTURES ARE CLARIFIED WHAT EFFICIENCY THEY HAVE DISPLAYED WILL BE DIMINISHED. SAME GOES FOR UPPER LEVEL AND UPPER MIDDLE GRADE BUREAUCRATS IN VARIOUS MINISTRIES, WHO WILL OBVIOUSLY BE WAITING FOR INFORMATION REGARDING IDENTITY THEIR NEW BOSSES, JUST WHERE THEY WILL STAND WITH THEM. IT WOULD SEEM ESSENTIAL, THEREFORE, THAT KHANH IDENTIFY AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY WHO WILL BE TAKING OVER VARIOUS PORTFOLIOS. AS OF THIS MOMENT HE HAS REVEALED NEITHER HIS CHOICES NOR HIS TIMETABLE ALTHOUGH CERTAIN MINISTERS ANTICIPATE NEW SLATE OF SECRETARIES OF STATE BY END OF WEEK.

2. AS FOR CONSTITUTION ITSELF, KHANH HAS ONCE AGAIN SET HIMSELF DIFFICULT TASK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST AN EARLY, ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE DEADLINE. ARTICLE 61 PROMISES THAT VARIOUS NEW ORGANISMS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AND OPERATING "AT THE LATEST ONE MONTH AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE PRESENT CHARTER."  
/TECHNICALLY,.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014883  
By uc, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

-2- 464, AUGUST 18, 7 PM, FROM SAIGON

3. HAVING SAID ALL THIS, WE ALSO UNDERSCORE THAT CONSTITUTION HAS MANY WORTHWHILE ASPECTS. FIRST, IT PROVIDES A BASIS FOR GOVERNMENT, SOMETHING WHICH HAS BEEN LACKING SINCE NOVEMBER 1. (IN THE MONTHS SINCE NOVEMBER 1 AND JANUARY 30 MANY OF MORE VOCIFEROUS POLITICIANS LOUDLY URGED THAT SOME FORM OF PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION BE ISSUED. KHANH CAN BE SAID TO HAVE RESPONDED TO THAT PETITION.) SECONDLY, IT DOES AWAY WITH MINISTERIAL POSITIONS, PLACES DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT UNDER SECRETARIES OF STATE (AS IN US) WHO WILL HOPEFULLY NOT FEEL THEY ENJOY AUTONOMY, WILL SUBMIT MORE READILY TO DISCIPLINE IMPOSED BY EXECUTIVE. THIRDLY, IT PROVIDES FOR A PROVISIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN WHICH POLITICIANS CAN PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN GOVERNMENT, SHOULD THEY SO CHOOSE. FINALLY, IT SETS FORTH A FORMULA FOR SUCCESSION, SOMETHING WHICH HAS NOT EXISTED SINCE NOVEMBER.

4. AS DEPT CAN SEE FROM AN INSPECTION OF TEXT, SOME OF CONSTITUTION'S FEATURES IN PRINCIPLE SIMILAR TO OUR OWN (E.G., SEPARATION OF LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY BRANCHES). DEPENDING ON HOW VARIOUS ARTICLES APPLIED DOCUMENT, DESPITE ITS HASTY DRAFTING, COULD PROVE QUITE WORKABLE.

5. REACTION TO CONSTITUTION SLOW COMING IN DUE TO PRESS CENSORSHIP.  
EMBASSY CONTACTS HAVE PRODUCED FOLLOWING PERSONAL REACTIONS:

DEPPRIMIN NGUYEN TON HOAN CALLED ON ALEX JOHNSON THIS MORNING  
AND STATED THAT THOUGH HE HAD MANY RESERVATIONS REGARDING  
FEATURES OF DOCUMENT HE AND DAI VIETS HAD DECIDED CONTINUE  
GIVING THEIR SUPPORT TO KHANH. KHANH SHOWED HIM DRAFT DAY BEFORE  
/PROMULGATION

JVC/22

~~SECRET~~

NOTE: CORRECTI 3 PASSED RELAY ADDRESSEES. 8/21/64

~~SECRET~~

-3- 464, AUGUST 18, 7 PM, FROM SAIGON

PROMULGATION AND HAD SATISFIED SOME OF HIS INITIAL OBJECTIONS. HE DID NOT INDICATE WHAT HIS FUTURE GOVERNMENTAL ROLE WOULD BE, BUT REPORTS CIRCULATE THAT HE WILL BE OFFERED PRESIDENT OF PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY.

OTHER CABINET REACTION NOT SO FAVORABLE. MINEDUCATION BUI TUONG HUAN AND SECSTATE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE TRAN QUANG THUAN WERE NOT CONSULTED IN ADVANCE, RESENT CONTINUANCE MILITARY IN PREDOMINANT ROLE. THEY INDICATE THEY WILL NOT SERVE IN NEW CABINET EVEN IF ASKED. FONMIN QUAT ALSO LEFT IN DARK PRIOR TO PROMULGATION, IS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS FUTURE BUT SAYS HE CONTINUES SUPPORT KHANH.

IN COURSE OF CALL ON AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, ARCHBISHOP BINH OF SAIGON EXPRESSED GENERALLY FAVORABLE VIEW OF GOVERNMENT CHANGE, IS HOPEFUL IT WILL RESULT IN TIGHTER GOVERNMENT, MORE FORCEFULL ACTION AGAINST THE VIET CONG. HE ADDED THAT SOME CONCERN EXPRESSED THAT GENERAL KHANH MOVING TOWARD ASSUMPTION DICTATORIAL POWERS BUT HE WAS INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THIS.

SEVERAL BUREAUCRATS HAVE EXPRESSED MISGIVINGS ABOUT KHANH'S MOVE. MANY CONSIDER IT AS EFFORT CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION AND POTENTIAL RETURN TO DICTATORSHIP. IMPORTANCE AND PERSISTENCE THIS REACTION DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. TYPICAL REACTION IS THAT MILITARY HAD POWER ANYWAY AND NO NEED FLAUNT IT.

CONCERN ALSO EXPRESSED OVER KHANH'S TREATMENT OF "BIG" MINH. LATTER'S REFUSAL PARTICIPATE VUNG TAU MEETING OF MRC WAS COVERED BY STORY OF HIS ILLNESS, BUT IN MEANTIME, AS REPORTED IN EMBTEL 454, SEMIOFFICIAL VIETNAM PRESS HAS CARRIED AGENCY FRANCE PRESSE REPORT OF THEIR FEUD DATING BACK TO JANUARY 30, HAS PUBLICLY EXPOSED THEIR QUARREL FOR FIRST TIME. "BIG" MINH HAS SUFFERED IMPORTANT LOSS OF FACE OVER **LAST FIVE DAYS**, BUT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THIS **RESULTS** IN ANY SIGNIFICANT DISAFFECTION AMONG OFFICERS FRIENDLY TO MINH.

/6. HOWEVER,

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-4- 464, AUGUST 18, 7 PM, FROM SAIGON

6. HOWEVER, KHANH HAS SHOWN SOME POLITICAL ADROITNESS IN HANDLING AFFAIR. MINH WAS NOT "FIRED" BUT JOB TAKEN OUT FROM UNDER HIM WITH ALL MEMBERS OF MRC PUBLICLY INDICATING THEIR SUPPORT FOR KHANH. KHANH HAS ALSO MANEUVERED DAI VIET INTO POSITION WHERE THEY HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO SUPPORT HIM. POLITICAL PARTY SECTION OF ASSEMBLY WILL GIVE EMPLOYMENT TO SOME POLITICIANS AND PLATFORM FOR THEM WITHOUT BEING ABLE SERIOUSLY EMBARASS KHANH'S RUNNING OF GOVERNMENT. KHANH ALSO HANDLED HIMSELF WELL IN SUNDAY'S PRESS CONFERENCE PRESENTING CONSTITUTION (EMBTel 438).

7. IN SUM, AND FOR PURPOSES TESTIMONY BEFORE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SUGGEST DOD REPS TAKE FOLLOWING LINE:

1) EMPHASIZE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF CONSTITUTION (PARAS 3 AND 4 ABOVE) INCLUDING ITS THOROUGHLY PROVISIONAL NATURE.

2) POINT OUT CONSTITUTION WAS NOT NECESSARY AT THIS TIME, AND IS COMMENDABLE AS SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE OF MRC AND KHANH FRANKLY AND FAIRLY SETTING FORTH FRAMEWORK WHICH THEY INTEND TO OPERATE. AS SUCH SHOULD IN LONG TERM BE STABILIZING INFLUENCE ON COUNTRY AND GOVERNMENT.

3) WHILE TOO EARLY ACCURATELY TO JUDGE REACTIONS OF VARIOUS GROUPS, THERE ARE AT MOMENT NO SIGNS OF SERIOUS OR IMPORTANT OPPOSITION. FUTURE WILL BE DETERMINED ON HOW CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS ACTUALLY BE PUT INTO PRACTICE AND WAY VARIOUS GROUPS FEEL THEMSELVES AFFECTED.

4) WE, OF COURSE, EXPECT NO CHANGE IN EFFECTIVE **WORKING** RELATIONSHIPS ESTABLISHED WITH GVN AND WOULD ANTICIPATE **THEIR** CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT WITHIN PRESENT FRAMEWORK.

/5) IN TESTIMONY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

=5= 464, AUGUST 18, 7 PM, FROM SAIGON

5) IN TESTIMONY LIKELY TO BECOME PUBLIC, ASSUME DOD REPS WILL, OF COURSE, EMPHASIZE INTERNAL VIETNAMESE ASPECTS OF QUESTION ON WHICH THEY BEST JUDGES AND FACT THAT RECENT EMERGENCY DECREES AND PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION RESPOND TO NEEDS OF SITUATION AS SEEN BY MRC AND PROVIDE KHANH AND HIS GOVERNMENT WITH BETTER INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK PROSECUTING WAR MORE VIGOROUSLY.

TAYLOR

AD

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 9:18 AM, 8/18/64.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA AT 9:55 AM, 8/18/64.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

88

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 14594  
Rec'd: AUGUST 18, 1964  
5:23 A.M.

SVN

FROM: SAIGON

Info

SS ACTION: SECSTATE 461 PRIORITY  
G DOD 62 PRIORITY  
SP CIA 52 PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014884  
By isa, NARA, Date 10-29-97

FE

P

INFO: CINCPAC 232

USIA

NSC

DATE: AUGUST 18, 4 P.M.

INR

NSA

RMR

MIN. QUAT TOLD SULLIVAN AUGUST 17 THAT AUGUST 16 MEETING OF CABINET AT VUNG TAU WAS CURIOUS AFFAIR, ENTIRE GROUP WAS USHERED INTO PRESSURE SENIOR MRC OFFICIALS, AND RECEIVED FIFTEEN MINUTE LECTURE FROM GEN KHIEM RE NEW CONSTITUTION AND MRC ATTITUDE TOWARDS CONTINUING AUTHORITY. KHIEM, WITH KHANH STANDING SILENTLY BY, SAID "I MADE BOTH NOV 1 AND JAN 30 COUPS", AND SUGGESTED THAT HE WAS DRIVING FORCE BEHIND MRC DECISION ELIMINATE BIG MINH.

KHANH THEN SPOKE FOR FIVE MINUTES, ASKED FOR RESIGNATION OF CABINET, AND ALSO ASKED ALL MINISTERS TO CONTINUE FUNCTIONS UNTIL NEW GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED. AFTER COMPLETING BRIEF CEREMONY IN WHICH ALL MINISTERS, AS A BODY, ORALLY SUBMITTED RESIGNATIONS, CABINET FLEW BACK TO SAIGON.

QUAT SAYS HE BELIEVES HE WILL BE RETAINED IN NEW GOVERNMENT, BUT ADMITS HE HAS NO ASSURANCE OF THIS. HE EXPECTS NEW DESIGNATIONS "WITHIN FEW DAYS". SAYS SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES, WHO DO NOT EXPECT TO BE REAPPOINTED, HAVE ALREADY CLEANED OUT THEIR DESKS AND LEFT THEIR MINISTRIES. EMPHASIZED FACT HE WAS CONDUCTING BUSINESS AS USUAL.

TAYLOR

DLW

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 7:00 A.M., AUGUST 18.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ 89  
Bundy

31  
Action

SS  
Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 13887  
RECD: AUGUST 17, 1964 10:10 A.M.  
FROM: SAIGON  
ACTION: SECSTATE 457 PRIORITY  
INFO: DOD 60  
WHITE HOUSE 48  
CINCPAC 230  
DATE: AUGUST 17, 9 PM. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

002

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014885  
By iss, NARA, Date 10-29-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS

THERE IS NEED FOR GUIDANCE TO COMUSMACV IN THE EXECUTION OF JOINT MILITARY PLANNING NOW UNDER WAY WITH RVNAF. THIS PLANNING WILL INVOLVE THREE CONTINGENCY AREAS: (1) CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO LAOS, (2) DRV GROUND ATTACK AGAINST NORTHERN PROVINCES OF SVN, (3) AIR ATTACK OF TARGETS IN DRV BY VNAF AND/OR US AIR FORCES. I SHOULD LIKE TO COMMENT BY CATEGORY WITH REGARD TO SOME OF THE EMERGING PROBLEMS.

## A. CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO LAOS

THIS KIND OF OPERATION HAS ALREADY BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH LIMITED SUCCESS IN THE FORM OF THE LEAPING LENA PARACHUTE DROPS. THIS PATTERN HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF MAKING REASONABLY SURE THAT A RECONNAISSANCE TEAM ARRIVES AT DESTINATION AND DOES NOT TURN BACK AT SOME POINT BEFORE GETTING THERE. I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED BY POOR INITIAL RESULTS BUT SHOULD PROCEED TO REESTABLISH THE CAPABILITY FOR LEAPING LENA OPERATIONS WHICH IS CURRENTLY VIRTUALLY NIL AS THE RESULT OF DISAFFECTION OF TRAINEES AT NHA TRANG.

IN EXPANDING CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS, CONSIDERATION IS NOW BEING GIVEN TO A CONCEPT INVOLVING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THREE "BRIDGEHEADS" OF CONSIDERABLE DIMENSION IN LAOS AS DESCRIBED IN MACV 8213 TO CINCPAC-JCS DTG 160943Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 457, AUGUST 17, 9 PM, (SEC ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

AS I UNDERSTAND THE PROPOSAL, IT SEEMS TO ME TO BE SUBJECT TO SEVERAL OBJECTIONS. IT IS OVERLY AMBITIOUS IN RELATION TO THE FORCES WHICH COULD PROPERLY BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE PACIFICATION EFFORT WHICH SHOULD ALWAYS REMAIN THE BREAD-AND-BUTTER PREOCCUPATION OF RVNAF. SINCE SUCH DIVERTED FORCES, IN MY JUDGMENT, SHOULD NOT RPT NOT EXCEED AT THIS TIME ABOUT 2-3 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS ADDITIONAL TO PRESENT BORDER FORCES THE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE IN STOPPING INFILTRATION. TO ACHIEVE ANY EFFECTIVENESS, I WOULD AGREE WITH THE JOINT PLANNERS THAT US ADVISORS SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE GROUND FORCES.

IT IS PROPOSED TO PROVIDE VNAF AIR SUPPORT FOR THESE GROUND OPERATIONS ON APPROVAL OF CINCRVNAF AND COMUSMACV. SUCH AIR OPERATIONS WOULD RAISE SOME OF THE QUESTIONS POSED BY AMBASSADOR UNGER IN VIENTIANE'S 162 TO DEPARTMENT AND WOULD CAUSE CONCERN IN MY MIND OVER LOSS OF US CONTROL OF AIR ACTIONS OUTSIDE OF SVN, WHICH COULD HAVE GREAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE TO US INTERESTS. US MISSION IS PRESENTLY STUDYING PROS AND CONS OF USING US AIR AGAINST PANHANDLE TARGETS AS DESCRIBED IN EMBTEL 236 RATHER THAN VNAF AND RESULTS OF THIS STUDY WILL BEAR ON OUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO USE OF AIR IN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS.

NOTWITHSTANDING THESE ADVERSE COMMENTS, I AM IN FAVOR OF JOINT CROSS-BORDER PLANNING NOT RPT NOT BECAUSE OF ITS PROBABLE EFFECTIVENESS BUT BECAUSE US WILL HAVE VALUE IN LETTING OFF SOME OF THE STEAM BUILDING UP IN LOCAL MILITARY.

B. DEFENSE AGAINST DRV GROUND/AIR ATTACK

COMUSMACV HAS DESCRIBED IN FOLLOWING TERMS THE MOST PROBABLE (IN VIEW OF JCS) OFFENSIVE GROUND REACTION OF DRV IN CASE OF MILITARY ESCALATION:

QUOTE ENTIRE UNITS OF PACV COULD BE INFILTRATED ON AN INTENSIVE SCALE PROBABLY WITH UNIT DESIGNATIONS CHANGED AND IN VC UNIFORMS BUT OTHERWISE MAINTAINING UNIT INTEGRITY. THIS INFILTRATION COULD TAKE PLACE ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND THROUGH THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE. FORCES EQUIVALENT TO DIVISION STRENGTH COULD BE THUS INFILTRATED AND MARSHALLED IN QUANG NAM OR THUA THIEN AND COULD MAKE A SUDDEN AND VIOLENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 457, AUGUST 17, 9 PM, (SEC ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

DESCENT UPON DA NANG AND HUE OR BOTH, WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING. AN ATTACK AT DA NANG COULD BE HIGHLY DESTRUCTIVE AND WOULD REPRESENT A DIRECT BLOW AGAINST A MAJOR US AIR BASE. END QUOTE

IN VIEW OF THIS THREAT, COMUSMACV RECOMMENDS HOLDING A BLT ON CALL TO LAND AT DA NANG WITHIN 6 HOURS AND THE REMAINDER OF MEF TO FOLLOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, HE WISHES A US BRIGADE AVAILABLE ON CALL TO MOVE TO THE DEFENSE OF TAN SON NHUT AND BIEN HOA IF NEEDED AND TO PROVIDE A GENERAL RESERVE. HE ALSO RECOMMENDS DEPLOYMENT TO SVN ASAP LOGISTIC, COMMUNICATION AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE UNITS, THE LATTER FOR THE AIR DEFENSE OF SAIGON COMPLEX, DA NANG AND NHA TRANG.

IN SUMMARY, COMUSMACV FEELS THAT A DRV GROUND ACTION IN I CORPS IS SUFFICIENTLY PROBABLE TO REQUIRE A BLT TO REMAIN INDEFINITELY AFLOAT OFF DA NANG (WITH THE REMAINDER OF MEF ON ALERT PRESUMABLY AT HOME STATIONS ON OKINAWA), TO KEEP A BRIGADE AVAILABLE FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT TO TAN SON NHUT AND DIEN HOA, AND TO DEPLOY NOW THE LOGISTIC AND COMMUNICATIONS ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT FORCES AND THE AIR DEFENSE ELEMENTS NECESSARY IN ANTICIPATION OF HOSTILE AIR ATTACKS ON SAIGON, DA NANG AND NHA TRANG.

THERE IS CONSIDERABLE LOGIC BEHIND THE ASCRIBED CAPABILITY OF DRV TO CREATE A SERIOUS GROUND SITUATION IN I CORPS IF PAVN UNITS ARE ADDED TO THE VC. HOWEVER, IF THE FORM OF THE ATTACK WERE THE INFILTRATION MODE DESCRIBED ABOVE, A CONCURRENT AIR ATTACK ON SAIGON, DA NANG AND NHA TRANG SEEMS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COVERT CHARACTER OF THE GROUND ACTION. NEVERTHELESS IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT AN AIR THREAT AGAINST THESE CROWDED BASES ALWAYS EXISTS IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE.

THE QUESTION COMES DOWN TO THE POINT OF DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT THE DRVN ACTIONS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN HAVE SO CHANGED OUR EVALUATION OF THE CAPABILITIES AND POSSIBLE INTENTIONS OF HANOI AS TO WARRANT PREPARATION AGAINST A GROUND ATTACK IN I CORPS AND THE CONSEQUENT THREAT TO DA NANG BY POSITIONING

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

-4- 457, AUGUST 17, 9 PM, (SEC ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

THE MARINES, ALERTING THE ARMY FORCES AND TAKING NOW THE AIR DEFENSE/LOGISTIC MEASURES MENTIONED ABOVE (INCLUDING INCREASING MILITARY FORCES PERMANENTLY IN SVN).

ANOTHER QUESTION ARISING IN JOINT PLANNING CONCERNS COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN CASE US GROUND FORCES ARE BROUGHT INTO SVN. THIS QUESTION COULD BECOME AN AREA OF FUTILE DEBATE IF NOT BROUGHT UNDER EARLY CONTROL AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED IF POSSIBLE. IF SOMETHING MUST BE SAID, COMUSMACV COULD COMMENT THAT THE KOREAN PATTERN OF ALLIED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP, WITH APPROPRIATE MODIFICATIONS, WOULD PROBABLY BE FAVORED BY US BUT THIS MATTER NEED NOT BE DECIDED NOW.

GP-1.

CFN 457 60 48 230 1 2 3 8213 160943Z 2-3 160 236 DA NANG  
6 GP-1.

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 11:55 AM, 8/17/64.  
PASSED CIA AT 1:25 PM, 8/17/64.

~~TOP SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

31  
Action  
SS  
Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 13930  
RECD: AUGUST 17, 1964 11:01 AM  
FROM: SAIGON  
ACTION: SECSTATE 457 PRIORITY (SECTION TWO OF TWO)  
INFO: DOD 60  
WHITE HOUSE 48  
CINCPAC 230  
DATE: AUGUST 17, 9 PM

002

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS

## C. AIR ATTACK OF TARGETS IN DRV

JOINT PLANNING WILL SOON GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE AIR ATTACK OF TARGETS IN DRV EITHER UNDER THE TIT-FOR-TAT CONCEPT OF CATEGORY II CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 OR THE MOUNTING PRESSURE CONCEPT OF CATEGORY III, SAME PLAN. HERE WE ARE BROUGHT FACE TO FACE WITH CERTAIN NEW FACTORS WHICH BEAR ON THE OPLAN 37-64 CONCEPT.

IT IS WELL TO REMIND OURSELVES THAT THIS CINCPAC PLAN WAS DRAWN UP WITH THE IDEA OF APPLYING MILITARY PRESSURE IN DRV THROUGH OVERT ACTIONS OF GVN WITH US PARTICIPATION LIMITED TO RECONNAISSANCE BEYOND CAPABILITY OF VNAF AND TO FARMGATE ACTIVITIES TO WHICH WOULD BE ADDED THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE B-57'S. SINCE THIS EARLY CONCEPT, SEVERAL NEW FACTORS HAVE COME INTO PLAY. THE DRV ATTACK IN THE GULF OF TONKIN HAS REQUIRED A US POSTURE OF READINESS REFLECTED IN CINCPAC FRAGORDER 062335Z WHICH CALLS ON US AIR FORCES ALONE TO ATTACK NVN TARGETS. THE CRASH REQUIREMENT FOR A PLAN READY FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION CAUSED THE MOVEMENT OF THE B-57'S TO SVN AS US, NOT FARMGATE, AIRCRAFT. FINALLY, THE APPEARANCE OF MIG 15/17'S AT PHUC YEN AIRFIELD, HANOI, HAS SET DEFINITE LIMITS UPON WHAT THE VNAF PROPELLER PLANES CAN DO IN CONTRIBUTING TO OPLAN 37-64.

THESE NEW FACTORS CALL FOR A QUICK REVIEW OF OPLAN 37-64 TO DECIDE WHAT ROLE THE US WISHES VNAF (WITHOUT AND WITH

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-457, AUGUST 17, 9PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM SAIGON FARMGATE) TO PLAY IN ANY AIR ACTION AGAINST NVN. Y EMPHASIZE QUICK REVIEW BECAUSE COMUSMACV NEEDS GUIDANCE TODAY AS TO HOW TO CONDUCT HIS PLANNING DISCUSSIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE WILL NEED TO KNOW WHETHER VNAF CAN HOPE TO GET JETS (PARTICULARLY THE B-57'S) AND, IF SO, WHEN AND HOW MANY. ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS DO NOT NEED TO BE ANSWERED NOW BUT WE DO NEED TO DECIDE IN GENERAL WHAT ROLE THE GVN SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PLAY IN OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR OPERATIONS. IT WILL NOT DO TO SAY THE ROLE IS ZERO AS NOW IMPLIED IN CINCPAC FRAGORDER. THIS GOVERNMENT MUST BE GIVEN A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ROLE TO PLAY WHICH WILL STIMULATE ENTHUSIASM WITHOUT DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM THE IN-COUNTRY PACIFICATION PLAN. THIS IS GOING TO BE A HARD BALANCE TO STRIKE.

IN CONCLUSION, I RECOMMEND APPROVING FOLLOWING JOINT PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR USE BY COMUSMACV WITH GVN:

A. CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS

- (1) ONLY ONE AREA OF GROUND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN AT OUTSET, PREFERABLY THE ONE OFFERING GREATEST PROMISE OF SUCCESS.
- (2) NOT MORE THAN TWO BATTALION EQUIVALENTS TO BE COMMITTED AT ANY ONE TIME (BEYOND PRESENT BORDER FORCES).
- (3) PLANS FOR AIR ACTIONS IN LAOS TO MAKE PROVISION FOR USE OF EITHER VNAF/FARMGATE OR US AIR WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO FINAL DECISION.
- (4) ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS TO BE ON APPROVAL BY COMUSMACV (WHO WILL OBTAIN NECESSARY US CLEARANCES).

B. DEFENSE AGAINST DRV GROUND/AIR ATTACK

- (1) NO PLANNING FOR LANDING US GROUND FORCES IN SVN BEYOND MARINES AT KC NANG TO PROTECT AIRFIELD IN CASE OF CLEAR THREAT. CINCPAC TO HAVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MARINES.
- (2) NO INDICATION OF ANY INTENTION TO INCREASE PERMANENT US GARRISON BEYOND POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF HAWK UNITS IF

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-457, AUGUST 17, 9PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM SAIGON

AIR SITUATION WORSENS.

(3) DISCUSSION OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIP TO BE AVOIDED AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. IF NECESSARY, USE KOREAN PATTERN AS BASIS FOR PLANNING WITHOUT COMMITMENT.

C. AIR ATTACK OF TARGETS IN DRV

(1) INCLUDE B-57'G IN FARMGATE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

(2) JOINT PLANNERS TO EXAMINE MIG THREAT AND DECIDE WHAT TARGETS COULD BE SAFELY GIVEN TO PROPELLER AIRCRAFT UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS.

(3) EVENTUALLY ASSURE APPROPRIATE PARTICIPATION OF VNAF IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING EXAMINATION.

THIS MESSAGE, WHILE BEARING ON SOME OF THE MATTERS CONTAINED IN DEPTTEL 439, WAS PREPARED BEFORE ITS RECEIPT AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ANSWER TO IT.

THE FOREGOING HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH WESTMORELAND WHO CONCURS WITH THE ABOVE RECOMMENDED GUIDANCE FOR JOINT PLANNING WITH GVN. HE REAFFIRMS HIS POSITION ON MILITARY POSTURE AS DESCRIBED IN MACV 8149 DTG 150123Z.

GP-1.

CFN 457 60 48 230 37-64 37-64 57 062335Z 57 15/17 37-64  
57 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 57 2 3 439 8149 150123Z GP-1.

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AUGUST 17 AT 12:25 PM  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 1:50 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

90

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

44

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority

*State ltr 2/27/78*

By

*bmj*, NARS, Date *4/10/78*

Action

RR RUEHCR

SVN

DE RUMJIR 05A 17/0239Z

Info

R 170236Z ZA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

013523

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

G

INFO RUMJDH/AMEMBASSY HKONG

SP

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

H

STATEGR

P

ORZIJC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 445 INFO HKONG 65 CINCPAC  
POLAD 224 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 17 - 11AM

USIA

TOKYO'S 28 SENT DEPT AS 547

NSC

INR

WOULD APPRECIATE TELEGRAPHIC COPY FULL TEXT BURCHETT ARTICLE  
REPORTED REFTEL. TWO POINTS STRIKE US AS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT  
(A) IDEA OF COMBINING VIETNAM AND LAOS "FRONTS" INTO SINGLE  
STRUGGLE, AND (B) UNLEASHING "100,000" VIETNAMESE WHO WENT  
NORTH IN 1954.

CIA

NSA

DOD

NIC

RMR

BOTH THESE VEILED THREATS WOULD SEEM TO SUGGEST DRV TYOING  
WITH IDEA OF MORE OVERT VIETMINH OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND VIETNAM.  
CFN 445 65 224 17 11 28 547 100,000 1954

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 05A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SINCE OUR INFO HERE INDICATES ONLY ABOUT 40,000 SOUTH VIETNAMESE  
FORCES WENT NORTH WITH VIET MINH IN 1954, WE COULD READ INTO  
THIS THREAT A PROPOSAL TO INTRODUCE 60,000 NEW NORTHERN CADRES  
INTO THE FIGHT.

WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT AND HONG KONG ANALYSIS THIS ARTICLE  
AND ESPECIALLY ANY COMMENT ABOUT NUMBERS OF SOUTHERN TROOPS WHICH  
WENT NORTH IN 1954. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 40,000 1954 60,000 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

(4) WH  
91

Action

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 10 MAR 76

Info

CONTROL: 13515

RECD: AUGUST 16, 1964, 11:21 PM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 444

DATE: AUGUST 17, 10 AM

~~SECRET~~

DEPTEL 432.

NODIS

ACCORDING TO PRESENT PLANS, KILLEN AND ZORTHIAN WILL BE WITH ME BOTH WAYS. LISA MANFULL, DAUGHTER OF POLITICAL COUNSELOR, WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON ONLY. MRS. THROCKMORTON, WIFE LT. GEN. THROCKMORTON OF MACV, WILL PROBABLY BE ON PLANE WASHINGTON TO SAIGON. NO RPT NO OTHER PASSENGERS ANTICIPATED AT THIS TIME.

AT MOMENT SEE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 24 BUT SUGGEST RECHECK OF SITUATION JUST IN ADVANCE. I RPT I HAVE LET IT BE KNOWN ABOUT TOWN THAT I RPT I HOPE TO RETURN SOMETIME FAIRLY SOON TO PICK UP MRS. TAYLOR BUT NO RPT NO MENTION OF DATES.

GP-4

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 432 NODIS KILLEN ZORTHIAN LISA MANFULL LT.GEN MACV

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



08655

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

92 ✓

Aug 17 4 42 PM '64

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE 454

INFO: CINCPAC XXXXXXXXXXXX

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr 2/29/78

049

By rmg, NARS, Date 4/10/78LINDISFOR THE AMBASSADOR  
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGEDOD representatives  
~~/Asking Secretary Vance~~ scheduled to testify before

House Armed Services Committee tomorrow morning. In light press accounts here of changes in Government, changes in US/GVN advisory relationships, and establishment joint US/GVN command; we expect searching questions. ~~ix~~ Would appreciate your providing as much of a wrap-up as possible of week-end developments, together with your best judgment effect any Government personnel changes by 8 a.m. Washington time tomorrow. Suggest you slug message DOD for Vance and McNaughton.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

MVForrestal:caw/S/VN 8/17/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: Michael V. Forrestal - S/VN

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Mr. Friedman (in substance) S/S-Mr. Davies

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

93

33

Action

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 36A 15/1055Z  
Z O 151050Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

Info

012990

1964 AUG 15 AM 7 11

033

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION FLASH DEPT 428 INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 214 FROM SAIGON  
AUG 15, 7 PM

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE, DOD WASHINGTON, CIA.

DECLASSIFIED

LIMDIS.

Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

REF EMBTELS 415 AND 416.

By inf, NARS, Date 7-20-79

EMBASSY HAS NOW BEEN INFORMED THAT PROCLAMATION, WHICH WILL  
RESUMABLY ALSO UNVEIL NEW CONSTITUTION, WILL BE ISSUED 10 A.M.  
AUGUST 16 SAIGON TIME. PRESS CONFERENCE HAS BEEN CONVENED IN  
NAME MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AT CAP ST. JACQUES (VAN  
TAU) FOR THAT TIME.

MINISTRY INFORMATION TELEPHONED SULLIVAN AFTERNOON AUGUST 15  
ASKING FOR ANY VIEWS WE MIGHT HAVE ON DRAFT PROCLAMATION.  
SINCE DRAFT HAS NOT RPT NOT YET ARRIVED EMBASSY, WE SENT  
CFN 428 214 15 7PM 415 416 10 AM 16 15

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 36A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ZORTHIAN AND SIMPSON TO VANG TAU TO ASSIST WITH EDITING AND  
SANDPAPERING DRAFT WHICH MRC HAS PRODUCED.

MINH REPORTEDLY WAS INVITED BY MRC TO BE PRESENT AT VANG  
TAU AND TO ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCE ALSO WITH OTHER MILITARY  
OFFICERS WHO WILL SPONSOR PROCLAMATION. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE  
SOURCE, HE HAS DECLINED THIS INVITATION AND REMAINS BROODING  
IN HIS PALACE.

GP-3. TAYLOR

BT

CFN MRC MRC GP-3.

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 7:15 a.m., August 15, 1964

NOTE: Passed White House, DOD, CIA, 8/15/64, 7:21 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

94

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action NNNNZCZCMJA783  
RR RUEHCR  
SVN DE RUMJIR 29A 15/0810Z  
Info R 150800Z ZEA  
SS FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)  
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
SP INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
FE RUEKDA/DID WASHDC  
IO RUEPIA/WASHDC  
NSC RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
INR STATE GRNC  
RMR BT

012981

1964 AUG 15 AM 5 59

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DEPT 422 INFO CINCPAC 210 DOD 49 CIA 42 WHITEHOUSE 38  
FROM SAIGON AUG 15, 3 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EMBTTEL 342

REACTION TO PIERCE ARROW AND PRIME MINISTER KHANH'S PROCLAMATION  
STATE OF EMERGENCY THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM HAS FOLLOWED FAIRLY  
PREDICTABLE LINES. IN GENERAL VIETNAMESE IN ALL WALKS OF LIFE  
GIVE BOOST BY US STRIKES ON DRV BASES, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS TINGED  
BY RATHER WIDESPREAD FEAR THAT DRV, WITH OR WITHOUT CHICOM  
ASSISTANCE, WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST SOUTH. WIDESPREAD HOARDING  
CFN 422 210 49 42 38 15 3PM 342 US DRV DRV

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 29A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS WAS REPORTED. THERE WAS ALSO SOME CONCERN,  
PARTICULARLY AMONG REFUGEE GROUPS AND OTHERS OF NORTHERN ORIGIN,  
THAT ATTACKS MAY HAVE INJURED RELATIVES OR DAMAGED FAMILY  
PROPERTIES (WHICH SOME DIE-HARD NORTHERNERS EXPECT ONE DAY TO  
RECLAIM). KHANH'S EMERGENCY DECREES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS  
A LOGICAL SEQUEL TO AMERICAN STRIKES AND CRITICISM THAT THEY  
MIGHT BE ATTEMPT KHANH'S PART CAPITALIZE ON SITUATION AND SEIZE  
DICTATORIAL POWER, HAS BEEN REMARKABLY SLIGHT GIVEN THE VIETNAMESE  
PROCLIVITY FOR FINDING ARRIERE-PENSEE BEHIND EVERY POLITICAL  
MOVE. FOR EXAMPLE DAI VIETS AROUND DEPPRIMIN NGUYEN TON HOAN,  
WHO HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF KHANH INPAST, HAVE BEEN PLAYING BACK  
TO EMBASSY CONTACTS LOYALTY THEME IN SUPPORT OF PRIMIN AND HIS ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014886

By us NARA, Date 10-29-97 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



REF ID: A66707  
VTC  
DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-422, August 15, 3 P.M. from Saigon

REACTION CHINESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY HAS BEEN CENTERED IN AREA OF THEIR POCKETBOOKS. FUKIEN CONGREGATION LEADER PREDICTED THAT DEVREES WOULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY ENFORCED, POINTED OUT THAT THEY HAD ALREADY CAUSED PIASTRE TO WEAKEN AND HOARDING BY PROFITEERS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT MAY CHINESE ARE CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT GENERAL SITUATION TO CONSIDER (THOSE WHO CAN) PULLING UP STAKES, AND LEAVING. HIGHLY-PLACED CHINESE BANKING SOURCE, RESIDENT IN SAIGON FOR BETTER PART OF TWENTY YEARS, IN MOVING HIS FAMILY TO TAIPEI. HE CITED CASE OF THREE OTHER WEALTHY CHINESE FAMILIES

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 29A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHO ARE LEAVING FOR PARIS. HE SAID THAT BANKING CIRCLES QUITE APPREHENSIVE OVER TREAD OF EVENTS AND WERE TIGHTENING UP CREDIT REGULATIONS. FROM OTHER CHINESE SOURCES WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT APPROXIMATELY TWENTY OTHER CHINESE FAMILIES ON POINT OF LEAVING.

BUDDHIST LEADER THICH TAM CHAU, IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, APPROVED RETALIATORY STRIKE AND WELCOMED THEM AS INDICATION DEPTH OF US DETERMINATION TO REMAIN IN SVN, AND AS GOOD LESSON FOR

DRV. DECREES HE FOUND ACCEPTABLE DURING EMERGENCY SITUATION, BUT EXPRESSED HOPE THEY WOULD BE EASED WHEN SITUATION IMPROVED. (VIEWS OF OTHER BUDDHIST POWER, THICH TRI QUANG, REPORTED REFTEL.)

CATHOLIC PRIEST (NORTHERN REFUGEE) HARTILY ENDORSED RETALIATORY STRIKES. HE AND COLLEAGUES CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY US DOES NOT ISSUE ULTIMATUM TO DRV WARNING OF FURTHER BOMBING IF VC ACTIVITY IN SOUTH CONTINUE. AS FOR KHANH'S DECREES, HE SEES THEM AS INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN GVN HAND IN CONTROLLING ALLEGED VC INFILTRATION OF BUDDHIST RANKS.

NOW EIGHT DAYS AFTER THE ATTACK, THERE IS NOTICABLE "WHAT NEXT" ATTITUDE DEVELOPING PARTICULARLY AMONGST BUREAUCRATS AND HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS OF GVN. FACT THAT US STRIKES WERE SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC PROVOCATION AND NOT NECESSARILY OPENING UN- IN HOSTILITIES BETWEEN DRV AND US GENERALLY LOST IN SENSATIONAL CFN SVN DRV DRV VC VC GVN US GVN US

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-422, August 15, 3 P.M. from Saigon

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 29A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACCOUNTS OF GULF OF TONKIN ACTION AND AFTERMATH SEEMS QUITE  
PROBABLE THAT ABSENCE OF ANY FURTHER US ACTION AGAINST DRV  
WILL RESULT IN EMOTIONAL LETDOWN BOTH IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT.  
IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFFS, SEC GEN MININTERION NGUYEN  
DINH XUONG ENUNCIATED PHILOSOPHY THAT IS GAINING CURRENCY GOVERNMENT  
CIRCLES: VIZ., ATTACK AGAINST NORTH IS ONLY WAY OUT OF PRESENT DILEMA  
CONFRONTING SOUTH. WAR CANNOT DRAG ON INDEFINITELY, MUST BE  
BROUGHT TO SOME SORT OF CONCLUSION. WOULD THEREFORE BE BETTER  
RISK EVERYTHING ON SUCH AN ATTACK. THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD REQUIRE  
US BACKING. US POSITION AGAINST WIDENING WAR IS UNDERSTOOD,  
BUT NATURALLY SUBORDINATED TO VIETNAMESE VIEW OF OWN NATIONAL  
INTEREST AS THEY SEE IT.

SEC GEN XUONG ACCOMPANIED PRIMIN ON RECENT PROVINCIAL SWING  
DURING WHICH KHANH MADE STATEMENTS WHICH WERE INTERPRETED BY SOME  
AS BACKDOWN FROM MARCH NORTH POSITION. XUONG MAINTAINS THAT KHANH  
DID NOT IN THESE ADDRESSES ABANDON HIS DESIRE, STILL BELIEVES  
WITH THOSE AROUND HIM THAT "GO FOR BROKE" ATTACK ON NORTH IS  
GVN'S ONLY HOPE. REASONABLE TO EXPECT THEREFORE THAT MORALE  
OF MANY VIETNAMESE WILL SINK AS IT BECOMES EVIDENT THAT US  
ACTION AGAINST PT BASES NOT TO BE FOLLOWED UP BY OTHER ATTACKS.  
IN SUCH ATMOSPHERE IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT MASS OF POPULATION  
CFN US US GVN S US PT

PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 29A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF KHANH'S EMERGENCY DECREES,  
AND THAT OFFICIALS WILL BE DISINCLINED STRICTLY ENFORCE THEM.  
IT THUS MAY BECOME REAL PROBLEM FOR GVN AND US TO MAINTAIN  
MOMENTUM CREATED BY TONKIN INCIDENTS AND KHANH'S DECLARATION OF  
EMERGENCY DECREES; IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT SURFACE MANIFESTATIONS  
OF MOMENTUM - E.G., AIR RAID DRILLS, AIR RAID AND TRENCH CONSTRUCTION  
-- WILL SUFFICE IN THIS REGARD; THE ONLY INTERFERE WITH DAILY  
ROUTINE WITH RATIONALE FOR THEM APPARENTLY DIMINISHING.

GP-3.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN GVN US GP-3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

95

44  
Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

P R 150659Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

P R I O R I T Y

0 1 2 9 3 8

AUGUST 15, 1964  
4:56 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT PRITY (419) INFO CINCPAC 207 FROM SAIGON  
AUG 15 3:05 PM

031

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

EMBTEL 404

IN ADVANCE OF NSC-MISSION COUNCIL MEETING AT CAP ST. JACQUES  
14 AUG I HAD A PRIVATE TALK WITH KHANH ABOUT SOME OF HIS  
PROBLEMS RE REMODELLING THE GOVERNMENT. HE CONCEDES THAT MINH  
IS HIS BIGGEST HEADACHE. I RECOUNTED TO HIM MY CALL ON MINH  
(EMBTEL 404) AND CLEAR IMPRESSION MINH WOULD RESIST BEING MOVED  
ABROAD. KHANH HAS FORMERLY SAID THAT HE HAS ENOUGH ON MINH  
TO BLACKMAIL HIM OUT OF THE COUNTRY. NOW AS A SHOWDOWN APPROACHES,  
HE IS NOT SO SURE.

KHANH EXPLAINED HOW THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE SET IN MOTION.  
FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF INTERIM CONSTITUTION (NOW REFERRED TO  
AS A CHARTER) ALL PRESENT OFFICIALS WILL RESIGN - INCLUDING MINH  
AND KHANH. THEN THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE WILL  
ELECT THE NEW PRESIDENT AND CONFIRM THE INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED  
BY THE PRESIDENT FOR VICE-PRESIDENT. THEREAFTER THE PRESIDENT  
WILL APPOINT HIS DEPARTMENTAL SECRETARIES AND OTHER KEY EXECUTIVE  
OFFICIALS.

KHANH POINTS OUT THAT MINH CAN STAND FOR ANY OF THESE POSITIONS  
BUT IN END MUST ABIDE BY DECISIONS OF HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES  
OF MRC. KHANH INDICATED THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT I WOULD HELP  
HIM PERSUADE MINH TO BE AMENABLE. I TOLD HIM THAT AS IN PAST  
I WOULD DO MY BEST BUT DOUBTED THAT MINH  
COULD BE BROUGHT TO VIEW IMPENDING EVENTS WITH ANY ENTHUSIASM.  
I URGED KHANH TO INFORM MINH OF CURRENT PLANNING IN EFFORT TO  
MAKE HIM A RESPONSIBLE PARTICIPANT.

KHANH STILL IS RELUCTANT TO TALK ABOUT PERSONNEL CHANGES AMONG  
HIS MINISTERS. TAYLOR

BT

CFN GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 15, 6:18 A.M.

PASSED THE WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AUGUST 15, 6:27 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority RAC 00014887

By isa NARA, Date 10-29-97



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

96

48

Action

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
STATE letter FEB 14 1979

SVN

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 22A 15/0715Z

Authority

By ind, NARS, Date 7-20-79

Info

P R 150705Z ZEA

SS

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

G

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

0 1 2 9 4 2

SP

RUEPVV/WHITE HOUSE

AUGUST 15, 1964

L

RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC

5:15 A.M.

H

RUEPIA/CIA WASHDC

FE

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

IGA

STATE GRNC

P R I O R I T Y

AID

BT

P

~~SECRET~~

USIA

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 418 WHITEHOUSE 37 DOD 48 CIA 41 INFO CINCPAC  
206 FROM SAIGON AUG 15, 3 PM

NSC

INR

NSA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

RMR

US MISSION COUNCIL MET AUG 14 WITH GVN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
IN GENERAL KHANH'S VILLA AT CAP ST. JACQUES. MEETING WAS  
CONDUCTED IN BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE DESPITE INFORMAL NATURE  
OF SURROUNDINGS. TWO BASIC AGENDA ITEMS WERE (1) COORDINATION  
US MISSION STAFF COMMITTEES WITH APPROPRIATE GVN COUNTERPARTS,  
AND (2) GVN CIVILIAN MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION IN HOP TAC PLAN.  
CFN 418 37 48 41 206 15 3PM 14 GVN (1) US GVN (2) GVN

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 22A ~~SECRET~~

ON FIRST ITEM, GVN DESIGNATED SIX COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN FOR INTER-  
MINISTERIAL BODIES COVERING (A) COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS  
(ARVN J-6) (B) CONSTRUCTION (ARVN CHIEF ENGINEER) (C) MANPOWER  
(ARVN J-1) (D) THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE (FOMIN QUAT) (E)  
RESOURCES CONTROL (INT MIN PHAT) (F) MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH  
(MIN HEALTH).

EACH OF THESE GVN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN WILL BE PUT IN TOUCH WITH  
UN COUNTERPART AND WILL SPELL OUT FULL COMPOSITION OF HIS  
COMMITTEE. SULLIVIAN AND GEN. CAO WILL THEN COOPERATE IN  
DRAWING UP AGREED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR GENERAL COMPETENCE  
OF COMBINED US-GVN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE TERMS  
OF REFERENCE, TOGETHER WITH SPECIFIC COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS  
(E.G. CONSTRUCTION COMMITTEE SHOULD STUDY PORT OF SAIGON AND  
SAIGON RIVER CHANNEL) WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL AT NEXT  
MEETING US MISSION COUNCIL - GVN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 418, AUGUST 15, 3 P.M. FROM SAIGON

IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION, KHANH MADE TWO OBSERVATIONS WORTH NOTING. FIRST WAS REQUEST FOR MANPOWER MOBILIZATION SPECIALIST (SEE SEPTTEL). SECOND WAS ENUMERATION OF THOSE ITEMS OF ASSISTANCE MOST NEEDED FROM THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES, I.E., MEDICAL TEAMS, CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL AND ENGINEERING PERSONNEL, ESPECIALLY FOR ROAD AND BRIDGE BUILDING.

ON SECOND AGENDA ITEM, KHANH INDICATED CLEAR GRASP OF REQUIREMENTS CPN GVN (A) ARVN J-6 (B) ARVN (C) ARVN J-1 (D) (E) (F) GVN US US-GVN US GVN

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 22A ~~SECRET~~  
FOR CIVILIAN MINISTRY PARTICIPATION IN HOC TAP PLANNING, AND ON GAVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO POLICE PROGRAMMING. HE INDICATED THAT BUDGET ARRANGEMENTS TO EMBRACE THIS PARTICIPATION WOULD REQUIRE SOME REVISION OF PRESENT LEVELS; BUT, REFERRING TO JOHNSON, BELL AND MCNAMARA STATEMENTS, ASSUMED THIS WAS NO REPEAGNO PROBLEM. BUDGET MATTER WAS REFERRED TO OANH AND KILLEN FOR BILATERAL RESOLUTION.

TAYLOR  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 15, 5:36 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

97

42-48

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Action JIA912  
PP RUEHCR  
SVN DE RUMJIR 18A 16/0620Z  
P R 150615Z ZEA  
Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
SS INFO RUEKDA/DOD  
G RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
SP RUEPIA/CIA  
FE RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
NSC STATE GRNC  
BT  
INR ~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (417) INFO CINCPAC 205 DOD 47  
NSA CIA 40 WHITEHOUSE 36 FROM SAIGON AUG 15 2:30 PM  
OEP  
RMR

Authority *State Sec 2127/108*

By *img*, NARS, Date *4/10/78*

0 1 2 8 9 9

AUGUST 15, 1964

3:28 A.M.

047  
52

P R I O R I T Y

GENERAL KHANH HAS REQUESTED EXPERT ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD OF WARTIME MANPOWER UTILIZATION. THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT BUT RELATIVELY NEGLECTED FIELD IN WHICH IT IS IN US INTEREST TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE. WHILE MACV PREPARED TO GIVE COMPETENT ADVICE IN MILITARY PERSONNEL MATTERS, WE DO NOT HAVE IN THE MISSION THE CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING ADVISERS IN THE FIELDS OF RESPONSIBILITY WHICH IN WASHINGTON FALL TO THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION AND SELECTIVE SERVICE.  
CFN 417 205 47 40 36

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 18A ~~SECRET~~

TO FILL THIS GAP ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS, I REQUEST THE LOAN OF TWO EXPERTS ONE FROM ODM AND OTHER FROM SELECTIVE SERVICE FOR THE PERIOD OF ABOUT TWO MONTHS TO SURVEY THE MANPOWER UTILIZATION PROBLEM TO INCLUDE THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONSCRIPTION LAW.

THE SOONER THEY CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE THE BETTER. TAYLOR  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 15, 6:20 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"



98  
INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 212n/198  
By mg, NARS, Date 4/10/78

44  
Action

00 RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 09A 15/0405Z  
O P 150400Z ZEA

SS

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEKDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO/RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

0 1 2 8 6 0

033

AUGUST 15, 1964  
1:04 A.M.

IMMEDIATE

cy # 34  
dest 8/17

~~SECRET~~

SEONE OF FIVE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 416 DOD 46 WHITEHOUSE  
35 CIA 39 INFO CINCPAC PRIORITY 204 FROM SAIGON AUG 15 12:10 P.M.

LIMDIS

EMBTel 415.

THERE FOLLOWS TEXT (WITH ANNOTATION) OF PROPOSED GVN CHARTER  
OF GOVERNMENT TRANSMITTED TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR BY GEN KHANH  
ON 14 AUG. THIS IS PRELIMINARY DRAFT, SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE REVISION  
BEFORE PROMULGATION.

BEGIN TEXT.

FORWARD

CFN 415 46 35 39 204 415 14

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 09A ~~SECRET~~

THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL,

FAITHFUL TO THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF THE MOTHERLAND, TO THE  
IDEALS AND ORDEALS OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION WHICH HAVE BEEN  
SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMED ON NOVEMBER 1963;

AWARE THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN OBLIGED  
TO CONTINUE TO ASSUME HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES, LEAD THE NATION  
TO VICTORY OVER AGGRESSIVE COMMUNISM, EXTERMINATE TERRORISM  
THROUGH THIS MOST CRITICAL SITUATION CAUSED BY THE PRESENT  
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE CRUEL COMMUNIST IMPERIALIST  
POLICY;

AWARE THAT ALL SEEDS OF DISUNITY HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED, THAT  
ALL ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONALIST FORCES HAVE TO BE UNITED, THAT  
ALL THE FORCES OF THE NATION HAVE TO BE MOBILIZED IN ORDER  
TO RAPIDLY COMPLETE THE BUILDING OF A PEACEFUL, FREE DEMOCRATIC  
UNIFIED PROSPEROUS AND POWERFUL NATION;

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 416, AUGUST 15, 12:10 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF FIVE) FROM SAIGON

AWARE THAT EVERY VIETNAMESE CITIZEN, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AS TO HIS ORIGIN AND RELIGION, GROUP OR ASSOCIATION IN THE CITIES AS WELL AS IN THE RURAL AREAS, HAS TO MAKE SACRIFICES TO LIBERATE THE MOTHERLAND;

AWARE, THAT, IN SPITE OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND IN THE FACE OF THREAT OF AGGRESSION FROM THE OUTSIDE, SUITABLE BASIC DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS HAVE TO BE PROGRESSIVELY ESTABLISHED, PARALLEL WITH AND RESPONSIVE TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION;  
CFN 1 1963

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 09A ~~SECRET~~

THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ESTABLISHED A SEPARATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENCIES, AND AT THE SAME TIME RECOGNIZES AND GUARANTEES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY;

AFTER DISCUSSIONS AND UNANIMOUS APPROVAL, THE MRC, REPRESENTING THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES,

PROMULGATES THE FOLLOWING CHARTER: (EMBASSY NOTE: THIS PREAMBLE MAY BE EXPANDED.)

## CHARTER

### CHAPTER I

#### BASIC PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1. VIETNAM IS A REPUBLIC, AND ITS TERRITORY IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE.

ARTICLE 2. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE, THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE JUDICIARY PROVIDES FOR GUARANTEES OF DEMOCRACY.

ARTICLE 3. THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WILL ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT ARE NOT CONTRARY TO ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EQUALITY BETWEEN NATIONS.

### CHAPTER 2.

#### RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE CITIZEN

~~SECRET~~

-3- 416, AUGUST 15, 12:10 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF FIVE) FROM SAIGON

ARTICLE 4. THE BASIC DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP ARE RECOGNIZED AND GUARANTEED. PRIVATE PROPERTIES MAY BE REQUISITIONED AGAINST PAYMENT OF DAMAGES FOR THE PUBLIC OR SOCIAL GOOD.

ARTICLE 5. THE CITIZEN HAS THE DUTY TO DEFEND THE MOTHERLAND, TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY AND TO SAFEGUARD THE REPUBLICAN REGIME.

CFN 1 2 3 4 5 2

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 09A ~~SECRET~~

(EMBASSY NOTE: THIS CHAPTER MAY BE EXPANDED CONSIDERABLY TO REFLECT THOSE RIGHTS PREVIOUSLY STIPULATED IN DIEM CONSTITUTION.)

### CHAPTER 3.

#### THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

ARTICLE 6. THE MRC REPRESENTING THE RVNAF IS THE SUPREME AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR LEADING THE NATION.

ARTICLE 7. THE MRC ELECTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 3 6 7

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-C AUGUST 15, 1:59 A.M.

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

033

48

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~Control:  
Rec'd:12889  
AUGUST 15, 1964  
2:58 AM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 416 IMMEDIATE  
DOD 46 IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE 35 IMMEDIATE  
CIA 39 IMMEDIATE*Cy # 35 dest  
8/17*

INFO: CINCPAC 204 PRIORITY

DATE: AUGUST 14, MIDNIGHT (SECTION II OF V)

LIMDIS

FOLLOWING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, THE MRC APPOINTS THE VICE PRESIDENT.

FOLLOWING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, THE MRC ACCEPTS THE RESIGNATION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OR RELIEVES HIM.

ARTICLE 8. THE MRC APPOINTS THE PRESIDENT, ONE OR MORE VICE PRESIDENTS AND THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 26.

THE MRC ACCEPTS THE RESIGNATION OF THESE PERSONS OR RELIEVES THEM.

ARTICLE 9. THE MRC APPOINTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COUNCIL OF MAGISTRATES. (EMBASSY NOTE: THIS BODY SUPERVISES THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.)

ARTICLE 10. THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL MADE UP OF A NUMBER OF PERSONS ELECTED BY THE MRC FROM ITS OWN MEMBERS, WILL SIT IN JUDGMENT OF THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM,

THE CHAIRMAN

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 416, AUGUST 14, MIDNIGHT (SECTION II OF V) FROM SAIGON

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, IN CASE THESE HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ACCUSED OF BETRAYING THE NATION OR OF COMMITTING MAJOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES.

THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL AS WELL AS THE PROCEDURES FOR PROSECUTION BEFORE THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR AT A LATER DAY. (EMBASSY NOTE: THIS IS AN INTERNAL MRC ORGAN, FOR IMPEACHMENT AND "COURT OF HONOR" PURPOSES.)

#### CHAPTER 4.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

ARTICLE 11. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS ELECTED BY THE MRC AND IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE MRC AND THE PEOPLE.

ARTICLE 12. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS ASSISTED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEPUTY SECRETARIES OF STATE.

ARTICLE 13. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM APPOINTS THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARIES WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE MRC.

ARTICLE 14. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ACCEPTS THE RESIGNATION OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, THE DEPUTY SECRETARIES OR RELIEVES THEM WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE MRC.

ARTICLE 15. THE MISSION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS TERMINATED IF HIS RESIGNATION IS ACCEPTED BY THE MRC OR BY DECISION OF THE MRC.

ARTICLE 16. IN CASE OF DEATH OR INCAPACITY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND BEFORE THE ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT BY THE MRC, THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLACES HIM.

ARTICLE 17. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CHAIRS THE COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENT. (EMBASSY NOTE: THIS HAS THE EQUIVALENT

OF A

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 416, AUGUST 14, MIDNIGHT (SECTION 11 OF V) FROM SAIGON

OF A CABINET, TO BE COMPOSED OF PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARIES OF STATE.)

ARTICLE 18. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE RVNAF.

ARTICLE 19. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM APPOINTS; AMBASSADORS, MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY, AND SPECIAL ENVOYS HAVING THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR OR MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY.

JUDGES OF JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS.

GENERAL OFFICERS AND SUPERIOR OFFICERS EXERCISING THE DUTIES OF GENERAL OFFICERS.

ARTICLE 20. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS, APPOINTS: THE HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT. (EMBASSY NOTE: THESE ARE THE SENIOR BUREAUCRATS.)

ARTICLE 21. UPON REQUEST FROM OR WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE MRC, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM DECLARES WAR OR SIGNS TREATIES.

ARTICLE 22. UPON REQUEST FROM OR WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE MRC THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PROCLAIMS THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, MARTIAL LAW OR THE STATE OF SIEGE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES A NUMBER OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS CAN BE SUSPENDED.

TAYLOR

JVC/22

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 3:16 AM AUGUST 15, 1964

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

48  
Action  
SS  
Info

012885

1964 AUG 15 AM 2 29

033

Cy # 34  
dest 8/17

00 RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 11A 15/0405Z  
O P 150400Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEKDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITEHOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~

I M M E D I A T E

SETRE OFFIVE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 416 DOD 46 WHITEHOUSE 35  
CIA 39 INFO CINCPAC PRITY 204 FROM SAIGON AUG 15, 12:10 PM

LIMDIS

A LEGISLATIVE ACT SHALL DETERMINE THE CONDITIONS FOR PROCLAIMING  
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THEIR EFFECTS.

ARTICLE 23. WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE MRC, THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SIGNS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 24. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SIGNS  
CREDENTIALS FOR THE AMBASSADORS, MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY  
AND SPECIAL ENVOYS HAVING RANK OF AMBASSADOR OR MINISTER  
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF VIETNAM TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND RECEIVES  
THE CREDENTIALS OF THE AMBASSADORS, MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY  
AND SPECIAL ENVOYS HAVING RANK OF AMBASSADOR OR MINISTER  
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO VIETNAM.  
CFN 23 24

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 11A ~~SECRET~~

ARTICLE 25. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS THE  
RIGHT TO PARDON, GRANT AMNESTY, OR SUSPEND SENTENCES.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AWARDS ALL KINDS OF  
DECORATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 416, August 15, 12:10 p.m., from Saigon (SECTION III OF V)

CHAPTER 5

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

ARTICLE 26. THE NLC IS MADE UP OF 140 MEMBERS:

A. 80 CIVILIAN MEMBERS:

PARTLY APPOINTED BY THE MRC FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCILS OF THE CAPITAL, TOWNS AND PROVINCES. FOLLOWING THE GUIDANCE OF THESE COUNCILS, EACH UNIT WILL NOMINATE ONE MEMBER. (EMBASSY NOTE: THESE WILL TOTAL 49, OR, IF NEW PROVINCE CREATED, 50).

THE REST IS APPOINTED BY THE MRC FROM AMONG THE PERSONALITIES IN AND OUT OF THE POLITICAL GROUPS. (EMBASSY NOTE: THESE WILL TOTAL 30, OR POSSIBLE 31.)

B. 60 REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES APPOINTED BY THE MRC.

ARTICLE 27. THE NLC VOTES ON ALL LEGISLATIVE BILLS.

CFN 25 5 26 80 140 49 50 30 31 60 27

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 11 A ~~SECRET~~

THE NLC EXAMINES ALL PROJECTS OF LAW PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR ALL BILLS PROPOSED BY AT LEAST 20 OF ITS MEMBERS.

ARTICLE 28. WITHIN FIVE FULL DAYS AFTER THE VOTE OF THE NLC, THE LEGISLATIVE BILLS ARE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHALL CONSULT THE JURIDICAL COMMITTEE PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 43 ON THESE BILLS AS WELL AS ON THE DRAFTS OF THE DECREE-LAWS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 416, August 15, 12:10 p.m., from Saigon (SECTION III OF V)

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PROMULGATES THESE LAWS WITHIN 45 FULL DAYS COUNTING FROM THE DAY OF RECEPTION. IN URGENT CASES, UPON REQUEST OF THE NLC, THE DELAY FOR PROMULGATION WILL BE 15 FULL DAYS.

ARTICLE 29. DURING THE DELAY FOR PROMULGATION, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM MAY REQUEST THE NLC TO REVIEW ONE OR MORE ARTICLES OF THE BILLS. (EMBASSY NOTE: PRESIDENT CAN THUS SEEK TO AMEND NLC LEGISLATION.)

WHEN REVIEWING, IF THE NLC REFUSES TO CHANGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, THE NLC SHALL HAVE THE FINAL WORD AFTER A VOTE BY CALLING OVER THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS WITH A MAJORITY OF THREE-FOURTHS OF ALL MEMBERS.

ARTICLE 30. DRAFT OF NATIONAL BUDGET MUST BE SENT TO THE OFFICE OF THE NLC BEFORE THE 1ST OF OCTOBER AND MUST HAVE THE FINAL APPROVAL BEFORE THE 31ST OF DECEMBER.  
CFN 20 28 43 45 15 29 30 31ST

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 11- ~~SECRET~~

ARTICLE 31. THE MEMBERS WHO INITIATE NEW ITEMS OF EXPENDITURES HAVE TO PROPOSE EQUIVALENT NEW RECEIPTS. (EMBASSY NOTE: THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, MAY SUBMIT AN UNBALANCED BUDGET.)

ARTICLE 32. IN CASES OF EMERGENCY, WAR, INTERNAL INSURRECTION, ECONOMIC OR FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE NLC MAY DELEGATE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM THE AUTHORITY TO SIGN DECREE-LAWS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK AND DURING THE PERIOD OF DELEGATION. ALL DECREE-LAWS HAVE TO BE SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NLC IMMEDIATELY AFTER SIGNATURE. (EMBASSY NOTE: THE NLC CHAIRMAN WILL CIRCULATE THESE TO NLC; BUT NLC WILL HAVE NO RPT NO RIGHT OF REVOCATION OR OF AMENDMENT.) TAYLOR

BT  
CFN 31 32

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 2:45 a.m., August 15

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

48  
Action

SS

Info

RUEHCR  
E RUMJIR 12A 15/0405Z  
O P 150400Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEKDA/DOD  
RUEPWW/WHITEHOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~

012886 033  
1964 AUG 15 AM 2 47

IMMEDIATE

cy#35  
dest 9/7

SEFOR OFFICE ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 416 DOD 46 WHITEHOUSE 35  
CIA 39 INFO CINCPAC PRITY 204 FROM SAIGON AUG 15, 12:10 PM

LIMDIS

ARTICLE 33. IN BETWEEN THE SESSIONS OF THE NLC, FOR REASONS OF EMERGENCY OR URGENT REQUIREMENTS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM MAY SIGN DECREE-LAWS. THESE DECREE-LAWS HAVE TO BE SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NLC IMMEDIATELY AFTER SIGNATURE. (EMBASSY NOTE: NLC COMPETENCE SAME AS IN ARTICLE 32.)

ARTICLE 34. MEMBERS OF THE NLC CANNOT BE PROSECUTED, TRACED, ARRESTED OR CONDEMNED FOR THEIR OPINION OR THEIR VOTE AT THE NLC AND WITHIN THE COMMITTEES OF THE NLC.  
CFN 416 46 35 39 204 33 32 34

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FLAGRANTE DELICTOCASES, MEMBERS CANNOT BE PROSECUTED, TRACED, ARRESTED OR CONDEMNED DURING THE DURATION OF THE SESSIONS OF THE NLC INCLUDING THE TIME SPENT TO GO TO AND RETURN FROM THESE SESSIONS.

ARTICLE 35. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CAN SEND MESSAGES TO THE NLC AND MAKE DECLARATIONS AT THIS COUNCIL.

SECRETARIES AND DEPTUY SECRETARIES MAY CONFER WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE CHAIRMEN OF THE NLC COMMITTEES.

WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, THE PRESIDENT OF THE NLC MAY INVITE SECRETARIES AND DEPUTY

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 416, August 15, 12:10 p.m., from Saigon (SECTION IV OF V)

SECRETARIES TO THE MEETINGS OF THE NLC COMMITTEES TO EXPLAIN PROJECTS OF LAW.

ARTICLE 36. EACH YEAR THE NLC HAS TWO REGULAR SESSIONS.

ONE SESSION BEGINS ON THE FIRST MONDAY OF APRIL AND WILL NOT LAST MORE THAN TWO MONTHS.

ANOTHER SESSION BEGINS ON THE FIRST MONDAY OF OCTOBER AND SHALL NOT LAST MORE THAN THREE MONTHS.

ARTICLE 37. IN BETWEEN THE REGULAR SESSIONS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM MAY CALL AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE NLC, IN WHICH CASE THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHALL FIX THE AGENDA.

CFN 35 "2 37

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~

ARTICLE 38. THE NLC MEETS IN OPEN SESSION. FOR SPECIAL REASONS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OR THE BUREAU OF THE NLC MAY REQUEST THAT THE NLC MEET IN CLOSED DOOR SESSIONS.

ARTICLE 39. THE MINUTES OF THE DEBATES WILL BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL, EXCEPT IN CASES THE NLC MEETS IN CLOSED DOOR SESSIONS.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE JUDICIARY

ARTICLE 40. THE JUDGES SHALL EXERCISE THEIR FUNCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR CONSCIENCE, WITH IMPARTIALITY AND WITH DUE RESPECT OF THE LAWS.

ARTICLE 41. TO INSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGES, THE PROMOTIONS, TRANSFERS OF AND DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AGAINST THE JUDGES SHALL BE DECIDED UPON BY THE HIGH COUNCIL OF JUDGES.

THE MRC APPOINTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COUNCIL OF JUDGES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 416, August 15, 12:10 p.m., from Saigon (SECTION IV OF V)

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHALL APPOINT THE JUDGES FOLLOWING THE PROPOSITION OF THE HIGH COUNCIL OF JUDGES.

ARTICLE 42. A DECREE-LAW SHALL FIX THE COMPOSITION, THE ORGANIZATION AND THE OPERATION OF THE HIGH COUNCIL OF JUDGES. (EMBASSY NOTE: THE SCOPE OF JURIDICAL FUNCTION IS NOWHERE DEFINED. THERE IS NO RPT NO CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TO INTERPRET THIS CHARTER. INTERPRETATION WILL BE DONE BY MRC.)  
CFN 38 39 40 41 42

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 12A ~~SECRET~~

## CHAPTER VII

### SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

ARTICLE 43. THE JURIDICAL COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR GIVING ITS OPINION ON BILLS OF LAW, DRAFTS OF DECREE-LAWS, DECREES AND ARRETES FORWARDED TO IT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

A LEGISLATIVE ACT SHALL FIX THE COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE JURIDICAL COMMITTEE. (EMBASSY NOTE: THIS BODY WILL BE LEGAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND WILL HAVE BROAD POWERS RE THE FORM AND THE TEXT OF LEGISLATION.)

ARTICLE 44. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM MAY ESTABLISH SPECIALIZED AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENTING IDEAS, GIVING OPINIONS, DRAFTING PROJECTS CONCERNING MATTERS RAISED BY THE GOVERNMENT. TAYLOR  
BT  
CFN 43 44

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 3:02 a.m., August 15

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

48  
Action

SS

Info

00 RUEHCR  
DE RUMJIR 13A 15/0405Z  
O P 150400Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEKDA/DOD  
RUEPWWXWHITE HOUSE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~

012887 033  
1964 AUG 15 AM 2 47

IMMEDIATE

ay #35 dest  
8/17

(SEFIV OFFICE) ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (416) DOD 46 WHITEHOUSE 35  
CIA 39 INFO CINCPAC PRITY 204 FROM SAIGON AUG 15, 12:10 PM

LIMDIS

## CHAPTER VIII

### FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 45. WHILE WAITING FOR THE COUNCILS OF THE CAPITAL, TOWNS AND PROVINCES TO BE ELECTED, THE MRC SHALL APPOINT THE MEMBERS OF THE NLC FOLLOWING THE PROPOSITION OF THE PREFECT, MAYORS AND PROVINCE CHIEFS.

THE TERM OF THESE MEMBERS SHALL AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATE UPON THE APPOINTMENT OF REGULAR MEMBERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES FIXED IN ARTICLE 26.

CFN 416 46 35 39 204 45 26

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 13A ~~SECRET~~

EMBASSY NOTE: TENURE OF NLC MEMBERS DELIBERATELY OMITTED BECAUSE CHARTER IS A "PROVISIONAL" DOCUMENT OF NO RPT NO FIXED DURATION.

ARTICLE 46. A PROVISIONAL HIGH COUNCIL OF MAGISTRATES CONSISTING OF 40 MEMBERS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE MRC.

THIS HIGH COUNCIL SHALL MAKE UP A LIST OF JUDICIARY JUDGES AND SHALL PROPOSE THEIR APPOINTMENTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 41 OF THIS CHARTER.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

-2- 416, AUGUST 15, 12:10 P.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE) FROM SAIGON

ARTICLE 47. THE ABOVE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AND SHALL BEGIN TO OPERATE ONE MONTH AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THIS CHARTER AT THE LATEST.

EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS ARE STILL APPLICABLE EXCEPT FOR THOSE ARTICLES WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE PRESENT CHARTER. (EMBASSY NOTE: MRC WILL DETERMINE WHICH ARE "CONTRARY".)

THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL END TEXT. TAYLOR

CFN 46 51 47 48 1 4 1963 2 7 1964

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 15, ~3:05 A.M.

COPY LBJ LIBRARY