

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 11, 2014

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
074	cable	MAC SOG 6938/260443Z sanitized 2/23/09 per NLJ/RAC 08-31	S	2	7/26/64	A
075	cable	MAC SOG 6886/250153Z sanitized 2/23/09 per NLJ/RAC 08-31 Dup. #39, NSF, VN, "Special Category Messages, Volume 2," Box 52	TS	1	7/25/64	A
076	cable	MAC SOG 7669/101005Z sanitized 2/4/10 per NLJ/RAC 08-32	TS	1	8/10/64	A
077	cable	MAC SOG 6986/271035Z sanitized 2/4/10 per NLJ/RAC 08-32	TS	2	7/26/64	A
078	cable	MAC SOG 7005/280351Z sanitized 2/4/10 per NLJ/RAC 08-32	TS	1	7/28/64	A
079	cable	MAC SOG 7060/290321Z sanitized 2/4/10 per NLJ/RAC 08-32	TS	1	7/29/64	A
083	cable	MAC SOG 7502/070231Z exempt NLJ 90-140 and per RAC 09/00	TS	5	8/7/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, NSC Histories

Folder Title "Presidential Decisions-Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, Volume 1"

Box Number 38

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13526 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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4/23/2014

AP
Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
088	cable	OJCSOG 8017/130825Z exempt 2/23/09 per NLJ/RAC 08-31	TS	4	8/13/64	A
090	cable	MAC SOG 7213/010321Z sanitized 2/4/10 per NLJ/RAC 08-32	TS	2	8/1/64	A
136	cable	CIA 39587 to Forrestal sanitized 3/29/77 per CIA letter	S	2	8/4/64	A
178	cable	050549Z CINCPAC to AMEMB Saigon more info released 9/12/01 per NLJ 01-141	S	3	8/5/64	A
200	memo	cover memo for selected messages exempt 9/2000 per RAC	PCI	1	8/8/64	A
200b	cable	Report No. 8 more info released 5/16/03 per NLJ/RAC 01-116 Dup. #1b, NSF, VN, "3 A (3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64," Box 77	S	1	8/4/64	A
200c	cable	Report No. 18 sanitized 5/16/03 per NLJ/RAC 01-116 Dup. #1c, NSF, VN, "3 A (3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64," Box 77	S	1	8/5/64	A

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200d	cable	Report No. 15 sanitized 5/16/03 per NLJ/RAC 01-116 Dup. #1d, NSF, VN, "3 A (3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64," Box 77	S	1	8/5/64	A
200e	cable	Report No. 6 sanitized 5/16/03 per NLJ/RAC 01-116 Dup. #1e, NSF, VN, "3 A (3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64," Box 77	S	1	8/3/64	A
200f	cable	Report No. 7 sanitized 5/16/03 per NLJ/RAC 01-116 Dup. #1f, NSF, VN, "3 A (3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64," Box 77	S	1	8/3/64	A
200g	cable	Report No. 7 sanitized 5/16/03 per NLJ/RAC 01-116 Dup. #1g, NSF, VN, "3 A (3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64," Box 77	S	1	8/4/64	A
200h	cable	Report No. 12 sanitized 5/16/03 per NLJ/RAC 01-116 Dup. #1h, NSF, VN, "3 A (3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64," Box 77 Dup. #127, NSF, VN "Operation Pierce Arrow," Box 228	S	1	8/4/64	A
200i	cable	Report No. 13 sanitized 5/16/03 per NLJ/RAC 01-116 Dup. #1i, NSF, VN, "3 A (3) Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64," Box 77 Dup. #123, NSF, VN, "Operation Pierce Arrow," Box 228	S	1	8/4/64	A

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212	cable	162 from Bangkok more info released 4/2014	S	3	8/8/64	A

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Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#74 Cable	DOD XS Gp 3 <i>Painted 2-23-09 NLJ/RAC 08-31</i> MAC SOG 6938 / 260443Z	2 p 7/26/64	A
#75 Cable <i>Painted 2-23-09 NLJ/RAC 08-31</i>	DOD TS Gp 1 TS Gp 1 <i>exempt NLJ 90-140</i> MAC SOG 6886 / 250153Z <i>Edrp # 39, VN "Sec. Cont. msg. vol. 2", Brn 52)</i>	1 p 7/25/64	A
#76 Cable <i>Sanitized 2-4-10 NLJ/RAC 08-32</i>	DOD TS Gp 1 TS Gp 1 <i>exempt NLJ 90-140</i> MAC SOG 7669 / 101005Z	1 p 8/10/64	A
#77 Cable <i>Sanitized 2-4-10 NLJ/RAC 08-32</i>	DOD TS TS <i>exempt NLJ 90-140</i> MAC SOG 6986 / 271035Z	2 p 7/26/64	A
#78 Cable <i>Sanitized 2-4-10 NLJ/RAC 08-32</i>	DOD TS Gp 1 TS Gp 1 <i>exempt NLJ 90-140</i> MAC SOG 7005 / 280351Z	1 p 7/28/64	A
#79 Cable <i>Sanitized 2-4-10 NLJ/RAC 08-32</i>	DOD TS Gp 1 TS Gp 1 <i>exempt NLJ 90-140</i> MAC SOG 7060 / 290321Z	1 p 7/29/64	A
#83 Cable	DOD TS Gp 1 TS Gp 1 <i>exempt NLJ 90-140</i> MAC SOG 7502 / 070231Z	5 p 8/7/64	A
#88 Cable <i>Exempt 2-23-09 NLJ/RAC 08-31</i>	DOD TS Gp 1 TS Gp 1 <i>exempt NLJ 90-140</i> OJCSOG 8017 / 130825Z	4 p 8/13/64	A
#90 Cable <i>Sanitized 2-4-10 NLJ/RAC 08-32</i>	DOD TS Gp 1 TS Gp 1 <i>exempt NLJ 90-140</i> MAC SOG 7213 / 010321Z	2 p 8/1/64	A
#116 Cable	DOD TS Gp 1 TS Gp 1 MAC SOG 7321 / 031231Z	1 p 8/3/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF NSC History
 Presidential Decisions - Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964 - Vol. I

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#127 Cable	DOD TS Gp 3 040331Z CINCPAC to JCS	8/4/64	A
	<i>Open RAC 5-18-98</i> exempt 8-13 NLS 90-140		
#135 Cable	DOD TS Gp 3 042035Z CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT	8/4/64	A
	<i>Open 8-17-83 NLI 83-120</i>		
#138 Cable	DOD TS Gp 3 012329Z CTF 77 to 77.6	8/4/64	A
#156 Cable	DOD TS Gp 3 041547Z CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT	8/4/64	A
#175 Cable	DOD TS Gp 1 051473Z/050635Z CINCPAC to PACAF	8/5/64	A
#178 Cable	DOD TS Gp 3 050549Z CINCPAC to AMEMB Saigon	8/5/64	A
	<i>same 9/12/01 NLS 01-141 (more released)</i> 6-10-92 NLS 90-140		
#189 Cable	DOD TS Gp 1 062341Z CINCPAC to JCS	8/7/64	A
	<i>open 6-10-92 NLS 90-140</i>		
#190 Cable	DOD TS Gp 1 062335Z CINCPAC to JCS	8/7/64	A
	<i>open 4/13/14 per NLS/RAC 12-373</i>		
#191 Cable	DOD TS Gp 1 062335Z final section	8/7/64	A
	<i>open 4/13/14 per NLS/RAC 12-373</i>		
#195 Cable	DOD TS Gp 1 110340Z CINCPAC to JCS	8/11/64	A
	<i>open 4/13/14 per NLS/RAC 12-373</i>		

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Presidential Decisions - Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964 - Vol. I

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#196-Cable	DOD TS Gp 3 <i>the withdrawal sheet for 3/2/77</i>		
MAC JCO	8170/150641Z COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 2 p	8/15/64	A
#198c-Cable	DOD TS Gp 3		
	071047Z / 070252Z CTF 77 to CINCPACFLT 2 p	8/7/64	A
#202-Cable	DOD TS Gp 3		
	050920Z CINCPAC to JCS 3 p	8/5/64	A
#203 Cable	DOD TS Gp 3		
	MAC J31-7573 / 080935Z 1 p	8/8/64	A

FILE LOCATION
 NSF NSC History
 Presidential Decisions-Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964-Vol.I

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#6a-Memo	DOD S -McNamara to Pres. 18 p	3/16/64	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#8a Notes	DOD S <i>Sanitized, #14</i> RMCN's Notes for Report to Pres. 5 p <i>C removed 8-8-64</i>	5/14/64	A + C
#38 Cable	DOD S -MAC-J32-7006/280435 Z 2 p	7/29/64	A
#80 Cable	DOD S -041628Z /041607Z-CINCPAC to COMUSMACV 1 p	8/4/64	A
#94 Cable	DOD S 020859Z COMSEVENTHFLT 1 p	8/2/64	A
#95 Cable	DOD C 020927Z /020907Z COMSEVENTHFLT 1 p	8/2/64	A
#96 Cable	DOD S 020958Z /020919Z to CTG 77.6 1 p	8/2/64	A
#97 Cable	DOD S 021242Z /020949Z fm CTG 72.1 2 p	8/2/64	A
#100 Cable	DOD C 021018Z /020945Z to CTG 77.5 1 p	8/2/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF NSC History
 Presidential Decisions -Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964-Vol.I

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#102 Cable	DOD S 021153Z / 021118Z to COMSEVENTHFLT 2 p	8/2/64	A
#104 Cable	DOD S 021614Z / 021506Z fm CTG 77.5 2 p	8/2/64	A
#112 Cable	DOD S 030745Z fm CTG 72.1 1 p	8/3/64	A
#113 Cable	DOD S 031546Z fm CTG 72.1 1 p	8/3/64	A
#114 Cable	DOD S 031403Z fm CTG 72.1 1 p	8/3/64	A
#120 Cable	DOD S duplicates #114 above		A
#121 Cable	DOD S duplicates #113 above		A
#129 Cable	DOD S 040511Z fm CTG 72.1 1 p	8/4/64	A
#130 Cable	DOD S Desoto Action SitRep 1 p	8/4/64	A
#133 Cable	DOD S 040635Z / July-August Desoto SitSum 8 1 p	8/4/64	A

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 Presidential Decisions - Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964 - Vol. I

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#139 Cable	DOD S 042014Z fm CINCPACFLT 2 p	8/4/64	A
#142 Cable	DOD S 050128Z fm CTG 77.6 2 p	8/4/64	A
#143 Cable	DOD S 040830Z fm NAVCOMMSTA 1 P	8/5/64	A
#144 Cable	DOD S Desoto Action SitRep / 041848 Z (duplicate of #130) 1 p	8/4/64	A
#146 Cable	DOD S 041240Z 1 p	8/4/64	A
#150 Cable	DOD S Desoto Patrol SitRep 3 1 p	undated	A
#152 Cable	DOD S Desoto SitRep 5 1 p	undated	A
#153 Cable	DOD S Desoto SitRep 4 1 p	undated	A
#154 Cable	DOD S 04/1554Z to CINCPACFLT 1 p	8/4/64	A
#155 Cable	DOD S 041607Z to COMUSMACV (duplicates #80 above) 1 p	8/4/64	A

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 Presidential Decisions - Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964 - Vol. I

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#157 Cable	DOD S 041657Z to JCS 2 p	8/4/64	A
#158 Cable	DOD S Desoto Action SitRep/041754Z 1 p	8/4/64	A
#163 Cable	DOD S 041708Z fm CINCPACFLT/041545Z 1 p	8/4/64	A
#170 Cable	DOD S STRJ3-0 8105/060228Z 2 p	8/6/64	A
#172 Cable	DOD S 050554Z fm CTG 77.6 1 p	8/5/64	A
#177 Cable	DOD S 051430Z fm CTG 77.6 3 p	8/5/64	A
#182 Cable	DOD S 052315Z fm CINCPAC 1 p	8/6/64	A
#184 Cable	DOD S DOAL/DOGG 49-8-4/052337Z 2 p <i>Open to B-1</i>	8/6/64	A
#186 Cable	DOD C STRJ3-0 8107/060735Z 2 p	8/6/64	A
#198a Cable	DOD S 062331Z fm USS Turner Joy 2 p	8/6/64	A

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 Presidential Decisions - Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964 - Vol. I

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#198b Cable	DOD S 062355Z fm CTG 72.1 / 071051Z 5 p	8/6/64	A
#204 Cable	DOD S 070410Z fm CINCPAC 1 p	8/7/64	A
#205 Cable	DOD S 041718Z fm CINCPAC 1 p	8/4/64	A

FILE LOCATION

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 Presidential Decisions - Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964 - Vol. I

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#124-Cable	JCS-----TS-Gp 3 -----JCS-7694 to-CINCPAC-----	8/3/64	A
#131-Cable	JCS-----TS-Gp 3 -----JCS 7720 to-CINCPAC-----	8/4/64	A
#132-Cable	JCS-----TS-Gp 3 -----JCS-7722 to-CINCPAC-----	8/4/64	A
#134-Cable	JCS-----TS-Gp 3 -----JCS-7700-----	undated	A
#140-Cable	JCS-----TS-Gp 3 -----JCS-7728 to-CINCAL-----	8/4/64	A
#141-Cable	JCS-----TS-Gp 3 -----JCS-7729 to-CINCPAC-----	8/4/64	A
#168-Cable	JCS-----TS-Gp 3 -----duplicates #140 above-----		A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
-#174-Cable	JCS S Gp-3 777 JCS-7732 1 p	8/5/64	A
-#185-Cable	JCS S Gp-3 777 JCS-7782 2 p	8/6/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
-#136 Cable	CIA S Gp 1 <i>Review of CIA file 8/4/64</i> CIA 39587 to Forrestal 2 p	8/4/64	A

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 Presidential Decisions - Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964 - Vol. I

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#200 Memo	NSA Un. cover memo for selected messages 1 p <i>Exempt RAC 140-007-1-2 9/2000</i>	8/8/64	A+C

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#200a Cable	all decisions reu NSA ltr 1/3/77	undated	A
#200b Cable More info released S.16.03 NW/RAC 01.116	S [redacted] <i>Exempt</i> SAITIALIZED 96-195 3/14/96 Report No. 8 [redacted]	1 p 8/4/64	A <i>docs. #200b-i dup. doc. #1b-c, Vietnam, "3A/3), Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64"</i>
#200c Cable sanitized S.16.03 NW/RAC 01.116	S [redacted] <i>Exempt</i> Report No. 18 [redacted]	1 p 8/5/64	A <i>bx 77</i>
#200d Cable sanitized S.16.03 NW/RAC 01.116	S [redacted] <i>Exempt</i> Report No. 15 [redacted]	1 p 8/5/64	A
#200e Cable sanitized S.16.03 NW/RAC 01.116	S [redacted] <i>Exempt</i> Report No. 6 [redacted]	1 p 8/3/64	A
#200f Cable Sanitized S.16.03 NW/RAC 01.116	S [redacted] <i>Exempt</i> Report No. 7 [redacted]	1 p 8/3/64	A
#200g Cable sanitized S.16.03 NW/RAC 01.116	S [redacted] <i>Exempt</i> Report No. 7 [redacted]	1 p 8/4/64	A
#200h Cable Sanitized S.16.03 NW/RAC 01.116	S [redacted] <i>Exempt</i> SAITIALIZED 96-195 3/14/96 Report No. 12 [redacted]	1 p 8/4/64	A <i>Dupe in VN Counter File Box 228-16 (P.O. Arrow #127)</i>
#200i Cable Sanitized S.16.03 NW/RAC 01.116	S [redacted] <i>Exempt</i> SAITIALIZED 96-195 3/14/96 Report No. 13 [redacted]	1 p 8/4/64	A <i>dup. as for 200h - doc #123</i>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 Draft	NSC TS OPEN NSA 2-13-06, JAN 7-21-06 Sanct 9-24-02 NIS/RAC 01-118 Paper: Gulf of Tonkin Attacks, August, 1964 53 p	11/1/68 more info released	A
#3a List	"Tabs on the Gulf of Tonkin Decisions" (near dup., #1) TS open 9-24-02 NIS/RAC 01-110 2 p	undated	A
#10 Memo	NSC TS open 10-18-90 NIS 90-141 Record of Meeting, SEA, WH SitRoom 7 p	undated	A
#20 Memo	NSC TS open 12-14-90 NIS 90-94 Record of Meeting, SEA, Cabinet Room 10 p	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#5-Memo	NSC _____ S _____ <i>4/15/64, Sec 1/2/64</i>		
	NSC Memo No. 288 1 p	3/17/64	A
#6-Memo	NSC _____ S _____ <i>4/15/64, Sec 1/2/64</i>		
	Smith-to-the-Council 1 p	3/16/64	A

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-#31-Cable	State TS 214 fm Saigon	7/25/64	A
-#32-Cable	State TS 215 fm Saigon	7/25/64	A
#33-Cable	State TS 232 fm Saigon	7/27/64	A
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-#36-Cable	State TS 239 fm Saigon	7/28/64	A
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#46 Cable	State TS 440 to Saigon	8/4/64	A
#47 Cable	State TS 303 fm Saigon	8/4/64	A
#72 Cable	State TS 908 to Paris	8/17/64	A
#84 Cable	State TS 332 fm Saigon	8/7/64	A
#85 Cable	State TS 379 to Saigon	8/7/64	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#169 Cable	State TS 133 fm Bangkok	8/5/64	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#209 Cable	State TS duplicates #169 above		A

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#12 Paper	State C Research Project 747 16 p	11/ /65	A
#22 Memo	State S Situation in SVN by WH Sullivan 7 p	7/13/64	A
#24 Cable	State S 377-fm-Saigon 10 p	8/10/64	A
#25 Cable	State S 192 to Saigon 2 p	7/20/64	A
#29 Cable	State S 253 to Saigon 4 p	7/25/64	A
#34 Cable	State S 235-fm-Saigon 2 p	7/28/64	A
#40 Cable	State C 328 to Saigon 1 p	8/2/64	A
#41 Cable	State C 281 fm Saigon 1 p	8/2/64	A
#42 Cable	State C 284 fm Saigon 1 p	8/3/64	A
#44 Cable	State S 342 to Saigon 2 p	8/4/64	A

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#48 Cable	State C 302 fm Saigon 1 p	8/4/64	A
#49 Cable	State S 304 fm Saigon 1 p	8/5/64	A
#50 Cable	State S 310 fm Saigon 2 p	8/5/64	A
#53 Cable	State C 313 fm Saigon 1 p	8/5/64	A
#54 Cable	State C 314 fm Saigon 1 p	8/5/64	A
#55 Cable	State S " " " 2 p	8/5/64	A
#56 Cable	State C 327 fm Saigon 1 p	8/6/64	A
#58 Cable	State S 328 fm Saigon 1 p	8/6/64	A
#59 Cable	State C 329 fm Saigon 1 p	8/6/64	A

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#61 Cable	State C duplicates #59 above		A
#62 Cable	State S <i>State Sec. 101</i> 338 fm Saigon 3 p	8/7/64	A
#64 Cable	State C <i>State Sec. 101</i> 336 fm Saigon open 4/24/01 4 p	8/7/64	A
██████████	██████████	██████████	██████████
██████████	██████████	██████████	██████████
#69 Cable	State S <i>State Sec. 101</i> 365 fm Saigon 1 p	8/9/64	A
#70 Airgram	State C <i>State Sec. 101</i> A-112 fm Saigon open 4/24/01 4 p	8/12/64	A
#82 Cable	State C <i>State Sec. 101</i> 343 fm Saigon 1 p	8/7/64	A
#93 Cable	State C ██████████ duplicates #41 above		A

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#98-Cable	State C duplicates #40 above		A
#105-Cable	State C duplicates #40 above		A
#208 Cable	State S <i>State Message</i> -343 to Saigon 2 p	8/4/64	A
#209a Cable	State S <i>State Message</i> 138 fm Bangkok 1 p	8/5/64	A
#210 Cable	State S <i>State Message</i> 350 to Saigon 2 p	8/5/64	A
#211 Cable	State S <i>State Message</i> -148 fm Bangkok 1 p	8/6/64	A
#212 Cable	State S <i>State Message</i> 162 fm Bangkok 3 p	8/8/64	A
#147 Cable	State C <i>State Message</i> 339 to Saigon 1 p	8/4/64	A

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1



PROCESSING NOTE

On this date, Archives staff discovered that there were two documents #1 in this file. One of them was removed and placed back in its original location, in Volume 2 in this same box.

Alexis Percle
April 25, 2014

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964

We lack adequate information on:

- (a) The President's decision not to retaliate for the attack of August 2.
- (b) The President's participation in the drafting of:
 - (1) Radio/TV speech to the nation on August 4;
 - (2) His August 5 Resolution message to Congress;
 - (3) His Syracuse speech of August 5;
 - (4) His letters to various Heads of State on August 4 and 5.

Light might be shed by:

The President

- personal recollections
- files, memcons, telecons for the period August 2-10, 1967

Other

- personal recollections of McGeorge Bundy
- personal recollections and files of Bill Moyers.


Marshall Wright

3

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS

THE GULF OF TONKIN ATTACKS OF AUGUST 1964

1

Draft Prepared By:
Mr. Marshall Wright/
Mr. Sven F. Kraemer
Vietnam Information Group
November 1, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSA 2-13-06
By JDK, NARA, Date 7-31-06

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONSTHE GULF OF TONKIN ATTACKS OF AUGUST 1964

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PRESIDENTIAL CHRONOLOGYTHE GULF OF TONKIN ATTACKS OF AUGUST 1964AUGUST 2

- A. M. The President is informed that North Vietnamese PT boats have attacked the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin.
- P. M. The President consults with his advisors, and decides not to retaliate against North Vietnam. He issues instructions: (1) to prepare a protest note to be sent to the North Vietnamese regime and (2) to strengthen the Tonkin patrol force and to counter attack and destroy any force attempting to repeat the attacks.

AUGUST 3

The President makes public his instructions issued the previous day to U. S. Navy units in the Gulf of Tonkin.

The Department of State publicizes the U. S. protest note to North Vietnam.

McNamara gives private briefing to Senate Foreign Relations Committee members.

The President consults with Rusk, McNamara and Wheeler.

AUGUST 4

- A. M. The President is informed that North Vietnamese PT boats
9:12 have launched a second attack in the Gulf of Tonkin against the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy.
- Noon The President meets with the National Security Council
- P. M. The President has a luncheon meeting with Rusk, McNamara,
1:00 McCone, Bundy and Vance. The decision is made to retaliate.
- 6:15 The President reviews his decision with the National Security Council. All agree.
- 6:45 The President reviews his decision with the Congressional leadership at a White House meeting. All agree. The President indicated that he will ask the Congress for a Joint Resolution on Southeast Asia.

- 10:06 The President discusses his decision by telephone with Republican Presidential candidate Goldwater. Goldwater agrees.
- 11:36 The President addresses the Nation via Radio/TV. He reviews the circumstances of the attack and his decision to retaliate.
- P. M. The President approves personal messages sent by him to several Heads of State and Heads of Government.
- P. M. The President reviews drafts of speech he will deliver on Radio/TV that evening and at Syracuse the next morning.

AUGUST 5

- A. M. The President, in his speech at Syracuse University reviews the Gulf of Tonkin events and his decision.
- P. M. The President sends a message to Congress reporting on the Tonkin attacks and on his response and requests a Joint Resolution.

In New York Ambassador Stevenson addresses a Security Council Meeting to present U. S. charges against North Vietnam.

In Bangkok the SEATO Council meets to review the Tonkin events.

In Paris a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council reviews the Tonkin events.

AUGUST 6

Congressional hearings and debate take place on the proposed Gulf of Tonkin resolution. McNamara, Rusk and Wheeler testify.

AUGUST 7

The President issues a statement hailing passage by the Senate and House of the Joint Resolution on Southeast Asia.

AUGUST 8

A high level stock-taking conference is held on the White House on developments in Southeast Asia.

AUGUST 10

The President signs into law the Joint Congressional Resolution on Southeast Asia.

At a White House meeting the President and his senior advisors review the situation. The President expresses his conviction that the present situation will not last long, and asks for recommendations to deal with future contingencies

PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS

THE GULF OF TONKIN ATTACKS OF AUGUST 1964

I - INTRODUCTION

For most Americans the war in Vietnam began in earnest in August 1964 with three developments focussed on the Gulf of Tonkin. On August 2 and again on August 4, North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked U. S. naval vessels in international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. The U. S. did not retaliate for the first attack, beyond warning North Vietnam of the grave consequences which would attend its repetition. When the attacks were repeated on August 4, the President, acting as Commander-in-Chief, responded quickly with a directive ordering retaliatory bombing against selected targets in North Vietnam. After consultations on August 4 with the Congressional leadership, the President on August 5 requested and the Congress, after three days of hearings and debates, on August 7 overwhelmingly approved, a joint resolution authorizing the President to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. "

The North Vietnamese attacks, the U. S. military response and the Congressional Resolution marked a significant sharpening of the confrontation in Vietnam. These developments coincided with major crises in Cyprus and the Congo involving special Presidential deliberations and the dispatch of special emissaries Under Secretary Ball (Cyprus) and Governor Harriman (Congo).

The Tonkin developments came at a time of chronic instability in South Vietnam and of an American Presidential election campaign contested in part on the issue of U. S. involvement in Vietnam. They, perhaps for the first time, brought home to the American people the stakes, responsibilities and risks in Southeast Asia. Seen as a watershed of subsequent developments they remain to this day a major focus of the Vietnam debate and constitute a significant chapter in the history of Lyndon B. Johnson's Presidency.

II - VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE TONKIN ATTACKS

In the first half of 1964 events in Southeast Asia pointed to increasing crisis and confrontation in Vietnam. The Viet Cong, trained and supplied by North Vietnam, pressed hard to exploit South Vietnamese political instability. In neighboring Laos, Hanoi's forces exacerbated existing civil and international conflicts. In the United States, debate on the best means of carrying out the U. S. commitment to South Vietnam filled the political arena, and the possible necessity of a heavier U. S. involvement was a recurrent theme of meetings at the highest levels of the U. S. Government.

1. January - March 1964

On January 30, South Vietnam's ruling junta, headed by General "Big" Minh, was overthrown by a group of generals headed by Nguyen Khanh. On April 15 the SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Manila issued a communique (France abstaining) agreeing "that defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of Vietnam but to that of Southeast Asia. . . (and) that members of SEATO should remain prepared. . . to take further concrete steps with their respective capabilities in fulfillment of their obligation. "

2. McNamara Trip to Vietnam and NASAM 288 - March

From March 8 to 12 Secretary McNamara and General Taylor traveled

through Vietnam. McNamara's recommendations called for South Vietnamese reforms, stepped-up U.S. assistance, preparation of a full range of Laotian and Cambodian border control operations and preparations of a contingency program to initiate "graduate overt military pressure against North Vietnam." These recommendations were adopted in National Security Action Memorandum #288 approved on March 17 (TAB 1).

3. Nixon Proposals on Vietnam - April

On April 15, upon returning from a three-week trip throughout Asia former Vice President Nixon attacked Senator Fulbright's critiques and proposed extending the Vietnam war into North Vietnam and Laos. In a speech of April 16 he called for military action against Communist bases in North Vietnam and Laos and said that the "enemy can no longer have privileged sanctuary" and that the U.S. "has gone too far in catering to neutrals." In a speech of April 18, Nixon proposed that South Vietnamese troops should go into Laos and North Vietnam "in hot pursuit" of Communist guerillas.

4. April Announcements on U.S. Reorganization in Vietnam

April also saw announcements on new U.S. military command reorganizations (April 14), Secretary McNamara's statement that the Administration had amended its plans to withdraw most U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam by the end of 1965 (April 24) and the announcement that Lt. General Westmoreland would replace General Harkins as head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. U.S. advisory troops in Vietnam at this

) time numbered some 16,000.

5. McNamara Trip to Vietnam - May

) On May 12 and 13 Secretary McNamara and General Taylor made another inspection trip to Vietnam and on May 13 McNamara announced in Saigon that the U. S. was sending 75 "Sky Raider" and A-1E attack planes to Vietnam to be used by U. S. and Vietnamese personnel. After another trip to Vietnam in May, McNamara reported to the President (TAB 2) on major problems in South Vietnam, including: frequent changes in leadership, incompetent leadership, poor concentration of resources, slow pacification program implementation, high RVNAF desertion rates, ineffective administration, government fragmentation and distrust, and brewing religious crises.

) McNamara's report discussed Ambassador Lodge's proposals for air strikes against the North as follows:

"Lodge wishes to carry out air strikes against the North coupled with the Canadian 'gambit' i. e. , the new Canadian ICC Commissioner should be instructed to state to Hanoi that air strikes will start and continue until such time as there is evidence -- perhaps a fall-off in COMINT traffic -- that the Viet Cong have received orders to terminate the insurgency. The objective of Lodge's program would be not only to cut off the supply of men and equipment from the North, but also to destroy the morale of the North Vietnamese and to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese. *** He (Lodge) considers that since his memorandum of last October to Averell Harriman he has consistently advocated this proposal. Lodge believes he has made clear his opposition to Bill Bundy's proposal for establishing a political base and time schedule for action against the North. *** Almost certainly Lodge has discussed such a plan with Khanh, hoping to lead him to accept it."

6. Other Developments during May

On May 13 Cambodia had forwarded a lengthy report on alleged South Vietnamese and U.S. attacks on Cambodian territory and had called for a UN Security Council session. On May 20 General de Gaulle proposed the reconvening of the 14 nation Geneva conference on Laos. In a major U.S. policy address to the UN Security Council on May 21, Ambassador Stevenson expressed U.S. opposition to the convening of a new meeting of the 14-power Geneva conference to consider the deteriorating political and military situation in IndoChina. Stevenson instead suggested the use of UN border inspectors.

On May 22 Secretary Rusk warned that if Hanoi, abetted by Communist China, persisted in its course of aggression in South Vietnam, the war there might be expanded. On May 24 Senator Goldwater commented that low yield atomic bombs could be dropped to defoliate border trips to expose infiltration lines. On April 18 Goldwater had proposed destruction of North Vietnamese rice and opium crops, and "hitting some depots" and "stopping some shipping."

At a White House meeting of May 24 attended by Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Taylor, Ball, Bell, McNaughton, Goodpaster, McGeorge and William Bundy and others the deteriorating situations in Laos and Vietnam and the possible options of military action against North Vietnam were discussed as was the project of political encadrement or "interlarding" of U.S. advisors into the South Vietnamese command structure (TAB 3).

7. Developments During June and July

On June 7 the Department of State disclosed that two U.S. planes had been shot down while on armed reconnaissance missions over Laos. On June 9 it was announced in Washington that U.S. jets that day had bombed Pathet Lao gun positions in retaliation for the downing of the U.S. planes. On June 9 Premier Souvanna Phouma called for a halt to U.S. missions over Laos. On June 9 Communist China warned the U.S. and called for a reconvening of the 14-nation Geneva conference, and on June 15 threatened Chinese retaliation for U.S. actions. On June 11 the State Department announced a U.S.-Laotian agreement for the resumption of U.S. reconnaissance flights. U.S. determination to prevent a Communist takeover in Southeast Asia was reasserted in Under Secretary Ball's meeting with General de Gaulle and in special messages to Communist China and to Premier Khrushchev on June 5 (TAB 4).

On June 18 Congressional testimony was released quoting William Bundy's May statement that in the face of further Pathet Lao advances "the only response we would have would be to put our own forces in there." On June 20 Admiral Felt, commander of U.S. Pacific forces, declared that in the face of Communist Chinese expansionism the U.S. was willing to risk war with Communist China. On June 20 major U.S. supply reinforcements were announced for Thailand and June 22 saw a report on the construction of a huge Air Force base at Danang, South Vietnam. At a June 29 press conference retiring Ambassador Lodge

declared that it would be helpful if the Viet Cong's supply routes from North Vietnam and Laos were cut. At a June 30 closed session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Lodge rejected a June 29 proposal by 13 Republican Congressmen urging U.S. assumption of direct operational command of the war in Vietnam (TAB 4).

In a June 10 White House meeting attended by Rusk, McNamara, Dillon, Harriman, McCone, Bell, Rostow, William and McGeorge Bundy and others, the developments in Laos proposed next steps in Vietnam and the matter of a Congressional Resolution had been discussed at considerable detail (TAB 5).

In the first week of July UN Secretary General U. Thant proposed a reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference and General Taylor arrived in Saigon to assume his new duties as U.S. ambassador. In mid July William Sullivan prepared a lengthy memo elaborating on specific action proposal for Vietnam (TAB 6).

On July 19 South Vietnamese Premier Khanh in a rally before 100,000 people including Ambassador Taylor called publicly for a full scale military attack on Communist North Vietnam. On July 20 the South Vietnamese Government issued a declaration reiterating Khanh's demand for an invasion of North Vietnam and decrying the Geneva Accords. On the same day the State Department stated that an attack on North Vietnam was in the realm of contingency planning and declined to comment on Premier Khanh's speech.

At a July 22 news conference Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky declared that the South Vietnamese air force was ready to launch bombing attacks against North Vietnam and indicated that for the past three years South Vietnamese combat teams had carried out combat raids inside North Vietnam by air, sea and land (TAB 4). At meetings between Ambassador Taylor and Premier Khanh, the Ambassador criticized the recent South Vietnamese statements. Department of State cables on South Vietnam statements are attached at TAB 7 .

At a July 24 news conference President Johnson declared that while North Vietnamese actions constituted a "danger and a provocation" and that "such provocation" could force a response, "it is also true that the U.S. seeks no wider war." The President rejected General de Gaulle's July 23 proposal for a great-power agreement on IndoChina saying "we do not believe in conferences called to ratify terror," and called instead for the Communists to live up to existing agreements.

III - THE GULF OF TONKIN ATTACK OF AUGUST 2

A. AUGUST 2 - THE FIRST ATTACK

1. The Circumstances of the Attack

During the early hours of Sunday morning, August 2 (the afternoon of August 2, Gulf of Tonkin time) Washington learned that North Vietnamese PT boats had launched a torpedo attack against the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin some 30 miles off the North Vietnamese coast.

The mission of the Maddox was to gather electronic intelligence as part of the regular "De Soto" patrol series. The Maddox patrol had no connection with clandestine South Vietnamese 34A operations directed against North Vietnamese arms smuggling activities and the Maddox was operating under instructions to stay away from the coastal area where 34A operations were going on (TAB 8).

North Vietnamese plans of the attack has previously been obtained from special intelligence sources. Since about noon Tonkin time, when Maddox radar had detected the approaching craft, the Maddox had sought to avoid contact. At 2:40 p.m. Tonkin time the Maddox reported that it was the apparent intent of the fast-closing PT boats to launch a torpedo attack and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary. As the PT boats closed to within 9,000 yards the Maddox fired three warning shots. At 3:08 the three PT boats attacked with machine gun fire and with at least three torpedoes directed against the Maddox. The

attacking craft were clearly seen by Maddox personnel and were photographed; the launching of the torpedoes and their wakes were observed clearly; a machine gun bullet was recovered. The Maddox responded by opening fire with her five-inch battery and four F-8E fighters from the carrier USS Ticonderoga, (which had been alerted to the impending enemy attack) arrived on the scene and strafed the enemy craft with Zuni rockets and 20mm ammunition. At 3:29 p.m. the engagement terminated. Two PT boats were damaged and one lay dead in the water. The Maddox, which was unharmed, moved southward under fighter escort on its patrol course. (TABs 9, 28, 29)

The cables received by the Defense Department relating to the Tonkin Gulf attacks are arranged chronologically under (TAB 9).

2. The Decision Process

No reprisal against North Vietnam was undertaken by the United States in the face of this unprovoked attack on the high seas. According to the testimony of Secretary McNamara, "we believed it possible that it had resulted from a miscalculation or an impulsive act of a local commander" and did not expect that it would be repeated (TAB 28).

The nature of Presidential consultations on August 2 on the possible implications of the North Vietnamese PT boat attacks cannot be retraced from the available records. It is known, however, that sometime during the day the President issued instructions along the lines of his August 3 public announcement to strengthen the Tonkin patrol force and to counter-attack and destroy any force attempting to repeat the attack.

B. AUGUST 3, 1964

On Monday, August 3 the President made public the instructions that he had issued the day before regarding future patrols and engagements with enemy craft. He reported to the American people that he had "instructed the Navy (1) to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of Vietnam; (2) to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol; (3) to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyer and (4) to issue orders to the commanders of the combat aircraft and the two destroyers (a) to attack any force which attacks them in international waters, and (b) to attack with the objective not only of driving off the force but of destroying it." (TAB 10).

At the same time as these instructions were being broadcast throughout the world, the State Department, acting pursuant to the President's further instructions, publicized a note of protest to the North Vietnamese regime. It concluded with the words, "The United States Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North Vietnam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against the United States forces." (TAB 11).

During the course of the afternoon of August 3 the President consulted privately with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler. The precise time and nature of this meeting could not be determined from the available source materials (TAB 12).

On this day too, Secretary McNamara gave a private briefing to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The precise time and nature of the briefing, of issues raised therein and of its relation to Presidential consultations could not be determined from available source materials (TAB 28).

C. THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 3-4

August 3 passed uneventfully in the Tonkin area as the Maddox, now joined by the destroyer USS Turner Joy and under protection of aircraft from the carrier USS Ticonderoga, continued on its regular patrol off the North Vietnamese coast.

During the night of August 3-4 Tonkin time South Vietnamese 34A operations were carried out against North Vietnamese shipping installations just north of the 17th parallel. At the time of these attacks the Maddox and the Turner Joy were patrolling an area of the Gulf of Tonkin approximately 70 miles to the northeast of the South Vietnamese attacks. At about this time CINCPAC sent a message that the De Soto patrols be conducted in such a way as to avoid any possible interference or connection with South Vietnam's 34A operations. (TAB 8).

IV - THE GULF OF TONKIN ATTACK OF AUGUST 4

1. SUMMARY DATA

The complex unfolding of events and decisions in the field and in Washington on August 4 is carefully summarized in the unclassified publications of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of testimony by Secretary McNamara on August 6, 1964 and February 20, 1968. (TABS 28,29) Additionally, a highly classified and almost minute by minute chronology for August 4 and 5 was undertaken at the President's direction by the Secretary of Defense. (TAB 13) This Defense memo, forwarded to the White House on August 31, 1964, contains detailed descriptions of all relevant conferences, telephone conversations and telegrams in Washington, Honolulu and in Southeast Asia.

Except where otherwise indicated, the material in the following pages is drawn from the Defense chronology. All times are Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) unless otherwise indicated. It should be noted that Saigon time is 12 hours later and that Gulf of Tonkin time is 11 hours later than EDT. The destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin kept Saigon time, while the carriers there used Gulf of Tonkin time. CINCPAC (Honolulu) time is 6 hours earlier than EDT. (TAB 13)

2. First Indications of Attacks on the U. S. Destroyers

At 7:40 AM EDT (6:40 PM on a moonless night in the Gulf of Tonkin) the Maddox, cruising with the destroyer C. Turner Joy some 65 miles from

the nearest land, reported on the basis of actions taken by nearby unidentified vessels that an attack appeared imminent. This message was received in the Pentagon (NMCC) at about 9:30 AM.

At 8:13 AM EDT the Pentagon DIA Indications Center had been notified by the National Security Agency that special intelligence (COMINT) indicated "imminent plans of DRV naval action possibly against the De Soto mission." Copies of the message were given to Secretary McNamara and JCS Chairman Wheeler at about 9:00. According to Secretary McNamara's Congressional testimony the same source reported while the engagement was in progress that the attack was underway, and immediately after the attack ended, this source reported that the North Vietnamese had lost two ships in the engagement. (TAB28)

At 8:36 AM (message received in Pentagon NMCC at 10:30 AM) the Maddox reported radar contact with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. U.S. fighter aircraft were then launched from the USS Ticonderoga (some 100 nautical miles NE of Danang) to provide air cover in accordance with the President's previously issued directives. At 9:08 the Maddox reported the disappearance of the unidentified aircraft from the radar but confirmed the continued presence of surface vessels. (Message received in NMCC at 11:04 AM). (TAB13)

At 9:12 AM EDT Secretary McNamara informed the President by telephone about the NSA/DIA intelligence warning. At 9:23 General Wheeler

telephoned CINCPAC to determine available information on the impending attacks and, according to the Defense memo, was "insistent that the destroyers 'clobber' the attacks and make every effort to destroy the hostile ships. . ."

During this period, the Maddox reported the approach of at least five high speed surface radar contacts evaluated as probable torpedo boats, and that an attack appeared imminent. Other amplifying messages quickly followed and by about 10:00 AM a flash message was received in Washington reporting that the U. S. destroyers, then located some 60 to 65 miles off the coast of North Vietnam, were actually under attack. Throughout the remainder of the morning and early afternoon, flash reports of the engagement, some ambiguous and conflicting, continued to pour in.

3. Early Meetings at the Pentagon

a. 9:25 AM - 11:20 AM Meeting

Beginning at 9:25 and until approximately 11:20 Secretary McNamara met with Deputy Secretary Vance and representatives of the Joint Chiefs to examine incoming reports and to discuss the possible alternative methods of retaliation. According to the Defense memo, "during these discussions, McNamara develops four options for a sharp limited blow and one option for continuous pressure against the North Vietnamese. The four options for the sharp limited blow are: (1) Air strikes against PT boats and their bases; (2) Air strikes against petroleum installations; (3) Air strikes on bridges;

and (4) Air strikes on prestige targets, such as a steel plant. The option for continuing pressure against the North Vietnamese is to mine important ports along their coastline. " When it was pointed out that the mines would have to be brought from the Philippines, and that this would take 48 hours, McNamara ordered that the mines be obtained as soon as possible. (TAB 13)

According to the Defense memo, "McNamara made three calls to the President during this period at 9:43 AM, 10:53 AM and 11:06 AM." The specific substance of these calls could not be ascertained from the available sources. However a memo by McGeorge Bundy reported in connection with Secretary McNamara's initial call of 9:12 AM to the President that "from that point onward, the President was kept fully informed on all action reports." (TAB 12)

b. Initial Decisions on New Rules of Engagement & Recommendations on Possible Targets

Secretary McNamara was informed at 10:04 AM of a flash message indicating that the American destroyers were under attack. At 10:19 he discussed these events in a telephone call to Admiral Sharp, the Commander in Chief, Pacific in Honolulu and indicated that modified rules of engagement would be sent to him. Then, according to the Defense memo, at 10:33 AM:

". . . a message, personally signed, McNamara, is sent from the JCS to CINCPAC modifying the existing rules of engagement for the destroyers and their supporting aircraft. Under the old rules, in event of attack in international waters (11 miles offshore or more), U. S. forces were to destroy the attackers, but hot pursuit of attacking forces into hostile waters or airspace was not authorized (JCS Message 7681, August 2, 1964 and the destroyers were to approach

the North Vietnamese coastline no closer than 11 miles. Combat air patrol was restricted to daylight hours and maintained seaward of the destroyers so as to preclude any possibility of overflying North Vietnam. (JCS Message 7680, July 2, 1964). Under the new rules (JCS Message 7700), the closest approach to the North Vietnam coastline for the destroyer patrol is 11 nautical miles, and in the event of a hostile attack, aircraft only are authorized to pursue and attack the hostile forces up to the three mile limit of the North Vietnamese coastline. The message also directed that the Constellation be moved into the area off South Vietnam. . ."

In a 10:59 telephone conversation with General Burchinal, who was in Secretary McNamara's office at the time, Admiral Sharp suggested Hon Ne, Hon Me, Ben Thuy and Quang Khe as possible strike targets and in an 11:18 telephone conversation with General Burchinal he suggested that the Loc Chao estuary be added to the list.

c. 11:25 AM - 12:30 PM Meeting

According to the Defense memo, McNamara, about 11:00 AM asked Rusk, (McGeorge) Bundy and the JCS to meet with him at the Pentagon. According to a memo by McGeorge Bundy the meeting was also attended by Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance and by CIA Chief, McCone. The Defense memo indicates that General Wheeler was out of town between the hours of 10:30 AM and 4:30 PM, keeping a previously arranged appointment with the New York Times editorial board. In his absence, General LeMay was the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The Defense memo indicates that at 11:20 McNamara and Vance met with the JCS LeMay, McDonald, Johnson, Greene, Goodpaster, Burchinal, and Mustin and Joint Staff Assistants). They were joined at 11:38 by Secretary Rusk and by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,

Marshall Green, General Burchinal briefed Rusk. At 11:40 McGeorge Bundy arrived and was briefed by Secretary McNamara. According to the Defense memo at this point:

"There is a discussion of retaliatory measures. McNamara and Bundy discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a sharp limited blow such as air strikes and/or the continuing pressure of mining the North Vietnamese coast. McNamara tells LeMay that the JCS should work up recommendations for immediate action, then recommend actions for 24, 48 and 60 hours ahead, with special emphasis on reinforcements, such as the movement of B-57's into South Vietnam and fighter interceptors into the Philippines. "

Then, according to the Defense memo, "At 12:04 McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Green (State Department) and Vance move to McNamara's office, while the JCS continue meeting in McNamara's dining room. At this meeting the options are essentially refined to three: (1) Sharp limited strikes against such targets as PT boats, PT bases, oil depots, etc.; (2) Continuing pressure, i. e., mining the Vietnam coast; (3) A combination of both. " At 12:20 PM McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, and Green departed for White House followed by Vance at 12:25. The JCS continued meeting until 1:49 PM and "during their meeting, at JCS direction, Burchinal calls McNamara at White House to recommend the sharp limited response option. "

4. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING - 12:04 PM to about 1:00 PM

A regularly scheduled National Security Council Meeting centering
was
on the Cyprus war/in progress when McNamara, Rusk and Bundy arrived at

the White House. In addition to the President, the participants were Robert Kennedy, McCone, McDermott, Ball, Talbot, Dillon, Rowan, Reedy, Valenti, Clifton, Bromley Smith and Komer. McNamara described the attack on the destroyers, and Rusk indicated that he, McNamara and the JCS were developing a set of options, but that these were not as yet sufficiently refined for presentation.

5. The President's Decision

Upon conclusion of the National Security Council meeting, about 1:04 p.m., the President continued the discussion at lunch with Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Bundy and Vance. At the same time, the meeting of the JCS was continuing at the Pentagon.

At 1:24 p.m. General Burchinal called McNamara at the White House and informed him that the Joint Chiefs had selected the option involving air strikes against the PT boat installations (Phuc Loi, Quang Khe and Loc Chao) and the Vinh oil complex. At almost the same time the JCS received from Admiral Sharp in Honolulu a recommendation that U.S. air strikes be authorized against a similar set of targets.

The President agreed that a firm and swift retaliatory strike must be carried out. A general consensus was reached on the approach reflected in the JCS order to CINCPAC sent later that afternoon, to strike the PT bases at Port Wallut, Hon Gay, Phuc Loi, Quang Khe, and Loc Chao, and the Vinh oil depot.

The President discussed, and rejected, the option of mining North Vietnamese ports and of an attack on Haiphong.

The President asked how long it would take to execute the strikes. McNamara estimated that a strike could be launched about 7:00 PM, Washington time which would be 7:00 AM Saigon time. The President suggested that McNamara call the JCS to confirm the time but McNamara indicated that he preferred to work this out more carefully after his return to the Defense Department. There was discussion of a Presidential announcement of the air strikes, and the President stressed that the announcement must be timed so as to avoid any possibility of giving the enemy advance warning of these attacks.

A McGeorge Bundy memo states that "during the luncheon meeting with the President, the entire situation was reviewed and a consensus was swiftly reached on the course of action on which the President decided. This discussion lasted for about two hours and was marked by thoroughness, clarity, and an absence of significant disagreement." (TAB 12)

After the Luncheon Meeting the President ordered the scheduling of a full National Security Council meeting for 6:15 to review his decision and a meeting of the Congressional Leadership at 6:45 so that he might inform them as to his decision. The members of the Luncheon Meeting then separated for departmental discussions and for the preparation of the necessary orders.

6. State Department Actions

State Department actions during the afternoon of August 4 included: transmission of a number of personal messages from the President to various heads of state (TAB 14); planning for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (TAB 15), drafting the suggested text of a Congressional Resolution (TAB 26) and preparing, in conjunction with the Defense Department, for a meeting of the NAC (TAB 16) and SEATO (TAB 17), and for the Congressional hearings to be conducted the next day. At the same time research papers were prepared on such topics as Communist intentions (TAB 18) and the question of international law on the high seas (TAB 19).

7. Defense Department Actions

During the afternoon some confusion arose as to the exact circumstances of the attack. In a telephone call to General Burchinal at 1:59 Admiral Sharp reported that a flash message had been received from the Maddox stating that "a review of the action makes many reported contacts and torpedos fired 'appear doubtful'" because of freak weather effects, over-eager sonarmen and the absence of visual sightings. At 2:08 Admiral Sharp reported that there was no doubt that a torpedo attack did occur but that some reported torpedo attacks might have been in error.

At 4:08 PM Secretary McNamara telephoned Admiral Sharp, who reported receipt of a message from Destroyer Task Force Commander Moore indicating "a little doubt on just exactly what went on." McNamara asked for a further check and discussed the problem of coordinating the planned 7:00 PM launch

time with the Presidential announcement of the retaliatory attacks. At 4:40 PM Admiral Sharp provided further details confirming the attacks and at 4:47 PM McNamara, Vance and the JCS met to evaluate the evidence that an attack on the destroyers had in fact occurred. They determined that the following five factors seemed conclusive: "(1) The Turner Joy was illuminated when fired on by automatic weapons; (2) One of the destroyers observed cockpit lights; (3) A PGM 142 shot at two U. S. aircraft (From COMINT); (4) A North Vietnamese announcement that two of its boats were 'sacrificed.' (From COMINT) and (5) Sharp's determination that there was indeed an attack."

At 5:23 Admiral Sharp called Burchinal and said that on the basis of several additional reports from the Turner Joy and an intercepted enemy message there was no doubt that an attack on the destroyers had occurred.

8. National Security Council Meeting - 6:15 PM

The 6:15 NCS Meeting was attended by the President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Speaker McCormack, McCone, Cline, McNaughton, Ball, William Bundy, Dillon, Rowan, Reedy, McGeorge Bundy, Jenkins, Moyers, Valenti, Bromley Smith and Cater.

The Defense memo indicates that McNamara outlined a four-part plan as follows: "(1) the strike against the PT boat bases and the supporting installations and armed reconnaissance along the North Vietnamese coast; (2) Sending reinforcements to the area, an expression of our will to escalate; (3) Presidential announcement of these actions; and (4) A Joint Congressional

Resolution in support of these actions and further actions, if necessary."

The President asked the NSC members if they had any objection to the plan. There were none. (TAB 12) The President then approved the plan. There followed a discussion of the probable launch time now estimated to be 8:00 PM and of the timing of public statements estimated to be 9:00 PM. The NSC meeting broke up at 6:38 and McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy met with the President in his office, prior to the Congressional leadership meeting.

9. The President's Meeting with the Congressional Leadership - 6:45 PM

At 6:45 PM the President met with 16 Congressional leaders at the White House. Notes taken at this meeting by Walter Jenkins (TAB 21) outline a sequence of events as follows: The President impressed all persons in the room with the requirement to "be very careful" in keeping "all matters in closest confidence." Secretary McNamara gave a briefing on what was planned. Secretary Rusk gave a report on the political situation and on diplomatic steps. CIA Director McCone gave his estimate of expected enemy reactions. (NOTE: Documents relating to reactions of Communist countries including the Soviet Union and Communist China are attached at ~~5~~TAB 18). Questions were asked of McCone concerning Allied provocations. General Wheeler was asked by the President to report on Ambassador Maxwell Taylor's recommendations (TAB 20).

The President summarized the reasons for his decisions and read the draft of his proposed public statements on the decisions. Discussion followed the President's reading of the draft statement. The President read

and the leadership discussed the draft of a proposed Joint Congressional Resolution requested by the President as an indication of Congressional concurrence.

The President's words to the leadership summarizing the rationale of his decisions are reported in the Jenkins memo as follows:

"We thought there were two decisions to take. After we were attacked yesterday and today and nine torpedoes were shot at our destroyers forty miles on the high seas we had to answer that attack. There are four bases where they use these boats. There is a relatively small civilian population around them. We can tuck our tails and run, but if we do these countries will feel all they have to do to scare us is to shoot the American flag. The question is how do we retaliate. We have worked out this plan, on these four bases. There have been many discussions and recommendations by people in the country that we go into this the northern area and not allow them to murder us from bases of safety. These boats came from these bases and have been shooting the American ships.

* * * * *

"I think I know what the reactions would be if we tucked our tails. I thought I should get the Security Council and get the leadership and after the orders are executed I would plan to make a statement something like this. The President then read the proposed statement. Senator Saltonstall pointed out that the word 'limited' was used three times in the statement and suggested that the word 'determined' be substituted for it and let the limitations speak for themselves. The President said: 'We want them to know we are not going to take it lying down but we are not going to destroy their cities and we hope we can prepare them for the course we will follow.'"

The President then said:

"I wanted the advice of each of you and wanted to consult with you. We felt we should move with the action recommended by the Joint Chiefs, but I wanted to get the Congressional concurrence. I think it would be very damaging to ask for it and not get it."

* * * * *

"We will probably make some changes in it. I don't ask you to draft the message. We have taken the resolutions you have had in the past.

I don't think any resolution is necessary, but I think it is a lot better to have it in the light of what we did in Korea.

* * * * *

"We can pretty well work out a good resolution with a minimum of doctoring. I wanted to see if you felt it was the wise thing to do."

The President concluded by saying "I have told you what I want from you," and he "then went around the table to each person and (each) made an expression of support one way or another."

A McGeorge Bundy memo states that, as in the case of the NSC meeting where "it was clear that all members of the NSC were in accord with the President's decision, . . . in the meeting of the Leadership a similar consensus readily developed." In the light of the Congressional comments, drafting continued in the evening of Tuesday August 4. (TAB 12)

10. The President's Actions During the Early Evening of August 4

During the evening, the President was in touch with the Pentagon, and probably reviewed drafts of the statement he would give that evening and of the speech he would give the next morning at Syracuse University. After trying for several hours, he reached Senator Goldwater by telephone at 10:06 PM, and informed the Republican Presidential candidate of his decision to retaliate against North Vietnam. (TAB 13) Goldwater expressed his approval, and a few minutes later told the press: "I am sure that every American will subscribe to the actions outlined in the President's statement. I believe it is the only thing we can do under the circumstances. We cannot allow the American flag to be shot at anywhere on earth if we are to retain our respect and prestige." (TAB 4) At this point, the President had, in

fact, as yet made no public statement.

11. The President's Radio/TV Address to the Nation August 4; 11:36 PM

The President's address to the nation, scheduled for 9:00 p.m., or one hour after the anticipated launch time, was delayed by some 2 1/2 hours. The delay was caused by the unanticipated inability of the carriers Constellation and Ticonderoga to mount the attacks as early as CINCPAC and Washington had assumed they could. The President had insisted that his announcement not be made until the planes were launched. Numerous messages and telephone calls had been made across the Pacific as the evening wore on in an attempt to confirm the launch time. Finally at 11:20 p.m. Admiral Sharp called McNamara to report that the Ticonderoga had launched the first wave of aircraft at 10:43 Washington time and that these planes were expected to arrive at the target area at 1:50 a.m. EDT. At 11:27, Secretary McNamara called the President and told him that it was now appropriate to make his public statement and at 11:36 p.m. the President went on the air. As McGeorge Bundy observed, "the timing of the President's address to the nation was complex. The address must be so timed as not to give any battle advantage to the North Vietnamese but at the same time must precede any announcement of the operation from the other side. The time which was eventually agreed to, met this requirement." (TAB 12)

The President reported on North Vietnam's renewed hostile actions against U.S. ships on the high seas and stated that "repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the

United States must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. " Taking account of the overall context of the enemy's action and the U. S. response, he noted that "in the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam had now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. "

Having stated the requirements of a response and the obligations of the U. S. commitment to South Vietnam, the President then carefully delineated the limited nature of the retaliatory actions he had ordered. He declared that "Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war. " The President indicated that he had instructed Dean Rusk "to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries" and that he had ordered Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson to request an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council to hear U. S. charges against North Vietnam.

The President told of his telephone conversation with Senator Goldwater and reported that the Republican Presidential candidate had expressed his

support of the President's statement. The President reported on his meeting with the Congressional leadership and stated that he had "informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia. I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support." The President concluded by declaring that "firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace; that firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace." (TAB 10)

V - DEVELOPMENTS ON AUGUST 5

A. SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S REPORTS ON US RETALIATORY STRIKES AND REINFORCEMENTS

Upon conclusion of the President's Radio/Television address, Secretary McNamara at 12:02 a.m. gave the first of his four detailed reports that day to the press and public concerning specific actions undertaken by U.S. Armed Forces (TAB 22).

In his midnight press conference McNamara reported on the chronology of the attacks. He indicated that the U.S. planes had encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire, and were using only conventional weapons. In a 9:00 a.m. press conference McNamara reported that during the night 64 attack sorties had been launched from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation against four North Vietnam PT bases and against the Vinh oil complex. Twenty-five enemy boats and 90% of the Vinh storage tanks had been destroyed or damaged and two U.S. aircraft had been lost. U.S. reinforcement moves in the Pacific area were listed as follows: "(1) an attack carrier group has been transferred from the First Fleet on the Pacific Coast to the Western Pacific; (2) interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft have been moved into South Viet Nam; (3) fighter bomber aircraft have been moved into Thailand; (4) interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons have been transferred from the United States into advance bases in the Pacific; (5) antisubmarine task force group has been moved into the South China Sea; and (6) selected Army and Marine forces have been alerted and readied for movement."

In a 7:30 p.m. interview with Neil Strawser of CBS-TV, McNamara reported that the U.S. air strikes have been accomplished "very successfully" and that any "aggressive initiatives of the North Vietnamese or the Communist allies" would be met "in a fashion similar to that of the last day." McNamara again reviewed the Tonkin events in a 9:15 p.m. interview.

B. THE PRESIDENT'S SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY SPEECH

A McGeorge Bundy memo reports that the President decided on Tuesday evening that his speech at Syracuse University the following day should be related to the Tonkin Gulf crisis. The President was briefed by Bundy on Wednesday morning before departing for Syracuse and by his military Aide, General Clifton, on the plane (TAB 12).

In his Syracuse speech the President reported that the deliberate and unprovoked attacks on U.S. ships in the high seas -- part of an "aggression, deliberate, willful, and systematic aggression [which] has unmasked its face to the entire world," -- had been answered by U.S. air strikes against "the hostile vessels and their supporting facilities." The President pointedly recalled the history of "long provocation" which had confronted three American Presidents and the American people in "threats to the peace and security of the peoples of Southeast Asia from the Communist government of North Vietnam." He cited the U.S. statements at Geneva in 1954 that the U.S. would "view any renewal of the aggression...with grave concern." The

President cited the SEATO pact of 1954 and reviewed North Vietnam's systematic violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos. Turning to Europe and "to our friends of the Atlantic Alliance," the President stated that "the challenge that we face in Southeast Asia today is the same challenge that we have faced with courage and that we have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba."

While underlining the global dimensions of the conflict reflected in the Gulf of Tonkin events the President was careful to assure the world at several points in his speech that "there is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States of America," that "peace is the only purpose of the course that America pursues," and that "the United States is now asking that this be brought immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations." (TAB 10).

The President closed his Syracuse speech with an unusually demonstrative affirmation of national unity in saying: ". . . let no friend needlessly fear -- and no foe vainly hope -- that this is a nation divided in this election year. Our free election -- our full and free debates -- are America's strength, not America's weakness. There are no parties and there is no partisanship when our peace or the peace of the world is imperiled by aggressors in any part of the world. We are one nation united and indivisible. And united and indivisible we shall remain." (TAB 10).

C. U.S. ACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS

At the President's request, Ambassador Stevenson called for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council and on August 5 presented to that international forum the facts concerning the "acts of deliberate aggression by Hanoi." (TAB 15). Stevenson called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos, and a cessation of "secret subversion," the "clandestine, illegal transit of international frontiers," and the "export of revolution and the doctrine of violence." He concluded by declaring that "when the peace agreements reached long ago are made effective, peace will return to Southeast Asia and military power can be withdrawn."

Department of State cables on U.S. and Government of Vietnam views and views of other nations concerning United Nations actions on the Gulf of Tonkin events are attached at TAB 15.

VI - JOINT CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION ON
U.S. ACTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A Congressional statement of support on the American defense commitment in Southeast Asia had for some time been considered at high levels of the U.S. Government as a desirable step. Such a resolution would warn North Vietnam authorities of the possible serious consequences of their aggression. And if aggression were to continue and U.S. involvement to deepen, such a resolution would give a clear demonstration of unified national concern and action -- a step which while perhaps not legally imperative was nevertheless highly desirable.

A. McGEORGE BUNDY MEMORANDUM AND WILLIAM BUNDY DRAFT ON
A CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION, JUNE 1964

A memorandum in the White House files dated June 10, 1964, on the subject "Alternative Public Positions for U.S. on Southeast Asia for the Period July 1 - November 15" reflects the consideration being given to a Congressional resolution. (TAB 23) The memo was prepared by McGeorge Bundy "for discussion June 10, 5:30 p.m." Notes of this June 10 meeting are attached at TAB 24. During the same period William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, had submitted to the White House draft texts for a possible Congressional resolution. (TAB 25).

The McGeorge Bundy memorandum of June 10 began with the words: "It is agreed that the U.S. will wish to make its position on Southeast Asia as clear and strong as possible in the next five months. The immediate watershed decision is whether or not the Administration should seek a Congressional resolution giving general authority for action which the President may judge necessary to defend the peace and security in the area."

Bundy foresaw that favorable passage of such a resolution "requires that the Administration be ready to give answers to a whole series of disagreeable questions" including the matter of a blank check to the President, the effect on Asian self-help projects, the kinds of force authorized, whether Southeast Asia really mattered that much, and the current rationale for requesting a resolution in answering the question "what change in the situation requires such a resolution now?" Bundy reasoned that "this answer should include a candid account of the existing situation and hazard and the growing changes both in Laos and in South Vietnam" and should also "refer to the need for international awareness that the U.S. is not immobilized by a political campaign." A resolution would "give additional freedom to the Administration in choosing courses of action," and "would give a signal of this new freedom of action and firmness of purpose in a number of important capitals, the most important of which are in Southeast Asia, on both sides of the line." Such a resolution "would require major public campaign by the Administration"

including "a Presidential message," which should "itself be preceded by a clear indication of the increasing firmness of the Administration's position and the reasons for that firmness. Such indications could be given only by a public statement of high officials or by such devices as a White Paper." Bundy recognized that "a strong campaign in defense of this resolution will require a substantial increase in the commitment of U.S. prestige and power to success in Southeast Asia."

The Bundy memorandum suggested that in the absence of a Congressional Resolution the U.S. course of action might not be too severely limited. First there were "alternative forms of bipartisan support for action: consultation with Eisenhower and the Republican candidate, discussion with bipartisan leadership of Congress; direct Presidential appeal to the people; ample, if not always encouraging precedent for Presidential action, as in Korea." Second, "a wider range of actions which are plainly permissible without a resolution" including "direct military action by South Vietnamese forces, and very substantial deployments of U.S. air, sea and ground forces. Within the framework of SEATO, and in defense of the agreements of 1962, we can plausibly move troops even into Vietnam, Thailand and Laos itself if the appropriate governments request it. Short of direct U.S. military action against North Vietnam, we could almost surely maintain adequate freedom of action even without a Congressional Resolution." Third, "the only time we can get a resolution, in the absence of acute emergency, is within the next three weeks. A strong case can be made that

we do not now need to commit ourselves so heavily, and that if the situation changes drastically, we could readily respond by emergency session, certainly in November and conceivably in September too."

It should be noted that the matter of earlier high-level discussion and drafts of a Congressional resolution prior to the Tonkin Gulf attacks has been a matter of considerable debate among some Congressional critics of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and of the President's role in increasing the U.S. role. The issues were discussed in considerable detail in testimony by Secretaries McNamara and Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 6, 1964 (TAB 28) and February 20, 1968 (TAB 29) and by William Bundy on December 21, 1967 (TAB 25).

B. PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS REQUESTING A JOINT RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AUGUST 5, 1964

The North Vietnamese attacks brought the issue of a Congressional resolution to a focus and led the President to seek the Resolution immediately. (See the description above on the August 4 Presidential meeting with the Congressional leadership).

On the afternoon of Wednesday, August 5, the President reported to the Congress (TAB 10) that the North Vietnamese attacks had precipitated "a new and grave turn to the situation in Southeast Asia," that retaliatory

U.S. air action had been decided on and completed, and that after earlier "consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a Resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." These protective U.S. commitments in that area, he pointed out, had been first undertaken by President Eisenhower in 1954 and "are well known to the Congress." "Our policy in Southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions: (1) America keeps her word... (2) The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole... (3) Our purpose is peace... and (4) This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity."

The President was careful to describe North Vietnam's systematic violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 as its forces had "constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos." The President drew a direct link between enemy aggression and U.S. commitments in Laos and Vietnam. He reviewed with the American people recent developments in Laos where at the request of the Government of Laos the U.S. had undertaken reconnaissance flights over Laotian "territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission." And, according to the President, "when the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval

vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States. As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the U.S. will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom." Thus, "I recommend a Resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO treaty." Such a Resolution "could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past" e. g. for Formosa, the Middle East and Cuba. Prompt enactment of such a resolution would "give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in Southeast Asia will be carried forward -- and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved."

As in his earlier statements at Syracuse, after reporting the evidence and his decisions and having pledged that he would do everything to limit the conflict and "that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution," the President ended his speech on a forceful proclamation of national unity. "The events of this week," he declared, "would in any event have made the passage of a Congressional Resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on three months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests and that in these matters there is no division among us."

C. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, DEBATE AND VOTE ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION

On August 6 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services met in joint executive session to hear Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Wheeler testify on the Congressional Resolution. The joint Senate Committee voted 31-1 to report the resolution favorably without amendment. Classified excerpts of the executive session are attached at TAB 27 ; the unclassified transcript is attached at TAB 28 .

Senate debate began on August 6. Most Senators confined their comments to support of the President's position and actions in the Gulf of Tonkin and cited the Formosa, Middle East and Cuba resolutions as clear precedents for Congressional action supporting the President's determination. Senators Morse and Gruening were a vocal minority of two in their opposition to the Resolution, which passed 88-2. Ten absent Senators indicated they would have voted "yea".

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs also met in executive session on August 6 and heard Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and General Wheeler. The Committee voted 29-0 to report the resolution favorably to the House. Two members voted "present". In the House, as in the Senate, the need for bipartisan unity was stressed by most speakers. The final vote was 416 to 0, with Representative Adam Clayton Powell voting "present" and with 14 members not voting.

The Congressional Resolution characterized North Vietnam's repeated attacks on the high seas as "part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression" against neighboring nations. The Resolution declared that "the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." (TAB 26)

A summary of the Congressional debate on the Resolution is attached at TAB 30 . A summary of Senator Fulbright's statement during the Senate debate is attached at TAB 31 . Statements bearing on the powers of the President are attached at TAB 33 . Full transcripts of the Senate and House debates are attached at TAB 32 . Memoranda on the legal position of the U.S. and a comparison of the Tonkin Resolution and the three similar Congressional resolutions are attached at TAB 34 . A 1967 memorandum refuting Senator Case's attack on the Administration's handling of Viet Nam,

with special reference to the Southeast Asia Resolution, is attached at TAB 35.

D. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS OF AUGUST 7 AND AUGUST 10

On August 7, the President issued a statement hailing the Senate and House passage of the Joint Resolution as "a demonstration to all the world of the unity of all Americans." He thanked the leaders and members of both parties in the Congress for their patriotic resolve and their rapid action. In signing the Joint Resolution into law on August 10, the President noted that as Commander in Chief the responsibility to retaliate was his alone but that as President he also had "the responsibility of submitting our course to the representatives of the people for them to verify it or veto it." The Congress had now spoken and "the unanimity of Congress reflects the unanimity of the country." Thus it should be clear to all that "to any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply. To any in Southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom we shall give it. In that region there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek--no territory, no military position, no political ambition. Our one desire--our one determination--is that the people of Southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way." (TAB 10).

VII - CONCLUSION

In the weeks immediately following the Tonkin events there were a number of high-level U. S. Government reviews of the situation in South-east Asia. They included White House conferences of August 8 (TAB 36) and August 10 (TAB 37), a State/Defense message of August 14 (TAB 38) and a new National Security Action Memorandum, NSAM 314, of September 10 (TAB 39). Related problems in Laos and Thailand were discussed in cables attached at TABS 40 and 41.

At a White House meeting with his senior advisors on August 10, the President conducted a postmortem on the Tonkin crisis. He was pleased with the nation's firm response. At the same time, however, he was convinced that the Tonkin crisis was but an episode in a longer and as yet unfinished story.

McGeorge Bundy's notes:

"The President expressed his basic satisfaction with what had been accomplished in the last week. He said the reaction from Congress was good, and also from the people judging by the polls. He said this response was quite a tribute to the Secretaries of State and Defense. He warned, however, that if we should fail in the second challenge, or if we should do nothing further, we could find ourselves even worse off than before this last set of events. The President did not wish to escalate just because the public liked what happened last week. We would have to pick our own ground: nonetheless, instead of letting the other side have the ball, we should be prepared to take it. He asked for prompt study and recommendations as to ways this might be done with maximum results and minimum danger. He did not believe that the existing situation would last very long."

POSTLOGUE

The President turned in mid-August from the Gulf of Tonkin crisis to other events in the world requiring intensive Presidential deliberations (Cyprus, Congo) and to the domestic preparations required for his nomination as candidate for the Presidency. The President's earnest hopes that his firm actions in the Gulf of Tonkin would deter the North Vietnamese were dashed by decisions in Hanoi. Forⁱⁿ the fall of 1964 the North Vietnamese decided to send units of their regular army southward along the Ho Chi Minh Trail through neutral Laos. Their mission was to give decisive support to Viet-Cong forces pressing for a final military victory. These Communist steps would eventually require the U. S. to respond some six months later with regular air strikes against targets in North Vietnam and with a commitment of American combat forces to the defense of South Vietnamese freedom.

PROCESSING NOTE

The first page of document #3a, page x, was originally the last page of document #3, but it has not appeared in any previous sanitizations of document #3. Document #1 from Gulf of Tonkin, Volume 2 (in this same box, and which was at one time mis-filed in Volume 1) is a near duplicate of #3a and its second page is labeled "xx." There are no pages vi-ix, nor pages xi-xix in the entire file. It appears that the listing of "Tabs on the Gulf of Tonkin Decisions" was moved or duplicated and repaginated. Page x has been numbered #3a. Page xx has been copied and attached as the second page of document #3a to complete the listing of tabs.

Alexis Percle
April 25, 2014

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TABS ON THE GULF OF TONKIN DECISIONS

TAB

I -- II INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

- 1 NSAM 288 - March 17, 1964 & McNamara Trip Report of March 16, 1964
- 2 McNamara Trip Report - May 14, 1964
- 3 White House Meeting of May 24, 1964
- 4 Chronologies - 1964
- 5 White House Meeting of June 10, 1964
- 6 William Sullivan Memo of - July 13, 1964
- 7 Department of State cables on SVN July - August 1964

III - ATTACKS OF AUGUST 2

- 8 South Vietnamese 34A Operations
- 9 Defense Department Cables July - August 1964
- 10 Presidential Statements - August 1964 & Campaign Period 1964
- 11 U.S. Protest Note
- 12 McGeorge Bundy Memorandum - August 5, 1964

IV - ATTACKS OF AUGUST 4

- 13 Defense Department Special Chronologies
- 14 Presidential Messages to Heads of State
- 15 United Nations Action
- 16 NAC Meeting
- 17 SEATO Meeting
- 18 Communist Intentions -- NVN, Communist China, Soviet Union
- 19 International Law of the High Seas
- 20 General Taylor's Recommendations of August 3, 1964
- 21 Jenkins Memo on Congressional Leadership Meeting of August 4

V - DEVELOPMENTS ON AUGUST 5

- 22 McNamara Reports of August 5, 1964

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ/RAC 01-118
 By SJ, NARA, Date 9-23-02

PRESERVATION COPY

TABVI - CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

- 23 McGeorge Bundy Memo of June 10, 1964
- 24 White House Meeting of June 10, 1964
- 25 William Bundy Draft and Q. & A. on Congressional Resolution
- 26 Text of Congressional Resolution
- 27 Classified Excerpts of August 6, 1964 Testimony
- 28 Congressional Testimony of August 6, 1964 by McNamara, Wheeler
and Rusk
- 29 Congressional Testimony of February 20, 1968 by McNamara & Wheeler
- 30 Summary of Senate Debate on Congressional Resolution
- 31 Summary of Senator Fulbright's Statements during Senate Debate
- 32 Transcripts of Congressional Debate August 5-8
- 33 Statements on Powers of the President
- 34 Memoranda on Legal Position and on Comparison of Tonkin Resolution
- 35 Memorandum Refuting Senator Case's Attack - 1967

VII - CONCLUSION

- 36 Memorandum of August 7
- 37 White House Meeting of August 10
- 38 August 14 Cable on Future Courses of Action in SEA
- 39 NSAM 314 of September 10, 1964
- 40 Laos
- 41 Thailand

(no 3)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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March 17, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 288

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Attorney General
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, United States Information Agency
 The Director, Bureau of the Budget
 The Administrator, Agency for International
 Development

SUBJECT: Implementation of South Vietnam Programs

1. The report of Secretary McNamara dated March 16, 1964 was considered and approved by the President in a meeting of the National Security Council on March 17. All agencies concerned are directed to proceed energetically with the execution of the recommendations of that report.
2. The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has designated the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to coordinate the execution of the recommendations in the report.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

C. Casper 3/17/64

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC ltr 4/28/77
By mg, NARS, Date 6/23/77

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Smith 6

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*Revised by
National and
Security Council 3/23*

~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Viet Nam, dated March 16, 1964

The enclosed memorandum to the President from the Secretary of Defense is circulated for consideration at the Council meeting to be held in the Cabinet Room of the White House at noon on March 17, 1964.

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary

*Annex A }
Annex B } not attached
Annex C }
Annex D }*

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 4/28/77
By msg, NARS, Date 6/23/77

NSC Control No. 154

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6a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CAD/W 3/24/77
By EMG, NARS, Date 4/15/77

This report addresses two questions:

1. What is the present situation in Vietnam? (What is the trend of the counterinsurgency program, how stable is the Khanh government, and what is the effectiveness of our current policy of assisting the South Vietnamese Government by economic aid, military training and logistical support?)

2. How can we improve that situation? (What are the plans and prospects of the Khanh government and what more should they be doing, and what more should the U. S. be doing under present or revised policy, in South Vietnam or against North Vietnam?)

To answer the questions, the report will review: I. U. S. Objectives in South Vietnam; II. Present U. S. Policy in South Vietnam; III. The Present Situation; IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected; and VII. Recommendations.

I. U. S. Objectives in South Vietnam

We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.

Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U. S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be under grave pressure.

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Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.

All of these consequences would probably have been true even if the U. S. had not since 1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U. S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist "war of liberation."

Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. They are increased by domestic factors.

II. Present U. S. Policy in South Vietnam

We are now trying to help South Vietnam defeat the Viet Cong, supported from the North, by means short of the unqualified use of U. S. combat forces. We are not acting against North Vietnam except by a very modest "covert" program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalists) - a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect. In Laos, we are still working largely within the framework of the 1962 Geneva Accords. In Cambodia we are still seeking to keep Sihanouk from abandoning whatever neutrality he may still have and fulfilling his threat of reaching an accommodation with Hanoi and Peking. As a consequence of these policies, we and the GVN have had to condone the extensive use of Cambodian and Laotian territory by the Viet Cong, both as a sanctuary and as infiltration routes.

III. The Present Situation in South Vietnam

The key elements in the present situation are as follows:

A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/US effort are generally sound and adequate. a/ Substantially more can be done in the effective employment of military forces and in the economic and civic action areas. These improvements may require some selective increases in the U. S. presence, but it does not appear likely that major equipment replacement and additions in U. S. personnel are indicated under current policy.

B. The U. S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is still sound.

a/ Mr. McCone emphasizes that the GVN/US program can never be considered completely satisfactory so long as it permits the Viet Cong a sanctuary in Cambodia and a continuing uninterrupted and unmolested source of supply and reinforcement from NVN through Laos.

Its application will not lead to any major reductions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in portraying to the U. S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial reductions in the numbers of U. S. military training personnel should be possible before the end of 1965. However, the U. S. should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of how long it takes.

C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September:

1. In terms of government control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant influence. In 22 of the 43 provinces, the Viet Cong control 50% or more of the land area, including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh Duong; 75% of Hau Nghia; 90% of Long An; 90% of Kien Tuong; 90% of Dinh Tuong; 90% of Kien Hoa; and 85% of An Xuyen.

2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration within the U. S. contingent:

a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and particularly the latter, are high and increasing.

b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively.

c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defense Corps, on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling.

3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position has been particularly noticeable. For example:

a. In Quang Nam province, in the I Corps, the militia in 17 hamlets turned in their weapons.

b. In Binh Duong province (III Corps) the hamlet militia were disarmed because of suspected disloyalty.

c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps, 75 hamlets were severely damaged by the Viet Cong (in contrast, during the twelve months ending June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic hamlets were few and none was overrun).

d. In Quang Ngai province, at the northern edge of the II Corps, there were 413 strategic hamlets under government control a year ago. Of that number, 335 have been damaged to varying degrees or fallen into disrepair, and only 275 remain under government control.

e. Security throughout the IV Corps has deteriorated badly. The Viet Cong control virtually all facets of peasant life in the southernmost provinces and the government troops there are reduced to defending the administrative centers. Except in An Giang province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect) armed escort is required for almost all movement in both the southern and northern areas of the IV Corps.

4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three months; one province had four). Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands have changed hands twice since the November coup. The faith of the peasants has been shaken by the disruptions in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.

5. North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing:

a. Communications between Hanoi and the Viet Cong (see classified annex).

b. Since July 1, 1963, the following items of equipment, not previously encountered in South Vietnam, have been captured from the Viet Cong:

Chicom 75 mm. recoilless rifles.

Chicom heavy machine guns.

U. S. .50 caliber heavy machine guns on Chicom mounts.

In addition, it is clear that the Viet Cong are using Chinese 90 mm rocket launchers and mortars.

c. The Viet Cong are importing large quantities of munitions and chemicals for the production of explosives: Approximately 50,000 pounds of explosive-producing chemicals destined

for the Viet Cong have been intercepted in the 12 months ending March 1964. On December 24, five tons of ammunition, of which one and one-half tons were 75 mm recoilless rifle ammunition, was captured at the Dinh Tuong Viet Cong arsenal. Ninety percent was of Chicom manufacture.

D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the uncertain viability of the Khanh government. Khanh himself is a very able man within his experience, but he does not yet have wide political appeal and his control of the Army itself is uncertain (he has the serious problem of the jailed generals). After two coups, as was mentioned above, there has been a sharp drop in morale and organization, and Khanh has not yet been able to build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant threat of assassination or of another coup, which would drop morale and organization nearly to zero. a/ Whether or not French nationals are actively encouraging such a coup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing pessimism and anti-Americanism of the French community in South Vietnam provide constant fuel to neutralist sentiment and the coup possibility. If a coup is set underway, the odds of our detecting and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high.

E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for encouragement in the performance of the Khanh government to date. Although its top layer is thin, it is highly responsive to U. S. advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Cong. Opposition groups are fragmentary, and Khanh has brought in at least token representation from many key groups hitherto left out. He is keenly aware of the danger of assassination or coup and is taking resourceful steps to minimize these risks. All told, these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to a sufficiently strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in the next few months for us to devote all possible energy and resources to his support.

IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action

A. Negotiate on the Basis of "Neutralization"

While de Gaulle has not been clear on what he means by this -- and is probably deliberately keeping it vague as he did in working toward an Algerian settlement -- he clearly means not only a South Vietnam that would not be a Western base or part of an alliance structure (both of which we could accept) but also withdrawal of all external military assistance and specifically total U. S. withdrawal. To negotiate on this

a/ Mr. McCone does not believe the dangers of another coup (except as a result of a possible assassination) at this time are as serious as he believes this paragraph implies.

basis -- indeed without specifically rejecting it -- would simply mean a Communist take-over in South Vietnam. Only the U. S. presence after 1954 held the South together under far more favorable circumstances, and enabled Diem to refuse to go through with the 1954 provision calling for nationwide "free" elections in 1956. Even talking about a U. S. withdrawal would undermine any chance of keeping a non-Communist government in South Vietnam, and the rug would probably be pulled before the negotiations had gone far.

B. Initiate GVN and U. S. Military Actions Against North Vietnam

We have given serious thought to all the implications and ways of carrying out direct military action against North Vietnam in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam. (The analysis of overt U. S. action is attached as Annex A.) In summary, the actions break down into three categories:

1. Border Control Actions. For example:

✓ a. An expansion of current authority for Laotian over-flights to permit low-level reconnaissance by aircraft when such flights are required to supplement the currently approved U-2 flights.

✓ b. Vietnamese cross-border ground penetrations into Laos, without the presence of U. S. advisors or re-supply by U.S. aircraft.

✓ c. Expansion of the patrols into Laos to include use of U. S. advisors and re-supply by U. S. aircraft.

✓ d. Hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border and destruction of VC bases on the Vietnam/Cambodian line.

✓ e. Air and ground strikes against selected targets in Laos by South Vietnamese forces.

2. Retaliatory Actions. For example:

✓ a. Overt high and/or low level reconnaissance flights by U. S. or Farmgate aircraft over North Vietnam to assist in locating and identifying the sources of external aid to the Viet Cong.

✓ b. Retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids on a tit-for-tat basis by the GVN against NVN targets (communication centers, training camps, infiltration routes, etc.).

✓ c. Aerial mining by the GVN aircraft (possibly with U. S. assistance) of the major NVN ports.

3. Graduated Overt Military Pressure by GVN and U. S. Forces.

This program would go beyond reacting on a tit-for-tat basis. It would include air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets. The program would utilize the combined resources of the GVN Air Force and the U. S. Farmgate Squadron, with the latter reinforced by three squadrons of B-57's presently in Japan. Before this program could be implemented it would be necessary to provide some additional air defense for South Vietnam and to ready U. S. forces in the Pacific for possible escalation.

The analysis of the more serious of these military actions (from 2(b) upward) revealed the extremely delicate nature of such operations, both from the military and political standpoints. There would be the problem of marshalling the case to justify such action, the problem of communist escalation, and the problem of dealing with the pressures for premature or "stacked" negotiations. We would have to calculate the effect of such military actions against a specified political objective. That objective, while being cast in terms of eliminating North Vietnamese control and direction of the insurgency, would in practical terms be directed toward collapsing the morale and the self-assurance of the Viet Cong cadres now operating in South Vietnam and bolstering the morale of the Khanh regime. We could not, of course, be sure that our objective could be achieved by any means within the practical range of our options. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, unless and until the Khanh government has established its position and preferably is making significant progress in the South, an overt extension of operations into the North carries the risk of being mounted from an extremely weak base which might at any moment collapse and leave the posture of political confrontation worsened rather than improved.

The other side of the argument is that the young Khanh government needs the reinforcement of some significant success against the North and without them the in-country program, even with the expansion discussed in Section C below, may not be sufficient to stem the tide.

On balance, except to the extent suggested in Section V below, I recommend against initiation at this time of overt GVN and/or U. S. military actions against North Vietnam.

C. Initiate Measures to Improve the Situation in South Vietnam.

There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by present policy -- the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U. S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable measure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an "either/or" between this course of action and possible pressures against the North; the former is essential without regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former.

The following are the actions we believe can be taken in order to improve the situation both in the immediate future and over a longer term period. To emphasize that a new phase has begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should be described by some term such as "South Vietnam's Program for National Mobilization."

Basic U. S. Posture

1. The U. S. at all levels must continue to make it emphatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

2. The U. S. at all levels should continue to make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are totally opposed to any further coups. The ambassador should instruct all elements, including the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible coups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such information to Khanh. However, we must recognize that our chances would not be great of detecting and preventing a coup that had major military backing.

3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan now announced by Khanh (described in Annex B), and particularly the basic theory -- now fully accepted both on the Vietnamese and U. S. sides -- of concentrating on the more secure areas and

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working out from these through military operations to provide security, followed by necessary civil and economic actions to make the presence of the government felt and to provide economic improvements. This so-called "oil spot" theory is excellent, and its acceptance is a major step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to get specific instructions out to the provinces, so that there is real unity of effort at all levels. A related matter is to stabilize the assignment of province chiefs and senior commanders and clarify their responsibilities and relationships.

Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs fit right into the framework of the Plan as announced by Khanh. Wherever possible, we should tie our urging of such actions to Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will be carrying out a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the U. S.

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Civil and Military Mobilization

4. To put the whole nation on a war footing -- to obtain the manpower for these efforts described below and to remedy present inequities and inadequacies in the use of manpower -- a new National Mobilization Plan (to include a National Service Law) should be urgently developed by the Country Team in collaboration with the Khanh Government. The present structure of decrees, dating from the Diem Government, is haphazard and produces substantial injustices. The new Program for National Mobilization would both greatly increase the effectiveness of the war effort and be a strong visible sign of the Government's determination and will. Full attention should be given to the way it is presented so that it appears as a remedy for past injustices and not as a repressive or totalitarian act.

5. The strength of the Armed Forces (regular plus paramilitary) must be increased by at least 50,000 men. About 15,000 of these are required to fill the regular Armed Forces (ARVN) to their present authorized strength. Another 5,000 would fill the existing paramilitary forces to authorized strengths. The balance of 30,000 men is required to increase the strength of the paramilitary forces, in whatever form these may be organized (see paragraph 7 below). (All of the foregoing strength figures are illustrative and subject to review, which review I have directed General Harkins to make in consultation with General Khanh.)

6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently required to work in the provincial capitals, the district towns, the villages, and the hamlets. "Hamlet civic action teams" of five men each are now beginning to be trained, on a small scale, to go into hamlets after they have been cleared, start the rehabilitation process, and train hamlet leaders to carry on. School teachers and health technicians are now assigned in some hamlets, many more are needed, and those on the job need to be retrained to higher competence. Many other types of technicians (e. g., agricultural workers) are needed, in varying numbers. Taking into account the fact that many hamlets are not now secure, and that adequate training is required, the initial goal during 1964 should be at least

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7,500 additional persons; the ultimate target, at least 40,000 men for the 8,000 hamlets, in 2500 villages and 43 provinces. The administrators would come largely from the areas in which they serve and would be paid by the national government. The U. S. should work with the GVN urgently to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training facilities, financing methods, and organizational arrangements, and should furnish training personnel at once, under the auspices of the AID Mission. Further, maximum effort should be made to make use of the available trained personnel by assignment to provincial and village administration where needed.

Improved Military Forces

7. The paramilitary forces are now understrength and lacking in effectiveness. They must be improved and re-organized.

Specifically:

a. What remains of the present hamlet militia (and related forces of a part-time nature for hamlet defense) should be consolidated with the Self Defense Corps into a single force compensated by the national government.

b. Pay and collateral benefits must be substantially improved at once. A reasonable course of action would be to raise the pay scale of the Civil Guard approximately to that of the regular Armed Forces, and to raise the pay scale of a reorganized Self Defense Corps approximately to the present level of the Civil Guard. In addition, measures should be taken to improve the housing and allowances of the families of both forces, so that they can live decently in areas near where the forces are operating.

c. Strength should be maintained and expanded by conscription, effectively enforced, and by more centrally directed recruitment policies.

d. Additional U. S. personnel should be assigned to the training of all these paramilitary forces.

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e. The National Police require special consideration. Their strength in the provinces should be substantially increased and consideration should be given to including them as part of an overall "Popular Defense Force". In expanding and improving the police, the AID Mission should make special arrangements to draw on the advice of the present British training mission under Brigadier Thompson because of its experience in Malaya. (Mr. Bell has instructed Mr. Brent, the USOM Chief, to accomplish this.)

8. An offensive Guerrilla force should be created to operate along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant. Such a force could be organized around present Ranger Companies and ARVN Special Forces and provided with special training and advice by U. S. Special Forces. The force should carry the fight to the VC on their own basis in advance of clear-and-hold operations on the conventional pattern.

Additional Military Equipment for the GVN

9. The Vietnamese Air Force should be strengthened at once by the substitution of 25 A-1H aircraft for the present 25 T-28s. The A-1H aircraft has a much greater bomb load and slightly better speed. a/

10. Although there are no major equipment deficiencies in other forces, we should act at once to replace the present M-114 armored personnel carriers by 63 M-113s and to provide additional river boats. Additional lesser deficiencies should also be met at an estimated cost of approximately \$10 million.

Economic Actions

11. The approved, but unannounced, Fertilizer Program should be particularly stressed and expanded and publicly announced. Its target of 85,000 tons for the present planting season (April - June) should probably be doubled for the next season and trebled the following season both to provide immediate

a/ Concurrently, the effectiveness of the USAF's Farmgate operation will be increased by assignment of A-1E aircraft in replacement of B-26s and T-28s. Furthermore, in another important area, we are strengthening the U. S. intelligence and reporting system.

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and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas and to improve the rice crops and export earnings. Estimates are that an additional ton of fertilizer costing around \$70 can, if properly applied, produce additional yield of an equivalent two tons of rice, which might be sold for \$110 per ton. Thus, the potential export improvement alone could be on the order of \$20 million from this year's 85,000 ton input.

US and GVN Costs of the Above Actions

The above actions will involve a limited increase in U. S. personnel and in direct Defense Department costs. More significantly, they involve significant increase in Military Assistance Program costs and in the budget of the GVN itself, with the latter requiring additional US economic aid. The estimates of additional annual costs are as follows:

<u>Action</u>	<u>GVN Budget Costs</u>	<u>Cost to U. S.</u>
a. Raise military and paramilitary numbers and pay scales	5-6 billion piastres	\$30-40 million ^{a/}
b. Enlarge civil administrative cadre	250 million piastres (1st year)	\$1,500,000 (first year)
c. Furnish additional military equipment		\$20 million (one time)

^{a/} Increases in GVN budget expenditures do not automatically require equal increases in U. S. economic aid. As a rough approximation, subject to later refinement, an increase of 5-6 billion piastres of GVN budget expenditures might require an increase of \$30-40 million worth of imports financed through U. S. economic aid. Some of the imports undoubtedly could be obtained under P. L. 480.

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Conclusion

If the Khanh Government can stay in power and the above actions can be carried out rapidly, it is my judgment that the situation in South Vietnam can be significantly improved in the next four to six months. The present deterioration may continue for a part of this period, but I believe it can be levelled out and some improvement will become visible during the period. I therefore believe that this course of action should be urgently pursued while we prepare such additional actions as may be necessary for success.

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V. Possible Later Actions

If the Khanh government takes hold vigorously -- inspiring confidence, whether or not noteworthy progress has been made -- or if we get hard information of significantly stepped-up VC arms supply from the North, we may wish to mount new and significant pressures against North Vietnam. We should start preparations for such a capability now. (See Annex C for an analysis of the situation in North Vietnam and Communist China.) Specifically, we should develop a capability to initiate within 72 hours the "Border Control" ^{a/} and "Retaliatory Actions" referred to on pages 5 and 6, and we should achieve a capability to initiate with 30 days' notice the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure." The reasoning behind this program of preparations for initiating action against North Vietnam is rooted in the fact that, even with progress in the pacification plan, the Vietnamese Government and the population in the South will still have to face the prospect of a very lengthy campaign based on a war-weary nation and operating against Viet Cong cadres who retain a great measure of motivation and assurance.

In this connection, General Khanh stated that his primary concern is to establish a firm base in the South. He favors continuation of covert activities against North Vietnam, but until such time as "rear-area security" has been established, he does not wish to engage in overt operations against the North.

In order to accelerate the realization of pacification and particularly in order to denigrate the morale of the Viet Cong forces, it may be necessary at some time in the future to put demonstrable retaliatory pressure on the North. Such a course of action might proceed according to the scenario outlined in Annex D.

a/ Authority should be granted immediately for covert Vietnamese operations into Laos, for the purposes of border control and "hot pursuit" into Laos. Decision on "hot pursuit" into Cambodia should await further study of our relations with that country.

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VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected

We have considered the following actions, but rejected them for the time being except to the extent indicated below:

1. Return of Dependents. We recommend that the present policy be continued of permitting dependents to return home on a voluntary basis, but not ordering them to do so. The security situation in Saigon appears to have improved significantly, and ordering dependents home would now, in the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, have a serious impact on South Vietnamese morale. It would also raise a serious question whether tours of duty for AID personnel would not have to be shortened. Thus, unless there are further serious incidents, or unless we were taking more drastic measures generally, we believe compulsory return should not be undertaken.

2. Furnishing a U.S. Combat Unit to Secure the Saigon Area. It is the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken.

3. U.S. Taking Over Command. It has been suggested that the U.S. move from its present advisory role to a role that would amount in practice to effective command. Again, the judgment of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the possible military advantages of such action would be far outweighed by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within South Vietnam and outside. Moreover, the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice -- although it has not yet reduced military reaction time -- makes it less urgent. At the same time, MACV is steadily taking actions to bring U. S. and GVN operating staffs closer together at all levels, including joint operating rooms at key command levels.

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VII. Recommendations

I recommend that you instruct the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government:

1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.
2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coups.
3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war footing.
4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men.
5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for work at province, district and hamlet levels.
6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and to increase their compensation.
7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force.
8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for the present T-28s.
9. To provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 armored personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-114s there), additional river boats, and approximately \$5-10 million of other additional material.
10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand it with a view within two years to trebling the amount of fertilizer made available.

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11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia.

12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.

Robert S. McNamara

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

25 May 1964

MEMO FOR Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Attached for your files is a copy of the report which I presented to the President on May 14, following my return from South Vietnam.

RM 9W
Robert S. McNamara

Attach.

Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes unclassified.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

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14 May 1964

RMcN's NOTES FOR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

Summarized below are my comments and conclusions based upon the discussions which General Taylor and I held in South Vietnam May 12 and 13.

1. The Situation

a. Since last September the number of villages under Government control has declined by 200, approximately 12%. Most of this decline occurred between September and January, but the decline continued at a lesser rate through March. The adverse trend appears to have leveled off in April.

b. Khanh states that today the Government controls 8 million people out of a total population of 14 million.

c. The Viet Cong continue to hold the initiative. The rate of harassing incidents, with its adverse effects on public morale, continues to rise. The fighting strength of the Viet Cong has risen and they are now able occasionally to stand and fight rather than to retire and dissolve in the face of Government pressure. However, they are not yet capable of seizing an area and holding it for an extended period of time against determined Government attack.

d. The Government's operations are improving in effectiveness:

- . "Holding" and "oil spot" operations are under way in several parts of the country.
- . Khanh has a clear and effective concept of the pacification program.

However: Frequent changes of leadership continue (there have been six Province Chiefs in Long An in recent weeks).

- . Incompetent leadership exists in many critical areas, e.g., the 5th Division and Hia Nghia Province.
- . Resources are not concentrated in the areas of highest priority (for example, the crescent of provinces around Saigon including Long An, Binh Duong, and Hia Nghia, has fewer troops and less competent leadership in relation to the Communist threat than do less critical areas).
- . Operational plans for applying the "holding" and "oil spot" concepts to all provinces or to all major parts of each important province (Long An) have not yet been developed.
- . Desertion rates remain high and the strength of both regular and para-military forces is inadequate and falling.

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By 4, NARA, Date 4-9-74

- . The administrative processes of the Government, particularly as they relate to the war effort and especially its budgetary aspects, are ineffective (the budget for January has not yet been approved and province chiefs are reluctant to assume responsibility for spending for such purposes as increases in pay, additions to strength, the rural pacification program).
- . The Government remains fragmented by dissension and distrust (e.g., the Foreign Minister reported to Manfull on May 13 that Khanh had possible Communist or neutralist connections).
- . A religious crisis is brewing both among the Buddhists and between the Buddhists and the Catholics, and the latter may spread to the Army (note the "ultimatum" letters to Khanh from both the Buddhists and the Catholics and the Bishop's proposal to remove Catholic chaplains from the Army).
- . Tri Quang, the leader of the Buddhists in the central part of the country, is an ambitious, dangerous, unpredictable, powerful, political force antagonistic to Khanh's Government.

e. MACV estimates:

- 1) The Pacification Program will not be in full swing until September.
- 2) Governmental control over the Central and Northern areas will not be achieved before mid-1965 and possibly as late as the end of 1965 (per Westmoreland and Stilwell).
- 3) Governmental control over the Delta will not be achieved in less than two to three years (per Westmoreland and Stilwell).
- 4) Governmental preparations for operations against the North will not be completed before September or October.

2. Actions which we have recommended to strengthen the Government's Program.

- a. The strength of the regular and paramilitary forces must be increased substantially by the end of the year. MACV was asked to prepare a detailed plan to accomplish this, to obtain Khanh's approval of the plan, and to monitor its implementation. The plan, prepared while we were in Saigon, proposed the recruitment of 147,000 men between April 1 and December 31, 1964. We asked Khanh to approve this plan -- he did.
- b. South Vietnam's financial budget must be approved immediately and the province chiefs must be instructed to implement it at once. Khanh agreed to issue the necessary instructions.
- c. Financial limitations or the fear of such limitations must not be allowed to stand in the way of the action required to expedite the Pacification Program. Mike Forrestal will stay in Saigon until he negotiates with Oanh a plan for providing whatever budgetary support is required to offset the bad psychological effect of what the South Vietnamese view as our restrictive financial policies (Oanh has requested an additional \$56 million for the CIP plus \$20 million to be

added to the foreign exchange reserve).

d. Detailed plans for the extensive application of the "oil spot" concept must be developed for all provinces and resources provided and allocated in accordance with these plans. MACV will assume the responsibility for this action.

e. Certain additional training or logistical support is required for the Vietnamese forces. We will endeavor to increase by 100% the number of Vietnamese fighter pilots within 90-100 days. We will increase the number of fighter aircraft by approximately 33% by the first of October and provide by that date additional pilots for such aircraft. We will approve MACV's request for additional financial and materiel assistance totalling approximately \$7 million (this list of items was submitted in response to my request that they tell us of any additional assistance which they required). A detailed training program for the 7,000 additional civilian administrators to be used for pacification cadres must be developed and expedited. The USOM Chief will follow this program.

3. Khanh's views. (For a more complete exposition of his comments, see the report of my interview with him.)

a. As stated earlier, Khanh believes that today the Government controls approximately 8 million of the population. He believes his plans for application of the "oil spot" concept will gradually extend the Government's control over the remainder of the population, but he points out this will require a long time.

b. He states that his major problem today is not military, but rather political and religious in character. Irresponsible elements of the urban population, who have not been exposed to the dangers and pressures of the war, press for political reforms which are inappropriate under the present circumstances. Religious crises involving controversy among the Buddhists and between the Buddhists and Catholics are mounting rapidly. He fears they will spread to the Army. In these areas Khanh stated he is "a fish out of water" and he seeks our advice.

c. Because the war will last a long time, Khanh believes that at some point a strike against the North will be desirable. He will probably not be ready for such a strike before the end of the year, although it may be forced upon him earlier by political and psychological factors. The strikes against the North can be carried out by South Vietnamese forces, but the decision to undertake such action must be that of the United States because if the North Vietnamese or Chinese Communists respond by attacking South Vietnam, Khanh must depend on U.S. forces for the protection of his country. In any event, Khanh states strikes against the North are not required now and he is not yet ready to carry them out.

d. Khanh accepts my statements of the requirement for:

- 1) A plan to increase the military and paramilitary strength of the GVN forces.
- 2) The early approval and effective provincial application of the financial budget.
- 3) The early assignment of ambassadors to key nations throughout the world.

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- 4) The concentration of resources in the strategic heartland.
- 5) The removal of incompetent leaders in both the military and political organizations.

e. Following Khanh's acceptance of my statements of the action he should take to increase the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program, I emphasized again that the U.S. would support fully whatever financial expenditures were required for projects which contributed to the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program.

4. Lodge's proposals for strikes against the North.

a. Lodge wishes to carry out air strikes against the North coupled with the Canadian "gambit" (i.e., the new Canadian ICC Commissioner should be instructed to state to Hanoi that air strikes will start and continue until such time as there is evidence -- perhaps a fall-off in COMINT traffic -- that the Viet Cong have received orders to terminate the insurgency. The objective of Lodge's program would be not only to cut off the supply of men and equipment from the North, but also to destroy the morale of the North Vietnamese and to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.

b. Not only is this the program which Lodge believes should be followed, but, according to Bill Sullivan, Lodge believes his record shows he has consistently recommended it. His memorandum of record of the conversation with Messrs. Bundy and Rusk indicates to him that he proposed such a plan to them. He considers that since his memorandum of last October to Averell Harriman he has consistently advocated this proposal.

c. Lodge believes he has made clear his opposition to Bill Bundy's proposal for establishing a political base and time schedule for action against the North. Dunn's notes of the conversations with Bundy and Rusk refer to Lodge's arguments against Bundy's proposal.

d. The time schedule which Lodge apparently would follow is based on the Canadians' arrival in Saigon in June. Lodge believes the necessary training will be completed and plans to protect Saigon implemented by the end of the summer, at which time the political-military program could start.

e. Almost certainly Lodge has discussed such a plan with Khanh, hoping to lead him to accept it.

5. Administration of the Country Team.

a. The relationship between Lodge and Nes is poor. Lodge considers Nes impulsive; he states had he known Nes before, he never would have approved him for the job; in the event Lodge is incapacitated, Lodge believes Nes should not be left in charge of the Mission for as long as a week -- in such a case Manfull would be more effective. Lodge treats Dunn, Manfull and Nes as equals. Nes does not see all of the cable traffic (the only person who does is Dunn) and he cannot be sure his memos to Lodge, which are processed through Dunn, are received by Lodge.

b. DeSilva's relationship to Lodge is "distant".

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c. Harkins and Lodge do not communicate effectively with each other. Neither Harkins nor Nes saw Lodge's cable reporting on his conversations with Khanh, nor did they see his "Dienbienphu" cable. Both Harkins and his staff and Nes and his staff distrust Dunn.

d. Brent is "washed up" and completely ineffective. Williams (the Rural Affairs Administrator) is not filled with a sense of urgency.

e. The morale in the Embassy is poor because the able people on the staff see no effective direction of the counterinsurgency program within the Country Team.

6. Miscellaneous comments.

a. Lodge believes that if Khanh disappears, the U.S. should be prepared to run the country, possibly from Cam Ranh Bay.

b. With respect to coup possibilities, DeSilva states that although Khanh is not very popular, this is a normal condition for a leader of such a country and coup prospects, in his opinion, are the lowest since January 30 of this year.

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By *[signature]* NARA. Date 10-15-90

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Summary Record of the Meeting on Southeast Asia, Situation Room,
May 24, 1964, 11:00 AM

Present: Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Director McCone, General Taylor, Under Secretary Ball, Director Bell, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster, Special Assistant Sullivan, Mr. Chester Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Douglass Cater, Mr. Bromley Smith

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by stating his general view toward the entire Southeast Asia problem. He reviewed current efforts to seal the Cambodian border and to uphold the government in Laos.

Referring to the proposal for a Congressional resolution, Secretary Rusk said it is most important that we not put the President in a precarious position. For example, General Khanh's position is somewhat difficult for us to defend until he takes certain actions to damp down religious controversy and internal bickering in South Vietnam. We must remember that while the South Vietnamese are not fighting for the U.S., they must create an image of being willing and able to fight for themselves.

With reference to the proposal to assume larger responsibility of Vietnamese conduct of the war, Secretary Rusk expressed his doubts that we should try to persuade Khanh to accept a plan involving U.S. officers giving direct orders to Vietnamese officers. He preferred a parallel command arrangement. He feared that if we got too deeply into operations of the Vietnamese military, we would be open to accusations of colonialism. We would be giving Khanh's enemies a chance to move against him in South Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara said the first issue which should be presented to the President is whether we believe that additional U.S. efforts within South Vietnam will or will not prevent further deterioration in South Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk developed his belief that we should straighten out the Laotian situation, possibly by moving against North Vietnam, and if we succeeded in this, we would then straighten out South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara commented that we had not studied the scenario for

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Laos. Does it provide another road to the north? If so, it required study by the group. Mr. William Bundy was assigned the task of preparing a Laotian scenario which emphasizes the link between the Laotian problem and the South Vietnamese problem.

Secretary Rusk referred to four preconditions which must be met before we agree to a Laotian conference. Copies of Vientiane telegram 1407 were circulated (copy attached). This cable contains a summary of Souvanna's press conference.

Secretary McNamara asked how we would get the Pathet Lao to withdraw from Laos. How could we force this? Secretary Rusk replied we could put pressure on Hanoi and Peking on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1962. If we were not successful in getting a conference on our terms, we might attack East Laos and North Vietnam. This action thus becomes our path to the north.

General Taylor said we can go into North Vietnam only for both reasons, i. e. Laos and South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said that if we went via the Laotian routes, the time schedule might be as short as fifteen to thirty days.

Secretary Rusk repeated his view that Laos is one chapter and South Vietnam is another and separate chapter. Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that we could not separate the political and military chapters on Laos and South Vietnam. We will have to crank in any Laos scenario.

Secretary Rusk said we might accomplish our purpose in phases. The first phase would be diplomatic activity in an effort to get a conference based on our preconditions. If we get a conference on our terms, we will have achieved our objective. Phase two would involve the situation if there were no conference. The question immediately arises as to whether we should use force to get a conference. In phase two U.S. pressure would be exerted first to restore the Plaine des Jarres in Laos to the neutralists, force the removal of Pathet Lao forces from Laos, and then deal with North Vietnam. He mentioned that consideration was being given to a plan which would provide for a UN Security Council resolution authorizing a four-power commission, including teams to inspect the Cambodian/Vietnamese border.

Director McCone expressed his view that if we go into North Vietnam we should go in hard and not limit our action to pin pricks. General Taylor commented that a surprise attack from the air could be very effective, but thereafter attacks would be less effective and losses would go up.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that we had three kinds of military force: A South Vietnamese air force comprising some fifty fighter bombers; a much larger force consisting of South Vietnamese air forces plus Farm Gate; and U.S. air power.

Secretary Rusk expressed his view that we should hit light at first so that North Vietnamese prestige was not involved. Ho Chi Minh could back out of the situation if his prestige was not deeply engaged. The Secretary referred again to the importance of getting the maximum out of General Khanh, such as actions which would induce full Vietnamese support of the Khanh government before we go to Congress asking U.S. support of the South Vietnamese government. Secretary McNamara's response was to ask what specifically do we do. Can General Khanh do what we ask him to do in the light of his restricted political power? Secretary Rusk said we do not go to war for a government which is more interested in quarreling than in fighting the Viet Cong.

Mr. Sullivan summarized his proposal to send many more U.S. advisers to Vietnam so that General Khanh can carry out some of the actions he is prepared to take. Many things that the South Vietnamese government wants to do are not being done merely because there are not enough Vietnamese officials who know what to do.

Director McCone said the proposal to send more U.S. advisers might produce a reverse reaction, i. e., there were so many Americans that the Vietnamese would take the position that they had no responsibility.

Secretary McNamara referred to another major issue, i. e., can U.S. air stop a Chinese Communist movement into Laos and Vietnam? Our inability to halt such a movement from the air means that we will need to be prepared to put U.S. forces on the ground in Southeast Asia. He said our objective was to find the best way to deter the North Vietnamese from attacking South Vietnam, and if the Chinese Communist attack in response to U.S. actions, the best way to defeat them.

Secretary Rusk said we should consider moving a U.S. division in Korea to Southeast Asia, at which time we would make public a declaration that any attack on South Korea would be met by the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said we need an operational plan on targets in North Vietnam. General Taylor said the Chiefs and CINCPAC were at work on such a plan which involved dividing targets into three categories.

Secretary Rusk said he favored cutting down on dependents in South Vietnam beginning now. They should be returning in small groups so that they would not be a problem to deal with on D-Day. Secretary McNamara said he thought this would give a wrong signal to the South Vietnamese, i.e. that we were preparing to withdraw. All agreed that the dependents should come out on the day the President makes a speech outlining our plans.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the President was interested in seeing what could be done if we decide to intensify covert actions now being undertaken. It was agreed that there is little more which can be done in this area.

There was a lengthy discussion of what was called inter-larding our political encadrement as explained in the paper listed as Tab 3. After Mr. Sullivan explained the concept, both Secretary McNamara and Director McCone pointed out that even if this plan were put into effect, it would have little effect in South Vietnam in the near future.

General Taylor said his reaction to the plan was to call it the "third coup." As he saw it, it followed a chief of staff concept. He said Khanh would have to want it badly or he would not accept it. He felt it raised the question as to whose war, ours or South Vietnam's. He thought it would have a bad effect on Vietnamese conduct of the war. He doubted that sufficient U.S. personnel could be found to implement it.

Secretary McNamara said that if he were President he would want to ask his advisers this question: "Do I want to use military force in Southeast Asia in the next two or three months?" This decision is not affected by whether or not we decide to attempt interlarding of U.S. forces. However, the President now appears to look at interlarding as an alternative or a substitute for the use of force.

Secretary Rusk said that a better situation in Saigon is a supporting requirement to a decision to go north. Congressional and world opinion

must be given this reassurance. Secretary McNamara said the proposed actions in South Vietnam were not a substitute for the use of force. The attempt to take over more of the direction of the war in South Vietnam was extremely complex. We lacked sufficient U.S. personnel. General Khanh could be removed suddenly as head of the government by assassination or by coup. We must concentrate on the most crucial points and acknowledge that the measures to support South Vietnam are restricted. They will not substitute for the use of force against North Vietnam. We do not have a solution and these proposals will not save us.

General Taylor said we should try the interlarding concept on a pilot province basis.

Secretary McNamara said that where our proposals are being carried out now, the situation is still going to hell. We are continuing to lose. Nothing we are now doing will win.

General Taylor replied that it was too early to say that Khanh was losing. To reach the conclusion that he is not going to win out is unwise. We should give him four or five months before we decide that the actions he is taking will not be successful.

Mr. Sullivan commented that all we are now doing ends up with Viet Cong assassinations which remove promising provincial leaders as soon as they begin to act effectively. Secretary McNamara added that the leadership in the provinces is worse now than before because most present province leaders lack governmental experience.

Mr. Sullivan said General Khanh can't implement his program, which is acceptable to us, because he lacks the personnel resources to carry it out.

Secretary Rusk said that, if necessary, the U.S. is prepared to take military action against North Vietnam and Communist China to keep Laos and South Vietnam from being overrun by the Communists. Thus, we are obliged to do everything we can to strengthen South Vietnam because the alternative is the use of force.

Secretary McNamara said the probability is that further weakening will occur in South Vietnam. The question is whether we should hit North Vietnam now or whether we can wait. South Vietnam is weaker now

than it was in January, but we can ride through for a few additional weeks, even with further weakening. Thus, we do not have to act now, but we may have to use military force later.

Secretary Rusk said we must act for reasons arising out of the situation in Southeast Asia and not for reasons arising out of the situation in the U.S. He hoped that we could get better reporting out of South Vietnam where all is not doom and gloom. We must get better information here and in Vietnam in order to present a brighter picture of the actual situation in Vietnam. We badly need actions in the information field.

General Taylor commented that we need a government-wide information program. He urged that senior officials here and U.S. officers returning from Vietnam be used in this program.

Secretary Rusk said we must counter public reports that the President is not acting because of the upcoming elections. He thought that a major speech by the President was required soon. It would not need to contain much new, but he and other officials must say the same thing over and over again. He pointed out that while he had said nothing new in his last speech, the press had called attention to one idea as if it were new when in fact he had been saying it for months.

General Taylor commented that the South Vietnam government isn't going to lose rapidly or win rapidly. Secretary McNamara restated his view that the situation in the provinces is much worse, the number of desertions has risen, and recruitment in South Vietnamese units is not adequate. He asked whether anything that we did could improve the situation as long as Viet Cong harassment continues. His personal view was that it was very doubtful whether we could affect the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam unless the Viet Cong could be stopped. If the Communist activity could be halted, what we are now doing in Vietnam would definitely improve the situation. General Taylor said the military would prefer to wait until fall before military action was taken. Better equipment would be available in the field and the administration of our military effort would be further along. However, prompt military action could be taken and it would serve as a shot in the arm for General Khanh and possibly be useful in dealing with the situation in Laos.

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Secretary McNamara expressed doubt that we could get at the North Vietnamese situation via the Laos route, as suggested by Secretary Rusk.

Bromley Smith

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CHRONOLOGY ON VIETNAM

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1964 only attached

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Authority State Ltr. 4/2/78
By chw, NARS, Date 5/10/78

Research Project No. 747
November 1965

Historical Studies Division
Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State

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Dec. 31 President Johnson declared in a message to General Duong Van Minh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council of Vietnam:

"The United States Government shares the view of your government that 'neutralization' of South Viet-Nam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Viet-Nam would only be another name for a Communist takeover."

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- Jan. 2 Secretary Rusk announced that a "Vietnamese Army group seized in the delta area of Viet-Nam some 300,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, weapons like mortars, recoilless ammunition, made in China Who actually forwarded them into South Viet-Nam is a matter of some speculation, but almost certainly the authorities in Hanoi are primarily responsible for that"
- Jan. 6 The Government of South Vietnam decreed a three-man military command over the Vietnamese forces and established a triumviral government, consisting of Major General Duong Van Minh (Chief of State), Major General Tran Van Don, and Major General Le Van Kim.
- Jan. 22 Secretary Rusk, in an address at Barnard College, remarked that suggestions were made "now and then ... that a conference be called to 'neutralize' South Viet-Nam", but that "nothing" was said "about 'neutralizing' North Viet-Nam." "No new conference or agreement is needed," he declared. "All that is needed is for the North Vietnamese to abandon their aggression."
- Jan. 27 Secretary of Defense McNamara in a speech before the House Armed Services Committee stated that the situation in South Vietnam "continues grave," but that "the survival of an independent Government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all of southeast Asia and to the free world

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that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory."

- Jan. 27 The French Foreign Office announced that France and Communist China "have decided, by mutual accord, to establish diplomatic relations."
- Jan. 30 Major General Nguyen Khanh, in a bloodless coup, ousted the Government of Major General Duong Van Minh. Khanh took over as Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and General Minh remained Chief of State.
- Jan. 31 The United States announced that it was "continuing relations with the new leaders of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam", and that "accordingly no question of recognition" was involved.

French President de Gaulle stated that "it would be absolutely impossible to envision, without China, a possible neutrality agreement relating to the South-east Asian States, in which States, for so many reasons, we French feel a very particular and cordial interest-- a neutrality which, by definition, must be accepted by all, guaranteed on the international level, and which would exclude both armed agitations supported by any one among them in one or another of the States, and the various forms of external intervention; a neutrality that, indeed, seems, at the present time, to be the only situation compatible with the peaceful existence and progress of the peoples concerned."

- Feb. 4-6 The Viet Cong launched an offensive in Tay Ninh province and the Mekong Delta. In the battle which followed, hundreds of Government troops were reportedly killed.
- Feb. 7 Secretary Rusk told the press that "we know that the other side has no present intention of talking about the neutralization of North Viet-Nam." He said that the United States could not accept "the idea that, while they [the other side] disregard their solemn commitments and move to undermine the Geneva accords of 1954, as well as of 1962, somehow we neutralize South Viet-Nam--meaning presumably by that

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withdrawing American forces and pulling out support so that South Viet-Nam would be even more exposed to the kinds of penetration which have been aimed at Southeast Asia from the north for these past few years". The Secretary said that "existing agreements ought to be observed, and if they would be observed, then the way is open for peace in Southeast Asia."

- Feb. 8 Major General Khanh announced the formation of a new Vietnamese Government with himself as Premier and, with a mixed civilian-military Cabinet in charge of administration. General Minh continued as Chief of State.
- Feb. 21 President Johnson said at the University of California in Los Angeles that the contest in South Vietnam was "first and foremost a contest to be won by the Government and the people of that country for themselves". But he warned that "those engaged in external direction and supply would do well to be reminded and to remember that this type of aggression is a deeply dangerous game."
- Feb. 25 Secretary Rusk declared in a speech that Laos and South Vietnam were "the targets of subversion and aggression directed and heavily supported by Communist North Viet-Nam, with the backing of Peiping." He declared that it was "vitally important to the security not only of Southeast Asia but of the entire free world that these aggressions ... not succeed"; that the United States was "committed to the support of Vietnamese freedom"; and that "all free nations should, in their own elementary self-interest, take care not to do anything that would encourage Communist militancy."
- Feb. 27 Secretary Rusk said that he did not believe there was "evidence of troop involvement by China or by the Soviet Union" in South Vietnam. He said that the support for the Viet Cong came "primarily out of Hanoi", though arms originating in China had been captured in South Vietnam.
- Mar. 6 Secretary Rusk said that talk of neutralization which implied "merely that the United States should withdraw its support of South Viet-Nam" tended to "undermine the morale of the South Vietnamese people" and that the

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United States was "not going to withdraw that support." He said that, if the North left Laos and South Vietnam alone, there could be "peace in that area and these countries need not be formally alined with anyone, any side."

Mar. 8-12 Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Saigon for a five-day inspection trip.

Mar. 17 In a statement released after Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported to the President, the White House said that since October there had "unquestionably been setbacks". It said that the Viet Cong had "taken maximum advantage of two changes of government, and of more longstanding difficulties, including a serious weakness and overextension which had developed in the basically sound hamlet program."

Mar. 26 Secretary of Defense McNamara, in an address before the National Security Industrial Association, defined three objectives of United States policy: "First, and most important ... the Vietnamese have asked our help. We have given it. We shall continue to give it Second, Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the United States ...: In Communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States and to the family of free-world nations to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the challenge in South Viet-Nam. And third, South Viet-Nam is a test case for the new Communist strategy", that is, "wars of liberation", or what is properly called covert aggression or insurgency." Secretary McNamara stated that, of the options open to the United States, the first two options--United States withdrawal or neutralization of Vietnam--were categorically rejected. The third option--"initiation of military actions outside South Viet-Nam, particularly against North Viet-Nam, in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Viet-Nam"--had been "carefully studied." "Whatever ultimate course of action may be forced upon us by the other side," he said, "it is clear that actions under

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this option would be only a supplement to, not a substitute for, progress within South Viet-Nam's own borders." McNamara said that the fourth course of action was "to concentrate on helping the South Vietnamese win the battle in their own country" and that all agreed this was "essential no matter what else" was done. He said that the President had "therefore approved the 12 recommendations" made by Taylor and himself "relating to this option." He went on to explain:

"We have reaffirmed U.S. support for South Viet-Nam's Government and pledged economic assistance and military training and logistical support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control."

Apr. 15

With France abstaining, the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization "expressed grave concern about the continuing Communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam, a protocol state under the terms of the Manila Pact." It said further: "The Council agreed that the members of SEATO should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty. The defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia"

Apr. 17-18

Secretary of State Rusk visited South Vietnam and conferred with Ambassador Lodge.

Apr. 20

Secretary Rusk stated upon his return to Washington that he thought other countries besides the United States were "prepared to be helpful in resources in South Viet-Nam," and that there were already "a few military personnel" in South Vietnam from other countries and perhaps "some technical people and some specialists." He did not, however, "envision organized combat units at the present moment from other countries."

Apr. 25

General William C. Westmoreland was designated to replace General Harkins as U.S. Commander MACV in Saigon.

May 2

An explosion in Saigon Harbor sank a United States aircraft transport ship.

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May 5

The United States announced that, in the light of the continued Viet Cong Communist aggression in Vietnam, it had added North Vietnam to the list of blocked countries in the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. The effect of the action was to freeze any North Vietnamese assets which might exist in the United States and to prohibit all financial and commercial transactions by Americans with North Vietnam. The announcement by the Treasury Department added: "Since the so-called 'National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam' was created by the Communist regime of North Viet-Nam and is based in and controlled by North Viet-Nam, this blocking action applies equally to all transactions with that puppet organization."

May 12

Secretary of State Rusk asked the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members to give greater support to South Vietnam.

May 13

Cambodia called for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider the "repeated acts of aggression" by South Vietnamese-United States forces.

May 18

President Johnson asked the Congress to appropriate an additional \$125 million for military and economic assistance to Vietnam.

May 21

Secretary of Defense McNamara said that our current military assistance program was "oriented mainly toward those countries on the periphery of the major Communist nations where the threats are greatest and in which the indigenous resources are least." He said that these were the "forward defense" nations, among which was South Vietnam, "the country of the forward group which now faces the most serious and direct armed action."

The United States called on the United Nations to establish a border patrol between Cambodia and South Vietnam. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, the U.S. Representative, told the U.N. Security Council that the South Vietnamese could not be blamed "for concluding that the International Control Commission cannot do an effective job of maintaining frontier security." He observed that "the fact that the situation in South Viet-Nam has reached the crisis stage is itself dramatic testimony of the frustration to which the International Control Commission has been reduced".

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- May 22 Secretary of State Rusk, outlining the choices in Vietnam, said that expansion of the war could result "if the Communists persist in their course of aggression."
- June 4 The U.N. Security Council, after considering the complaint of Cambodia regarding "incidents" on Cambodian territory in the vicinity of the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border, unanimously adopted a resolution to send a delegation "to the two countries and to the places where the most recent incidents have occurred in order to consider such measures as may prevent any recurrence of such incidents."
- June 8 Thomas Hughes, Department of State Director of Intelligence and Research, in an address in the Panama Canal Zone, said that the policy of containment had "both succeeded and become obsolete"; that the "conspicuous forward motion of conventional Communist armies" had been "stopped"; and that the new "fact" was that "Communist military aggression from within a country" was "becoming more frequent." He declared that "by far the greater part of the Viet Cong forces in South Viet-Nam are South Vietnamese, the preponderance of Viet Cong weapons come not from Communist countries but from capture, purchase, and local manufacture."
- June 23 President Johnson announced the appointment of General Maxwell D. Taylor as Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, to succeed Ambassador Lodge, and of Career Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to hold the new post of Deputy Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam.
- June 29 A New Zealand military detachment of 25 engineers arrived at Saigon.
- July 1 Secretary of State Rusk was asked how he would "reply to men like Senator (Wayne) Morse who say that the United States is an outlaw nation and has become, in his words, the greatest threat to peace in the world because we have not turned the Southeast Asia problem over to the United Nations for settlement". He answered that he thought "operations which are in the presence of the kind of fighting going on in Southeast Asia would be something

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that ... the United Nations would find very difficult." He observed that he did not, "at the moment, believe that either the Laotian question or the South Vietnamese question can be measurably moved toward a peaceful solution simply by throwing them overnight into the U.N. Security Council."

- July 14 General Maxwell D. Taylor presented his credentials as Ambassador of the United States to Vietnam.
- July 28 Cambodia, in a telegram to the United Nations Security Council, accused the United States Government and the Government of Vietnam of responsibility for spreading poisonous chemicals by aircraft on the Cambodian province of Ratanakiri, with resulting loss of life. (For U.S. reply, see Aug. 3)
- Aug. 2 The U.S.S. Maddox, "operating on the high seas, in the Gulf of Tonkin", was the object of an "unprovoked attack made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats."
- Aug. 3 The United States protested to the Hanoi regime following the U.S.S. Maddox incident, stating that the "United States Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North Viet-Nam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces."

President Johnson read the following statement to news correspondents:

"I have instructed the Navy:

1. to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Viet-Nam,
2. to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol,
3. to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers, and
4. to issue orders to the commanders of the

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aircraft and the two destroyers (U.S.S. Maddox and U.S.S. C. Turner Joy),
(a) to attack any force which attacks them in international waters, and
(b) to attack with the objective not only of driving off the force but of destroying it."

Replying in the U.N. to the Cambodian accusation of July 28, the United States said that "a careful investigation" had been conducted and that it had been determined that "no Republic of Vietnam nor American aircraft have conducted chemical operations of any character whatever either adjacent to the Cambodian territory indicated, much less over Cambodian territory, on any of the dates or at any time in the period cited by the Royal Government of Cambodia. Furthermore, the sole chemical operations conducted within South Vietnam by the Government of Vietnam employ weed-killing chemicals of types used throughout the world, and extensively within the United States itself. These are spread in liquid form, leave no powder residue, and are harmless to human beings."

Aug. 4

The destroyer U.S.S. C. Turner Joy and U.S.S. Maddox were attacked by PT boats. President Johnson reported, in an address to the nation, that the destroyers and supporting aircraft, acting on the orders given after the previous attack on the Maddox, had sunk "at least two of the attacking boats" and that there were "no U.S. losses". He said that, in addition, "air action" was then "in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile operations."

Aug. 5

President Johnson sent a message to Congress asking it "for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia." He declared:

"The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us."

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Aug. 6 Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara, appearing before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Services Committees, urged early passage of a joint congressional resolution. Secretary McNamara revealed that "military deployments" were underway which included:

- "a. Transfer of an attack carrier group from the Pacific coast to the western Pacific;
- "b. Movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South Vietnam;
- "c. Movement of fighter bomber aircraft into Thailand;
- "d. Transfer of interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from the United States to advance bases in the Pacific;
- "e. Movement of an antisubmarine force into the South China Sea;
- "f. The alerting and readying for movement of selected Army and Marine Forces."

He added that meanwhile "U.S. destroyers, with protective air cover as needed, continue their patrol in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin."

Cambodia charged that "Americans in uniform joined South Vietnamese in firing into Cambodia."

Aug. 7 The U.S. Congress adopted the Joint Resolution proposed by the President (the House unanimously, the Senate by a vote of 88-2), and the President signed it into law on August 10 (Public Law 88-408). The Resolution approved and supported the President's determination "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

Aug. 14 The United States informed the U.N. Security Council that it "would welcome an impartial international investigation" of continued Cambodian charges that the United States and South Vietnam had used poisonous chemicals. The United States suggested that "an international organization such as the World Health Organiza-

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- tion or the International Committee of the Red Cross would seem well-qualified to carry out this kind of investigation and to report the facts to the Security Council."
- Aug. 16 The Military Revolutionary Council ousted Major General Duong Van Minh as Chief of State, elected Lieutenant General Nguyen Khanh President, and installed a new constitution.
- Aug. 25 Following a series of mass demonstrations and political pressure by civilian parties, Khanh promised liberalization of his government.
- Aug. 27 The new Vietnamese Constitution was withdrawn; the Revolutionary Council disbanded; and Khanh, Duong Van Minh, and Tran Thien Khiem were named provisional leaders.
- Aug. 29 Nguyen Xuan Oanh was named Acting Premier of Vietnam to head a caretaker government for two months. He stated that General Khanh had suffered a mental and physical breakdown.
- Sept. 3 Cambodia charged that South Vietnam had launched a "major attack" near Koh Rokar, penetrating into Cambodian territory.
- Sept. 5 General Khanh resumed the Premiership, dissolved the triumvirate provisional government established on August 27, and restored Duong Van Minh to his former position of Chief of State.
- Sept. 9 The U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, General Taylor, at a press conference held at the White House, stated that "the military situation, in spite of the disturbances of the last 10 days in August, remained essentially normal." He said that the war was one of small units, a "war of the squadron, the platoon, and the company," and did not require "the centralized governmental direction which would be the case in a so-called conventional war."

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- Sept. 13 A bloodless coup was attempted in Saigon by Brigadier General Lam Van Phat, but by night forces loyal to Khanh regained control.
- Sept. 14 Secretary of State Rusk, in an address before the Economic Club of Detroit, commented that the coup against Premier Khanh and the quick restoration of his Government were "an example of the kind of development that makes the Vietnamese problem so complex and so different from any that this country has found itself involved in." Expressing gratification that the authority of the triumvirate regime under Premier Khanh had been reaffirmed, he said that the Vietnamese leaders "should now be able to return to their efforts to build a stable government and to continue with the war against the Viet Cong."
- Sept. 19 Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that two U.S. destroyers on a routine patrol in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin had been "menaced by four unidentified vessels", had "fired warning shots", and finally had "properly opened fire", after which the unidentified vessels had disappeared. Secretary McNamara said that the destroyers were "continuing their patrols in the international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin" and that U.S. "air and sea forces" remained "prepared to respond immediately to any attack."
- The Vietnamese Government made sweeping changes in the military command in reaction to the abortive coup of September 13.
- Sept. 26 The Vietnamese High National Council was formally inaugurated and was charged with preparing a new constitution.
- Oct. 20 The Revolutionary Council presented a new Vietnamese constitution.
- Oct. 24 An unarmed United States C-123 airplane, based in South Vietnam, was shot down by Cambodia. The United States admitted (October 27) that the plane had gone over Cambodian territory inadvertently through a navigational error.

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- Oct. 25 The United States charged that Cambodians had fired on a U.S. helicopter in South Vietnam which was searching for a missing U.S. officer presumed to be dead.
- Oct. 26 The Vietnam Revolutionary Council elected Phan Khac Suu Chief of State.
- Nov. 1 Tran Van Huong was named Premier of Vietnam.
- Dec. 1 The White House announced that the President had reviewed the Vietnamese situation with Ambassador Taylor and with Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara. The White House announcement stated that "Ambassador Taylor had reported that the political situation in Saigon was still difficult but that the new government of Prime Minister Huong was making a determined effort." The announcement further said that the "Ambassador also reported that, although the security problems have increased over the past few months in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam, with uneven progress elsewhere, the strength of the armed forces of the government was being increased by improved recruiting and conscription and by the nearly 100-percent increase in the combat strength of the Vietnamese Air Force."
- Dec. 11 Upon the conclusion of talks between Vietnamese officials and Ambassador Taylor, the Vietnamese Government announced that it had accepted a United States offer of additional military and economic assistance, including "provision for increased numbers of military, paramilitary and police forces, the strengthening of the air defense of South Viet-Nam, and further economic assistance for a variety of forms of industrial, urban and rural development."
- Dec. 15 Ambassador Tran Thien Khiem of the Republic of Vietnam presented his credentials to President Johnson.
- Dec. 20 The Council of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam proclaimed the "dissolution of the High National Council". It expressed continued confidence in Phan Khac Suu, however, "in his capacity as Chief of State" and "confidence in and support for the civilian government of Mr. Tran Van Huong in the present transitional period and until the national congress is convened."

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Dec. 22

The Department of State announced, with respect to "allegations criticizing our Ambassador in Saigon as well as the United States Government", that Ambassador Taylor had been "acting throughout with the full support of the United States Government." "As we have repeatedly made clear", the Department's statement continued, "a duly constituted government exercising full power on the basis of national unity and without improper interference from any group is the essential condition for the successful prosecution of the effort to defeat the Viet Cong and is the basis of United States support for that effort. This is the position Ambassador Taylor has been expressing to Vietnamese leaders."

Following reports that the United States Government was concerned about the intervention by the Council of the Armed Forces in the civilian rule of South Vietnam, Lieutenant General Khanh defended the "dissolution of the High National Council" on December 20 and argued that the armed forces had "respected their August 27 pledge to turn power over to a civilian government since the Council still supports Chief of State Phan Khac Suu and the civilian government of Mr. Tran Van Huong." He added that "we make sacrifices for the country's independence and the Vietnamese people's liberty, but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country." He concluded that it was "better to live poor but proud as free citizens of an independent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreigners and communists."

Dec. 24

Terrorist bombing of American barracks in Saigon killed 2 Americans and wounded 52 Americans and 13 Vietnamese.

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Jan. 4

In his State of the Union address to Congress, President Johnson explained why the United States was in Vietnam:

"We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against the Com-

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munist aggression. Ten years ago our President pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it now.

"Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in one generation we have had to fight against aggression in the Far East. To ignore aggression now would only increase the danger of a much larger war.

"Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace.

"What is at stake is the cause of freedom, and in that cause America will never be found wanting."

- Jan. 8 South Korea announced that it would send 2,000 non-combat military advisers to South Vietnam in response to a January 2 request for aid from South Vietnam.
- Jan. 14 General Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, said that the United States was continuing to maintain its "assistance and advisory effort [in Vietnam] at the current level of about 23,000 Americans from all three services, of which about 15,000 are Army personnel". He said that the Viet Cong were "estimated conservatively" to be suffering battle casualties of "at least three to one for each Vietnamese soldier that is killed."
- Jan. 23 Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy said that the Viet Cong was "not capable of anything like a Dien Bien Phu". He remarked that, while possibilities for a U.N. role in Vietnam might emerge, it was "not clear that the U.N., which has been unable to carry through commitments such as the Congo, would be able to act effectively to deal with this far more difficult situation in its present form. And this has been the public judgment of the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. U Thant".

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— WORLD AFFAIRS —

Southeast Asian Crisis

U.S. Raids North Vietnam Bases. U.S. Navy planes Aug. 4-5 bombed North Vietnamese coastal bases, patrol boats and an oil installation. The 5-hour raid along 100 miles of coastline was in retaliation for North Vietnamese PT-boat attacks on the U.S. destroyers *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin Aug. 2 and 4. Pres. Johnson ordered the retaliatory action Aug. 4.

At a Washington news conference Aug. 5, Defense Secy. Robert S. McNamara disclosed that the U.S. planes, flying 64 sorties from the 7th Fleet's aircraft carriers *Constellation* and *Ticonderoga* in the Gulf of Tonkin, had destroyed or damaged 25 PT-boats (about 1/2 of the North Vietnamese navy) in raids on naval bases at Hongay, Loc Chao, Phuc Loi and Quang Khe. McNamara said the U.S. planes had virtually destroyed an oil storage depot at Vinh, near Phuc Loi. He said this installation had accounted for about 10% of the country's oil storage facilities and was used as a support facility for the North Vietnamese navy's Soviet-built Swatow-type torpedo boats. McNamara said that 2 of the U.S. planes had failed to return and that 2 had been damaged. One of the missing planes was lost at sea; the other was believed shot down by North Vietnamese anti-aircraft. McNamara said the U.S. planned no further raids unless the U.S. was provoked. He said "no other operations are being carried out by our forces at the present time, other than the continuation of the routine patrol activities" in the gulf of the destroyers *Turner Joy* and the *Maddox*.

McNamara announced that the U.S. was reinforcing its position in the Southeast Asia area in the event of more trouble. Among military moves undertaken: an antisubmarine task force was assigned to the South China Sea; "selected" Army and Marine units had been alerted and were prepared "for movement"; interceptors and fighter-bomber planes from the Philippines were flown to South Vietnam and Thailand; the carrier *Ranger* left San Francisco to join the 7th Fleet in Southeast Asia (its departure was described as "routine deployment").

In a TV interview later Aug. 5, McNamara was questioned as to possible intervention by Communist China or the Soviet Union. He replied: "We are prepared for any action they may take."

A North Vietnamese communiqué Aug. 5 said its anti-aircraft had shot down 5 U.S. planes and damaged 3 others during the U.S. attack. The Communists said one pilot had been captured. The communiqué, asserting that the North Vietnamese were "overjoyed by their successes," said the U.S. planes had been downed near the coastal cities of Vinh, Thanhhoa and Hatinh. The communiqué assailed the raid as "an extremely brazen act of aggression and provocation of U.S. imperialists."

Hanoi's statement charged that the U.S. report of the PT-boat attacks on the 2 American destroyers had been falsified to cover up U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia. North Vietnam had ad-

mitted the Aug. 2 attack on the *Maddox* but said it was in North Vietnamese territorial waters. North Vietnam said the *Maddox* had been part of the U.S. and South Vietnamese naval force that had bombed the North Vietnamese islands of Hon Mé and Hon Ngu July 20. The U.S. had denied attacks on the islands.

Events preceding the U.S. action against North Vietnam:

►The U.S. Defense Department reported Aug. 2 that 3 North Vietnamese PT-boats had fired torpedoes and shells at the 3,300-ton *Maddox* that day while the destroyer was on routine patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters about 30 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. The *Maddox*, undamaged, fought off the attackers with the aid of 4 fighter planes that came to its assistance from the *Ticonderoga*. One PT-boat was put out of action by the destroyer's guns; the 2 other Communist boats were damaged by U.S. aircraft fire.

►Pres. Johnson, in an order issued later Aug. 2 and made public Aug. 3, directed the Navy "to attack any force which attacks" its ships "in international waters and to attack with the objective of not only driving off the force but of destroying it." The President ordered that a 2d destroyer, the *C. Turner Joy*, join the *Maddox* on patrol and that the destroyers be provided with air cover.

►In reporting the 2d Communist naval raid, the Defense Department announced Aug. 4 that an "undetermined number of North Vietnamese PT-boats" had made a "deliberate attack" that day on the *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* about 65 miles off shore. During the clash (reportedly lasting about 3 hours in rough seas) the destroyers and carrier-based planes repelled the attackers and apparently sank 2 of them, the department said. Neither destroyer was damaged.

►The Aug. 2 North Vietnam attack had been sharply protested by the U.S. earlier Aug. 4, just prior to the 2d raid. In a note delivered to Hanoi via the U.S. embassy in Saigon, the U.S. warned North Vietnam of "grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces." The note said the U.S. was determined to have its ships operate "freely on the high seas in accordance with rights guaranteed by international law."

The Defense Department Aug. 3 rejected a Hanoi charge that U.S. planes had attacked North Vietnamese territory Aug. 1. The North Vietnamese protest Aug. 2 said 4 U.S. planes flying from the Laotian village of Nong Het, near the Plaine des Jarres, had attacked the North Vietnamese border post of Nam Can and the village of Noong De. The protest said the Laotian government "must bear heavy responsibility for having allowed the U.S. to use Laotian territory to encroach" on North Vietnam.

LBJ Orders Attack. The U.S. action against North Vietnam had been ordered by Pres. Johnson Aug. 4 and publicly announced by him later that night in a nationwide TV broadcast. Mr. Johnson acted after North Vietnamese PT-boats that day had attacked the *Maddox* (for the 2d time) and the *C. Turner Joy*.

Asserting that "repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply," the President said: "That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air ac-

FACTS ON FILE

World News Digest With Index **FOF**
Published Weekly

Vol. XXIV, No. 1240 July 30-Aug. 5, 1964

Headline News

U.S. planes bombed N. Vietnam, retaliated for attacks on U.S. Navy destroyers.

Ranger 7 took close-up pictures of moon.

Pres. Johnson barred R. F. Kennedy, other cabinet members from Vice Presidential race.

Searchers found bodies of 3 missing civil rights workers in Mississippi.

Jersey City Negroes rioted.

tion is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities which have been used in these hostile operations." "This new act of aggression aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia."

The President said that although the U.S. "full commitment" to South Vietnam "will be redoubled by this outrage," "our response for the present will be limited and fitting." Asserting that "we still seek no wider war," he said he had instructed State Secy. Dean Rusk "to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries, and, indeed, to all."

Mr. Johnson said he had ordered Amb.-to-UN Adlai E. Stevenson to request an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council to hear U.S. charges against North Vietnam. The President said that just before his speech he had spoken to Sen. Barry Goldwater and that the Republican Presidential candidate had "expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight."

(After hearing Pres. Johnson's speech, Goldwater said in a statement in Newport Beach, Calif.: "I am sure every American will subscribe to the actions outlined in the President's statement. . . . We cannot allow the American flag to be shot at . . . if we are to retain our respect and prestige.")

Prior to the address, Mr. Johnson had discussed the crisis at a White House meeting attended by 16 Democratic and Republican Congressional leaders. The President also conferred on the situation at other meetings with Rusk and McNamara and at a regularly scheduled meeting of the National Security Council.

In a speech at Syracuse (N.Y.) University* Aug. 5, Pres. Johnson warned the Communists in Southeast Asia not to "be tempted to support or widen the present aggression" there. Mr. Johnson said: "There is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States. . . . But there can be no peace by aggression, and no immunity from reply. And that is what is meant by the actions we took yesterday." "The challenge that we face in Southeast Asia is the same challenge we have faced with courage and that we

*Mr. Johnson spoke at the dedication of the Samuel I. Newhouse Communications Center.

have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea and in Lebanon and in Cuba." The U.S. was a country united in the face of the latest Communist challenge; "let no friend needlessly fear, and no foe vainly hope, that this is a nation divided in this election year."

UN Meets. The U.S. defended its attack on North Vietnamese territory at an emergency UN Security Council meeting held Aug. 5.

U.S. Amb. Stevenson, who had requested the meeting, declared that the U.S. had "found it necessary to take defensive measures" to counter North Vietnam's "deliberate and repeated attacks" on U.S. naval vessels. Stevenson said the U.S. was in Southeast Asia "to help our friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror or alien assassination managed by the North Vietnam Communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese Communists from Peking."

Soviet delegate Platon D. Morozov said his government "condemns" the U.S. "acts of aggression" against North Vietnam. Morozov submitted a resolution to let a North Vietnamese delegate participate in Council discussions. Morozov also proposed that Council Pres. Sivert A. Nielsen of Norway ask Hanoi to provide the Council with "urgently necessary information relating to the U.S. complaint."

Stevenson accepted North Vietnamese participation in Council debate on condition that South Vietnam also be represented. The Council then adjourned to permit its members to discuss the Soviet resolution informally.

International Reaction. Foreign response to the U.S.' attack on North Vietnam ranged from Communist denunciation of the American action to full support from pro-U.S. powers. Among reactions reported Aug. 5:

►A Chinese Communist government statement said Peiping would not "sit idly by" while the U.S. committed "deliberate armed aggression" against North Vietnam. The U.S.' "wholly premeditated aggression" against Hanoi was tantamount to aggression against China, the statement said. Accusing the U.S. of having gone "over the brink of war," Peiping said that (a) the first Gulf of Tonkin incident was caused by the Maddox intrusion in North Vietnamese waters; (b) the 2d North Vietnamese attack on U.S. vessels never took place, but Pres. Johnson "created the myth of the 2d Tonkin Gulf incident" as an excuse to bomb North Vietnam "and to extend the war in Indochina."

►The Soviet press agency Tass called the U.S. raid "aggressive actions" that could result in "a dangerous exacerbation" of the Southeast Asian situation. It warned that further U.S. "rash steps or provocations" could lead to a "broad armed conflict."

►British Foreign Secy. R. A. Butler said U.S. Navy ships had been "gratuitously attacked" and had "every right on the high seas to defend themselves against their assailants."

►A majority of NATO members supported the U.S. action after Elbridge C. Durbrow, U.S. deputy permanent representative to NATO, reported on the in-

cident at a NATO Council meeting in Paris.

►But the French government did not express approval of the U.S. action. Paris officials said the latest crisis pointed up the necessity of accepting Pres. Charles de Gaulle's repeated calls for an international conference on Southeast Asia.

►A statement issued by South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Khanh's office said: North Vietnam's "2d attack confirms . . . the provocative attitude of the Communists of North Vietnam and Red China"; South Vietnam "supports the [U.S.] firm reaction."

►An Indian government statement issued after an emergency cabinet meeting presided over by Prime Min. Lal Bahadur Shastri said New Delhi was "distressed" and "deeply disturbed" over the U.S.-North Vietnam clashes. The statement expressed "hope that the explosive situation" "will not be further aggravated."

U.S.-South Vietnam Dispute. The U.S.-North Vietnamese clashes had been preceded by sharp U.S.-South Vietnamese debate in July on whether to extend the war to North Vietnam.

U.S. Amb. Maxwell D. Taylor met with Premier Nguyen Khanh in Saigon July 23 and reportedly said that recent South Vietnamese pronouncements and threats of carrying the war beyond South Vietnam's borders were contrary to U.S. policy.

One such warning, made in a South Vietnamese government declaration July 20, had said that "if Communist China and Communist Vietnam obstinately continue their war of aggression, the government and entire people of Vietnam will step up the war . . . until total victory liberates the whole of our national territory."

Taylor also was said to have expressed displeasure with a statement that had been made by Vietnamese Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky at a Saigon news conference July 22. Ky had said his air force was ready to launch bombing attacks against North Vietnam immediately. Ky also said that for the past 3 years South Vietnamese "combat teams" had carried out combat raids inside North Vietnam by "air, sea and land." (The N.Y. Times reported July 23 unofficial evidence indicated "virtually no success" for these raids. "More than 80% of undercover teams were reported to have been apprehended before they had made any progress," the Times said.) Ky asserted that more Vietnamese pilots and infiltration teams were being trained for combat missions against North Vietnam.

During their meeting, Taylor and Khanh were said to have reprimanded Ky. Khanh was said to have assured Taylor that the U.S. and South Vietnam's war policy were basically the same, that their differences centered only on timing and on what to announce publicly. After the meeting the Vietnamese Defense Ministry disavowed Ky's threat to bomb North Vietnam.

In a further explanation of South Vietnam's military policy, Khanh told newsmen July 28 that his régime had "complete freedom of action," inside or outside South Vietnam. Asserting that "we are already victims of North Vietnamese aggression," Khanh said "any response from us would be a counterattack," not aggression.

Vietnamese Civil War. During July the Viet Cong stepped up the rate of its attacks on South Vietnamese villages and troops. As an apparent result of the increased attacks the U.S. was reported July 27 to have committed about 5,000 more men to its 16,000-man military mission in South Vietnam. The reinforcements were to be sent over a period of months. Many were to be used as advisers to South Vietnamese military units. The first contingent was to be a 600-man unit from Okinawa.

Figures released in Saigon July 30 showed that 163 U.S. servicemen had been killed in combat and more than 1,000 wounded in the Vietnamese struggle since Dec. 1961. About 60% of the casualties were officers.

Among developments reported:

One defender was killed and one wounded July 9 when the Viet Cong were repulsed at a small Special Forces forward camp at Plei Jirang in the jungles near the Cambodian border. The attack was the 3d in less than a week on Special Forces camps in the central highlands area.

The Viet Cong were reported July 13 to have captured 570 weapons during a series of victories over government troops. South Vietnamese casualties in the previous week's battles were given as 192 killed and about 75 missing. Viet Cong casualties were estimated at 364 killed and 48 captured. Government forces were reported July 11 to have killed 68 Viet Cong, to have captured 73 and to have suffered the loss of 9 men killed and 28 wounded in fighting on the edge of the Plain of Reeds, 15 miles west of Saigon.

In reportedly the biggest battle of the war so far, the Viet Cong inflicted what was called a staggering defeat on government forces in Chuong Thien Province July 11-12. 200 government troops were reported killed, wounded or captured. A government relief force sent to the rescue was ambushed and battered. More than 1,000 Viet Cong guerrillas attacked a small Mekong Delta outpost and virtually destroyed the nearby village of Vinh Cheo. Lt. Col. Ly Ba Pham, the provincial chief, conceded that "the guerrilla war is over in my province."

South Vietnamese forces reportedly killed more than 100 Viet Cong guerrillas in a battle in the Mekong River delta July 14. Government losses were said to be 17 dead and at least 45 wounded.

Viet Cong and government forces reportedly clashed 15 separate times in central South Vietnam July 15-16. U.S. Air Force planes carried 1,034 combat troops into the battle areas July 15.

The Viet Cong killed 24 children and 16 women in the tiny Mekong River district capital of Cai Be 55 miles southwest of Saigon July 20. 11 government militiamen guarding the outpost were killed and 40 of their dependents wounded. At least 27 Viet Cong guerrillas were reported killed. Government troops were reported to have killed some 100 members of the Viet Cong's 514th and 261st Battalions north of Cai Be July 21 in retaliation for the outpost's massacre. (The South Vietnamese government charged July 31 that the 514th and 261st Battalions were made up of North Vietnamese army regulars and had been directed by Communist Chinese advisers in the Cai Be attack.)

At least 26 government troops were killed, possibly 100 wounded and an estimated 135 captured when the Viet Cong ambushed a truck convoy July 21 in Chong Thien Province about 100 miles south of Saigon.

An American Special Forces enlisted man was killed and a U.S. officer wounded when the Viet Cong ambushed a unit going to a forward outpost in the central highlands July 23.

An estimated 60 guerrillas were killed July 23 when government troops repulsed a Viet Cong ambush of a South Vietnamese mechanized relief force 25 miles northwest of Saigon. 17

FACTS ON FILE is published weekly by Facts on File, Inc., 119 W. 57th St., New York 19, N.Y. (Columbus 5-2011-2). 2d class postage paid at New York, N.Y. Subscription \$120.00 a year; Yearbooks (bound volumes) from 1943-\$30 each. Cumulative Index published twice a month. Copyright 1964 by Facts on File, Inc. Edw. Van Westerborg, President & Treasurer; Lester A. Sobel, Secretary & Editor; Bernard Messenger, Business Manager.

government troops were killed, 34 wounded and 3 reported missing.

A U.S. captain and 9 government troops were reported killed in the jungle near Ben Cat, 30 miles north of Saigon, when Viet Cong machine-gun fire raked a Vietnamese Ranger battalion July 30. About 25 of the Rangers were wounded.

A Viet Cong battalion raided the village of Vinhloc, 4 miles west of Saigon, Aug. 1. Casualties were reported light, and the Viet Cong reportedly abandoned the battle.

A 181-page government report, released July 26, charged that Communist China had increased its military aid to the Viet Cong. The report said: "It is particularly the aid from Communist China that had daily increased the murderous violence of this aggression." "Evidence exists that considerable sums of money, large amounts of arms, and equipment of every kind are sent secretly from the Communist countries to South Vietnam."

It had been reported in Saigon July 25 that Premier Khanh had written personal appeals asking the leaders of 34 nations for material support in the fight against the Viet Cong. He said additional aid was required because "of a considerable expansion of the means and forces brought into play by the aggressors."

The U.S. Military Assistance Command in Saigon July 29 raised its intelligence estimates of Viet Cong strength in South Vietnam. Despite heavy casualties, the Viet Cong were believed to have 28,000-34,000 full-time troops fighting regularly, plus 60,000-80,000 armed guerrillas fighting part-time when not taking care of their rice paddies and village jobs. Viet Cong strength had been estimated in February as 23,000-27,000 regular troops fighting full-time. [See p. 226A1-C2]

French-Vietnam Dispute. Relations between France and South Vietnam continued to deteriorate after Vietnamese students had damaged a French war memorial in Saigon July 20 and had invaded the French embassy in Saigon July 21.

France July 21 vigorously protested the incidents, demanded that the South Vietnamese government pay for the damage and asked for a public apology. The South Vietnam Foreign Ministry responded July 25 with what was called a coldly worded note of regret to the French embassy in Saigon. South Vietnam offered to pay for the damages but explained: "These incidents came about under special circumstances, at a time when the French chief of state had shown sympathy for the neutralization of Vietnam—a policy that Vietnamese public opinion has not ceased to judge incompatible with the higher interests of the nation."

South Vietnamese soldiers, aided by a crane and heavy vehicles, completed the defacement of the French war memorial July 30. France protested again in strong terms, and the South Vietnam Foreign Ministry rejected the new protest in another note to the French embassy in Saigon. The note attributed the memorial's desecration to emotion aroused by French Pres. Charles de Gaulle's July 23 renewed neutralization proposal. The French government replied July 31 in a communiqué asking whether the Khanh régime could be trusted to protect foreigners and their property. The communiqué questioned

South Vietnam's determination to honor its international agreements under the circumstances. (15,000 French citizens still lived in South Vietnam.) [See p. 233F1]

Laotian Civil War. Laotian neutralist forces and pro-Communist Pathet Lao troops resumed heavy fighting in northern Laos in July.

Among major military developments:

A Pathet Lao drive launched July 16 against the neutralist stronghold of Muong Soui, at the edge of the Plaine des Jarres, was reported July 17 to have been blunted by Laotian air force attacks. 2 hours after the pro-Communists had started their drive in the Phou Kout hill area, 7 neutralist T-28 fighter-bombers strafed and bombed Pathet Lao artillery and supply lines. A Laotian Defense Ministry communiqué July 16 said the attack was carried out by 4 Pathet Lao battalions, supported by North Vietnamese troops.

Pro-Communist pressure on Muong Soui was further eased when neutralist troops July 21 ousted Pathet Lao units from Phou Kout and advanced toward the plain. The government success was nullified July 23 as the Pathet Lao recaptured the northern section of the hill. This was the 7th time Phou Kout had changed hands during the year's fighting.

A combined rightwing-neutralist force July 29 achieved what the government called July 30 a major victory over the Pathet Lao by winning complete control of Route 13, the strategic north-south road that linked Luang Prabang, the royal capital, with Vientiane, the administrative capital. (Government forces already were in control of Route 7, which formed a junction with Route 13 in the north, just west of the Plaine des Jarres.) The government drive from the south, which had been launched July 26, forced the Pathet Lao to abandon and destroy their major supply bases at Muong Kassy and Sala Ahou Khoun on Route 13. About 2,000 Pathet Lao troops scattered to both sides of the road and took cover in tangled brush.

Vientiane had reported July 27 the capture of 2 North Vietnamese soldiers in the Route 13 fighting near Pha Home. [See p. 209D2]

A Pathet Lao broadcast announced July 22 that a U.S. Navy airman shot down over Laos during a reconnaissance flight June 6 had confessed guilt. The broadcast quoted Lt. Charles F. Klusmann, 30, as having said: "The foreigners who come to Laos to wage war are crazy. . . . We do not have any reason to send military planes to violate Laotian airspace. . . . I and my friends, in making flights over Laos, are guilty before the Laotian people." [See p. 190G3]

A report by the International Control Commission on Laos warned that the Laotian fighting could "lead to open civil war." The document, made public by the British Foreign Office in London July 24, had been sent to Britain and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on Laos. The report had been signed by the ICC's Canadian and Indian members; Poland, which had boycotted the ICC since May, did not sign. The report further stated that because of "persistent Pathet Lao denials of ready access" by ICC observers "to Pathet Lao-controlled territory, the commission is . . . not able to produce irrefutable evidence to show where responsibility lies for violations of the cease-fire." The report said, however, that Pathet Lao actions in obstructing ICC movements were an indication that the Pathet Lao had "something to hide." [See p. 201G3]

Laos Government Shift. Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma July 29 announced the resignation of 4 cabinet ministers and the appointment of replacements. The resigned ministers had demanded the appointment of more offi-

cial to promote greater efficiency and honesty in government.

The new cabinet appointees (men they replaced in parentheses): Justice Min. Bouvaan Norasing (Khun One Voravong); Culture Min. Oune Heuna Norasing (Bounthou Songvilay); Education & Sports Min. Tay Keo Luankei (Bonthong Voravong); State Secy. for Finances Sisoik Na Champassak (Phongphet Phanarath).

UK-USSR Talks on Laos. British Foreign Secy. Richard Austen Butler conferred in Moscow July 27-31 with Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Foreign Min. Andrei Gromyko on USSR demands for the immediate convening of a 14-nation Geneva conference on Laos to seek a solution to the civil war there.

Butler had scheduled a wide range of talks on international matters with the Soviet leaders, but Laos became the principal topic after a Soviet threat July 25 to withdraw from its responsibilities as co-chairman of the 1962 conference on Laos. In a note to Britain (made public July 26), the USSR had warned that if the U.S. and other Western powers continued to "block" the reconvening of an international meeting on Laos, Moscow would have to "reexamine" its co-chairmanship position, which it shared with Britain.

The Russian demand for the immediate reconvening of the 14-nation Geneva conference remained unchanged after final talks Butler held with Gromyko July 31. Gromyko rejected Butler's suggestion (a reiteration of previous U.S. and British proposals) that the 14-power conference be held only after the Laotian situation had been stabilized by the reestablishment of an effective coalition government, a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Pathet Lao troops to positions they had held prior to the launching of their spring offensive. Gromyko also turned down Butler's suggestion that Britain and the USSR use their good offices to help Laos' 3 political factions meet at a neutral site to resolve their differences. The latter proposal was presented after Butler had received a plea from Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma that Britain and the USSR arrange for a meeting of the rival Laotian factions.

Before leaving Moscow Aug. 1, Butler said Soviet rejection of his proposals had led him to appeal to India and Canada, as members of the International Control Commission on Laos, to help arrange for a meeting of the Laotian leaders. Butler said that despite his plea to the Soviet leaders not to abandon their co-chairmanship of the Geneva conference, Moscow "was not keen on continuing its responsibilities in Laos."

(A communiqué issued Aug. 1 revealed these other aspects of the British-Soviet talks: The need for strengthening the UN's peace-keeping machinery was discussed; the 2 nations favored disarmament and agreed on the necessity of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; Britain and the USSR agreed to start talks soon on a consular convention.)

The Soviet demand for the convening of an immediate conference on Laos was supported by Communist China Aug. 2. In a note to Moscow, Peiping said "it was necessary that the Soviet government should use its capacity and influence as co-chairman of the Geneva conference to persuade the United States to give up its unreasonable conditions and accept . . . the convening of a 14-nation conference." [See p. 201D3]

A Anzus Conference. The U.S., Australia and New Zealand held their annual Anzus ministerial conference in Washington July 17-18. The ministers issued a communiqué expressing "grave concern" about Communist attacks and threats against South Vietnam and Laos and reaffirming support for Malaysia against Indonesia. They denounced "the aggression against South Vietnam which the Communist régime in Hanoi organized and is directing, supplying and supporting in flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962." They "agreed that the defeat of this aggression is necessary not only to the security of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific but as a demonstration that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be allowed to succeed." They reiterated that their 3 nations were prepared to "take further concrete steps" against Communist aggression. [See p. 122C2]

B UN Cambodia Mission. A special 3-man Security Council mission that visited the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border area June 26-July 14 recommended in a report to the Council July 28, that the UN take prompt action to prevent further border clashes.

C The report suggested: (a) Having the border clearly marked to avoid confusion; (b) appointing a top-level UN negotiator "approved by the 2 parties" to bring the South Vietnamese and Cambodian governments together to discuss the frontier problem; (c) urging the 2 governments to resume diplomatic relations; (d) sending teams of unarmed UN civilian observers to Cambodia to see if there were frontier incursions.

D Cambodia had agreed to the UN observer plan. But South Vietnam had insisted, in a proposal unacceptable to Cambodia, that an international police force be established to keep the frontier under surveillance.

The report attributed much of the trouble to Cambodia's neutralism as contrasted with South Vietnam's pro-Western position. [See pp. 225F3, 210A1]

E In a message to the Security Council, made public July 29, Cambodia charged the U.S. and South Vietnam with conducting a chemical warfare campaign that had killed 76 persons in 6 Cambodian villages. The message alleged that airplanes had dropped toxic powder on villages in the Dandaungpich area of Rattanakiri Province June 13 and 20 and July 9, 17, 20, 21, 22 and 23. It called the attacks "part of the chemical warfare that the United States-South Vietnamese forces had hitherto waged only in South Vietnam." It said the Cambodian government had protested to the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments and had appealed for help to the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference, Britain and the Soviet Union.

F The U.S. Aug. 3 denied Cambodia's charges and told the Security Council that it would welcome an impartial investigation. South Vietnam also denied the charges Aug. 3.

G African Summit Meeting

OAU Meets in Cairo. Representatives of the 34-nation Organization of African Unity (OAU) met in Cairo July 17-21 to discuss mutual problems.

Among resolutions approved at the conclusion of the conference July 21:

►Oil-rich African states were urged to bar petroleum shipments to Portugal and South Africa as one way of combating those countries' racial policies. African states were also asked to sever trade relations with the 2 countries and to bar their planes and ships from their airports and harbors.

►The OAU's secretariat was asked to study means of compensating poorer African countries for loss of trade resulting from compliance with OAU-directed boycotts of Portugal and South Africa. (Malawi Prime Min. H. Kamuzu Banda had argued that it would be "economic suicide" for his country to discontinue trade relations with Portugal because products from his land-locked nation had to pass through Portuguese-held Mozambique.)

►"Vigorous and immediate" action was pledged to counter any unilateral decision by the white-dominated Southern Rhodesian government to proclaim its independence with a "European minority government" in control. Britain was urged to convene a conference of all Southern Rhodesian political parties to draw up a constitution "insuring majority rule on the basis of one man, one vote."

Dialla Telli of Guinea was chosen secretary general of a permanent secretariat, which still was to be established. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was selected as the OAU's permanent headquarters.

Among other conference highlights:

►In a welcoming address, UAR Pres. Gamal Abdel Nasser July 17 urged the African leaders to bury their differences in order to achieve a "real spirit of understanding" and "constitutional unity."

►UN Secy. Gen. U Thant, speaking at the opening session, praised the OAU's activities and said the UN "recognizes the value of regional associations" based on the UN Charter.

►A message of Pres. Johnson, read to the conference, lauded the OAU for its "striking progress" and its "capacity to deal through peaceful means with African problems."

►Portugal and South Africa were bitterly attacked by delegates July 18. Nigerian Prime Min. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said the 2 states were "reactionary" "black sheep of the international community." Kenyan Prime Min. Jomo Kenyatta assailed South Africa's *apartheid* policies as "sheer brutality." Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia urged African support of independence movements in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique.

►Ghanaian Pres. Kwame Nkrumah July 19 reiterated his call for a federal union of all African states. Asserting that "it is incredible that imperialists would defy a truly united Africa," Nkrumah said: "Only union can guarantee African survival"; "without it we shall all be colonized again." Nkrumah's proposal was assailed July 20 by Pres. Julius K. Nyerere of the Republic of Tanganyika & Zanzibar. Accusing Nkrumah of preaching rather than practicing unity, Nyerere charged that "this union government business has become a cover for doing some of the most unbrotherly

things in Africa." Nyerere also criticized Nkrumah for refusing to support the OAU's liberation committee.

The OAU conference had been boycotted by the Congo Republic (Léopoldville). Pres. Moïse Tshombe, who had planned to leave for the meeting with Pres. Joseph Kasavubu July 16, said in a statement July 15 that "in the light of the atmosphere that exists in Cairo our country has decided not to participate." The boycott decision was in response to statements in which several African leaders had announced their refusal to participate in a conference that would include Tshombe. (Among those who expressed anti-Tshombe sentiment were Algerian Pres. Ahmed Ben Bella and Nkrumah.) Many African leaders had opposed Tshombe on the ground that he had allegedly been in league with whites during his secessionist activities in the Congo's Katanga Province.

In a further statement on his refusal to attend the meeting, Tshombe July 16 denounced African leaders who "have not yet understood that the Congo is a sovereign and independent nation." Singling out the Algerian president, Tshombe declared: "To Mr. Ben Bella who shouts loudly, I answer with the same force: Do as we have done—liberate your political prisoners." [See pp. 76G3-77B1]

Congo

Rebels Gain. The new Congo régime, headed by Premier Moïse-Kapenda Tshombe, was hardpressed by a continuing revolt in the eastern provinces. The rebels scored gains in July in the face of weak resistance by government troops, and the insurrection spread to Lake Leopold II Province in the west.

Among major developments:

►Rebels in North Katanga Province were reported July 14 to have crossed the Kongolo-Kabalo rail line. This was their deepest penetration of the province since the outbreak of the revolt. Kabolo's capture was reported July 29.

►The East Katanga Province town of Baudouinville was taken by rebel forces June 19.

►Rebel activity spread to Maniema Province, in the eastern region, and the capital city of Kindu was captured July 22. 4 Belgians, including a Roman Catholic missionary, were said to have been slain by insurgents. Rebels also occupied the Maniema Province towns of Punia and Kalima. 4 persons, including 2 Belgians and a Catholic priest, were killed by rebels in Kalima.

►Lake Leopold II Province was invaded the week of July 20 by a group of rebels who reportedly had crossed the Congo River from the neighboring Congo Republic (Brazzaville). The invaders captured the town of Bolobo, about 180 miles north of Léopoldville, but were forced out by government troops July 31. A report from Léopoldville July 29 said that 2 more provincial towns along the Congo River—Kvenmouth and Mushie—had been taken by the rebels. Baron Patrick Nothomb, secretary in the Belgian embassy in Léopoldville, had flown to Mushie July 28. He said he was told by the rebels that they were under the command of the National Liberation

SPACE

Committee, which was directing the uprisings in the eastern provinces.

►Tshombe Aug. 1 showed newsmen and diplomats in Léopoldville weapons and propaganda literature reputedly taken in the recapture of Bolobo. He called them "incontrovertible proof" that Communists and African states were supporting the rebellion. Some of the material was said to have belonged to Col. Vital Pakassa, chief of staff of the "revolutionary forces," who reportedly had made his way back to Brazzaville after the Bolobo attack. Tshombe said his government had evidence that the operations of Pakassa and the National Liberation Committee were financed by the Chinese Communist embassy in Brazzaville. He said the material found in Bolobo included a Mali passport that was made out in the name of a Mali government official but that bore Pakassa's photograph.

(Tshombe's transitional government had been assailed as illegal July 18 by Kivu Province rebel leader Gaston Soumialot. Speaking at a news conference in rebel-held Albertville, Soumialot said that the Congo had no legal government since Cyrille Adoula had resigned as premier June 30. Soumialot criticized Tshombe for not having consulted "with representative parties before forming his government.")

►Stanleyville came under direct rebel threat Aug. 3 as an insurgent force, advancing north from Maniema Province, attacked Congolese troops at Wanie Rukula, 30 miles south of the city.

►The Kivu Province capital city of Bukavu was reported Aug. 3 to be the target of a renewed rebel drive. An insurgent unit was said to be advancing toward Lubongola (80 miles from Bukavu) after having captured Shabunda, 140 miles west of the capital. Kivu Province Interior Min. Dieudonne Boji urged Bukavu residents Aug. 3 to take up arms "to defend yourselves and your province against aggression." Provincial Pres. Simon-Pierre Malago appealed for foreign assistance after conferring with the U.S., Belgian and West German consuls.

Tshombe had held his first meeting with a rebel representative July 22 in an effort to end the uprising. He conferred in Bujumbura, Burundi with Bwimba Focas, reputed minister of youth affairs and sports in Kivu Province's revolutionary government. [See p. 225D2]

Gizenga Released. Leftist leader Antoine Gizenga, 39, was released July 16 by the Tshombe régime from a Congo River island where he had been imprisoned since Jan. 1962. Gizenga, whose Babunda tribal followers were in revolt in Kivu Province, said at a Léopoldville news conference July 17 that he was ready "to work for pacification and reconciliation in the country." Gizenga later toured the city in an auto with Tshombe and Agriculture Min. Albert Kalonji.

Gizenga had served as vice premier in 1960 under the late Patrice Lumumba, the Congo's first premier. Following Lumumba's arrest later in 1960, Gizenga fled and established a rival government in Stanleyville that was recognized by the USSR and other Communist countries. Gizenga was arrested by the central government after his Stanleyville régime collapsed in 1961. [See p. 211A2]

FACTS ON FILE

Ranger Gets Moon Photos. The U.S. *Ranger 7*, launched from Cape Kennedy, Fla., July 28, televised back to earth 4,316 close-up photos of the moon July 31. The pictures were taken and transmitted during the last 18 minutes of the 253,665-mile flight before *Ranger 7* crashed into the surface of the moon northwest of the dry Sea of Clouds.


The *Ranger 7* photos were described by Dr. Gerard P. Kuiper, head of the scientific team assigned to evaluate them, as "1,000 times better than the best photographs" previously taken of the moon through the earth's shifting atmosphere. In the final photo, a crater 1½ foot in diameter was visible. The photos were said to indicate that a large portion of the moon's surface was suitable for manned landings and that it was not covered with a deep layer of dust.

Pres. Johnson called the flight "a basic step forward in our orderly program to assemble the scientific knowledge necessary for man's trip to the moon." The President expressed this view to Dr. William H. Pickering, director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) at Pasadena, Calif., who had phoned Mr. Johnson to report the success of the mission a few minutes after the flight had ended. The JPL, operated by the California Institute of Technology, was under contract to the National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) to manage the *Ranger* project.

After a public briefing by Pickering and Asst. NASA Administrator Homer Newell Jr. at the White House Aug. 1, Mr. Johnson said that although "we started behind in space," "we know this morning that the United States has achieved fully the leadership we sought for free men." The President called the achievement "a victory for peaceful civilian international cooperation," and he noted that "more than 60 countries . . . work for us and work for peaceful progress and work for peaceful uses of outer space." He "thank[ed] them for their tracking stations" and "for their joint participation with us."

Pope Paul VI, at his Castel Gandolfo summer home, lauded the *Ranger 7* achievement Aug. 2 as a "celebration of the development of man's spirit." "We must pray the Lord," the pope said, "that in this progressive conquest of the world of nature, man . . . may understand that . . . the problem of man and the problem of God are not canceled but become more imperious."

Ranger 7, a complicated 806-pound space vehicle equipped with 6 TV cameras, had been launched from Cape Kennedy at 12:50 p.m. EDT July 28 by means of a 2-stage Atlas-Agena-B rocket booster. The lunar probe was first put into a parking orbit around the earth. The engine of the Agena stage shut off briefly as scheduled and then fired again over the South Atlantic to bring *Ranger 7* out of earth orbit and head it toward the moon. These maneuvers were accomplished with such precision that, in its initial trajectory, the spacecraft was on a course that would have brought it crashing into the moon—but on the side hidden from the earth—without further



NASA diagram indicates *Ranger* trajectory and accuracy required. The probe had to be within 5 miles of the center of the "corridor," and it had to travel at between 24,463 and 24,487 mph., or even correction would have been impossible.

course correction. In order to crash-land *Ranger 7* on the visible side of the moon, however, an 88-minute mid-course maneuver was made starting at 6 a.m. July 29; earth-based radio signals altered the space vehicle's attitude, fired a small mid-course rocket and then returned the lunar probe to its proper attitude.

Ranger 7's 6 TV cameras began snapping pictures and televising them back to earth at about 9:08 a.m. July 31 when the spacecraft was some 1,250 miles from the moon's surface. The televising continued until *Ranger 7*, traveling then at about 5,850 mph., crashed on the moon's surface just before 9:26 a.m. and was destroyed. The last picture was taken from an altitude of perhaps 1,000 feet.

The *Ranger 7* flight was the first of 13 U.S. lunar missions to be completely successful. All 6 previous *Ranger* flights (4 on lunar, 2 on non-lunar missions) had been considered at least largely failures.

According to a NASA spokesman's estimate, the *Ranger 7* mission cost about \$28 million. (\$260 million was budgeted for the entire *Ranger* program of 9 space vehicles, including 2 scheduled for launching in 1965.) [See pp. 35F3-36A2, 60E2, 184E1]

NASA to Get \$5.2 Billion. A compromise bill (HR10456) authorizing \$5,227,506,000 for the NASA in fiscal 1965 was passed by voice vote of both houses of Congress July 2 and was signed by Pres. Johnson July 13. The total was \$76,494,000 less than the Administration had requested, \$33,695,000 more than the House had approved in its initial vote on the measure Mar. 25 and \$18,787,250 less than the Senate had voted in its first action.

The bill's biggest item was the full \$2,985,500,000 requested for continued research and development on projects Gemini (\$308,400,000, to put 2-man crews into extended orbit around the earth) and Apollo (\$2,677,500,000, to land Americans on the moon by 1970). \$4,341,100,000 of the full authorization was for research and development, \$262,880,500 for construction of facilities and \$623,525,000 for administration.

Although the Senate had approved its original \$5,246,893,250 version by voice vote June 22, a 2d vote was forced June 24 (and the bill was then passed by 78-3 vote) by Sens. Wayne Morse (D., Ore.) and J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.), who were defeated in their proposal to cut the Apollo authorization by 10%. [See pp. 230A3, 193A-D3, 39E1]

Delta Failure. An attempt to orbit a 120-pound satellite for laser-ray experiments failed after what had appeared to be a successful launching from Cape Kennedy Mar. 19. The satellite was destroyed over the South Atlantic. The failure was due to malfunctioning of the 3d stage of the Delta booster rocket. (The Delta was the U.S.' most successful satellite-launching rocket; satellites had been put into orbit successfully in each of the 22 preceding Delta launchings.) [See p. 36B2]

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Politics

Johnson Bars RFK. Pres. Johnson disclosed July 30 that he had removed Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy from the race for the Democratic Vice Presidential nomination.

The President announced that he felt it would be "inadvisable" to select "any member of my cabinet or any of those who meet regularly with the cabinet" as his running mate. Mr. Johnson said at a hastily arranged TV appearance that he had therefore informed Kennedy, State Secy. Dean Rusk, Defense Secy. Robert S. McNamara, Agriculture Secy. Orville L. Freeman, Amb.-to-UN Adlai E. Stevenson and Peace Corps director Sargent Shriver that they could not be considered for the Vice Presidential nomination. Noting that "the list has been narrowed," the President said: "I shall continue to give the most thoughtful consideration to the choice of the man who I will recommend and I shall make my decision known in due course."

Pres. Johnson had said at a news conference earlier July 30 that he had made no decision on a running mate. He stressed that he was looking for a man "equipped to handle the duties of the Vice Presidency and the Presidency . . . a [man] will be received in all states of the union among all our people . . . [a man] experienced in foreign relations and domestic affairs . . . a man of the people who felt a compassionate concern for their welfare and who enjoyed public service and was dedicated to it . . . [a man] attractive, prudent and progressive . . . [a man who] would meet with overwhelming approval of the delegates . . ."

Pres. Johnson had told Kennedy of his decision July 29 and reportedly had offered Kennedy the job of managing his election campaign. [See p. 86A2]

Goldwater on Vietnam. Sen. Barry M. Goldwater Aug. 3 criticized the Administration's actions in Vietnam. He expressed his views in written answers at his vacation retreat in Newport Beach, Calif., to newsmen's written questions about the attack Aug. 2 by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the U.S.S. *Maddox*.

Goldwater said: "I think the American people are entitled to ask some questions of their own in regard to this event: Does the presence of American destroyers in the area signify the possible landing of larger American ground forces? Does it mean medium bombers are going to be used to interdict supply lines? Does it mean a change is taking place in foreign policy at White House and State Department levels?"

Goldwater indicated that he saw signs the Administration might be adopting his suggestion that the military effort be expanded and Communist supply lines in North Vietnam bombed. [See p. 166C2]

Labor Vs. GOP. The 27-member AFL-CIO Executive Council, meeting in Chicago Aug. 3, denounced the platform adopted by the Republican National Convention as "an insult to the intelligence of the voters."

AFL-CIO Pres. George Meany said the council was "so shocked by the nature of the Republican platform" that it had declared its opposition even before the adoption of the Democratic platform.

The council asserted that the GOP platform departed "from the realities of American society . . . at virtually every point on which the platform is specific." The council especially attacked the Republican platform positions on unemployment, labor-management matters, hospital insurance for the aged, and consumer interests.

Teamsters Joint Council 16, with 167,000 members in the N.Y. City area, pledged July 30 to support Pres. Johnson and whomever he chose as his running mate. Council Pres. John J. O'Rourke announced that the council's executive and advisory boards had made the decision unanimously. "I just can't see anybody supporting Barry Goldwater—especially anybody from the labor field," he declared. [See p. 184C2]

Goldwater Opposed, Backed. Rep. John V. Lindsay (R., N.Y.) charged Aug. 3 that Conservative Party supporters of Goldwater in New York were "bent on a course of destruction in the 17th Congressional District and I have no choice but to fight back with all the strength at my command." He stressed that he could not support Goldwater for President and would seek reelection to a 4th term as an independent Republican. [See p. 236B1]

Sen. J. Glenn Beall (R., Md.), who had said he might not be able to support Goldwater, announced Aug. 1 that a recent conversation with the Republican nominee had "confirmed that my areas of agreement with Sen. Goldwater outnumber my instances of concurrence with the actions and policies of the present administration." Beall, running for reelection, said that he would back Goldwater. [See p. 236D1]

Wallace Quits Campaign. Gov. George C. Wallace (D., Ala.) announced July 19 his withdrawal as a Presidential candidate. He had indicated an intention to run in 16-25 states in an attempt to draw uncommitted state electors of both parties and thus deprive the major candidates of a majority. This could have forced the election into the House

of Representatives. Wallace generally was considered to have had an appeal somewhat similar to Goldwater's for the states-rights, segregationist and "white backlash" votes.

Speaking on the CBS-TV "Face the Nation" program, Wallace said he had accomplished his "mission," which was to "conservatize" the "high councils of both . . . parties." Asked whether his move would help Goldwater, he said he had never met or talked with Goldwater or anyone from Goldwater's staff about his withdrawal.

Goldwater commented that Wallace's move was a "surprise" to him and that "I never gave this Wallace thing much thought." Goldwater had said July 9 that a Wallace candidacy would have "a direct and strong effect on the election outcome." He had said of Wallace July 12: "I would hope in his wisdom—and he is a very able man—I would hope he would withdraw"; "this is the first time in my life that a man has appeared . . . who might put enough votes together to form a 3d party." [See pp. 221E-F1, C2; 158A1; 157D3, C3]

Miller on Riots. Rep. William E. Miller (N.Y.), GOP Vice Presidential nominee, charged in a TV interview Aug. 2 that Democratic political machines were responsible for creating conditions that had caused race riots in Northern cities.

"I think if you had a different environment in New York City than a Tammany Hall administration for 30 years," Miller declared, "you wouldn't have the problem in Harlem you have today." He said most of the rioting had been "occurring in areas and in cities which have been under the control of entrenched Democratic political machines for years and years." He asserted that the machines had created "the frustrations which exist in these large cities."

Miller said that he and Goldwater supported "the right to demonstrate peacefully and the right to picket within the purview of the law." He urged Pres. Johnson to exercise "moral persuasion and moral example" to halt violence instead of being "half wishy-washy" in support of demonstrations.

Miller declined to reject the backing of the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan for the Republican ticket. He explained that he and Goldwater did not believe in making blanket indictments and added: "Any individual has a right to be judged on his own philosophy." [See pp. 244A3-245C3]

Minutemen Back Goldwater. Robert B. de Pugh, national leader of the Minutemen, a militant far-right group with an estimated 25,000 members, was reported July 29 to have said that members would try to infiltrate Pres. Johnson's election campaign headquarters throughout the nation. The idea would be to sabotage the President's campaign and try to win the election for Goldwater. De Pugh asserted that members were already working clandestinely in every county in the U.S., with emphasis on training for guerrilla warfare to restore constitutional government if Communists overran the nation. [See Vol. XXI, pp. 429G3-430A1]

Salinger to Senate. Democratic Gov. Edmund G. Brown of California appointed Democratic Senate nominee Pierre Salinger Aug. 4 to complete the last 5 months of the term of the late Democratic Sen. Clair Engle.

The U.S. Senate Aug. 5 approved Salinger's appointment by 59-29 vote, and he was sworn in. The vote was on straight party lines with 2 exceptions: Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel (R., Calif.) and Sen. Milton R. Young (R., N.D.) sided with the Democratic majority. The Republican minority objected to Salinger's seating on the ground that he was not a legal resident of California and not a registered voter there. The Senate agreed to refer the question to the Subcommittee on Privileges & Elections for a report by Aug. 13.

George Murphy, Salinger's Republican Senatorial opponent in the November election, filed in Los Angeles Superior Court Aug. 5 a suit seeking to invalidate Salinger's interim appointment on the ground that he was not a qualified voter in the state. [See p. 102B3]

Primaries. Among primary election results:

Iowa (June 1)—Gov. Harold E. Hughes (D.), 42, and State Atty. Gen. Evan Hultman (R.), 39, won unopposed elections for their parties gubernatorial nominations. In a 6th Congressional District election, for the seat of retiring Rep. Charles B. Hoeven (R.), Sioux City Mayor Stanley L. Greigg, 31, won the Democratic nomination over 2 opponents; the 7-way Republican race was inconclusive (no candidate got the necessary 35% of the vote).

Montana (June 2)—Gov. Tim Babcock (R.), 44, was unopposed for renomination. The Democratic gubernatorial nomination was won by Dr. Roland R. Renne, 58, ex-president of Montana State College and ex-Assistant Agriculture Secretary. Senate Democratic leader Mika Mansfield, 61, won renomination by a 7-2 margin over ex-Rep. Joseph Patrick Monaghan, 58. The Republican Senatorial nomination was won by State Rep. Alex Blewett Jr., 51.

North Carolina (June 27)—Dan K. Moore, 58, a former state judge, defeated L. Richardson Preyer, 45, a former federal judge, in a Democratic gubernatorial run-off after they had led in a field of 6 in the May 30 primary but had failed to win a majority. The Republican nomination was won May 30 by Robert L. Gavin, 48, in the first GOP gubernatorial primary ever held in the state.

South Dakota (June 2)—The Republican gubernatorial nomination was won by Lt. Gov. Nils A. Boe, 51, with 54.2% of the vote, over ex-Gov. Sigurd Anderson (45.8%). Ex-Lt. Gov. John F. Lindley, 45, won the Democratic gubernatorial nomination over Mitchell Municipal Court Judge Merton B. Tice, 65.4% to 34.6%.

Texas (June 6)—Winners of run-offs: Houston oilman George Bush (62.2%), 39, over Jack Cox (37.8%), 43, unsuccessful 1962 GOP candidate for governor, for the Republican Senatorial nomination; conservative Rep. Joe Pool (57.0%), over moderate Robert W. Baker (43.0%), 43, for the Democratic at-large House seat; conservative state Rep. Eligio (Kika) de la Garza (64.6%), 34, over liberal State Rep. Lindsey Rodriguez (35.4%), for the Democratic nomination in the 15th Congressional District (Rep. Joe M. Kilgore was retiring); conservative Richard White (51.4%), 41, ex-state representative, over liberal state Rep. Malcolm McGregor (48.6%), for the Democratic nomination in the 16th Congressional District.

Republican Energy Policy. A "new and constructive federal" power policy was proposed June 25 by the Critical Issues Council of the Republican Citizens Committee. The policy was drafted by a task force on energy, headed by Lewis L. Strauss. The council called for a detailed study of power generating methods and "due consideration to the demonstrated achievements of private industry" in reducing power costs. "The wise production and use of electrical energy

calls for sound working relationships between private enterprise and government," the council said. [See p. 203C2-B3]

Racial Unrest

Bodies of 3 Found. FBI agents Aug. 4 found 3 bodies in an earth dam recently built 5 miles southwest of Philadelphia, Miss., where 3 civil rights workers had disappeared June 21.

Pathologists and FBI identification experts examined the bodies in Jackson, Miss. Aug. 5 and identified them as those of the 3 missing rights workers, Michael H. Schwerner, 24, and Andrew Goodman, 20, both white and both of N.Y. City, and James E. Chaney, 21, a Negro, of Meridian, Miss.

The *Jackson Daily News* reported that the 3 men had been shot to death and the bullets removed, but the FBI declined Aug. 5 to give the cause of death. County Coroner Fulton Jackson, Sheriff L. A. Rainey, Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price and a 6-man coroner's jury visited the dam site Aug. 4 and 5; Jackson said they were not sure what was the cause of death.

Roy K. Moore, chief of the special FBI field office in Jackson, said Aug. 4 that the bodies were found as the result of weeks of systematic searching throughout the countryside by FBI agents. But there were several reports Aug. 5 that an informer had been paid a reward of \$25,000-\$30,000 to lead FBI agents to the grass-covered graves.

Mississippi Gov. Paul B. Johnson Jr. pledged Aug. 4: "If these are the bodies of the 3 civil rights workers . . . , the investigative forces of the state of Mississippi will exert every effort to apprehend those who may have been responsible for their deaths." [See pp. 213B3-214D2]

Jersey City Riots. Racial violence flared in Jersey City, N.J., late Aug. 2 after a rumor of police brutality against a Negro who had just been arrested. Widespread looting and clashes between Negroes and police were reported in 3 separate outbreaks of violence during the night. Violence was repeated Aug. 3 and 4. At least 56 persons were injured, including 22 policemen and a Negro youth who was shot and seriously wounded. 36 persons were arrested. 68 stores were damaged and 18 looted.

(About 50,000 of Jersey City's 300,000 residents were Negroes, and there were

repeated charges of police brutality made by Negroes. The city had been declining economically for more than 30 years.)

Mayor Thomas J. Whelan Aug. 3 called the riot an "isolated incident" caused by hooligans. But Police Lt. Raymond Blaszak said the rioting had been planned in advance by young agitators.

Negro leaders, clergymen and city officials met the evening of Aug. 3 to discuss means of averting a repetition of the rioting. But the meeting ended quickly, and Whelan said: "As far as I am concerned they [the Negroes] presented us no formal demands."

Rioting broke out again that evening on a more violent scale, and Negroes concentrated on attacking policemen and whites instead of looting stores. Youths threw bricks, stones and Molotov cocktails at policemen, and policemen fired shots into the air. Teams of civic leaders, Negro lawyers, clergymen, and representatives of CORE and the NAACP tried to persuade the rioters to disperse. An estimated 450 policemen from Jersey City and surrounding communities tried to quell the rioting. Policemen from N.Y. City were reported in the area as observers to see whether any of the persons involved in the recent New York riots were instigating the Jersey City violence.

Whelan declared at a news conference Aug. 4: "To all Negroes in Jersey City, may I say that I not only sympathize with your cause—I support it. But I will neither support nor tolerate outbreaks of violence or terror by any citizen or any group of citizens, . . . black or white. . . . This is . . . hoodlumism versus law and order, and I am determined that law and order will win."

Scattered violence on a smaller scale took place the evening of Aug. 4. Roving groups of Negroes threw Molotov cocktails in the streets and there was some gunfire by policemen.

Whelan met with a delegation of clergymen Aug. 5, and they said afterwards that they had been encouraged by his willingness to listen to their point of view. But Fred Martin, the city's only Negro councilman, accused Whelan of actually prolonging the riots. Martin charged: "Whelan and his boys . . . think they can still get away with the police beating the hell out of Negroes with clubs. Well, they can't. . . . When things calm down again, we're going to hit him on everything—schools, housing,

U.S. Treasury Statement

	June	June 1963	Fiscal Year 1964	Fiscal Year 1963
Total deposits	\$ 14,590,772,615	\$ 13,014,258,066	\$128,338,123,795	\$120,541,525,144
Net deposits	\$ 14,179,772,257	\$ 12,651,311,429	\$121,192,565,659	\$113,991,192,269
Indiv. income taxes:				
Withheld	3,862,532,052	3,460,461,200	54,240,889,707	50,443,255,601
Other	1,915,139,356	1,865,083,636	16,124,155,712	15,142,129,550
Corp. income taxes	6,158,162,805	5,429,802,179	24,290,887,998	22,283,596,023
Excise taxes	1,229,573,307	1,189,617,110	13,894,166,793	13,347,419,784
Customs	120,908,738	89,072,045	1,285,324,443	1,237,182,654
Net withdrawals	\$ 9,151,876,763	\$ 7,850,286,944	\$123,593,060,878	\$118,076,644,550
Military (including military foreign aid)	3,756,024,083	3,196,992,717	49,978,959,951	50,412,439,056
Economic foreign aid	155,208,722	148,787,616	1,934,463,648	1,985,509,431
Veterans	430,925,313	451,762,284	5,337,966,814	5,229,990,932
Interest on public debt	437,959,964	381,167,161	8,263,962,831	7,628,219,580
Increase in public debt			5,138,233,393	6,584,285,474
Decrease in public debt	534,106,923	418,703,747		

Gross public debt and guaranteed obligations \$311,810,858,314 (including \$311,449,140,766 statutory limitation); previous year \$305,391,718,570
 Gold reserve \$15,461,239,587; previous year \$15,733,068,381
 Treasury balance \$11,140,567,950; previous year \$12,297,269,030

jobs, everything. We're not going to let him get off the hook."

Raymond A. Brown, head of the Jersey City NAACP chapter, asserted Aug. 5 that Whelan and the clergymen "have been blinded to the fact that this is a group of kids making a protest against terrible conditions in the only way they know how."

The city was reported comparatively peaceful the evening of Aug. 5. [See Vol. XXIII, p. 442B3]

N.Y. Riots Sequel. Following the wave of racial violence in N.Y. City, Mayor Robert F. Wagner July 31 proposed a program to cope with Negro problems.

The Wagner plan made no mention of the civilian police review board urged by civil rights leaders or of their demands that Police Lt. Thomas R. Gilligan be suspended for shooting and killing a Negro youth July 16. Instead, the mayor recommended an economic program calling for the creation of about 1,500 temporary and permanent city jobs for unemployed youths. He also agreed to establish a committee to review the findings of Deputy Mayor Edward F. Cavanagh Jr., who had been ordered to check on the actions of the police department's review board.

The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. said in Atlanta July 31 that he was "very sorry" Wagner had not followed his suggestion to create an independent board to investigate charges of police brutality. [See p. 245B3]

L. Joseph Overton, president of the Unity Council of Harlem Organizations, renewed July 31 a demand for a police review board that would have no association with the city government or the police. "He [Wagner] has made it virtually impossible for me to guarantee continued peace on the streets of Harlem," Overton asserted.

A N.Y. County grand jury Aug. 5 indicted William Epton, 32, chairman of the Progressive Labor Movement in Harlem, on charges of advocating the overthrow of the N.Y. State government by force and violence and of calling for the killing of police officers and judges. He was charged with advocating criminal anarchy.

(Gus Hall, leader of the U.S. Communist Party, had denounced Epton July 30 and had said Epton had been expelled from the CP several years ago.) [See p. 245E2-A3]

Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, director of Harlem Youth Opportunities, Inc. (HARYOU), resigned July 30. He accused Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (D., N.Y.) of seizing control of Harlem's \$110 million HARYOU-ACT (Associated Community Teams) anti-poverty drive to use it for his own purposes. [See p. 237B2]

Leaders Urge 'Moratorium.' 4 Negro leaders July 29 signed a statement calling upon Negroes to observe a "broad curtailment if not total moratorium" on mass demonstrations until after the Nov. 3 Presidential election.

The statement declared: "Our own estimate of the present situation is that it presents such a serious threat to the implementation of the Civil Rights Act . . . that we recommend a voluntary, temporary alteration in strategy and procedure."

The 4 leaders denounced rioting and looting by Negroes "in several urban areas." They called on Negroes to stress voter registration and political activity. "We believe that racism has been injected into the campaign by the Gold-water forces," they declared.

The 4 signers were Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Whitney M. Young Jr. of the National Urban League and A. Philip Randolph of the Negro American Labor Council.

John Lewis of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and James Farmer of CORE refused to sign the statement. Farmer said July 31: "People must be allowed to protest, must be allowed to demonstrate"; his group "will be engaged in all the necessary non-violent action to support" a move to seat an integrated Mississippi delegation at the Democratic National Convention.

FOREIGN

Dominican Republic. Manuel Enrique Travares Espaillat, the sole remaining member of the triumvirate that took power in the Sept. 1963 military coup, resigned from the Dominican Republic's ruling 3-man civilian directorate June 27. Directorate Pres. J. Donald Reid Cabral and 3d directorate member Ram6n Caceres Troncoso announced the resignation June 28. [See p. 126C3]

Morocco. The government reported June 12 that 9 men had been killed and 4 wounded in a clash in East Morocco June 9 between Moroccan security forces and 20 armed Moroccans who had crossed the border from Algeria. Pres. Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria assured King Hassan II of Morocco June 14 that there would be no more incidents of Moroccan subversives from Algeria entering Morocco.

19 Moroccan subversives had been captured after crossing the border into Morocco June 2 and 9. A military tribunal in Oujda, Morocco, convicted 6 of them June 22 of threatening internal and external state security; it sentenced the 6 to death. [See p. 85B2]

Tunisia. The National Assembly May 11 passed a government bill providing for the nationalization by the end of 1964, at government assessments, of 750,000 acres of farmland, of which 90% was owned by French individuals or French companies and 10% by Italians and Maltese. The French government suspended economic aid to Tunisia May 12 in retaliation. [See Vol. XXIII, p. 328C2]

United Arab Republic. Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, 45, was sworn in as first vice president in Heliopolis Mar. 25. Zacharia Mohieddin, Hussein el-Shafei and Hassan Ibrahim were simultaneously sworn in as vice presidents.

Pres. Gamel Abdel Nasser Mar. 25 named Ali Sabry as premier and created 11 deputy premierships in the cabinet. He made these appointments of deputy premiers:

Financial & Economic Affairs—Dr. Abdul Meim el-Kaissouny; Industry & Mineral Wealth—Dr. Aziz Sidky; Culture, Tourism & National Guidance—Dr. Abdel Kader Hatem; Scientific Affairs—Kamal Rifaat; Local Administration & Services—Abbas Redwan; Justice, Labor & Youth—

Dr. Nour Eddine Tarraf; Religious Affairs—Ahmad Abdul el-Sharabasy; Supply & Internal Trade—Dr. Kamal Ramzy; Sino; Communications Affairs—Dr. Mustafa Khalil; Agriculture & Irrigation—Abdul Mohsen Abu Elnur.

Foreign Min. Mahmoud Fawzi was named a deputy premier, and Amb.-to-UN Mahmoud Rad was named foreign minister. [See Vol. XXII, p. 358G1-D2]

The UAR June 14 raised Suez Canal ship tolls a minimum of 1%, effective June 29. The increase would be higher for bigger ships. Canal Authority Chairman Mahmoud Younis said rising costs and a desire to have larger ships pay a proportionately larger share of canal improvement costs necessitated the increase. He estimated that the toll increases would yield an annual extra revenue of \$3½ million in addition to the current \$150 million. It was the first toll increase since Egypt nationalized the canal in 1956. [See Vol. XXII, p. 287C3]

MISCELLANEOUS

Cohn Acquitted. A federal jury in N.Y. City July 16 acquitted Roy M. Cohn and Murray E. Gottesman of charges that they had tried to obstruct a federal investigation of a \$5 million stock swindle. Cohn had been charged with perjury and obstruction of justice, Gottesman with perjury. The trial had lasted 27 days. [See p. 128C2]

Women Make World Solo Flights. Mrs. Jerrie Mock, 38, of Columbus, O. completed the first world solo flight by a woman Apr. 17 in the single-engine Cessna 180 *Spirit of Columbus*. She covered 22,858.8 miles in 29 days and made 21 stops. Her trip began and ended in Columbus. Pres. Johnson awarded the FAA's Gold Medal Award to Mrs. Mock in Washington May 4 and named her vice chairman of the FAA's Women's Aviation Advisory Committee May 5.

The 2d world solo flight by a woman was completed May 12 in Oakland, Calif. by Joan Merriam, 27, of Long Beach, Calif. in a twin-engine Piper Apache. Miss Merriam flew the route begun in 1937 by Amelia Earhart. She traveled 27,750 miles in 56 days with 28 stops.

OBITUARIES

Sen. Clair Engle, 52, Democratic Senator from California since 1959, U.S. House member 1943-59; July 30 in Washington after an 11-month illness necessitating brain surgery. (Engle had appeared in the Senate June 10 and 19 in a wheelchair to cast his vote for cloture on the civil rights bill debate and June 26 to vote for the bill's passage.) [See pp. 205E1, 184G3]

James McCauley Landis, 64, Presidential adviser to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman and John F. Kennedy, dean of Harvard Law School 1937-46; found drowned July 30 in his swimming pool in Harrison, N.Y. (Appointed to the FTC in 1933, Landis became an SEC member in 1934 and served as its chairman 1935-37. He was appointed director of the Office of Civil Defense in 1942, served as CAB chairman 1946-47. He assisted President-elect Kennedy in 1960 by drawing a report on federal regulatory agencies. He was convicted in Aug. 1963 of income-tax evasion.) [See Vol. XXIII, p. 428D3]

seized all major government buildings, banks, cable offices and other facilities. They surrounded the homes of prominent officials of the coalition régime, among them Premier Souvanna, the leader of Laos' neutralist faction. Several neutralist leaders were reported to have been arrested. Although gun battles were said to have taken place between the rebel troops and neutralist soldiers, only 2 soldiers were reported killed during the action. The rightists were said to have completed their seizure of the capital within 2 hours.

The rightist coup came only 24 hours after the collapse of another attempt to settle the continued differences between the coalition's 3 factions—the rightists, neutralists and pro-Communist Pathet Lao movement. The leaders of the 3 factions, Prince Souvanna, Gen. Phoumi Nosavan of the rightist group and Prince Souphanouvong of the Pathet Lao, had met Apr. 17 in the Plaine des Jarres area of north-central Laos. Their talks, which had been expected to produce an agreement under which Souphanouvong and other Pathet Lao leaders would end their self-imposed exile in northern Laos, and rejoin the Vientiane coalition, collapsed Apr. 18 when the rightists refused to agree to Pathet Lao proposals that the seat of government temporarily be shifted from Vientiane 110 miles northward to Luang Prabang, Laos' royal capital.

Souvanna, in a statement issued Apr. 18 after the collapse of the Plaine des Jarres meeting, declared that on his return to Vientiane he would report to King Savang Vathana that the talks had proven "the impossibility of resolving the Laotian problem." He added that at the same time he would submit his resignation as premier of the coalition government. "There is nothing more to say," he said.

In one of its first communiqués issued after taking control of Vientiane, the rightist group, known as the Revolutionary Committee of the National Army, broadcast what purported to be Souvanna's resignation as premier. The statement cited Souvanna's repeated assertions that he would resign unless he was able to settle Laos' internal political problems. It concluded: "I resign and give my power to the Revolutionary Committee of the National Army."

The Revolutionary Committee Apr. 19 broadcast proclamations in which it imposed a "state of siege," gave its troops the right of unlimited search and seizure and forbade all political meetings or demonstrations. The committee insisted that it had acted only after the Souvanna coalition had exhausted all possibilities of a settlement of differences within the coalition framework. It asserted that its aims were to "achieve national harmony and improve the standard of living of the population."

The committee disclosed that its membership consisted of 76 officers, 18 of them generals. The rebel group's leadership was said to be in the hands of an executive committee of 15 officers headed by Kouprasith as president and Gen. Siho Lamphoukatoul, chief of Laos' security police, as vice president. Gen. Phoumi was not a member of either group and was not believed to have been a partici-

pant in the coup despite his position as leader of the rightist faction.

(The coup was denounced Apr. 19 by the U.S. as a violation of the 1962 Geneva accords providing for Laos' independence and neutrality under the tripartite coalition government. A formal declaration delivered to Kouprasith by U.S. Amb.-to-Laos Leonard Unger said that the U.S. was "opposed to any seizure of power and urges immediate release of all neutralists as a first step toward restoring the situation." The U.S. intervention, supported by Britain and France, was reported to have swayed the rightists from their stated intention to replace the coalition, and it was reported from Vientiane Apr. 22 that the rebel committee had agreed to restore Souvanna at the head of a new coalition government on condition that he first resigned and dissolve the deposed government.) [See pp. 65D3, 15F1]

Manila Conference. The Ministerial Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) held its 10th annual meeting in Manila Apr. 13-15. The conference was marked by opposition within SEATO to France's proposals for neutralization of Southeast Asia.

France abstained from voting on a section of a final communiqué issued Apr. 15 that pledged SEATO support for South Vietnam against the Viet Cong guerrillas. The section was approved by Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and the U.S. It said: The SEATO Council "agreed that defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of Vietnam but to that of Southeast Asia. . . . The council agreed that members of SEATO should remain prepared . . . to take further concrete steps with their respective capabilities in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty." The communiqué accused North Vietnam of directing, supplying and supporting the Viet Cong.

Foreign Min. Maurice Couve de Murville, head of the French delegation, voted for the rest of the communiqué, which expressed SEATO determination to oppose overt Communist aggression in the area covered by SEATO.

At the opening meeting of the council's closed session Apr. 13, Couve de Murville praised U.S. support of Saigon's war effort but said he did not think South Vietnam could defeat the guerrillas. He based his doubts on what he called lack of public support for Premier Nguyen Khanh's régime and its failure to exert national authority.

Couve de Murville called for a "political solution" in Vietnam. (A spokesman later said this statement was, in effect, a plea for Pres. de Gaulle's neutralization proposal.)

U.S. support for Premier Khanh and Saigon's war effort was expressed by State Secy. Dean Rusk. Conceding that the Viet Cong had captured large Vietnamese areas, Rusk said the U.S. was committed to supporting the war against the guerrillas. He said the U.S. did not rule out the possibility of extending the conflict to North Vietnam.

France's neutralization proposals were attacked at the Apr. 14 meeting by Australian Foreign Min. Sir Garfield Barwick. Barwick said that in seeking clarification

of the plan he found it to be a generalized concept. Publicizing the proposal at this time could harm South Vietnam's struggle against the Viet Cong, Barwick said. [See Vol. XXIII, p. 127A2]

Rusk in Vietnam. State Secy. Rusk visited South Vietnam Apr. 17-20 to emphasize U.S. support of Premier Khanh and his régime's war against the Viet Cong.

(Rusk arrived from Manila where he had attended the SEATO conference Apr. 13-15. Before coming to Saigon, Rusk had stopped in Formosa and conferred with Chinese Nationalist Pres. Chiang Kai-shek. Rusk had assured Chiang that U.S. support of his government against Communist China remained unchanged.)

On arriving in Saigon Apr. 17, Rusk declared in an airport statement: South Vietnam and its allies must defeat Communist efforts to "impose their own misery on you." "I am here to make it clear once again that we shall help you to do it." Peace would come to South Vietnam "when Hanoi and Peking have been taught to leave their neighbors alone."

Rusk was briefed later by Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge, Gen. Paul D. Harkins, chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, and CIA and other U.S. officials. Rusk Apr. 18 discussed the Vietnamese and Southeast Asian situation during a meeting in Saigon with Khanh, Lodge, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army chief of staff, and Asst. State Secy. (for Far Eastern Affairs) William P. Bundy. Rusk, accompanied by Khanh, Lodge and Wheeler, later toured the northern province of Ninh Thuan. In a visit to the fortified hamlet of Phuoc Hung, Rusk told villagers that "we are comrades in your struggle" against the Viet Cong. "Some day that régime in Hanoi will disappear and you and your brothers in the north will be able to join in a free and democratic Vietnam."

Prior to leaving South Vietnam, Rusk said in an airport statement Apr. 20 that he and Khanh had discussed ways in which the U.S. could bolster its assistance to his régime. Rusk said he was "impressed by the military, economic and social programs instituted by Gen. Khanh."

Rusk returned to Washington Apr. 20 and reported to Pres. Johnson. Following the White House meeting, Rusk said South Vietnam might ask several of the U.S. allies for military advisers to assist in the war against the Viet Cong. (In addition to U.S. military advisers, the Saigon régime was aided by a 30-man Australian mission and 10 British officers.) [See p. 83A2]

Nixon for Attack in North. Ex-Vice Pres. Richard M. Nixon, returning Apr. 15 from a 24-day trip throughout Asia, proposed extending the war in South Vietnam into North Vietnam and Laos. Arriving in New York from Tokyo Apr. 15, Nixon told reporters that "we should strengthen our policy toward Communist

FACTS ON FILE is published weekly by Facts on File, Inc., 119 W. 57th St., New York 19, N.Y. (Columbus 5-2011-2). 2d class postage paid at New York, N.Y. Subscription \$120.00 a year; Yearbooks (bound volumes) from 1945-49 each. Cumulative Index published twice a month. Copyright 1964 by Facts on File, Inc. Edw. Van Westenberg, President & Treasurer; Lester A. Sobel, Secretary & Editor; Bernard Messinger, Business Manager.

activities in Asia rather than move along the lines suggested by Sen. [J. W.] Fulbright." [See p. 100G3]

In a speech before the N.Y. Chamber of Commerce Apr. 16, Nixon called for military action against Communist bases in North Vietnam and Laos and said the "enemy can no longer have privileged sanctuary." He said that any softening of U.S. policy toward Communist China would be the "straw that broke the camel's back in Southeast Asia." The U.S. "has gone too far in catering to neutrals," he declared.

In Washington Apr. 18, Nixon said in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors that South Vietnamese troops should go "in hot pursuit" of Communist guerrillas into Laos and North Vietnam. To win the war there, the initiative must be carried north, he asserted.

During his Asian tour, described as a "business trip," Nixon gave press conferences in Beirut, Lebanon Mar. 23, Saigon, South Vietnam Apr. 1 and Hong Kong Apr. 4. In Saigon he also conferred with Amb.-to-South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge. Among his comments:

In Beirut—"It is inappropriate to discuss foreign policy when abroad. There are differences but I will not engage in criticism."

In Saigon—The Administration policy there was "inconsistent, improvised and uncertain." [See p. 114E3]

(Before his trip, Nixon appeared on the NBC-TV "Today" program Mar. 6 and said he was not a candidate for President or Vice President but would accept the Vice Presidential nomination if his party asked him to. He told newsmen at a press conference in Newark, N.J. Mar. 11 that as "titular leader" of the Republican Party he would "bring the case home" against Pres. Johnson and that "there is no man in this country who can make a case against Mr. Johnson more effectively than I can.") [See pp. 78A1,70E3]

Cambodian Issue. French Pres. Charles de Gaulle offered France's help to Cambodia Mar. 24 in arranging international guarantees of Cambodia's borders and its neutrality.

In a letter (published Mar. 25) to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodian chief of state, de Gaulle said he would urge the U.S. and Britain to agree to a new Geneva conference with Russia and Communist China participating. He advised Sihanouk, however, to first seek a settlement of Cambodia's border problems through direct talks with South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. De Gaulle's letter was in reply to a message in which Sihanouk had sought French support for a 14-nation Geneva conference on Cambodia's political future.

Foreign Min. Maurice Couve de Murville told the French National Assembly Apr. 3 that the de Gaulle government supported the calling of an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's independence and neutrality. He said France was willing to act as an intermediary between Cambodia and the other governments concerned.

The U.S. and Britain had advocated talks among the U.S., Cambodia, South Vietnam and Thailand on the frontier disputes before the convening of a new

Geneva conference. Sihanouk said Mar. 25 that he would agree to send a Cambodian delegation to Saigon for bilateral talks with South Vietnam if the U.S. and Britain would accept Cambodia's proposal of a Geneva conference. South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Khanh said Mar. 28 that he would welcome the reopening of negotiations with Cambodia, but he objected to the linking of border talks with a Geneva conference.

Sihanouk Mar. 30 reportedly abandoned the Apr. 15 deadline he had set for a Geneva conference. He had threatened that, if the deadline were not met, he would negotiate guarantees of Cambodia's frontiers through Peking with pro-Communist forces—the Viet Cong of South Vietnam and the Pathet Lao of Laos.

Cambodian sources reported in Phnompenh Apr. 6 that a military mission led by Defense Min. Lt. Gen. Lon Nol had met in Peking with Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and had exchanged guarantees of support in case of war. (Nol arrived in Moscow Apr. 6 simultaneously with the USSR's announcement that it would build a large hydroelectric plant on the Kamohai River in Cambodia.) [See p. 76G1-A3]

Kashmir

Abdullah Released. Sheik Mohammed Abdullah (the "Lion of Kashmir"), 59, ex-prime minister of the Indian-held part of Jammu and Kashmir, was released by India Apr. 8 after having been imprisoned since 1953 (he had been allowed 5 months of freedom in 1958).

Abdullah was freed after a Jammu judge acquitted him and 13 other defendants of conspiracy charges that stemmed from Abdullah's advocacy of a plebiscite to determine Kashmir's future. Abdullah favored an independent state completely free of India, which controlled 2/3 of Kashmir, and of Pakistan, which ruled the remaining part. India opposed a plebiscite on the ground that Kashmir was an integral part of India. Abdullah's acquittal came after the prosecution withdrew its charges against the 14 defendants for "reasons of state."

Among those freed with Abdullah was Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, finance minister in Abdullah's former cabinet and a founder of the Plebiscite Front party.

Abdullah, a Moslem, reiterated his original demands for a plebiscite, with some qualifications, in a series of statements made following his release. Abdullah said at a gathering of 15,000 persons in Jammu Apr. 9 that Kashmiris themselves must decide "what is in your best interest." Abdullah had said at a news conference earlier Apr. 9 that he would favor an Indian-Pakistani negotiated settlement "if some people believe" a plebiscite "will create a problem." Abdullah said Apr. 10 that he favored a Pakistani proposal that he discuss the matter with Pakistani Pres. Mohammad Ayub Khan. "Let us find out what Pakistan wants," he declared. "There are 3 parties to the Kashmir dispute: India, Pakistan and the people of this state." He had said Apr. 9 that the dispute should be negotiated and that

"no party should come away . . . with a sense of defeat."

Abdullah's statements on Kashmir were assailed Apr. 11 by Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indian minister without portfolio. Shastri said that Abdullah "has freedom of speech, but there should be no freedom to preach some kind of independence or Kashmir's getting out of this country." India would not "allow that kind of propaganda," Shastri said, but "except for that, Sheik Abdullah will have complete freedom." Kashmir's accession to India "is irrevocable," Shastri declared.

Alluding to Shastri's remarks, Abdullah said Apr. 13 "if this is the Indian government's attitude what is the purpose of my visiting Delhi?" Abdullah had been invited to New Delhi Apr. 26 to confer with Indian Prime Min. Nehru.

Asserting that Kashmir must "win the right of self-determination," Abdullah, in a speech to 40,000 persons at Anantnag Apr. 17, opposed India's position that "Kashmir is an undetachable part of India."

Abdullah returned to his home city of Srinagar Apr. 18 and was greeted by 250,000 persons, many of whom carried placards demanding a plebiscite. [See p. 67C1; Vol. XXI, 497B3]

Cyprus

UN Gets Turkish Protest. Turkey charged in a note to UN Secy. Gen. U Thant Apr. 15 (made public Apr. 20) that Greek Cypriot government acts against the Turkish minority on Cyprus posed "a continuing danger to international peace and security." The note, filed by Turkish UN delegate Orhan Eralp, warned that Ankara would submit the matter to the UN Security Council "if the above-mentioned danger to peace shows no sign of being abated."

In his note Eralp said: Greek Cypriots had attacked the Turkish minority on 5 occasions since the UN peace-keeping force was authorized Mar. 4 to help restore order; there had been other incidents involving "murder, abduction, looting and wanton and systematic destruction of private property"; "Greek Cypriot authorities" were "harassing and rendering helpless and hopeless the Turkish community on the island" in a policy of "piecemeal annihilation"; Greek Cypriot armed "irregular bands," posing falsely as "security forces," were "a grave danger to peace"; the forcible exclusion from the Cypriot government of Vice Pres. Fazil Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, and of 3 Turkish Cypriot cabinet members made the current Nicosia régime unlawful; Pres. Makarios' statements on his recent trip to Athens proved that he had "now finally discarded the pretense of 'independence for Cyprus,' 'self-determination' and all the other stepping stones to his ultimate objective of union with Greece." [See p. 113E2-D3]

Greece Apr. 20 charged Ankara with persecution of the Orthodox Church in Turkey. Foreign Min. Stavros Costopoulos said that 2 Orthodox bishops in Istanbul had been deprived of their Turkish citizenship and ordered to leave the country and that 4 more bishops faced ouster. All were members of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's executive body.

— WORLD AFFAIRS —
Southeast Asia

U.S. War Warnings. The U.S. State Department asserted June 22 that world Communist leaders were fully aware of the U.S.' determination to resist aggression in Southeast Asia. Reiteration of this U.S. policy in a department statement was designed to dispel any doubts as to the U.S.' commitments in the area and, thereby, to avert "another Korea."

In a formal statement, the department said: "There can be little doubt in the minds of the Communist leaders . . . that we are prepared to help the Vietnamese repel Communist aggression. Our support to Thailand is equally clear. We have provided military assistance to Thailand for some time, while also helping the Thai government build its military capacity. Our position with respect to Laos is equally clear."

The statement was issued in answer to a question as to the possibility of a major war in Southeast Asia.

The U.S.' determination to prevent a Communist take-over of Southeast Asia reportedly had been conveyed to French Pres. Charles de Gaulle by U.S. State Undersecy. George W. Ball in Paris June 5, to Communist China through British diplomatic channels and by Danish Premier Jens Otto Krag to Soviet Premier Khrushchev during Khrushchev's recent visit to Denmark. [See p. 190F2-A3]

(It was reported that U.S. officials had informally urged newsmen to stress that U.S. policy in Southeast Asia was tantamount to an unlimited commitment to bar Communist aggression in the area. This policy was seen as similar to the U.S. position on defending West Berlin.)

Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, declared in Taipei, Formosa June 20 that the U.S. was "willing to risk war with Communist China because we believe too strongly it cannot and must not win." Asked whether he believed the U.S. was ready to risk full-scale conflict to halt Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia, Felt answered: China "will not risk going to war with the United States . . . because they know how strong we are. Now you asked if we were willing to risk—yes."

Asst. State Secy. (for Far Eastern affairs) William P. Bundy had warned that if Pathet Lao forces in Laos gained a decided military advantage, "the only response we would have would be to put our own forces in there." Bundy's statement was made in testimony May 4 (made public June 18) before the House Appropriations subcommittee that was holding hearings on Pres. Johnson's \$3½ billion foreign aid program. Bundy predicted that the U.S. would "drive the Communists out of South Vietnam" even if it meant eventually "attacking the countries to the north." [See p. 169A1-D2]

U.S. Bolsters Position. The U.S. was strengthening its military posture in Southeast Asia by a series of moves that included (a) sending more arms and equipment to its military supply base in Thailand and (b) building a powerful forward air base in South Vietnam.

Reinforcement of U.S. supplies in Thailand was disclosed by the Defense Department June 20. A department spokesman said tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks and other military equipment were being sent to "resupply and replace" matériel that had been sent to Thailand during the 1962 Laotian crisis. The department spokesman described the shipment as routine.

(The U.S. reported June 22 that it was helping Thailand build 2 roads linking the strategic Laotian border area in the north with Thailand's principal road network. The \$11 million project was being financed equally by Thailand and the U.S. Agency for International Development.)

The N.Y. Times reported June 22 that the U.S. was building a huge Air Force base at Danang, South Vietnam to put the U.S. in a strategic position to cope with any possible full-scale military move by Communist China. The base was about 350 miles north of Saigon and 160 miles from the Chinese island of Hainan. It would be capable of handling the largest jet planes. Although unfinished, the base was already servicing F-100 jet fighters.

U.S. Laos Flights Debated. Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma June 22 upheld the U.S.' reconnaissance flights over Laos. The flights had established North Vietnamese military presence in Laos, he declared. Souvanna said "recent aerial photographs taken over the Plaine des Jarres and in the Valley of Pugia [20 miles northeast of Khang Khay] constitute an excellent reply" to North Vietnam's protest against the flights.

North Vietnam's rôle in the Laotian civil war had been assailed by Souvanna in a letter sent to Britain and the Soviet Union June 15 (made public June 19). Souvanna charged that Hanoi and Communist China "show sympathy for the Pathet Lao and aid them militarily—actions contrary to the principle of peaceful coexistence and noninterference, which they constantly talk about."

Peiping radio charged June 19 that a U.S. plane had flown over Hokow in China's Yunnan Province June 18. Yunnan bordered North Vietnam. The report was made in the Chinese Foreign Ministry's "296th serious warning" of alleged U.S. violations of Chinese air space.

A Pathet Lao broadcast June 18 assailed "continued bombing and strafing by United States imperialism and its lackeys of Laotian liberated areas." The protest, quoted by the Chinese Communist news agency Hsinhua, was issued by the "command of Laotian genuine neutralist forces." Peiping had adopted the term "genuine neutralist" to differentiate between the "neutralists" who had sided with the Pathet Lao and Souvanna's "neutralists," who had merged with the rightists.

A Pathet Lao broadcast June 17 had charged that planes of the "United States and its lackeys" June 15 had "spray[ed] poisonous chemicals over the area of Nhom Ma Lat, Cammon Province" and that "local inhabitants and a number of oxen were poisoned."

Western military sources in Vientiane June 17 said leftist reports of air raids were often exaggerated or false. According to these sources the June 11

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World News Digest With Index **FOF**

Published Weekly

Vol. XXIV, No. 1234 June 18-24, 1964
In 2 Sections—Section 1

Headline News

- U.S. reiterated willingness to repel aggression in Southeast Asia; strengthened supply, attack position.
- UN force's term in Cyprus extended.
- Malaysia summit meeting collapsed. Amb. Lodge resigned to aid Scranton drive for GOP nomination.
- House voted full aid request.
- Sen. Kennedy injured in plane crash.
- Senate passed civil rights bill.

raid on Pathet Lao headquarters in Khang Khay June 11 had been made by a single Laotian air force piston-engine plane and not by 6 planes, as Communist China still charged. [See p. 191E2]

Gen. Kong Le, commander of neutralist forces in Laos, arrived in Vientiane June 18 and brought with him allegedly Chinese-made weapons captured from the Pathet Lao. Kong Le said 27 such weapons had been taken from the Pathet Lao.

In the fighting, neutralist forces recaptured Phou Kout, a hill just west of the Plaine des Jarres, but strong Pathet Lao pressure forced them to abandon the 4,000-foot strategic point by June 18. [See pp. 190C3-191E3]

Laos Coalition Plea. Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma appealed to Deputy Premier Souphanouvong, head of the Pathet Lao, to confer with him in a neutral country "because the situation is becoming very dangerous." In a message dated June 15 (made public June 16), Souvanna said the talks could be held in New Delhi, Rangoon or Zurich. Souvanna said he suggested neutral sites to overcome Souphanouvong's previous objections to renewing coalition talks in Vientiane, Laos' administrative capital, or in Luang Prabang, the royal capital. Souphanouvong had expressed fear for his safety in the rightist-controlled cities.

Souphanouvong suggested that Luang Prabang be demilitarized for the proposed meeting. But Souvanna announced June 20 that he had rejected this proposal on the ground that the city could not be deprived of military protection.

Tass announced June 20 that the Soviet government had endorsed Souphanouvong's appeal for renewed peace talks by Laos' rightists, neutralists and Pathet Lao. Tass said that a draft of the proposal given to the Soviet and British co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on Laos "expresses the hope that the governments of the United States and other countries parties to the Geneva agreements 'will scrupulously abide by these agreements and prevent interference in the internal affairs of Laos.'" Tass said Souphanouvong's appeal for resumption of Laotian coalition negotiations had been sent to the co-chairmen along with a protest against U.S. reconnaissance flights over Laos. [See p. 191E3]

(The Polish government announced June 19 that Jerzy Dudzinski, Warsaw's representative on the International Control Commission in Laos, would return to Vietnam. He had been recalled from his post in May.) [See p. 155F3]

USSR Refuses Aid to Laos. The Soviet Union June 19 rejected a May 25 request by Laotian Premier Souvanna

REFERENCES in brackets give location of background information in this & preceding volumes

— WORLD AFFAIRS —

Southeast Asia

Lodge Returns to U.S. Retiring U.S. Amb.-to-South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge returned to Washington from Saigon June 29 and gave the Johnson Administration optimistic reports on the U.S.-Vietnamese campaign against the Viet Cong guerrillas. In a report to Pres. Johnson, Lodge said Vietnam was "on the right track" in the war, and he predicted victory over the Viet Cong after a long struggle. Lodge delivered separate reports to State Secy. Dean Rusk and to Defense Secy. Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was to succeed Lodge as ambassador to Saigon.

Introducing Lodge to newsmen, Mr. Johnson lauded him as having served with "great distinction." The President said: "We hate to see you leave, but we understand your reasons and we are thankful for the good job you have done."

Lodge met again with newsmen later June 29 and gave this assessment of the war in Vietnam:

►The situation was encouraging because of recent reports that (a) the Vietnamese army had scored 2 military successes against the Viet Cong, (b) the Vietnamese populace had stopped supplying the Viet Cong with food and (c) the rebels were resorting to extreme measures as a result of their desperate position.

►It would be helpful if the Viet Cong's supply routes from North Vietnam and Laos were cut off.

►To improve the military effort against the Viet Cong the U.S. should have civil political advisers in the corps areas, "the status of the paramilitary" should be improved, "the amount of night fighting" should be stepped up, other countries should increase their aid to Saigon, "a better price for rice" should be sought and land reform should be encouraged.

►U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia was "utterly unthinkable."

Lodge testified June 30 at a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. After the hearing Lodge rejected a June 29 report by 13 Republican Congressmen that suggested that the U.S. assume direct operational command of the war in South Vietnam. "If we do that we become a colonial power," Lodge said, and there would be "unfortunate results in the form of anti-American feelings." Lodge expressed confidence in South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Khanh's ability to lead the anti-guerrilla drive.

Gen. Taylor also opposed direct U.S. control of the war. He said "it is always difficult" for one country to lead troops of another nation and the results were problematical.

Before leaving Saigon June 28, Lodge had been made an honorary citizen of South Vietnam in airport ceremonies presided over by Premier Khanh. In a farewell address he said: "We Americans are with you . . . in your struggle to achieve and maintain your independence." [See p. 203C2]

Among developments reported in the Vietnamese civil war:

One U.S. soldier was killed in a Viet Cong ambush near the Tay Ninh Province town of Baucot (60 miles north of Saigon), it was reported June 25. 2 other Americans were missing and presumed dead.

A Viet Cong force June 24 captured a Civil Guard platoon in a strategic hamlet in Quang Tri Province. Reporting on the raid, a U.S. military spokesman June 25 said the invaders did not fire a shot.

50 Viet Cong were killed June 24 in an attack by Vietnamese militiamen on a guerrilla training center in northern Quangngai Province. A 3-day government offensive elsewhere in Vietnam ended June 25 and resulted in a Viet Cong casualty toll of 28 dead and 6 captured.

A Vietnamese force of armored carriers killed at least 100 Viet Cong in a 6-hour battle June 25 near Baucot. The carriers attempted to penetrate a line of several hundred guerrillas but were forced to withdraw for lack of ammunition.

Vietnamese rangers June 26 killed at least 43 Viet Cong at Long Hoi. 18 government troops were slain. A U.S. helicopter supporting the government attack was shot down by Viet Cong ground fire. 2 American crewmen were killed and 2 others were injured. A U.S. T-28 fighter-bomber also was shot down, but the U.S. pilot and Vietnamese crewman escaped by parachute.

4 U.S. crewmen were killed June 29 when their helicopter crashed during a combat mission near Cao Linh, 75 miles southwest of Saigon. 2 Americans lost their lives June 30 when Viet Cong ground fire downed their helicopter in the northern section of the country.

24 non-combat New Zealand soldiers arrived in Saigon June 29 to assist in the war against the Viet Cong. The force was made up of engineers whose first task was to help build bridges and roads in Binh Duong Province. In greeting the New Zealand unit, Lt. Gen. William Westmoreland, head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, said: "We welcome this detachment of volunteers who will join Americans and Australians now standing side by side with our Vietnamese allies." New Zealand's decision to send troops to Vietnam was based on talks Premier Keith J. Holyoake had had with Premier Khanh in April. [See p. 183C1]

China Scores U.S. The U.S.' military involvement in Laos and South Vietnam was sharply assailed June 24 by Chinese Communist Foreign Min. Chen Yi.

—Asserting that "the situation in Indochina has become increasingly grave in the past few days," Chen charged at a Peiping banquet for a Mali government delegation that the U.S. was "continuing its wanton bombing in Laos and stepping up its preparation for new military adventures in southern Vietnam" despite "the serious protests of the Laotian and Chinese people."

Recalling that China was "a signatory to the 2 sets of Geneva agreements," Chen said "the Chinese people will not sit idly by while the Geneva agreements are completely torn up and the flames of war spread to their side." "It must be pointed out that Indochina is situated by China and not by the United States," he said. Chen repeated China's plea for reconvening the Geneva conference on Laos. He said this position should not be mistaken "for a sign of weakness."

The Chinese Communist news agency Hsinhua charged June 29 that 18 U.S. planes had bombed, strafed and made reconnaissance flights over Pathet Lao positions the previous week. Hsinhua said that there were no North Vietnamese troops in Laos and that the U.S. was using the charge to justify its own military activities in the country. A Hanoi broadcast June 24 had quoted the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry as charging that U.S. air attacks on Pathet Lao positions were "directly threatening the security" of North

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World News Digest With Index 
Published Weekly

Vol. XXIV, No. 1235 June 25-July 1, 1964

Headline News

Lodge returned to U.S., gave optimistic Vietnam war report.

Pres. Johnson held Cyprus mediation talks with Turkish, Greek premiers.

Tshombe returned to the Congo, UN troops withdrew.

Robert F. Kennedy toured West Germany, Poland.

Pres. Johnson said U.S. would 'risk war' for freedom.

Massive search sought 3 missing civil rights workers in Mississippi.

Dirksen backed Goldwater for GOP race, Scranton campaigned for delegate votes.

Vietnam. The ministry said "the U.S. air forces have made more than 60 sorties, bombed and strafed dozens of villages and cities, and areas such as Khang Khay and Lat Bua."

Rightwing military sources in Vientiane said June 24 that Laotian T-28 fighter-bombers had attacked 4 North Vietnamese battalions in southern Laos near the Cambodian border.

Laotian Foreign Min. Pheng Phongsavang said June 24 that the Chinese Communist "economic and cultural mission" that had been destroyed in a June 11 air attack at Khang Khay had been established illegally without the consent of the Laotian government. [See p. 201C2-C3]

Laos Truce Urged. An immediate cease-fire in Laos and withdrawal of all Pathet Lao and neutralist troops to their original positions prior to the outbreak of the recent fighting was urged in a communiqué issued in Vientiane June 29 at a meeting of the ambassadors of the U.S., Britain, Canada, South Vietnam and Thailand.

The ambassadors, who had been meeting since June 2, said there was undeniable evidence that the Pathet Lao attacks were being assisted by North Vietnamese soldiers in "flagrant violation of the Geneva agreements."

The Indian ambassador participated in the Vientiane conference but refrained from signing the communiqué because of disagreement with assessment of the Laotian military situation. [See p. 169E2-D3]

The Pathet Lao's offensive and North Vietnam's military assistance had been assailed in a resolution adopted June 27 by the King's Council, Laos' 12-member upper legislative house. It was said to be the first time that the normally non-political Council had expressed itself so affirmatively on any issue.

Laotian Budget. A 1964-65 deficit budget estimating government expenditures at \$14 million and income at \$4 million was announced June 27 by Finance Min. Phoumi Nosavan. Foreign aid, largely from the U.S., was to offset the deficit.

REFERENCES in brackets give location of background information in this & preceding volumes

— WORLD AFFAIRS —

South Vietnam

Khanh Demands Attack on North. South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Khanh called publicly July 19 for a fullscale military attack on Communist North Vietnam. Khanh's demand for the invasion, opposed by the U.S., was made at a Saigon rally marking the 10th anniversary of the 1954 Geneva accords freeing Indochina from French rule and partitioning it into 4 separate countries (South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia).

Addressing an audience estimated at 100,000 persons, Maj. Gen. Khanh, chairman of South Vietnam's ruling military junta, declared that the Vietnamese people had "called for the war to be carried to the north." He said that one million refugees who had fled to South Vietnam to escape Communist rule in the north nourished "the dream of liberating their native land." "The government," he said, "cannot remain indifferent before the firm determination of all the people who are considering the push northward as an appropriate means to fulfill our national history."

(The Saigon rally was staged as part of observances of a "National Day of Shame" commemorating the 1954 armistice between the French and the Communist Viet Minh, currently the rulers of North Vietnam. Leaflets had warned that South Vietnam's Communist Vietcong terrorists planned to disrupt the observances with attacks primarily directed against Americans serving in Vietnam, but no important terror incidents were reported.)

The South Vietnamese government issued a declaration July 20 reiterating Khanh's demand for an invasion of North Vietnam to liberate it from Communist domination. The government, decrying the Geneva accords, charged that "over the last 10 years Communist China and Communist North Vietnam never once implemented the cease-fire and helped to restore peace, which was the only objective of the Geneva agreement they themselves had signed with the colonialists." It warned: "If Communist China and Communist Vietnam obstinately continue their war of aggression, the government and entire people of Vietnam will step up the war with determination until total victory liberates the whole of our national territory."

About 50 Vietnamese students invaded the French embassy in Saigon July 21 and smashed windows, broke furniture, tore pictures from the walls and burned a station wagon on the embassy grounds. The students, as did many Vietnamese officials, blamed the 1954 Geneva accords on France's "surrender" to the Viet Minh. [See p. 225F2-E3]

U.S. Quiet on Demand. U.S. Amb.-to-South Vietnam Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor attended the July 19 Saigon rally and was reported to have listened without comment to Gen. Khanh's demand for an invasion of North Vietnam. The U.S. State Department conceded July 20 that an attack on North Vietnam was "in the realm of contingency planning" and declined comment on Gen. Khanh's speech. A State Department spokesman had

said July 9 that the U.S. was not interested in a new 14-nation Geneva conference, but only in compliance with the 1954 agreement.

The U.S. was reported July 14 to have agreed to send 300 more Special Forces troops to South Vietnam to stiffen defenses against North Vietnamese guerrilla infiltration. 300 more military advisers also were to be sent to South Vietnam to work at the battalion level. The reinforcements would bring the U.S. military manpower commitment in South Vietnam to 16,000. More supplies were also to be committed to the war effort. [See p. 154 D, G2]

China Pledges Hanoi Defense. North Vietnamese Foreign Min. Xuan Thuy sent a message June 25 to the 14 signers of the 1954 Geneva accords, including Communist China, calling upon them to take "firm . . . action to demand that the U.S. government give up its design of intensifying provocation and sabotage" against North Vietnam.

Communist Chinese Foreign Min. Marshal Chen Yi replied July 6 that "the Chinese people naturally cannot be expected to look on with folded arms" if North Vietnam were attacked. Marshal Chen committed Communist China to defend North Vietnam against any U.S. attack, which he called a potential threat to China's security.

The Chinese CP newspaper *Jenmin Jih Pao* called Chen's statement "a forceful warning from the Chinese government to United States imperialism." The newspaper said in an editorial: "The Chinese people have always maintained that it is an unshirkable proletarian internationalist duty of all Socialist countries to safeguard the peace and security of the entire Socialist camp, to protect all its members from any imperialist invasion and to defend the Socialist camp."

Marshal Chen denounced the U.S. July 14 for "direct and undisguised military intervention in Laos" and charged the U.S. with plotting "to expand its aggressive war in South Vietnam." He warned of the danger of a war throughout Southeast Asia and advocated reconvening of the 14-nation Geneva conference.


United Nations

USSR Backs Peace Force. The Soviet government expressed support July 7 for the establishment of a permanent international military force that would serve at the orders of the UN Security Council in future peace-keeping operations. The proposal, a reversal of past Soviet opposition to UN peace-keeping actions, was welcomed by Western diplomats as a possible step toward meaningful negotiations on the matter.

The USSR's views were stated in government memoranda delivered to the U.S., Britain, Japan and certain other countries, and to UN Secy. Gen. U Thant. Press reports of the contents of the Soviet statement largely were based on the version delivered to Japan July 6 (July 7 Western time) and published in unofficial translation by the Japan Times the next day. None of the memoranda were published officially immediately.

The memo sent to Japan reiterated the USSR's position that UN peace-keeping actions were the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. It rejected the procedure, worked out in the UN's

FACTS ON FILE

World News Digest With Index 

Published Weekly

Vol. XXIV, No. 1238

July 16-22, 1964

Headline News

Khanh urged attack on North Vietnam.

USSR backed UN peace force. Miller won GOP Vice Presidential nomination; Goldwater defended 'extremism'; made no overtures to moderates; took control of party machinery.

Racial riots erupted in New York. New Orleans cotton exchange closed.

Uniting for Peace resolution, under which the General Assembly had authorized the formation of the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East during the 1956 Suez crisis. The memo said: "The [UN] Charter stipulates that the Security Council is the only organ that has a right to decide a United Nations action on the maintenance . . . of international peace. . . . No other organ of the United Nations, including the General Assembly, has the power to decide the above things." The Security Council's responsibilities, it said, extended to the personnel, command, tactics and financing of a potential UN peace force.

Two further conditions were posed by the Soviet memo: (1) that the proposed force be drawn from the smaller nations of the Soviet, Western and neutralist blocs, with the Soviet bloc assured adequate representation in the UN command; (2) that the 5 permanent members of the Security Council—the U.S., Britain, France, USSR and Nationalist China—be barred from participating in the force. The memo added: "The Soviet Union . . . is ready to shoulder its due share of . . . expenses if decisions on the establishment of a United Nations force and expenditures involved are adopted by the Security Council in the spirit of the [UN] Charter."

(Secy. Gen. Thant, addressing a UN press conference July 8, said that the Soviet memo and the prior Western proposals for a UN peace force were "a very good augury for the future of negotiations on the subject." He recalled, however, that the USSR's insistence on the Security Council's exclusive responsibility for peace-keeping actions had been "contested" by other members.)

(U.S. Amb.-to-UN Adlai E. Stevenson was reported July 12 to have informed other UN envoys privately of the U.S.' disappointment with the Soviet memo's insistence on Security Council prerogatives in the peace-keeping sphere. But Stevenson and Sir Patrick Dean, Britain's UN envoy, met July 20 with Soviet Amb.-to-UN Nikolai T. Fedorenko to exchange views on the matter and to clarify the points of difference between the 2 sides.)

Prior U.S. Proposal. The Soviet memo was viewed, at least in part, as a response to long-standing Western proposals for the renewal of negotiations on

REFERENCES in brackets give location of background information in this & preceding volumes

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Summary Record of the Meeting on Southeast Asia, Cabinet Room,
June 10, 1963, 5:30 PM -- Southeast Asia (without the President)

Present: Secretary Rusk (later), Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, Under Secretary Harriman, Director McCone, Director Bell, Director Rowan, Mr. Rostow, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goddaster, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Special Assistant Sullivan, Mr. Chester Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Douglass Cater, Mr. Bromley Smith

Three papers were considered. Copies of each are attached. The attached agenda was followed.

The first question which arose was what statement should be made to the press about the reconnaissance missions over Laos.

Secretary McNamara said we should say that a U.S. reconnaissance mission was flown in Laos, that it was fired upon, and that the U.S. planes fired back.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said this statement was not true and strongly cautioned that nothing be said now which later could be used to prove that the U.S. Government had told a lie. He said the U.S. must not risk being exposed as making false statements.

Mr. William Bundy referred to Ambassador Unger's plea contained in his telegram 1586 (copy attached) that the U.S. not admit that the planes escorting the reconnaissance planes had used suppressive fire. The Ambassador's cable was in response to a request for his views when it appeared here that it would almost be impossible to maintain our position of "no comment" in reply to questions concerning the firing of U.S. planes in Laos. Mr. William Bundy said that at an earlier meeting this morning all present had agreed with Ambassador Unger's reasoning and he asked that the present group agree to stand on "no comment." Mr. McGeorge Bundy agreed that refusing to comment on operations was a much better position than one which, in effect, was not true.

Secretary Rusk asked whether the press furor over the "no comment" position would blow over in a few days. Mr. McCone replied that he thought that press interest in the Laos operation would be very short-lived. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that Senator Morse would undoubtedly yell but we could live with his criticism.

Secretary Rusk, who had just returned from the Hill, said that he felt that there was little Congressional interest in the Laos situation. He noted that several Congressmen had reacted almost with boredom to a discussion of the reconnaissance flights in Laos. He wondered

Don't change in wire

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Authority *FRUS, Vol. 1, # 210 + Vol. XXVII, # 88*
By *M*, NARA, Date *2-8-12*

whether we and Ambassador Unger had built up the air strike out of all proportion.

In response to Secretary Rusk's question, Mr. Rowan said there had been some international interest in our air activity in Laos, but there had been no huge international outcry over press reports to date. Secretary Rusk said our long-range stake in keeping Souvanna in power in Laos was great. He thought that we should back our Ambassador in the field. Secretary McNamara agreed as to what we would say to the press. However, he thought that to Members of Congress and friendly governments we should say that U.S. reconnaissance missions over Laos had been fired on and we fired back. Mr. McGeorge Bundy repeated his statement that this would not be the truth. He strongly disagreed that we should make such a statement because he believed that it would not stick and the true facts would become public.

Mr. William Bundy said we would be making a general statement without reference to a specific mission. We would simply say that reconnaissance missions were being flown in Laos and our planes were authorized to fire back when they were fired upon. We would not admit that we had carried out a suppressive mission. The British do not know that we carried out a specific air strike. The only explanation we would make to foreigners would be that there has been firing in Laos by U.S. planes because they had been fired upon.

Secretary McNamara urged that everyone in the room agree on one position to be taken by all so that all discussions of this subject would be identical.

Assistant Secretary Manning was asked to draft guidance for the use of everyone to include statements to the press, statements to the press, statements to Congressmen, and statements to foreign nations. It was agreed that we would continue to stand on "no comment" to the press but that Congressmen and foreign government officials would be told that our planes had been fired on and that they had fired back.

Mr. William Bundy said that the International Control Commission (ICC) inspectors were on the ground in the general area where firing had taken place. It is possible that they may see bomb craters caused by U.S. planes. There is doubt that Ho Chi Minh would allow the ICC to inspect Khang Khay because he would thereby reveal to outsiders the existence of anti-aircraft batteries manned by Viet Minh crews. In addition, he would be creating a precedent of allowing the ICC inspectors to enter Communist-held territory.

The group then considered the paper entitled "Defuzing Laos." Mr. Forrestal summarized its content and said that its purpose was to reduce pressures in Laos.

Secretary Rusk said that if we accomplished the first objective

stated in the paper, we would be in a hell of a shape. Our real objective in Laos is to get strict compliance with the 1962 Geneva Accords, which means getting the Pathet Lao out of Laos. We have taken this position recently with important foreign nations including the Soviet Union. We should push hard in any conference, such as that proposed by the Poles, for our prerequisites for a Geneva-type conference. It is in our interest to keep the Russians and the Poles in opposition to the Chinese Communists and Ho Chi Minh. We should not give up the effort to get the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres by diplomatic means. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said he thought our objective was to keep Souvanna in power so that we could go ahead with our major objective which is to improve the situation in South Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara said we must not keep on restating unrealizable objectives. He said we have no program which, in his view, will result in forcing the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres.

Secretary Rusk suggested that a paper should be prepared which spells out the position which we have just taken with Khrushchev.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that nothing now planned will get the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres. Only General Taylor could do this by using U.S. military force and he would resign before agreeing to put U.S. troops into the Plaine des Jarres. The important problem is South Vietnam, not the presence of the Pathet Lao in the Plaine des Jarres.

Secretary Rusk said the defuzing paper surrenders our objective of seeking a pressure point against Hanoi and would result in giving Souvanna and the Thais a very leaden feeling. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said if it were true that the proposed policy would give Souvanna and the Thais a leaden feeling, this would be a valid reason to oppose it, but he did not think that its lack of effect on the Pathet Lao problem in the Plaine des Jarres was a valid objection.

Secretary McNamara said the President had been confused because there has always been a difference between our stated objectives and our courses of action. He expressed in several ways his view that the actions we have proposed to the President will not achieve our stated objectives.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said we have never told the President that the Communists had now gone too far and that we propose to throw them out. Secretary Rusk replied that our objective is certainly not to support Souvanna solely for the purpose of halting further Pathet Lao advances. Our objective is to force the Pathet Lao to retreat. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said he thought that our policy was aimed at trying to avoid bringing things to a military head over Laos.

Secretary Rusk said he visualized our Laos policy in three stages. The first preventive stage was to take those actions necessary

to be ready militarily to do more than we are now doing if it appeared that the Pathet Lao was undertaking a campaign to seize the Mekong River towns. The second stage was to do all we could during the Polish-proposed conference to achieve our preconditions for a Geneva conference. We may not achieve this objective but we might. We simply don't know. The third stage would be a Geneva conference at which we would seek to obtain the removal of the Viet Minh from Laos and South Vietnam and close the North Vietnam corridor to the South Vietnamese.

Secretary McNamara asked whether we would go to a Geneva conference if we did not obtain the preconditions. Secretary Rusk replied that we would not. Secretary McNamara said that, therefore, there would be no conference. The defuzing paper is to look at the situation we would be in without a Geneva-type conference. The plan is based on not taking U.S. military action until we had obtained a Congressional resolution, which it did not appear would be obtainable very soon.

Secretary Rusk asked why we should not take as our objective the most probable contingency facing us.

Secretary McNamara suggested that, for the President, we prepare a paper which gave our stated objective being sought on the diplomatic track. The paper would acknowledge that we were unlikely to achieve our stated objective by diplomatic means and that, therefore, we propose to deviate from the diplomatic track and then state what we would do. He felt that we were leading the President down a track which would oblige him to resort to the use of military force in the next three months if the situation were to be saved. He expressed his fear that the conference route will run out in a few weeks and then there will be nothing left for us to do but use U.S. military force.

Director McCone expressed his concern that we would not be able to resist world public pressure for a conference by saying merely that we won't go to a conference unless the Pathet Lao holds back a few miles in the Plaine des Jarres. Secretary Rusk replied that the Pathet Lao pullback, which is a prerequisite for the conference, would not be difficult for the Communists to agree to do.

Mr. Rowan said he wanted to make certain that all were aware of the danger of having public objectives which differed from objectives known only to government officials. Mr. Forrestal said the objectives listed in his paper should accurately be described as interim objectives.

Mr. McCone wanted to know how we proposed to discourage further Pathet Lao territorial grabs as stated in objective number two. Mr. Forrestal said the actions he had in mind involved those listed under point thirteen of the McNamara report, including the movement to the area of U.S. forces.

Secretary Rusk asked that he be permitted to study the paper

for another day or so. He was concerned that if we gave up the objective of moving the Pathet Lao back, we might forfeit the effort which we have been making in Moscow and indirectly in Peking.

Secretary McNamara said we do have military actions which could be used to prevent the Pathet Lao from grabbing further territory in Laos, but we do not have actions which he felt were adequate to force the Pathet Lao to get out of the Plaine des Jarres.

Secretary Rusk said he did not feel that a mountainous diplomatic effort would be necessary to get the Pathet Lao back to their previous lines. The Soviets have a stake in not ratting out on the agreement they have with us on Laos.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy, who had been out of the meeting for a few minutes, returned to say that he had told the President it would not be necessary for him to join the group today because another working session would be required before the group was ready to discuss recommendations with him.

The group then turned to consider item three of the agenda, i. e., next steps in South Vietnam. Mr. Sullivan reported on the existing situation. The most important element in the South Vietnam picture is the will and determination of the Khanh government and the South Vietnamese people. Their morale would be deeply affected by the position we take in Laos. If we stand firm they will be encouraged to adopt our new suggestions with respect to adding U.S. advisory personnel to the Vietnamese civil and military structure. They must, however, have a clear idea of what we plan to do in the future. If we go to a Geneva conference without gaining our preconditions, there will be crisis of confidence in South Vietnam. If we ask and obtain a Congressional resolution in support of our Southeast Asia policy, the Vietnamese will be greatly encouraged. The Manning information operation here and the Zorthian USIA operation in Saigon are efforts in the right direction. We will need to indoctrinate our own people so that they are not conveying to the Vietnamese that we are Gung Ho for a military victory, but, rather, are in South Vietnam for the long term. Our training people can convince the South Vietnamese that we are sticking with them. With the takeover of the military command by General Westmoreland, we can shift from trying to kill every Viet Cong, to protecting the Vietnamese population. The country team in Saigon has taken three provinces in which pilot projects will be initiated. These three are among the eight provinces recommended by the Honolulu meeting. The Vietnamese Foreign Minister Quat is returning to South Vietnam and, hopefully, will speed up the dispatch abroad of South Vietnamese ambassadors. In addition, the South Vietnamese government has wired a U.S. public relations firm to assist it in drawing public attention to its accomplishments. He

concluded by repeating that if the Vietnamese can be convinced we are sticking with them and not withdrawing they will agree to our plans for greater participation in the governmental structure of South Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk asked why the South Vietnamese doubt that we are sticking with them. Mr. Sullivan responded that they are upset by the statements which Senator Morse makes almost daily, by Agence France press reports from Saigon, by whispering which constantly goes on in Saigon involving neutralization proposals, and by the diplomatic activity which we are engaged in involving the problem of Laos.

Secretary McNamara said there is no question but that we face a morale problem in South Vietnam. Many South Vietnamese doubt that we will take actions necessary to save the situation. We must be prepared to take what actions are necessary to maintain morale which has weakened in the last two or three weeks.

Mr. Sullivan said that events in Laos have weakened morale in South Vietnam. He referred to certain evidence that the South Vietnamese think we lack firmness in our policy toward the Laos situation.

Mr. William Bundy disagreed. He suggested that we wait until we had further evidence of the effect of our actions in Laos on the state of morale in Saigon. The air strike in Laos has helped morale in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara agreed that as a result of our air strike in Laos morale in South Vietnam had improved in the last two days.

Mr. Cooper asked how we could realistically change South Vietnamese morale. The situation in Laos might have affected morale in South Vietnam, but we cannot say flatly that it was the result of our actions in Laos. It may have been the result of the improved situation in Laos.

Mr. Sullivan said it was necessary to reassure the South Vietnamese every day. Secretary Rusk agreed and said that this necessity applied to several other countries, even including Germany. We cannot build our policy on the constant need to reassure nervous friendly countries.

Secretary McNamara said he concluded, following the Honolulu meeting, that the situation in South Vietnam was weakening. He acknowledged that Ambassador Lodge thought things were getting better there. However, Secretary McNamara felt that the U.S. would not have to take any major action in South Vietnam in the next two or three months. We should review the situation and the actions we are taking every two weeks. Mr. Sullivan agreed that we did not have a short fuse on the South Vietnamese situation. He noted that the Viet Cong had eased up on their attack on South Vietnam military bases and are

concentrating their propaganda on trying to erode South Vietnamese support of General Khanh's government, to weaken U.S. support of that government, and to bring U.S. domestic public opinion pressure on the U.S. Government to reduce its support of General Khanh.

Secretary Rusk suggested we might initiate an operations checklist which might have as many as one hundred items on it. This checklist would be reviewed every few days. Pluses and minuses would be placed after each item on the list. Items would include such subjects as the countries giving aid to South Vietnam, the appointment of South Vietnamese ambassadors, the religious question, and pay and housing for troops. These detailed actions are the essence of our program rather than big diplomatic moves. The checklist would be a stimulus to continued action on the many small proposals.

Mr. Cooper said the weekly combined report now being prepared on South Vietnam meets part of the Secretary's suggestion.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that Mr. Sullivan's group was the proper group to draw up a list of current problems with comment as to progress being made on each. Mr. Rowan volunteered to prepare a study on South Vietnam morale, based on press reports from Saigon.

Secretary Rusk felt it would be helpful to the President to know that we are reviewing South Vietnam actions comprehensively and in detail.

Director McCone expressed some concern over the prospect that we might be confronted in South Vietnam with a sudden Communist thrust. There is some evidence to indicate that the Communists may be holding back their forces and building up for a new attack. The Watch Committee is closely following this subject. There has been a period of relative quiet for the past two weeks in Vietnam, during which there have been no large enemy military actions. Conceivably, the Viet Cong may be assembling resources for a major blow at the Khanh government. Mr. Alexis Johnson said that the Viet Cong may be turning away from military actions to attacks on the morale of the South Vietnamese, as had been pointed out earlier by Mr. Sullivan.

Secretary Rusk asked that the closest watch be kept on the deployment of the Communist Chinese air forces. He emphasized the extreme importance of any movement of these air forces.

Mr. Sullivan summarized the view of Mr. Burdett, an English correspondent who had spent considerable time in Communist areas in the Far East. Mr. Burdett's view is that the Viet Cong is not seeking a military victory in Vietnam but is trying to turn South Vietnam into another Laos by creating political confusion for the Khanh government and spreading confusion throughout the countryside.

The group then turned to consideration of a draft Congressional resolution which was summarized by Mr. William Bundy. The draft

resolution tries to convey a firm posture but also emphasizes the peace motive and the readiness to negotiate, plus the willingness to use SEATO and the UN. The objective is to enlist the support of as many Senators as possible, minus Senator Morse. Paragraph two of the draft resolution is modeled on the Near East resolution rather than on the Off-shore Island resolution or the Cuban resolution. The whereases are important in the effort to gain maximum support. Section three of the draft is considered by the lawyers to be very important but it could be dropped as not being absolutely necessary.

The group then turned to Mr. McGeorge Bundy's paper, "Alternative Public Positions for U.S. on Southeast Asia for the Period July 1 - November 15." Mr. Bundy said the only time to seek the Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia would be at the end of the Civil Rights debate, which may occur within ten days or two weeks. However, if there were a crash situation in Southeast Asia, a resolution could be dealt with at any time.

Secretary Rusk said the ideal situation would be a short resolution adopted unanimously by Congress. It would be disastrous if Congress refused to vote a resolution proposed by the Administration or if the resolution was basically weakened during the course of Congressional debate. We should ask for a resolution only when the circumstances are such as to require action, and, thereby, force Congressional action. There will be a rallying around the President the moment it is clear to reasonable people that U.S. action is necessary.

Secretary McNamara said we would not be in a position to ask for a Congressional resolution before July 1.

The Attorney General foresaw great difficulties in obtaining approval of a Congressional resolution if the Administration's course of action was not crystal clear. He felt the difficulties on the Hill would be great if events are not pushing us to prompt action. It would be great if events are not pushing us to prompt action. It would be much simpler to obtain approval of a resolution if U.S. actions are forcing the pace. Heavy ground work with Congressmen will be necessary.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said the Congressional ground work would be difficult if we are not committed to seek a resolution. Secretary McNamara doubted that we could go to Congress before July 1. Secretary Rusk said there was no basis for a resolution in the existing situation or on decisions which the Administration has so far taken.

Secretary McNamara said a Congressional resolution before September was unlikely unless the enemy acts suddenly in the area, which is also unlikely. Our actions proposed to date are not such as to require a resolution.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy asked that the group not dismiss the

proposal to seek Congressional resolution without taking into account the great benefit such a resolution would have in conveying our firmness of purpose in Southeast Asia.

Secretary Rusk said we can get a resolution passed only with great difficulty unless the President has already taken basic decisions as to what we would do in Southeast Asia. Success in obtaining the Cuba resolution and the support we obtained from NATO countries followed the announcement of our decision to act. Before we reach a higher climax resulting in firm U.S. decisions, our Congressional problem will be considerable.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy agreed to beef up the last page of his paper which deals with how we can meet the situation in Laos prior to a Congressional resolution or without seeking one.

Secretary McNamara suggested that a press campaign should be launched which would be of such a nature as to avoid building up public pressure for drastic action. Mr. Manning said perhaps the public information program should be aimed at continuing the present disinterest in the Laos and South Vietnam situations. This is a different objective than trying to sell a Congressional resolution.

Secretary Rusk said the Congressmen he had met recently were reacting as if they were unconcerned and not as if there were a crisis. Secretary McNamara pointed out, however, that there was dissatisfaction in Congress with what we are now doing. Mr. Manning said one very thin sample of public opinion consisted of letters being sent to the State Department. About one-third of the letters received dealt with Southeast Asia. Most of these were "soft" in the sense of inquiring as to what we are doing in Southeast Asia, but were not as "soft" as they had been earlier.

Secretary McNamara suggested that in the event of a dramatic event in Southeast Asia we would go promptly for a Congressional resolution, but we would not plan on one and that our public information program would not be aimed at getting support for a resolution.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy called attention to the problem of how far we could go in influencing the situation in Southeast Asia without taking actions which could be initiated only with a Congressional resolution. Secretary McNamara replied that the thirteen actions he had recommended could be taken without a Congressional resolution and that these actions go quite far. Mr. McGeorge Bundy agreed that even air defense actions in Southeast Asia would be possible without a Congressional resolution.

Secretary Dillon said the arguments for a Congressional resolution could be reversed. If we get a resolution and then do not act promptly, there could follow a crisis of morale.


Mr. Alexis Johnson asked whether, if the Pathet Lao attacked, we had sufficient authority to hit back. Mr. McGeorge Bundy felt that

SEATO

under the ~~NATO~~ Treaty such a response would be possible. Director McCone said that putting U.S. troops on the ground in Southeast Asia would require a Congressional resolution. He reminded the group that the idea of a resolution arose when we were discussing how to deal with a Communist reaction to an attack by us on North Vietnamese targets.

Secretary Rusk requested that the paper on the Congressional resolution be rewritten to reflect the views expressed during the meeting.

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PROCESSING NOTE

On this date, Archives staff discovered that document #22 was missing from the file. A copy of the document was recovered from University Publications of America microfilm and has been placed in the file.

Alexis Percle
April 21, 2014

National Security File, NSC Histories, "Presidential Decisions—Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, Tabs 1-8," Box 38

22 13 Jul 64
by W.H. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM ON SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET NAM

I. United States Programs for South Viet Nam:

As of last March we recommended a series of actions to be taken which would give the Vietnamese more ability to carry out General Khanh's Pacification Program. The main thrust of these recommendations was to increase and improve the organization of para-military forces, which would be better paid, better equipped, and better trained than in the past. These forces, recruited locally and inspired with the purpose of protecting their own families, would be a key element in the "holding" phase of the pacification "clear and hold" programs.

At the same time, we recommended that the Vietnamese Air Force be re-equipped. T-28's and B-26's were to be phased out by A-1H's and A-1E's. The size of the air force was to be expanded and the number of pilots capable of flying the new aircraft were to be expanded in order to provide a better pilot to plane ratio. This program is well advanced; new aircraft are arriving in Viet Nam; pilots are being upgraded; and the training program is moving ahead.

After the Honolulu meeting, we recommended sharpening the focus of this effort by the selection of eight critical provinces in the vicinity of Saigon where there would be a greater infusion of American personnel and the execution of "clear and hold" pacification programs. Americans would be introduced as advisors to the para-military forces, and together with Vietnamese counterparts as a joint team, would go into these provinces actually to perform some of the executive and administrative functions necessary to the execution of the "clear and hold" programs. Similarly, in Saigon, a joint US-Vietnamese group would be established to supervise this effort.

In the economic and social fields, we have expanded the American effort significantly. Because the increase in pay, allowances and dependents benefits for the military forces have strained the Vietnamese budget, we have increased our own financial contribution both in terms of direct grants and in terms of expanded imports. Against this increase, we have negotiated with the Vietnamese for more flexible budgetary and financial systems within their own government structure. We have

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authorized the addition of nearly 200 American civilians to the AID Mission. We are doubling the number of AID provincial representatives throughout the country, expanding the administrative training program, and have hired a new highly qualified team to direct the rural affairs program.

We have doubled the amount of fertilizer being provided the Vietnamese farmers and hope that the subsequent increase in rice production will result in expanded Vietnamese rice exports and consequent foreign exchange earnings. This year's crop has been better than earlier predictions suggested and it now appears that as much as 150,000 tons of rice may be exported. We have encouraged land reform and General Khanh has taken several measures which should have an attraction to the Vietnamese farmers. We are continuing to press for better marketing arrangements, better agricultural methods, and more attention to rural needs.

We have pressed friendly countries to show their solidarity with South Viet Nam by making tangible contributions to the Vietnamese Government. We have had favorable responses from Australia, New Zealand, China, the Philippines, and Korea. We expect actions by Germany, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom and Thailand. The Vietnamese Government and our own mission in Saigon have established a coordinated mechanism to solicit and accept these contributions.

We have persuaded the American medical profession to take more interest in the medical needs of Viet Nam. A team of American physicians, under the sponsorship of MEDICO and CARE, are now in Saigon working out a program for the introduction of American volunteer physicians on a rotating basis in Viet Nam. This is a technique which MEDICO has used successfully in Algeria and which we believe can be applied in Viet Nam. It will require a recruiting campaign during the summer months here in the U.S.

The Vietnamese information effort, both internally and throughout the world, has been far from satisfactory. We have quadrupled our own U.S. advisory staff in the field of psychological operations and are attempting to improve the quality of Vietnamese propaganda directed toward the population of South Viet Nam. We have constructed new radio stations; we are providing 100,000 radio sets; we are asking the Japanese to provide an additional 100,000 and we are working directly with

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the Vietnamese Information Service in programming the content of their broadcasts and their written propaganda. We have established an American press officer with General Khanh to act as his personal press advisor. We have pressed the Vietnamese to increase their embassy establishments abroad and particularly to augment their information staffs. We have encouraged them here in their plan to contract with an American public relations firm.

II. Additional Measures Being Contemplated:

We have examined for some time the question of how we can make the U.S. effort more directly effective in Viet Nam. Most U.S. officials who have served there firmly believe that there is needed a closer integration of U.S. personnel within the Vietnamese structure. This concept, however, raises a number of problems, especially problems of national sensitivity. We have under review proposals which would address this idea in various forms. Among them are the "encadrement" of U.S. personnel into the provincial administrative structure and into the para-military forces; the establishment of a "catalyst team" of specially chosen individuals who would operate as shadow advisors to key personnel in the Vietnamese government; the collocation of US and Vietnamese military headquarters so that US and Vietnamese officials are working in and out of the same building; the establishment of "joint operations centers" in which there would be binational participation in the direction of various programs.

Another possibility which we are exploring is the re-establishment of direct US participation in the montagnard guerrilla operations. These montagnard forces were originally trained and assisted by US personnel but have subsequently been turned over to Vietnamese special forces control. Because of ancient antipathy between the montagnards and the ethnic Vietnamese, there are indications that this program has faltered. CIA and DOD are examining the possibility of reconstituting the program with more direct American participation.

We have reviewed several times the question of removing US dependents from Viet Nam. Ambassador Lodge, at the Honolulu meeting, recommended against such action unless we were willing to accompany it by a fairly dramatic operational commitment against North Viet Nam. An alternative proposal which has recently been raised is the construction of a US housing compound, on the outskirts of Saigon, where American families could live in a more secure but isolated area and where they would be less exposed to the possibility of Viet Cong terror tactics.

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We are continuing to study the possibility of introducing a US naval presence more or less permanently based out of Viet Nam. A CINCPAC team is inspecting Cam Ranh Bay as a possible location for such a naval station, and as an area where the US fleet plus Marine forces could conduct amphibious training operations. We have similarly located B-57 aircraft in the Philippines which could be introduced into Viet Nam if we wish to increase the capability of jet bomber potential from South Viet Nam. We are examining the requirements for a US air defense contribution to protect South Vietnamese cities in the event there is a more direct air threat from the North.

III. Problem Areas:

In attempting to accomplish many of these programs, we have encountered resistance both from the Vietnamese and from our own US Mission. Ambassador Lodge has been most reluctant to increase a civilian staff, especially in the rural areas. He fears that this will augment American casualties and undermine American support for the effort in Viet Nam. He also fears that the increased introduction of Americans would give a colonial coloration to our presence there and would cause the Vietnamese to depend more and more on our execution of their programs. The Vietnamese have resisted for a number of reasons. They, too, worry about American civilians in the provinces whom they are unable to protect. They have some fear of appearing to be American puppets by excessive American presence in civilian ministries. Finally, there is some indication that they are reluctant to associate themselves too closely with the Americans there until they feel more confident of ultimate American intentions.

At the current moment, there is great doubt and confusion in Viet Nam about US determination. The daily speeches of Senator Morse, the columns of Walter Lippman, the NEW YORK TIMES editorials, the AFP distortions of George Ball's meetings with General de Gaulle, the diplomatic negotiations with respect to Laos, and the absence of any clear signal concerning US intentions in Southeast Asia have worried the Vietnamese. As a leading Saigon newspaper said on June 12: "We must be vigilant and we must be ready to meet any eventuality so as to avoid the possible shameful sacrifice and dishonor to our country as in the past."

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Given this sort of atmosphere in South Viet Nam, it is very difficult to persuade the Vietnamese to commit themselves to sharp military confrontations with the communists if they suspect that something in the way of a negotiated deal is being concocted behind their backs. Consequently, many of the actions which we are pressing on the South Vietnamese are flagging because of this uncertainty. Recruitment for the army and the para-military forces, expansion of the civil service, and a willingness to accept more Americans in the administrative measures are all affected by this attitude.

Both Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland, at the Honolulu Conference, expressed the opinion that the situation in South Viet Nam would "jog along" at the current stalemated pace unless some dramatic "victory" could be introduced to put new steel and confidence into Vietnamese leadership. General Westmoreland defined "victory" as a determination to take some new vigorous military commitment, such as air strikes against Viet Cong installations in the Laos corridor. Ambassador Lodge defined "victory" as a willingness to make punitive air strikes against North Viet Nam. The significant fact about both the Ambassador's and the General's suggestions was that they looked toward some American decision to undertake a commitment which the Vietnamese would interpret as a willingness to raise the military ante and eschew negotiations begun from a position of weakness.

While it is almost impossible to establish measurements of Vietnamese morale, we are able to say that there is not at the current moment a single galvanized national purpose, expressed in the government leadership and energizing all elements of the country with a simple sense of confidence. The internal divisions of South Viet Nam are historical and, under the stress of years of war, have persisted rather than disappeared. General Khanh inherited an internal political and religious situation which was badly divided and he contributed to further division by his action against the four generals who had run the November coup. He has moved with some success over the last few months to paper over these various divisions and has achieved a measure of external unity.

However, he has still not been able to crystalize a spirit of leadership or to develop a leadership team in South Viet Nam. Leadership and control of their own destinies is something which has been alien to the Vietnamese for so long that it becomes difficult for many in the country to view their status in anything other than in a client relationship to the great powers. There

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is a general impression, to some degree enhanced by their heavy dependence upon the US, that South Viet Nam's role in working out its own destiny is essentially passive, and not the primary determinant.

IV. Vietnamese Capabilities:

If we assume that the first step that has to be taken is the inspiration of confidence and a spirit of leadership, we still have to examine whether such an inspired leadership would find capable resources to command. In general, our assessment on this point remains affirmative. The Vietnamese army is well trained and well equipped. The Vietnamese soldier, when properly led, has proved himself in battle time and again. The resistance and tenacity of the peasant in the face of constant harassment over twenty years is nothing short of remarkable. The native intelligence and industriousness of the Vietnamese people are extremely high.

There are, however, some major shortcomings. The highly sophisticated nature of the Viet Cong guerrilla warfare requires a sophisticated response. General Khanh has developed a pacification plan which, to all observers, is essentially sound. This plan requires extensive, articulated actions on a military, political, and economic scale. The Vietnamese government doesn't possess the executive and administrative apparatus to put this plan effectively into action. This is partly because the French left them with only a shadow of administrative apparatus, partly because the Viet Cong have deliberately assassinated government officials, and partly because of the absence of clear direction and leadership from Saigon.

The military situation in South Viet Nam is far from perilous. While the Viet Cong retain an effective capacity for continuous harassment on a nation-wide scale, they are not yet militarily capable of winning a stand-up, open battle with government forces. Consequently, they cannot militarily seize and hold any significant areas in South Viet Nam. Government forces, which can be mustered in superior numbers and fire power against any Viet Cong concentration, can move into and clear any position which the Viet Cong attempt to establish.

On the other hand, by their system of harassment, terror, and secret cellular organizations, the Viet Cong deny security to major elements of the Vietnamese population. Their constant effort is to extend this sense of insecurity further and further into those territories where Vietnamese Government control exists.

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The sort of pacification campaign which is required of the government to reverse this effort and to extend the areas of security guaranteed to the South Vietnamese population is extremely complex. The task of organizing the extensive executive machinery necessary to accomplish victory is an enterprise in which there must be a direct and continuing US involvement.

If we can obtain a breakthrough in the mutual commitment of the US and Viet Nam to a confident sense of victory, we believe that we can introduce this sort of executive involvement into the Vietnamese structure. Moreover, we believe that the Vietnamese structure itself, in such an event, would be more effective and more responsive to such involvement. There is no one who can define with precision just how that breakthrough can be established. It could come from the external actions of the US, internal leadership in Viet Nam, or from an act of irreversible commitment by the US.

V. Conclusions:

The general conclusion from this analysis is that we can anticipate no sharp upturns in the Vietnamese willingness or ability to press for the extermination of the insurgency if the current situation continues. Indeed, if they continue to worry about American will and determination, we could expect further political fragmentation and increasing disabilities. On the other hand, we cannot guarantee that a dramatic "victory" or active commitment by the US would produce the sharp infusion of spirit which both the Ambassador and General Westmoreland predict.

It is clear, however, that unless some improvement in spirit and leadership can be introduced, we will have great difficulty in introducing more effective American assistance or in obtaining more effective Vietnamese utilization of that assistance. There is no immediate sharp crisis in South Viet Nam at the current moment. However, there are the rumbling undertones of crises which, as they emerge, will more likely appear in the form of a crisis of confidence rather than a military debacle. Communist propaganda and communist tactics over the last few months have accentuated the campaign against the will and determination of the Vietnamese as well as the will and determination of the Americans. This is currently the most critical factor to which we now have to address ourselves.

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CONTROL: 7432
RECD: AUGUST 10, 10:07 AM

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Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 377 PRIORITY SECTION ONE OF FOUR
DATE: AUGUST 10, 9 PM

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E X D I S

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THIS IS A US MISSION REPORT.

THE FOLLOWING SITUATION REPORT BASED ON A COMBINATION OF JUNE AND JULY DATA IS SUBMITTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH DEPTELS 108 AND 270. BECAUSE OF THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF THE TWO COUPS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE GVN AND THE INVALIDATION OF MUCH OF THE DATA BASE USED TO MEASURE PROGRESS IN THE EARLIER MONTHS (E.G., THE STATUS OF FORTIFIED HAMLET PROGRAM), IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE THE PRESENT SITUATION AGAINST THAT EXISTING FAR ENOUGH IN THE PAST TO PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL COMPARISON. IT IS HOPED THAT THE PRESENT REPORT WILL SERVE AS A BASELINE FROM WHICH TO MEASURE PROGRESS IN FUTURE MONTHS.

THIS IS THE FIRST SITUATION REPORT IN WHICH ESTIMATES OF SUCH FACTORS AS ARMY AND PUBLIC MORALE, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY UNITS, US ADVISOR-GVN COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF GVN OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN BASED LARGELY ON A COUNTRY-WIDE CANVASS OF THE VIEWS OF THE RESPONSIBLE US ADVISORS AND OBSERVERS. BY REPEATING THIS PROCEDURE ON A MONTHLY SCHEDULE, WE HOPE TO DEVELOP A MORE RELIABLE BASIS FOR REPORTING ON THESE IMPORTANT FACTORS WHICH IN THE PAST HAVE HAD NO YARDSTICK FOR MEASUREMENT.

IN THIS FIRST SAMPLING OF ADVISOR OPINION, WE HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY ITS OPTIMISM WHICH, GENERALLY SPEAKING, HAS EXCEEDED THAT OF MOST SENIOR US OFFICIALS IN SAIGON. IT WILL REQUIRE SOME TIME TO DETERMINE WHERE THE RIGHT LIES -- IT MAY BE ONLY ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION THAT THE FRONT LINE MORALE IS USUALLY BETTER THAN THAT OF THE COMMAND POST.

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By [Signature], NARA, Date 2-8-12

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-2- 377, August 10, 9 P.M., From Saigon (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

WHERE POSSIBLE, WE HAVE INDICATED WHERE WE HOPE TO BE IN OUR PROGRAMS AT YEAR END. THERE IS LITTLE SCIENTIFIC IN THESE PROJECTIONS WHICH MERELY INDICATE GOALS WHICH, IF VIGOROUSLY PURSUED IN A REASONABLY STABLE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, APPEAR FEASIBLE OF ATTAINMENT.

INTRODUCTION

THE COMMUNIST ~~STRATEGY~~ IN THE THEIR CONTINUING EFFORT TO TAKE OVER SOUTH VIET NAM HAS BEEN CLEARLY DEFINED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS BOTH IN THE HANOI REGIME AND IN THE PUPPET NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. IT IS NOT THEIR PURPOSE TO ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT THE SUPERIOR REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM MILITARY FORCES IN THE FIELD OR TO SEIZE AND CONQUER TERRITORY BY MILITARY MEANS. INSTEAD, IT IS THEIR ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO HARASS, ERODE AND TERRORIZE THE POPULATION AND ITS LEADERSHIP INTO A STATE OF SUCH DEMORALIZATION THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS WILL ENSUE. THEY PROPOSE TO ACHIEVE THIS POLITICAL OBJECTIVE BY STAGES, PASSING FIRST THROUGH "NEUTRALISM", USING THE LIBERATION FRONT MACHINERY, AND THE TECHNIQUE OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IT IS AGAINST THIS GOAL ~~THAT~~ WE SHOULD MEASURE US-GVN PROGRESS.

FACED WITH THIS KIND OF CHALLENGE, THE KHANH GOVERNMENT IS CALLED UPON TO EXECUTE AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX BODY OF PROGRAMS INVOLVING NOT ONLY MILITARY ACTIONS, BUT ALSO SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND, ABOVE ALL, ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES OF A HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED NATURE. THE ABILITY OF THE GVN TO RISE TO THIS LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE IS THE PRIME DETERMINANT OF THE UNFOLDING SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET NAM. FOR THIS REASON, AND IN SPITE OF THE DIFFICULTY IN DISCUSSING THE SITUATION IN NEAT CATEGORIES, WE PRESENT OUR EVALUATION IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC, MILITARY, OVERALL.

GP-1

TAYLOR

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 11:45 A.M., 8-10-64.
ADVANCED DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 10:35 A.M., 8-10-64.

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Action

CONTROL: 7480
RECD: AUG 10, 10:47 A.M.

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FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 377 PRIORITY
DATE: AUG 10, 9 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

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E X D I S

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
POLITICAL EVALUATION

AS INDICATED ABOVE, THE MOST IMPORTANT AND MOST INTRACTABLE INTERNAL PROBLEM OF SOUTH VIET NAM IN MEETING THE VIET CONG THREAT IS THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. THE BEST THING THAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE PRESENT KHANH GOVERNMENT IS THAT IT HAS LASTED SIX MONTHS AND HAS ABOUT A 50-50 CHANCE OF LASTING OUT THE YEAR ALTHOUGH PROBABLY NOT WITHOUT SOME CHANGED FACES IN THE CABINET. ALTHOUGH OPPOSED BY MINH AND RESISTED LESS OPENLY BY DAI VIET SYMPATHIZERS AMONG THE MILITARY, PRIME MINISTER KHANH SEEMS FOR THE TIME BEING TO HAVE THE NECESSARY MILITARY SUPPORT TO REMAIN IN POWER. HOWEVER, IT IS AN INEFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT BESET BY INEXPERIENCED MINISTERS WHO ARE ALSO JEALOUS AND SUSPICIOUS OF EACH OTHER. KHANH DOES NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE OR TRUST IN MOST OF THEM AND HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO WELD THEM INTO A GROUP WITH A COMMON LOYALTY AND PURPOSE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ONE IN SIGHT WHO COULD DO BETTER THAN KHANH IN THE FACE OF THE MANY DIFFICULTIES WHICH WOULD FACE ANY HEAD OF GOVERNMENT.

ON THE SIDE OF POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENT, KHANH SEEMS TO HAVE ALLAYED THE FRICTION BETWEEN BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLICS AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, HAS WON THE COOPERATION OF THE HOA HAO AND CAO DAI, AND HAS RESPONDED TO OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GVN AND US MISSION.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARD THE KHANH GOVERNMENT, MOSTLY CONFUSED AND APATHETIC SINCE ITS INCEPTION, IS ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE FAVORABLE THAN A YEAR OR TWO MONTHS AGO, DESPITE CONSIDERABLE

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-2- 377, August 10, 9 P.M., (SECTION TWO OF FOUR) From Saigon
EFFORTS, KHANH HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN BUILDING ANY SUBSTANTIAL BODY
OF ACTIVE POPULAR SUPPORT IN SAIGON. IN THE COUNTRYSIDE,
US EMBASSY PROVINCIAL REPORTERS INDICATE THAT SUPPORT EXISTS FOR
THE GVN IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THE DEGREE OF SECURITY ESTABLISHED
BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. THERE ARE GROUNDS TO CONCLUDE THAT NO
SOPHISTICATED PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH IS REQUIRED AT THIS STAGE
TO ATTRACT THE COUNTRY PEOPLE TO THE KHANH GOVERNMENT--THE
ASSURANCE OF A REASONABLY SECURE LIFE IS ABOUT ALL THAT IS
NECESSARY.

THE INTRIGUING INSIDE HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE ABSENCE OF DRAMATIC
MILITARY OR POLITICAL SUCCESSES REACT UPON KHANH WHO IS INCLINED
TO BE MOODY AND OCCASIONALLY SUBJECT TO FITS OF DESPONDENCY.
SEEING THE SLOW COURSE OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AND
FRUSTRATED BY THE WEAKNESS OF HIS GOVERNMENT, KHANH HAS TURNED
TO THE "MARCH NORTH" THEME TO UNIFY THE HOME FRONT AND TO OFFSET
THE WAR-WEARINESS WHICH HE ASSERTS IS OPPRESSING HIS PEOPLE AND HIS
ARMED FORCES. US OBSERVERS, IN ASSESSING THE SYMPTOMS OF WAR-
WEARINESS AND OF THE BAD MILITARY MORALE WHICH KHANH REPORTS, ARE
INCLINED TO FEEL THAT THE SYMPTOMS OF DEFEATISM ARE MORE IN THE
MINDS OF THE INEXPERIENCED AND UNTRIED LEADERSHIP IN SAP ON THAN
IN THE PEOPLE AND THE ARMY.

KHANH'S STATE OF MIND WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE FUTURE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND IN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF US POLICY. HE AND MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES ARE FINDING IT VERY
DIFFICULT TO FACE UP TO THE LONG HRS OF SLOW HARD SLUGGING
WHICH IS ALL THEY SEE AHEAD UNDER THE PRESENT RULE OF OPERATIONAL
CONDUCT. WHILE THEY RECEIVED A DRAMATIC LIFT FROM OUR AUGUST 5
ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIET NAM, ITS VERY SUCCESS MAY WHET THEIR
DESIRE FOR POSITIVE ACTION AGAINST THE NORTH PARTICULARLY IF THE
SITUATION TENDS TO SUBSIDE AGAIN INTO THE DOLDRUMS OF CONTINUED
VIET CONG INCIDENTS AND INDECISIVE BLOODSHED. IN THE COMING MONTHS,
WE MAY EXPECT TO FACE MOUNTING PRESSURES FROM THE GVN TO WIN THE
WAR BY DIRECT ATTACK ON HANOI WHICH, IF RESISTED, WILL CREATE
FRICTIONS AND IRRITATIONS WHICH COULD LEAD LOCAL POLITICIANS TO
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION OR LOCAL SOLDIERS
TO A MILITARY ADVENTURE WITHOUT US CONSENT.

TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-C August 10 at 12:10 p.m.
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 12:25 p.m.

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Action CONTROL: 7490
RECD: AUGUST 10, 1964, 2:42 P.M.

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Info FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE (377) PRIORITY

DATE: AUGUST 10, 9 P.M. (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)

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E X D I S

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SVN HAVE THUS FAR APPEARED TO BE OF SECOND ORDER IMPORTANCE. PRICES ARE STABLE AND INFLATION IS UNDER CONTROL. INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT CONTINUES TO BE INSIGNIFICANT ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME RECENT RISE. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, THOUGH SMALL, HAS RISEN STEADILY FROM 140 PERCENT OF THE 1962 LEVEL ON APRIL 1 TO 143 PERCENT ON JULY 31 AND IS PROJECTED AT 150 PERCENT AT THE END OF THE YEAR, A 30 PERCENT RISE OVER 1963. EXPORTS ARE OFF THIS YEAR SO THAT ANY RISE IN CAPITAL GOODS IMPORTS WOULD, IF NOT COVERED BY US ASSISTANCE, LEAD TO A MAJOR BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEM. FOR A VARIETY OF FACTORS, ONE OF WHICH IS UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CHINESE COMMUNITY, THE BLACK MARKET RATE OF THE PIASTER HAD DROPPED TO 135-40 TO THE DOLLAR (LEGAL RATE: 72 PIASTERS). A MORE PENETRATING SCRUTINY, HOWEVER, MAY INDICATE CERTAIN BASIC WEAKNESSES IN THE ECONOMIC POLICY AND OPERATION OF THE GVN. THE TAX STRUCTURE, IMPORT POLICY AND OPERATION OF THE GVN. THE TAX STRUCTURE, IMPORT POLICY AND THE PRESENT MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM MAY BE ACTING AS DRAGS BOTH ON THE COMPETENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE PROPER USE OF TOTAL RESOURCES IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION. USOM IS EXAMINING THESE PROBLEMS IN DEPTH AND WILL SUBMIT ITS FINDINGS FOR MISSION COUNCIL CONSIDERATION.

BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE COUNTER VC PACIFICATION PROGRAM. AS THE ARMED FORCES CLEAR THE IDENTIFIED VC FORCES FROM AN AREA, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CIVILIAN MINISTRIES OF THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING POLICE, EDUCATION, PUBLIC WORKS, INTERIOR, INFORMATION, RURAL AFFAIRS, HEALTH AND FINANCE. IT IS THE TASK OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE (USIS) TO ENERGIZE THESE FORCES OF GOVERNMENT AND TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION IN THE PROVINCES

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-2- 377, AUGUST 10, 9 PM, FROM SAIGON (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)

WITH THE MILITARY PACIFICATION EFFORT. THIS TASK IS PROVING TO BE A MOST DIFFICULT ONE PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE MINISTRIES, THEIR INEPTITUDE IN PLANNING AND THEIR GENERAL LACK OF SPIRIT OF TEAM PLAY. TO STEP UP THE JOB, USOM HAS STRENGTHENED ITS PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATION FROM 45 IN MARCH TO 64 IN JULY BUT THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS IS STILL INSUFFICIENT. A YEAR END OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED OF TWO AMERICANS IN ALL PROVINCES, OFTEN REINFORCED WITH A THIRD PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER. USIS HAS 16 AMERICAN PERSONNEL THE FIELD AND EXPECTS TO REMAIN AT ABOUT THAT STRENGTH.

ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION IS IN THE HANDS OF INEXPERIENCED JUNIOR OFFICER OPERATING UNDER THE POLICY AND FISCAL SUPERVISION OF REMOTE, POORLY STAFFED CIVILIAN MINISTRIES IN SAIGON. IN SPITE OF THIS UNPROMISING BACKGROUND, US OBSERVERS REPORTED IN JULY THAT IN ABOUT THREE-FOURTHS OF THE PROVINCES THE GVN PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT OFFICIALS WERE PERFORMING EFFECTIVELY; ALSO THAT IN GENERAL THEY WERE WORKING WELL WITH THEIR US COUNTERPARTS. THIS SITUATION IS INDICATIVE OF PROGRESS SINCE THE GOVERNMENTAL UPHEAVALS AT THE TIME OF THE COUP, BUT THERE IS STILL MUCH TO BE DONE TO BRING THE CIVIL CAPABILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT ABREAST OF ITS MILITARY.

TAYLOR

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CONTROL: 7516
RECD: AUG 10, 11:38 A.M.
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 377 PRIORITY
DATE: AUG 10, 9 P.M. (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

AS A MAJOR VEHICLE FOR ACHIEVING THE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH WE SEEK, THE US MISSION, WORKING JOINTLY WITH THE GVN, HAS DEVELOPED A SIGNIFICANT PACIFICATION PLAN (WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN THE NAME HOPTAC) BUILDING OUTWARD FROM THE "OILSPOT" URBAN CENTER OF SAIGON-CHOLON. NOT ONLY IS THIS AREA OF PARAMOUNT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, BUT, IN ITS BROADEST EXTENSION, IT CONTAINS 40 PERCENT OF THE NATION'S POPULATION, ALMOST ALL OF ITS LIMITED INDUSTRY, AND ITS CENTERS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POWER. IN GRAPPLING WITH TANGIBLE PROBLEMS OF THIS PLAN, WE HOPE TO INDUCE THE VIETNAMESE (A) TO WORK TOGETHER BETTER AS A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT, (B) TO BUILD BOTH THEIR URBAN AREAS AND THE OUTLYING RURAL AREAS TOWARDS A SOUNDER ADMINISTRATIVE, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REALITY, AND (C) FINALLY TO ACHIEVE SOME PRAGMATIC MILITARY SUCCESSES WHICH WILL BOLSTER THEIR MORALE, ENGAGE THE ENERGIES OF THEIR BEST QUALIFIED PEOPLE, AND DRIVE THE VIET CONG EFFECTIVELY AWAY FROM THE NATION'S HEARTLAND.

THE US MISSION HAS RECOGNIZED IN ITS INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS THE NEED TO PRESENT THE KHANH GOVERNMENT IN ITS MOST FAVORABLE LIGHT AT HOME AND ABROAD, PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES. WE OBTAINING A MORE BALANCED AND WIDER MEDIA COVERAGE BY IMPROVING FACILITIES FOR THE PRESS BY INVITING FOREIGN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES TO VIET NAM AND BY HELPING THE KHANH GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE ITS PRESS RELATIONS. OUR OWN EFFECTIVENESS BOTH IN THE PRESS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FIELDS HAS BEEN INCREASED BY PLACING COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL US ASSETS IN THE DIRECTOR, USIS.

• THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN WITH INFORMATION TAKEN

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-2- 377, AUGUST 10, 9 P.M., (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE) FROM SAIGON.

VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED. IN BOTH CATEGORIES, WE HAVE UNDERWAY EXTENSIVE PROGRAMS FOR IMPROVEMENT PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF WAR INTERROGATION WHERE WE EXPECT TO TRIPLE THE VIETNAMESE CAPABILITY BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

MILITARY EVALUATION

THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN SVN ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF SLOW IMPROVEMENT SINCE THE PERIOD OF DETERIORATION WHICH FOLLOWED THE TWO COUPS IN NOVEMBER 1963 AND JANUARY 1964. THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SVN AS WELL AS OF THE PARAMILITARY FORCES (REGIONAL FORCES AND POPULAR FORCES) IS SLOWLY RISING AND BY JANUARY 1965 SHOULD REACH ABOUT 98 PERCENT OF THE TARGET YEAR AND STRENGTH OF 446,000. THE DESERTION RATE OF THE ARMY HAS CURRENTLY DROPPED TO ABOUT 5.72 PERCENT OR HALF OF THE RATE OF LAST MARCH. IN SPITE OF UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF BAD MORALE, ONLY ONE UNIT IN THE ARMY, AND INFANTRY REGIMENT ON A STATIC SECURITY MISSION, IS CONSIDERED BY THE RESPONSIBLE US ADVISORS TO HAVE UNSATISFACTORY MORALS.

THE REEQUIPPING OF THE VNAF WITH THE A 1 H AIRCRAFT IS ON SCHEDULE SO THAT THREE SQUADRONS WILL BE COMBAT READY BY 30 SEPTEMBER 1964 AND A FOURTH BY 1 DECEMBER 1964. THE PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM DIRECTED AT ATTAINING A TWO-PILOT-TO-ONE-AIRCRAFT RATIO SHOULD REACH THAT GOAL BY YEAR END.

IN THE VIEW OF US ADVISORS, MORE THAN 90 PERCENT OF THE BATTALIONS OF THE ARMY ARE AT LEAST marginally EFFECTIVE. TWO OUT OF THIRTY REGIMENTS, ONE OUT OF 101 BATTALIONS (INFANTRY, MARINE, AIRBORNE),

TAYLOR

JHW/3

NOTE: THIS IS SECTION FOUR OF FIVE.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 2:25 P.M., 8/10/64;
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 2:10 P.M., 8/10/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CONTROL: 7548
RECD: AUG 10, 11:59 A.M.
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 377 PRIORITY
DATE: AUG 10, 9 P.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE)

~~SECRET~~

E X D I S

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THREE OUT OF TWENTY RANGER BATTALIONS AND ONE OUT OF 20 ENGINEER BATTALIONS ARE RATED AS NOT COMBAT EFFECTIVE. THE PRINCIPAL DEFECTS THROUGHOUT THE ARMY ARE LOW PRESENT-FOR-DUTY STRENGTHS AND WEAK LEADERSHIP AT THE LEVEL OF JUNIOR OFFICERS AND NCO'S.

IN GENERAL, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE WEAKNESS IN THE MILITARY FORCE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND ARE RECEIVING CORRECTIVE TREATMENT. THE RECENTLY AUTHORIZED INCREASE IN US ADVISOR STRENGTH SHOULD ASSURE INCREASED PROGRESS THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE YEAR IN IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF ALL CATEGORIES.

AGAINST THIS IMPROVEMENT ON THE SIDE OF THE GVN, ONE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ACCEPTED ESTIMATE IN MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE VC STRENGTH OF AT BETWEEN 28-34,000, IN CONTRAST WITH 23-27,000 ESTIMATED ACCEPTED PRIOR TO JULY 1964. IN TERMS OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, THE VC ARE BETTER ARMED AND LED TODAY THAN EVER IN THE PAST. INFILTRATION CONTINUES BOTH FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE VC ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN REPLACING THEIR LOSSES IN MEN AND EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IN THE COMING MONTHS THEY WILL WISH TO RISK THEIR PAST GAINS IN AN OVERT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH GVN FORCES ALTHOUGH THEY KEEP A SIZEABLE UNUSED FORCE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS WITH CONSIDERABLE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. FINALLY, THEY HAVE UNUSED DIRTY TRICKS IN THEIR BAG SUCH AS THE MINING OF THE SAIGON RIVER, SABOTAGE OF POL STOCKS AND TERRORIST ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN COMMUNITIES AND US DEPENDENTS.

* This copy must be retained to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

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-2- 377, AUGUST 10, 9 PM, FROM SAIGON (SEC FIVE OF FIVE)

OVERALL FORECAST

IN EARLY JULY, THE PERCENTAGES OF THE RURAL AND COMBINED RURAL AND URBAN POPULATIONS UNDER GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL, VC CONTROL AND CONTESTED WERE AS FOLLOWS:

RURAL		RURAL AND URBAN
GVN CONTROL	33 PERCENT	40 PERCENT
VC CONTROL	20 PERCENT	18 PERCENT
CONTESTED	47 PERCENT	42 PERCENT

BY YEAR END, ASSUMING NO FURTHER POLITICAL UPHEAVALS, THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES SHOULD BE ATTAINABLE:

RURAL		RURAL AND URBAN
GVN CONTROL	40 PERCENT	47 PERCENT
VC CONTROL	16 PERCENT	14 PERCENT
CONTESTED	44 PERCENT	39 PERCENT

THIS CHANGE IN PERCENTAGES, IF ACHIEVED, WILL REPRESENT MODEST PROGRESS TOWARD STABILIZING THE IN-COUNTRY SITUATION. IT WILL NOT REPRESENT A DRAMATIC ADVANCE TOWARD CUTTING DOWN THE VC TO SIZE, STOPPING INFILTRATION OR JUSTIFYING A FORECAST OF FINAL SUCCESS. IT IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ENOUGH TO INDUCE GENERAL KHANH TO GIVE UP HIS CAMPAIGN IN FAVOR OF ATTACKING NVN OR TO CONVINCHE HANOI TO GIVE UP THE CONTEST IN SOUTH VIET NAM.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, IT IS FELT THAT THE US EFFORTS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS DURING THE COMING MONTHS:

- A. DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BOLSTER THE KHANH GOVERNMENT.
- B. IMPROVE THE IN-COUNTRY PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VC BY CONCENTRATING EFFORTS ON STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AREAS SUCH AS THE PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON (THE HOPTAC PLAN).
- C. UNDERTAKE "SHOW-WINDOW" SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROJECTS IN SECURE URBAN AND RURAL AREAS.
- D. BE PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT CONTINGENCY PLANS AGAINST NORTH VIET NAM WITH OPTIMUM READINESS BY JANUARY 1, 1965.
- E. KEEP THE US PUBLIC INFORMED OF WHAT WE ARE DOING AND WHY.

TAYLOR

GP-1

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 2:15 PM, 8/10/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 2:45 PM, 8/10/64.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: [] COLLECT
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Classification

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON

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DECLASSIFIED

JUL 20 9 33 PM '64

Info

EXDIS

Authority State Ltr. 4/27/78
By Shaw, NARS, Date 5/10/78

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

Realize you fully aware importance keeping General Khanh as far as possible on same track as ourselves regarding possible action against North. Khanh's speech of yesterday plus editorial in Bui Diem's paper suggests to us that GVN may be attempting stimulate pressure for U.S. involvement in such action.

You may wish to reiterate to Khanh importance of maintaining parallel position. Talk of this sort tends to distract GVN from first job of getting on with pacification. It also confuses our signals to the North and the rest of the world. If it should become necessary to take such action in response to significant escalation by Hanoi, we would want to be in position of responding to new aggression rather than appear to be carrying out

Drafted by:

S/VN:MVForrestal:caw **MP**

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

AR The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Tueller **BCT**

FE William Bundy **WMB**

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previously planned and publicized offensive.

END

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Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE

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JUL 20 9 27 PM '64

Info:

INFO: CINCPAC for POLAD

SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV

EXDIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978

By inf, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

There follows text of draft statement on proposed U.S. military ~~inc~~ personnel increases SVN. This has not been reviewed at highest levels. Would appreciate your comments by noon our time tomorrow.

"In keeping with the United States policy to provide the Government of South Vietnam with whatever amounts of economic aid, military training and logistic support are required to maintain the independence of that country, I have approved a request by Secretary McNamara for a substantial increase in United States military assistance in South Vietnam. This request is based upon proposals by Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland and has the support of the Joint

Drafted by: by [signature]
SVN: MVForrestal:caw

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

MVF by [signature]
MVForrestal - S/VN

Clearances:

FE Mr. Wm. Bundy by [signature]
DOD/ISA Mr. McNaughton by [signature]

S/S - Mr. But Tueller

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Chiefs of Staff.

The Government of South Vietnam, as we previously announced, has been working on plans to intensify pacification in critical areas. Part of the increase in the United States effort stems from recommendations, in response to those plans, submitted to me in June by Ambassador Lodge based upon proposals by General Westmoreland. Prior to Ambassador Taylor's departure for Vietnam, he had been studying whether the increased effort proposed in June would be sufficient. Working with General Westmoreland, and based upon his personal observation of the situation, Ambassador Taylor ~~XXXXXX~~ recently concluded that further increases were called for.

Therefore, over the next six to twelve months, the strength of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam will be increased to approximately 22,000. The movement of personnel and supporting equipment will commence almost immediately.

This increase in U.S. military assistance does not reflect any change in U.S. policy in South Vietnam or in the concept which has governed our advisory activities in that country. No combat units are included, and there will be no change in the advisory relationship between U.S. personnel and the Vietnamese military and

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and civilian authorities.

The U.S. continues to recognize that the greatest attention must be given to the political, social, and economic, as well as the military, aspects of the struggle. General Taylor has told me he intends to forward recommendations for an increase in U.S. civilian personnel to fill civilian advisory functions, principally in the provinces outside of Saigon.

The purpose of the increase in U.S. military personnel is to extend the U.S. military advisory effort in three major respects.

First, we intend to extend and reinforce the United States advisory effort at the South Vietnamese combat level-- by which I mean at the level of the regular military forces such as the army battalions, the navy patrol craft, and the armored personnel carrier detachments.

Second, the United States military advisory effort at the district level of the South Vietnam Government will be intensified. The key aim here is to provide greater support for the overall pacification effort of the Government of South Vietnam. Equally important, we shall be putting greater

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stress upon our advisory effort with the South Vietnamese paramilitary forces--the people that often find themselves on the immediate firing line when their villages and hamlets are attacked by the Communist rebels.

Third, we intend to increase greatly our advisory assistance to the South Vietnam Special Forces units. Their mission is to carry out offensive guerrilla-type and interdiction actions against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. These units operate along the border areas and are an important part of the Government's effort to seal the border against infiltration.

The personnel increases in these three categories will nearly double the advisory effort at the lower echelons in the field, as well as the number of places where U.S. advisors will be located.

In order to provide the necessary logistical and technical support for the increased effort, we are increasing the number of helicopters and transport aircraft and support personnel in South Vietnam. A substantial part of the increased United States effort falls in this category.

There are other comments I would like to make about

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the situation in South Vietnam.

First, I am gratified that our United States effort there is increasingly being joined by that of our Free World allies. As previously reported, most recently last week-end at the ANZUS conference, Australia and New Zealand have augmented their military assistance efforts considerably. Korea has announced that it would send a hospital unit and combat instructors to Vietnam, while the Philippine Congress has just passed a special appropriation to support the contribution of medical teams and other advisory personnel. The Governments of China, Germany, Japan, and Thailand have also announced that they would give aid and support to Vietnam in its struggle against Communist imperialism, and several other countries are currently considering the ways in which they might assist.

Second, we remain committed to an advisory, training and support program that will enable American personnel to leave ~~wxxxxx~~ Vietnam when they complete their jobs there. We continue to work toward this end--toward the time when the Vietnamese will be fully capable of training and advising their own countrymen.

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Third, combat activity in Vietnam has intensified recently. As the Government's pacification plan gathers momentum, and in the face of increasing Communist capabilities, it is natural that it should. We must be prepared for that increase.

Finally, we all know--and our opponents must also know--that there is danger in Southeast Asia. I have said that before; I say it now. The United States must be fully prepared to meet that danger in whatever form it may take. We are prepared.

Let me emphasize once again that the American purpose in South Vietnam--and elsewhere in Southeast Asia--is peace. I have said ~~h~~ this repeatedly. We Americans are there to help the Vietnamese to achieve peace in the face of Communist-led and inspired terror and insurgency. We remain steadfast and determined to use American strength to help the Vietnamese to that end".

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JUL 23 8 23 PM '64

Origin
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ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 224 FLASH
INFO: CINCPAC
SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV
EXDIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978
By isg, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

Opinion at highest level here now is that news of increase of US military assistance to South Vietnam would better come from Saigon than from Washington. The form we suggest is brief joint statement by you and General Khanh, immediately preceded by backgrounder from you to US press. Believe this would tend to focus attention on US-GVN partnership and might go some way towards satisfying General Khanh's continuing need for evidence of our support. Your backgrounder could also prevent otherwise natural tendency to connect these reinforcements to pressure to go north. We believe joint announcement could say simply that two governments have agreed on need for intensification of pacification effort, and US has agreed to increase substantially its military and civilian participation in pacification effort, specifically including advisers with regular, paramilitary and special forces. In backgrounder you could within your own discretion explain

Date: S/VN: MVForrestal: pp 7/23/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal MF

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy FE - Mr. William Bundy
DOD - Mr. Solbert P - Mr. Manning (All clearances in draft)
U - Mr. Ball
S/S - Mr. Tuelker by M V

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thinking which led country team to these recommendations.

The one thing highest authority wishes to avoid is official confirmation of total numbers. Numbers game unproductive to us and helpful only to Viet Cong. You will be pressed for precise numbers of increased personnel and should refuse to describe future plans. You should state our position as one of readiness to state at all times what force levels are in place, and unwillingness to assist the enemy by precise advance notice of our intentions.

The President has scheduled a press conference at 3:30 Washington time Friday and may wish to give indication that new decisions are in the making, depending on your ability to schedule backgrounder and public announcement promptly thereafter.

Entire plan is subject to your comment, which together with a draft joint statement is requested in time for discussion Friday morning here.

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JUL 21 6 34 PM '64

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ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 205

Info

EXDIS

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

Highest Authority has approved in principle, subject to further review of details, the requested increase in authorized military strength to approximately 22,000. It has not yet been decided whether or how this augmentation should be announced. Steps should be taken to insure that there is no RPT no intentional or accidental release of information on this subject from Saigon until authorized.

END

RUSK

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Authority State 10-11-78, OSD 3-15-79

By iq, NARS, Date 7-30-79

S/VN: MVForrestal:caw

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

MVForrestal - S/VN *NK*

Clearances:

- BKX** DOD - Mr. McNaughton (in draft) *NF*
- FE** - Mr. Wm. Bundy *WMS*
- SS** - Mr. Moose *JM*

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Info: CINCPAC _____ IMMEDIATE

JUL 25 4 56 PM '64

EXDIS

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STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE Authority State ltr. 4/7/78
By Chiu, NARS, Date 5/10/78
REF: Embtels 213, 214, 215

1. Analysis your 213 most helpful and persuasive. We note particularly your judgment that sense of frustration and desire for some action particularly strong among generals but perhaps not widespread in people as a whole.
2. Proposal your 215 for announcement personnel increase fully approved. Please let us know soonest what you propose to say in backgrounder so that we can keep backgrounding here fully in tune. As stated our 235, we do not propose announcement here.
3. Re proposal your 214, our objective should be to provide channel for frustrations of Khanh and generals without committing USG to action, and with minimum risk of disruptive leaks that might add to picture of US/GVN disagreement, cause wrong signal to Hanoi and Peking, and above all impair our freedom of action and public policy

Drafted by: FE: W. P. Bundy/bmm 7/25
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE: W. P. Bundy *WPA*

Clearances: White House - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ McG Bundy (substance) *WPA*
DoD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton *WPA* U - Mr. Ball (substance) *WPA* M - Gov. Harrime
P - Mr. Manning (subs.) *WPA* S/S - Mr. ~~Ball~~ *WPA* (substance)
S/VN - Mr. Forrestal *WPA* ~~SECRET~~ *WPA* REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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posture. We have impression that Khanh's meetings in Dalat will have been concerned with the pressures he is under ~~from~~ from Khiem on the one hand and with reference to Minh's position on the other. Thus, you should first draw him out on results Dalat meetings and on his present position and state of mind. If this part of conversation confirms analysis your 213 and 214 that major pressures and frustrations do exist and that it essential to Khanh's position and our relationship with him to go forward, you are authorized to make following points:

a. USG has of course made careful study of problems involved in action against DRV and believes it would be useful pursue this subject in more concrete manner in small and select joint group.

b. Vital that such discussions be conducted so that they do not leak in any way. Military security alone dictates this, but you should also emphasize to Khanh that leaks can only lead to same problems of clarifying statements and apparent disunity that we have already had in last week, and that these will if anything make it more difficult USG pursue additional courses of action if and when these become necessary.

c. Accordingly, Khanh for such discussions should bring in only very few most needed and trusted GVN officers chosen personally by him for their ~~loyalty~~ loyalty and security.

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d. While we do not believe ~~you~~ you should table any written statement or terms of reference as proposed your 214, you should make these points orally and particularly underscore that USG assuming no commitment to carry out such plans.

4. FYI: We concur completely that resulting discussions should highlight need for completing preliminary actions, which may take some time to accomplish. You should be prepared to stress particularly such concrete items as the need for additional AIH aircraft and trained pilots, and Khanh himself may suggest importance air defense measures. However, arguments of under-strength ARVN units and need for greater degree of control over VC may encounter response that these aspects are not going to get any better. Hence importance of stress on military essentials for attack itself. End FYI.

5. JCS considering urgently what additional external measures might be taken, short of attack on DRV itself, that would provide maximum military escalation benefit with minimum risks of ~~escalation~~ or international complications. Request your ~~x~~ judgment as to actions you would recommend under this heading. If you think it useful, you could tell Khanh Monday that you have asked your government to consider such actions and that these could be discussed in same group. Khanh's reaction might produce some suggestion this area that would help to meet basic problem of channel for frustrations.

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6. We remain deeply concerned that even with these restrictions and caveats Khanh's position and attitudes of key generals now such that he or they will feel strong temptation publicize existence such planning exercise perhaps in some tendentious form and with implication USG committed at least in some degree. Our line here in such case would be that USG has not changed policy but has repeatedly made it clear that wider action not excluded. Hence natural that US and GVN should be giving careful study this subject, and such contingency discussions have ~~long~~ been underway long period.

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JUL 26 6 21 PM '64

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy VIENTIANE

IMMEDIATE 89

Info

INFO: AmEmbassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE 261

EXDIS

VIENTIANE FOR AMBASSADOR UNDER
SAIGON FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR FOR INFORMATION ONLY. NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION
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1. Primarily for reasons of morale in South Viet-Nam and to divert GVN attention from proposal to strike North Viet-Nam, we are considering proposing to Ambassador Taylor that he discuss with Khanh air attacks on VC supply lines in the Laotian Panhandle. For meeting of Secretaries, request by 0600 our time Monday your views on such operations, your estimate of reaction of Souvanna and other Lao leaders, and your advice as to best way to obtain Souvanna's acquiescence.
2. Our preliminary views as to possible air attacks are as follows:

- a. The military objective would be to interdict and destroy facilities supporting infiltration into SVN. (It is possible that the political objective might be achieved by fewer targets and/or sorties than indicated below.)

Drafted by: OSD/ISA: JTMcNaughton: gm

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/VN - M. V. Forrestal MF

Clearances: 7/26/64

~~DOD - Mr. McNamara (draft)~~

JCS - Gen. Wheeler (draft) MF

FE - Mr. Bundy (draft) MF

S/S Mr. Williams DOD-Mr. McNaughton

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Authority NL 388-65; State 10/11/78

By Dept, NARA, Date 4-18-70

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- b. Initial targets, which would be programmed for moderate to severe damage, would probably be Muong Phine army barracks (12 sorties), Ban Thay military camp and 4 AAA gun emplacements (18 sorties), Ban Na Nhom military camp (12 sorties), Tchepone army barracks (68 sorties), Muong Nong military area (10 sorties), and Ban Trim barracks and supply area (34 sorties). Also considering Mu Gia border control point just inside North Viet-Nam (14 sorties). At same time, attacks of opportunity would be carried out on lines of communication by armed reconnaissance.
- c. Aircraft would be either ALH with only GVN pilots, or ALH plus ALE with American instructors also aboard in case of ALEs. Our present thinking does not RPT not include use of Lao T-28s.
- d. Armament would be napalm unless politically unacceptable, in which case armament would be less effective conventional bombs, rockets and 20 mm.
- e. Estimate that attacks could begin in early August and could, without serious degraation of air support for pacification in SVN, be carried out at rate of 20 sorties a day. Our proposal, however, may be that strikes be

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conducted on intermittent basis at a slower rate than indicated depending on political requirements.

f. Estimated aircraft losses at less than two per cent in early stages, meaning that some planes will probably be downed in Laos during attacks on initial targets.

g. We may recommend certain readiness measures in Laos and Thailand to cope with possible communist reaction or escalation (e.g., PL moves on Panhandle towns or even toward Mekong).

h. It is assumed that attacks would promptly become known and responsibility would be acknowledged by GVN; that if US instructors are on board, US would acknowledge this fact; that operation would be justified on grounds of infiltration of personnel and supplies through corridor in violation of Geneva Accords; and that we would publicize relevant evidence from photography and POW interrogation. We would hope Souvanna would publicly support such a rationale but at minimum would do or say nothing to undermine it.

3. As you know, joint US-GVN planning is underway not only for air attacks but also for ground operations up to battalion size in Panhandle. We may be querying you shortly for your reactions regarding regarding such ground operations.

END

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

31

~~TOP SECRET~~

39
Action
Info

CONTROL: 20462
RECD: JULY 25, 1964, 8:10 AM
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 214 FLASH
INFO: CINCPAC 97 IMMEDIATE
DATE: JULY 25, 5 PM

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978
By *[signature]*, NARS, Date JUL 18 0 1979

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS

THE GVN PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FOR "MARCHING NORTH" (REPORTED EMBTEL 201) MAY TAKE SEVERAL COURSES. IN THE FACE OF US COOLNESS AND ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OF REAL GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT OUTSIDE CERTAIN MILITARY QUARTERS, IT MAY DIE DOWN FOR A WHILE ALTHOUGH IT IS HARDLY LIKELY TO DISAPPEAR COMPLETELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PROponents OF A "QUICK SOLUTION" MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP IT ALIVE INDEFINITELY AS AN ACTIVE ISSUE, IN WHICH CASE IT IS LIKELY TO FOMENT AN INCREASING AMOUNT OF DISSATISFACTION WITH THE U.S. (ASSUMING THAT WE CONTINUE TO GIVE IT NO SUPPORT) TO THE SERIOUS DETRIMENT OF OUR WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE GVN AND HENCE OF THE ULTIMATE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF THE IN-COUNTRY PACIFICATION PROGRAM. IN SUCH A CASE, VIETNAMESE LEADERS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT, UNABLE TO FIND A VENT TO THEIR FRUSTRATION IN "MARCHING NORTH" MAY SEEK OTHER PANACEAS IN VARIOUS FORMS OF NEGOTIATION FORMULAS. GENERAL KHANH MAY FIND IN THE SITUATION AN EXCUSE OR A REQUIREMENT OF RESIGN.

FINALLY, THIS "MARCH NORTH" FEVER CAN GET OUT OF HAND IN AN ACT OF RASHNESS -- ONE MAVERICK PILOT TAKING OFF FOR HANOI WITH A LOAD OF BOMBS -- WHICH COULD TOUCH OFF AN EXTENSION OF HOSTILITIES AT A TIME AND IN A FORM MOST DISADVANTAGEOUS TO U.S. INTERESTS.

FACED WITH THESE UNATTRACTIVE POSSIBILITIES, WE PROPOSE A COURSE OF ACTION DESIGNED TO DO SEVERAL THINGS.

WE WOULD TRY TO AVOID HEAD-ON COLLISION WITH THE GVN WHICH UNQUALIFIED U.S. OPPOSITION TO THE "MARCH NORTH" CAMPAIGN

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OFFICE SYMBOL		

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 214, JULY 25, 5 PM: FROM SAIGON

WOULD ENTAIL. WE WOULD DO THIS BY EXPRESSING A WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR VARIOUS FORMS OF EXTENDED ACTION AGAINST NVN. SUCH PLANNING WOULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE AN OUTLET FOR THE MARTIAL HEAD OF STEAM NOW DANGEROUSLY COMPRESSED, BUT WOULD FORCE THE GENERALS TO LOOK AT THE HARD FACTS OF LIFE WHICH LIE BEHIND THE NEON LIGHTS OF THE "MARCH NORTH" SLOGANS. THIS PLANNING WOULD ALSO GAIN TIME BADLY NEEDED TO STABILIZE THIS GOVERNMENT AND COULD PROVIDE A USEFUL BASIS FOR MILITARY ACTION IF ADJUDGED IN OUR INTEREST AT SOME FUTURE TIME. FINALLY, IT WOULD ALSO AFFORD US AN OPPORTUNITY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO HAVE A FRANK DISCUSSION WITH GVN LEADERS CONCERNING THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WHICH THEY WOULD ENVISAGE AS THE PURPOSES INHERENT IN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE DRV. WE DO NOT REALLY KNOW WHETHER THEY FEEL THAT VIET-NAM CAN INDEED BE UNIFIED BY MILITARY ACTION, OR WHETHER SUCH ACTION IS INTENDED ONLY TO INTRODUCE A PRESSURE WHICH WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO VIET CONG TERROR IN ORDER TO INDUCE DRV TO DESIST FOR AIDING VC AND TO IMPROVE BARGAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR A POLITICAL NEGOTIATION WITH HANOI.

IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, IN INITIATING SUCH A LINE OF ACTION THAT WE MAKE A CLEAR RECORD THAT WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT ASSUMING ANY COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT SUCH PLANS. THEREFORE, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO GIVE GENERAL KHANH THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN STATEMENT:

"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS NOTED RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY VARIOUS LEADERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM PROPOSING MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE SOURCES OF AGGRESSION IN NORTH VIET-NAM. THE REASONS WHICH HAVE PROMPTED THESE STATEMENTS ARE CLEAR AND THE IMPATIENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING SUBVERSIVE WAREFARE FROM THE NORTH IS UNDERSTANDABLE.

"IN CONSIDERING WAYS AND MEANS TO BRING THE VIET CONG INSURGENCY UNDER CONTROL, AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON HAVE GIVEN SERIOUS STUDY OVER A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD TO THE QUESTION OF BRINGING MILITARY PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE LEADERS OF NORTH VIET-NAM. IT HAS BEEN THEIR CONCLUSION THAT THIS IS A COMPLEX PROBLEM INVOLVING JUDGEMENTS AND DECISIONS IN BOTH THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS WHICH NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR VIET-NAM COULD TAKE INDEPENDENTLY. THE CURRENT ACTIVITY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSISTS IN THE PROVISION OF MASSIVE ASSISTANCE TO YOUR GOVERNMENT IN THE EXTENSION OF ITS ICRC/NPTI*APPROVED PACIFICATION PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. THE QUESTION OF EXTENDING THIS ASSISTANCE BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO A PROGRAM OF ACTION OUTSIDE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 214, JULY 25, 5 PM FROM SAIGON

THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM HAS NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY DISCUSSED UP TO NOW, BUT IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR GIVING THE MATTER A THOROUGH ANALYSIS.

"IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE BEST METHOD OF PRODUCING SUCH AN ANALYSIS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF A JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING STUDY, UNDERTAKEN BY APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, WITHOUT ADVANCE COMMITMENTS BY EITHER SIDE AS TO SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS. IF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AGREES, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS AUTHORIZED ME TO APPOINT REPRESENTATIVES WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO MEET, UNDER CONDITIONS OF MAXIMUM DISCRETION AND SECURITY, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM TO UNDERTAKE SUCH DISCUSSIONS."

IT IS MY OPINION THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS, IF INITIATED WITH RESPONSIBLE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, WOULD NOT ONLY DEVELOP SOME OF THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL THINKING WHICH IS CURRENTLY MOTIVATING THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, BUT WOULD ALSO REVEAL THE NEED FOR THE COMPLETION OF A NUMBER OF PRELIMINARY ACTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN BEFORE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION CAN BE GIVEN TO EXPANDING THE WAR. SUCH ACTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE THE ABSORPTION OF THE NEW A1H AIRCRAFT BY NOVEMBER 1, THE FILLING OF THE RANKS OF UNDERSTRENGTH ARVN UNITS, AIR DEFENSE MEASURES FOR URBAN CENTERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GREATER DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE VC THAN NOW EXISTS IN ORDER TO SECURE THE REAR AND FLANKS OF FIGHTING FORCES.

IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF APPROVAL FOR THE ABOVE STATEMENT CAN BE RECEIVED TO PERMIT ITS USE AT MY NEXT MEETING WITH KHANH SCHEDULED FOR 1600, 27 JULY (SAIGON TIME).

G-1.

TAYLOR

CFN 96 GVN 201 1,

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 7:55 AM, JULY 25.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 8 AM, JULY 25.

* AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

32

~~TOP SECRET~~

39
Action
88
Info

CONTROL 20489
RECD JULY 25, 7:41 AM
FROM SAIGON
ACTION SECSTATE 215 IMMEDIATE
INFO: CINCPAC 98

I

DATE: JULY 25, 5 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978
By [Signature] NARS Date JUL 13 1979

~~TOP SECRET~~

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E X D I S

DEPTEL 224 AND EMBTEL 195.

ON FURTHER REFLECTION AND CONSIDERING IMPORTANCE DOING
UTMOST TO GIVE SOME PROMPT VISIBLE SUPPORT AND BUILD-UP TO
KHANH, BELIEVE I SHOULD GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE
FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF INCREASE TO BE FOLLOWED UP BY BACK-
GROUNDER BY ME. THIS WILL ENABLE KHANH PRESENT VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
WITH SOLID ACHIEVEMENT OF INCREASED US MATERIAL SUPPORT AND
HOPEFULLY SERVE IN SOME SMALL DEGREE UNDERCUT PRESSURES
ON HIM REPORTED IN SEPTELS.

THEREFORE, I WOULD PROPOSE AT MY MEETING WITH HIM ON MONDAY
AFTERNOON, GIVING KHANH FOLLOWING DRAFT TEXT, IN ORDER AVOID
"TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" CONNOTATION I WOULD OF COURSE INDICATE
READINESS DISCUSS NON-SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES BUT WOULD INSIST
UPON OUR AGREEMENT TO FINAL TEXT. ALTERNATIVELY I WOULD OFFER TO
INCORPORATE SUBSTANCE IN JOINT STATEMENT BY THE TWO OF US.

"THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN INFORMED BY AMBASSADOR TAYLOR THAT
IN SUPPORT OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM MUTUALLY AGREED UPON

BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE US HAS APPROVED A SUBSTANTIAL
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
ADVISERS IN VIETNAM.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 215, JULY 25 5, PM: FROM SAIGON

THE MAJOR PORTION OF THIS INCREASE IN AMERICAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL BE DEVOTED TO STRENGTHENING THE PRESENT AMERICAN ADVISORY EFFORT IN FOUR MAJOR AREAS:

1. IT WILL EXTEND AND REINFORCE THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORY EFFORT WITH THE LOWER ECHELONS OF THE REGULAR VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY WITH ARMY BATTALIONS, NAVY PATROL UNITS AND AIR FORCE SQUADRONS.
2. IT WILL PROVIDE A MAJOR INCREASE IN US SPECIAL FORCES TO AUGMENT TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR OWN SPECIAL FORCES UNITS TO ENHANCE CAPACITY FOR GUERRILLA ACTIONS AGAINST VIET CONG UNITS AND BASES, AND TO DEAL WITH INFILTRATION ACROSS OUR BORDERS.
3. IT WILL INCREASE THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORY ASSISTANCE AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL IN ORDER TO PLACE GREATER STRESS ON IMPROVEMENT OF OUR REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES.
4. IT WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN CIVILIAN ADVISERS AT ALL LEVELS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR EVEN CLOSER COOPERATION WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS IN SUCH FIELDS AS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH, POLICE, FORCES, AGRICULTURE AND GENERAL WELFARE.

THIS INCREASE IN AMERICAN PERSONNEL, WHICH WILL COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY, WILL BE PARALLELED BY AN INCREASE IN US SUPPORT ELEMENTS TO INCLUDE HELICOPTERS, TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, COMMUNICATIONS AND SERVICE PERSONNEL.

THE AUGMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN EFFORT IN VIETNAM DOES NOT REFLECT ANY CHANGE IN CONCEPTS AGREED TO BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

THAT AMERICAN PERSONNEL WILL SERVE IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY NOR WILL IT CHANGE PRESENT OPERATING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

THIS INCREASE IN AMERICAN ASSISTANCE, COUPLED WITH THE CONSTANTLY INCREASING SUPPORT OF MANY OTHER NATIONS IN RESPONSE TO OUR CALL FOR AID, SHOULD SERVE AS A WARNING TO THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS IN HANOI THAT THE FREE WORLD IS DETERMINED TO HELP THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN ITS STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE. THE AMERICAN ASSISTANCE SERVES PARTICULARLY AS CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF AMERICA'S CONTINUED DETERMINATION TO PROVIDE WHATEVER RESOURCES ARE NECESSARY TO ASSIST US IN THIS EFFORT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 215, JULY 25, 5 PM:FROM SAIGON

THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WELCOMES THIS ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES".

IN BACKGROUNDER I WOULD OF COURSE FOLLOW GUIDANCE IN DEPTTEL 224. I WILL ALSO MAKE POINT THAT THESE INCREASES ARE THE RESULT OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY BOTH AMBASSADOR LODGE AND MYSELF. PRESUME WASHINGTON WOULD BE PREPARED PROMPTLY TO CONFIRM SUBSTANCE OF STATEMENT. WOULD APPRECIATE APPROVAL SOONEST.

GP-1.

CFN 224 195 1 2 3 4.224 GP-1

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 8:20 AM, JULY 25.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 8:36 AM, JULY 25.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Handwritten initials

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Z 271300Z
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
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~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION FLASH SECSTATE 232 SEONE OF TWO, CINCPAC 108, WHITE HOUSE 13, SEC DEF UNN, JULY 27, 10 AM

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978

DEPTEL 253.

By *isg*, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

ALEX JOHNSON AND I CALLED ON KHANH AT DALAT AT 1500, 27 JULY AND DISCUSSED ALONE WITH HIM A WIDE RANGE OF TOPIC. WE WERE UNCERTAIN IN WHAT MOOD WE WOULD FIND HIM AS WE HAD RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT THE PREVIOUS DAY HE HAD BEEN GRUMBLING ABOUT THE UNCERTAINTIES OF US POLICY AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO ADJUST HIMSELF TO A PUPPET ROLE.

ON ARRIVING WE ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS DAY AND A HALF OF CONFERENCES WHICH HE WAS HAVING WITH HIS SENIOR GENERALS. THE QUESTION ELICITED NO IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OTHER THAN THAT NUMEROUS SUBJECTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. SOME OF THE SUBJECTS CAME OUT IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION REPORTED ELSEWHERE IN THIS MESSAGE.

I OPENED THE MATTER OF A PRESS RELEASE BY HIM COVERING THE US MILITARY PERSONNEL INCREASE. HE SAW AT ONCE THE ADVANTAGE OF HIS PUTTING OUT SUCH A RELEASE AND ACCEPTED OUR TEXT WITH ONE MODIFICATION. HE PREFERRED TO CHANGE REFERENCE TO "ADVISORS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL" TO "ADVISORS THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCES" SAYING THAT THE MENTION OF THE DISTRICT SUGGESTED AN UNDESIRABLY DEEP US ADVISOR PENETRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD TAKE THE STATEMENT BACK TO SAIGON WHERE WE WOULD BE MET BY ONE OF KHANH S OFFICERS WHO WOULD ARRANGE FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE. HE UNDERSTANDS THE NECESSITY TO AVOID PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF ULTIMATE END STRENGTHS AND AGREES TO CONFORM TO OUR REQUEST FOR SECRECY ON THIS SUBJECT.

THERE WAS A SHORT DISCUSSION OF PRESS LEAKS GENERATED BY THE QUICK APPEARANCE IN THE PRESS ON JULY 23 OF OUR JOINT CONFERENCE ARISING FROM GENERAL KY S STATEMENT ON PENETRATIONS OF NORTH VIET NAM. MR. JOHNSON TOLD HIM THAT A SAIGON US PRESSMAN HAD SAID THAT THE LEAK WAS FROM THE VIETNAMESE SIDE. WE AGREED THAT, WHOEVER THE CULPRIT, THE INCIDENT IS A REMINDER THAT THERE ARE UNFRIENDLY ELEMENTS HERE AND ELSEWHERE ANXIOUS TO DRIVE

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-232, July 27, 10 a.m., from Saigon (SECTION I OF II).

A WEDGE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS IN GENERAL AND BETWEEN KHANH AND TAYLOR IN PARTICULAR. WE ALL AGREED TO BE WATCHFUL IN THE FUTURE. KHANH MADE A NOTE TO INVESTIGATE LEAK.

KHANH SAID PRESS STORIES ON ALLEGED US CORRESPONDENCE WITH PEKING THROUGH AYUB HAD BEEN RAISED AT CABINET MEETING. WE REPLIED THAT THIS IS JUST TYPE THING THAT HOSTILE ELEMENTS WILL USE TO CREATE SUSPICION AND DISTRUST BETWEEN US. FACTS WERE EXACTLY OPPOSITE FROM THOSE IN PRESS STORIES. FACTS WERE THAT WE HAD ASKED CERTAIN COUNTRIES HAVING RELATIONS WITH PEKING, PARTICULARLY SEATO COUNTRIES, TO MAKE CLEAR TO PEKING (AND WHERE POSSIBLE TO HANOI) THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO SVN WAS FIRM, THEY SHOULD NOT MAKE MISTAKE OF THINKING WE ABANDON SVN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AND IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR PEKING AND HANOI TO MAKE ANY ASSUMPTION TO CONTRARY. AYUB HAD APPARENTLY MADE SOME REPRESENTATIONS TO PEKING AND HAD A REPLY. THIS WAS FAR DIFFERENT FROM US ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING THRU PAKISTAN. WE HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE OVER SVN BEHIND BACK GVN. IT WAS ESSENTIAL KHANH BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ON THIS. WE WOULD EXPECT THE SAME FROM HIM. HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING AND SAID WE MUST APPRECIATE VIETNAMESE SENSITIVITIES ON THIS AFTER THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH FRENCH. HE MENTIONED THERE WERE EVEN RUMORS THAT BECAUSE OF JOHNSON S PREVIOUS BACKGROUND OF NEGOTIATION WITH CHICOMS, HE HAD SOMEHOW BEEN SENT HERE TO NEGOTIATE. JOHNSON REPLIED THAT HIS PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF NEGOTIATRY WITH CHICOMS WAS JUST REASON THAT HE PERSONNALLY HAD NO DESIRE REPEAT EXPERIENCE.

WE THEN INVITED KHANH TO SPEAK FRANKLY ABOUT HIS VIEWS ON US POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM -- WAS HE AS UNHAPPY ABOUT IT AS REPORTED? HE ANSWERED INDIRECTLY BY EXPLAINING HIS VIEWS ABOUT THE NEED FOR PRESSURE ON THE NORTH. HE AGAIN SPOKE STRONGLY ABOUT NATIONAL WAR WEARINESS AND THE NEED TO BRING HOSTILITIES TO A PROMPT END. ONCE MORE IT CAME OUT CLEARLY THAT HE IS THINKING ABOUT REPRISAL TIT-FOR-TAT BOMBING RATHER THAN A MOVEMENT NORTH WITH LAND FORCES OR MASSIVE BOMBING TO EFFECT TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF HANOI AND ALL ITS WORKS. HE WANTS TO DO THIS REPRISAL BOMBING TO ENCOURAGE HIS PEOPLE AND TO HASTEN HO CHI MINH

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-232, July 27, 10 a.m., from Saigon (SECTION I OF /II).

TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SUPPORT OF THE VC SHOULD END. HE RECOGNIZES THAT AT SOME TIME HE WILL NEED THE COOPERATION OF HO CHI MINH TO END THE VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH.

CFN 108 13 253 1500 28623 SVN SVN VC

TAYLOR

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 11:35 a.m., July 27.

Passed White House July 27 at 11:50 a.m.

Passed DOD at 11:50 a.m., July 27.

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

34

32

~~SECRET~~

S/V.N

Action PP RUEHCR RUEPIA
 DE RUMJIR 16A 28/0901Z
 SS PR 280343Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
 RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
 RUEKDA/JCS
 RUEPIA/CIA
 RUEKDA/SEC DEF
 STATEHGRNC
 BT

021915

1964 JUL 28 AM 7:00

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~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (235) INFO CINCPAC 109 WHITE HOUSE
 10 JCS 11 CIA 15 SEC DEF 16 FROM SAIGON JULY 28 5PM

E X D I S

IN THE WAKE OF THE ACTUAL AND ALLEGED DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OVER THE PAST WEEK, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND SELECTED STAFF OFFICERS INTERVIEWED OVER THE WEEK END SENIOR ADVISORS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. INTERVIEWS HAVE FOCUSED ON THREE PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS: MORALE OF THE TROOPS AND LEADERS; LOYALTY TO KHANH, TO INCLUDE ANY INDICATION OF COUP PLOTTING; AND THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROSECUTION OF THE PACIFICATION
 CFN 235 109 14 11 15 16 28 5PM

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 16A ~~SECRET~~
 CAMPAIGN. THE GIST OF MACV APPRAISAL FOLLOWS:

MORALE IN GENERAL REMAINS GOOD TO EXCELLENT AT THE TROOP AND LEADERSHIP LEVELS. MORALE IS DOWN IN A FEW BATTALIONS WHICH HAVE SUFFERED RECENT REVERSALS, BUT THIS CONDITION DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE SPREAD TO ANY MAJOR ELEMENT. MORALE HAS DIPPED AT NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF BOTH THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES BECAUSE OF REVISED ARRANGEMENTS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION WHICH WILL DIMINISH THE AUTHORITY OF THESE HEADQUARTERS.

NO EVIDENCE OF LACK OF LOYALTY TO KHAMH WAS DISCLOSED, NOR DO THE ADVISORS HAVE REPORTS OF COUP PLOTTING OR RUMORS. SOME LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE COUNTRY HAS NOT RAPIDLY RALLIED BEHIND KHANH.

THE COMMANDERS OF I CORPS AND THE 1ST DIVISION EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE WAR CAN BE ENDED SOLEY THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THEY FEEL THAT AN ATTACK ON NORTH VIETNAM MUST TAKE PLACE. THE CORPS COMMANDER BELIEVES THAT HE NOW HAS

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4

GPO 867-149

By rg NARA, Date 2-9-12

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-2- 235, JULY 28, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON

RESTORED THE SITUATION BUT IS NOT CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN WIN IN HIS AREA SO LONG AS THE VIET CONG ARE CONTINUALLY REINFORCED FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE VNAF WING STATIONED AT DANANG IS CONVINCED THAT AIR ATTACKS ON NORTH CFN 1ST

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 16A ~~SECRET~~
VIETNAM MUST BE CARRIED OUT NOW; IN THIS POSITION HE OBVIOUSLY REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF GENERAL KY, CSAF. ELSEWHERE IN COUNTRY, THE LEADERS HAVE EVIDENCED NO DESIRE TO CHANGE THE METHOD OF PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, NOR IS A SENSE OF PESSIMISM OVER THE OUTLOOK FOR PACIFICATION PROGRESS APPARENT. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, SEVERAL COMMANDERS (FOR EXAMPLE GENERAL HON OF THE 5TH DIVISION) FEEL THAT ASSIGNED FORCES ARE INADEQUATE TO THE TOTAL TASK, BUT THE GENERAL ATTITUDE IS ONE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM WILL WORK, AND THAT THE JOB AT HAND MUST BE MUCH FURTHER ALONG BEFORE FORCES CAN BE DIVERTED FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NORTH.

THIS SURVEY WAS PATENTLY NOT AN INVESTIGATION IN DEPTH. THE IMPRESSIONS DESCRIBED ARE THE CURRENT OPINIONS OF SENIOR ADVISORS BASED ON THEIR DAY TO DAY CONTACTS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS. HOWEVER, IF THE RESULTS REFLECT MAJORITY OPINIONS WITHIN THE ARVN COMBAT UNITS, AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE OTHERWISE THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR SERIOUS CONCERN AT THIS JUNCTURE OVER THE MORALE AND STABILITY OF THE FIELD FORCES. CONTINUOUS REPORTING IS IN EFFECT ON ANY CHANGES OF ATTITUDES WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. IF ANY IMPORTANT VARIATIONS OCCUR THEY WILL BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY.

GP-2. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 5TH GP-2

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 7:38 AM, 7/28/64.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Classification

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

Info:

REF: Emtel 236

EXDIS

In view need for wider discussion here and presumably
Saigon URNODISTEL made EXDIS. Substantive comments follow.

END

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SAIGON

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Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978
By MS NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

Drafted by:

S/S:Mr. Hilliker: amp 7/28/67

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/S:G Hilliker

Clearances:

XXX S/VN

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

36

B
Action
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Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

S/UN

CONTROL: 22212
RECD: JULY 28, 1964
11:06 AM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 239

DECLASSIFIED

DATE: JULY 28 7 PM

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978
By *[signature]*, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPT PASS ROUTINE CINCPAC 111 WHITE HOUSE DOD UNN
FROM SAIGON

E X D I S

FURTHER TO MY 232 WE YESTERDAY RAISED WITH KHANH QUESTION OF BETTER GVN ORGANIZATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY AID AND HE SAID THAT HE HAD APPROVED INTER-MINISTERIAL DECREE FOR FOREIGN OFFICE COORDINATION THIS SUBJECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, AS WELL AS BUILDING GVN INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY IF ACTION AGAINST NORTH TO BE CONTEMPLATED, WE BROUGHT UP IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY OF BETTER GVN REPRESENTATION ABROAD. HE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BUT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO ELICIT ANYTHING SPECIFIC, KHANH AGAIN REFERRING TO DIFFICULTY IN FINDING PROPER MEN AND RAISING A NEW POINT, THE EXPENSE OF THESE MISSIONS.

GP-1.

CFN 111 232 GP-2

TAYLOR

NOTE: Relayed to CINCPAC, White House, DOD July 28, 1964

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
OFFICE SYMBOL	<i>7/28/64</i>	<i>hu</i>

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

S/VN 37

~~TOP SECRET~~

①

Action

CONTROL: 21951

Info

RECD: JULY 28, 1964, 7:42 A.M.

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 236, IMMEDIATE

INFO: VIENTIANE 11

DATE: JULY 27, 6 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

REF: A) DEPTTEL 89 TO VIENTIANE RPTD SAIGON 261.
 B) VIENTIANE 170 TO DEPT RPTD SAIGON 106.

EXDIS

1. WE ARE GRATEFUL HERE FOR POSITIVE ACTION UNDER CONSIDERATION TO ASSIST IN BUILDING GVN RPT GVN MORALE AND THEREBY DIVERT LOCAL ATTENTION FROM PROPOSALS TO STRIKE NVN RPT NVN. WHILE MATTER IS STILL IN DISCUSSION PHASE I WOULD LIKE TO ADVANCE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM POINT OF VIEW SAIGON.
2. IN THE FIRST PLACE I DO NOT RPT NOT FEEL ANY GREAT URGENCY TO GET ACTION STARTED AGAINST PANHANDLE TARGETS BY EARLY AUGUST. IT IS LIKELY THAT KHANH WILL REOPEN SHORTLY THE QUESTION OF JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND UPON BECOMING ENGAGED THEREIN WILL REMAIN SATISFIED AT LEAST FOR A TIME. IN THE COURSE OF THIS JOINT PLANNING, WE WOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO AN ATTACK OF PANHANDLE TARGETS ALONG LINES PROPOSED IN REF (A) OR AS DISCUSSED PARA THREE BELOW. IF INDEED WE DECIDE TO EXECUTE SUCH A PLAN, IT IS HIGHLY PREFERABLE FROM POINT OF VIEW SAIGON THAT IT SHOULD BE A PRODUCT OF OUR JOINT PLANNING ACTIVITIES.
3. NOTING SOME OF THE COGENT RPT COGENT OBJECTIONS RAISED BY AMBASSADOR UNGER, I WOULD SUGGEST CONSIDERING AS A VARIANT TO PLAN IN REF (A) THE ATTACK OF PANHANDLE TARGETS AS AN OUTGROWTH OF US RPT US ARMED RECONNAISSANCE IN LAOS. IN COURSE OF FLYING RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OF PLAINES RPT PLAINES DES

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: <i>S/VN</i>	ACTION TAKEN: TOP SECRET	REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED
NAME OF OFFICER: <i>Mr. Formentor</i>	DATE OF ACTION: <i>7/30</i>	DIRECTION TO RM/R: <i>files</i>
OFFICE SYMBOL:		

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4

By *ly* NARA, Date *2-9-12*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 236, July 27, 6 p.m., from Saigon

RPT DES JARRES RPT JARRES AND OF OTHER LOCATIONS OF INTEREST TO SUVANNA RPT SOUVANNA PHOUMA RPT PHOUMA THERE LOULD BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY AND EXCUSE TO DESTROY TARGETS SUCH AS THOSE CONTAINED IN REF (A) ON BASIS THEY REPRESENT THREATS TO OUR RECCE RPT RECCE MISSIONS. TIMING COULD BE RELATED AS DESIRED EITHER TO REQUIREMENTS OF LAOTIAN SITUATION AND/OR TO THOSE OF SVN RPT SVN.

4. IN CONCLUSION I RECOMMEND THAT NO RPT NO DECISION BE TAKEN ON THIS MATTER AT THIS TIME BUT THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO DEVELOP A JOINT PLAN FOR THE ATTACK OF PANHANDLE TARGETS FOLLOWING INITIATION OF JOINT PLANNING WITH KHANH RPT KHANH. AS MATTER OF PRIORITY ON THE US RPT US SIDE, WE SHOULD NOW RPT NOW EXAMINE THE PROPOSED TARGET LIST TO SEE WHETHER IT IS THE MOST SUITABLE FOR INTENDED PURPOSE AND CONSIDER THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OUTLINED IN REF (A), OF THAT SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, OR ON SOME OTHER CONCEPT. ONCE THE PREFERRED ONE IS DETERMINED IT WOULD BE USED IN OUR PLANNING WITH KHANH RPT KHANH.

GP-1 .

CFN 89 261 170 106 1 2 3 3 4 3

TAYLOR

RDC

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

38

32

~~SECRET~~

Action PP RUHPA RUEKDA RUEHC RUEPCR
 DE RUMSMA 177 28/0630Z
 SS P 230435Z
 Info FM COMUSMACV
 TO RUHPA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUEKDA/JCS
 RUEHC/STATE
 RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE
 ZEN/US AMB SAIGON
 ZEN/CG 2D AD
 ZEN/CG USASCV
 ZEN/CO HSAS
 BT

S/UN

023271

1964 JUL 29 PM 12 00

DECLASSIFIED

Authority osd bu 3/24/77
 By rmg, NARS; Date 4/15/77

001

~~SECRET~~ SPECAT LINDIS MAC J32 7006
 EXCLUSIVE CINCPAC FOR ADM SHARP, INFO OSD FOR MC NAMARA
 AND MC NAUGHTON, STATE FOR FORREST, WHITEHOUSE FOR BUNDY, JCS FOR
 WHEELER, AMEMB FOR TAYLOR.
 ADDITIONAL SUPPORT RVN (U)

- A. CINCPAC 210155Z JUL 64.
- B. MACV J312 6433 DTG 211745Z JUL 64.
- C. MACV J32 6881 DTG 241875Z JUL 64.

FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS KEYED TO PARAGRAPHS YOUR MSG, REF A:
 A. PARA 2. REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL USA UNITS, TO INCLUDE INFOR-

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 177 ~~SECRET~~ SPECAT LINDIS
 MATION TO SUPPORT CARIBOU REQUEST FORWARDED BY REF B. COMMENTS ON
 MODIFYING VNAF FORCE STRUCTURE TO INCLUDE ARMED HELOS FORWARDED BY
 REF C.
 B. PARA 3. CONCEPT OF EXPANSION OF MARINE ADVISORY ROLE FORWARDED
 BY REF C.
 C. PARA 4. DETAILS OF MAJOR MEDICAL EQUIPMENT FOR FACILITY AT
 CAN THO ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) SETS

- (A) MEDICAL EQP SET, COMM ZONE DISPENSARY.
- (B) SURGICAL INSTRUMENT SET, SHOCK TREATMENT TEAM.
- (C) SURGICAL INSTRUMENT SET, GEN SURG TEAM.
- (D) GENERATOR (EMERGENCY POWER SOURCE - SIZE UNK UNTIL FACILITY OBTAINED.)
- (E) REFRIGERATOR.
- (F) AIR CONDITIONERS (NR UNK UNTIL FACILITY OBTAINED).
- (G) AUTOCLAVE, FIELD 16 X 36.
- (H) AMBULANCE, 3/4 T, FIELD.
- (I) 1/4 T TRK W/TLR.
- (J) DENTAL EQP, NON-EXPENDABLE, LIST FOR ONE OPERATOR CLINIC.

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CTION	ACTION	SECRET	PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
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NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION	7/29/64	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
OFFICE SYMBOL			file

GPO 867-149

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~~SECRET~~

-2- DTG 280435Z JULY: FROM COMUSMACV

IAGE 3 RUNSMA 177 ~~SECRET~~ SPECAT LINDIS

D. PARA 5. DEVELOPMENT OF REQUIRED DATA RELATING TO NAVY SUPPORT IS PROCEEDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSED PHASE-IN SCHEDULE AND POPULATION CRITERIA.

E. PARA 6. ADDITIONAL FUNDING DETAILS, AS REQUESTED, WILL BE FORWARDED BY MSG O/A 29 JULY 64 WITH BUDGET SUBMISSION BY 10 AUG 64.

F. PARA 7. BASE LOADING AND CONSTRUCTION DATA WILL BE FORWARDED BY MSG O/A 30 JULY 64.

G. PARA 8. CHANGES TO JTD'S AND TD'S ARE IN PREPARATION TOGETHER WITH PERSONNEL DATA FOR RESPECTIVE SERVICES.

GP 4
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:41 PM, JULY 29.

~~SECRET~~