

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 23, 2014

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
26a	photos	NVN Target photos - Sanitized 3/25/10 partial dup., #6, NSF, NSC Meetings, "Vol. 3, Tab 30," Box 1	S	6	N.D.	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File, Vietnam

Folder Title "Reprisal Attack, Feb. 11, 1965"

Box Number 228

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13526 governing access to national security information.
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5/28/2014

_____ Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>all discussions per O.S.D. let. 3/31/77</i> #26a Photo. Sanitized 3-25-10 NL 09-88	DOD S <i>Sanitized</i> NVN targets [partial dup. #6, NSF, NSC M. top, Vol. 3, Tab 30, 6 p, Box 1]	1 / 64	A
#42 Cable	DOD TS 111710Z fm Macv	1 p 2/11/65	A
#45 Cable	DOD TS 101725Z fm Macv	1 p 2/10/65	A
#52 Cable	DOD S 111630Z fm 77.4	6 p 2/11/65	A
#53 Cable	DOD TS 111603Z fm 77.7	7 p 2/11/65	A
#54 Cable	DOD S 111417Z fm 77.5	8 p 2/11/65	A
#57 Cable	DOD S 110813Z fm 77.7	1 p 2/11/65	A
#58 Cable	DOD S 110802Z fm 77.4	2 p 2/11/65	A
#59 Cable	DOD S duplicates #58 above		A
#60 Cable	DOD S 110801 fm 77.7	2 p 2/11/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File
 Vietnam Reprisal Attack 2/11/65

RESTRICTION CODES

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2 of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>all decisions per OS Dir 3/3/77</i>			
#61 Cable	DOD S 110740Z fm 77.7	2 p 2/11/65	A
#62 Cable	DOD TS 110325Z fm 2AIRDIV	2 p 2/11/65	A
#65 Cable	DOD TS 110346Z fm 77.7/110016Z fm Com7thflt	1 p 2/11/65	A
#66 Cable	DOD TS 102238Z fm 77.7	3 p 2/11/65	A
#67 Cable	DOD TS 101654Z fm 77.7	2 p 2/11/65	A
#69 Cable	DOD TS 111740Z fm Macv	2 p 2/11/65	A
#70 Cable	DOD TS ██████████ duplicates #42 above		A
#73 Cable	DOD S 110928Z fm Macv	1 p 2/11/65	A
#74 Cable	DOD S 110837Z fm Macv	1 p 2/11/65	A
#75 Cable	DOD S 110755Z fm Macv	1 p 2/11/65	A

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3 of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>all documents per OIA BA 3/3/77</i>			
#76 Cable	DOD S 110536Z fm Macv	1 p 2/11/65	A
#77 Cable	DOD S 110445Z fm Macv	1 p 2/11/65	A
#79 Cable	DOD S 110335Z fm Macv	3 p 2/11/65	A
#84 Cable	DOD TS 101945Z fm Macv	1 p 2/10/65	A
#90 Cable	DOD TS 101805Z fm Macv	1 p 2/10/65	A
#96 Cable	DOD C 101255Z fm Macv	1 p 2/10/65	A
#98 Cable	DOD TS 120336Z fm Cinepac	1 p 2/12/65	A
#99 Cable	DOD TS duplicates #98 above		A
#102 Cable	DOD TS 102323Z fm Cinepac	2 p 2/10/65	A
#103 Cable	DOD TS 102216Z fm Cinepac	1 p 2/10/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File
 Vietnam Reprisal Attack 2/11/65

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4 of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>all decision per O.D. ltr 3/3/77</i>			
#104 Cable	DOD TS 102012Z fm Cincpac	2 p 2/10/65	A
#105 Cable	DOD TS 101733Z fm Cincpac	1 p 2/10/65	A
#106 Cable	DOD TS 101712Z fm Cincpac	2 p 2/10/65	A
#107 Cable	DOD TS 101705Z fm Cincpac	2 p 2/10/65	A
#108 Cable	DOD TS 101450Z fm Cincpac	1 p 2/10/65	A
#109 Cable	DOD S 101413Z fm Cincpacflt	1 p 2/10/65	A

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NSF Country File
 Vietnam Reprisal Attack 2/11/65

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

State 2-6-78 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

5 of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#31 Cable	State S Gp 3 2506 fm Saigon	1 p 2/11/65	A
	<i>open 9-4-79 ing</i>		
#32 Cable	State S Circular 1466	1 p 2/11/65	A
	<i>"</i>		
#33 Cable	State S 2491 fm Saigon	1 p 2/10/65	A
	<i>"</i>		
#34 Draft	State S draft cable to Saigon	3 p undated	A
	<i>"</i>		
#35 Cable	State S 1690 to Saigon	1 p 2/11/65	A
	<i>"</i>		
#36 Cable	State S 4997 to London	3 p 2/10/65	A
	<i>"</i>		
#37 Cable	State S Gp 1 1686 to Saigon	3 p 2/10/65	A
	<i>sanitized 9-4-79 ing Open RAC 5.7.98</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File
Vietnam Reprisal Attack 2/11/65

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

6 of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 Memo	CIA S <i>Open RAC 5.18.98</i> <i>Sanitized, CIA Dec 3/11/77, State Dec 5/6/77</i> OGI No. 0764/65	2/12/65	A

FILE LOCATION
 NSF Country File
 Vietnam Reprisal Attack 2/11/65

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

> of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	To be submitted to Defense for concurrence.		
#4a Memo	WH _____ C _____ McCafferty to Bundy	1 p 2/11/65	A
	<i>OSD ltr 1/19/77</i>		
#5 Memo	duplicates #4a above		A
	<i>OSD ltr 1/19/77</i>		
	To be submitted to State for concurrence.		
#16a Cable	WH _____ S _____ CAP 65037 Bundy to Wright	2 p 2/11/65	A
	<i>sanitized 9-4-79 ing</i>		
	<i>Open RAC 5.7.98</i>		
#17 Draft	duplicates #16a above	" " "	A

FILE LOCATION
 NSF Country File
 Vietnam Reprisal Attack 2/11/65

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

8 of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#26 Map & Report	JCS TS Reprisal Options	2/10/65	A
#27 Cable	JCS TS JCS 004926	2/10/65	A
#28 Cable	JCS TS JCS 004973	2/10/65	A
#29 Map	duplicates #26 above		A
#41 Cable	JCS TS JCS 005027	2/11/65	A
#43 Cable	duplicates #28 above		A
#46 Cable	duplicates #27 above		A
#47 Cable	JCS TS JCS 004922	2/10/65	A
#48 Cable	duplicates #27 above		A

All decisions per JCS Sec 2/10/65

FILE LOCATION

NSF Country File
 Vietnam Reprisal Attack 2/11/65

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Free World Reaction
VN Air Strikes

-1

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

7/15
2 39
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OCI No. 0764/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
12 February 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 17130
By us NARA, Date 5-18-98

Free World Reaction to the
Vietnam Air Strikes

There has been no significant reaction reported as yet to the 11 February air strikes; comment below, unless otherwise indicated, is based on delayed reaction to the events of 7 and 8 February. Foreign reaction in general continues to follow established attitudes toward US policy. Common themes running through most commentary, both favorable and unfavorable, include: fear of escalation; the need for prudence on the part of the US and the USSR; hope that the incidents will lead to a negotiated peace; and inconclusive speculation on the future course of Sino-Soviet relations. Student demonstrations have now been reported in Copenhagen, Buenos Aires, and in three Italian cities.

Far East

Commentary in Japan, reflecting the normal pacifist bent of the press, has been uniformly concerned with the danger of escalation and has taken a strongly negative tone. The one hope the press sees is that the air attacks may open the way for a negotiated settlement. In responding to questions in the Diet concerning the 11 February retaliation, Prime Minister Sato continued to avoid taking a public position, merely stressing Japan's efforts to prevent an expansion of hostilities.

In the Philippines, on the other hand, both official and press reactions have reflected general satisfaction over US firmness, and Thai officials and newspapers continue to voice approval of the air strikes as justifiable defensive measures. Laotian neutralist military leader Kong Le has sent a message to the US Ambassador in Vientiane supporting the US action.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
~~SECRET~~

A clandestine source reports that top South Korean officials are unanimous in their praise for the strong posture taken by the US. At a meeting of the ROK National Security Council on 9 February President Pak Chong-hui reportedly ordered contingency planning on a top secret basis to make available additional ROK combat troops for dispatch to South Vietnam if needed.

Taipei press reaction, reflecting the government's views, contrasts markedly with that following the Tonkin Gulf retaliatory raids. The earlier action resulted in considerable optimism that the war in Vietnam was entering a new, wider phase. Although the air strikes are approved, a consistent line, reflected in all editorials, emphasizes the inadequacy and the ineffectiveness of the present US retaliation policy.

Official reaction in Indonesia initially has been relatively restrained. President Sukarno, however, termed the air strikes "unfortunate" and called upon the US to cease its "intervention." Foreign Minister Subandrio is quoted by Radio Indonesia as stating that the situation in the DRV is "truly critical in view of US aggression against its territory." The Indonesian police have alerted US authorities to a possible demonstration today involving attacks against the embassy and the USIS Library.

Prince Sihanouk has sent a message to Ho Chi Minh reaffirming Cambodia's support for North Vietnam and castigating the 7-8 February air strikes by the US and its "henchmen" as a "brazen" violation of the UN charter and the Geneva agreements. Cambodia's leftist press has sounded a similar note, calling the strikes a "sadistic crime" perpetrated by "international gangsters." A preparatory meeting of the Indochinese Peoples Conference, scheduled to begin in Phnom Penh on 14 February, is expected to provide an attractive forum for further anti-American propaganda.

In Saigon itself, the reaction of articulate Vietnamese has been for the most part highly favorable, although perhaps less so than for the strikes of last August. This attitude is tempered somewhat by fear of possible Communist retaliation; the withdrawal of US dependents has caused some uneasiness in this respect.

South Asia

India's Prime Minister Shastri on 12 February repeated his earlier call for negotiations by joining with Burma's General Ne Win in calling for an international conference "to insure peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia." The joint communique urged all parties concerned "to strive for a solution enabling the people of Indochina to enjoy independence without outside interference." Meanwhile, Indian press reaction to the US retaliation has been mixed, most papers regretting, and a few condemning, the action. The Government of Ceylon has made no official statement. A high official of the Ministry of External Affairs, however, told the US Ambassador that he and his colleagues now believe that there has been infiltration from the North and that North Vietnam has been directing Viet Cong action in South Vietnam.

There has been no official Pakistani reaction. Press comment, however, has been uniformly and sharply hostile to the US strikes. They are called "serious acts of aggression against North Vietnam," inspired by the "total war" lobby. In Afghanistan, Prime Minister Yusuf has privately shown concern that the incidents may escalate into a wider conflict. While not strongly critical of the US action, Yusuf obviously wished the US would find a "peaceable way" to settle the conflict; he seemed to feel that the US was risking a "conflagration" which could engulf Afghanistan.

Middle East

There has been no significant official reaction reported from either Turkey or Greece. Turkish newspaper reaction has centered primarily on questioning the advisability of the US attacks and on fears that the war will escalate. The Voice of Cyprus, a clandestine radio operated by Turkey, took the occasion to comment that if the US could take such action to fulfill its treaty obligations, Turkey would be justified in intervening in Cyprus to fulfill its obligations to protect Turkish Cypriots.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

When informed of the air strikes, a high Iranian official commented that they were "logical" and there was "no other choice." In the Arab States, the situation has been overshadowed by the West German-Egyptian controversy over arms to Israel. The Egyptian press, while factually accurate, is unbalanced and is playing up Communist reaction against the US "aggression."

Africa

The Algerian Government on 11 February issued a relatively moderate communique which charged that the American "aggression" against the DRV endangers world peace. It also reaffirmed Algeria's solidarity with the DRV, and called for the withdrawal of foreign troops in order to permit "an effective and loyal application of the Geneva accords." All Algerian newspapers opposed the US action. In Ghana, the regime-controlled radio asserted that American "brinkmanship" in Southeast Asia is "a measure of their desperation in the face of inevitable military defeat." Acknowledging that the US does not want a nuclear war, the radio said that in reality the US action was an effort to appeal to the USSR to use its influence on Peiping and Hanoi to find a solution acceptable to the US public and allies. In Tunisia, a high pro-Western foreign ministry official stated that his government understands and sympathizes with the US. In Rwanda, the government and press gave the US its customary friendly and favorable treatment.

Western Europe

British Foreign Secretary Stewart continues to reject pleas calling for another Geneva conference on Vietnam. More than 50 Labor Party members of Parliament on 10 February signed a motion urging the government to bring about a cease-fire by calling a conference. Members of the party's extreme left provided most of the signatories but they had some support from the center and the right. Most of the British press also is plumping for another conference.

Ambassador Bohlen reports he has found considerable "understanding" in private statements of French officials regarding the US counterstrikes. Like the press, French officials tend to see these US moves as creating embarrassment for Moscow and Peking and as opening a way to a negotiated settlement. Ambassador Bohlen does not believe the latest French proposal

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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constitutes any new proposal as the press appears to believe.

The Italian government supports the US position on the counterstrikes, and the embassy considers the Communist attempts to exploit the situation less than effective. However, Italy's most influential daily carried a critical editorial on 11 February which stated the US justification on grounds of provocation was juridically weak and politically inopportune: juridically weak because the situation in South Vietnam is a true war and Viet Cong attacks are acts of war; politically inopportune because the US retaliates if the rebels kill seven Americans but not if the rebels kill 700 "natives."

The Portuguese Government reportedly does not wish to make any official statement at this time but is pleased that the strikes were made. Lisbon intends to use this precedent when necessary to defend its African provinces from outside aggression.

Western Hemisphere

Prime Minister Pearson on 10 February said that Canada would support a Geneva conference because the fight could escalate into a "full-scale Chinese-American war."

Latin American press and officials continue to be generally sympathetic. The major papers in Brazil presented the situation in true perspective with fullest factual coverage, one commentary noting that the US could not afford to do less even at the risk of spreading war.

The US Embassy in Paraguay reports that "from high military sources to the various political elements, government officials, and common citizens" come confidential affirmations of satisfaction with what is commonly termed "determined US action."

141

Memo's & Misc.

(B)

4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/11/65

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is all we know at present.
The Defense Department will be
in touch with his family.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

The North Vietnamese have announced the capture of a U. S. pilot by the name of Shoemaker. For your information, the pilot of the plane which has been missing from the mission this morning is Lt. Cmdr. Robert Shumaker. I have received the following biographic information on him.

Born: May 11, 1933 in New Castle, Penna.

Wife: Lorraine Shaw Shumaker, presently residing with an uncle, Mr. John Schwartz, at 421 W. Northview, Phoenix, Arizona. There are no children.

Parents: Alvah M. and Elenor Blanche Shumaker, Willow Brook Farms, New Wilmington, Penna.

A sister lives in Beloit, Wisconsin.

Arthur McCafferty

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Authority OSD Ltr. 1/19/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 6/30/77

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Smith
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CONFIDENTIAL

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A sister lives in Beloit, Wisconsin.

Arthur McCafferty

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Authority SSD/la 1/19/77
By AMG, NARS, Date 6/30/77



S/S 1890

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1965

✓ 6
*(enclosures
retained
by me)*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Public Statements by Department
of State Officials on Viet-Nam

In accordance with your request of today, there are enclosed copies of public statements concerning Viet-Nam made by officials of the Department of State since January 1963. An index of these statements is under preparation and will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

Also enclosed are three separate publications of the Department of State concerning Viet-Nam:

- 1) Background Notes -- South Viet-Nam
- 2) United States Policy on Viet-Nam
- 3) Viet-Nam -- The Struggle for Freedom


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

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Press Release

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Bundy

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
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RUEPCR/NSA
RUCSCG/CINCSAC
RUCJHK/CINCSSTRIKE
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TO USIA

STATE
DAUD (PA)
VIA: NMCC
INFO CINCPAC
WHITE HOUSE (SITUATION ROOM)
ZEN/BANGKOK
BT

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 5/10/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USIA-MACV HELD JOINT PRESS
CONFERENCE FOR 67 SAIGON MEDIA ON
11 FEB JOINT RVN-US AIR OPS AGAINST
MIL TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM.
MISSION SPOKESMAN READ FOLLOWING
STATEMENT: "SINCE FEB 3, THERE HAVE
BEEN CONTINUED ACTS OF AGGRESSION
BY THE COMMUNIST VIET CONG UNDER
THE DIRECTION AND WITH THE SUPPORT
OF THE HANOI REGIME AGAINST THE
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND INSTALLATIONS
IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND AGAINST
THEIR AMERICAN ADVISORS. FOR
EXAMPLE, THESE AGGRESSIVE ACTS HAVE
INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: THE MINING
OF THIRTEEN BRIDGES AND SEVEN
SEPERATE ACTS OF SABOTAGE AGAINST
THE RAILROADS RESULTING IN DEATH AND
INJURY TO 13 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS
AND TWO ESCORT SOLDIERS IN ADDITION
TO THE MATERIAL DAMAGE;
ATTACKS ON HAMLETS AND CONVOYS
RESULTING IN DEATH OR INJURY TO
MANY VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS AND THE
KIDNAPPING OF OTHERS IN ADDITION
TO SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CASUALTIES:
THE VICIOUS ATTACK AND RELATED
ACTIONS INVOLVING THE AMERICAN
ENGINEER MEN'S QUARTERS AT QUI

PRESERVATION COPY

WHICH BY VC TERRORIST DEMOLITION TEAMS
RESULTING IN TWELVE KNOWN VIETNAMESE
AND AMERICAN DEAD, INCLUDING MORE
THAN 40 OTHERS WOUNDED AND MISSING.
MANY OF THE LATTER MUST BE SUPPOSED
DEAD.

IN RESPONSE TO THESE CONTINUED
ATTACKS BY THE COMMUNISTS,
SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN
AIR ELEMENTS TODAY CARRIED OUT AIR
OPERATIONS AGAINST SELECTED MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN PART
OF NORTH VIETNAM WHICH HAVE BEEN
USED BY THE HANOI REGIME FOR
TRAINING AND SUPPORT OF THE VIET
CONG PERSONNEL CARRYING OUT THESE
ACTS.

US MIL SPOKESMAN OUTLINED BASIC
FACTS ON AIR STRIKES MADE AGAINST
CHANH HOA AND CHAP LE IN NORTH
VIETNAM. AT 111430H MORE THAN
100 NAVY AIRCRAFT HIT MILITARY
BARRACKS AT CHANH HOA. APPROX
28 VNAF PLANES SUPPORTED BY USAF
PLANES IN FIRE SUPPRESSION ROLE
HITS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AT
CHAP LE, AT 111600H. REPORTS NOT
COMPLETE, BUT RAIDS CAN BE
CLASSIFIED SUCCESSFUL. FIRE
AND SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS OBSERVED.
VNAF LOST NO ACFT. US LOST THREE
CARRIER ACFT. TWO DOWNED AT SEA,
THIRD CRASH-LANDED AT DANANG WHERE
HUNG BOMB HAD LOW ORDER DETONATION
AND PILOT SUFFERED WRENCHED SHOULDER.
ONE NAVY PILOT REPORTED PICKED UP
ALIVE AT SEA. MILITARY SPOKESMAN
SAID TAN SON NHUT USED IN ADDITION
TO DANANG. MILITARY SPOKESMAN
DESCRIBED LOW-LEVEL TACTICS NECESSI-
TATED BY CLOUD COVER. SAID MOST
GROUND FIRE WAS SMALL CALIBER,
THOUGH SOME REPORTS OF 20MM.
SAID 30 TONS ORDNANCE DROPPED CHAP LE
RANGED FROM SMALL FRAGMENTATION
TO 750 POUND BOMBS. MILITARY
SPOKESMAN SAID THAT RESULTS OF
3 FEB RAID ON CHAP LE
FAIRLY GOOD. MILITARY SPOKESMAN
EXPLAINED 11 FEB RAID LED BY DEPUTY
COMMANDER VNAF, THAT AIR VICE
MARSHAL KY PARTICIPATED IN PRE-
STRIKE BRIEFINGS, BUT, UNLIKE
3 FEB, DID NOT FLY. MILITARY
PORTION ATTRIBUTABLE TO US
MILITARY SPOKESMAN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GP-7

BT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

9

SECT 1 OF 3 OF 2 2 0 3 1

F833/JCS744/10 /R-2 R-12
VZCZCIEM478JIA740ZCRJA266
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMSMA 1232B 10/1805Z
ZNR
O 101803Z

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

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IMMEDIATE

FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEKDA/OASD PA
INFO ZEN/AMEMB PAO
ZEN/USIS
RUEHIA XUSIA
RUEKDA/JCS
RUAPHP/OIC PAC STARS AND STRIPES
RUEHC/STATE DEPT WASHDC
BT

READD TO WHITEHOUSE

UNCLAS MAC OI 4217 SECTION 1 OF 3
SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS TRENDS NUMBER 036B-5
SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS TRENDS FOR 10 FEBRUARY 1965
(UNCLASSIFIED)

1. THIS IS FIRST PART OF TWO-PART BRIEFING AT DAILS USIS/
MACV PRESS SESSION 101700H. THIS DEALS WITH RESULTS OF
INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF ATK ON U.S. COMPOUND AT II CORPS
HQS IN PLEIKU AND ON NEARBY CAMP HOLLOWAY 070200H FEB. EXPL
OF WHAT HAPPENED GIVEN BY COL GARTH, DEP CHIEF OF ACTIV
SPECIALLY DETAILED FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT. BACKING UP COL
GARTH ON DETAILS WAS COL FREUND, DEP SR ADVISOR II CORPS.
HANDLING POLICY QUESTIONS ON SUBJECT WAS LT GEN THROCKMORTON,
DEPUTY COMUSMACV. GRD RULES WERE THAT STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE
TO U.S. MILITARY SPOKESMAN AND NOT TO INDIVIDUALS.

ACT: PA-5

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-2 SACS-5 DIA-15 NMCC-2
SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 WHITEHOUSE-3 NIC-1 SECDEF-5
ISA-9 CIA-4 NSA-4 FILE-1(88)WS/RAM

PAGE 1 OF 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

2. USING BLACKBOARD DIAGRAM COL GARTH ROUGHLY EXPL AS FLWS:
THESE TWO AREAS ARE SEPARATED BY ABOUT SIX KMS SO WILL
DISCUSS THEM SEPARATELY. OVER HERE IS II CORPS U.S.
COMPOUND THAT WAS ATKD AT 070200H FEB. ATK CAME FROM
THE NORTH AGAINST THIS SIDE OF THE LIVING QTRS AREA. WE
THINK THERE WERE PROBABLY SIX TO TEN VC USING DEMOLITIONS
AND AUTO WPNS. THERE WAS BARBED WIRE ABOUT 75 TO 100 YDS
FROM THE BLDG. THEY CUT A SMALL OPENING THRU IT AND CRAWLED
THRU. WE THINK THE ATK WAS PREMATURELY TRIGGERED BECAUSE A
U.S. SENTRY MOVED DOWN TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSE OF SOME
NOISE. HE WAS KILLED IN THE ATK SO WE MUST SPECULATE
THAT POSSIBLY THEY WERE GOING TO BLOW A GATE AND ENTER THE
COMPOUND. IF THIS HAD HAPPENED, I AM SURE IT WOULD HAVE
BEEN MORE DISASTROUS THAN IT WAS, BECAUSE THE QTRS OPEN
INTO THE COMPOUND AND THE OCCUPANTS WOULD HAVE BEEN MOWED
DOWN BY AUTO WPNS FIRE AS THEY EMERGED FROM THEIR ROOMS.
ATK LASTED ABOUT TEN MINUTES. AFTER THE SENTRY WAS KILLED,
TWO SGTS WENT BACK AND OCCUPIED THAT POSITION AND ENG
W/DRAWING VC. OFFICERS AND MEN FIRED FROM THEIR WINDOWS
WHEN THE FIGHT STARTED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE BLDG.
NEXT MORNING AT FIRST LIGHT THEY DISCOVERED ONE FC WOUNDED
IN THE WIRE.

Q. WHAT WAS YOUR SECURITY, THE VIETNAMESE SECURITY OF THE
COMPOUND? DO YOU FEEL THE VIETNAMESE PERFORMED ACCURATELY;
THAT THE SECURITY IN THE OUTER PERIMETER WAS ADEQUATE?

A. I THINK THAT WELL-TRAINED GUERRILLAS WHO HAVE
THE WILL AND FORTITUDE TO GO THRU WITH THIS TYPE OF ATK CAN
GET BY ALMOST ANYTHING ANYTIME THEY TRY. (ANSWER SUPPLEMENTED
BY DEP COMUSMACV AS FLWS: LET ME MAKE THE POINT HERE THAT
WE'RE ONLY TALKING ABOUT THE INTERIOR SECURITY OF THIS
AREA. THE ENTIRE PLEIKU COMPLEX IS BROKEN DOWN INTO
SECTIONS AND THE VARIOUS ARVN UNITS IN THAT AREA
ARE ASSIGNED A SECTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY.
THEY ARE REUQUIRED TO CONDUCT PATROLS AND TO SET UP AXBUSHES
DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. THIS APPLIES OUT TO THE 4,000
METER RANGE, WHICH IS THE RANGE OF 81MO MORTARS. SO YOUR
QUESTION COVERS MORE GRD THAN COL GARTH IS TRYING TO COVER
HERE.)

Q. CAN YOU TELL US IF THERE HAD BEEN SUCH PATROLS DURING
THE TWO OR THREE DAYS PRIOR TO THE ATK?

A. (COL GARTH) I HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THERE WERE.
THE CORPS CMDR, GEN CO, HAS AN INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY AS
DO WE.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

Q. DIDN'T THEY, IN FACT, REACH THE GATE AND COME INTO THE COMPOUND?

A. DON'T BELIEVE THES DID. OUR INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THEY BLEW THE GATE AND PROBABLY NEVER ENTERED THE COMPOUND. AS I SAID EARLIER WE THINK THE SENTRY WHO WAS KILLED PREMATURELY TRIGGERED THE ATK. ALSO, THE MEN OF THE ADVISORY TEAM WERE ALERTED AND STARTED TAKING IROMPT ACTION AND TRND FIRE.

Q. IS AREA FLOOD LIT AT NIGHT?

A. HAS LIGHTS ON FENCE BUT WOULD NOT CALL IT FLOOD LIT.

Q. HOW FAR FROM PLACE WHERE WIRE CUT TO SENTRY POST MANNED BY THREE VN GUARDS?

A. ABOUT 250 METERS.

(DEP COMUSMACV) ONE OTHER SECURITY ELEMENT NOT SET MENTIONED WAS THAT TWO-MAN U.S. ROVING PATROL WAS WORKING ITS WAY AROUND COMPOUND. UNFORTUNATELY WAS ON OTHER SIDE OF BLDG WHEN ATK OCCURRED. THESE WERE THE TWO MEN WHO TOOK UP THE POSITION VACATED BY THE SENTRY WHO WAS KILLED. THES PROMPTLY OPENED FIRE ON VC SEEN ON NORTH SIDE OF BLDG. THIS PROB CONTRIBUTED TO HASTY DEPARTURE OF VC'S.

Q. WAS VC CPTD NEXT MORNING ON THE WIRE MONTAGNARD OR VIETNAMESE?

A. WAS NIETNAMESE.

Q. ANY EVIDENCE THAT THREE VIETNAMESE IN SENTRY POST WERE TURNCOATS?

A. AS SAID, GEN CO IS CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION AND FACTS SUCH AS THIS WILL BE COVERED IN THAT INVESTIGATION.

U. HOW COME U.S. SENTRY FIRED ON VC BUT ARVN SENTRIES WHO WERE CLOSER DID NOT?

A. NOT TRUE THAT ARVN SENTRIES WERE CLOSER. THEY WERE THREE TIMES FARTHER AWAY.

Q. WAS THERE MG IN ARVN SENTRY POST?

A. NO. THEY HAD A BAR.

BT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 2 OF 2 2 0 3 1

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

2 11 01 37Z

A216/10/JCS733/R2/R12
UNCLAS CIEN400CJIA731ZCRJB941
RUEKDA
DE RUMSMA 1233B 10/1805Z
ZNR

O 101803Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEKDA/OASD PA
INFO ZEN/AMEMB PAO
ZEN/USIS

REL WHITE HOUSE (AUTO)

RUEHIA XUSIA
RUUKDA/JCS
RUAPHP/OIC PAC STARS AND STRIPES
RUEHC/STATE DEPT WASHDC
BT

UNCLAS MAC OI 4217 SECTION 2 OF 3

(DEP COMUSMACV) IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT WE DO NOT KNOW AT THIS TIME WHAT ARVN SENTRIES SAW, HEARD OR WHAT REACTIONS WERE. MUST AWAIT GVN INVESTIGATION TO GET FACTS SUCH AS THOSE.

Q. WHAT KIND OF CHARGES WERE USED BY VC?

A. WERE HOME-MADE TYPE, W/EXPLOSIVE IN BEER CANS AND WRAPPED W/BAMBOO CORD. HAD FOUR TO FIVE SECOND DELAY FUZE MUCH LIKE GREN.

Q. HAS INTERNAL SECURITY BY AMERICANS BEEN INCREASED AT PLEIKU?

A. YES, HAVE ADDED FOUR MORE GUARD POSTS.

Q. AS THIS BEEN DONE AT ALL U.S. INSTALLATIONS IN RVN?

A. (DEP COMUSMACV) NOT NECESSARILY. SOME CMDRS MAY FEEL THAT EXISTING SECURITY MEASURES ALREADY ADEQUATE. THAT IS DECISION TO BE MADE BY LOCAL CMDR. HAVE ALERTED ALL CMDRS OF NEED TO EVALUATE EXISTING SECURITY MEASURES.

Q. ARE VIETNAMESE STILL MANNING THE POST WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING?

A. YES.

Q. SINCE SAT NIGHT WAS END OF VC TRUCE DURING TET, WAS PLEIKU ON ANY KIND OF SPECIAL ALERT?

A. (DEP SR ADVISOR II CORIS) WE NEVER REALLY LET DOWN OUR GUARD SINCE WE DID NOT ACCEPT VC ALLEGED TRUCE. HAD NO LESS SECURITY BECAUSE OF ALLEGED TRUCE.

ACT.....PA-5

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-2 SACSA-5 DIA-15 NMCC-2
SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 WHITE HOUSE-3 NIC-1 ISA-9
SECDEF-5 CIA-4 NSA-4 FILE-1(88)WS/JPR

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

1. DID YOU FEEL THAT SECURITY WAS ADEQUATE?

A. WE MUST PLACE CERTAIN AMOUNT OF RELIANCE ON PERIMETER DEFENSE IS ADEQUATE, OUR DEFENSE WAS CERTAINLY ADEQUATE.

Q. DO TRPS HAVING SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY HAVE AN AMERICAN ADVISOR?

A. (DEP COMUSMACV) THERE IS A U.S. OFF ASSIGNED AS THE OVERALL ADVISOR FOR SECURITY OF THE ENTIRE PLEIKU COMPLEX. THERE IS SUCH AN ADVISOR FOR EVERY CRITICAL INSTALLATION.

Q. HAVE VIETNAMESE INCR SECURITY IN PLEIKU AREA SINCE THE ATK?

A. YES THEY HAVE. WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY RETURN SESTERDAS OF ONE RANGER BN TO PLEIKU WHERE IT IS NORMALLY ASSIGNED.

Q. WHAT IS SIZE OF VIETNAMESE SECURITY FORCE AT PLEIKU?

A. THEY DRAW ON UNITS WHICH ALL TOGETHER WOULD TOTAL ABOUT 4,000 MEN. EACH UNIT IN AREA HAS MUTUALLY SUPPORTING DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THEY ALSO PUT OUT PATROLS.

Q. CAN VIETNAMESE ARMED FCS PROSECUTE WAR AGAINST VCC AND AT SAME TIME GUARANTEE AMERICAN SECURITY?

A. (DEP COMUSMACV) IN FIRST PLACE, WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO GUARANTEE (EMPHASIZED) SECURITY UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH EXIST HERE. MUST RECOGNIZE THAT IN ORDER FOR THEM TO BE ABLE TO SAY POSITIVELY THAT NONE OF OUR INSTALLATIONS WILL BE ATKD BY MORTAR OR RIFLE FIRE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO

DEPLOY AN EXCEPTIONALLY LARGE NUMBER OF TRPS AROUND THESE KEY INSTALLATIONS TO ABSOLUTELY PRECLUDE INFILTRATION. SO WE HAVE GOT TO TAKE CERTAIN CALCULATED RISKS. OTHERWISE WE GET TRPS TIED DOWN TO STATIC SECURITY TASKS AND UNABLE TO MOVE OUT AGAINST THE VC; TO OPERATE AWAY FROM THESE INSTALLATIONS.

U. IS THERE ANY CONSIDERATION TO GIVE VIETNAMESE HELP BY BRINGING IN AMERICAN SECURITY UNITS?

A. (DEP COMUSMACV) RIGHT NOW WE ARE OPERATING UNDER POLICY THAT DEFENSE OF THESE KEY INSTALLATIONS IS VIETNAMESE RESPONSIBILITY. OF COURSE, WE ARE PROVIDING CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INTERNAL SECURITY OF OUR OWN, BUT OUTER PERIMETER IS DEFINITELY JOB OF THE VIETNAMESE. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE ARE PROVIDING THEM W/ADVISORS AND ARE MAINTAINING CONSTANT CHECKS ON THEM TO SEE THAT THEY HAVE WHAT WE CONSIDER ADEQUATE SECURITY.

(COL GARTH NEXT EXPL NATURE OF ATK ON CAMP HOLLOWAY, USING

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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BLACKBOARD DIAGRAM) DURING MORTAR ATK 34 RDS HIT IN LIVING
QTRs AND 21 FELL SHORT IN OPEND AREA. ACFT WERE DAMG OR DEST
BY DEMOLITION CHARGES, NOT BY MORTAR FIRE.

Q. HOW LARGE FORCE CARRIED OUT MORTAR ATK?

A. MUST HAVE BEEN ABOUT ONE PLAT IN ORDER TO CARRY THAT
MANY RDS AND THE WPNS. HAD FOUR TUBES.

Q. WERE MORTARS LOCATED IN AN INHABITED AREA?

A. NO. NEAREST CLUSTER OF HUTS WAS ABOUT 500 METERS AWAY.

Q. HOW MANY U.S. SENTRIES AT CAMP HOLLOWAY?

A. THERE WERE EIGHT GUARDS POSTS, MANNED BS ONE SENTRY IN
EACH. IN ADD THERE IS A ROVING PATROL. THE PATROL HAD
CHECKED THE AREA THREE TIMES PRIOR TO TWO O' CLOCK. IN ACFT
PARKING AREA ON ONE CHECK THEY THOUGHT THEY HEARD SOME NOISE,
SO LET TWO MEN OFF THE JEEP TO CHECK BUT THEY FOUND NOTHING.

Q. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR AREA BEYOND THE 1,500 METER
MORTAR RANGE?

A. AS SAID PREV, THAT FALLS UNDER PLEIKU AREA DEFENSE.
PART OF THAT PARTICULAR AREA COMES UNDER THE ARMORED CAVALRY
UNIT, PART OF IT COMES UNDER ENGINEER BN.

Q. HOW MANY VN GUARDS AT CAMP HOLLOWAY?

A. 11 GUARD POSTS MANNED BY VN, W/SIX MEN IN EACH IOST.

Q. HOW CLOSE NEAREST VN GUARD POST TO VC MORTAR POSITION?

A. ABOUT 580 METERS.

Q. ANY ROVING OUT OF THOSE POSTS?

BT

ADV TO OSD/NMCC

PAGE 3 OF 3

JCS IN 22031

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

A220/11/JCS008/R2/R12
VV SZC986VV MAB6551
OO RUHLHQ RUEKDA RUEHIA RUEHC RUAPHP
DE RUMSMA 1234B 10/1805Z
ZNR

O 101803Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHLHQ/CICCPAC
RUEKDA/OASD PA
INFO ZEN/AMEMB PAO
ZEN/USIS
RUEHIA XUSIA
RUUKDA/JCS
RUAPHP/OIC PAC STARS AND STRIPES
RUEHC/STATE DEPT WAS DC
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IMMEDIATE

REL WHITE HOUSE (AUTO)

SECT 3 OF 2 2 0 311

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

2 11 02 15Z

UNCLAS MAC OI 4217 FINAL SECTION OF 3
A. THEY HAVE AMBUSH GROUP THAT THEY PUT IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS
AROUND PERIMETER EACH NIGHT. THAT NIGHT THEIR POSITION WAS
ABOUT 500 METERS FROM THE MORTAR POSITION.
Q. HOW QUICKLY DID THEY REACT?
A. THEY WERE W/DRAWN INTO ONE OF THE BUNKERS ABOUT 0100H
THAT NIGHT. THEY ARE W/DRAWN AT VARYING TIMES. INSTRUCTIONS
THAT NIGHT WAS FOR THEM TO W/DRAW AT 0100H.
Q. HOW DO YOU THINK THEY GOT THOSE MORTARS INTO POSITION
W/OUT BEING DETECTED?

ACT.....PA-5

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-2 SACSA-5 DIA-1 5
SAMAA-1 NMCC-2 CSA-2 CNO-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 WHITE HOUSE-3
NIC-1 SECDEF-5 ISA-9 CIA-4 NSA-4 FILE-1(88)YJS/JPR

PAGE 1 OF 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

A. (DEP COMUSMACV) WILL MAKE GUESS AS TO HOW THEY DID IT. THINKK THEY PROBABLY DID IT OVER PERIOD OK SEVERAL NIGHTS, MOVING ONE OR TWO MEN IN AT A TIME, CACHING THE MORTARS IN ONE SPOT AND THE AMMO IN ANOTHER. MEN PROBABLY INTERMINGLED W/PEOPLE IN AREA AND ON PREARRANGED SIGNAL THEY ASSEMBLED, SET UP THEIR MORTARS AND STARTED FIRING.

Q. E HOW QUICKLY DID THE GROUP THAT HAD BEEN W/DRAWN INTO THE BUNKER REACT ONCE THE ACTION BEGAN?

A. THAT BUNKER WAS TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY WHAT WE THINK WAS THE VC SUPPORT ELEMENT. PERSONNEL IN THE BUNKER, INCL THE AMBUSH PATROL, EXCHANGED FIRE WITH THOSE VC'U.

Q. WHAT WERE RESULTS OF THE REACTION BY GVN FCS?

A. (DEP COMUSMACV) REACTION INITIATED AT DAYLIGHT ON SUNDAY WAS FLWD UP W/EAGLE FLT. MADE CONTACT W/VC ELEMENT ABOUT 18 KMS NE OF PLEIKU. ENDED UP W/28 VC KILLED (BODY COUNT, 12 EST WOUNDED; FOUND MAP AMONG CPTD DOCU'S WHICH HAD PLAN OF ATK ON II CORPS COMPOUND AND CAMP HOLLOWAY. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT REACTION OPN DID IN FACT INTERCEPT UNIT THAT MADE THE ATK.

Q. ANYTHING FOUND WHICH WOULD LINK KW DIRECTLY W/HANOI?

AA. NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

Q. DOES REAL PROBLEM LIE IN FACT THAT IF VC WANT BADLY ENOUGH TO HIT A TARGET THEY CAN PUT ENOUGH INTO THE OPN TO GIVE THEM REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS?

A. (DEP COMUSMACV) THIS IS ONE OF MOST DIFFICULT TYPES OF OPN TO DEFEND AGAINST. AS ALL OF YOU ARE AWARE, SINCE THE BIEN HOA ATK, WE HAVE STEPPED UP OUR DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY, PRIMARILY AT THE THREE MAJOR AFLDS. ONLY QUESTION WE DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO IS HOWW MANS SUCH ATKS HAS THIS INCREASED ATTENTION PREVENTED--OR HAS IT PREVENTED ANY? WE HOPE THAT WE HAVVE PREVENTED THE VC FROM LAUNCHING OTHER ATKS. AS TO WHETHER THES CAN DO IT AGAICR

PAGE 2 OF3

JCS IN 22031

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

IN THE FUTURE, IT IS PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE THE ODDS ON SUCH. ALL WE CAN HOPE TO DO IS TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT OUR DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND DO THE BEST WE CAN TO IMPROVE THEM; BUT STILL STAYING SHORT OF THE IDEA OF COMMITTING ALL TRPS TO THE DEFENSE OF STATIC INSTALLATIONS.

Q. DO YOU THINK VIETNAMESE ARMY SHOULD BE INCRD IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE ADEQUATE DEFENSE OF CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS?

A. (DEP COMUSMACV) THE BEST DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENT FOR THESE INSTALLATIONS IS A GOOD OFFENSE. IF WE CAN MAINTAIN OUR OFFENSIVE OPNS, SEEKING OUT THE VC AND DESTROYING THEM BEFORE THEY CAN SET FOR AN OPN OF THIS TYPE, WE ARE MUCH BETTER OFF THAN TO SIT AND WAIT FOR THEM TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. WILL NOT GO INTO THE SUBJECT HERE OF WHETHER VIETNAMESE ARMED FCS ARE LARGE ENOUGH.

Q. HAS USE OF DOGS BEEN CONSIDERED?

A. VIETNAMESE HAVE ONE PLAT OF DOGS IN PLEIKU AREA AND HAVE BEEN USING THEM. UNFORTUNATELY THEY WERE NOT IN USE IN THIS AREA WE HAVVZRQV DISCUSSING.

(SESSION ENDED W/REMINDER THAT WOULD BE FOR ATTRIBUTION TO U.S. MILITARY SPOKESMAN)

BT

ADV TO OSD/NMCC

PAGE 3 OF 3

SECT 3 OF 22031

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10
/


2/10/65

Mr. Bundy,

Greenfield suggests adding
final statement repeating no-wider-war
policy of last Sunday lest press conclude
this is change of policy.

BKS

BKS



DRAFT WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

Corrected Version
2/10/65

235
10a

"On February 11, U. S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in ~~retaliatory~~ attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Vietnam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi regime, beyond those actions reported to the press on February 7.

Over the past several days, a large number of South Vietnamese and U. S. personnel have been killed in an increasing number of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun ~~by the Viet Cong~~, resulting in further Vietnamese and U. S. casualties. In ~~both Saigon and Qui Nhon~~ there ~~has~~ ^{has} been an explosion in quarters used by U. S. enlisted men, resulting in an as yet undetermined number of dead and injured. In addition, there have been a number of mining and other attacks on the railway in South Vietnam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials.

The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this outbreak of new aggressions and outrages.

###

(10/65)

27

While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading the conflict,
the two governments felt compelled to take the action described above.

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

February 11, 1965

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

On February 11, U. S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Vietnam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi Regime.

Since February 8, a large number of South Vietnamese and U. S. personnel have been killed in an increased number of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, resulting in further Vietnamese and U. S. Casualties. In Qui Nhon, Viet Cong terrorists in attack on an American military billet murdered Americans and Vietnamese. In addition, there have been a number of mining and other attacks on the railway in South Vietnam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials.

The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this continuation of aggressions and outrages. While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading the conflict, the two governments felt compelled to take the action described above.

#

12

TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT AS APPROVED BY
THE PRESIDENT

"On February 11, U.S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Vietnam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi Regime, ~~beyond those actions reported to the Press on February 7.~~

since Feb 8,
~~Over the past several days,~~ a large number of South Vietnamese and U.S. personnel have been killed in an increasing^{ed} number of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, resulting in further Vietnamese and U.S. casualties. In Qui Nhon, Viet Cong terrorists in a ~~vicious sneak~~ attack on an American military billet murdered Americans and Vietnamese. In addition, there have been a number of mining and other attacks on the railway in South Vietnam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials.

The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this continuation of aggressions and outrages. While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading the conflict, the two governments felt compelled to take the action described above."

✓ 13

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

(2/10/65)

*On February 11, U. S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in ~~retaliatory~~ attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Vietnam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi regime, beyond those actions reported to the press on February 7.

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The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this outbreak of new aggressions and outrages.*

The two governments ~~have~~ ^{agreed} ~~found~~ ~~in~~ the ~~actions~~ ~~was~~ ~~announced~~.
~~that~~ ~~has~~ ~~been~~ ^{has} taken. ~~in~~ ~~aggression~~.

(2/10/65)

While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading the conflict,
the two governments felt compelled to take the action described above.

14 ✓

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

(2/10/65)

"On February 11, U. S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in ~~retaliatory~~ attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Vietnam.

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The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this outbreak of new aggressions and outrages."

The two governments agreed on the actions that have been taken. ###

✓ 14-1

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

(2/10/65)

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The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this outbreak of new aggressions and outrages.

###

LS

Msg to P.M. Wilson

15

11

3

Feb. 1, 1965

16 2

To: Mr. Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary
Department of State

From: McGeorge Bundy

Attached for information.
Mr. William Bundy is informed
of the background.

SENT
WHCA

RECEIVED

16a

Bundy

PRUS 001/11
110800Z 11 FEB 64
FM MCGEORGE BUNDY
TO WRIGHT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
~~SECRET~~
CITE CAP65037

1965 FEB 11 08 22 1965 FEB 11 03 26

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 17131
By is NARA, Date 5-8-98

~~SECRET~~

FOR DELIVERY AT OPENING OF BUSINESS, THURSDAY

THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO SEND YOU AT ONCE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION AND OUR CURRENT PLANS. IN DAYLIGHT HOURS, FEBRUARY 11, U.S. AND VIETNAMESE AIR UNITS WILL STRIKE TWO TARGETS IN SOUTHERN PART OF NORTH VIETNAM. THESE TARGETS WILL BE ARMY BARRACKS, CLEARLY ASSOCIATED WITH INFILTRATION PROGRAM OF HANOI. THESE STRIKES WILL BE IN AREAS WHERE AIR REACTION IS UNLIKELY. OPERATION HAS BEEN DESIGNED UNDER PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL AND CAREFUL SUPERVISION TO BE PROMPT, ADEQUATE AND MEASURED.

WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE FACT THAT KOSYGIN IS IN ASIA AND PRESENT OPERATIONS ARE ORDERED ONLY BECAUSE AFTER VERY GRAVE PROVOCATIONS OF RECENT DAYS, FAILURE TO REACT COULD BE DANGEROUSLY MISUNDERSTOOD BY FRIENDS AND ADVERSARIES ALIKE.

WE ESTIMATE SOVIET REACTION, TO DATE, AS VERY MODERATE IN THE LIGHT OF COMPETITION AMONG COMMUNISTS. REACTION FROM PEKING IS STRONG IN WORDS, BUT NOT CLEAR IN ACTION. IT IS AN HANOI THAT PROVOCATIONS APPEAR TO BE DELIBERATELY PLANNED, AND WE CURRENTLY EXPECT MORE OUTRAGES BEFORE THERE ARE LESS.

THE PRESIDENT REMAINS DETERMINED TO GIVE ALL NECESSARY REPLIES WHILE KEEPING IT CLEAR AT ALL TIMES THAT HE DESIRES NO WIDER WAR AND THAT ROOT CAUSE OF ENTIRE SITUATION IS IN SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION BY FORCE AND FRAUD AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM UNDER DIRECTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF OPERATION IS EXPECTED TO BE IN APPROXIMATE FOLLOWING TERMS ABOUT 0800 WASHINGTON TIME:

"ON FEBRUARY 11, U.S. AIR ELEMENTS JOINED WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE IN ATTACKS AGAINST MILITARY FACILITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM USED BY HANOI FOR THE TRAINING AND INFILTRATION OF VIET CONG PERSONNEL INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. THESE ACTIONS BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS WERE IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER DIRECT PROVOCATIONS BY THE HANOI REGIME, BEYOND THOSE ACTIONS REPORTED TO THE PRESS ON FEBRUARY 7. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, A LARGE NUMBER OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN KILLED IN AN INCREASING NUMBER OF VIET CONG AMBUSHES AND ATTACKS. A DISTRICT TOWN IN PHUOC LONG PROVINCE HAS BEEN OVERRUN, RESULTING IN FURTHER VIETNAMESE AND U.S. CASUALTIES. IN QUI NHON THERE HAS BEEN AN EXPLOSION IN QUARTERS USED BY U.S. ENLISTED MEN, RESULTING IN AN AS YET UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF DEAD AND INJURED. IN ADDITION, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF MINING AND OTHER ATTACKS ON THE RAILWAY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS WELL AS ASSASSINATIONS AND AMBUSHES INVOLVING SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN IN CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM ON THIS OUTBREAK OF NEW AGGRESSIONS AND OUTRAGES. WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR DESIRE TO AVOID SPREADING THE CONFLICT, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS FELT COMPELLED TO TAKE THE ACTION DESCRIBED ABOVE."

THE PRESIDENT WILL DISCUSS WHOLE SITUATION FULLY WITH AMBASSADOR BRUCE BEFORE HIS RETURN TO LONDON AND ASKS ME TO REPEAT THAT HE WELCOMES CONSULTATION BY CABLE AND TELEPHONE AT ANY TIME THE PRIME MINISTER THINKS IT USEFUL. HE ASSUMES PRIME MINISTER WILL PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IN THESE EXCHANGES, BUT IS GLAD TO HAVE IT KNOWN THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER ARE IN CLOSEST COMMUNICATION

END

*By field in 17
Country correspondence*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 17132

~~SECRET~~

By is NARA, Date 5-8-98

FOR WRIGHT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM McGEORGE BUNDY
AT
FOR DELIVERY AND OPENING OF BUSINESS, THURSDAY

The President has asked me to send you at once the following account of the situation and our current plans. In daylight hours, February 11, U.S. and Vietnamese air units will strike two targets in Southern part of North Vietnam. These targets will be Army Barracks, clearly associated with infiltration program of Hanoi. These strikes will be in areas where air reaction is unlikely. Operation has been designed under President's personal and careful supervision to be prompt, adequate and measured.

We have carefully considered the fact that Kosygin is in Asia and present operations are ordered only because after very grave provocations of recent days, failure to react could be dangerously misunderstood by friends and adversaries alike.

We estimate Soviet reaction, to date, as very moderate in the light of competition among Communists. Reaction from Peking is strong in words, but not clear in action. It is in Hanoi that provocations appear to be deliberately planned, and we currently expect more outrages before there are less.

The President remains determined to give all necessary replies while keeping it clear at all times that he desires no wider war and that

~~SECRET~~

root cause of entire situation is in systematic campaign of aggression by force and fraud against South Vietnam under direction of North Vietnamese leadership.

Announcement of operation is expected to be in approximate following terms about 0800 Washington Time:

"On February 11, U.S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Vietnam. These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi Regime, beyond those actions reported to the Press on February 7. Over the past several days, a large number of South Vietnamese and U.S. personnel have been killed in an increasing number of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, resulting in further Vietnamese and U.S. casualties. In Qui Nhon there has been an explosion in quarters used by U.S. enlisted men, resulting in an as yet undetermined number of dead and injured. In addition, there have been a number of mining and other attacks on the railway in South Vietnam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials. The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this outbreak of new aggressions and outrages. While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading

~~SECRET~~

the conflict, the two Governments felt compelled to take the action described above."

The President will discuss whole situation fully with Ambassador Bruce before his return to London and asks me to repeat that he welcomes consultation by cable and telephone at any time the Prime Minister thinks it useful. He assumes Prime Minister will protect Confidential information in these exchanges, but is glad to have it known that he and Prime Minister are in closest communication.

18

SitRoom Rpt.

19 2/11/64

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11:06 p. m.

NMCC advised by telephone conversation that strikes on Target 24, Chanh Hoa Barracks, would commence at 110600Z (0100 Washington Time) by aircraft from the USS HANCOCK and USS RANGER. Aircraft from USS CORAL SEA will strike same target 15 minutes later. Strike on Target 32, Vu Con Barracks, is scheduled for 110800Z (0300 Washington Time). This information had been received by telephone call at NMCC. Follow-on messages were expected.

10 FEBRUARY 1965

20

6:20 p.m.

JCS 102212Z to CINCPAC directed coordinated attacks by United States and VNAF against North Viet Nam target as reprisal for VC attack against U.S. personnel at Qui Nhon.

Targets assigned are:

For U.S. Forces - Primary Target 24, Chanh Hoa
(2d Air Division) Barracks.

Alternate Target 33, Dong Hoi
Barracks.

For VNAF - Primary Target 32, Vu Con Barracks.

Alternate Target 39, Chap Le Barracks.

From COMUSMACV 101725Z strike forces will probably be:

VNAF - 24 strike A-1H aircraft,
8 flak suppression F-100 aircraft.

(U.S. 2d Division aircraft will provide CAP).

U.S. - 28 strike F-105 aircraft,
12 MIG CAP F-100 aircraft,
12 flak suppression F-100 aircraft.

(7th Fleet aircraft may provide decoy plus destruction
Vinh Son radar.)

6:30 p.m.

Bromley Smith advised earlier that Press release will be coordinated for release initially by SAIGON after attack has been completed, to be followed by Press announcement about one-hour later from the White House.

10 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

6:45 p.m.

CTG 77.7 102238Z to CINCPAC set forth strike plan against Target 24, Chanh Hoi Barracks. Aircraft employed will be from USS HANCOCK, (CVA -19) and will consist of:

Strike Aircraft - 8, A4C.

4, A4E.

Flak Suppression Aircraft - 4, A4E

4, F8E

RESCAP Aircraft - 4, AlH

Photo Reece Aircraft - 2, RF8A

Photo Recce Escort - 4, F8C

Alternate specified was Target 53 -- believe this to be error as Target 33 had been directed by JCS as alternate.

Total time en route will be 2 hours for prop aircraft and 1 hour for jets.

If the above is correct, 2d Air Division aircraft will not be used for strike.

7:25 p.m.

CINCPAC 102323Z to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV assigned Target 24, primary, and Target 33, alternate, to CINCPACFLT and for COMUSMACV to assign Target 32, primary, and Target 39, alternate, to VNAF.

CINCPACAF to provide flak suppression and CAP to VNAF. Strikes to be simultaneous, if possible, but not if undue delay experienced.

CINCPACAF to be strike coordinator.

Estimated and actual TOT's required.

8:02 p.m.

MACV EAP 110015Z gave latest Qui Nhon military casualties as 1 KIA, 17 WIA, and 24 missing. In addition, 4 civilians who were in hotel at time of explosion were killed; 2 women, and 2 children.

10 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

9:40 p.m. Received information from WHCA Duty Officer that London was activating PICKWICK (London) line for a call from Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson. It was estimated that circuit would not be ready for about 30 minutes.
Bromley Smith advised McGeorge Bundy who was with the President.

10:10 p.m. CTG 77.7 110028Z specified coordination instructions. Indicated strike aircraft would come from USS RANGER and USS CORAL SEA, in addition to USS HANCOCK aircraft specified earlier by CTG 77.7 102238Z.

10:25 p.m. PICKWICK circuit operational; however, Mr. Bundy already has London call in progress on a clear line.

10:28 p.m. CTG 77.7 1102111Z corrected his 102238Z. Alternate target now "33" vice "53."

10:30 p.m. MACV EAC 110147Z stated dependent withdrawal will be completed February 18th.

11:06 p.m. NMCC advised by phone conversation that strikes on Target 24, Chanh Hoa Barracks, would commence at 110600Z (0100 Washington Time) by aircraft from the USS HANCOCK and USS RANGER. Aircraft from USS CORAL SEA will strike same target 15 minutes later. Strike on Target 32, Vu Con Barracks, is scheduled for 110800Z (0300 Washington Time). This information had been received by telephone call at NMCC. Follow-on messages were expected.

10 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

11:27 p. m.

Mr. Bundy advised that the President did not desire to be called during the night for routine reports -- only in the event of extremely unusual or spectacular happenings.

The President would call if he desired information. Bromley Smith relayed this to General Cox, Duty General in the NMCC, as guidance for those in DOD. If the necessity arises to pass information to the President, clear first with Bromely Smith. Also, Mr. Smith would like to know if any unusual happenings -- specifically, if MIG opposition is encountered.

11:47 p. m.

Mr. Reedy is to be called an hour before SAIGON expects to make its Press announcement following the strikes. SAIGON is to inform us of their expected release time. Mr. Bromley Smith would like to be called when we inform Mr. Reedy.

11 FEBRUARY 1965

00:40 a.m.

NMCC telecon to Situation Room reports a Flaming Dart 2 all fleet aircraft airborne at 11/0500Z (0001 Washington Time).

01:05 a.m.

Critic by phone received from CIA (separate message).

00:30 a.m.

11/0300Z from Air Div to CTF reports Time over Target 24 is 0600Z - Time over Target 32 is 0800Z.

01:00 a.m.

11/0333Z MACV to NMCC reported casualties at Qui Nhon:

2 KIA (U.S.)
18 WIA (U.S.)
23 MIA (U.S.)

62 EM s billeted in hotel - 19 not in building at time accounted for.

7VN civilians KIA in addition to 4 VN KIA previously reported.

11/0442Z CTG 77.4 to JCS reported launches of 8AHL at 11/0432Z from CVA 61 - TOT 11/0600Z.

01:05 a.m.

11/0451Z CTG 77.7 to JCS advised 8 AHL Rescap and 2 AHL "Barn Owl" launched at 11/0448Z. Estimated TOT 11/0610Z.

01:10 a.m.

11/0500 CTG 77.5 to JCS reports 8A1 Strike and A1 Rescap launched CVA43 at 11/0500. Estimated TOT 11/0615.

11 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

01:25 a.m. 11/0526Z CTG 77.7 to JCS reported launch from
CVA19 of Strike, Suppress, Tarcap, Coordinator
and Escort at 11/0525Z.

8 A4C
8 A4E
4 F8E
1 A4C
2 F8C

Estimated TOT 11/0610Z

01:40 a.m. 11/0325Z 2d Air Div to PACAF advises operation
plan and composition of VNAF Strike Force for
Target 32 (alternate Target 39). TOT is 11/0800Z.

02:15 a.m. 11/0616Z reports weather for Target 32 at 1800 feet
broken, 3500 feet broken, visibility 3-4 miles.
Weather recee proceeding to Target 39.

11/0553Z CTG 77.5 to JCS reports launches of CVA43
force at 11/0550Z - ETA at target 11/0615Z.

02:40 a.m. 11/0723Z - Secretary of State informs Saigon that
U.S. must make announcement in Washington and
requests Saigon hold off joint statement a couple
of hours. Requests flash of proposed time Saigon
will make announcement.

02:53 a.m. NMCC telecon to Situation Room reports both
primary targets selected to be hit. Target 24
already hit.
11/0737Z from JCS reports one (1) Navy aircraft,
type unknown, down 8NM from Dong Hoi at 90 degrees.

Page 2

11 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

03:20 a.m.

NMCC telecon to Situation Room reports that pilot of the downed A1 aircraft has been recovered, however, another A4 aircraft was diverted to Danang with hung ordnance. His landing gear collapsed on touchdown and his bombs exploded.

03:25 a.m.

The President called and talked with Bill Joy and Lt Col Cook requesting info on the strikes. We informed him that the U.S. strike had been made and the VNAF strike time was 3 a.m. We informed him that we had lost one Navy aircraft but the pilot was recovered. We informed him that one aircraft diverted to Danang with hung ordnance; gear collapsed on landing and munitions exploded. Runway at Danang is closed at this time. The President asked the results of our strike and we informed him we had received no results as yet. He asked that we call him when we have some results.

03:30 a.m.

I called the NMCC and informed the Admiral on duty of the President's interest in getting a report of our strike. He informed me that results are just beginning to come in and that NMCC would give us strike results and information as rapidly as possible.

NMCC telecon to Situation Room reports 1 A4C flamed out but pilot ejected and has been recovered.

04:20 a.m.

NMCC telecon to Situation Room reported NVAF launched at 11/0745Z. Have selected secondary target.

Pilot reportedly abandoned aircraft before it crashed at Danang.

11 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

04:30 a.m. NMCC telecon to Situation Room reported all AIH aircraft (24) in second operation have been recovered.

05:00 a.m. Called Admiral Grimm, NMCC and again requested mission summary report. He informed me no definite results received yet; messages are in transit and he is making every effort to obtain results for us. He confirmed aircraft losses as follows:

- 1 AIH down at sea. Pilot recovered
- 1 A4C flameout and abandoned. Pilot recovered
- 1 A4 crashed at Danang and ordnance exploded. Pilot abandoned aircraft before explosion and was recovered.
- 1 F8D unaccounted for

VNAF diverted to secondary target - #39 - Chop Le Army Barracks. All VNAF aircraft recovered at Danang. Admiral Grimm will call PACAF and try to get verbal estimate of strike results.

05:15 a.m. Admiral Grimm of NMCC called and stated that 3 messages were being dispatched giving us as much information as they have at this time.

05:30 a.m. George Reedy was informed that Saigon announcement will be made at 7 a.m. Washington Time (8 p.m. Saigon Time). He stated that he plans to make the release in Washington at 8 a.m. Washington Time.

05:40 a.m. I called the President to give him the latest information we have on the mission. Informed him we had definitely lost 3 aircraft with all pilots recovered and that one aircraft is unaccounted for. Informed him that strike results are preliminary; first reports on USAF strike at Target 24 indicated heavy to moderate

11 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

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06:00 a.m.

Colonel Tisdale, DIA, called in response to our query concerning numbers of people in the target areas. DIA estimates a capacity of 2,000 at Chanh Hoa - approximately 10% in barracks at time of attack (which was near lunch time). At Chop Le, capacity is estimated as 5,000 with approximately 5% in barracks at strike time. Additional numbers were likely in the areas near barracks and could have been affected by the strike.

11 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

06:00 a.m.

NMCC telecon to Situation Room reported that:

- 1 A4E crashed at Danang. Pilot recovered
- 1 A4C crashed. Pilot ejected and was recovered.
- 1 F8D missing

Earlier statement that an A1E was down was in error.

06:50 a.m.

Colonel Fay, NMCC, reports following revised aircraft loss statistics:

- 1 A4 crashed at sea - pilot recovered
- 1 A4 crashed at Danang - pilot recovered
- 1F8 missing

All lost aircraft were from Coral Sea. No losses from Hancock or Ranger.

All VNAF and USAF aircraft on the second mission have recovered except 1 RF101 and escort of 4 F-100s which are still airborne on BDA mission.

0835

The President called for further information and was given a briefing jointly by Lt Col Cook and Mr Art McEberty. He expressed dissatisfaction with the results being reported to him - lack of pictures, lack of firm results etc. Mr McGeorge Bundy is going to relay the President's reaction to Secretary McNamara

10 FEBRUARY 1965

21 ✓

6:20 p.m.

JCS 102212Z to CINCPAC directed coordinated attacks by United States and VNAF against North Viet Nam target as reprisal for VC attack against U.S. personnel at Qui Nhon.

Targets assigned are:

For U.S. Forces - Primary Target 24, Chanh Hoa Barracks.
(2d Air Division)

Alternate Target 33, Dong Hoi Barracks.

For VNAF - Primary Target 32, Vu Con Barracks.

Alternate Target 39, Chap Le Barracks.

From COMUSMACV 101725Z strike forces will probably be:

VNAF - 24 strike A-1H aircraft.
8 flak suppression F-100 aircraft.

(U.S. 2d Division aircraft will provide CAP).

U.S. - 28 strike F-105 aircraft.
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(7th Fleet aircraft may provide decoy plus destruction Vinh Son radar.)

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10 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

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CTG 77.7 102238Z to CINCPAC set forth strike plan against Target 24, Chanh Hoi Barracks. Aircraft employed will be from USS HANCOCK, (CVA -19) and will consist of:

Strike Aircraft - 8, A4C.

4, A4E.

Flak Suppression Aircraft - 4, A4E

4, F8E

RESCAP Aircraft - 4, A1H

Photo Recce Aircraft - 2, RF8A

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Alternate specified was Target 53 -- believe this to be error as Target 33 had been directed by JCS as alternate.

Total time en route will be 2 hours for prop aircraft and 1 hour for jets.

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CINCPACAF to provide flak suppression and CAP to VNAF. Strikes to be simultaneous, if possible, but not if undue delay experienced.

CINCPACAF to be strike coordinator.

Estimated and actual TOT's required.

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11 FEBRUARY 1965

00:40 a.m. NMCC telecon to Situation Room reports a
Flaming Dart 2 all fleet aircraft airborne
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01:05 a.m. Critic by phone received from CIA (separate
message).

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Target 24 is 0600Z - Time over Target 32 is 0800Z.

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11 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

01:25 a.m.

11/0526Z CTG 77.7 to JCS reported launch from CVA19 of Strike, Suppress, Tarcap, Coordinator and Escort at 11/0525Z.

8 A4C
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11/0325Z 2d Air Div to PACAF advises operation plan and composition of VNAF Strike Force for Target 32 (alternate Target 39). TOT is 11/0800Z.

02:15 a.m.

11/0616Z reports weather for Target 32 at 1800 feet broken, 3500 feet broken, visibility 3-4 miles. Weather recon proceeding to Target 39.

11/0553Z CTG 77.5 to JCS reports launches of CVA43 force at 11/0550Z - ETA at target 11/0615Z.

02:40 a.m.

11/0723Z - Secretary of State informs Saigon that U.S. must make announcement in Washington and requests Saigon hold off joint statement a couple of hours. Requests flash of proposed time Saigon will make announcement.

02:53 a.m.

NMCC telecon to Situation Room reports both primary targets selected to be hit. Target 24 already hit.

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11 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

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11 FEBRUARY 1965 (Continued)

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- 1F8 missing

All lost aircraft were from Coral Sea. No losses from Hancock or Ranger.

All VNAF and USAF aircraft on the second mission have recovered except 1 RF101 and escort of 4 F-100s which are still airborne on BDA mission.

✓ 22

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NMCC Followup

1. Estimated 20-30 U. S. enlisted men may have been killed.
2. At least 5 persons are trapped in ruins but are alive. Amputation may be necessary to extricate these men.
3. VC also threw grenades at the National Police Station.
4. 7 U. S. wounded have been evacuated.
5. Satchel charges were found adjacent to the building.
6. U. S. soldiers on top floor of hotel killed 2 VC in street in front of hotel immediately before the explosion.

Joseph Swift

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: MACV Explosion Report

Followup - 64 persons were billeted in the hotel which completely collapsed. There were 40-45 persons in the hotel at the time. Latest report indicated that 7 U.S. wounded have been taken from the building. These men were from the 140th Aviation Maintenance Detachment.

Joseph Swift

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

24 ✓

8 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. The air strike authorized to be carried out against Chap Le Army Barracks by the South Vietnamese Air Force, with U. S. cover, was carried out at 0231 E. S. T. this morning.
2. All aircraft have been recovered with the exception of a South Vietnamese strike plane which crashed at Danang. The pilot was recovered.
3. Initial interview with Recon pilot indicates strike was very effective and results were excellent. There were numerous fires in the complex with two very large fires in separate areas. Secondary explosions were observed in the barracks buildings. Pilot reports the timing was excellent with flak suppression aircraft lacing the area effectively just before strike aircraft attacked. Strike aircraft appeared to be on target with most of the munitions expended.
4. Following is a statement on strike issued this morning by Embassy and Vietnamese government:

" In furtherance of the action announced yesterday by the Acting Prime Minister and the U. S. Ambassador, it was made known that military action was taken today by Vietnamese and U. S. aircraft against other military installations in North Vietnam. "

5. Additional details on yesterday's strike against the Dong Hoi barracks have just come in from the field and will be available ~~at your 0830 meeting.~~
later this morning

Situation Room

Reprisal Option

5e


5e

REPRISAL OPTION

C H I N A

(101055 FEB 65)

TOP SECRET



U.S. ONLY - ○

TGT#	NAME	ESTIMATED SORTIES STRIKE/FLAK/CAP/TOTAL			
14	Thanh Hoa Bridge	32	12	4	48
24	Chanh Hoa Bks	28	12	12	52
	Totals	60	24	16	100

WEATHER ALTERNATES - ○

53	Phu Van Sup Depot SE	36	12	4	52
55	Vinh Son Sup Depot SW	8	4	4	16

U.S. AND VNAF - □

32	Vu Con Bks	10	8	4	22
----	------------	----	---	---	----

WEATHER ALTERNATE - □

36	Vit Thu Lu Bks	24	8	4	36
----	----------------	----	---	---	----

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DeSta 2/10/77
By mg, NARS, Date 6/30/77

10 February 1965
10:55 a.m. EST

REPRISAL OPTIONS

- | <u>TGT #</u> | <u>NAME</u> | <u>TGT DATA</u> |
|--------------|--|---|
| 14 | <u>Thanh Hoa Bridge</u> - RR & Hwy Bridge over Song Ma River, 510' x 25'. Two-lane highway with single track RR. Only N-S line from Hanoi to Vinh. Prestige bridge of major importance. | AA defense - 2 occupied sites (8 Lt positions).
3 inactive sites.
Radar - Early warning with GCI capability.
Collateral damage - Minor warehouse damage.
Casualties - Estimated 70 civilian casualties outside target area. |
| 24 | <u>Chanh Hoa Bks</u> - Large complex of 3 main areas. 76 admin/support, barracks type buildings. Hdq 325th Inf Div reported at this location. Supports Mil Region IV in DMZ and constitutes a major installation in this area. | AA defense - No known AA in the immediate vicinity.
5 inactive sites in Dong Hoi area (20 positions).
Occupancy varied in past. Photo 17 January shows all unoccupied.
Radar - Covered by radar in Dong Hoi airfield complex.
Collateral damage - Insignificant.
Casualties - Estimated 400 military casualties in target area and 10 civilian and 10 military casualties outside target area. |
| 53 | <u>Phu Van Supply Depot SE</u> - Part of large military complex. Two adjacent secured storage sites containing 3 large warehouses, 26 storage bldgs, 12 probable bks, 1 admin bldg, 5 small support bldgs and 3 misc bldgs. Depot part of large military complex in Vinh Son area serving 324th Inf Div/Bde. Located between Routes 7 and 8, both main avenues of DRV support to PL. | AA defense - Nearest AA defenses consist of two 6-position emplacements (57/85 mm - 10 occupied positions) approximately 3 NM NNW.
Radar - Radar coverage with GCI capability.
Collateral damage - Insignificant.
Casualties - Estimated 280 military casualties in target area, and 50 civilian and 30 military casualties outside target area. |
| 55 | <u>Vinh Son Supply Depot SW</u> - Part of large military complex serving 324th Inf Div/Bde. A small supply depot consisting of 5 warehouses, 4 storage sheds and 3 bks located between Routes 7 and 8, both main supply routes for DRV support to PL. | AA defense - Two medium sites with 10 weapons located in immediate area. Only other known AA defenses more than 23 miles away.
Radar - Radar coverage with GCI capability.
Collateral damage - Insignificant.
Casualties - Estimated 100 military casualties inside target area and 50 civilian casualties outside target area. |

10 February 1965

TGT
#

NAME

TGT DATA

- 32 Vu Con Bks - Two major areas .5 NM apart. North area - 38 bldgs. South area - 26 bldgs. This newly constructed area extensively used is an occupied strong point on DMZ and also may be staging area for infiltration units.
 AA defense - Falls within defenses of DMZ complex. No 57 mm or higher caliber AA positions known to exist in immediate target area.
 Radar - Covered by radar in Vinh Linh area.
 Collateral damage - Insignificant.
 Casualties - Estimated 75 military casualties in target area and 180 civilian casualties outside target area.
- 36 Vit Thu Lu Bks - Four separate areas containing 53 storage, utility and bks. bldgs. Is principal supply point for troops moving into DMZ or beyond.
 AA defense - Within defense of DMZ complex. No AA positions reported in immediate area.
 Radar - Covered by radar in Xom Bang area.
 Collateral damage - Insignificant.
 Casualties - Estimated 90 military casualties in target area.

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

26a

TARGET NO 14



~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TARGET NO 24

CHANH HOA ARMY BKS/HQ 325 INF DIV. SE.

70 31 08N 106 34 52E

Area "D" (Approx 1/2 mile)
39 Barracks
1 Admin Building
13 Storage Bldgs

Area "C"

Training Area

105 Barracks
58 Administrative
& Support Bldg.

Dong Hoi Airfield

Administration Area

Area "B"

Area "A"

UTM: XE-5936

SCALE 1:9,120

3.3 (b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TARGET NO 53



~~SECRET~~


NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TARGET NO 55

VINH SON ARMY SUPPLY DPO SW
18 53 40 N 105 17 45 E



11 supply bldgs
At least 4 misc.
bldgs.

UTM: S 104 E

SCALE: 1:8,600

3.3 (b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP-1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

NORTH VIETNAM
VU GON MIL INSTALLATION
16°54'45"N-106°49'50"E



28 Storage-Type Buildings



8 Barrack-Type Buildings

7 Support/Utility Buildings

3 Support/Utility Buildings



UTM: XD 950706

SCALE: 1:6,000

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

3.3(b)(1)


~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TARGET NO ³⁶ 34

VIT THU LU MIL INSTALLATION

17 01 30 N 106 38 40 E



UTM: XO-7689

SCALE: 1:6,000

3.3
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
~~TOP SECRET~~

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION FLASH
INFO FLASH

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DIST: CJCS-2(4-5) DJS-3(6-8) SJCS-1(9) J3-6
 (10-15) J4-2(16-17) J5-2(18-19) SACSA-4
 (20-23) SAMAA-1(24) DIA-1(25) NMCC-2
 (26-27) SECDEF-5(28-32) ISA-5(33-37)
 CSA-2(38-39) CSAF-2(40-41) CNO-2(42-43)
 CMC-2(44-45) WHITE HOUSE-3(46-48) RRA-1
 (49) FILE-1(1)RW/W CY2 COMEBACK CY3 DACC
 CY 50 ADV TO OSD. CY51 ADV TO CJCS. CY52
 ADV TO DJS.

DTG 101641Z FEB 65

FROM JCS

TO CINCPAC

INFO: CINCUSAC
 CINCUSARPAC
 CINCPACFLT
 CINCPACAF
 COMUSMACV
 WHITE HOUSE
 STATE
 AMEMB SAIGON
 AMEMB BANGKOK
 AMEMB VIENTIANE
 2D AIR DIV
 COMSEVENTHFLT
 CTF 77
 CTG 77.5
 CTG 77.4
 CTG 77.7
 DIA/ZEN
 CIA
 NSA
 ANMCC
 NECPA
 NEACP
 CINCSTRIKE

LIMDIS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Regular JCS
 Distribution
 Plus
 OSD
 OSD/ISA
 LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority Jesta 2/10/77
 By smg, NARS, Date 6/30/77

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS JCS 004926 JCS Send. 46

Subject: Reprisals (S)

1. This is a warning order. Upon direction from Washington, be prepared to conduct the following coordinated attacks during daylight hours, 11 February 1965, Saigon time:

DATE	TIME
10	
MONTH	YEAR
Feb	1965
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASER	SIGNATURE
				TYPED (OR STAMPED) NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~ REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GP-3

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

- a. For US forces - Targets - 14 - Thanh Hoa Bridge
24 - Chanh Hoa Barracks

Weather alternates - Targets-53- Phu Van Supply Depot

55- Vinh Son Supply Dep SW

- b. For VNAF - Target - 32 - Vu Con Barracks

Weather alternates - Target - 36 - Vit Thu Lu Barracks

2. Additional instructions:

- a. Forces - CVAs, USAF in SVN and Thailand, VNAF.

Plan target assignments so that failure of Thais to grant permission to use bases will not negate plan.

- b. Damage levels - maximum feasible.

- c. Ordnance optimum - conventional excluding napalm.

- d. US flak suppression, CAP, recce, and SAR

authorized for both US and VNAF strikes. FARM GATE

Pathfinders authorized for VNAF but strikes will be

performed by VNAF pilots only.

- e. No aircraft will be recycled.

- f. Insure no interference by OPLAN 34 A operations.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-3				TOP SECRET	

DD FORM 173-1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

3. Imperative there be no leaks and minimum press speculation, since former could completely jeopardize mission. Extreme care in this regard in coordinating with GVN/VNAF. 7

4. Advise ASAP planned times of strike launch, force assignments, number of sorties by type mission, weapon loading tactics, and weather outlook. GP-3

CONTROL NO.	TOP/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	3		
REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-3				TOP SECRET	

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

DISTR: CJCS-2(4-5) DJS (6-8) SJCS-1(9)
J3-6(10-15) J4-2(16-17) J5-2(18-19)
SACSA-4(20-23) SAMAA-1(24) DIA-1(25)
NMCC-2(26-27) SECDEF-5(28-32) ISA-5
(33-37) CSA-2(38-39) CSAF-2(40-41)
CNO-2(42-43) CMC-2(44-45) WHITE HOUSE-3
(46-48) RRA-1(49)H/THM FILE-1(1)

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

FLASH

INFO

FLASH

ADV COPIES FURN CJCS, SECDEF, CSA, CSAF AND CNO

DTG

102212Z FEB 65

CY#2 CC, CY#3 CB

FROM JCS

TO CINCPAC

INFO: CINCSAC
CINCUSARPAC
CINCPACFLT
CINCPACAF
COMUSMACV
WHITE HOUSE
STATE
AMEMB SAIGON
AMEMB BANGKOK
AMEMB VIENTIANE
2D AIR DIV
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTF 77
CTG 77.5
CTG 77.7
CTG 77.4
DIA/ZEN
CIA
NSA
ANMCC
NECPA
NEACP
CINCSTRIKE

~~LIMDIS~~

~~FLASH~~

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Regular JCS
Distribution
Plus
OSD
OSD/ISA
LIMDIS

crw

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *JCS/IA 2/10/77*
By *pmg*, NARS, Date *6/30/77*

48

ZFF-3

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS JCS **004973** JCS Send.

Subject: Reprisals (S)

Ref: JCS 004926

1. This is an execution message. During daylight hours on 11 February 1965, Saigon time, conduct the

DATE	TIME
10	
MONTH	YEAR
Feb	1965
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

JCS/P-3

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

74084

RELEASED

SIGNATURE

D. A. Burchinal

Lt. General D.A. Burchinal
Director, Joint Staff

TYPED (OR STAMPED) NAME AND TITLE

D. A. BURCHINAL, Lt Gen, DJS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

GP-3

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

following coordinated attacks:

a. For US Forces - Primary Target 24 - Chanh Hoa Barracks

Alternate Target 33 - Dong Hoi Barracks

b. For VNAF - Primary Target 32 - Vu Con Barracks

Alternate Target 39 Chap Le Barracks

2. Paragraph 2, additional instructions of ref apply, except do not repeat not use Thai based aircraft.

3. Request flash reports of launch, strike, recovery and results. GP-3

004973

CONTROL NO.	TON/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-3				TOP SECRET	


DD FORM 173-1
NOV 68

REPRISAL OPTION

C H I N A

(101055 Z FEB 65)

TOP SECRET



U.S. ONLY -

COST	NAME	ESTIMATED SORTIES			
		STRIKE	FLAK	CAP	TOTAL
14	Thanh Hoa Bridge	32	12	4	48
24	Chanh Hoa Bks	28	12	12	52
	Totals	60	24	16	100

WEATHER ALTERNATES -


53	Phu Van Sup Depot SE	36	12	4	52
55	Vinh Son Sup Depot SW	8	4	4	16

U.S. AND VNAF -

32	Vu Con Bks ✓	10	8	4	22
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WEATHER ALTERNATE -

36	Vit Thu Lu Bks	24	8	4	36
----	----------------	----	---	---	----



TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: *OP 116 2/10/97*
By: *rmg*, NARS, Date: *6/30/97*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
10 February 1965
10:55 a.m. EST

REPRISAL OPTIONS

<u>TGT #</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TGT DATA</u>
14	<u>Thanh Hoa Bridge</u>	<p>- RR & Hwy Bridge over Song Ma River, 510' x 25'. Two-lane highway with single track RR. Only N-S line from Hanoi to Vinh. Prestige bridge of major importance. AA defense - 2 occupied sites (8 Lt positions). 3 inactive sites. Radar - Early warning with GCI capability. Collateral damage - Minor warehouse damage. Casualties - Estimated 70 civilian casualties outside target area.</p>
24	<u>Chanh Hoa Bks</u>	<p>- Large complex of 3 main areas. 76 admin/support, barracks type buildings. Hdq 325th Inf Div reported at this location. Supports Mil Region IV in DMZ and constitutes a major installation in this area. AA defense - No known AA in the immediate vicinity. 5 inactive sites in Dong Hoi area (20 positions). Occupancy varied in past. Photo 17 January shows all unoccupied. Radar - Covered by radar in Dong Hoi airfield complex. Collateral damage - Insignificant. Casualties - Estimated 400 military casualties in target area and 10 civilian and 10 military casualties outside target area.</p>
53	<u>Phu Van Supply Depot SE</u>	<p>- Part of large military complex. Two adjacent secured storage sites containing 3 large warehouses, 26 storage bldgs, 12 probable bks, 1 admin bldg, 5 small support bldgs and 3 misc bldgs. Depot part of large military complex in Vinh Son area serving 324th Inf Div/Bde. Located between Routes 7 and 8, both main avenues of DRV support to PL. AA defense - Nearest AA defenses consist of two 6-position emplacements (57/85 mm - 10 occupied positions) approximately 3 NM NNW. Radar - Radar coverage with GCI capability. Collateral damage - Insignificant. Casualties - Estimated 280 military casualties in target area, and 50 civilian and 30 military casualties outside target area.</p>
55	<u>Vinh Son Supply Depot SW</u>	<p>- Part of large military complex serving 324th Inf Div/Bde. A small supply depot consisting of 5 warehouses, 4 storage sheds and 3 bks located between Routes 7 and 8, both main supply routes for DRV support to PL. AA defense - Two medium sites with 10 weapons located in immediate area. Only other known AA defenses more than 23 miles away. Radar - Radar coverage with GCI capability. Collateral damage - Insignificant. Casualties - Estimated 100 military casualties inside target area and 50 civilian casualties outside target area.</p>

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TGT
#

NAME

TGT DATA

- 32 Vu Con Bks - Two major areas .5 NM apart. North area - 38 bldgs. South area - 26 bldgs. This newly constructed area extensively used is an occupied strong point on DMZ and also may be staging area for infiltration units.
 AA defense - Falls within defenses of DMZ complex. No 57 mm or higher caliber AA positions known to exist in immediate target area.
 Radar - Covered by radar in Vinh Linh area.
 Collateral damage - Insignificant.
 Casualties - Estimated 75 military casualties in target area and 180 civilian casualties outside target area.
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 AA defense - Within defense of DMZ complex. No AA positions reported in immediate area.
 Radar - Covered by radar in Xom Bang area.
 Collateral damage - Insignificant.
 Casualties - Estimated 90 military casualties in target area.

30
1

Flaming Dart II
State Msgs

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

31
NSC

4-S

~~SECRET~~

Action

SS

Info

***** ZZ RUEHCR RUEHJS RUEHEX
DE RUMJIR 578A 11/0835Z
Z 110831Z ZEA

09372

~~FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON~~
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHJS/DOD WASHDC
RUEHEX/WHITEHOUSE
STATE GRNC

1965 FEB 11 AM 4 01

FLASH 120/25

BT

~~SECRET~~ ACTION FLASHDEPT 2506 DOD-442 WHITEHOUSE 352
FROM SAIGON FEB 11, 4 PM

REF: YOUR 1690

PLAN RELEASE TEXT AT 2000 HOURS SAIGON TIME TO BE FOLLOWED
IMMEDIATELY BY BRIEFING ON SPECIFIC TARGETS HIT AND RESULTS.

GP-3 TAYLOR

BT

CFN 2506 442 352 1690 2000

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 2-11-65, 4:02 A.M.

NOTE: PASSED CIA, 2-11-65, 4:12 A.M.

NOTE; Handled LIMDIS per S/S-O.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 2-6-78
By [Signature], NARS, Date 9-4-79

~~SECRET~~

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

06041

32

103

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

2-S

Origin
FE
Info
SS
G
SP
SAL
EUR
NEA
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD

Action:	CIRCULAR 1466	
XIXIXIX	Amembassy, LONDON	FLASH
"	CANBERRA	FLASH
"	WELLINGTON	FLASH
"	PARIS	FLASH
"	OTTAWA	FLASH
"	NEW DELHI	FLASH
"	MANILA	FLASH
"	USUN	FLASH
"	TOKYO	FLASH
"	BANGKOK	FLASH
"	VIENTIANE	FLASH
"	PARIS FOR USRO	FLASH
"	TAIPEI	FLASH
"	SEOUL	FLASH
"	ROME	FLASH

FEB 11 3 26 AM '65

Info Amembassy, SAIGON PRIORITY

" **MOSCOW PRIORITY**

Re Deptel 4997 to London repeated other addressees.

Subject: Actions in Viet-Nam.

Execute.

END BALL

Drafted by: FE/VN:TJCorcoran:mlc 2/10/65	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE/VN:Thomas J. Corcoran
--	---

Clearances:

FE:Mr. Bundy

S/S-O E. R. Williams

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter FEB 6 1978 ~~SECRET~~

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FORM DS-322

isp, NARS, Date 9-4-79

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

33

NSC

43

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

*****ZZ RUEHCR RUEHEX RUEHJS RUEHLG
DE RUMJIR 523A 10/1615Z
J 101605Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHEX/WHITEHOUSE
RUEHJS/DOD WASHDC
RUEHLG/CIA WASHDC
RUHPA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter FEB 6 1978
By *isp*, NARS, Date 9-4-79

22/27

8 6 8 3

1965 FEB 10 AM 14:32

~~SECRET~~

ACTION FLASH DEPT 2491 INFO FLASH WHITEHOUSE 349 DOD 438
CIA 333 CINCPAC 1480 FROM SAIGON FEB 10 MIDNIGHT

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

JOHNSON AND I HAVE JUST REVIEWED THE QUI NHON HOTEL BOMBING WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND HIS STAFF. WHILE THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IS NOT YET DETERMINED IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS VC ATROCITY JUSTIFYING PROMPT AIR REPRISAL, PREFERABLY IN THE DAYLIGHT HOURS OF FEBRUARY 10 (SAIGON TIME). WE SO RECOMMEND.

CFN 2491 349 438 333 1480 10 JOHNSON QUI NHON HOTEL WESTMORELAND NOT YET VC 10

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 523A ~~SECRET~~
MEANWHILE MACV AND VNAF PLANNERS ARE AT WORK AT SPECIFIC TARGET RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WILL BE COMPLETED DURING THE NIGHT AND FORWARDED FOR APPROVAL WHEN READY. I HAVE ALERTED ACTING PRIME MINISTER OANH TO THE NEED OF GOVERNMENT DECISION TOMORROW MORNING. WESTMORELAND IS ALERTING KHANH.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN MACV VNAF OANH TO WESTMOREGKND KHANH

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 11:37 A.M., 2/10/65.

Handled Lundis per S/S

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~Bundy 34

ACTION: Amembassy, SAIGON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter FEB 6 1978

By isp, NARS, Date 9-4-79~~NO DIS LOR~~

Reprisal strikes February 7 - 8 and February 11 have in effect set in motion program of continuing US-GVN military actions against North Viet-Nam which were subject of discussions with Bundy group in Saigon last week and which in principle has been cleared at highest level, as noted .

There follow guidelines for the further elaboration of this program to assist Mission in developing specific military plans, guidelines for public relations and for conducting conversations with GVN. We wish emphasize that fundamental objective of program is to assure that, together with the way it is presented to Governments, that it conveys the desired messages to Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow, to the Government and people of South Viet Nam, to Viet Cong, the American public and free world allies and neutrals. The message, already often stated, is that our actions are in response to the North Vietnamese open and covert encouragement and support of the Viet Cong efforts to

~~SECRET~~

-2-

subvert the GVN. If North Vietnamese interference should come to an end so would our retaliatory actions. While we maintain our desire to avoid spreading the conflict in Viet Nam, the U.S. and GVN feel compelled to take retaliatory action in response to North Vietnamese aggression.

(1) Reprisal strikes. In general reprisals will be made in response not to individual actions but to over-all VC program of terror and military pressure. While frequency of reprisals will be examined regularly in light of level of Viet Cong activity and in context of over-all political situation, at outset for planning problems we should count on reprisal every five or six days. Assuming no improvement in situation you should think in terms of gradual increase in intensity of program through greater frequency, heavier attacks, and moving attacks northward. Some reprisals may be specifically and directly responsive to Viet Cong actions such as knocking out railway bridges or installations following Viet Cong railway attacks.

~~SECRET~~

Cardinal principal with regard to reprisal strikes will be important participation of GVN forces to other military actions. There had been underway for some time a series of military operations against North Viet Nam which now should be reexamined in light of initiation of new program. Actions which had primarily harassment purpose will be evaluated here to determine desirability and need for their continuation and if so at what level. Various sea and air operations fall in this category and your views as to what should be future pattern are requested.

(2) Barrel Roll activities should continue, probably with some reshaping of mission in Laos and with extension up infiltration routes onto DRV territory. We are also contemplating instituting RECCE flights over the DRV on the Yankee Team pattern and your views solicited on both these possible innovations in order set stage for systematic study in Defense Department.

(3)

06084

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

35

2

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON FLASH 1690
 SS INFO: DOD FLASH UNN
 WHITE HOUSE FLASH UNN

FEB 11 2 12 AM '65

3

EXDIS

Embtel 2492

We must make announcement here and would prefer you hold off your joint statement about two hours if possible to shorten time gap between Saigon and Washington announcements. We are proceeding revise along lines your suggestions.

Please Flash actual time you will make your announcement.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority STATE letter FEB 6 1978
 By isp, NARS, Date 9-4-79

BALL.

Drafted by: FE/VN TJCorcoran/gaf	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE/VN TJCorcoran
--	---

Clearances:
FE: MR. Bundy

S/S-O - E. R. Williams

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~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

05896
36
49

~~SECRET~~

84
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy LONDON 4997 IMMEDIATE

Feb 10 7 42 PM '65

CANBERRA	616	"
WELLINGTON	604	"
MOSCOW	2170	"
PARIS	4178	"
OTTAWA	868	"
NEW DELHI	1625	"
MANILA	1239	"
USUN	1992	"
TOKYO	2011	"
BANGKOK	1198	"
VIENTIANE	684	"
PARIS FOR USRO	-	"
TAIPEI	754	"
SEOUL	723	"
ROME	1688	"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter FEB 6 1978

By inf, NARS, Date 9-4-79

~~XXXX~~

INFO: AmEmbassy SAIGON PRIORITY

DOD CIA WHITE HOUSE

LIMDIS

Addressees except Moscow should stand by to seek out highest
~~xxx~~ appropriate local official at approximately 0700 tomorrow
 Washington time to inform them of substance following draft announce-
 ment. Since announcement may be revised, text itself should not be
 used. We expect Saigon ^{joint} ~~joint~~ announcement about 0700 to be followed
 by White House announcement about 0800.

TEXT:

"On February 11, U. S. air elements joined with the South

Drafted by: FE: WPBundy/bmm 2/8	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: W. P. Bundy
------------------------------------	--

EUR - Mr. Creel
EUR - Mr. Tyler

UNP - Mr. Buffum
S - The Acting Secretary (substance)
S/S - Mr. Reade

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

Vietnamese Air Force in attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Vietnam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi regime, beyond those actions reported to the press on February 7.

Over the past several days, a large number of South Vietnamese and U. S. personnel have been killed in an increasing number of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, resulting in further Vietnamese and U. S. casualties. In Qui Nhon there has been an explosion in quarters used by US enlisted men, resulting in an as yet undetermined number of dead and injured. In addition, there have been a number of mining and other attacks on the railway in South Vietnam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials.

The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Vietnam on this outbreak of new aggressions and outrages. While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading the conflict, the two governments felt compelled to take the action described above. " END TEXT

FYI: Addressees will note action based on broader statement VC ^{activity} ~~activities~~ than Sunday with more stress on activity against South Vietnamese. Also avoids

~~SECRET~~

Page 3 of telegram to London, Canberra, Wellington, Moscow, Paris, Ottawa, New Delhi, Manila, USUN, Tokyo, Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris for USRO, Taipei, Seoul

~~SECRET~~
Classification

any explicit statement continuing action. These intentional and should be left speak ~~specific~~ for themselves. You should also avoid specifics on operations since ~~wet~~ weather may alter these.

You will receive FLASH execute signal when we know at least some operations have in fact been carried out.

We expect call in embassies tomorrow for fuller discussion. Report any reactions you receive so that we can deal with these here.

~~GPxx~~

KMBX

In determining appropriate level to approach you should seek to avoid making any dramatic move but at same time ensure that government will be satisfied it fully informed just as soon as this was possible. We want to be less dramatic in view possibility further similar actions, but also to establish routine of notification. END FYI.

~~XXXXX~~ QTE FOR ROME. Prime Minister Moro has telephoned Ambassador ~~XXXXX~~ advice Fenoaltea to request urgent ~~XXXXX~~ intentions in light latest developments Viet Nam. He said he needs this information urgently for use in parliamentary debate scheduled tomorrow afternoon. You should therefore keep Moro currently and fully informed. UNQTE.

FOR FINLETTER: You may wish to inform ~~KMB~~ SYG Brosio in strict

~~GPxxx~~ confidence along above lines.

BALL.

GP-1

~~SECRET~~
Classification

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

05823

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

37

81
Origin
55
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 1686 - IMMEDIATE
DOD
WHITE HOUSE
EXDIS

Feb 10 7 08 PM '65

003

Following is our draft text proposed White House announcement tomorrow morning.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 17134
By isa NARA, Date 5-8-98

TEXT

"On February 11, US air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in attacks against military facilities in North Vietnam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Vietnam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi regime, beyond those actions reported to the press on February 7.

Over the past several days, a large number of South Vietnamese and U. S. personnel have been killed in an increasing number of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, resulting in further Vietnamese and U. S. casualties. In Qui Nhon there has been an explosion in quarters used by U. S. enlisted men, resulting in an as yet undetermined number of dead and injured. In

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

FE: WPBundy/bmm/ 2/10/65

classification approved by:

W. P. Bundy

Clearances:

The Acting Secretary (subs) White House - Mr. McGeorge Bundy (subs)
S/S - Mr. Read

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~~SECRET~~

FORM 8-63 DS-322

~~SECRET~~

statement. This is to avoid unnecessary complications in Soviet reaction and also more generally until we wish to make policy of continuing responses more explicit, which may not be at least until Kosygin returns to Moscow.

3. We also envisage you would make first report on specific targets hit and results. We would then follow with confirmation here, probably through standard DoD information channels. In general, we are throwing publicity ball more to you and trying to avoid dramatic touches moving toward possible future policy describing operations only in general terms.

GP-1.

END

BALL.

~~SECRET~~

38
✓

DRAFT NEWS RELEASE

The following is the text of an announcement made by the White House at approximately EST, Thursday, February 11, 1965:

"On February 11 U.S. air elements were directed to support the South Vietnamese Air Force in its retaliatory attacks against military facilities in North Viet Nam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet Nam and against rail and other facilities supporting the North Vietnamese military efforts directed against South Viet-Nam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime, beyond those actions reported to the press on February 7.

Over the past several days in Viet Cong ambushes and attacks _____ personnel of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces are reported killed as well as _____ U.S. personnel. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been over-run by the Viet Cong, resulting in further Vietnamese and U.S. casualties. In both Saigon and QuiNhon there have been explosions in quarters used by U.S. enlisted men, resulting in an as yet undetermined number of dead and injured. In addition attacks on the railway in South Viet-Nam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials continue.

These new aggressions and outrages, coupled with the attacks on

airfields, barrack areas and villages as reported on February 7 give a clear picture of determination by the Hanoi regime to intensify the fighting and destruction in South Viet Nam which/^{it} has been fomenting and supporting through the Viet Cong.

The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Viet Nam on this outbreak of new and more bitter Viet Cong actions and reprisal actions already mentioned were agreed upon. The reprisal action received the President's approval following discussion with the National Security Council on February 10.

The North Vietnamese provocations will thus receive an appropriate response reflecting that regime's responsibility for the Viet Cong's aggressions in the South. A continuation of this pattern of provocation must inevitably bring responses such as have just been ordered by the South Vietnamese and U.S. Governments; ~~it~~ it lies with North Viet Nam to bring this unfortunate situation to an end.

39

Flaming Dart II
JCS Msgs

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

ACT: DJS-3

CJCS-2 SJCS-3 J1-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-2 J6-3
SACSA-5 DIA-15 NMCC-2 SAMAA-1 SECDEF-5
ISA-9 PA-1 WHITE HOUSE-3 STATE-1 RRA-1
USIS(MAIL)-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10
FILE-1(83)TWC/W

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCL

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

X

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

Routine

INFO

DTG 121735Z FEB 65

FROM: OCJCS

TO: CINCPAC
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF (Courier) /ZEN

INFO: CSA/ZEN
CNO/ZEN
CSAF/ZEN
CMC/ZEN

Uncl JCS 005117 For Sharpe and Burchinal from

Wheeler:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are pleased to forward the following message from the Secretary of Defense:

"Timely and effective response was made by the United States and South Vietnamese governments to the February 7 Hanoi-inspired night attacks against the Pleiku, Tuy Hoa, and Nha Trang areas. Within twelve hours of these attacks, our unequivocal reply to the challenge had been delivered. Within twenty-four hours, the results of our first strike on the Dong Hoi staging area had been assessed and reported to the world. Our action was continued with equal effect on the following day.

"Such a response was made possible by the dedication, professional skill, and courage of many individuals - and by exemplary planning, coordination, and execution actions on the part of our military establishment as a whole. Very adverse weather conditions complicated the usual problems of communications and control inherent in the conduct of a precise operation

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DISTR:

Regular JCS
OSD
STATE
WHITE HOUSE
USIA

ZFF-1 #170

DATE 12	TIME 1220 R
MONTH Feb	YEAR 1965
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 2

D
R
A
F
T
E
R

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE
79121

SIGNATURE

Bernard W. Rogers, Colonel, USA
Executive

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
Bernard W. Rogers, Colonel, USA
Executive, OCJCS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCL

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCL

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION Routine	Bernard W. Rogers, Col. USA	Bernard W. Rogers, Col. USA	79121.
INFO			

half the world away from our seat of government. All obstacles were overcome, with results which reflect great credit on those involved.

"Please convey my congratulations and appreciation to all participating individuals and commands." Signed Robert S. McNamara.

005117

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 2	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCL	

41

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNION CENTER			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET				DIST: CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(9-11) SJCS-3(12-14) J3-6(15-20) J4-2(21-22) J5-2(23-24) SACSA-5(25-29) SAMAA-1(30) DIA-4(31-34) SECDEF-5(35-39) ISA-9(40-48) <u>WHITE</u> HOUSE-3(49-51) CSA-2(52-53) CNO-2(54-55) CSAF-2(56-57) CMC-5(58-62) FILE-1(1) JNF/F CY #2 TO DACC; CY #3 TO COMEBACK			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	ADV TO CJCS #4, DJS #5 & SECDEF #6 RRA-1(63)			
		X		DTG 111912Z FEB 65			
PRECEDENCE							
ACTION IMMEDIATE							
INFO IMMEDIATE							

FROM: JCS

TO: AIG 936(ACTION ADDRESSES ONLY)
NSA
CIA

INFO: STATE
WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~/JOPREP 005027 02004/JCS/SITREP 04/111800Z.

Reference JCS 5010 111602Z Feb.

1. Hanoi radio claims to have captured U.S. pilot Robert Shumaker. CINCPACFLT carries Lt. Cmdr. Robert H. Shumaker as pilot of missing F8D.

2. Total aircraft participating in Chap Le Barracks was ⁵²~~50~~. Twenty-^{four}~~six~~ Vietnamese Al-H aircraft accomplished the strike while ²⁸~~30~~ U. S. F-100 and RF-101 provided support. GP-1.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
Regular JCS Distribution Plus OSD	
ZFF-1 (#138)	
# 1	
DATE	TIME
11	
MONTH	YEAR
FEB	1965
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 210177

By smg, NARS, Date 6/30/77

49

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	<i>James M. Tiley</i>	59625		<i>[Signature]</i>
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS		
	TOP SECRET	Operations (NMCC) GP-4		

RECEIVED
WHCA

42

JCU946
*****ZZZ RUEPWW
DE RUEKDA 227 11/1834Z
Z 111833Z

1965 FEB 11 18 51

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/NSA

6869

111710Z
FM MACV EAC
TO CINCPAC

~~TOP SECRET~~

NMCC
ZEN 2D AIR DIV
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

(SPECIAL OP-00 BDA/RECCE FLAMING DART II:
A. 2ND AIR DIV 110235Z

Bundy

1. PRELIMINARY REPORT INDICATES VNAF
STRIKE ON TGT 39 CHAP LE BKS WAS
SUCCESSFUL BUT THE DEGREE IS UNKNOWN,
PLANNED POST STRIKE BDA DID NOT
GET COVERAGE DUE TO BAD WEATHER
AND DARKNESS OVER TGT 39.

2ND AIR DIV REQUESTS AUTHORITY
TO LAUNCH BDA/RECCE AS FOLLOWS:

A. INFO APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL MSN:

- (1) GREEN 53/54 2RF101
WHITE 61-64 4 F100 BDA ESCORT
- A. TGT 39 CHAP LE BKS
- B. ROUTE REF A: SAME AS GREEN
43/WHITE 51-54 FLAMING DART II POST
STRIKE MSN THAT ATTEMPTED BDA 11/0942Z
FROM DANANG

C. PRIMANRY DATE: REQUEST APPROVAL
IN TIME TO LAUNCH 12/0600Z RPT 12/0600Z.

B. REMARKS:

- (1) GREEN 53/54 LAUNCH TSN 12/0600Z
- (2) WHITE 61-64 LAUNCH DANANG 12/0630Z
- (3) AIRCRAFT WILL RENDEZVOUS OVER
DANANG THEN PROCEED TO TET 39.

(TELETYPE WILL FOLLOW:)

GP-3
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 3/3/77

NNNN

By rmg, NARS, Date 4/8/77

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DISTR: CJCS-2(4-5) DJS-3(6-8) SJCS-1(9)
J3-6(10-15) J4-2(16-17) JS-2(18-19)
SACSA-4(20-23) SAMAA-1(24) DIA-1(25)
NMCC-2(26-27) SECDEF-5(28-32) ISA-5
(33-37) CSA-2(38-39) CSAF-2(40-41)
CNO-2(42-43) CMC-2(44-45) WHITE HOUSE-3
(46-48) RRA-1(49) H/THM FILE-1(1)

43

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION FLASH			
INFO FLASH			

ADV COPIES FURN CJCS, SECDEF, CSA, CSAF AND CNO

DTG 102212Z FEB 65 CY#2 CC, CY#3 CB

FROM JCS

TO CINCPAC

INFO: CINCNSAC
CINCUSARPAC
CINCPACFLT
CINCPACAF
COMUSMACV
WHITE HOUSE
STATE
AMEMB SAIGON
AMEMB BANGKOK
AMEMB VIENTIANE
2D AIR DIV
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTF 77
CTG 77.5
CTG 77.7
CTG 77.4
DIA/ZEN
CIA
NSA
ANMCC
NECPA
NEACP
CINCSTRIKE

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS JCS 004973 JCS Send.

Subject: Reprisals (S)

Ref: JCS 004926

1. This is an execution message. During daylight hours on 11 February 1965, Saigon time, conduct the

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Regular JCS Distribution Plus OSD OSD/ISA LIMDIS

crw

ZFF-3

04

DATE	TIME
10	
MONTH	YEAR
Feb	1965
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE
Lt. General D.A. Burchinal Director, Joint Staff		74084	<i>[Signature]</i>
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	GP-3

DD FORM 173 1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *JCS 2/10/77*

By *AMG*, NARS, Date *6/30/77*

44

JCU747
OO RUEPWW
DE RUEPDA 172 10/1944Z
O 101939Z
FM JCS
TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUCSC/CINCSAC
RUHLHSCINCUSARPAC
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE DEPT
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUTMBK/AMMMB BANGKOK
RUMJFS/AMEMB VIENTIANE
ZEN/DIA
RUEKC/ANMCC
RUEKMJ/NEACP
RUEKVDA/NECPA
BT

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WHCA

1965 FEB 10 20 21

5571

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By VR, NARS, Date 5/10/76

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ JCS 004945 J-3 SENDS
SUBJ: REPRISAL ATTACK OPTIONS (S)
REF: JSC 004922 DTG 101534Z FEB 65
REFERENCE IS CANCELED. GP-4
BT

5

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

FLASH

RECEIVED
WHCA

1965 FEB 10 18 16

45

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✓

JCU736
*****ZZ RUEPWW
DE RUEKDA 157 10/1805Z
Z 101804Z
FM JCS
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/NSA
RUCSC/SAC
RUCJHK/CINCSRIKE

5538

Z 101725Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO CINCPAC
INFO JCS (PLEASE PASS STATE)
PACAF/PACFLT
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMBINED RETALIATION
1. TWO COMMUNIST OUTRAGES TODAY
MERIT COMBINED REPRISALS. DUC
PHONG MERITS REPRISAL IN GEN
KHANH'S JUDGEMENT BY VNAF;
THROUGH RETURNS ON QUI NHON NOT IN
AMB TAYLOR AGREES IT MERITS
IMMEDIATE REPRISAL FROM US POINT
OF VIEW. REPRISALS CLEARED BY AMB
WITH ACTING PRIME MINISTER.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Lu. 3/3/77
By Amg, NAKS, Date 4/8/77

2. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING TARGETS
FOR FORCES INDICATED:
A. VNAF: PRIMARY NBR 52 VU
CON BKS; 24 STRIKE A-1H 3 F100
FLAK SUPPRESSION: MIG
CAP. PROVIDED BY 2ND AIR DIV ACFT ON MIG CAP FOR NBR 24.
SECONDARY NBR 39 CHAPLE BKS AREA
B. 2ND AIR DIV PRIMARY NBR 24
CHANH HOA BKS 28 STRIKE F-105;
12 FLAK SUPPRESSION F-100; 12
MIG CAP F-100. SECONDARY TGT NBR 33.
C. 7TH FLEET: DECOY PLUS DESTRUCTION
INH SON RADAR WEIGHT OF ATTACK
AND COVER OPTION OF TASK FORCE
COMMANDER. DESTRUCTION OF THIS
RADAR WOULD BE OF GREAT ASSIST TO
34A WAROPS.
D. TOT TO BE DETERMINED AND
PROMULGATED BY COM 2ND AIR DIV.

GP-3
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION FLASH
INFO FLASH

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER
DIST: CJCS-2(4-5) DJS-3(6-8) SJCS-7(9) J3-6
(10-15) J4-2(16-17) J5-2(18-19) SACSA-4
(20-23) SAMAA-1(24) DIA-1(25) NMCC-2
(26-27) SECDEF-5(28-32) ISA-5(33-37)
CSA-2(38-39) CSAF-2(40-41) CNO-2(42-43)
CMC-2(44-45) WHITE HOUSE-3(46-48) RRA-1
(49) FILE-1(1)RW/W CY2 COMEBACK CY3 DACC
CY 50 ADV TO OSD. CY51 ADV TO CJCS. CY52
ADV TO DJS.

DTG 101041Z FEB 65

46

FROM JCS
TO CINCPAC
INFO: CINCSAC
CINCUSARPAC
CINCPACFLT
CINCPACAF
COMUSMACV
WHITE HOUSE
STATE
AMEMB SAIGON
AMEMB BANGKOK
AMEMB VIENTIANE
2D AIR DIV
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTF 77
CTG 77.5
CTG 77.4
CTG 77.7
DIA/ZEN
CIA
NSA
ANMCC
NECPA
NEACP
CINCSTRIKE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Regular JCS Distribution Plus CSD CSD/ISA LIMDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS JCS 004926 JCS Send.

05

Subject: Reprisals (S)

1. This is a warning order. Upon direction from Washington, be prepared to conduct the following coordinated attacks during daylight hours, 11 February 1965, Saigon time:

DATE	TIME
10	
MONTH	YEAR
Feb	1965
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

RD	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	RELEASER	SIGNATURE
				TYPED (OR STAMPED) NAME AND TITLE
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
			GP-3	

DD FORM 173 1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 2110/77
By *nmj*, NARS, Date 6/30/77

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

- a. For US forces - Targets - 14 - Thanh Hoa Bridge
24 - Chanh Hoa Barracks

Weather alternates - Targets-53- Phu Van Supply Depot

55- Vinh Son Supply Dep SW

- b. For VNAF - Target - 32 - Vu Con Barracks

Weather alternates - Target - 36 - Vit Thu Lu Barracks

2. Additional instructions:

- a. Forces - CVAs, USAF in SVN and Thailand, VNAF.

Plan target assignments so that failure of Thais to grant permission to use bases will not negate plan.

- b. Damage levels - maximum feasible.

- c. Ordnance optimum - conventional excluding napalm.

- d. US flak suppression, CAP, recce, and SAR

authorized for both US and VNAF strikes. FARM GATE Pathfinders authorized for VNAF but strikes will be performed by VNAF pilots only.

- e. No aircraft will be recycled.

- f. Insure no interference by OPLAN 34 A operations.

SYMBOL NO.	WORK/YES	CHECK NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3		
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-3					

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

3. Imperative there be no leaks and minimum press speculation, since former could completely jeopardize mission. Extreme care in this regard in coordinating with GVN/VNAF.

4. Advise ASAP planned times of strike launch, force assignments, number of sorties by type mission, weapon loading tactics, and weather outlook. GP-3

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		3	3		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			GP-3	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET				DIST: CJCS-2(4-5) DJS-3(6-8) SJCS-3(9-11) J3-6 (12-17) J5-2(18-19) JRC-2(20-21) SACSA-5 (22-26) NMCC-3(27-29) DIA-4(30-33) SECDEF- 5(34-38) ISA-9(39-47) CSA-2(48-49) CSAF-2 (50-51) CNO-2(52-53) CMC-5(54-58) WHITE HOUSE-3(59-61) RRA-1(62) FILE-1(1) (62)RW/CL NOTE: CY #2 TO DACC, CY #3 COMEBACK. 2074 IS IN 74344			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE				
		X					
PRECEDENCE							
ACTION	PRIORITY						
INFO	PRIORITY			DTG 101534Z FEB 65			

FROM JCS

TO CINCPAC

INFO: COMUSMACV
CINCSAC
CINCUSARPAC
CINCPACFLT
CINCPACAF
WHITE HOUSE
STATE DEPARTMENT
AMEMB SAIGON
AMEMB BANGKOK
AMEMB VIENTIANE
DIA/ZEN
ANMCC
NECPA
NEACP

~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS 004922 J-3 Sends

Subj: Reprisal Attack Options (S)

Refs: a. JCS 004484 DTG 030019Z; b. AMEMB Saigon to State 2074

1. In order to be prepared for reprisal actions in the immediate future, request you develop as matter of urgency reprisal plans based on target system and attack options described below.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Regular JCS Distribution plus OSD/OSD/ISA

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Authority JCS Ltr 2/10/77

By rmg, NARS, Date 6/30/77

#1

DATE	TIME
10	1030
MONTH	YEAR
Feb	1965
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	4

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	Col. C. M. Mount, Jr., USA Chief, Pacific Division	77921	
			TYPED (OR STAMPED) NAME AND TITLE
			L. M. MUSTIN, VADM USN Director for Operations
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
TOP SECRET		GP-1	

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY			
INFO PRIORITY			

OPTION 1

TGT #	NAME	ESTIMATED SORTIES			
		STRIKE	FLAK	CAP	TOTAL
24	Chanh Hoa Bks & Hdqtrs	28	12	12	52
36	Vit Thu Lu Bks	24	8	4	36
53	Phu Van Army Supply Depot SE	36	12	4	52

OPTION 2

OPTION 1 PLUS

32	Vu Con Army Bks	10	8	4	22
55	Vinh Son Army Supply Depot SW	8	4	4	16

OPTION 3

OPTION 2 PLUS

14	Thanh Hoa Bridge	32	12	4	48
74	Quang Khe Naval Base	22	4	2	28

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REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS GP-1				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

2. For planning purposes consider targets in any unassigned option above plus the following at weather alternate targets for both US and VNAF strikes.

TGT #	NAME	ESTIMATED SORTIES			
		STRIKE	FLAK	CAP	TOTAL
64	Xom Bang Army Depot	88	24	8	120
33	Dong Hoi Bks (Restrike)	24	8	8	40
39	Chap Le Army Bks (Restrike)	40	12	4	56

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REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

3. Request plans include provisions to strike any or all of Options as described above, or alternatively, any target or combination of targets from this complex is designated.

4. Use available US forces plus up to three CVAs, plus forces located in Thailand subject to coordination and control as specified in ref b. Request plan for this force ASAP.

5. Further request plans include provisions for strike Target 32 by VNAF. US flak suppression, CAP, Pathfinder, and SAR authorized for this mission. This strike by VNAF may or may not be ordered in connection other possible reprisals, depending on circumstances. GP-1

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C- 600

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 *****ZZ RUEPWW
 DE RUEKDA 126 10/1707Z
 Z 101641Z
 FM JCS
 TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUCSC/CINCSAC
 RUHKR/CINCSURPAC
 RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
 RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
 RUEHCR/STATE
 RUEHCR/AMEMB SAIGON
 RUMTBK/AMEMB BANGKOK
 RUMJFS/AMEMB VIENTIANE
 RUMSAL/2D AIRDIV
 RUMBEUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMGCR/CTF 77
 RUMGCR/CTG 77.5
 RUMGCR/CTG 77.4
 RUMGCR/CTG 77.7
 ZEN/DIA
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUEFOR/NSA
 RUEKC/ANMCC
 RUEKCD/NECPA
 RUEKNJ/NEACP
 RUCJHK/CINCSRIKE
 BT

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5532

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Authority Jesta 2/10/77
 By mg, NARS, Date 6/30/77

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS JCS 004926 JCS SEND.
 SUBJECT: REPRISALS (S)

1. THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. UPON DIRECTION FROM WASHINGTON, BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT THE FOLLOWING COORDINATED ATTACKS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS, 11 FEBRUARY 1965, SAIGON TIME:

- A. FOR US FORCES-TARGETS - 14 - ~~THANH HOA BRIDGE~~
 24 - CHANH HOA BARRACKS

WEATHER A

TERNATES - TARGETS-53-PHU VAN SUPPLY DEPOT

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 55-VINH SON SUPPLY DEP SW

- B. FOR VNAF - TARGET- 32 - VU CON BARRACKS
 WEATHER ALTERNATES -TARGET -36-VIT THU LU BARRACKS

2. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- A. FORCES -CVAS, USAF IN SVN AND THAILAND, VNAF. PLAN TARGET ASSIGNMENTS SO THAT FAILURE OF THAIS TO GRANT PERMISSION TO USE BASES WILL NOT NEGATE PLAN.
- D. DAMAGE LEVELS - MAXIMUM FEASIBLE.
- C. ORDNANCE OPTIMUM - CONVENTIONAL EXCLUDING NAPALM.
- D. US FLAK SUPPRESSION, CAP, RECCE, AND SAR AUTHORIZED FOR BOTH US AND VNAF STRIKES. FARM GATE PATHFINDERS AUTHORIZED FOR VNAF BUT STRIKES WILL BE PERFORMED BY VNAF PILOTS ONLY.
- E. NO AIRCRAFT WILL BE RECYCLED
- F. INSURE NO INTERFERENCE BY OPLAN 34 A OPERATIONS

3. IMPERATIVE THERE BE NO LEAKS AND MINIMUM PRESS SPECULATION, SINCE FORMER COULD COMPLETELY JEOPARDIZE MISSION. EXTREME CARE IN THIS REGARD IN COORDINATING

PAGE 3 RUEKDA 126 ~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS
 WITH GVN/VNAF.

- 4. ADVISE ASAP PLANNED TIMES OF STRIKE LAUNCH, FORCE ASSIGNMENTS, NUMBER OF SORTIES BY TYPE MISSION, WEAPON LOADING TACTICS, AKD WEATHER OUTLOOK. GP-3

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Flaming Dart II
CTC Msgs