

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 23, 2014

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
015	cable	315 fm Saigon sanitized 6/1/78 per State Letter	C	2	8/5/64	A
036a	report	Chronology of Events sanitized 2/13/06 Dup. #4b, NSF, VN, "Gulf of Tonkin, Codeword, 8/64-9/64," box 77	TS-	38	8/28/64	A
073	cable	457 fm New Delhi sanitized 6/1/78 per State Letter	C	1	8/10/64	A
137	cable	459 fm New Delhi sanitized 6/1/78 per State Letter	C	1	8/10/64	A
163	cable	299 to New Delhi exempt 6/1/78 per State Letter	C	2	8/9/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, NSC Histories

Folder Title "Presidential Decisions-Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of Aug. 1964, Volume 2"

Box Number 38

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13526 governing access to national security information.
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4/23/2014

AP
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#13 Cable	State TS <i>open 4-17</i> 305 fm Saigon 1 p	8/5/64	A
#20 Cable	State TS 389 to Saigon 1 p	8/9/64	A
#21 Cable	State TS Gp 1 362 fm Saigon 1 p	8/9/64	A
#48 Cable	State TS 383 to Saigon 4 p	8/8/64	A
#54 Cable	State TS <i>open 4-14</i> 869 to London 1 p	8/5/64	A
#146 Cable	State TS <i>open 7-30-79 ing</i> 285 fm Saigon 2 p	8/3/64	A
#148 Cable	State TS 135 to Vientiane 1 p	8/7/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF NSC History

Presidential Decisions-The Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964-Vol. II

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#36 Memo	DOD TS Codeword <i>8/21/64-2:14</i> Califano to Bundy [duplicate of #4a in NSF Country File, Vietnam, Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64-9/64]	1 p 8/31/64	A
#36a Report	DOD TS Codeword Chronology of Events... [duplicate of #4b in NSF Country File, Vietnam, Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64-9/64] <i>SARJ. NSA 2-13-06</i>	38 p 8/28/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#26a-Map	DOD S <i>add to file</i> USS Maddox Incident 1 p	undated	A
#29 Memo	DOD S <i>add to file 8/15/64</i> SitSum-DeSoto Patrol 1 p	8/4/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
j38a #38 Memo w/ att. chron.	CIA TS Codeword Smith to Bundy & Memo for the Record 18 p [duplicate of #2 in NSF Country File, Vietnam, Gulf of Tonkin, 3 A (3)] open NSA 2-13-06, 7/31/06	8/10/64 7/22/76 -3/5/76.	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#27-Opsum	JCS TS 8/6/64 1/12/77 NMCC OPSUM-103-64 3-p	8/6/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 List	NSC TS <i>100000 1/28/77</i> Tabs-on-the-Gulf-of-Tonkin-Decisions 2-p	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#33 Memo	To be submitted to Defense for concurrence. WH S Rostow to Pres. 1 p open 6/95	2/16/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	To be submitted to Defense for concurrence.		
#35-Memo	WH TS Codeword <i>open RAC 140-008-1-1</i> Bundy to Pres. 2 p	9/4/64	A
	[duplicate of #4 in NSF Country File, Vietnam, Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64-9/64]		
#187b Report	WH TS <i>Summary of Leadership Meeting</i> 4 p	8/4/64	A <i>8-8-79</i>
#188 Notes	taken at Leadership mtg similar to #187b 5 p	8/4/64	C <i>open 8-8-79</i>
	To be submitted to State for concurrence.		
#169 Draft	WH TS <i>Pres. letter to Khrushchev</i> 2 p	8/7/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#9 Cable	State S <i>Sanitized</i> <i>Open 4-2014</i> 295 fm Saigon 1 p	8/4/64	A
#11 Cable	State C 335 to Saigon 2 p	8/3/64	A
#14 Cable	State C <i>Sanitized</i> <i>Open 4-2014</i> 346 to Saigon 1 p	8/5/64	A
#15 Cable	State C <i>Sanitized</i> 315 fm Saigon 2 p	8/5/64	A
#16 Cable	State C <i>Sanitized</i> <i>Open 4-2014</i> 885 to London 1 p	8/5/64	A
#17 Cable	State C <i>Sanitized</i> <i>Open 4-2014</i> 323 fm Saigon 1 p	8/6/64	A
#18 Cable	State S <i>Sanitized</i> <i>Open 4-2014</i> British Position re... 1 p	8/6/64	A
#19 Cable	State C <i>Sanitized</i> <i>Open 4-2014</i> 354 to Saigon 1 p	8/6/64	A
#40 Cable	State C <i>Open 7-2014</i> 222 Circular 2 p	8/4/64	A
#41 Cable	State C 223 Circular 2 p	8/4/64	A
#43 Cable	State C 218 Circular 2 p	8/4/64	A

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#45-Cable	State C <i>State Dept. 10-10-64</i> 168-fm Brussels <i>Open 4-2-84</i>	2 p 8/5/64	A
#47-Cable	State G 51-to-Rangoon	1 p 8/6/64	A
#50-Cable	State C <i>State Dept. 10-10-64</i> 060140Z fm Taipei <i>Open 3-25-88</i>	1 p 8/5/64	A
#60-Cable	State C <i>Open 7-23-80</i> 225 Circular	1 p 8/5/64	A
#62-Cable	State C <i>State Dept. 10-10-64</i> 722 fm Paris <i>Open 4/2/84</i>	1 p 8/6/64	A
#63-Cable	State C <i>State Dept. 10-10-64</i> 689 fm Paris <i>Open 11/2/84</i>	1 p 8/5/64	A
#64-Cable	State C <i>Open 7-23-80</i> 667 fm Paris	1 p 8/5/64	A
#67-Cable	State S <i>Open RAC 5.18.98</i> 353 fm Saigon	4 p 8/8/64	A
#68-Cable	State C <i>State Dept. 10-10-64</i> 478-fm-Bonn <i>Open 4-2-84</i>	1 p 8/6/64	A
#69-Cable	State C <i>Open RAC 5.18.98</i> 459 fm Bonn	2 p 8/5/64	A

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NSF NSC History
Presidential Decisions-Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964-Vol.II

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#72 Cable	<i>State S [illegible] 07/20/4-2014</i> 397 fm New-Delhi	2 p 8/5/64	A
#73 Cable	State C <i>[illegible]</i> 457 fm New Delhi	1 p 8/10/64	A
#74 Cable	State G 223 fm-Djakarta	1 p 8/6/64	A
#78 Cable	State S <i>[illegible] Open RAC 5.18.98</i> 470 fm Tokyo	1 p 8/6/64	A
#79 Cable	State S <i>[illegible] " " "</i> 363 to Tokyo	1 p 8/6/64	A
#80 Cable	State S <i>[illegible] 07/20/4-2014</i> 458 fm Tokyo	1 p 8/5/64	A
#83 Cable	State G <i>[illegible] 07/20/4-2014</i> 606 fm London	1 p 8/6/64	A
#85 Cable	State C <i>[illegible] 07/20/4-2014</i> 138 fm Kuala-Lumpur	1 p 8/5/64	A
#87 Cable	State S <i>[illegible] 07/20/4-2014</i> 113 fm The Hague	1 p 8/7/64	A
#88 Cable	State C <i>[illegible] 07/20/4-2014</i> 77 fm-Wellington	1 p 8/5/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#90-Cable	State C 79 fm Oslo	8/5/64	A
#93-Cable	State C 252 fm Karachi	8/5/64	A
#95-Cable	State S 244 fm Manila	8/5/64	A
#99-Cable	State S 911 to London	8/6/64	A
#99a-Cable	State S unnumbered to London	8/6/64	A
#100-Memo	State S Vietnam Situation	8/7/64	A
#107-Cable	State C 141 fm Bangkok	8/5/64	A
#113-Chart	State C Aid to SVN	8/6/64	A
#114-Cable	State C 282 to USUN	8/3/64	A
#116-Cable	State C duplicates #114 above	8/3/64	A

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#117-Cable	<i>State 6/17/64 ...</i> State C 353-to-Saigon	3-p 8/5/64	A
#119 Memo	State C Cleveland to Secretary	2-p 8/5/64	A
#120-Cable	State C 299-to-USUN	2-p 8/6/64	A
#123 Cable	State C <i>Open 4-20-14</i> 327 fm-Saigon	1-p 8/6/64	A
#124 Cable	State C 358-fm-USUN	2-p 8/10/64	A
#126-Cable	State C 418-to-Saigon	2-p 8/12/64	A
#126a-Cable	State C 423 to USUN	1-p 8/18/64	A
#132 Cable	State C 198-to Paris	1-p 8/4/64	A
#133 Cable	State C <i>Open RAC 5.18.98</i> Polto 208 fm Paris	2-p 8/5/64	A
#135 Cable	State S <i>Open 4-20-14</i> 176 to Brussels	2-p 8/7/64	A

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#136 Cable	<i>State Sec. 8/1/71 under no. 12 of archive</i> State C <i>Sample open 4-2014</i> 334 fm-Saigon 1 p	8/7/64	A
#137 Cable	State C <i>Sample</i> 459 fm New Delhi 1 p	8/10/64	A
#139 Cable	State G 175 to-Bangkok 1 p	8/4/64	A
#140 Cable	State G duplicates #107 above <i>open 4-2014</i>		A
#141 Cable	State G 170 fm-Bangkok 1 p	8/10/64	A
#143 Memo	State S <i>open 8-6-92</i> Rostow to Secretary 5 p <i>NLS 92-314 [duplicate #31, NSF, CF, VN, Maddox incident, Box 227]</i>	8/5/64	A
#144 Memo	State S RFE-56 4 p	8/6/64	A
#145 Cable	State G <i>Sample</i> 279 fm-Saigon 2 p <i>open 4-2014</i>	8/2/64	A
#147 Cable	State C <i>Sample</i> 702 fm Paris 2 p <i>Open RAC 5.18.98</i>	8/6/64	A
#149 Cable	State G <i>Sample</i> " " " 742 fm Paris 1 p	8/7/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#156-Cable	<i>State</i> State <i>140 fm Hongkong</i> State 140 fm Hongkong	8/5/64	A
#158 Cable	State 147 above <i>open 4-2014</i>		A
#159 Cable	State 155 fm Hongkong 2 1 p	8/8/64	A
#160 Cable	State 148 fm Hongkong 4 p	8/6/64	A
#161 Cable	State 160 above <i>open 4-2014</i>		A
#163 Cable	State 299 to New Delhi 2 p <i>deleted</i>	8/9/64	A
#164 Cable	State 166 fm Hongkong <i>open 4/24/01</i> 2 p <i>deleted</i>	8/10/64	A
#165 Cable	State 167 fm Hongkong 4 p	8/10/64	A
#171 Cable	State 271 fm Vientiane 1 p <i>open 4-2014</i>	8/8/64	A
#174 Cable	State 281 Circular 3 p <i>open 4-2014</i>	8/13/64	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#178-Cable	<i>State 6/14/70 memo noted otherwise</i> State C 144 fm Beirut	1 p <i>April 4-2014</i> 8/6/64	A
#181-Memo	State C <i>open 1-18-80 ing</i> Read to Bundy	1 p 8/7/64	A
#181a Memo	State C <i>Open RAC 5.18.98</i> Law of the Sea...	3 p 8/7/64	A
#182-Memo	State C <i>open 1-18-80 ing</i> Hilliker to Bundy	1 p 8/21/64	A
#182a Memo	State C <i>Open RAC 5.18.98</i> Law of the Sea...	1 p 8/18/64	A
#184-Cable	State S 282 fm Saigon	2 p 8/3/64	A

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PROCESSING NOTE

Document #1 was returned to its correct location, here, on this date; it had been incorrectly filed in Volume 1 of this box.

Alexis Percle
April 25, 2014

National Security File, NSC Histories, "Presidential Decisions—Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, Volume 1," Box 38

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- 12 McGeorge Bundy Memorandum - August 5, 1964

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 4/28/77
By MBA, NARS, Date 5/16/77

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE GULF OF TONKIN ATTACKS
AND ON U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

1. Statements During August 1964
2. Selected Statements August-October 1964

VIG

Statement by the President Upon Instructing the Navy To Take
Retaliatory Action in the Gulf of Tonkin. *August 3, 1964*

I HAVE instructed the Navy

(1) to continue the patrols in the Gulf of
Tonkin off the coast of North Viet-Nam,

(2) to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol,

(3) to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers, and

(4) to issue orders to the commanders of the combat aircraft and the two destroyers
(a) to attack any force which attacks them in international waters, and (b) to attack with the objective not only of driving off the force but of destroying it.

NOTE: The statement was issued following an attack on the U.S. destroyer *Maddox* by Communist PT boats as it patrolled the Gulf of Tonkin.

Remarks at Syracuse University on the Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia. August 5, 1964

Dr. Newhouse, Chancellor Tolley, Governor and Mrs. Rockefeller, Members of the Congress, distinguished guests, members of the faculty, ladies and gentlemen:

I know that you share with me the great admiration and pride that the generosity of Dr. Newhouse has made possible for this area of our Nation and for this great institution. We all are in his debt, and in the years and generations and centuries to come, we will see the products of this great adventure.

On this occasion, it is fitting, I think, that we are meeting here to dedicate this new center to better understanding among all men. For that is my purpose in speaking to you.

Last night I spoke to the people of the Nation.

This morning, I speak to the people of all nations—so that they may understand without mistake our purpose in the action that we have been required to take.

On August 2 the United States destroyer *Maddox* was attacked on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin by hostile vessels of the Government of North Viet-Nam.

On August 4 that attack was repeated in those same waters against two United States destroyers.

The attacks were deliberate.

The attacks were unprovoked.

The attacks have been answered.

Throughout last night and within the last 12 hours, air units of the United States Seventh Fleet have sought out the hostile vessels and certain of their supporting facilities. Appropriate armed action has been taken against them. The United States is now asking that this be brought immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

We welcome—and we invite—the scrutiny of all men who seek peace, for peace is the only purpose of the course that America pursues.

The Gulf of Tonkin may be distant, but none can be detached about what has happened there.

Aggression—deliberate, willful, and systematic aggression—has unmasked its face to the entire world. The world remembers—the world must never forget—that aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed.

We of the United States have not forgotten.

That is why we have answered this aggression with action.

America's course is not precipitate.

America's course is not without long provocation.

For 10 years three American Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—and the American people have been actively concerned with threats to the peace and security of the peoples of southeast Asia from the Communist government of North Viet-Nam.

President Eisenhower sought—and President Kennedy sought—the same objectives that I still seek:

That the governments of southeast Asia honor the international agreements which apply in the area;

That those governments leave each other alone;

That they resolve their differences peacefully;

That they devote their talents to bettering the lives of their peoples by working against poverty and disease and ignorance.

In 1954 we made our position clear toward Viet-Nam.

In June of that year we stated we "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the 1954 agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

In September of that year the United States signed the Manila pact on which our participation in SEATO is based. That pact recognized that aggression by means of armed attack on South Viet-Nam would endanger the peace and the safety of the nations signing that solemn agreement.

In 1962 we made our position clear toward Laos. We signed the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos. That accord provided for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and respect for the neutrality and independence of that little country.

The agreements of 1954 and 1962 were

also signed by the government of North Viet-Nam.

In 1954 that government pledged that it would respect the territory under the military control of the other party and engage in no hostile act against the other party.

In 1962 that government pledged that it would "not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel."

That government also pledged that it would "not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries."

That government of North Viet-Nam is now willfully and systematically violating those agreements of both 1954 and 1962.

To the south it is engaged in aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

To the west it is engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos.

To the east it has now struck out on the high seas in an act of aggression against the United States of America.

There can be, there must be no doubt about the policy and no doubt about the purpose.

So there can be no doubt about the responsibilities of men and the responsibilities of nations that are devoted to peace.

Peace cannot be assured merely by assuring the safety of the United States destroyer *Maddox* or the safety of other vessels of other flags.

Peace requires that the existing agreements in the area be honored.

Peace requires that we and all our friends stand firm against the present aggressions of the government of North Viet-Nam.

The government of North Viet-Nam is today flouting the will of the world for peace. The world is challenged to make its will against war known and to make it known

(Cont.)

Radio and Television Report to the American People Following Renewed Aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin. August 4, 1964

[Delivered from the Fish Room at the White House at 11:36 p.m., e.d.t.]

My fellow Americans:

As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer *Mad-dox*, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy. But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile operations.

In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for

peace and security in southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America.

The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia.

I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed

with overwhelming support. And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight.

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of Amer-

~~ica, but it is my~~ considered conviction,

shared throughout your Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace; that firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace.

NOTE: The President began speaking at 11:36 p.m., eastern daylight time.

For the President's special message to Congress, see Item 500. For his remarks upon signing the joint resolution in support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia see Item 507.

clearly and to make it felt and to make it felt decisively.

So, to our friends of the Atlantic Alliance, let me say this, this morning: the challenge that we face in southeast Asia today is the same challenge that we have faced with courage and that we have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba. And to any who may be tempted to support or to widen the present aggression I say this: there is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States of America. But there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply. That is what is meant by the actions that we took yesterday.

Finally, my fellow Americans, I would like to say to ally and adversary alike: let no friend needlessly fear—and no foe vainly hope—that this is a nation divided in this

election year. Our free elections—our full and free debate—are America's strength, not America's weakness.

There are no parties and there is no partisanship when our peace or the peace of the world is imperiled by aggressors in any part of the world.

We are one nation united and indivisible.

And united and indivisible we shall remain.

NOTE: The President spoke at the dedication of the new journalism building, the first unit of the Newhouse Communications Center to be constructed at Syracuse University. In his opening words he referred to Dr. Samuel I. Newhouse, owner and publisher of a chain of newspapers, Dr. William P. Tolley, chancellor of the University, and Governor and Mrs. Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York. The Communications Center is a gift from Dr. and Mrs. Newhouse.

Following his address, the President received an honorary degree of doctor of laws from the University.

Special Message to the Congress on U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia. August 5, 1964

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against US naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gun boats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two US aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a Resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in Southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This Treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their Constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in Southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. *America keeps her word.* Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. *The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.* A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. *Our purpose is peace.* We have no military, political or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. *This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.* Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of Southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva Accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the U.S. will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a Resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty.

At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The Resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our armed forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a Resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a Congressional Resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on three months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

NOTE: A joint resolution "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia" was approved by the President on August 10.

Statement by the President on the Passage of the Joint
Resolution on Southeast Asia. *August 7, 1964*

THE 414-to-nothing House vote and the 88-to-2 Senate vote on the passage of the Joint Resolution on Southeast Asia is a demonstration to all the world of the unity of all Americans. They prove our determination to defend our own forces, to prevent aggression, and to work firmly and steadily for peace and security in the area.

I am sure the American people join me in expressing the deepest appreciation to the leaders and Members of both parties, in both Houses of Congress, for their patriotic, resolute, and rapid action.

NOTE: This statement was read by the Press Secretary to the President, George E. Reedy, at his news conference held at the White House at 1:40 p.m. on August 7, 1964.

[4.] I have been in communication with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,² and other officials in Washington, and I have a brief statement to make on southeast Asia.

The situation created by unprovoked aggression against our naval forces on the high seas remains serious, but there have been no further incidents in the last 24 hours. We, of course, remain fully alert against any attempt to renew or widen the attacks from any source.

It is important for us all to understand

² Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President.

that these attacks at sea are only part of a basic pattern of aggression which had already shown itself against the people and Government of South Viet-Nam and the people and the Government of Laos. Our actions this week make clear not only our determination to give a clear and positive reply to aggression at sea, but our general determination to resist and repel aggression in the area as a whole. That is the meaning also of the resolution adopted yesterday by the Congress with almost complete unanimity.

The most encouraging fact of the week, indeed, was the unity, calmness, and strength of purpose shown by our own people, together with the understanding and support which our actions have received from our friends around the world.

Ambassador Lodge,³ pursuant to my request and in accordance with my directions, will proceed at an early date to communicate in more detail with our friends in other parts of the world.

Our friends who are defending their freedom and independence in the area can take new courage from this unity and this support as they carry on, with our help, in the continuing work of repelling aggression by terror and by infiltration.

Finally, let me repeat again and again that in all our actions, our purpose is peace.

Remarks Upon Signing Joint Resolution of the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Southeast Asia. *August 10, 1964*

My fellow Americans:

One week ago, half a world away, our Nation was faced by the challenge of deliberate and unprovoked acts of aggression in southeast Asia.

The cause of peace clearly required that we respond with a prompt and unmistakable reply.

As Commander in Chief the responsibility was mine—and mine alone. I gave the orders for that reply, and it has been given.

But, as President, there rested upon me still another responsibility—the responsibility of submitting our course to the representatives of the people, for them to verify it or veto it.

I directed that to be done last Tuesday.

Within 24 hours the resolution before me now had been placed before each House of Congress. In each House the resolution was promptly examined in committee and reported for action.

In each House there followed free and serious debate.

In each House the resolution was passed on Friday last—with a total of 502 votes in support and 2 opposed.

Thus, today, our course is clearly known in every land.

There can be no mistake—no miscalculation—of where America stands or what this generation of Americans stand for.

The unanimity of the Congress reflects the unanimity of the country.

The resolution is short. It is straightforward. I hope that it will be read around the world.

The position of the United States is stated plainly. To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply.

To any in southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it.

In that region there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition.

Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way.

This resolution stands squarely within the four corners of the Constitution of the United States. It is clearly consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

This is another new page in the outstanding record of accomplishments the 88th Congress is writing.

Americans of all parties and philosophies can be justly proud—and justly grateful. Proud that democracy has once again demonstrated its capacity to act swiftly and decisively against aggressors. Grateful that there is in our National Government understanding, accord, and unity between the executive and legislative branches—without regard to partisanship.

This is a great strength that we must always preserve.

This resolution confirms and reinforces powers of the Presidency. I pledge to all Americans to use those powers with all the wisdom and judgment God grants to me.

It is everlastingly right that we should be resolute in reply to aggression and steadfast in support of our friends.

But it is everlastingly necessary that our actions should be careful and should be measured.

We are the most powerful of all nations—we must strive also to be the most responsible of nations.

So, in this spirit, and with this pledge, I now sign this resolution.

NOTE: The President spoke in the East Room at the White House. The joint resolution is Public Law 88-408 (78 Stat. 384).

Remarks to Members of the National Association of Counties.
August 11, 1964

Only one week ago, at about this same hour, we were very conscious of that responsibility. At that time we were faced with the challenge of a direct, deliberate, and unprovoked act of aggression. That act was committed by a government which is a relentless and ruthless enemy of local self-government.

That government sends its guerrillas into neighboring free lands with orders to seek out, with orders to kill, local officials and their families like you and your families.

When that challenge was laid down, there was no delay, there was no hesitation, there was no divided counsel here in your White House.

The United States delivered a firm and unmistakable reply and delivered it promptly.

The world understands that the United States' only purpose is peace. But the world also understands that this generation of Americans has only one policy. Our resources are committed, our sacrifices are made, our vigil is maintained so that there shall be no win for aggression in our times.

At this time last week, we could not know what the consequences of our course would be. But as we could be confident that our cause was right, we could also be confident of our might.

In Viet-Nam, too, we work for world order.

For 10 years through the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administration, and this administration, we have had one consistent aim—observance of the 1954 agreements which guaranteed the independence of South Viet-Nam. That independence has been the consistent target of aggression and terror.

For 10 years our response to these attacks has followed a consistent pattern. First, that the South Vietnamese have the basic responsibility for the defense of their own freedom. Second, we would engage our strength and our resources to whatever extent needed to help others repel aggression.

Now, there are those who would have us depart from these tested principles. They have a variety of viewpoints. All of them, I am sure, you have heard in your local community.

Some say that we should withdraw from South Viet-Nam, that we have lost almost 200 lives there in the last 4 years, and we should come home. But the United States cannot and must not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom of a brave people to be handed over to Communist tyranny. This alternative is strategically unwise, we think, and it is morally unthinkable.

Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. Moreover, such action would offer no solution at all to the real problem of Viet-Nam. America can and America will meet any wider challenge from others, but our aim in Viet-Nam, as in the rest of the world, is to help restore the peace and to reestablish a decent order.

The course that we have chosen will require wisdom and endurance. But let no one doubt for a moment that we have the resources and we have the will to follow this course as long as it may take. No one should think for a moment that we will be worn down, nor will we be driven out, and we will not be provoked into rashness. But we will continue to meet aggression with firmness and unprovoked attack with measured reply.

That is the meaning of the prompt reaction of our destroyers to unprovoked attack. That is the meaning of the positive reply of our aircraft to a repetition of that attack. That is the meaning of the resolution passed by your Congress with 502 votes in favor and only 2 opposed. That is the meaning of the national unity that we have shown to all the world last week.

There is another consideration wherever the forces of freedom are engaged. No one who commands the power of nuclear weapons can escape his responsibility for the life of our people and the life of your children.

It has never been the policy of any American President to sympathetically or systematically place in hazard the life of this Nation by threatening nuclear war. No American President has ever pursued so irresponsible a course. Our firmness at moments of crisis has always been matched by restraint—our determination by care. It was so under President Truman at Berlin, under President Eisenhower in the Formosa Straits, under President Kennedy in the Cuba missile crisis. And I pledge you that it will be so as long as I am your President.

In Viet-Nam, in Cyprus, and in every continent, in a hundred different ways America's efforts are directed toward world order. Only when all nations are willing to accept peaceful procedures as an alternative to forceful settlement will the peace of our world be secure.

I particularly appreciate the faith of my homefolks. I can't tell you that every decision I make will be the right one. But I can tell you that when I had to issue the order the other day to send the boys off of that carrier with the bombs in their planes to destroy the nests of those PT boats that had fired on our destroyer, that it was an order that I didn't want to give. It was an act that I realized was a very serious act. But I felt that it was in the best interest of this Nation and it was the only course I could follow if I really wanted peace, to let them know that we meant what we said and said what we meant, and we were prepared to back it up. And we did that.

We didn't bomb any cities. As a matter of fact, we carefully refrained from doing that. We didn't kill any women and children. We didn't invade any metropolitan areas. We didn't provoke any great nations. We said to them, "You must leave your neighbors alone and you mustn't ever shoot at United States destroyers without expecting a reply."

I get a lot of advice and I need a lot, and I seek it all the time. I am very happy that the men on this platform with me tonight are the kind of men that I can counsel with and I can trust. I have had advice to load our planes with bombs and to drop them on certain areas that I think would enlarge the war and escalate the war, and result in our committing a good many American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land.

And for that reason, I haven't chosen to enlarge the war. Nor have I chosen to retreat and turn it over to the Communists. Those are two alternatives that we have to face up to. The third alternative is neutralization in Viet-Nam. We have said that if anyone was willing to come forward and guarantee neutralization, in other words guarantee the independence of these free people and guarantee them security from their neighbors who are trying to envelop them, we would be the first to stand up to the table and say to them, "Show us that you can guarantee their independence and we will salute you and we will be very proud of you."

But there is no country that is willing to do that, that we know of, so neutralization is not very practical at this stage of the game. There are three alternatives we considered.

The fourth alternative is to do what we are doing, to furnish advice, give counsel, express good judgment, give them trained counselors, and help them with equipment to help themselves. We are doing that. We have lost less than 200 men in the last several years, but to each one of those 200 men—and we lose about that many in Texas in accidents on the 4th of July—to each one of those 200 men who have given their life to preserve freedom, it is a war and a big war and we recognize it.

But we think that it is better to lose 200 than to lose 200,000. For that reason we have tried very carefully to restrain ourselves and not to enlarge the war.

* * *

So we have had in Viet-Nam in less than a year, three different governments. That is pretty difficult, to carry on the resistance that must be carried on when you are changing governments very often. As a matter of fact, I know how difficult it is to change governments at all, because notwithstanding the experience that we had, the transition following the tragedy in Dallas has been a very difficult one that required the cooperation of all good people, Republicans, Democrats, and independents for the last 8 months.

We just had two governments in the United States. I hope we don't have another one in November. But we do have some of our people, a rather hard core people, they make up a rather small minority, I think, of our total population.

But some of them are frustrated, some of them are overalarmed, some of them have their blood pressure worked up, some of them are excited and think our country is not doing at all well, and everything is being mismanaged, and we have a lot of woes and a lot of troubles and a lot of headaches that we could do without.

Well, we do have troubles and we do have problems, any great nation has them. When you are the leader of the world, when you are the richest nation in the world, when you are the most prosperous people in the world, you do have difficulties.

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

STATEMENTS ON VIETNAM - CAMPAIGN PERIOD 1964

SELECTED STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON THE U. S.
COMMITMENT AND THE USE OF U. S. FORCES IN VIETNAM --
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, 1964

Radio and TV Report on Gulf of Tonkin Attacks - August 4, 1964

"Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the Government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war."

Remarks Before the American Bar Association - August 12, 1964
New York City

"Some say that we should withdraw from South Vietnam, that we have lost almost 200 lives there in the last 4 years, and we should come home. But the United States cannot and must not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom of a brave people to be handed over to Communist tyranny. This alternative is strategically unwise, we think, and it is morally unthinkable.

"Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. Moreover, such action would offer no solution at all to the real problem of Vietnam. America can and America will meet any wider challenge from others, but our aim in Vietnam, as in the rest of the world, is to help restore the peace and to re-establish a decent order.

"The course that we have chosen will require wisdom and endurance. But let no one doubt for a moment that we have the resources and we have the will to follow this course as long as it may take. No one should think for a moment that we will be worn down, nor will we be driven out ..."

Remarks at a Barbeque in Stonewall, Texas - August 29, 1964

"[We destroyed North Vietnamese PT boat installations] to let them know that we meant what we said and said what we meant, and we were prepared to back it up. And we did that.

"We didn't bomb any cities. As a matter of fact, we carefully refrained from doing that. We didn't kill any women and children. We didn't invade any metropolitan areas. We didn't provoke any great nations....

"I have had advice to load our planes with bombs and to drop them on certain areas that I think would enlarge the war and escalate the war, and result in our committing a good many American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land. And for that reason, I haven't chosen to enlarge the war. Nor have I chosen to retreat and turn it over to the Communists."

Eufaula Dam Dedication - Oklahoma - September 25, 1964

"There are those that say you ought to go North and drop bombs, to try to wipe out the supply lines, and they think that would escalate the war. We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia.

"There are some that say we ought to go South and get out and come home, but we don't like to break our treaties and we don't like to walk off and leave people who are searching for freedom, and suffering to obtain it, and walk out on them....

"So what are we doing? We're staying there and supplying them with some of the things that we have..."

Manchester, New Hampshire

September 28, 1964

"Some of our people - Mr. Nixon, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Scranton, and Mr. Goldwater - have all, at some time or other, suggested the possible wisdom of going north in Viet-Nam. Well, now, before you start attacking someone and you launch a big offensive, you better give some consideration to how you are going to protect what you have. And when a brigadier general can walk down the streets of Saigon as they did the other day, and take over the police station, the radio station, and the government without firing a shot, I don't know how much offensive we are prepared to launch.

As far as I am concerned, I want to be very cautious and careful, and use it only as a last resort, when I start dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American boys in a war in Asia with 700 million Chinese.

So just for the moment I have not thought that we were ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. What I have been trying to do, with the situation that I found, was to get the boys in Viet-Nam to do their own fighting with our advice and with our equipment. That is the course we are following. So we are not going north and drop bombs at this stage of the game, and we are not going south and run out and leave it for the Communists to take over."

* * * *

"So we are not going north and we are not going south; we are going to continue to try to get them to save their own freedom with their own men, with our leadership, and our officer direction, and such equipment as we can furnish them. We think that losing 190 lives in the period that we have been out there is bad. But it is not like 190,000 that we might lose the first month if we escalated that war."

* * * *

Breakfast for Indiana and Kentucky State Party Leaders, Louisville October 9, 1964

"We are trying as best we can not to enlarge that war, not to get the United States tied down in a land war in Asia, and not for American boys starting to do the fighting that Asian boys ought to be doing to protect themselves. We don't want to pull out and come home and say, "We will turn it all over to you. "

So if you don't want to enlarge it and you seek no larger war, and you don't want to pull out and run home, the only thing you can do is what we are doing. We let them know that when they shoot at us as they did in the Tonkin Gulf, we will make prompt, adequate, and sufficient reply. "

Akron, OhioOctober 21, 1964

"In Asia we face an ambitious and aggressive China, but we have the will and we have the strength to help our Asian friends resist that ambition. Sometimes our folks get a little impatient. Sometimes they rattle their rockets some, and they bluff about their bombs. But we are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."

* * * *

"But we have a choice. We can seek a wider war. China is there on the border with 700 million men, with over 200 million in their army. And we could get tied down in a land war in Asia very quickly if we sought to throw our weight around. Or we could retreat and pull out and say 'Goodby' to the rest of the world, that we are going to live on our own shores, and we would let Asia go to other people. But we don't seem to think that either of those alternatives is the wise decision.

We are going to continue to try to make these people more effective and more efficient, and do our best to resolve that situation where the aggressors will leave their neighbors alone, and they will finally learn to live together in peace as they have in other parts of the world."

AMERICAN COMMENT ON VIETNAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

P

11554
RM/R File 5

(21)
TO : The Secretary
FROM : P - James L. Greenfield *gib*
SUBJECT : American Comment on Viet-Nam,
July 30-August 6

August 6, 1964

President Johnson's rapid response to North Vietnamese provocation in the Gulf of Tonkin prompted voluminous discussion which overshadowed the continuing heavy comment on Southeast Asia. Highlights are presented here; a fuller analysis is being prepared.

- 1 - President Johnson's retaliatory action against North Viet-Nam for the second attack on U.S. destroyers on the high seas receives overwhelming support from the press, Congress, labor and veterans' organizations, as political differences are submerged and ranks close.

A partial list includes: Chicago Tribune, N.Y. Times and Herald Tribune, Balt. Sun, Wall St. Journal, Phila. Inquirer, Scripps-Howard press, N.Y. News, Harry Truman, Walter Lippmann, Gov. Rockefeller; AFL-CIO, Catholic War Veterans, Goldwater and Miller.

- 2 - The reaction to the engagements in the Gulf of Tonkin indicates virtually unanimous agreement that (a) the U.S. cannot tolerate harassment of American ships in international waters; (b) if the Communists are out to create a major incident by repeated attacks, the U.S. will have to "react more sharply."

Excluded by 841

(1) A few have strong reservations about the U.S. action. Sen. Morse continues to charge the U.S. is as much to blame as is North Vietnam for the current crisis, and has violated the 1954 Geneva accords. Sen. Aiken (R-Vt.) was greatly troubled by the "expanding" military involvement of the U.S., but has joined the rally behind the President.

- 4 - The planned U.S. buildup in South Viet-Nam continues to receive support from the nation's press; but some

P/POS/HSF: em


XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

10 L 2-14151

found the prospective increase "foreboding" and doubted that additional Americans could alter the situation. A few anticipated that the next step would be commitment of combat troops.

- 5 - Premier Khanh's "precarious" political situation, and the apparent inability of the Revolutionary Council to provide a more broadly based government, remain a source of concern to observers.
- 6 - Calls for a political solution of hostilities in Vietnam continued to be rejected as premature.

P/POS:HSF:em



OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

00735

33-6 15-VICT

7

FOR DCI USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON ~~MASTHEAD~~ FLASH 335 AUG -3 7 48 PM '64

Info

Please hand

~~transmit~~ the following ~~USS Maddox~~ ~~to the ICC~~ with the request that ~~this protest~~ be passed to the Hanoi regime:

QUOTE The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of the unprovoked attack made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on an American naval vessel, the USS Maddox, operating on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2.

United States ships have traditionally operated freely on the high seas, in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations. They will continue to do so and will take whatever measures are appropriate for their defense.

The United States Government ~~expects~~ expects that the authorities of the regime in North Viet-Nam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces. UNQUOTE

Drafted by:

S/VN:TJCorcoran/mlg 8/3/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary ~~Undersecretary~~

Clearances:

E - Mr. Green
/VN - Mr. Forrestal
L - Mr. Meeker
S/S - Mr. Christensen

P - Mr. Greenfield
~~DOB: 055/154/11~~
M - Gov. Harriman
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The Under Secretary (in M)
White House
SEA - Mr. Trueheart
DOD
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FORM 8-63 DS-322

Classification

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

Text will be released in Washington at noon press
briefing August 4.

End

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

43

Action

Z 040508Z ZEA

SVN

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

Info

BT

SS

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EUR

FE

NEA

IO

AID

P

USIA

NSC

INR

SA

CA

SCS

0 0 1 4 4 3

AUGUST 4, 1964

1:21 A.M.

FLASH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FLASH (292) AUGUST 4 - 1 PM

DEPTEL 335

ASSUME RELEASE CONTAINED REFTTEL WILL BE MADE WITHOUT ANY
REFERENCE TO OUR GIVING COPY TO ICC FOR DELIVERY TO HANOI
REGIME. INTEND DISCUSS TRANSMITTAL OF TEXT WITH SEABORN
(CANADIAN ICC) THIS AFTERNOON BUT WE NOT SURE HE OR INDIAN
CHAIRMAN WOULD BE WILLING UNDERTAKE TASK. SHOULD THEY SHOW
RELUCTANCE SUGGEST WE SEND CONFIRMATION COPY OUR PROTEST TO
HANOI THROUGH BRITISH CONSUL HANOI. TAYLOR

BO

CFN 292 4 1 335

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 4, 1:23 A.M.; PASSED
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AUGUST 4, 1:38 A.M.

RMR

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*9

36

Action

SVN

Info

SS

G

SP

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USIA

NSC

INR

NSA

NIC

RMR

00 RUEHCR
DE RUIR 16A 04/1150Z
O 041145Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RQLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
SWTE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 295 INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 137 VIENTIANE
19 FROM SAIGON AUG 4 7 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CANADIAN ICC COMMISSIONER SEABORN INFORMED EMBASSY TODAY
ICC UNANIMOUSLY AGREED THIS MORNING TO INVESTIGATE DRV
CHARGES WHICH HANOI HU RECENTLY BROADCAST ACCUSING US AND
GVN OF ATTACKS AGAINST DRV TERRITORY. CANADIANS SUGGESTED
FIXED TEAM VINH MAKE INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS RE TWO ISLANDS
REPORTEDLY SHELLED FROM SEA. POLISH COMMISSIONER, HOWEVER,
DEMURRED AND ASKED DELAY UNTIL HE COULD OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS.
WILL FOLLOW PROGRESS CLOSELY AND REPORT.

TAYLOR.

BT

CFN 295 137 19 4 7PM ICC ICC DV US GVN ICC

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 9:10 AM, 8/4/64.
PASSED USUN AT 9:20 AM, 8/4/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 9:35 AM, 8/4/64.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RA 000 4811By 121/4, NARA, Date 4-2-14~~SECRET~~

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XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

00865
10
9

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

38

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 339 FLASH

FE

Info:

AUG 4 11 27 AM '64

SS

SVN

Urtel ~~335~~ 292

G

SP

Text our protest note being given press at noon today

L

H

EUR

NEA

IO

AID

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SCA

SCS

local time. In response to anticipated question as to how our protest to Hanoi has been delivered, we will confine our response to: QTE The US protest over the unprovoked attack on the USS Maddox was sent to our Embassy in Saigon for transmittal to the North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi through appropriate channels. UNQTE

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE:Marshall Green:ej

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearance:

SVN - MForrestal

P - RMcCloskey

S/S - Mr. Davies

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SD442

*****ZZ RUEPWW

DE RUEHCR 735 04/0010Z

Z 040005Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY ¹⁹⁶⁴AUG 4 00 13

Z 03/2355Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FLASH 335, AUG. 3, 3 PM

PLEASE HAND THE FOLLOWING TO THE ICC WITH THE REQUEST
THAT THIS PROTEST BE PASSED TO THE HANOI REGIME:

QUOTE: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TAKES AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS
VIEW OF THE UNPROVOKED ATTACK MADE BY COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE
TORPEDO BOATS ON AN AMERICAN NAVAL VESSEL, THE USS MADDOX,
OPERATING ON THE HIGH SEAS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN ON AUGUST 2.

CFN 335 3 3 2

C/Smith

11

RECEIVED
WASA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Hate Str. 4/1/78

By lpw, NARS, Date 8/8/78

Bundy

S

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 735 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES SHIPS HAVE TRADITIONALLY OPERATED FREELY ON THE HIGH SEAS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO VESSELS OF ALL NATIONS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO AND WILL TAKE WHATEVER MEASURES ARE APPROPRIATE FOR THEIR DEFENSE.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THAT THE AUTHORITIES OF THE REGIME IN NORTH VIET-NAM WILL BE UNDER NO MISAPPREHENSION S TO THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT FROM ANY FURTHER UNPROVOKED OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST UNITED STATES FORCES. UNQUOTE.

TEXT WILL BE RELEASED IN WASHINGTON AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING
AUGUST 4. RUSK

BT

CEN 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

West Nam
12

48

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

Control: 2707
Rec'd: AUGUST 5, 1964
3:58 AM

FE

FROM: SAIGON

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 306 IMMEDIATE

SVN

G

INFO: CINCPAC 143 PRIORITY

SP

L

DATE: AUGUST 5, 3 PM

H

EUR

NEA

IO

AID

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

F

USLA

DEPTTEL 339

NSC

INR

NSA

RMR

CANADIAN ICC COMMISSIONER INFORMED US THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD CHECKED OUT ICC DELIVERY OF OUR PROTEST NOTE TO HANOI REGIME AND IS CONVINCED NOTHING ICC COULD DO WITHOUT ENDLESS AND PROBABLY INCONCLUSIVE DEBATE. IF DEPARTMENT DESIRES DELIVERY TO HANOI REGIME THROUGH BRITISH IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR FOREIGN OFFICE TO SO INSTRUCT BRITISH EMBASSY HERE.

(BRITISH CONSUL, WHO ONLY ACCREDITED TO MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES HANOI, CURRENTLY IN SAIGON AND EXPECTED RETURN HANOI TOMORROW). HOWEVER, APPEARS DELIVERY THIS TEXT OVERTAKEN BY LATER EVENTS AND PERHAPS WE COULD STAND ON OUR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

TAYLOR

HC

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:09 AM, AUGUST 5, 1964

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 8/5/64, 5:15 AM

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

31

Action

SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

13

CONTROL: 2725

RECEIVED: AUGUST 5, 4:01 AM

FROM: AMEMBASSY SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC 305

DATE: AUGUST 5, 1 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS

DEPTTEL 160

SEABORN INFORMED SULLIVAN THAT ICC HAS VOTED HOLD ITS NEXT MEETING HANOI AUGUST 10. HIS CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO GATHE BUT NOT SOLICIT, COMMENTS FROM SENIOR DRV OFFICIALS RELATIVE TO DISCUSSIONS HELD DURING HIS PREVIOUS VISIT. HE HAS READ BOTH ICC RPT ICC NOTE OF MAY 20, 1962 AND JULY 10 CIA PUBLICATION. HE IS THOROUGHLY PUZZLED BY DRV MOTIVATION IN INITIATING ATTACKS ON US RPT US DESTROYERS ON HIGH SEAS AND WILL ATTEMPT SEEK SOME ENLIGHTMENT DURING COURSE HIS THREE DAY STAY.

CFN 160 10 20 1962 10

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAL 000 148 12

By 120/15, NARA, Date 4-2-74

TAYLOR

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO.	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER	TOP SECRET	8/8/64	REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICE SYMBOL			File

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: ☐ COLLECT
 LARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: SAIGON IMMEDIATE 346.

Info

INFO CINCPAC

Ref: Saigon 306

*Pal 27 Viet S
 XIR Pal 33-6 US-Viet S
 Re bombing of USS Maddox*

AUG 5 5 52 AM '64

Since British Consul assigned Hanoi is returning Hanoi tomorrow from Saigon, you should give him text of protest to take back to Hanoi for possible delivery Hanoi regime. Meanwhile we considering whether to contact London with view to its having British Consul seek deliver this protest to Hanoi authorities.

End.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-219

By *West/My* NARA, Date 4-2-14

Drafted by:

Marshall Green: cw: 8/5/64

Clearances:

S/S-O E. R. Williams *ELW*

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

M. Green *mg*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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WASHINGTON TELEGRAM Department of State

38

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 3186
Rec'd: AUGUST 5, 1964
11:05 AM

SVN

FROM: SAIGON

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 315

G

SP

INFO: LONDON 22

L

NEW DELHI 9

H

MOSCOW 5

EUR

OTTAWA 6

FE

WARSAW 7

NEA

DATE: AUGUST 5, 7 PM

IO

P

USIA

REF EMBTEL 295

NSC

INR

CTA

IA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

RMR

COL. AN, HEAD VN ICC MISSION, INFORMED EMB OFF AUGUST 5 THAT COMMISSION WILL VISIT HANOI AUGUST 10 AT WHICH TIME WILL DISCUSS INVESTIGATION DRV CHARGES VIOLATION ITS TERRITORY.

SANITIZED

Authority State Ltr. 4/1/78
By Shur, NARS, Date 8/8/78

IN ANY CASE AN SAYS NO QUESTION INVESTIGATION BEING UNDERTAKEN PRIOR AUGUST 10.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 315, AUGUST 5, 7 PM, FROM SAIGON

XGDS-1

GP-3.

TAYLOR

BAP

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: ☐ COLLECT
PAGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON *J85* PRIORITY

Info

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON *351*
CINCPAC FOR POLAD *HONOLULU*

AUG 5 7 14 PM '64

Our attempt to deliver protest note to Hanoi regime via ICC on first repeat first North Vietnamese attack on US destroyer in Gulf of Tonkin has met with reply from Canadian ICC Commissioner that he is convinced that there is nothing ICC can do without endless and inconclusive debate. Would, therefore, appreciate it if Embassy London would request British Government to instruct British Consul Hanoi to deliver this protest note as early as possible to Hanoi regime.

We have already asked Embassy Saigon to give copy of protest to British Consul assigned Hanoi who has been in Saigon and is returning Hanoi August 6. Our 335 to Saigon containing text protest is being repeated to London.

Since we have already announced text protest in expectation that it would be delivered at early date, we are most interested in having text placed on record with Hanoi and would appreciate British help. We recognize British Consul Hanoi does not normally have much access to Central Government officials in Hanoi but believe our purposes would be served if he could get it to an official at some level of this regime.

GP-3. ~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"~~

END

RUSH

Drafted by:

FE/RA:JAMendenhall:avm 8/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green *mg*

Clearances:

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal *MF*

BNA - Mr. Glazer *HBSG*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

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FORM DS-322
8-63

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NZT 82-220*

By *10/14*, NARA, Date *4/2/14*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL 27 VIET S
XR POL 33-6 US-VIET 1
17

42-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action OO RUDTLN RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 04A 06/0800Z
FE OR 060746Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)
Info TO RUHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
SS RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
SVN STATE GRNC
BT

IMMEDIATE

003900

1964 AUG 6 AM 4 38

G ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (323) INFO LONDON 23
SP CINCPAC 154 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 6 4PM

L CINCPAC FOR POLAD

H
EUR
NEA DEPTTEL 346

IO AS INDICATED EMBTEL 306 BRITISH CHARGE TOOK POSITION THAT HE
AID WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN OFFICE BEFORE HE
P COULD AGREE SERVE AS CHANNEL FOR DELIVERY US PROTEST TO HANOI
USIA REGIME. ON BASIS OUR INFORMAL APPROACH HE REQUESTED SUCH
NSC INSTRUCTIONS AND WAS INFORMED THIS MORNING THAT FOREIGN OFFICE
NR DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT BRITISH CONSUL HANOI WOULD
NSA CFN 323 03 154 6 4PM 346 306
RMR

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 04A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BE THE "APPROPRIATE CHANNEL" FOR DELIVERY OUR PROTEST.
IN MEANTIME, COPIES OF PROTEST HAD BEEN GIVEN TO BRITISH CONSUL
TO TAKE BACK TO HANOI WITH UNDERSTANDING HE WOULD AWAIT FURTHER
INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING POSSIBLE DELIVERY.

ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS POSSIBILITY USING FRENCH CHANNELS TO
GET MESSAGE DELIVERED HANOI. DEPARTMENT WILL APPRECIATE
HOWEVER THAT NONE RPT NONE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF POTENTIAL
COURIERS IN SAIGON WILL BE ABLE CARRY OUT DELIVERY ON OWN AUTHORITY
SUCH AUTHORITY WILL INEVITABLY HAVE TO COME FROM CAPITALS.

AS WE SEE IT, DEPARTMENT CAN (A) ASK LONDON REVISE ITS CURRENT
INSTRUCTIONS (B) APPROACH FRENCH IN PARIS (C) APPROACH INDIANS
IN DELHI, OR (D) EVEN APPROACH SOVIETS. SINCE COPY OF NOTE ALREADY
WITH BRITISH, WE WOULD SUGGEST (A) AS MOST FEASIBLE.
TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:41 AM, 8/6/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 4:55 AM, 8/6/64.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NLS 82-219*

By *10/4*, NARA, Date *4-2-14*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

18

DATE: August 6, 1964
5:45 a.m.

SUBJECT: British Position Re Delivery U. S. Protest to Hanoi

PARTICIPANTS: Richard A. Ericson, Jr., First Secretary, American Embassy, London
James M. Montgomery, S/VN

COPIES TO: Amembassy London
FE
FE:RA
FE:SEA
S/VN
INR

Mr. Ericson called from London concerning our proposal to have the UK Consul in Hanoi deliver our note of protest to Hanoi. London has not yet received Saigon's latest cable on this subject.

Ericson said that on the basis of informal talks the British are very concerned about their Consul's position in Hanoi.

Peck is on leave and they are dealing with Cable. Ericson believes we would have to go higher and much stronger to change fast hardening position.

Ericson said that the Foreign Office is under the impression, based on communications from their people here, that Forrestal is not so inclined to push the British on this. The British said they would have been happy to have done it Monday, before they said what they did in New York.

The British suggested an Eastern European country, perhaps the Poles.

No confirming cable is being sent.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4

By *af* NARA, Date *4-3-14*

microfilmed by RM/R

SECRET

GPO 865971

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: ☐ COLLECT
ARG: TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Origin

Info

ACTION:

Amembassy, SAIGON

Immediate

354

Amembassy, LONDON

Immediate

889

INFO CINCPAC

Ref: Saigon's 323 Info London 23

Pol 27, Vicks
X R Pol 23-6 US-Vicks

Re bombing 7455 madd

In view of ICC refusal to handle delivery of our protest note to Hanoi and in view of British reluctance (reftel as well as Ericson-Montgomery telcon), we consider it best at this late stage simply to leave the note with ICC. Although ICC will presumably refuse to take further action, our protest note has been broadcast by VOA and published in press. Meanwhile events of August 4 and 5 completely overshadow this question of delivery. END

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: AJS 82-219

By: [signature] NARA, Date: 4-2-14

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE:MGGreen:mlc 8/6/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearance:

S/VN - Mr. Forrestal (ms)

S/S - Mr. Davies (ms)

FE:RA - Mr. Mendenhall (ms)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

IN ☐ ATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

427J

20

AUG 9 6 42 AM

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Origin

ACMON: Amembassy SAIGON

FLASH 389

Info:

INFO: Amembassy OTTAWA

PRIORITY 172

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS

Authority State Mr 3/31/78
 By JK (Haw), NARS, Date 5/2/78

REF Saigon 362, repeated Info as Saigon 8 to Ottawa

We Agree. In view time element, request you immediately
 contact Seaborn with view to deleting two words QUOTE to continue
 from
 UNQUOTE ~~from~~ last sentence paragraph 9 c.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

FE-Marshall Green *mg*:djh

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE-Marshall Green *mg*

Clearances:

S/VN-Mr. Forrestal *(mg)*

S/S-O *(mg)* R. Parker

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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'INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

S/IN

43
Action~~TOP SECRET~~Control: 6891
Rec'd: August 9, 1964
4:51 a.m.

21

SS

Info

FROM: Saigon

ACTION: SecState 362 Flash

INFO: Ottawa 8 Flash

DATE: August 9, 4 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State etc. 3/31/78By JK (Haw), NARS, Date 5/2/78

EXDIS

Department telegram 383

Because of possible confusion inherent in the last sentence of paragraph 9C, I recommend that two words "to continue" be deleted from this sentence.

001

GP-1

TAYLOR

LM

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-O at 4:58 a.m., August 9

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 5:07 a.m., August 9

• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

ACTION	ASSIGNED TO: <i>S/IN</i>	ACTION	REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
NAME OF OFFICER	<i>TJC</i>	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECT PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
OFFICE SYMBOL		TO RM/R	<i>file</i>

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

22

S:

12

23
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. GEORGE REEDY

Subject: A brief chronology of events - August 3-7

By Monday morning, when I returned to Washington, the President had already issued instructions -- on Sunday -- along the line of the announcement which he read Monday morning. On Monday morning he decided to make this order public. On Monday^{afternoon} there was a private meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and General Wheeler, and it was agreed that no further immediate action was needed. On Tuesday (mid-morning) the President was informed by Secretary McNamara of the first reports of the second attack on the Maddox and C. Turner Johnson. He was kept fully and promptly informed from that point forward on all action reports. Secretary McNamara gave a brief description of the existing situation at the scheduled NSC meeting at noon, and the matter was then discussed in detail at lunch by the President with the two Secretaries, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance and myself. All of us except the President had earlier engaged in a detailed discussion of the choices of reply at the Pentagon, where the necessary military information was most readily available. This meeting at the Pentagon preceded the NSC meeting.

During the luncheon meeting with the President the entire situation was reviewed and a consensus was swiftly reached on the course of action on which the President decided. This discussion lasted for about two hours and was marked by thoroughness, clarity, and an absence of significant disagreement. The members of the meeting separated then for the purpose of preparing the necessary orders. The President ordered the scheduling of a full NSC meeting for 6:15 to review his decision, and a meeting of the Leadership at 6:45 so that he might inform them. At the 6:15 meeting it was clear that all members of the NSC were in accord with the President's decision, and in the meeting of the Leadership a similar consensus readily developed.

Meanwhile in the State Department and in the Defense Department all the necessary orders and cables were put swiftly in motion on a coordinated basis. The nature of the military orders has since been made clear by Secretary McNamara's press conferences. The diplomatic track included a number of personal messages from the President, immediate

plans for a meeting of the NAC, SEATO and the Security Council (UN), and arrangements for the initial drafting of a Congressional Resolution.

The first draft of the Congressional Resolution was discussed with the Leadership, and in the light of their comments redrafts continued in the evening, and at a breakfast meeting in the Department of State the Secretary and his associates hammered out a short, basic, agreed version with the bipartisan leaders. This version was reviewed by the President and approved by him immediately upon his return from Syracuse. He had already directed the preparation of an accompanying message which he approved at this same meeting and which went promptly to the Congress that afternoon. Meanwhile at the White House the President's statement to the people was prepared under his immediate direction, and the President, in addition to his other meetings, communicated with Senator Goldwater.

The timing of the President's address to the nation was complex. The address must be so timed as not to give any battle advantage to the North Vietnamese but at the same time must precede any announcement of the operation from the other side. The time which was eventually agreed met this requirement and at 11:40 the President made his statement to the nation.

The President also decided in the course of Tuesday evening that the speech at Syracuse should be related to this set of events, and he issued instructions and guidelines for the preparation of the speech which he delivered on Wednesday morning. On Wednesday the President was briefed by Bundy and ~~Clifton~~ ^{by Clifton in the plane.} before he departed for Syracuse. On his return he reviewed and approved the Congressional Resolution and the message to accompany it, as previously stated. In the course of the afternoon he received repeated telephone reports on the situation and through the evening he kept close watch on events. On Thursday and on Friday the President continued to receive full diplomatic and intelligence reports. ^{Thursday was also a Thant Day.} The American people were kept continuously informed by the appropriate officers of the State and Defense Departments. The Congressional hearings on the Resolution proceeded, and the Resolution was voted Friday noon. The President then issued his statement hailing this event.

In this same period the President personally directed and wound up with the necessary votes to pass his Poverty bill in the House of Representatives. He also kept a close eye upon the work of Under Secretary

Ball on the crisis in Cyprus, and ^{of} with Governor Harriman on the Congo, and while these situations are both still very tense and full of danger, they have at no time been beyond the range of attention of the President and Commander in Chief.

McG. B.

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS FROM WHITE HOUSE FILES

August 4, 1964

25

AGENDA FOR NSC MEETING - 6:15 PM - 8/4/64

1. Situation report on second attack on Maddox - Secretary of Defense
2. Basic policy and immediate diplomatic action - Secretary of State
3. Planned immediate military action - Secretary of Defense
4. Possible enemy reaction - Director of Central Intelligence
5. Possible Congressional Resolution - Secretary of State
6. General discussion led by the President.
7. Discussion of the President's public statement.

26

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

According to NMCC, Secretary McNamara has had a conversation with Admiral Sharp who reports that communications are deteriorating (apparently due to weather) in area of today's attack on the DeSoto patrol. McNamara has asked Sharp to try to get all communications available to him and has been assured by Sharp that he has everything they have received.


The situation has apparently calmed down with a report that three of the attacking enemy craft have been sunk after expending more than 20 torpedoes in an effort to sink the Maddox and Turner Joy. There have been no personnel or material damages suffered by either the U.S. ships, although one intercept DRV message reports damaging a U.S. aircraft (NMCC unable to provide any confirmation of this report at 1630).

Today's activity took place in the same general area as Sunday's attack. (Maddox reported position at 19.07 N, 107.00 E, and proceeding SE at time of first radar contact). (1530 EDT) The last report from Ticonderoga aircraft indicated restricted visibility and deteriorating weather and no visual sightings of any enemy vessels.

AP and UPI started picking up the story at 1645 EDT.

~~SECRET~~

USS MADDOX INCIDENT



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority 010 66 215170
 By amg, NAKS, Date 06/24/77

262

~~TOP SECRET~~

CORRIGENDUM

6 AUGUST 1964
NMCC OPSUM 103-64NMCC
OPERATIONAL
SUMMARY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS/Sec 1/12/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 3/23/97EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

Copy No. 67

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



CORRIGENDUM

TO OPSUM 103-64

6 AUGUST 1964

Page 3 OPSUM 103-64 6 August 1964 is corrected
by the following page. Information added is underlined.

NMCC OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



CINCPAC

GULF OF TONKIN ACTION

US SHIP PATROL

The JCS directed CINCPAC to continue the Gulf of Tonkin patrol not later than 7 August. Ships of the patrol are not to go closer than 11 nautical miles to the North Vietnam coastline. In the event of hostile attack, only aircraft are authorized to pursue and attack the hostile forces up to the three nautical mile limit of the Vietnamese coastline. Ships are authorized to return fire if attacked, with the objective of destruction of hostile forces. (TS)

RESULTS OF OPERATION "PIERCE ARROW"

A total of 64 sorties were flown in the air strike against North Vietnam targets of Vinh/Ben Thuy, Quang Khe, Hon Gay, and the Loc Chao estuary (see map). Of 30 SWATOW's and PT boats sighted, 8 were destroyed, 6 severely damaged, 10 moderately damaged, and 4 lightly damaged. One patrol craft was beached and one six gun AAA installation was severely damaged. It is estimated that 90 percent damage was inflicted on the POL facility at Vinh. (TS)

Details of strikes against individual targets are as follows:

VINH/BEN THUY/PHUC LOI COMPLEX - Two strikes were flown by twenty aircraft from the USS TICONDEROGA against POL storage and PT boats. The first strike destroyed at least eight POL tanks, set the storage area ablaze, and inflicted moderate damage to four PT boats and light damage to two. The second strike destroyed two to four more POL tanks. A six gun AAA position was severely damaged. (TS)

QUANG KHE - One strike of six aircraft from USS TICONDEROGA was flown against torpedo boat concentrations. It is estimated that one boat was destroyed and three were damaged. (TS)

6 Aug 64

NMCC OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

Page 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Date ²
A-5.5?

5

28

HERE IS A BRIEF RESUME OF WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE YOU WENT HOME

THE VINH POL TARGETS WERE ATTACKED WITH ESTIMATED SUCCESS OF 90%. A RESTRIKE WAS SCHEDULED FOR 0400 EDT NO RESULTS OF THIS STRIKE AS YET.... ACCORDING TO LATER MESSAGES THE PLANES ON THE RESTRIKE MISSION ARE ON SCHEDULE.

TWO AIRCRAFT WERE SEEN TO CRASH INTO THE HARBOR DURING THE STRIKE AGAINST HON GAY...THERE WERE NO BAILOUTS OBSERVED. THE FLIGHT LEADER OF THIS ATTACK REPORTS HOWEVER THAT FIVE PT's WERE DESTROYED.

BRITAIN HAS ANNOUNCED THAT SHE WILL CONDEMN THE N. VIETNAMESE PT ATTACKS AS A BREACH OF THE UN CHARTER WHEN THE MATTER IS DISCUSSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY.

THE PRESIDENT IS STILL SCHEDULED TO FLY TO SYRACUSE TODAY AT 0915.



LATE PILOT REPORTS ON THE LOC CHAO ESTUARY STRIKE ESTIMATE SEVERE DAMAGE TO TWO TORPEDOBOATS AND LIGHT DAMAGE TO ANOTHER.

*Two additional PT's reportedly sunk on Vinh mission.

~~SECRET~~

29
12:15 AM
August 4, 1964

Situation Summary - DeSoto Patrol
USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy (TU 72.1.2)

DTG/EDT

- 041240Z/8:40 A.M. 1. Imminent attack by P-4 craft reported by DeSoto patrol. Ships proceeding southeast at best speed.
- 041326Z/9:26 A.M. 1. Ticonderoga launched 2 F-8 fighter aircraft and 4 A-4D attack aircraft. Four additional attack aircraft to be launched in 15 minutes.
- 041336Z/9:36 A.M. 1. Task unit commander (in Maddox) reported two surface craft and three aircraft in area.
- 041408Z/10:08 A.M. 1. Unfriendly aircraft reported by JCS to have disappeared. Unfriendly ships not closing -- maintaining distance of 27 miles.
- 041434Z/10:34 A.M. 1. Two original craft opened to 40 miles.
2. Three new unfriendly ships closed to 11 miles at 40 knots.
3. U.S. aircraft overhead Desoto Patrol and under Desoto Control.
4. Photos taken.
- 041442Z/10:42 A.M. ✓ 1. USS Turner Joy and USS Maddox reported they were under attack and commenced return fire at 04140Z/10:40 A.M.
- 041452Z/10:52 A.M. 1. Desoto Patrol under continuous torpedo attack.
- 041515Z/11:15 A.M. 1. Maddox reported avoiding at least six torpedos and under attack by three P-4's.
2. No friendly combat air Patrol (aircraft support) expected for 15 minutes. (Original CAP A/C probably returned to Ticonderoga due low-fuel state.)
3. USS Turner Joy appears to have sunk one P-4.

120

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD/DA 4/5/77
By mg, NARS, Date 6/24/77

4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONFebruary 19, 1968, Monday, 6:30 P.M.
30
34
Rec'd 6:40p

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Tonkin Gulf Incident

The first attack on the Destroyer, USS MADDUX, operating in the Gulf of Tonkin, took place on Sunday, August 2, 1964.

On August 3 the President instructed that the Navy continue the patrols in the Gulf and issued orders that combat aircraft and the two destroyers attack any force which attacked them in international waters with the objective not only of driving off the force, but of destroying them.

On Tuesday, August 4 in mid-morning, Secretary McNamara reported a second attack on the USS MADDUX.

There followed a noon meeting, a luncheon with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance and Mr. McGeorge Bundy during which the entire situation was reviewed and a course of action decided upon.

At 6:15, the National Security Council met to discuss the proposed action.

At 6:45 the Leadership was informed.

The Defense Department sent the necessary military orders for the reprisal attack.

At 11:40 the President made a statement to the nation via television at which time he not only announced the second attack, but also the actions taken in reprisal against gunboats and supporting facilities in North Vietnam which had been used in launching the hostile operations against U.S. naval vessels.

Bromley
Bromley Smith

12/22/1967

31

STATEMENT BY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN

Gulf of Tonkin

Any suggestion that the August 1964 attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf did not occur is contrary to the known facts.

The two attacks were made on August 2 and 4 when U.S. destroyers were on patrol in international waters. The attacks were seen, heard, and detected electronically by the crews of the ships.

During the first, daylight, attack, photos were taken of the attacking torpedo boats, and damage was done to the destroyer by machine gun bullets.

The evidence that the destroyers were attacked is conclusive. It includes:

AUGUST 2 ATTACK

- 1) Visual sighting of three torpedoe boats making daylight runs on the Destroyer MADDOX and firing at least four torpedoes.
- 2) Photographs of the attackers taken from ships and aircraft.
- 3) Damage to the MADDOX from North Vietnamese fire.

AUGUST 4 ATTACK

- 1) Radar tracks of fast, small craft paralleling and then closing in on the Destroyers MADDOX and TURNER JOY.
- 2) Numerous sonar detections of torpedoes fired at the destroyers, reported by the sonar man who manned the MADDOX'S equipment throughout the attack.
- 3) Visual sighting by an officer and several crewmen of the WAKE of a torpedo passing near the TURNER JOY.
- 4) Visual sighting of the attacking craft lit by aircraft flares and by shells fired during the engagement.

- 5) Visual sighting of a search light beam from one of the attacking craft.
- 6) Visual sighting of anti aircraft fire directed at American planes overhead.
- 7) Visual sighting from aircraft of the WAKE of a small, fast craft near the destroyers.

Persons who have examined all of the evidence can have no doubt that the MADDOX twice and the TURNER JOY once were attacked by North Vietnamese small naval craft well in international waters and without provocation.

Dictated by phone by Miss Valenti (11-70713) 12/22/67
taken by C. L. Horn

Release Aug 7, 1964

✓
32

Secretary of Defense McNamara recommended to President Johnson that he schedule his announcement of the retaliatory attack against the North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their supporting installations for 11:40 p.m. August 4 because:

1. By that time U.S. naval aircraft had been in the air on their way to their targets approximately one hour.
2. Hanoi, through its radar, had then received indications of the attack.
3. The time remaining before the aircraft arrived over their targets would not permit the North Vietnamese to move their boats to sea or to alert their forces.
4. It was important that the people of our country learn of the manner in which their government was responding to the attacks on its vessels from their President rather than from Hanoi which was expected to announce the attack at any moment.
5. It was desirable that the North Vietnamese government and others be told as soon as possible the character of the attack -- "Our response for the present will be limited and fitting. We ... know ... the risks of spreading conflict. We will seek no wider war."

As you know, the North Vietnamese government did not have time to move their forces; our attacking aircraft found the torpedo boats at their docks; the attack was highly successful.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

3A

33

Friday, February 16, 1968
1:15 p.m.

Read 1:30P

SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

I had a long talk with Clark Clifford this morning conveying to him your views.

He recommends that:

- Bus Wheeler go out to Viet Nam tomorrow (Saturday);
- that you await final decision on a package to go to the Hill until he returns.

I also talked, as instructed, with Bus Wheeler. He says that Bob very much wants him to wait until after the Tonkin Gulf hearing on Tuesday before going to Saigon.

He thinks if he left on Wednesday, Feb. 21st, he could be back on Monday, Feb. 26.

The operational question is, therefore, whether Bob can be persuaded to take on the Tonkin Gulf problem next Tuesday with, say, Admiral Moorer.

I have just finished talking to Bob, who still feels strongly that Bus Wheeler ought to be there for the Tonkin Gulf hearing.

In short, your advisers appear to agree that final decision on the package should await Bus Wheeler's trip: the question is whether Bus leaves tomorrow, Saturday, or on Wednesday.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *SP/AG* NARA, Date *12/30/95*

SECRET

34

13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~ DINAR

September 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chronology of the Gulf of Tonkin

I attach the chronology of the Gulf of Tonkin affair which you asked for from McNamara. I had sent it back for correction on a couple of small points, and I have read it myself to see if I could save you any time, but my conclusion is that you will probably want to read it all the way through yourself when you have time.

There is still no evidence whatever that the timing of your announcement adversely affected the success of the operation in any way. All the evidence, indeed, runs the other way. The appendix to this report shows that North Vietnamese did have the aircraft in their screens before you spoke. The post-strike estimates show that there was no significant alert in the ports struck by the first attack from TICONDEROGA. The planes we lost were lost in the second strike several hours later, long after a complete alert had been given by the first attack. Moreover, it is clear that you yourself never gave any assurance of the kind Halleck claimed. Finally, the record of public discussion suggests that Goldwater's charges and Halleck's have been rejected by sober commentators and by the American people. Nevertheless this record does make it clear that we narrowly escaped a dangerously early announcement of the attacks. The reasons for this are four:

(1) Admiral Sharp and other military officers repeatedly assured McNamara that it would be a simple matter to mount an air strike in the early morning in the Gulf of Tonkin. This assurance led to initial planning built around a 7 p.m. announcement here, and when these estimates proved gravely optimistic, McNamara himself became increasingly impatient and eager to get the matter announced.

(2) Communications in this around-the-world operation were slower than McNamara and Sharp expected them to be. Thus, there were repeated delays in getting the final orders to execute from Washington to the carriers. There was also confusion about time zones which cost us an hour of planned time.

(3) This same time lag, in reverse, made us slow to understand the difference between the real operation and the one which Sharp and McNamara had in their mind's eye. Neither of them knew until late in the evening, our time, that there would be a time interval of 2-1/2 hours

~~TOP SECRET~~ DINAR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC/40-008-1-1

By JW, NARA, Date 7-31-06

9/4/64

between the first launch and the actual strike in the case of TICONDEROGA. They assumed 40 minutes to one hour.

(4) Finally, we were a little casual in Washington about acting on this accurate information of TICONDEROGA's strike plan when it did arrive. It was known to McNamara in the Pentagon and to officers in the Situation Room here ^{just} before you went on the air, but no one told me -- or you -- as far as I know. Indeed, Bob McNamara does not seem to have got this fact clearly in his own mind, because in his own press conference just after midnight he wrongly said that the carriers "have already conducted air strikes against the North Vietnamese bases."

The net of this is that we were saved from real trouble by your own stern and repeated insistence on positive assurance that the planes were in the air well before you spoke, and by the other facts cited earlier.

Bob McNamara is the ablest man in the government, but when he makes a basic decision and gets up a head of steam, he does not always keep the sharpest eye out for new evidence. Others of us could have been more alert than we were to help guard against this one weakness of an extraordinary man.

h. J. B.

McG. B.



36
4569


~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

31 AUG 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR McGeorge Bundy
 Special Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs

I am attaching the chronology of the events surrounding
the strike in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 4 and 5, 1964,
that the President requested from Secretary McNamara.


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
The Special Assistant

Attachment
As stated

412126

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
Approved NLT 140-008-1-2
By NARA Date 3-28-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

36a

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4

and

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1964

TONKIN GULF STRIKE

SANITIZED
Authority NSA 2-13-06
By JOW NARA, Date 7-31-06

412126

August 28, 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET LINAR~~

INTRODUCTION

This is a chronological account of the events of Tuesday, August 4, 1964 and Wednesday, August 5, 1964 as they relate to the attacks on the destroyers MADDOX and C. TURNER JOY in international waters by patrol boats of the North Vietnamese Navy and the subsequently executed retaliatory strikes against the North Vietnamese by naval aircraft from the USS CONSTELLATION and TICONDEROGA.

No chronology, of course, can ever hope to capture the full flavor and intensity of these two days in August. The events were complex, the pressures were great. Throughout, however, a number of basic themes emerge. There is the search for options, as word of the second attack on the destroyers filters in early on the morning of August 4th. These options must be shaped not only to the immediate problem of dealing swiftly and sharply with the PT Boat Bases but must, in the selection of additional reinforcements, deal as well with the long range strategic implications of the situation. There is a period of carefully refining these options for the President, the ultimate decision resting in his hands. Planning the strike occupies a good part of the afternoon of the 4th, coupled with the insistent demand that the attacks on the destroyers be verified clearly and convincingly. Throughout the evening, word is awaited for the first launch, signalling the start of the retaliatory response. The launches begin at 10:43 PM, EDT, and the President goes on the air within the hour to announce our action to the world. Finally, the strike itself is completed, a remarkably successful operation.

The chronology has relied substantially on cables, recordings, maps, news releases, minutes of relevant meetings, and discussions with Messrs. McNamara, Vance, Bundy, McNaughton and General Wheeler.

It must be remembered that much of the action reported is occurring simultaneously at different levels - the Pentagon, in CINCPAC Headquarters Honolulu, Tonkin Gulf, the South China Sea, and the target areas. Most of these locations are in different time zones, and reports of the action arrive at different intervals. For ease of reference, however, all of the times, unless otherwise indicated, are Washington Eastern Daylight Time.

~~TOP SECRET LINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

2

Saigon time is 12 hours later than EDT. Gulf of Tonkin *no*
time is 11 hours later: the Destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin kept
Saigon time, while the Carriers there used Gulf of Tonkin time
beginning in the later afternoon (EDT) of August 4. CINCPAC
(Honolulu) time is 6 hours earlier than EDT. Thus, for example,
10:00 AM in Washington is 10:00 PM Saigon time and 4:00 AM
Honolulu time.

The various abbreviations used throughout are these:

CINCPAC - Commander-in-Chief, Pacific -
Admiral Sharp

CINCPACFLT - Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet -
Admiral Moore

COMSEVENTHFLT - Commander, Seventh Fleet -
Admiral Johnson

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET BINARY~~

3

TUESDAY

AUGUST 4TH, 1964

7:40 AM (7:40 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The MADDOX reports that an attack appears imminent from actions taken by unidentified vessels. The MADDOX, in company with the C. TURNER JOY, is heading southeast near the center of the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters approximately 65 miles from the nearest land. These ships immediately go on the alert. (NMCC receives this report at about 9:30 AM.)

8:13 AM: First word of a possible attack on the MADDOX is received at the Pentagon by the DIA Indications Center over the phone from NSA. While on the phone, a copy of the NSA field unit message arrives and copies are delivered sometime about 9:00 a.m. to the Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler. The message states that there are "imminent plans of DRV naval action possibly against DeSoto mission" gathered from COMINT.

8:36 AM (8:36 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The MADDOX establishes its first radar contacts with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. U. S. fighter aircraft are then launched from the USS TICONDEROGA to provide the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY with protection against possible attacks from the unidentified vessels and aircraft, in accordance with the President's previously issued directives. At this time, the TICONDEROGA is located approximately 100 nautical miles East North East of Da Nang. (NMCC receives this report at about 10:30 AM.)

9:08 AM (9:08 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The MADDOX reports that the unidentified aircraft have disappeared from its radar screen but that the surface vessels are still remaining at a distance. U. S. aircraft from the TICONDEROGA arrive and commence defensive patrol over the MADDOX and the C. TURNER JOY. (NMCC receives this report at 11:04 AM.)

~~TOP SECRET BINARY~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

4

9:12 AM: McNamara calls the President and tells him about the NSA/DIA intelligence warning he has just received that the MADDUX is on the alert again, with the presence of hostile ships reported.

9:19 AM: Wheeler is now in receipt of several messages, including the NSA/DIA cable, indicating that the MADDUX may be under attack. He calls Admiral Grimm, NMCC, and asks whether Grimm has seen any messages on the attack and whether CINCPAC will be able to respond effectively. Grimm reports that he has one message, but has not talked to CINCPAC. Wheeler then says he will call CINCPAC himself.

9:23 AM: (3:23 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Wheeler calls General McCutcheon (CINCPAC J-3) and asks whether he has received any word on an impending attack on the destroyers. McCutcheon says he has no word, but will immediately check. Wheeler is insistent that the destroyers "clobber" the attackers, and make every effort to destroy the hostile ships, using additional air support, if required.

* * * *

9:25 AM - 11:25 AM
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4
EARLY MEETINGS AT PENTAGON

McNamara, Deputy Secretary Vance, General Burchinal, Colonel Jones, and Admiral Mustin of the Joint Staff meet at the Pentagon beginning at 9:25 AM as reports of the attack on the destroyers come in. As the situation grows more intense, possible levels and time of retaliation are discussed, and target folders are examined. High on the list are the PT boats and bases and supporting POL installations, but other targets such as airfields, industrial complexes and bridges are also scrutinized. Captain Miller of the Navy, a mine expert, is also asked to join the meeting and the possibility of mining one or more of the North Vietnamese important ports is discussed. Here it is pointed out that the mines would have to be brought to the carriers from Subic Bay, the Philippines.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET McNAMARA~~

5

McNamara orders that mines be brought to the carriers as soon as possible. Burchinal informs McNamara that a retaliatory attack can take place at first light. McNamara, during this time, calls the President, informs him that a retaliatory attack is being planned, and tells the President that he will call Secretary Rusk and Presidential Assistant Bundy to join him in preparing a number of options to be presented to the President as soon as possible.*

During these discussions, McNamara develops four options for a sharp limited blow and one option for continuous pressure against the North Vietnamese. The four options for the sharp limited blow are:

1. Air strikes against PT boats and their bases.
2. Air strikes against petroleum installations.
3. Air strikes on bridges.
4. Air strikes on prestige targets, such as a steel plant.

The option for continuing pressure against the North Vietnamese is to mine important ports along their coastline.

McNamara, about 11:00 AM, summons Rusk, Bundy, and the JCS and they arrive shortly thereafter.

Wheeler leaves Washington, D. C. at 10:30 AM to keep a previously arranged appointment with the New York Times editorial board for a luncheon and off-the-record discussion. He arrives in New York at noon, and ten minutes later is called by McNamara, who tells him to finish up his business and return to the Pentagon. Wheeler leaves New York at 3:00 PM, arrives at the Pentagon at 4:30 PM, and immediately meets with Burchinal.

* * * *

*McNamara made three calls to the President during this period at 9:43 AM, 10:53 AM and 11:06 AM.

~~TOP SECRET McNAMARA~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

6

9:26 AM (9:26 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The carriers report to CINCPAC stating that pursuant to JCS orders issued on August 2, they have launched a combat air patrol over the destroyers, consisting of 2 F-8s, 2 A-3s, and 4 A-1s.

9:30 AM (9:30 PM, August 4, Saigon time): Additional vessels are observed on the MADDOX radar screens, and these vessels begin to close rapidly on the destroyer patrol at speeds in excess of 40 knots. As the attacking craft continue to close rapidly from the west and south, the MADDOX evaluates their intentions as hostile. (NMCC receives this message at 11:20.)

9:32 AM (3:32 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Grimm (NMCC) contacts the CINCPAC duty officer, Major Rosenbaum. Grimm reports that the NMCC has just received word from the MADDOX that a possible attack appears imminent from PT boats, wants to know if air cover is available, and what has been done to supply the destroyers with an effective response capability. Grimm indicates that additional measures, beyond those directly involving the destroyers, are being considered in Washington. The duty officer has no information about the situation but adds that McCutcheon is on his way in. Grimm says that he will arrange for an open line between CINCPAC and Washington, and tells the CINCPAC representative that this is a "hot one."

9:52 AM (9:52 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The destroyers report that they are under continuous torpedo attack and are engaged in defensive counterfire against North Vietnamese patrol boats. (NMCC receives this message at 11:39 AM and 11:42 AM.)

10:04 AM (4:04 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): McCutcheon calls Burchinal, who is then in McNamara's office. Burchinal tells him that the Pentagon has just received a "flash" that the destroyers are under attack. McCutcheon replies that he has not seen it yet, but indicates that the fleet and the Carrier Task Force have been alerted. The TICONDEROGA, about 15 minutes away from the destroyers by air, is alerted. So is the CONSTELLATION, which had left Hong Kong yesterday and is headed south. Burchinal

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET BINARY~~

7

states that the CONSTELLATION will be ordered to move into position off South Vietnam, in the vicinity of the TICONDEROGA. He also tells McCutcheon that a possible retaliatory strike is being considered against North Vietnamese bases and asks him to take a look at some of the possible targets if, in fact, an attack is carried out against the destroyers. Burchinal mentions that McNamara is considering a new set of rules of engagement.

10:15 AM (10:15 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The destroyers report that they have avoided torpedoes and have sunk one of the attacking craft. (NMCC receives this at 11:52 AM.)

10:19 AM (4:19 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): McNamara calls Sharp and asks whether he has seen the messages regarding a possible attack on the MADDOX. Sharp says he has just arrived at the CINCPAC Command Center and that the messages are in. They discuss the "kill" capability of the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY. McNamara is particularly interested in assuring that the destroyers have whatever they need in the way of complete support, air and sea. McNamara tells Sharp to make it "perfectly clear" to the destroyers that the objective is to "destroy the attacking craft." McNamara also indicates that a modification of the rules of engagement is being sent to Sharp. (See 10:33 entry below.)

10:33 AM: A message, personally signed McNamara, is sent from the JCS to CINCPAC modifying the existing rules of engagement for the destroyers and their supporting aircraft. Under the old rules, in event of attack in international waters (11 miles offshore or more) U.S. Forces were to destroy the attackers, but hot pursuit of attacking forces into hostile waters or airspace was not authorized (JCS Message 7681, August 2, 1964) and the destroyers were to approach the North Vietnamese coastline no closer than 11 miles. Combat air patrol was restricted to daylight hours and maintained seaward of the destroyers so as to preclude any possibility of overflying North Vietnam. (JCS Message 7680, July 2, 1964) Under the new rules (JCS Message 7700), the closest approach to the North

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Vietnam coastline for the destroyer patrol is 11 nautical miles, and in the event of a hostile attack, aircraft only are authorized to pursue and attack the hostile forces up to the three mile limit of the North Vietnamese coastline. The message also directed that the CONSTELLATION be moved into the area off South Vietnam, with the exact location at the discretion of the commander. (Note: At 5:19 AM, August 2, the CONSTELLATION was ordered to slip quietly out of Hong Kong. The CONSTELLATION departed Hong Kong at 6:01 PM and proceeded south toward the Gulf of Tonkin.)

10:42 AM (10:42 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The destroyers report that they have evaded additional torpedoes and have sunk another of the attacking craft. Other protective aircraft have arrived overhead, but weather and darkness are hampering their activities. (NMCC receives this message at 11:37 AM.)

10:52 AM (10:52 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The MADDOX reports that the destroyers are still under attack. (NMCC receives this message at 12:24 PM.)

10:55 AM (4:55 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Miller of Joint Staff calls CINCPAC and directs that mines be placed aboard the TICONDEROGA.

10:59 AM (4:59 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls Burchinal in McNamara's office, and a discussion of possible options for a retaliatory strike ensues. Sharp suggests HON NE, HON ME, BEN THUY, and QUANG KHE. Burchinal indicates that a number of options along these and other lines are being considered. Sharp says that a strike could be carried out -- "All you have to do is say so" -- states that an armed reconnaissance along the North Vietnamese coast would be advantageous, and points out that the CONSTELLATION, about 350 miles from the destroyers, is coming in to provide support. Sharp says, "She could go in there right now and support them . . . we've speeded her up to get her down there as fast as possible." There is also talk of providing the carriers with a mining capability. Burchinal tells Sharp that McNamara wants him to get a mining capability on the TICONDEROGA

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as quickly as possible. Sharp says that it might take about 48 hours to achieve the capability, the problem being to get the mines aboard the carriers. He also reports that he has a message indicating that the destroyers are under continuous torpedo attacks.

11:18 AM (5:18 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls Burchinal and provides him with the latest situation report on the attack. According to Sharp, the destroyers were exchanging fire with the patrol boats and the MADDOX had dodged at least five torpedoes. Sharp then suggests that the LOC CHAO estuary be added to any list of targets since he now has information it is being used as a hiding place for the PT boats. When Sharp mentions the desirability of an armed reconnaissance "at first light" along the coastline, Burchinal makes it absolutely clear that McNamara is seriously considering more severe action. He also indicates that there is a desire to act "at the first light background." He tells Sharp that Secretary of State Rusk is on his way to the Pentagon, and that meetings will be held later at the White House. Sharp reiterates that it will take about 48 hours to attain a mining capability.

11:30 AM (11:30 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION receives a preliminary alerting message stating that for planning purposes "there is a strong possibility you will be directed on short notice to lay on armed reconnaissance at sea against Swatows or reprisal attack against Swatow bases such as QUANG KHE, BEN THUY or PHUC LOI." At this time, the CONSTELLATION is heading in a south southwest direction to join the TICONDEROGA.

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11:20 AM - 12:30 PM
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4
JCS MEET

BUNDY AND RUSK ARRIVE AT PENTAGON

11:20 AM: At McNamara's call, the JCS meet in McNamara's dining room with Vance and McNamara. Present are Acting Chairman LeMay, Admiral McDonald, General Johnson, General Greene, General Goodpaster, Burchinal, Mustin and Joint Staff assistants. McNamara informs the JCS that he has called the President and that he is interested in a quick capability to respond.

11:38 AM: Rusk and Green (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Far Eastern Affairs) arrive at the JCS meeting. At McNamara's direction, Burchinal briefs Rusk.

11:40 AM: Bundy arrives at JCS meeting. McNamara briefs Bundy. McNamara describes the five options listed on page 5 above. McNamara informs the group that he has issued orders to have mines moved from Subic Bay into Da Nang. There is a discussion of retaliatory measures. McNamara and Bundy discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a sharp limited blow such as air strikes and/or the continuing pressure of mining the North Vietnamese coast. McNamara tells LeMay that the JCS should work up recommendations for immediate action, then recommended actions for 24, 48 and 60 hours ahead, with special emphasis on reinforcements, such as the movement of B-57s into South Vietnam and fighter-interceptors into the Philippines.

12:04 PM: McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Green (State Dept.) and Vance move to McNamara's office, while the JCS continue meeting in McNamara's dining room. At this meeting the options are essentially refined to three:

1. Sharp limited strikes against such targets as PT boats, PT bases, oil depots, etc.
2. Continuing pressure, i. e., mining the Vietnam coast.
3. A combination of both.

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12:20 PM: McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and Greene depart for White House. Vance goes into McNamara's dining room to ask JCS if it would make any difference whether the retaliatory strikes were conducted at first light. JCS tell Vance that the time of attack would make no difference from a military standpoint but that fewer people would be at the PT boat bases and supporting installations at first light.

12:25 PM: Vance departs for the White House. The JCS continue meeting until 1:49 PM. During their meeting, at JCS direction, Burchinal calls McNamara at White House to recommend the sharp limited response option.

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12:40 - 3:00 PM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENT

A regularly scheduled National Security Council Meeting centering on the Cyprus situation is in progress when McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy arrive at the White House. McNamara briefs the participants*, including the President, on the available details of the attack on the destroyers. Rusk indicates that he, McNamara, and the JCS are developing a set of options, but that they are not sufficiently refined for presentation at that time.

At a lunch, which began about 1:04 PM and ended about 2:50 PM, following the NSC meeting, the types of response and the targets are key topics. Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Bundy, and Vance are with the President at lunch.

*Present are Robert Kennedy, McCone, McDermott, Ball, Talbot, Dillon, Rowan, Reedy, Valenti, Clifton, Bromley Smith, and Komer.

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The President agrees that a firm, swift retaliatory strike must be carried out. Here, a general consensus is formed on the approach finally taken in the JCS message to CINCPAC, developed later that afternoon, ordering the strikes into execution against the PT boats located at bases PORT WALLUT, HON GAY, PHUC LOI and QUANG KHE and LOC CHAO estuary and the oil depot at VINH. (See the 5:19 PM entry below.) The mining option, as well as an attack on HAIPHONG, is rejected. The President asks how long it would take to execute the strike. McNamara estimates from the advice he has received that a strike could be launched at about 7:00 PM, (7:00 AM, Saigon time). The President suggests that McNamara call the JCS to confirm the time, but McNamara says he wants to work it out carefully with the JCS on his return to the Pentagon.

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12:22 PM Sharp calls Burchinal and gives him the latest situation report on the torpedo firings at the destroyers. Estimates are that 3 to 6 PT Boats are engaged, with two reported sunk, no enemy aircraft are reported in the area, and aircraft (10 A-1s, 2 F-8s) from the CONSTELLATION are on station over the destroyers. Sharp asks that the destroyers be given permission to pursue PT Boats to the three-mile limit, and that aircraft be permitted to engage in hot pursuit over North Vietnamese territory. Burchinal advises him that the rules of engagement are being considered by McNamara and the JCS. Burchinal advises Sharp to dig out target material on PHOC LOI, QUANG KHE, and the VINH oil complex.

12:32 PM (12:32 AM Saigon time, August 5): The destroyers report that at least two enemy craft have been sunk, but that low ceilings continue to hamper the aircraft operations. (NMCC receives this report about 1 1/2 to 2 hours later.)

12:54 PM (12:54 AM Saigon time, August 5): In addition to the torpedo attack, the TURNER JOY reports that during the engagement she was fired upon by automatic weapons while being illuminated by searchlights. (NMCC receives this report about 1 1/2 to 2 hours later.)

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12:57 PM (6:57 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): CINCPAC sends message to JCS recommending that authority be granted to conduct punitive U. S. air strikes as soon as possible against BEN THUY, HON ME, QUANG KHE, and LOC CHAO. (NMCC receives this message at 1:27 PM.)

1:01 PM (7:01 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls Burchinal and reports two jet aircraft have been sighted flying out of HAINAN as far south as DA NANG. Sharp says that we cannot afford to permit hostile aircraft to fly over carriers. Sharp then quotes proposed message on rules of engagement for aircraft which would grant authority to declare hostile and engage any North Vietnamese/ChiCom aircraft whose actions show within a "reasonable certainty" that an attack on U. S. forces is intended. Burchinal agrees that the message should be sent if needed for the security of CINCPAC Forces, will note Sharp's comments for the JCS, and tells Sharp that a meeting is now going on at the White House.

1:03 PM: Bob ^{Hayes} Hayes at the White House Situation Room calls Col. Nickols at Pentagon Command Center and advises that the NSC meeting has just broken up. McNamara, McCone, Rusk, Bundy, and Vance have now gone to lunch with the President. Situation Room wants to be sure that the latest reports from the destroyers are forwarded at once.

1:24 PM: McNamara, still at White House, calls Burchinal at Pentagon. Burchinal tells him that Sharp had reported the presence of hostile aircraft (probably IL-28's) flying out of HAINAN and was issuing a "to engage" order if the security of his forces was threatened by enemy air (see the 1:01 entry above). McNamara is insistent that faster situation reports be obtained from the MADDOX and asks that Sharp try to contact the destroyer by radio. Burchinal advises that the JCS have selected the option involving air strikes against PHUC LOI, QUANG KHE, LOC CHAO, and the VINH-PHUC LOI oil complex.

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1:27 PM (1:27 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The Destroyer Division Commander on the MADDUX sends a "Flash" message to CINCPACFLT, with JCS on the information list. The "Flash" states that a review of the action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired "appear doubtful". "Freak weather effects" on radar, and "over-eager" sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. "No visual sightings" have been reported by the MADDUX, and the Commander suggests that a "complete evaluation" be undertaken before any further action. (NMCC receives this report about 1 1/2 to 2 hours later.) (Note: Sharp repeats the substance of this message to Burchinal. See the 1:59 PM and 2:08 PM entries below.)

1:28 PM (7:28 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Following up McNamara's request, Burchinal calls Sharp and asks for a status report on the engagement. Sharp reports that two PT Boats have been sunk but is uncertain as to the total number involved and says that some 13 torpedoes have been launched. Also, he reports that there is some indication of enemy aircraft in the area but says that aircraft from both the TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION are on the scene. Burchinal asks Sharp to obtain a direct radio report from the ships engaged.

1:30 PM (1:30 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The destroyers report that the attacking craft had apparently broken off the engagement. The MADDUX and TURNER JOY are directed to resume their patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin at daylight on the 5th of August. (NMCC receives this message about 1 1/2 to 2 hours later.)

1:59 PM (7:59 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls Burchinal and says that he cannot contact ships by voice radio, but tells him that he has sent message requesting that situation reports be expedited. As for the communication link between CINCPAC and the destroyers, Sharp says that "our Flash messages have choked up the circuit. I have just told everybody to knock off using FLASH." Sharp says that the last message from the ships reports that freak weather is affecting radar performance, with many contacts and torpedo runs doubtful. Sharp says that the MADDUX itself has reported no visual sightings, and over-anxious

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sonarmen may have accounted for what they erroneously thought to be torpedoes.

2:08 PM (8:08 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp advises Burchinal that the latest situation report indicates that three PT boats have been sunk, and that the weather is deteriorating and hampering aircraft operations. Sharp expresses the view that there is no doubt that a torpedo attack did occur, but adds that many of the reported torpedo attacks may have been due to inaccurate sonar reports. "Whenever they get keyed up on a thing like this, everything they hear on the sonar is a torpedo," says Sharp.

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3:00 PM - 5:15 PM

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4

MEETINGS AT THE PENTAGON

THE STRIKE EXECUTE MESSAGE IS DRAFTED

At the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs begin their meeting at 3:00 PM*. McNamara and Vance arrive at 3:06 PM and inform the Chiefs that the President wants the strikes to take place at 7:00 PM Washington time, if possible, and at the following targets: PT boats and bases at QUANG KHE, PHOC LOI, PORT WALLUT, HON GAY and LOC CHAO, and the oil complex at VINH. The JCS agree with this proposal. At about 3:25 PM, Burchinal alerts Sharp by phone and gives him the targets to be attacked and the time of attack. At 4:42 PM, McNamara and Vance return to the JCS meeting. McNamara states that the time of the strike is important, for there will be no announcement until the strike gets under way. McNamara reviews the strike message which originally reads "By 0700 local time 5 August or as soon thereafter as weather permits conduct attack" and changes it to "By 0700 local 5 August conduct a one-time maximum effort attack",

* Throughout the afternoon, Wheeler, LeMay, McDonald, Johnson, Greene, Burchinal, Goodpaster, Mustin, General Carroll and Service and Joint Staff assistants are present at various intervals.

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and that "if weather precludes meeting the above time of attack, proceed soonest, and notify JCS ASAP." (The major part of the message is quoted in the 5:19 PM entry below.) Also during the meeting, the deployment and alerting of reinforcements to the area is considered, telling proof of our desire to escalate if we had to. These are divided into three categories. In the First category are those forces ordered deployed as soon as possible. They consist of the 1st CVS Group (the Kearsage, 4 destroyers, and 3 destroyer escorts) which would be moved from Japan to the South China Sea; a Marine Special Landing Force (1600 men, 24 helicopters, the Valley Forge and supporting Craft) to be moved from Subic Bay to the vicinity of Da Nang; the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, consisting of 6500 men to be moved from Okinawa to the South China Sea; an F-101 Reconnaissance Task Force to be moved from Shaw AFB to Kadena and a CVA Task Group, consisting of the Ranger and 4 destroyers to be moved from the 1st Fleet to WESTPAC.

The Second category are those forces alerted for deployment immediately upon the receipt of political clearance. These will consist of 2 B-57 squadrons, to be moved from Clark AFB to South Vietnam; 1 F-105 squadron to be moved from Yokota to Korat; 1 F-100 squadron to be moved from Clark AFB to Takhli; 12 F-102s to be moved from Clark AFB to South Vietnam; 8 KC-135s to be moved from SAC to Clark AFB; 2 F-100 squadrons from STRICOM to Clark; 1 F-105 squadron from STRICOM to Yokota; and 1 Reconnaissance Task Force (6 RF-101s) from Misawa/Kadena to Southeast Asia.

The Third category consists of those forces alerted for possible deployment to Southeast Asia. These are the 173rd Airborne Brigade, a Forward Floating Depot, a Marine Air Group, and an Army Brigade.

3:30 PM (9:30 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Mustin of the Joint Staff calls Sharp and tells him to be on the alert since a strike execute message is being prepared and would be transmitted as soon as released.

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3:34 PM: Mustin calls General Smith, Deputy Director for Operations, Joint Staff, and informs him that the JCS are in session, that a strike execute message is now being typed for final review by the JCS and that Sharp knows it is coming. Mustin asks that the line be held open for an immediate transmission of the strike execute message to Sharp.

4:08 PM (10:08 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): McNamara calls Sharp and asks for the latest information on the destroyer attack. Sharp responds by saying that although he has just received a sum-up situation report from Destroyer Task Force Commander Moore it "indicates a little doubt on just exactly what went on." McNamara wants to know if there is a possibility that no attack occurred, and Sharp replies, "Yes, I would say that there is a slight possibility." Sharp says he is going to ask Moore to get a definite report which "should come in within an hour." McNamara sums up the situation by stating that "We've got problems on timing here . . . we don't want to release news of what happened without saying what we are going to do; we don't want to say what we are going to do before we do it." Sharp recommends that any execute notice be held until "we have a definite indication that this happened."

McNamara then observes that the execute is scheduled "for 7 p.m. our time which is three hours from now." Sharp says this is right, it is being set for "7 o'clock local out there." McNamara says that even if definite confirmation of the attack is not forthcoming for another 2 hours, an hour would still remain and the execute order could then be issued. McNamara states: "It seems to me we ought to go ahead on that basis; get the pilots briefed, get the planes armed, get everything ready to go." Sharp agrees.

4:14 PM (4:14 AM, August 5, Saigon time; 10:14 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): CINCPACFLT transmits an alert message to COMSEVENTHFLT, the TICONDEROGA and the

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CONSTELLATION to be prepared "at 0700G" to strike targets (8:00 PM Washington time; 7:00 AM Saigon time). (See entries at 5:23 PM, 5:29 PM, and 5:33 PM, August 4) The designated targets are the PT Boat bases at QUANG KHE, BEN THUY, HON NE Island and SONG MA estuary, HON GAY and PORT WALLUT; any identified North Vietnamese PT Boats located at sea; and the VINH petroleum storage depot. The latter is labeled the number one target priority. The message indicates that it would be "desirable" that all targets be struck simultaneously, but adds that authority is granted to recycle aircraft as necessary to strike the two southern targets (QUANG KHE and BEN THUY) with a second launch if the Forces on the TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION are inadequate. It concludes by specifying that this is a preparatory order, and that launching should not be accomplished until an execute order is received. (TICONDEROGA receives this message at 4:55 PM.)

4:35 PM (4:35 AM, August 5, Saigon time; 10:35 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): CINCPAC transmits an official alert message to CINCPACFLT to prepare to execute air strikes with a "high level damage expectancy" at 7:00 PM (7:00 AM local time), against (1) PORT WALLUT, (2) BEN THUY (VINH), (3) HON GAY, (4) QUANG KHE, and (5) LOC CHAO. "Conventional ordnance only" is specified. The message specified that the Vinh POL should be struck with a "very high level of expected damage."

4:40 PM (10:40 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls Burchinal and is informed that the JCS strike execute message is in the McNamara office ready to go, but that there is still a slight doubt whether the destroyers were in fact attacked. Sharp will try to get more definite information from Admiral Moore, but states that he has now seen reports of visual sightings of cockpit lights pursuing near the MADDOX and another report of the destroyers being illuminated and fired against. Burchinal then asks Sharp whether he continues to believe the launch could be

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accomplished at 7:00 PM. Sharp responds that "it will be tight," but "I think so." He adds, however, that "it may be just as well to wait an hour or so, if we have to, to be certain" an attack had occurred. Sharp then suggests it might be necessary to recycle some of the aircraft for a second strike against VINH and Burchinal says "this will be all right," if needed. Sharp estimates that about 70 aircraft in all will be involved in the strikes.

4:49 PM (10:49 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): The JCS strike execute message to CINCPAC is transmitted by direct teletype from the NMCC to the CINCPAC Command Center. (CINCPAC receives this message at 5:28 PM (11:28 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time).)

4:55 PM (4:55 AM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA receives the CINCPACFLT alert message directing COMSEVENTHFLT to be prepared at 7:00 PM to strike the PT boats at designated locations. The TICONDEROGA is already on an alert status as a result of the PT boat attacks on the destroyers. Upon receipt of this alert message, its pilots and Weapons Planning Board commence to plan for the strikes. A message is also sent from TICONDEROGA to Naval Air Station at Cubi Point, Philippines (some 500 miles away), directing all ready-to-go A-1 and A-4 aircraft to return to the TICONDEROGA as soon as possible. This is necessary because the complement of aircraft on the TICONDEROGA has to be augmented by additional strike aircraft for the maximum strike effort. A number of the aircraft on the TICONDEROGA had been used previously for reconnaissance (Yankee Team) efforts over Laos, and could not appropriately be used for the strike.

5:00 PM Colonel Jones of the Joint Staff, in the JCS conference room, calls the NMCC Pacific desk at Pentagon (Commander Hathaway) and says that the JCS would like a forecast of the weather over the target area at 7:00 AM local time.

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4:47 PM - 6:00 PM
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4
JCS-SECDEF MEETING TO DETERMINE IF ATTACK
ON DESTROYERS OCCURRED

4:47 PM: McNamara, Vance and the JCS meet to marshal the evidence to overcome lack of a clear and convincing showing that an attack on the destroyers had in fact occurred. They conclude that an attack had taken place. In this regard five factors are considered:

1. The TURNER JOY was illuminated when fired on by automatic weapons.
2. One of the destroyers observed cockpit lights.
3. A PGM 142 shot at two U. S. aircraft. (From COMINT)
4. A North Vietnamese announcement that two of its boats were "sacrificed." (From COMINT)
5. Sharp's determination that there was indeed an attack.

Burchinal, at Wheeler's request, tells McNamara that the 7:00 PM strike time will not be met because the carriers are operating on a time which makes 8:00 PM Washington time 7:00 AM carrier time.

5:19 PM: JCS strike execute message is retransmitted FLASH precedence as JCS 7720 to CINCPAC. It states that by 7:00 PM EDT (0700 local time) a one-time maximum effort attack against PORT WALLUT (later cancelled because of weather), HON GAY, PHUC LOI, QUANG KHE, LOC CHAO and VINH, and an armed reconnaissance against PT boats beyond the three mile limit should be conducted. The message cautions that if the weather precludes meeting the above time of attack, the commander is to "proceed soonest" and to notify the JCS as soon as possible. (CINCPAC receives this message at 5:52 PM (11:52 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time).)

5:23 PM (11:23 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls Burchinal and says there is no doubt that an attack on the destroyers had occurred, for he has intercepted a North Vietnamese

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message stating that two of its PT boats were "sacrificed." Sharp is now satisfied with all the evidence, what with several additional reports from the TURNER JOY. Sharp mentions then that the attack will be "coming off" at 8:00 PM Washington time not 7:00 PM but still at 7:00 AM local time. The reason is that the CINCPAC execute message used "HOTEL" time (Saigon time, a 12 hour difference from EDT), whereas the carriers (based on a CINCPACFLT message) were shooting for the operation on "GOLF" time (an 11 hour difference from EDT), giving them an extra hour. Sharp says that he will convert his strike message to "GOLF" time.

5:29 PM: Mustin calls the NMCC (General Smith) and indicates that some confusion exists over the time in the Gulf of Tonkin. He asks Smith to get on the teletype and straighten out the matter.

5:33 PM (11:23 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Smith calls McCutcheon at CINCPAC and asks for a breakdown of the times between the carriers, Saigon, and Washington. McCutcheon replies that when the Washington time is 8:00 PM, the local time (GOLF time) for the carriers would be 7:00 AM the next morning. When the Washington time is 7:00 PM, the local time in Saigon would be 7:00 AM the next morning. McCutcheon reports that Sharp, realizing that the carriers can use that extra hour, has told them to use GOLF time, so that 7:00 AM for the carriers would be 8:00 PM in Washington.

5:39 PM (1:39 PM, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls Burchinal and says that his understanding is that launch time will be 7:00 AM, August 5 (carrier time), or 8:00 PM, August 4, Washington time.

5:51 PM: McNamara, Vance, and Wheeler leave the meeting for the White House.

6:10 PM (6:10 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The TICONDEROGA receives a copy of the JCS strike execute message.

6:27 PM (6:27 AM, August 5, Saigon time): CINCPAC transmits strike execute message to CINCPACFLT. (See 4:35 PM entry, August 4.)

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6:15 PM - 6:38 PM
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
6:38 PM - 6:45 PM
SPECIAL MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

The National Security Council* is convened as McNamara, Vance and Wheeler arrive at the White House. McNamara outlines the four-part plan:

1. The strike against the PT boat bases and the supporting installations and armed reconnaissance along the North Vietnamese coast.
2. Sending reinforcements to the area, an expression of our will to escalate.
3. Presidential announcement of these actions.
4. A Joint Congressional Resolution in support of these actions and further actions, if necessary.

The President asks the NSC members if they have any objection to the plan. All NSC members approve the plan. The President then approves the plan. McNamara informs the President that the previously estimated 7:00 PM launch time will not be met, but that the launch time is now estimated to be 8:00 PM. McNamara then recommends that no public statement be released until 9:00 PM, the estimated time over target of the first strike.

The NSC meeting breaks up at 6:38. McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy meet with the President in his office, prior to the Congressional leadership meeting which starts at 6:45. Vance returns to Pentagon and meets with Burchinal to determine what reinforcements can be moved without political clearance from other countries and to put in motion the political clearance process where required. Vance authorizes the movement of units not requiring political clearance.

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* Present at this meeting are the President, Speaker McCormack, McCone, Cline, McNaughton, Rusk, Ball, William Bundy, Dillon, Rowan, Reedy, McG. Bundy, Jenkins, Moyers, Valenti, Bromley Smith and Cater.

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6:07 PM (12:07 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls Burchinal and repeats that he is satisfied that the destroyers were attacked. Sharp now has the JCS strike execute message. Burchinal says that McNamara, now at the White House, is also satisfied that the attacks on the destroyers have occurred and had made the statement just a short time ago that the "show is now on the road." After agreeing that suppressive fire "was part of the game," Sharp then states that the press should not get the story at 7:00 PM. Burchinal replies that "we will insure that nothing comes out until we know that you're off target." Sharp estimates this to be 9:00 PM, one hour after launch. Burchinal emphasizes that any announcement will be delayed so that there is "no possibility of anyone reading" the strike. The matter of deploying additional forces to the theater is also discussed.

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6:45 PM - 8:45 PM
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING

General Wheeler was one of those in attendance at the leadership meeting. In his recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Wheeler stated that the President told the Congressmen that he would make a public announcement but left the time "up in the air because he did not want to make the announcement too soon." Wheeler then recalled that the timing of the announcement may have actually been settled either in a preliminary meeting between McNamara and the President (around 6:38 PM) or at the leadership meeting itself. In any event, Wheeler said that the decision was made that a statement could be released "at the time the aircraft took off from carriers, in other words when the strikes were enroute." Chairman Vinson said he would verify this because "I sat there and I heard the whole discussion." In short, Wheeler remembered that the President "was going to wait until it was safe to make the announcement . . . it would not be made prior to the launching of the aircraft." McNamara's recollection is the same as General Wheeler's.

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6:56 PM (6:56 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION receives a copy of the JCS strike execute message.

7:22 PM (7:22 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The TICONDEROGA receives the CINCPACFLT execute message.

7:30 PM (7:30 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION receives the CINCPAC message which passes the JCS strike message with instructions not to execute until directed. (Note: According to Mustin, the "hold" notice was presumably prompted by CINCPAC's desire to make certain that the second attack on the MADDOX did in fact occur. Once this was confirmed the strike execute message was issued (see the 7:50 PM entry below).)

7:49 PM (7:49 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION receives its target assignments.

7:50 PM (7:50 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION receives the CINCPAC strike execute message.

7:59 PM (1:59 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): General Wisman, NMCC Pacific Desk at Pentagon, calls the CINCPAC Duty Officer, Lt. Colonel Lindsey, and asks for the take-off times, numbers and types of planes in the carrier strike. Lindsey replies there is nothing yet on the strikes, although there is some combat air patrol activity in relation to the earlier attacks on the destroyers.

8:05 PM: Wheeler, in the Cabinet room at the White House, calls Burchinal at the Pentagon and asks if anything is happening. Burchinal says that he has a clear line open, but no word has been received. Wheeler wants to know as soon as the word arrives that the aircraft have been launched.

8:39 PM (2:39 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): McNamara, back from the White House, calls Sharp and asks whether the carriers have launched their aircraft. Sharp replies that he has

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received no word yet, but this probably because the carriers will provide a coordinated report when the launch is completed. McNamara, however, says that the launch is already 40 minutes after the ordered time of take-off and wants Sharp to contact the carriers directly by radio. McNamara then states: "Let's get an immediate statement from them if we can. Part of the problem here is just hanging on this news, you see. The President has to make a statement to the people and I am holding him back from making it, but we're forty minutes past the time I told him we would launch." Sharp estimates, although he does not have the launch plan, that it would take the aircraft about an hour to reach the target. McNamara asks Sharp to find out when they are launching and the time of the first flights over the targets.

9:00 PM (9:00 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The situation at this time and thereafter as reflected on North Vietnamese and ~~radar~~ radar is described at Appendix A.

9:09 PM (3:09 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls McNamara at his office and says that one carrier (perhaps both) would not be able to launch for another 50 minutes (10:00 PM Washington time). "In other words, they couldn't make the time," reports Sharp. Sharp explains that the compression of time and the communications lag are the reasons, and thinks that the last estimated times over target, with a 10:00 PM launch will be about 12:00 midnight, Washington time. McNamara then asks what Sharp thinks about a Presidential statement issued about the time of launch that would say this: "At this moment air action is now in execution against gun boats and supporting facilities in and near four ports of North Vietnam which have been used in support of hostile operations." Sharp thinks it would not be a "good idea" because it will alert the enemy, "No doubt about it." McNamara says that the enemy would be alerted as soon as the aircraft start coming into the coast. Sharp says, "They won't know where they're going. Of course they will be alerted as soon as they get in the air because Hainan is going to pick them up and so will the other people. But they won't know where they are going. I wouldn't recommend it."

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9:22 PM (3:22 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp tells McNamara that PT boats (presumably those returning from attack on the destroyers) were taking sanctuary within the three-mile limit. McNamara recommends that the aircraft proceed to hit designated targets, but authorizes striking any boats sighted on the way in. He says, "Get them off . . . That is the main thing."

9:28 PM (9:28 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION submits its strike plan for approval to the Carrier Task Force Commander.

10:00 - 10:30 PM: During this period, McNamara calls Bundy to discuss the Presidential announcement. As a result of his earlier conversation with Sharp, McNamara recommends that Bundy delete the entire sentence which reads: "At this moment air action is now in execution against gun boats and supporting facilities in and near 4 ports in North Vietnam which have been used in support of hostile operations." Bundy disagrees and tries to work out some language changes that will meet McNamara's point about giving away the targets. Bundy secures McNamara's agreement to the following language, which appears in the President's statement as given over the air at 11:40 PM: "Air action is now in execution against gun boats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations." Thus, the words "in and near 4 ports" were deleted, with the rest of the sentence allowed to remain substantially in tact.

10:06 PM: After trying to reach Senator Goldwater for several hours, the President finally gets through and informs him of the decision to retaliate.

10:26 PM (4:26 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): McNamara calls Sharp and asks whether the aircraft are launched yet. Sharp says he has no firm word, but is "sure" one carrier (TICONDEROGA) "is going to go, or has gone" at 10:00 PM Washington time. According to Sharp, however, the other carrier (CONSTELLATION) "is not going to launch" one of its groups (the slower propeller driven A-1 aircraft) until 1:00 PM Washington time, and the other (the jets) until 2:30 AM, with a time over target for both groups estimated around 3:15 AM, apparently because "she is not able to get in position in time." Sharp explains this by stating

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that the CONSTELLATION was coming from the north and had to get into position by coming around Hainan to strike her assigned northern targets. In order to get into position, "she had to use a good many of her aircraft for refuelers." Sharp repeats that the TICONDEROGA "should have gotten off a half hour ago (10:00 PM) but "we haven't heard yet." McNamara tells Sharp to make "damn sure she got off" by getting in touch with her right away. As to the CONSTELLATION, McNamara asks how long it would take its aircraft to reach the target. Sharp replies the farthest target will be reached in about five hours from now. McNamara then says that no announcement here "is going to influence what they think about those aircraft coming in because you will already have launched about a half hour ago against the other targets." Sharp agrees "as long as they don't know what the targets are." McNamara states that "I have cut that out of the statement," and Sharp says "there will still be the element of surprise . . . as long as you don't say what the targets are."

10:40 PM (10:40 AM, August 5, Saigon time): CONSTELLATION recovers the last group of A-1 aircraft from combat air patrol over the destroyers.

10:43 PM (10:43 AM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA launches four A-1 strike aircraft with instructions to orbit overhead. This is necessary so that the carrier deck could be free from the landing of A-4 aircraft from Cubi Point then orbiting overhead and to permit coordination of prop and jet strikes to ensure a simultaneous arrival time over the target. The A-1 launching marks the beginning of the attack, and within the hour these four A-1's depart for VINH. (NMCC receives this message at 12:36 AM, August 5.)

10:46 PM (4:46 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): McNamara calls Sharp again, seeking confirmation of the launch times. Sharp says that he has been trying to reach the Task Force but "it is just a question of getting through this circuit and apparently the circuit is a little jammed." He reports that no word has yet been received, and McNamara suggests he radio in the clear, asking the TICONDEROGA if it did "what it said it would do at 10:00." McNamara states that the President wants to go on the air at 11:15, but should not go on "unless he has a confirmation of the launch." McNamara then wants Sharp to secure half-hourly post-strike reports, once the launching occurs.

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10:48 PM: Clifton at the White House calls General Wisman, the Deputy Director for Operations, Joint Staff and states that new launch times for the CONSTELLATION have been received which are considerably later than the TICONDEROGA's, that the President is shooting for an 11:15 PM statement, and asks how much would be revealed by the announcement. Wisman states that Sharp agrees with a Presidential announcement now that McNamara has recommended the deletion of specific portions dealing with the targets.

10:56 PM: The UPI ticker reports from Balboa, California, that Goldwater had spoken to the President and that "President Johnson read his statement on the tense situation in Vietnam to Senator Barry M. Goldwater, the Republican Presidential candidate. Goldwater expressed approval of the President's statement."

10:59 PM: The UPI ticker, in amplifying the prior story, quotes Goldwater from Balboa, California, as stating this: "I am sure that every American will subscribe to the actions outlined in the President's statement. I believe it is the only thing we can do under the circumstances. We cannot allow the American flag to be shot at anywhere on earth if we are to retain our respect and prestige."

11:05 PM: Wisman calls Burchinal and reports that nothing is airborne yet, that the CONSTELLATION is not in position, and that several more hours would be required for its first launch. There is now the possibility, according to Wisman, that the CONSTELLATION because of weather may have to scrub its operation. He recognizes this would tip our hand if one force goes in, and says that there can be no scrubbing of the mission until the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are first notified.

11:11 PM: McNamara calls Sharp, and is told "it is just that I don't think that there is any question that they have launched. It is just a question of getting the report." McNamara, with regard to the weather conditions and possible cancellation of the CONSTELLATION strikes, states "As a nation we just can't sit here and let them attack us on the high seas and not do something . . . So I think the President has to say we are going to retaliate." McNamara

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asks if there is "any reason why the CONSTELLATION couldn't launch against the southern targets, including the oil depot." Sharp responds that this is "exactly what we would do," although he mentions that the weather to the south is not good and beginning to deteriorate.

11:20 PM (5:20 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls McNamara and says it is now confirmed. "She /the TICONDEROGA/ got her planes off at 0243" (Zulu time) (10:43 PM, Washington time; 10:43 AM, Saigon time). Sharp indicates that it will take the aircraft about an hour and fifty minutes from now to reach their targets. The attack will be in two waves, both scheduled to arrive at the same time.

11:27 PM: After discussion of the matter with General Wheeler, McNamara calls the President and tells him that it is now appropriate to make his statement over radio and TV. Commander Henson of the NMCC Pacific Desk at the Pentagon notifies the White House Situation Room that the TICONDEROGA launched its first aircraft at 10:43 PM, with an estimated time over the target at 1:10 AM.

11:35 PM (11:35 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION advises the Carrier Task Force Commander of its intended launch position for strikes with a simultaneous time over target at 3:45 AM.

* * * * *

11:36 PM
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4
PRESIDENT GOES ON THE AIR

The President goes on radio and TV at 11:36 PM and states at 11:40 PM:

"Repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you. Air action is now in execution against gun boats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations."

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The decision to go on the air is based on these considerations:

1. U. S. Naval aircraft had been in the air approximately one hour.
2. Hanoi and Hainan, through their radar, had then received indications of the attack.
3. The time remaining before the aircraft arrived over the targets would probably not permit the North Vietnamese to move their boats to sea or to alert their forces.
4. It was important that our people learn of the manner in which their government was responding to the attacks on its vessels from their President, rather than from Hanoi, which was expected to announce the attack at any moment.
5. It was desirable that the North Vietnamese government and others be told as soon as possible the limited, punitive character of the attack.
6. It was important that the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists know that this was the firm and deliberate response of the U. S. Government to an unprovoked aggressive act, and not the act of a local commander.

* * * *

11:51 PM (11:51 AM, August 5, Saigon time): Sharp calls Wheeler and they discuss the possibilities of a restrike against VINH, with Wheeler saying that he will take it up with McNamara.

11:54 PM (11:54 AM, August 5, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION receives a message that TICONDEROGA had launched its aircraft at 10:43 PM, with scheduled arrival over target at 1:10 AM.

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WEDNESDAY

AUGUST 5, 1964

12:00 Midnight (Noon, August 5, Saigon time): Wheeler calls Sharp to discuss the recycling of the VINH strike. Sharp indicates that the recycling may only have to be off the TICONDEROGA, but wants the added flexibility of recycling with both carriers. "The problem" says Sharp, "is that it takes so damn long to get the word out to them." Sharp also tells Wheeler that both carriers had been conducting air operations all night before in supporting the MADDOX and TURNER JOY and as a result "they are kinda pooped out." The CONSTELLATION "didn't make as much headway as she would have because she apparently had to turn in the other direction for a landing and launching . . . so that she is behind her hoped for position . . . so that's the reason she launched late." The TICONDEROGA, on the other hand, "is also quite a long run from where she is to these various targets; and she being a small carrier doesn't have as many airplanes either." Sharp indicates that the CONSTELLATION may have to scrub only the northernmost target (PORT WALLUT) and this because of a combination of factors, such as, the target's distance and the adverse weather.

12:02 - 12:30 AM: Secretary McNamara holds a press conference in which he describes the action taking place.

12:15 AM (12:15 PM, August 5, Saigon time): Six A-4s and six F-8s are launched from the TICONDEROGA flying to VINH at an altitude of 25,000 feet. The target is 320 nautical miles away.

12:34 AM (12:34 PM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA launches six F-8s which depart for QUANG KHE, flying at an altitude of 25,000 feet. The target is 250 nautical miles away.

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12:38 AM (6:38 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Wheeler calls Sharp and tells him that he has discussed the recycle with McNamara. Wheeler's major concern is that the attacks must not be "open-ended" affairs. Three rules are set for the recycle: First, up to 20 aircraft may be used; second, the only target will be VINH; and third, the attack should be launched no later than 3:00 AM, Washington time. Sharp thinks that the 3:00 AM time is cutting it too short, with closer to 4:00 AM as the more realistic hour. Sharp adds that he will do his best to compress the time and will recycle as quickly as possible. Wheeler indicates that he will pass this on to McNamara.

12:43 AM: Wheeler calls Sharp and tells him that the 4:00 AM recycle time is acceptable to McNamara, but Sharp now indicates launch on the recycle could not begin until 5-6:00 AM. Wheeler says this is too late, and they arrive at an agreement that Sharp would launch what he could up to 4:00 AM and would then have to cease.

1:00 AM (1:00 PM, August 5, Saigon time): CONSTELLATION launches four A-1s which depart for HON GAY, flying at an altitude of from 1,000 - 5,000 feet. HON GAY is 360 nautical miles away. CONSTELLATION also launches four A-1s which depart for LOC CHAO, flying at an altitude of 1,000 - 5,000 feet. LOC CHAO is 330 nautical miles away.

1:11 AM (1:11 PM, August 5, Saigon time; 7:11 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): CINCPAC duty officer calls Lt Colonel Smith in McNamara's office and says that the estimated times over target for the TICONDEROGA will be 1:15 AM for the first and 1:25 AM for the second. "Everything is on track," he reports.

1:15 AM (1:15 PM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA's six F-8s launched at 12:34 AM strike QUANG KHE with 20 mm shells and 5" rockets. There is no AA fire. Seven boats are sighted, four are severely damaged and one moderately. There are no U. S. losses.

1:25 AM (1:25 PM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA's four A-1s launched at 10:43 PM, six A-4s launched at 12:15 AM and six F-8s launched at 12:15 AM strike at the VINH - BEN THUY-PHUC LOI complex. They report moderate AA fire. Of the six

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sighted, four are moderately damaged and two lightly damaged. Eight POL tanks and two AA guns are destroyed. There are no U. S. losses. The ordnance used ranges from 1,000 lb. bombs to 5" Zuni rockets to 2.75 mm rockets.

2:16 AM (8:16 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp calls McNamara's office and gives the first strike report to Colonel Moody. He states that VINH has been struck, the oil installation is burning fiercely, the four PT boats in the harbor have all been hit, with one dead in the water. Heavy flak has been experienced and one F-8 is hit, headed for DA NANG. Moody says Vance will be promptly advised of these developments. Vance is informed immediately.

2:30 AM (2:30 PM, August 5, Saigon time): The CONSTELLATION launches ten A-4s and two F-4s which depart for HON GAY at an altitude of 25,000-30,000 feet. HON GAY is 360 nautical miles away. The CONSTELLATION also launches five A-4s and three F-4s which then depart for LOC CHAO, flying at an altitude of 25,000-30,000 feet. LOC CHAO is 330 nautical miles away.

3:25 AM (3:25 PM, August 5, Saigon time): CONSTELLATION's four A-1s launched at 1:00 AM and its five A-4s and three F-4s launched at 2:30 AM, strike at LOC CHAO. They report moderate AA fire (20 mm from the boats). The boats are not under way. Of the five PT boats sighted, two are damaged seriously and three moderately. One A-1 aircraft (Sather's, third in the column) is shot down. One A-1 is damaged, but returns to carrier safely. The attacks last 25 minutes. 2.75" rockets and 20 mm strafing attacks are used.

3:40 AM (3:40 PM, August 5, Saigon time): CONSTELLATION's four A-1s launched at 1:00 AM and its ten A-4s and two F-4s launched at 2:30 AM, strike HON GAY. They report moderate to heavy AA fire. Of the five boats sighted, five are destroyed. The boats do not get under way until after the attack started. Alvarez' A-4 aircraft, the second in column, is shot down while on a second pass against boats at anchor. The attack lasts 25 minutes, with 2.75" rockets and 20 mm strafing attacks utilized.

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3:43 AM (9:43 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): Sharp tells Wisman of the Joint Staff that it might be best to pull the MADDOX and C. TURNER JOY out of their patrol because they are low on fuel and ammunition, and the North Vietnamese have already been given a "good punishment." Sharp adds that to keep the destroyers on station might invite further attacks, perhaps even a loss. Wisman says this will require JCS approval.

3:58 AM (9:58 PM, August 4, CINCPAC time): McCutcheon at CINCPAC calls Wisman about pulling the destroyers out. McCutcheon says that these destroyers have special equipment and could not readily be replaced, but that the ships have had several sleepless nights. The relief of these ships would be temporary only, about a 24 hour rest, after the strikes had ceased. Wisman says he will talk to Burchinal.

4:03 AM (4:03 PM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA launches four F-8s and eight A-4s which depart for the restrike against VINH.

4:15 AM (4:15 PM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA launches two A-4s which depart for HON ME at an altitude of 25,000 feet.

4:41 AM: Wisman calls Burchinal and tells him that an A-1 and A-4 from the CONSTELLATION have been lost over HON GAY. (Note: Actually, one was lost over HON GAY, another over LOC CHAO.) Burchinal is the first to be notified, and he suggests that Wisman inform the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. Vance is informed immediately.

4:45 AM (4:45 PM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA's four F-8s and eight A-4s, all launched at 4:03 AM, strike VINH. They report heavy AA fire from the additional AA guns brought into position after first strike, but they destroy two to four POL tanks and six AA guns. There are no U. S. losses.

5:15 AM (5:15 PM, August 5, Saigon time): TICONDEROGA's two A-4s, launched at 4:15 AM, strike HON ME with 20 mm shells and rockets. They report no AA fire. Of the six boats sighted, three are destroyed, three moderately damaged, and one is forced to beach. There are no U. S. losses.

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6:08 AM: Wisman calls Mustin and says the operation is just about wound up and was a "pretty good effort, highly successful." He states that Sharp was able to accomplish the recycle against VINH and that the destroyer patrol is being pulled out, with approval, for replenishment.

8:30 AM (2:30 AM, August 5, CINCPAC time): McNamara calls General Milton at CINCPAC to check on the results of the punitive strike, based on present information. Here, these facts are confirmed:

- 64 strike sorties were launched (with 59 planes) against 4 North Vietnamese patrol boat bases, including the LOC CHAO estuary, and the supporting oil storage depot at VINH.
- About 25 PT boats were destroyed or damaged, in addition to damage to their bases and supporting facilities.
- An estimated 90% of the VINH oil depot, containing 14 tanks and 10% of the petroleum capacity of North Vietnam, was destroyed. Smoke was seen rising to 14,000 feet.
- Two U. S. Navy aircraft were lost and two damaged.

Two pages Sanitized in their entirety
NSA, 2/13/06

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10 August 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Chronology of Events on Desota Patrol and Incidents
Involving the Maddox and Turney Joy

Attached is a memorandum for record developed by Colonel Steakley's people, pulling together the timing of 34A actions and the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin. With respect to the latter, the intercepts from the DRV, as well as the key messages from our own forces, have been included.

The evidence in these messages makes the hostile intent of the DRV during the 2-4 August period unmistakable. Following the attack on the 2d of August, the DRV again began to concentrate their forces and to track the US vessels. On 4 August, two Swatow boats were told to prepare for operations that night. The Maddox had this information, and when the ships approached on hostile tracks, the action began.

I understand that some additional COMINT sifting still is underway. If these investigations turn up anything new or different--and I learn of it--I will pass it on to you.

W. Y. SMITH

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Authority RAC 140-008-13
By JOW, NARA, Date 7-31-06

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10 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Chronology of Events Relating to DESOTO
Patrol Incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin
on 2 and 4 August 1964

Background - By CINCPAC's message 152123Z July, approval was requested to conduct a DESOTO Patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin during the period 31 July through 8 August. The last patrol into the area was made by the USS CRAIG (DD 885) during the period 28 February thru 10 March 1964. Limitations on the closest points of approach (CPA) for the USS CRAIG included:

- a. North Vietnamese (DRV) Coast 4 NM,
- b. Chinese Communist (CHICOM) mainland 15NM, and
- c. CHICOM off-shore islands 12NM.

- CINCPAC requested that the July - August patrol with the USS Maddox be cleared for CPA's as follows:

- a. North Vietnamese Coast 8 NM,
- b. North Vietnamese Islands, 4 NM, and
- c. CHICOM Coast 15NM.

- DRV and CHICOM reaction to the CRAIG patrol, noted below, had been quite limited:

a. On 28 February, a Kronstadt - class patrol craft intercepted and paced the CRAIG for a short period;

b. On 29 February, one unidentified aircraft remained 36 miles from the CRAIG for about two hours,

c. On 1 March, Haiphong alerted the Master of a DRV ship, "The ship appearing is the enemy. Our Navy is presently pursuing and tracking,"

d. On 2 March, Peking issued 280th serious warning.

- CINCPAC's 15 July proposal was approved as requested by the State Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the President.

- First Incident (2 August)

a. Intercept of North Vietnamese communications (COMINT, Atch #1) on 1 August indicated that the MADDOX was being tracked by DRV naval elements. During the same day, the DRV Southern Fleet Base at BEN THUY radioed an unidentified surface craft that a decision had been made to "Fight the enemy tonight." At 1244H the next day, the DRV Northern Fleet base at Port Wallut was advised by Swatow Boat T-142, "Received Orders 146 - 142 DID use high speed to go together with enemy following to launch torpedoes." An attack was apparently imminent at 1412H when an unidentified shore station ordered the T-146 to "leave the T-135 and turn back to path of the enemy . . . to attack." At

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1607H the MADDOX reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese craft and that it was opening fire.

b. Subsequent DRV COMINT substantiated reports from the MADDOX that an attack had, in fact, occurred. COMINT reflections indicated that the attack had been carried out by DRV Torpedo Flotilla 135 comprised of T-333, T-336 and T-339. DRV communications revealed that the T-339 was sunk while the T-336 sustained heavy damages; the T-333 apparently escaped with only minor damages.

- Second Incident (4 August)

a. On 4 August, DRV naval communications (COMINT, Atch #1) again indicated preparations were underway for another attack that night. The T-142 and T-146 (Swatow boats) were ordered to prepare for "Military Operations." The T-333, which was involved in the previous incident, was ordered to obtain oil to participate in the second attack. That night the MADDOX joined by the USS TURNER JOY, reported surface and air contacts on their radar screens. The surface contacts were later identified as hostile, and at 2240H the MADDOX opened fire. Subsequent reports from the destroyers indicated that possibly two PT boats had been sunk. This was later confirmed by a DRV message stating, "We sacrificed two comrades but all are brave and recognize our obligations." The same message reported that two enemy planes had been shot at and at least one damaged. A later report stated that "an enemy vessel perhaps wounded."

Map shows time
of day as
08H.
Identified as
hostile by their
act of
launching
speed, direction.

b. Debriefing of the pilots, providing air coverage over the MADDOX and TURNER JOY, revealed that during the incident they observed gun flashes on the surface of the water and bursting light AA at their approximate flight altitude. It is possible that the DRV PT boats mistook the illumination flares being dropped by the aircraft as hits on the planes.

Swatow PT
boats have some
20 mm & 37 mm
guns.

- In response to Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, a modified DESOTO Patrol was resumed on 7 August and completed on 8 August. The northern point for this modified track was 1841N. No DRV hostile reaction to the patrol was indicated during 7 - 8 August period. CINCPAC was authorized to withdraw the destroyers from the area due to Typhoon "IDA", however he was able to complete the modified patrol on 8 August prior to withdrawing.

- CINCPAC, by his message 080155Z, requested permission to conduct another full scale DESOTO Patrol into the Gulf of Tonkin during the period 12 - 17 August. The patrol was considered necessary in view of the recent attacks, the forced retirement from the Gulf due to Typhoon IDA, and that the intelligence objectives for the area north of 20°N latitude had not been fulfilled. The patrol has been disapproved at this time but will be considered at a later date.

Conclusions - Correlation of DRV communications traffic and situation summaries from the surface and air units involved, verifies that the two incidents not only took

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place but the attacks were instigated by the DRV using Swatows and motor torpedo boats.

- Examination of tracks of the MADDOX/TURNER JOY and the units of OPLAN 34A indicates that there was no mutual interference. Additionally, the MADDOX/TURNER JOY were not in the 34A operations area when the two ships were attacked.

Ralph D. Steakley
RALPH D. STEAKLEY
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Joint Reconnaissance
Center
Operations Directorate

4 Attachments

1. Chronology of Events Derived
from message traffic
2. Chart showing first incident
3. Chart showing second incident
4. Chart showing MADDOX/TURNER JOY
tracks

Prepared by:

Cdr H.E. Fitzwater, USN
Joint Reconnaissance Center, J-3
Extension: OX 5-7356

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ATTACHMENT 1

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

<u>DATE/TIME</u> <u>(HOTEL)</u>	<u>SHIPS/PTF</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
28 July	USS MADDOX		Departed Keelung, Taiwan
300830	MADDOX	17-01N 108-29E	Sighted 2 PT type craft that passed ahead south-erly heading "NASTY CLASS" Two more sighted 15 min later one "same class" other appeared to be Soviet "P-6 class". CPA 3 miles.
301405	PTFs 2,3,5,6 (These are South Vietnamese 34A forces)	Underway DANANG	
301440	PTFs 2,3,5,6	16-20N 108-20E	
301610	PTFs 2,3,5,6	17-00N 108-20E	
302110	PTFs 2,3,5,6	18-40 107-10	
302315	PTFs 2,3,5,6	19-00 106-16	PTF 2 and 5 then pro-ceeded direct to HON NIEU. PTFs 3 and 6 direc to HON ME.
310002	PTF 3,6	HON ME	PTFs commenced bombard-ment HON ME.
310037	PTFs 2,5	HON NIEU	PTFs commenced bombard-ment HON NIEU.
310048	PTFs 3,6	HON ME	PTFs departed from area
310110	PTFs 2,5	HON HIEU	PTFs departed from area
-	PTF 2,5	-	Returned to base along same route as approach
-	PTFs 3,6	-	Returned to base via 19-00N, 106-16E thence direct to Danang
310730	PTF 2	-	Suffered an engine casualty.
310955	PTF 6	DANANG	Arrived at base
311045	PTF 5	DANANG	Arrived at base
311055	PTF 3	DANANG	Arrived at base
311120	PTF 2	DANANG	Arrived at base
311300	MADDOX	17-05N 107-18E	Arrived at Pt. ALPHA. Sighted 60-80 junks apparently fishing.

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011600	MADDOX	18-04.9N 106-41.8E	
011801	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	A message was intercepted being passed from Naval Hqs at BEN THUY to surface vessel hull #377 which was interpreted as an apparent plan coordination of naval/artillery elements fire missions on nautical charts to support DRV naval patrols. It was interpreted as being a possible reaction to recent "enemy incursion in DRV waters".
012000	MADDOX	19-00N 105-54.3E	110 junks fishing craft sighted. USS MADDOX sent: "Contemplate serious reaction my movements in vicinity Pt. Charlie in near future. Received information indicating possible hostile actions".
012219	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	Message intercepted informing vessel T-142 "Turn on equipment. Enemy going in course of 52 degrees. Located 9NM from HON ME bearing 134".
012222	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	Vessel T-146 sent "Enemy located at 9NM from HON ME bearing 1480".
020027	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	BEN THUY sent a message to T-255 noting that it had been "decided to fight the enemy tonight when you receive directing orders". T-255 was queried if she had received "the enemy's consecutive change from 52."
020152	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	Observation post on HON ME and Swatow Class PGM T-146 were informed that 01 1800 position of enemy vessel was 11 NM SE of HON ME bearing 168.
020255	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	Port Wallut informed same Swatow class vessel T-146 that three vessels from BN 135 have been ordered to HON ME.

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020400	MADDOX	19-05.1N 105-54E	
020413	<u>DERIVED FROM COMINT SOURCES</u>		Swatow Class PGM T-377 reported "the unit was launched at 0230G and was waiting northeast of HON NGU.
020448	MADDOX		MADDOX sent: "Have terminated orbit. Proceeding due East from Pt. "C" at ten knots until daylight. Heavy concentration of junks to North".
020645	MADDOX		MADDOX reported: "Conditions unchanged. Unless otherwise directed am proceeding to Pt. DELTA.
021100	MADDOX	19-47N 106-08E	"Sighted approximately 75 junks. Will deviate from track as necessary to avoid passing through."
021230	MADDOX		MADDOX reported "sighted 3 PT craft 10 miles North of HON ME Island on a Southerly heading - - speed 20K. CPA 7NM. Evaluated as P-4s."
021244	<u>DERIVED FROM COMINT SOURCES</u>		T-142 to Port Wallut "received orders - 146, -142 DID (1 group missing) Use high speed to go together with enemy following to launch torpedoes."

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021315	MADDOX		MADDOX reported: "Sighting 2 poss. Swatow class North of HON ME on Southerly heading. Speed 5K. All appeared to be heading for vicinity of HON A.
021412	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	An unidentified source station possibly SAM SON 1943 30N/105-55E ordered the T-146 to "leave the T-135 and turn back to the enemy and attack."
021540	MADDOX		MADDOX "I am being approached by Hi speed craft with apparent intention of torpedo attack. I intend to open fire if necessary in self defense".
021547	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	Between 021547 thru 022230, DESOTO Patrol was under continuous surveillance by DRV naval elements. Several references to repulsing the enemy were noted. Track data reveals that three vessels, the T-142, T-146 and the T-135 close and instituted the action on the MADDOX. <i>This is possible to extend that T-135 turned out of later analysis to be a flotilla of 5 boats</i>
021550	MADDOX	19-47N 106-31.1E	From MADDOX: "3 torpedo boats nearing on bearing 268° range 11.5 NM closing at 50 Kts."
021607	MADDOX		MADDOX: "Being attacked by 3 DRV PT craft. I am opening fire with 5 inch battery. Air support from TICO ETA 15 minutes."
021608	MADDOX	19-41.5N 106-35.6E	PT boats closed to 9000 yards, MADDOX turned to course 150° and fired 3 warning shots with 5" guns. Speed 27 knots. Torpedo boats continued to close, taken under continuous fire. Although receiving numerous hits and near misses, 2 boats closed to about 5000 yards, and because of volume of gun fire made an ineffective launch of 2 torpedoes. MADDOX turned away and torpedoes passed on starboard side from aft to forward.

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021608 (Cont'd)			Machine gun fire from PT resulted in one hit. After boats turned away MADDUX turned to pursue until TICO aircraft arrived. MADDUX directed aircraft to attack.
021608	MADDUX		Message from CTG 77.5 to COM7THFLT said: "1. MADDUX 25K claims being pursued by 3 high speed 45Kt surface craft. 2. Orig providing 4 F-8E cover armed with Zuni and ammo. 3. Instructed not to open fire unless MADDUX or aircraft fired upon."
021621	MADDUX		Third torpedo boat had pulled almost abeam, and at time of receiving direct hit, dropped torpedo in water. Was not observed to run (torp
021622	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	T-146 instructed T-142 (6157) order 135 "Do not make war during day- (Pretend to go to the shore then return to HON ME ".)
021629	MADDUX		From MADDUX: "PT craft completed torpedo attack and retired. Ship sustained no damage. Ships guns damaged one. Aircraft from TICO now attacking one craft. I am retiring to the Southeast".
021630	MADDUX		4 F-8s arrived over MADDUX and on request by MADDUX attacked 3 motor PT boats. Boats proceeding away at high speed in Northerly direction. 2 PT boats were approximately 10 miles North of MADDUX and 1 about 15 miles. The first F-8s attacked the Northerly pair of PTs with Zunis. No hits on the first run. One aircraft reported hit but still in control, was told to orbit MADDUX.

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DATE/TIME SHIPS/PTF
(HOTEL)

POSITION

REMARKS

021630 (Cont'd)

Another Zuni run and 4 strafing attacks were made. Zuni did not hit target but hits were observed in the strafing runs. 2 PTs not observed to slow down. Second 2 F-8s attacked Southerly single PT boat. Rockets were expended on first run but no hits observed. Each aircraft made two strafing runs, one aircraft against the Northerly pair. Hits were observed on all strafing runs and single PT boat was reported dead in water and burning near stern.

021641 MADDOX

MADDOX sent: "PT craft completed torpedo attack and retired. Ship sustained no damage. Ships guns damaged one. Aircraft from TICO now attacking 1 craft. I am retiring to Southeast".

021659

COM7THFLT sent: "To MADDOX: Retire from area until situation clears and further advised. Do not pursue attacking craft. Fire as necessary in self defense. Report situation".

021700 DERIVED FROM
COMINT SOURCES

The T-142 and 146 turned back to HON ME Islands. At 022230H, messages were sent to the T-146 telling her to meet the T-142 and T-135 at HON ME Island, then go immediately to 1941N 10637E. After arriving they should investigate the area for a radius of 10NM for a DRV vessel which was wounded and lost because of enemy aircraft fire or because of engine trouble or out of fuel. After finding it they were directed to tow it back.

021707

COM7THFLT to TICO: "Direct your NW picket (TURNER JOY) to close MADDOX best speed. Give MADDOX all practicable air support, while maintaining own AAW posture".

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021715	MADDOX	1921.5N 10646E	MADDOX retiring at best speed to rendezvous with TURNER JOY thence TICO. Anticipate rendezvous approximately 022000H.
021942	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>		DRV vessel T-142 passed the following recap from its ships log for 2 Aug: "1525 - Saw the 135 attack the enemy". "1630 - Were ordered to turn around and return to concentrate and to communicate with 165".
031527	MADDOX	19-00N 10553E	MADDOX reports: "Air radar now operative. Detected probable skin head radar bearing 330T at 031420 indicating possible surface surveillance of my movement".
031610	PTFs 1,5	DANANG	Underway from base.
031616	PTFs 2,6	DANANG	Underway from base.
031645	PTFs 1,2,5,6	1620N 10820E	All PTFs in company.
031704	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	The T-142 sent the following message to an unidentified station: "At 1420G (1520H) HON ME reported 2 enemy ships bearing 170° range 25NM course 0°.
031727	MADDOX	1947N 10608E	MADDOX reports: "No DRV military craft sighted. CTG 77.5 provided continuous air support throughout patrol.
031758	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	The T-142 reports the 1845H position of the DESOTO destroyers as 20NM off HON ME.
031818	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	DRV merchant cargo THONG NHAT passed urgent message to Viet NEWIS NATH maritime transport service "031625 at a distance of 18NM from VAL SOV SON, there is 1 prop aircraft 303 from the direction. They will fly to observe the ship maneuver after that to fly directly in the direction of the ship will sneak."
031845	PTFs 1,2,5,6	1700N 10820E	PTF 2 engine casualty, commenced return to base.

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032000	MADDOX	1921.2N 10647.9E	MADDOX sends: "I intend to proceed Southeast to 1842N 10730E thence North to position 1853N 10733E thence West to Point DELTA arriving and commencing line patrol to Point CHARLIE at 041300."
032110	PTF 2	DANANG	Returned to base.
032222	PTFs 1,5,6	1758N 10711E	PTFs commenced independent approach to targets.
032320	MADDOX	1845N 10716E	MADDOX reports: "Hold surface contact 012T range 38.5 miles. Contact has paralleled my movement including ZIG ZAG for past hour. TURNER JOY holds ECM contact evaluated as Skir. Head radar on same bearing. Strongly suspect shadow by block patrol/PT craft."
032352	PTF 6	1752N 10627E	Commenced fire on military complex located at South bank of RON River.
032400	PTF 1	1757.30N 10630.20E	Commenced fire on VINH SON radar site.
032400	PTF 5	1758.00N 10630.00E	Commenced fire on VINH SON radar site.
040002	PTF 6	-	Ceased fire and departed from area.
040020	PTF 6	-	Pursued by enemy craft.
040025	PTFs 1,5	-	Ceased fire, departed from area, and commenced return to base along approach route.
040100	PTF 6	-	Outdistanced pursuing craft and commenced return to base along approach route.
040625	PTF 6	DANANG	Arrived at base.
040630	PTF 5	DANANG	Arrived at base.
040715	PTF 1	DANANG	Arrived at base.
041300	MADDOX	-	MADDOX sends: "Vicinity of Pt. DELTA. Commencing patrol to Pt. CHARLIE. Will remain North of 1910N per ref. A. I

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041300 (Cont'd)			intend withdraw to East at 041730. Air support in the area. No significant sighting/detection. Suspect shadow continued South after my turn North at 040100. Last contact at 040400 range 78 miles'
041400	MADDOX	1947N 10619E	MADDOX sends: "Vicinity of Pt. DELTA patrolling to 1910N. Suspect shadow 15 miles to the East. Contact has paralleled my movements for the past four hours. Unable to have continuous overhead low CAP from the TICO due to distance."
041650	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	<p>In a series of messages released by T-142 to HAI PONG on 4 Aug sized up the after attack report of the attack on the "MADDOX".</p> <p>The 3 MTBs which were engaged, T-333, T-336 and the T-339 comprised what is believed to be MTB Sq 135. Damage result in our report is as follows: "MTB 333 with 3 holes; possible life boat damage; lube oil pressure is low; auxiliary engine damage, after pipe damage suspected.</p> <p>MTB 339: Sunk as reported by T-333.</p> <p>MTB-336: Heavily damaged with many holes. Our oil lines damaged and possible oil contamination. Tank gun barrel damaged; 2 men wounded. (This MTB was towed to possibly VAN NOA.)"</p>
041701	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	HAI PHONG had informed Swatow Class PGM T-146 and BACH DANG there are two objectives, enemy attack vessels located at 1952.25N 10629.25E at 1321H and at 1936N 10619.25E at 1445H.
041710	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	HAI PHONG informed vessels T-142 of DESOTO destroyers location: Time 1445H position 1936.23N 10619.30E.

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041940	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	HAI PHONG informed vessel T-142 (Swatow Class) to make ready for military operations for the night of 4 Aug. The sister ship T-146 has also received similar orders. COMMENT: Message indicated that all efforts were being made to include MTB T-333 in this operation as soon as additional oil can be obtained for that vessel. (MTB T-333 participated in original attack.)
042040	MADDOX	1910.7N 10700E	From MADDOX: "Received information indicating attack by PGN/P-4. (PTs or Swatows) Proceeding Southeast at best speed". <i>Maddox has COMINT capability. This was some g info. D</i>
042049			7THFLT sent to MADDOX: "At first light 5 Aug proceed to intercept original track between Pt. CHARLIE and DELTA at 1910N. Remain on this track during daylight hours. Further instructions to follow".
042136			TICO reports: "MADDOX reports two unidentified surface vessels (Skunks) and three unidentified aircraft (Bogies)."
042208			MADDOX reports: "Unidentified aircraft disappeared from radar screen. Unidentified surface contacts not closing this time, maintaining distance of 27 miles."
042234			TICO reports: "Two original Skunks opened to 40 miles. Three new Skunks contacted at 13 miles. Closed to 11 miles evaluated as hostile. CAP/STRIKE/PHOTO overhead under control of MADDOX."
042240	MADDOX		MADDOX reports: "Commenced firing on closing PT boats."

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042248	MADDOX		MADDOX reports: "Two Skunks on beam closed to 10 miles, 2 South at 40 miles closing at relative speed of 70 knots."
042252	MADDOX		MADDOX reports: "Am under continuous torpedo attack."
042315	MADDOX		MADDOX reports: "Have thus far successfully avoided at least six torpedoes. Small craft continuing attacks. Believe one sunk by TURNER JOY. At least two remain".
042340	MADDOX		MADDOX reports: "PT from West continued attacking run. MADDOX opened fire. PT launched torpedo".
042350	MADDOX	1817N 10732E	MADDOX reports: "Am under attack again."
042354	<u>DERIVED FROM</u> <u>COMINT SOURCES</u>	-	Swatow Class PGN T-142 reported to MY DUC (1952. 45N 10557E) "We shot at two enemy airplanes and at least one was damaged. We sacrificed two comrade (possibly two boats) but all are brave and recognize our obligations

*May have
mistaken a
air-dropped
flare for a
falling aircraft.*

Also reported to same station that "an enemy aircraft was observed falling into the sea. Enemy vessel perhaps wounded."

DERIVED FROM
COMINT SOURCES

*Since 4 August have have
see additional reports of
REV preparation for
further attacks on
vessels.*

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