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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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IP AIR COLLECT
 ICE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EXDIS

Classification

Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR FLASH 222

Info:

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW

DECLASSIFIED

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Authority State 6-1-78; NSC 2-29-80 U.S.

By isp, NARS, Date 7-23-80

The following personal message from the President to the Head of Government or Head of State, as appropriate, in your country should be delivered as soon as possible to him or senior available official:

"I am asking my Ambassador to convey to you personally a statement I am making in Washington tonight with regard to deliberate attacks which have been made by Communist North Viet-Nameese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high seas.

"As I am sure that you will agree, these attacks could not go unanswered. The response we are making is, however, limited and fitting. I hope that ^{it} ~~they~~ will make clear to North Viet-Nameese regime the dangerous character of the course they are following in Southeast Asia.

"The United States Government is reporting on these events

/to the

okl2

Drafted by: IO:HClleveland.ebb 8/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Under Secretary *Spitzer*

Clearances:

FE:Mr. Green (in draft)

ADS/S - Mr. Hilliker
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to the United Nations Security Council on which your Government is represented. I am confident that you share fully our deep concern over these deliberate acts of aggression. I know that your Government will give ~~appropriate~~ appropriate expression to this concern in the Security Council."

Text of Presidential message as well as Pentagon announcement being sent to you septel and via USIS wireless file, respectively, and should accompany this personal message.

DC/T: Send to: Amembassy, OSLO

" RIO DE JANEIRO
" LA PAZ
" RABAT
" ABIDJAN

RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 PAGE TO

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Classification

Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR

FLASH 223

AUG 4 11 01 PM '64

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Info

EXDIS--PIERCE ARROW

DECLASSIFIED

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Authority State 6-1-78, NSC 2-29-80 (U.S.)

By ms, NARS, Date 7-23-80

The following personal message from the President to the Head of Government or Head of State, as appropriate, in your country should be delivered as soon as possible to him or senior available official:

QTE I am asking my Ambassador to convey to you ~~MEMORANDUM~~ a statement I am making in Washington tonight with regard to deliberate attacks which have been made by Communist North Viet-Nameese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high seas.

As I am sure that you will agree, these attacks could not go unanswered. The response we are making is, however, limited and fitting. I hope that ^{it} ~~they~~ will make clear to North Viet-Nameese regime the dangerous character of the course they are following in Southeast Asia. UNQTE

SEATO countries should add paragraph stating: QTE I am bringing this to your personal attention because I know that your country, as a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty

OKH

Drafted by:

FE:MGreen:ej ms

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Undersecretary ej

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Tyler (ms)

FE - Mr. Bundy WMA

S/S - Mr. Hilliker ms

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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Organization, has special concerns and responsibilities with regard to the peace and security of the area. We will wish to keep in particularly close touch in the days ahead. UNQTE

Text of Presidential message as well as Pentagon announcement being sent to you septel/and should accompany this personal message. ~~and via USIS wireless file, respectively,~~

AND OTTAWA

FOR LONDON: Please have this note delivered to Malaysian PriMin now in London (it also being given to Acting PriMin Razak). Note should not be delivered to UKG. or to Canadian Government.

GP-3.

END

SENT TO:

CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
MANILA
BANGKOK
LONDON
~~SIEMREAP~~
TOKYO
SEOUL
TAIPEI
VIENTIANE
KUALA LUMPUR
~~NEW DELHI~~
OTTAWA
ADDIS ABABA

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ACTION: CIRCULAR FLASH 221
ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

(US.)

PIERCE ARROW

All posts except Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw, deliver text President's statement transmitted separately on urgent basis to ranking available Foreign Office official. Supplement with Pentagon announcement of attack contained USIS ~~wireless~~ wireless file. Separate instructions follow to:

- | | | |
|----------------------|------------|--------------|
| Canberra | Wellington | Manila |
| Bangkok | Tokyo | Seoul |
| Taipei | Wientiane | Kuala Lumpur |
| Addis Ababa | New Delhi | Karachi |
| London | Ottawa | Oslo |
| Rio de Janeiro | LaPaz | Rabat |
| Abidjan | Paris | The Hague |
| Bonn | Brussels | Luxembourg |
| Rome Rome | | |

(4)
OK/P

Drafted by: G/PM:JKitchen:idp 8/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/S - Grant Hilliker

Clearances:

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DATE: COLLECT
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ACTION:

CIRCULAR 2/8 IMMEDIATE
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Amembassy BRUSSELS
Amembassy THE HAGUE
Amembassy LUXEMBOURG
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy ROME

AUG 4 9 42 PM '64

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Authority State 6-1-78, NSC 2-29-80
By ing, NARS, Date 7-23-80

(U.S.)

PARIS PASS USRO: DELIVER DURBROW 8:00 A.M. AUGUST 4.

INFO: Amembassy COPENHAGEN Amembassy ATHENS
Amembassy LISBON Amembassy ANKARA
Amembassy LONDON Amembassy MADRID
Amembassy OSLO
Amembassy OTTAWA
Amembassy REYKJAVIK

EXDIS - ~~XX~~ PIERCE ARROW
FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

The following personal message from the President to the Head of Government in your country should be delivered as soon as possible to the FonMin RPT FonMin or senior available official:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT:

I am asking my Ambassador to convey to you a statement I am making in Washington tonight with regard to deliberate attacks which have been made by Communist North Viet-Nameese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high seas.

only

Drafted by: FE: MGreen/EUR: RCCreen/ghm/AMR

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

EUR - William R. Tyler

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Hilliker

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As I am sure that you will agree, these attacks could not go unanswered. The response we are making is, however, limited and fitting. I hope that ~~it~~^{IT} will make clear to ~~the~~^{the} North Viet-Nameese regime the dangerous character of the course they are following in Southeast Asia. END VERBATIM TEXT

as well as Pentagon announcement

Text of Presidential message ~~XX~~
and via USIS wireless file ~~XX~~,
being sent to you SEPTEL and should accompany this personal message.
Slug future messages this subject "PIERCE ARROW".
END

GP-3

VERBATIM TEXT:

convey to y

with regard

RUSIP

EUR - William A. Tyler

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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O R 050700Z
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC
RUDSCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
BT

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1964 AUG 5 AM 6 20

UNCLAS ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 88 INFO CINCPAC 16 LONDON ONE
LAST 177 FROM CANBERRA FIFTH

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING IS TEXT MINEXTAFF HASLUCK PRESS RELEASE AUGUST 5
ON VIET NAM SITUATION.

QUOTE

ON THE SECOND AUGUST THREE NORTH VIETNAMESE FAST PATROL
BOATS CARRIED OUT A TORPEDO ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
DESTROYER "MADDOX" WHICH WAS ON PATROL ON THE HIGH SEAS IN THE
GULF OF TONKIN, SOME 30 MILES OFF-SHORE. A RENEWED ATTACK BY
NORTH VIETNAMESE FAST PATROL BOATS TOOK PLACE DURING THE
CFN 88 16 17 5 30

NIGHT OF THE FOURTH AUGUST ON THE "MADDOX" AND ANOTHER DESTROYER
WHICH HAD JOINED IT, "C. TURNER JOY". THE SECOND ATTACK TOOK
PLACE SOME 60 MILES FROM THE COAST. AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK THE
UNITED STATES MADE PUBLIC A PROTEST NOTE TO NORTH VIETNAM,
WARNING OF THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS.

THESE CONSEQUENCES HAVE NOW EVENTUATED. THE AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COULD DO
NO LESS THAN TAKE THE NECESSARY MILITARY MEASURES TO PROTECT
ITS NAVAL VESSELS FROM ATTACK IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THE ACTION
BY THE UNITED STATES IN DEFENCE OF ITS FORCES AND IN DEFENCE OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS - A MATTER OF
PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO AUSTRALIA - HAS OBLIGED THE UNITED
STATES, IN THE WORDS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST
"CERTAIN SUPPORTING FACILITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM WHICH HAVE BEEN
USED IN THESE HOSTILE OPERATIONS". THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT
THIS ACTION WAS COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED AS NORTH VIETNAM COULD NOT
BE LEFT UNDISTURBED IN ITS CAPACITY TO LAUNCH AND RENEW SUCH
ATTACKS.

THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT NOTES THAT THE ACTION BEING TAKEN BY
THE UNITED STATES FORCES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM BASES AND
CFN 60

Canberra 88
8-5-64

microfilmed by RM/R

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-2-88, August 5, from: Canberra

PAGE 3 RUMJAG 780
SUPPORTING FACILITIES WAS DESCRIBED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AS
"LIMITED AND FITTING" AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SEEKING
A MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL TO DISCUSS THE
SITUATION TODAY. UNQUOTE
BATTLE
BT. -

Note: Passed to White House, DOD & CIA at 7:55 a.m. 8/5/64
Advance copy to S/S-0 at 6:45 a.m. 8/5/64

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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P 051754Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

Belgium

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY [168] AUG 5 7PM

EXDIS

PIERCE ARROW

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 22825
By 10/1/84, NARA, Date 3-28-14

DEPCIRTEL 218; EMBTEL 167

I DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND ADDRESS TOGETHER WITH MCNAMARA STATEMENT TO SPAAK THIS AFTERNOON. STRESSED THIS ACT OF OPEN AGGRESSION FOLLOWING AN EARLIER SIMILAR AGGRESSION HAD OCCURRED ABOUT 100 KMS. FROM NEAREST LAND AND THAT DESPITE THIS ACT OF WAR, US RESPONSE HAD FOR PRESENT BEEN LIMITED BECAUSE WE SEEK NO RPT NO WIDER WAR.

SPAAK SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE FULL TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S AND MCNAMARA'S STATEMENTS. ALREADY HE HAD RECEIVED TELEGRAMS FROM COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS URGING THAT BELGIAN PARLIAMENT BE RECONVENED FROM SUMMER RECESS TO PASS RESOLUTION CONDEMNING US. SPAAK SAID HE HAD NO RPT NO INTENTION OF DOING ANY SUCH THING. HOWEVER, INEVITABLY COMMUNISTS WOULD EXPLOIT OUR ACT TO MAXIMUM AND ALREADY HE WAS ALSO RECEIVING SOME MESSAGES PROTESTING WHAT WE HAD DONE FROM BELGIAN NON-COMMUNIST SOURCES.

SPAAK STRESSED THAT OUR PUBLIC STANCE WAS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE AND HOPED WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GET TRUE PICTURE ACROSS TO BELGIAN AND WORLD OPINION. IN PARTICULAR HE BELIEVED OUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESENTATION SHOULD STRESS:

A. FACT THAT LATEST ATTACK FOLLOWED EARLIER ONE MADE TWO DAYS BEFORE WHICH WE HAD PROTESTED TO NORTH VIETNAM;

B. THAT LATEST ATTACK WAS DELIVERED IN OPEN WATERS ABOUT 100 KMS FROM NEAREST LAND BY NUMEROUS NORTH VIETNAMESE WARSHIPS.

• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

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ASSIGNED TO	TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE	DIRECTIONS
OFFICE SYMBOL	ACTION	TO RM/R

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-2- 168, AUGUST 5, 7 PM FROM: BRUSSELS.

C. THAT US ITSELF HAD TAKEN INITIATIVE AT ONCE TO BRING THESE ACTS OF AGGRESSION TO ATTENTION OF UNSC;

D. DESPITE THESE OPEN ACTS OF WARFARE, US HAD LIMITED ITS RESPONSE TO VESSELS AND BASES FROM WHICH ATTACKS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT.

INFORMED SPAAK THAT WE WERE TRYING TO GET PRECISELY THESE POINTS ACROSS TO BELGIAN MEDIA AND WOULD ALSO PASS ON HIS SUGGESTIONS TO WASHINGTON.

SPAAK CONCLUDED BY COMMENTING THAT INSOFAR AS HE KNEW SOVIETS HAD NOT YET REACTED AND HE THOUGHT THIS WAS OF SOME INTEREST. ALSO INSOFAR AS HE HAD HEARD, CHICOMS NEWS MEDIA HAD NOT YET COMMENTED. FINALLY, HE SAID HE WOULD BE MUCH INTERESTED IN OUR CONFIDENTIAL ESTIMATE OF REASONS WHY NVN HAD ENGAGED IN THESE TWO ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND ANYTHING DEPT CAN GIVE ME TO PASS ON TO SPAAK ON THIS WOULD BE APPRECIATED. GP-3.
MACARTHUR
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8/5/64, 305PM

Note: Passed White House, DOD, CIA, USUN 515PM 8/5/64,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

46

CONFIDENTIAL

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DE RUESUA 102 05/1813Z -
O 051808Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY RIODEJANEIRO
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
STATE GRNC
BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 284 USUN
NEW YORK 2 AUGUST 5 3 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By TR, NARS, Date 4-22-76

EXDIS

DEPCIRTELS 221 AND 222

1. SINCE PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO IN BRASILIA AND FOMMIN VASCO LEITAO DA CUNHA ENROUTE FROM BRASILIA TO RIO WEDNESDAY MORNING, I DELIVERED LETTER TO VASCO AT NOON WEDNESDAY. HE TOOK IMMEDIATE STEPS TO TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT.
2. VASCO'S REACTION WAS THAT ATTACKS SO FAR FROM LAND OBVIOUSLY DELIBERATELY PROVOCATIVE AND DESERVING REPRISAL. HE ALSO NOTED WITH APPROVAL LBJ EMPHASIS ON MODERATION AS WELL AS FIRMNESS. I FEEL REASONABLY CONFIDENT GOB POSITION IN UNSC WILL BE HIGHLY SATISFACTORY TO US.

GP-4: GORDON
BT

CFN 284 2 5 3 221 222 1 2 GP-4

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 3:10 P.M., 8/5/64;
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 2:58 P.M., 8/5/64;

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ON ASSIGNED TO.	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
<i>S/VN</i>	CONFIDENTIAL <i>(initials)</i>	AUG 6 1964	FILE

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ACTION: Amembassy RANGOON - 51
INFO : Amembassy SAIGON 362

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Authority State M. 6/1/78
By Shw, NARS, Date 8/8/78

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RANGOON-51

At Burmese Embassy request SEA Office Director briefed Counselor Soe August 5 on Vietnamese developments. Briefing based on Presidential MacNamara statements, Defense Dept. release on ~~MEMPHIS~~ press ~~xxx~~ briefing, and Ambassador Stevenson's UN speech. Soe's principal concern obviously whether or not we contemplated additional retaliatory measures in absence further North Vietnamese or ChiCom provocation. He was assured U.S. had no intention take further action provided other side did not engage in new aggression.

Trueheart emphasized that U.S. forced to react to unprovoked aggression against our naval vessels operating in international waters and that response was effective and suited to provocation. He also made it clear that U.S. earnestly hoped that ~~xxxx~~ incident was closed and that we had no desire to prolong or expand it into wider conflict.

Soe observed his main concern was that incidents in Gulf of Tonkin would escalate war in Southeast Asia and bring Burma into armed conflict. Soe expressed appreciation for briefing and asked for, and was assured, additional briefings if situation so warranted.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by: JMK
FE:SEA:JMKang:jll 8/6/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: SEA - William C. Trueheart W

Clearances:

VN - Mr. Corcoran η

FE - Mr. Green mg

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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DATE: [] COLLECT
PAGE 10

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VERBATIM TEXT

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

169 - AUG 10 4 41 PM '64
383

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EXDIS Authority State ltr. 3/31/78
By lpw, NARS, Date 5/2/78

(Canada)

Following message was handed directly to Canadian Embassy here for transmittal to Seaborn by fastest channel. This is for your information only.

QUOTE Canadians are urgently asked to have Seaborn during August 10 visit make following points (as having been conveyed to him by US Government since August 6):

A. Re Tonkin Gulf actions, which almost certainly will come up:

1. The DRV has stated that Hon Ngu and Hon Me islands were attacked on July 30. It should be noted that the USS MADDOX was, all of that day and into the afternoon of the next day, over 100 miles south of those islands, in international waters near the 17th parallel, and that the DRV attack on the MADDOX took place on August 2, more than two days later. Neither the MADDOX or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV islands.

2. Regarding the August 4 attack by the DRV on the two US

OK/R

Drafted by: FE:WPBundy:hst 8-8-64
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green

Clearances: DOD - Secretary McNamara (draft) wgs
U - Mr. Ball (draft) wgs
White House - Mr. Bundy (draft) wgs

S/S - Mr. Moos lpw

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[US destroyers, the Americans were and are at a complete loss to understand the DRV motive. They had decided to absorb the August 2 attack on the grounds that it very well might have been the result of some DRV mistake or miscalculation. The August 4 attack, however--from the determined nature of the attack as indicated by the radar, sonar, and eye witness evidence both from the ships and from their protecting aircraft--was, in the American eyes, obviously deliberate and planned and ordered in advance. In addition, premeditation was shown by the evidence that the DRV craft were waiting in ambush for the destroyers. The attack did not seem to be in response to any action by the South Vietnamese, nor did it make sense as a tactic to further any diplomatic objective. Since the attack took place at least 60 miles from nearest land, there could have been no question about territorial waters. About the only reasonable hypothesis was that North Viet-Nam was intent either upon making it appear that the United States was a ^{INNER} paper tiger ^{END INNER} or upon provoking the United States.

3. The American response was directed solely to patrol craft and installations acting in direct support of them. As President Johnson stated: ^{INNER} /QUOTE Our response for the present will be limited ^{END INNER} and fitting. / UNQUOTE

4. In view of uncertainty aroused by the deliberate and unprovoked DRV attacks this character, US has necessarily carried out precautionary deployments of additional air power to SVN and Thailand.

B.

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B. Re basic American position:

5. Mr. Seaborn should again stress that US policy is simply that North Viet-Nam should contain itself and its ambitions within the territory allocated to its administration by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He should stress that US policy in South Viet-Nam is to preserve the integrity of that state's territory against guerrilla subversion.

6. He should reiterate that the US does not seek military bases in the area and that the US is not seeking to overthrow the Communist regime in Hanoi.

7. He should repeat that the US is fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controls and directs the guerrilla action in South Viet-Nam and that the US holds Hanoi directly responsible for that action. He should similarly indicate US awareness of North Vietnamese control over the Pathet Lao movement in Laos and the degree of North Vietnamese involvement in that country. He should specifically indicate US awareness of North Vietnamese violations of Laotian territory along the infiltration route into South Viet-Nam.

8. Mr. Seaborn can again refer to the many examples of US policy in tolerance of peaceful coexistence with Communist regimes, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. He can hint at the economic and other benefits which have accrued to those countries because their policy of Communism has confined itself to the development of their own national territories and has not sought to expand into other areas.

9.

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9. Mr. Seaborn should conclude with the following new points:

a. That the events of the past few days should add credibility to the statement made last time, that ^{INNER} QUOTE US public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely ^{END INNER} thin. / UNQUOTE

b. That the US Congressional Resolution was passed with near unanimity, strongly re-affirming the unity and determination of the US Government and people not only with respect to any further attacks on US military forces but more broadly to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary means, DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South Viet-Nam and Laos.

c. That the US has come to the view that the DRV role in South Viet-Nam and Laos is critical. If the DRV persists in its present course, it can expect to continue to suffer the consequences.

d. That the DRV knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored.

e. That the US has ways and means of measuring the DRV's participation in, and direction and control of, the war on South Viet-Nam and in Laos and will be carefully watching the DRV's response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them. UNQUOTE.

GP-1.

END

RUSK

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Canada
POL 33-6 US-VIET

FOLLOWING EXCHANGE TOOK PLACE HOUSE OF COMMONS AFTERNOON AUGUST 5. TEXT BASED EMB OFF'S NOTES:

OPPOSITION LEADER DIEFENBAKER ASKED MARTIN IF ABLE GIVE HOUSE PICTURE SITUATION NVN. DIEFENBAKER SAID REALIZED AWESOME RESPONSIBILITY WHICH RESTS ON THE US TO PRESERVE THE PEACE. ASKED WHAT ACTION BEING TAKEN TO UN. ADDED REALIZED COMPLETELY UNPROVOKED ATTACK TOOK PLACE 65 MILES FROM SHORE. CFN 156 5 65

PAGE TWO RUEHOT 986
MARTIN TOLD HOUSE PRIMIN HAD RECEIVED WORD FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON VIA THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND WAS AWARE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION TO ORDER ACTION TO PREVENT SPREAD HOSTILITIES. QUOTED TWO PARAGRAPHS PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT BEGINNING "YET OUR RESPONSE, FOR THE PRESENT, WILL BE LIMITED AND FITTING". MARTIN STRESSED TWO IMPORTANT IDESA CONTAINED HEREIN.

1. ACTION LIMITED TO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO DETER CONTINUATION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACK.
2. THERE ARE ASSURANCES THAT THE US GOVT DOES NOT SEEK TO WIDEN THE ATTACK.

MARTIN WELCOMED THE US DECISION TO TAKE MATTER TO THE UN AND LOOKED FORWARD TO RESULTS OF THIS AFTERNOON'S SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION.

NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADER TOMMY DOUGLAS ASKED IF PM IN CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE MADE IT CLEAR THAT CANADA SAW VITAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FIRING ON NORTH VIETNAMESE "GUNBOATS" AND SHORE INSTALLATIONS. SAID

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-2- 156, August 5, From Ottawa

LATTER WOULD AMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR. HE SAID IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT CANADA WAS NOT GOING TO SUPPORT ACTIONS DESIGNED TO SHORE UP "SAW-DUST GOVERNMENTS" IN THIS AREA.

PAGE THREE RUEHOT 986

PRIMIN TOLD HOUSE HE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED IN THE STRICT SENSE OF THE WORD BUT INFORMED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS WERE OTHER GOVERNMENT LEADERS OF THE ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY THE US. HE TOLD DOUGLAS THE US DEEDS WERE MORE A "REACTION TO AN ATTACK ON THE HIGH SEAS" BY ENEMY SHIPS.

DOUGLAS THEN ASKED IF GOC MADE IT CLEAR THAT CANADIAN SUPPORT WOULD BE CHANNELED VIA UN. THE PM REPLIED THAT GOC COMMITMENTS TO THE UN WERE CLEAR.

DIEFENBAKER THEN ASKED THE PM TO AGREE THAT SELF-PRESERVATION WAS THE PARAMOUNT FACTOR HERE AND IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE POSITION OF THE HOUSE WAS NOT ACCURATELY REFLECTED BY DOUGLAS'S STATEMENT ON SHORING UP OF "SAW-DUST CAESARS".

THE PM SAID THE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED BY NVN COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP AND HAD NVN GOVERNMENT IN FACT LIVED UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO ATTACK OR CRISIS SITUATION IN SEA.

PAGE FOUR RUEHOT 986

DOUGLAS THEN RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER POINT AND ASKED AGAIN "IS THERE NOT A DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIRING ON GUNBOATS AND ATTACKING INSTALLATIONS" THE PM SAID HE STOOD BY THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

SOCIAL CREDIT LEADER ROBERT THOMPSON ASKED IF GOC WERE IN TOUCH WITH ITS COMMONWEALTH SISTERS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WHO ARE SHARING THE FIGHT IN SVN. THE PM REPLIED GOC WAS IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH BOTH COUNTRIES.

CREDITISTE LEADER REAL CAQUETTE ASKED IF THE SUGGESTION OF FRENCH PM DEGAULLE REGARDING THE NEUTRALIZATION OF INDO-CHINA WAS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED HERE. PEARSON REPLIED HE WAS CERTAIN PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS AWARE OF DEGAULLE'S SUGGESTION AND ADDED "WE ONLY WISH NEUTRALIZATION WERE POSSIBLE". BUTTERWORTH

UNCLASSIFIED

41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

55

Info

RR RUEHCR
DE RUASTP 06 06/0200Z
R 060140Z ZEA
FN ANEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASH DC
STATE GRNC
BT

1964 AUG 5 PM 10 36

003837
50

(China, Nationalist)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

97, AUGUST 6, 9:40AM.

EXDIS PIERCE ARROW

DEPCIRTEL 223

I DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT CHIANG AUGUST 5 PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE AND ACCOMPANYING STATEMENTS AS INSTRUCTED REFTEL.

PRESIDENT CHIANG COMMENTED THAT US REACTION TO NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACK WAS PROPER. HE SAID WE MUST NOW WATCH WHAT NEXT NORTH VIETNAMESE STEP WOULD BE. WHATEVER IT WAS, THE CHICOMS WOULD BE BEHIND IT.

FOREIGN MINISTER SHEN CHANG-HUAN COMMENTED THAT ACTION TAKEN BY US WAS GOOD THING. HE SAID ONE ATTACK ON US SHIPS COULD HAVE BEEN AN ACCIDENT, BUT SECOND ATTACK MADE IT CLEAR THIS WAS POLICY DECISION BY NORTH VIETNAMESE.

IF THE US HAD NOT RESPONDED QUICKLY AND STRONGLY, IT WOULD HAVE CREATED IMPRESSION OF US WEAKNESS. RESPONSE US HAD MADE WOULD BOLSTER MORALE OF ANTI-COMMUNIST PEOPLES IN WORLD AND

STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE IN US DETERMINATION.

GP-3
WRIGHT

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 11:11 p.m., August 5

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 11:23 p.m., August 5

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *pc* NARA, Date *3-21-08*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

ON	ACTION	DATE OF	DIRECTIONS
ASSIGNED TO.	TAKEN	AUG 6 1964	TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER			<i>FILE</i>
OFFICE SYMBOL			

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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51

30
Action
SVN

Control: 3469
Rec'd: August 5, 1964
2:41 p.m.

Info
SS
G
SP
AF
FE
IO
NSC
INR
CIA
OSD

FROM: Contonou *(Dahomey)*

ACTION: Secstate 20

DATE: August 5, 6 p.m.

Department Circular Telegram 221

When I delivered text President's statement to Prime Minister Ahomadegbe this afternoon he studied it with great care and then said "Obviously the Chinese Communist are behind all this."

CARSON

RMR

ACT/10

Advance copy to S/S-0 8/5/64 5:45 p.m.
Passed White House 8/5/64 5:55 p.m.

RECORDED

Microfilmed by RMR

1.

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(43)

52

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

30

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Action
SVN
Info
SS
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NSA
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PP RUEHOR
OO RUESSD 285 00/1905Z
P 001905Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHCN/CINCLANT
RUEPAL/ODECSO
STATE GRNC
BT

1964 AUG 6 10 24 43 AM

LIMITED OFFICIAL ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (31) INFO
CINCLANT UNN CINCOS UNN FM SANTO DOMINGO AUG 6, 1964

CINCLANT AND CINCOS FOR POLADS
EMBTEL 126 - polw 27 viet S.

SUBJECT VIETNAM

FOLLOWING ASSURANCES TO AMB EARLIER IN DAY, TRIUMVIRATE PRES-
IDENT DONALD REID CABRAL MADE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT LAST NIGHT TO
EFFECT [DOMINICAN] GOVERNMENT REGRETTED HAPPENINGS IN NORTH VIET-
NAM AND HAD OFFERED US "ALL ITS COOPERATION." HE ADDED DOMIN-
ICAN DELEGATES TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAD INSTRUCTIONS
SUPPORT US POSITION. REID STATEMENTS GIVEN PROMINENT FRONT-
PAGE PLAY IN TODAY'S PRESS. BENNETT

BT
OPN 131 6 1964 126

RECORDED

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 August 6 at 1:38 p.m.
Passed White House August 6 at 1:55 p.m.
Passed USUN August 6 at 2:15 p.m.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

53

54

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Action

G NNNNES731SDA201
Info PP RUEHCR
SS DE RUESSD 201 05/1825Z
SVN P 051822Z ZEA
SP FM AMEMBASSY SANTODOMINGO
ARA TO SECSTATE WASHDC
FE STATE GRNC
IO BT

003465

1964 AUG 5 PM 2 40

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PRIORITY 126 AUG 5 1PM

[Dominican Republic]

RMR

REF: DEPCIR 221 *psk 27 meet S*
x psk 33 - 6 US meet H
but 6 US

HAVE PROVIDED REID CABRAL WITH TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. HE SAID WE COULD COUNT ON FULL DOMINICAN SUPPORT ON ANYTHING NEEDED AND INDICATED HE WAS SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON AND AT UN TO GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO US POSITIONS IN WHATEVER MIGHT DEVELOP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. HE CONTINUED WITH A SMILE THAT WE COULD COUNT ON MILITARY SUPPORT TOO ALTHOUGH GODR DID NOT HAVE MUCH TO OFFER.

BENNETT
BT

CFN 126 5 1PM 221

TOP SECRET

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 3:20 PM, 8/5/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, USUN 4:30 PM, 8/5/64.

1

microfilmed by 622/2

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GOING TELEGRAM Department of State

01783

54

AUG 5 3 47 PM '64

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

INDICATE: COLLECT
 MESSAGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy LONDON 869

Info

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW

(United Kingdom)

Following message received from Prime Minister for the President:

QUOTE August 5, 1964

Thank you very much for keeping me in touch with your action against the North Vietnamese attacks on your war ships.

You will, of ~~course~~ course, have our support in the Security Council later today for your absolute right to ~~defend~~ defend your shipping in international waters and to take the action necessary to do so.

These are anxious days for you and I shall follow with this great sympathy your efforts to stop aggression without embarking on a war the consequences of which none can foresee.

Let us keep in close touch. ~~END~~ UNQUOTE

RUC

Drafted by Text recd from WH
8/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Davies [Signature]

Clearance:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC 6-29-77, State 8-4-78
By [Signature], NARA, Date 3-28-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Classification

FORM 8-63 DS-322

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY~~

GOING
MESSAGE
VIA TELEGRAPH

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

55

AUG 6 9 29 PM '64

(U.S.)

SENT TO: CIRCULAR 242

Origin

Info:

ITV airshipping Aug. 6 four-minute newsclip with text of Stevenson
statement to Security Council UN re Vietnamese situation. Advise placement.

SENT TO:
CURACAO
DUBLIN
DHAHRAN
KUWAIT

RUSH

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

(1)

Drafted by: *[Signature]* TRANSMISSION AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: *[Signature]* WARNING: REPRODUCTION OF TELEGRAMS, UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED.
Clearances: USIA;ITV/M:EJFriedmann ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ USIA/IAN: CBlosser *[Signature]* (phone)
USIA:ITV/M:RLDoerschuk USIA/ITV/M:ADiggle DOS/NEA:GCMoore *[Signature]* (phone)
U A:ITV/M:FYSavage USIA/ITV/M:MKarnis *[Signature]*
X DOP/EUR/BNA:HBlutstein *[Signature]* (phone) UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

30

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: COLLECT
ARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification

XR. 02310
56
POK 33-6 US-VIET
DEF 6 US
- Aug 5 9 44 PM '64

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: CIRCULAR 234

(U.S.)

PIERCE ARROW

Top officials of Australian, New Zealand, Philippine, Thai, Korean, Japanese, GRC and Malaysian Embassies were called in separately today by Deputy Assistant Secretary Green for briefing on Pierce Arrow. He gave full background and report of results of operation. Also discussed international reactions and possible DRV motivations behind attacks on our destroyers.

GP-3.

RUSK

END

TO:

CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
MANILA
BANGKOK
SEOUL
TOKYO

TAIPEI
KUALA LUMPUR

①

Drafted by:

FE: MGreen:ej 8/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

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Classification

75

FOC 27 VIETS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

XM POC 33-6-WS
VIET N
Aug 5 9 08 PM
57
CIR
CAN

GOING
MESSAGE
VIA TELEGRAPH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification
VERBATIM TEXT

SENT TO: CIRCULAR 233

US

Origin
Info
Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)

USIA/ITV airshipping on Aug. 6 full 14-minute text of President Johnson major policy address re Vietnam at Syracuse University Aug. 5. 16 mm kinescopes.

SENT TO:

BUCHAREST
BUDAPEST
MOSCOW
PRAGUE
SOFIA
WARSAW

RUSK

Drafted by: USIA;ITV/M:EJF *Redmann*
Clearances: USIA:ITV/M:EXSA FYSavage *25*
IA:ITV:BLDoerschuk *Doerschuk*
TRANSMISSION AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: *AEHiley*
USIA/IAS:HTuck *HTuck* by phone
DOS:EEJDenis *EEJDenis* by phone
DOS:ENA:IBB *IBB* by phone

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Classification

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02187

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~~U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY~~

GOING
MESSAGE

VIA TELEGRAPH

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

58

Aug 5 7 13 PM '64

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

SENT TO: CIRCULAR 232

Origin

Info:

USIA ITV airshipping immediately six-minute full text English version Vietnam 16mm kinescope President Johnson nationwide statement August 4. Due urgency move this priority material no "voice over" language versions will be available. Where translation necessary Posts should begin local translating immediately IPS official texts prior to receipt this coverage in preparation to voicing by local announcers.

Cable placement, effectiveness.

SENT TO:

CURACAO
DHAHRAN
DUBLIN
KUWAIT

Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)

RUSK

1

Interlined by RM/A

Drafted by:

USIA/ITV/M:EJFriedmann:mh 8/5/64

TRANSMISSION AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

OC:OCT:AEHiley

WARNING: REPRODUCTION OF TELEGRAMS, UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED.

Cleances:

USIA/IAN:GFAustin (phone)

USIA/ITV/MS:ADiggle

ITV/MS:FISavage

A/TAL:Murphy (phone)

USIA/ITV/MS:MKarnis

DO

DOS/EUR/RNA:RBlutstein (phone)

USIA:ITV:RLDoerschuk

XXX UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

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36

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

01925

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

POL 33-6 US-VIETNAM
DEF 6 US 59

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Origin
Info

ACTION: CIRCULAR 224 PRIORITY

AUG 5 4 56 PM '64

ALL AMERICAN ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ DIPLOMATIC POSTS
(Additional addresses)

(U.S.)

PIERCE ARROW

In lieu of not yet available detailed wrap-up of PIERCE ARROW
operation, posts should ^{rely} ~~rely~~ on following items contained wireless file
for information and guidance:

- (a) McNamara's press conference morning August 5;
- (b) McNamara's press conference scheduled afternoon or evening August 5;
- (c) Stevenson speech before Security Council;
- (d) Presidential speech at Syracuse University.
- (e) Secretary's TV appearances evening August 5.

End

PARIS PASS USRO _____ CINCPAC for POLAD _____ CINCSOUTH for POLAI
 CONGEN HONG KONG _____ CINCEUR for POLAD ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
 CONGEN SINGAPORE _____ CINCLANT for POLAD _____ CINCMEAFSA for POLA

3

Drafted by: FE:JMoore:ac 8-5-64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green *mg*

Clearances: P - Mr. Greenfield (subs)

S/S - Mr. Davies *md*

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Vertical handwritten note on the right margin.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 ARGUE TO

72 0-1924

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

POL 33-6 US-VIET N
DEF 6 US 60

AUG 5 4 52 PM '64

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

CIRCULAR FLASH 225

Info:

PIERCE ARROW

[US]

Ref: Dept. Cirtel 221

In order to avoid possibility ruffled feelings,
/ Posts should take appropriate steps to ensure that existence of
personal Presidential messages to selected foreign governments not
rpt not be revealed publicly ~~to~~ or to other governments.

GP-3.

End

- | | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Sent to: Canberra | Wellington | Manila |
| Bangkok | Tokyo | Seoul |
| Taipei | Vientiane | Kuala Lumpur |
| Addis Ababa | New Delhi | Karachi |
| London | Ottawa | Oslo |
| Rio de Janeiro | LaPaz | Rabat |
| Abidjan | Paris Paris | Saigon |
| Bonn | Brussels | The Hague |
| Rome | | Luxembourg |

Info: USUN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 6-1-78, NSC 2-25-80

By inf, NARS, Date 7-23-80

(3)

Drafted by:

FE:JMOORE:ac 8-5-64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

P - Mr. Greenfield (subs) S/S - Mr. Davies

FE/P - Mr. Manell

White House - Mr. Thomson ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Classification

FORM 8-63 DS-322

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

CATEGORY: COLLECT
ARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

POL 27 VIET 5
XR POL 33-6 NS-VIET 01548
XR DEF 6-2 NS
61
Aug 5 12 19 AM '64

Origin

ACTION: Circular

FLASH 210

U.S.

Info

ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS (Additional addressess page)

~~Inter-Agency~~

~~(Action)~~ made by

Following is statement ~~by~~ the President ~~(Name)~~
~~at end of message~~

QUOTE As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against U.S. ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take ~~immediate and determined~~ action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers, and supporting aircraft, acted at once on the orders ~~given by me~~ I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy.

But repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the

3

Drafted by:

Text rec'd from White House

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S

- Mr. Christensen

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

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UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Classification

of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air ~~XXX~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ action is now in execution against gun boats and ^{Certain} certain supporting facilities ⁱⁿ ~~in and near four ports of~~ North Vietnam which have been used in support of ^{these} hostile operations.

In the larger sense, this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, ^{again brings} ~~bringing~~ home to all of us ^{in the United States} ~~again~~ the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against ^{the United States of} America. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage.

Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. ^{Americans} We know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict--we still seek no wider war.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position and totally clear to friends, to adversaries, and indeed to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~NNNN~~ UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States, and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom, and in defense of peace, in Southeast Asia. I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support.

And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight.

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of America. But it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace. That firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace. END.

RUSH

PARIS PASS USRO _____	CINCPAC for POLAD _____	CINCSOUTH for POLAD _____
CONGEN HONG KONG _____	CINCEUR for POLAD _____	CINCMEAFSA for POLAD _____
CONGEN SINGAPORE _____	CINCLANT for POLAD _____	

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

~~REVISED DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT~~

As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against U. S. ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take ~~(limited but determined)~~ action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox_x on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U. S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers, and supporting aircraft, acted at once on the orders ^{T. Jones} given ~~by me~~ after the initial act of aggression. We believe ^{at least four} ~~three~~ of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U. S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy.

But repeated acts of ^{violence} ~~war~~ against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply.

That reply is being given as I speak to you, ^{tonight} ~~limited~~ Air action is now in execution against gun boats and supporting facilities ^{centrum} ~~(in and near four ports)~~ ^{these} of North Vietnam which have been used in support of hostile operations.

~~The armed forces of the U. S. are entirely competent not only to defend themselves but to give this proper punishment of piracy.~~

In the larger sense, this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, ^{again} ~~must~~ bring^s home to all of us ^{in the United States} ~~again~~ the importance ~~to us~~ ~~in the United States~~, of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia.

Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against ^{the United States of} America.

The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage.

Yet our response, for the present, will be limited, ^{and fitting} and fitting to the crime. We ^{Americans} know, although others appear to forget, the risk of spreading conflict -- we still seek no wider war.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends, ^{and} to adversaries, and indeed to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States, and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that ^{our} the Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom, and in defense of peace, in Southeast Asia. I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders, ^{of both parties} that ^{such a} this resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support.

~~I have thought it appropriate also to communicate my decision to the Republican candidate for President, and Senator Goldwater has assured me of his full support of the course of action I have outlined.~~

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of America. But it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace. That firmness will ~~never be impulsive~~ ~~or~~ ~~it will~~ always be measured. Its mission is peace.

end

INSERT

And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight.

67

Pol 33-6 US-1

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

62

44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SVN NNNNVV EUBG4-DEA535
RR RUEHCR RUEHDT

Info DE RUF6WP 253 06/1950Z
R 061940Z ZEA

SS (FM AMEMBASSY PARIS)

G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

SP INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON

L RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

H RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN

BT

EUR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 722 INFO-LONDON 84

FE SAIGON 30 CANBERRA 02 USUN 30 FROM PARIS AUG 6, 7PM

IO

P

USIA

NSC

INR

OTA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RFR

IN DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS ON TONKIN BAY CRISIS AUSTRALIAN AND UK EMBASSIES HAVE DETECTED CERTAIN SKEPTICISM THAT INFORMATION FROM US SOURCES NECESSARILY ACCURATE. QUAI SYG DE CARBONNEL TOLD UK AMBASSADOR IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE US HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF DRV ERROR. CARBONNEL ALSO THEORIZED THAT CHINESE TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY DRV ACTION SINCE CPR REACTION QUITE RESTRAINED, THEIR STATEMENT IN

PAGE 2 RUF6WP 253 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EFFECT SAID ONLY US HAD BETTER NOT GO ANY FURTHER. UK EMBOFF TELLS US HE INFORMED BY SENIOR QUAI OFFICIAL THAT QUAI HAD HAD CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY PERSUADING DE GAULLE NOT TO ISSUE STATEMENT CRITICAL OF US ACTIONS AND DRAWING CONCLUSION HIS CONFERENCE PROPOSAL MORE NECESSARY THAN EVER. INFORMATION FROM BRITISH ON OCCASION MUST BE TAKEN WITH GRAIN OF SALT.

GP-3. LYON

BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8:13 PM, 8/6/64.

2

microfilmed by RMJR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority RAC 00014858
By 10/14, NARA, Date 3-27-74

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State POL 33-6 US-VIET

POL 27 VIET 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SVN

Info

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RR

FE

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USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

SD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

MC

RMR

NNNNVV EUA277DEC710
PP RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUFGW 178 05/1755Z
P 051750Z ZEA

003548

~~BY AMEMBASSY PARIS~~

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
BT

1964 AUG 5 PM 4 30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 689 INFO
PRIORITY USUN, 27 SAIGON 28 AUGUST 5, 6 PM

QUAI INDOCHINA CHIEF BRETHES TOLD UK EMBASSY THAT DE GAULLE PERSONALLY HAD INSTRUCTED FUNMIN AND SEYDOUX TO ASSEMBLE DOSSIER ON TRUE FACTS OF CRISIS IN GULF OF TONKIN. OTHERWISE SEYDOUX HAS NO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AS GOF UNDERSTANDS NO REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC ACTION IS INVOLVED. DURING CONVERSATION QUAI POLITICAL AFFAIRS CHIEF LUCET TELEPHONED BRETHES FOR OPINION ON EXTENT OF DRV TERRITORIAL WATERS.

PAGE 2 RUFGW 178 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED ABOUT 20 PROTEST MESSAGES OF EVIDENT COMMUNIST ORIGIN WHICH BEGAN ARRIVING ALMOST AS SOON AS NEWS OF EVENTS WAS AVAILABLE AND MORE EXPECTED THIS EVENING UNDER AEGIS COMMUNIST-SPONSORED PEACE MOVEMENT. PCF GUIDANCE TO PROTESTERS APPEARS TO CONTINUE STRESS ON NEED FOR NEGOTIATION.

I HAVE JUST SPOKEN WITH LUCET WHO TELLS ME GOF ATTACHES ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE TO INFORMATION WE HAVE GIVEN THEM. THEY SINCERELY HOPE SITUATION WILL NOT ESCALATE. HE SAID THAT WE KNOW THEIR POSITION THAT THIS IS SUBJECT WHICH SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AROUND A TABLE, REFERRING OF COURSE TO PROPOSED GENEVA CONFERENCE.

IN ANSWER TO MY INQUIRY LUCET SAID THAT UNTIL THEY HEARD MR. STEVENSON'S REPORT, GOF WAS TAKING NO POSITION AS TO WHAT FRENCH ATTITUDE WOULD BE AT SC. GP-3. LYON
BT

② ADVANCE COPY S/S-0 5:55 PM 8/5/64

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 5/25/77
By [Signature] NARA, Date 4-2-74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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8/5/64

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ACTION COPY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0029611
1964 AUG 5 AM 8 20

00 RUEHCR
DE RUFGW 138 05/1155Z
O 051150Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
BT

(France)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE (667) AUG 5 1PM

RE DEPCIRTEL 218

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO PRES DE GAULLE DELIVERED 11:30 AM PARIS TIME TO SECRETARY GENERAL FONOFF, DE CARBONNEL, FOR TRANSMISSION TO PRES DE GAULLE WHO IS AT COLOMBEY LES DEUX EGLISES, WITH COPY FOR PRIMIN, ALSO ABSENT FROM PARIS AS IS FOREIGN MIN, AND COPY FOR MIN JOXE WHO IS HIGHEST OFFICIAL IN PARIS AT MOMENT.

LUCET, DIRECTOR, POLITICAL AFFAIRS, FONOFF, WHO WAS PRESENT

PAGE 2 RUFGW 138 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ASKED ME WHETHER WE WOULD BE MAKING SOME REQUEST OF NAC AT THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING. I TOLD HIM I WAS NOT INSTRUCTED BUT IMAGINED OUR PRIMARY PURPOSE WOULD BE TO INFORM NAC WHAT HAD HAPPENED. GP-3.

LYON
BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 8:25 A.M., 8/5/64, ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8:40 A.M., 8/5/64.

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Authority State 6-1-78 NSC 2-29-80
By mg NARS, Date 7-23-80

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FOREIGN REACTIONS

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

Control: 7224
Rec'd: AUGUST 10, 1964
6:26 AM,

FE

FROM: PHNOM PENH

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ACTION: SECSTATE 80 PRIORITY

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INFO: SAIGON 64

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CINCPAC 44

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DATE: AUGUST 10, NOON.

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RMR

OFFICIAL AKP AUGUST 9 PUBLISHED TEXTS TELEGRAMS SUPPORTING DRVN FROM PRINCE SIHANOUK TO HO CHI MINH AND FROM RKG FORMIN HUOT SAMBATH TO DRVN FORMIN XUAN TOY. SIHANOUK'S TELEGRAM CONDEMNS "FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF UN CHARTER" AND EXTENDS HO CHI MINH "OUR SYMPATHY AND OUR FRATERNAL DDLS' -"#.

SAMBATH'S SOMEWHAT LONGER MESSAGE SAYS AMERICAN "AGGRESSION AND PROVOCATION" UNDENIABLY CONSTITUTE FLAGRANT VIOLATION 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS; RKG "ENERGETICALLY CONDEMNS AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF USG... AND ASKS THAT IT IMMEDIATELY END THIS POLICY. RKG SUPPORTS WITHOUT RESERVE HEROIC STRUGGLE OF PEOPLE OF DRVN IN DEFENSE ITS SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY". TELEGRAM ALSO REITERATES RKG REQUEST FOR URGENT MEETING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA.

FULL TEXTS FOLLOW BY AIRGRAM.

SPIVACK

Microfilmed by RMR

DHP

AS RECEIVED. SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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Control: 6463
Rec'd: AUGUST 8, 1964
8:28 A.M.

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 353 PRIORITY

INFO: PARIS 35 PRIORITY
USUN 34 PRIORITY
CINCPAC 170

DATE: AUGUST 8, 7 PM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 17038
By us NARA, Date 5-18-98

070

(France)

RMR
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FRENCH REACTIONS TO PIERCE ARROW.

1. GENERAL: IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF FEW HOURS AFTER AIR ATTACKS STARTED AUGUST 5 AND AGAIN TWO DAYS LATER, FRENCH CHARGE D' AFFAIRES PERRUCHE AND HIS MILITARY ATTACHES AND COUNSELOR EVINCED NO PARTICULAR ALARM OR DISPLEASURE AT US ACTIONS.

THEIR ATTITUDE SEEMED TO BE ONE OF PERSONAL APPROVAL BUT OFFICIAL RESERVE PENDING RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS. WHEN ASKED HOW NON-OFFICIAL FRENCH COMMUNITY WOULD REACT, PERRUCHE REPLIED ACCORDING TO HOW RECENT ACTION WOULD APPEAR TO AFFECT THEIR OWN INTERESTS. THEY WOULD APPROVE ACTION THAT WAS STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND REDUCED PROSPECTS OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF SVN.

SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH PLANTERS AND BUSINESSMEN SUGGEST THEY HIGHLY APPROVE OF ATTACKS AND ARE NOT WORRIED ABOUT CONSEQUENCES, WHEREAS HOUSEWIVES AND SCHOOL TEACHERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITIES OF REPRISAL BOMBINGS BY DRV OR MASSIVE INVASION OF ALL SEA BY CHICOMS. THERE IS NO WAVE OF DISAPPROVAL OF US ACTION, BUT RATHER A GENERAL AND GRATIFYING RECOGNITION THAT ACTION WAS NECESSARY REPLY TO AGGRESSIONS THAT COULD NOT BE LEFT UNANSWERED. ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE

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-2- 353, AUGUST 8, 7 PM FROM SAIGON

HAVE BEEN MORE CRITICAL OF US RPT US ACTION NOTED WITH SATISFACTION AND AGREEMENT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S INDICATIONS THAT ACTION WAS MODERATE, LIMITED, RELEVANT AND ONE-TIME.

2. AS OF 1800 LOCAL AUGUST 7, PERRUCHE CLAIMED HE HAD NO TELEGRAMS FROM PARIS OR FRENCH EMBASSY WASHINGTON SUBSEQUENT TO REPORTING OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH ANNOUNCING SECOND ATTACK ON DESTROYERS AND REPLY BEING DELIVERED. SHOWED EMBOFF THAT EMBASSY WASHINGTON TELEGRAMS DATED AUGUST 3 WERE REPEATED BY PARIS AUGUST 4 AND REACHED HIM SAIGON ONLY AUGUST 6.

HE SAID BOTH PARIS AND EMBASSY WASHINGTON SEEMED TO BE TAKING IT CALMLY OR NOT KEEPING SAIGON FULLY INFORMED THEIR REACTIONS. ADDED THAT PARIS SEEMED TO BE REACTING CALMLY TO UN DEBATE ON SUBJECT. PERRUCHE READ EMBASSY WASHINGTON TELEGRAM AUGUST 3 REPORTING FIRST ATTACK ON MADDOX AS NEW DRV ACTION ENLARGING WAY AND COMMENTING THAT DRV ACTION MIGHT UPSET THE DELICATE BALANCE WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WAS TRYING TO MAINTAIN WITH SVN. TELEGRAM SPECULATED THAT CHICOMS MIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT PRESIDENT WOULD BE AFRAID TO REACT FORCEFULLY BEFORE ELECTIONS AND THAT THEY COULD ATTACK WITH IMPUNITY. EXCEPT FOR USUAL TENDENCY OF FRENCH REPORTING TO EXAGGERATE ROLE OF NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, THIS REPORTING WAS FACTUAL AND NOT UNFAVORABLE TO US RPT US POSITION.

3. PERRUCHE ANALYSIS:

A. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF CURRENT UNSC SITUATION, PERRUCHE BEGAN MISCHIEVOUSLY AND LIGHTLY BY SAYING THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR GVN TO BE REPRESENTED, SINCE IT THUS FAR NEITHER ACCUSED NOR IMPLICATED. IN SAME VEIN INQUIRED IF USG WOULD PERHAPS ASK SC TO SOLVE THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM, AND WONDERED WHAT SECRETARY RUSK HAD TOLD U THANT IN RECENT WASHINGTON CONVERSATIONS. MAYBE US WAS MEETING FRANCE HALF WAY BY SEEKING INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION THROUGH UN ("MACHIN") BECAUSE OF DE GAULLE'S KEEN DISLIKE FOR UN. BUT SERIOUSLY AND THOUGHTFULLY HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT UN WAS NOW DEFINITELY INVOLVED IN VIETNAM PROBLEM AND THAT THIS WAS MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENT.

IT WENT

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 353, AUGUST 8, 7 PM FROM SAIGON

IT WENT FAR B N ANY EARLIER UN INVOLVEMENT, SUCH AS HANDLING OF CAMBODIAN COMPLAINT. HE THOUGHT FRANCE WOULD BE COOPERATIVE AT UN AND SAID IT WAS UNFAIR AND IRRESPONSIBLE FOR VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERS TO OBJECT TO FRANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW DRV TO BE HEARD.

B. EMBOFF SAID WE WERE FRANKLY PUZZLED BY DRV ATTACKS ON DESTROYERS AND ASKED HOW PERRUCHE WOULD EXPLAIN THEM. PERRUCHE REPLIED THERE WERE THREE POSSIBLE LOGICAL EXPLANATIONS: DRV ACTING UNILATERALLY TO BROADEN THE STRUGGLE AND FORCE CHICOMS TO SUPPLY MORE AID; DRV ACTING AT CHICOM REQUEST TO EMBARRASS SOVIET UNION; OR AMERICAN FABRICATION AND PROVOCATION TO JUSTIFY AN ESCALATION WITHOUT WHICH AMERICANS MIGHT BELIEVE THEY COULD NOT WIN. HE PROTESTED UNCONVINCINGLY THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIRD EXPLANATION BUT INCLUDED IT JUST FOR LOGICAL COMPLETENESS. (PERRUCHE'S PROBABLE REAL FEELINGS ON THIS MATTER AND INTEREST IN IT TEND TO CONFIRM BRITISH REPORTING CITED IN PARIS 722 TO DEPT, NOTAL).

ON BALANCE, PERRUCHE SAID, HE WOULD BELIEVE SECOND HYPOTHESIS, THAT CHICOMS AND DRV HAD AGREED ON ACTION AGAINST DESTROYERS. SAID IT HARD TO IMAGINE DRV ACTING UNILATERALLY AND NOTED THAT CHINA MIGHT WELL HAVE BELIEVED IT COULD NOT LOSE: IF US DID NOT REACT, CHICOMS WOULD HAVE HAD A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY, AND IF US DID REACT, CHICOMS AND DRV COULD CALL ON SOVIET UNION FOR HELP AND FORCE SOVIET HAND.

4. PERRUCHE REMARKED FRENCH WERE GETTING NOTHING SIGNIFICANT FROM EMBASSY IN PEKING, STAFF OF WHICH WERE VIRTUAL PRISONERS. SAID SENIOR REGIONAL FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE AT HONG KONG HAD SUGGESTED ATTACHE AT PEKING BE TRANSFERRED TO HONG WHERE HE COULD ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING. PERRUCHE CLAIMS NO REPORT YET FROM FRENCH HANOI DELEGATION BUT EXPECTS POUCH AUGUST 11 AND PROMISED KEEP US INFORMED.

5. FRENCH MILATTACHE PARTICULARLY PLEASED AT US ACTIONS AND SAID IN HIS REPORTING TO PARIS HE HAD EMPHASIZED THE SCOPE OF US REACTION, FROM CHINESE BORDER TO 17TH PARALLEL. ASKED WHY US HAD NOT HIT HAIPHONG POL STORAGE. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT ATTACK WAS LIMITED

~~SECRET~~

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-4- 353, AUGUST 8, 7 PM FROM SAIGON

WAS LIMITED TO OFFENSIVE BOATS AND THEIR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT FACILITIES AND NOTED DESIRE AVOID CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND THEREFORE BUILT-UP AREAS. ATTACHE REJOINED THAT HE KNEW HAIPHONG POL STORAGE AREA WELL AND FELT IT NOT HEAVILY POPULATED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACKED TOO.

TAYLOR

JGG

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 8/8/64 11:15 AM
PASSED DOD 8/8/64 11:15 AM
PASSED CIA 8/8/64 11:15 AM
ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O 8/8/64 9:28 AM

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O 061447Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (BONN)
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 478, August 6
BT

4431
August 6, 1964
11:29 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - EXDIS

(W. Germany)

REFERENCE: DEPCIRTEL 218; EMBTEL 459.

THE FOLLOWING PRIVATE MESSAGE FROM CHANCELLOR ERHARD TO THE PRESIDENT WAS RECEIVED BY THE AMBASSADOR UNDER COVER OF A LETTER FROM MINISTER WESTRICK:

QUOTE

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WANT TO THANK YOU THAT YOU FOUND THE TIME YESTERDAY, IN THE DIFFICULT HOURS OF DECISION, TO INFORM ME THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR; YOUR MESSAGE IS A NEW PROOF OF THE CLOSE AND TRUSTFUL COOPERATION WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH CONCERN THE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA FOR SOME TIME AND REGRET THAT IN RECENT DAYS ILLEGAL ATTACKS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AGAINST YOUR PATROL UNITS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. I AM ALSO CONVINCED THAT A BROADENING OF THE CONFLICT WILL BEST BE PREVENTED BY THE FIRM STAND YOU HAVE TAKEN.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE KNOW WITH WHAT DEVOTION YOU ARE SERVING THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM. I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN THIS UNDERTAKING OF YOURS. UNQUOTE

THE EMBASSY WAS INFORMED THAT THE LETTER IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION, ALTHOUGH ITS EXISTENCE HAS ALREADY BEEN PICKED UP BY THE NEWS SERVICES. GP-3. MCGHEE

BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 12:08 P.M. 8/6/64
Passed to White House at 12:40 P.M. 8/6/64

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Authority RAC 22829
By [signature] NARA, Date 3-28-14

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NAME OF OFFICER	[signature]	DATE OF ACTION	8/14/64
OFFICE SYMBOL	[signature]	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	File

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

459 AUG 5, 5 PM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 17035
By ie NARA, Date 5-18-98

W. Germany

EXDIS 7 PIERCE ARROW

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN DEPTTEL CIRC 218, I PRESENTED THIS MORNING TO MINISTER WESTRICK THE LETTER (WITH ACCOMPANYING STATEMENTS) FOR THE PRESIDENT TO CHANCELLOR ERHARD, WHO IS ON VACATION AT TEGERNSEE. I HAD EARLIER TODAY PRESENTED A COPY OF THE LETTER TO STATE SECRETARY LAHR, RANKING FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL PRESENT.

I REVIEWED FOR BOTH WESTRICK AND LAHR THE DETAILED SCENARIO OF THE

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 522 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTACKS ON AUGUST 2 AND 4, WHICH ESTABLISHED THAT THEY WERE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, AND WERE ENTIRELY UNPROVOKED. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR QUERIES I WAS ABLE TO ASSURE THEM THAT BOTH ATTACKS WERE BY NORTH VIETNAMESE VESSELS.

AFTER READING THE LETTER AND STATEMENTS, WESTRICK SAID THAT HE PERSONELLY FELT THE UNITED STATES HAD TAKEN EXACTLY THE RIGHT ACTION THE BEST WAY TO DISSUADE FURTHER ATTACKS FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OF THE TYPE ENCOUNTERED WAS TO RESPOND VIGOROUSLY. HE INDICATED THAT HE, AND PRESUMABLY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, WOULD FEEL THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE U.S. WAS ENTIRELY JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE FACT THAT WE CONTEMPLATED NO FURTHER ACTION UNLESS THERE WERE NEW AGGRESSIVE MOVES ON THE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. HE FELT IT IMPORTANT THAT THEY BE PERMITTED A WAY OUT.

WESTRICK SAID THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING WITH THE CHANCELLOR ON THE PHONE AT FIVE P.M. LOCAL TIME AND WOULD CONVEY THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER AND STATEMENTS TO HIM. IF THE CHANCELLOR HAD ANY COMMENTS, HE WOULD COMMUNICATE THEM TO ME IMMEDIATELY.

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AL JN	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
ASSIGNED TO: <u>Eur</u>	<u>No action</u>	<u>8/14/64</u>	<u>File</u>
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: <u>Gen-Fin</u>			

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 459, August 5, 5:00 PM, FROM BONN.

STATE SECRETARY LAHR CONFINED HIS COMMENTS TO A SEARCH FOR POSSIBLE NORTH VIETNAMESE MOTIVATIONS. HE COULD NOT DISCERN WHY IT WAS IN

PAGE RUFHOL 522 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE INTEREST OF NORTH VIETNAM TO MAKE SUCH AN ATTACK, AND SAW IN IT POSSIBLE PRESSURE BY THE COMMUNIST CHINESE OR NORTH VIETNAMESE INSUBORDINATION.

IN THE MEANTIME THE FONOFF HAS ISSUED A "SEMI-OFFICIAL STATEMENT" (EMBTTEL 453) WHICH STATES: "IN POLITICAL CIRCLES IN BONN, THE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS OBSERVED WITH CONCERN. THE LIMITED ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE A JUSTIFIED ANSWER TO ACTIONS OF AGGRESSION WHICH VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW. THERE IS POSITIVE HOPE THAT THE SITUATION IN THAT AREA SOON WILL RETURN TO NORMAL, AND PEACE BE ESTABLISHED AGAIN." GP-3
MCGHEE
BT

NOTE: PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE, 1:33 P.M., 8/5/64; ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-Q, 12:44 P.M., 8/5/64.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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XR POL 33-6 US-VIE
XR AID (GER W) VIETS

57 NNNNVVV FKA657
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SVN ZNR
Info R 081548Z
G FM AMEMBASSY BONN

1964 AUG 8 PM 2 41 70

SP TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
SS INFO RUABSG/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
BT RUDWC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
EUR RUFJC/AMEMBASSY-PARIS
FE RUFHJA/USMISSION BERLIN

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IO UNCLAS ACTION DEPT 521 INFO SAIGON 13 LONDON 142 PARIS 137 BERLIN
AID 153 FM BONN EIGHTH

P PARIS ALSO FOR USRO
USIA AT A BONN PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY, (ACTING FEDREP PRESS CHIEF
NSC KRUEGER), A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN/EXPANDED ON THE PREVIOUS FONOFF
INR STATEMENT ON VIETNAM, WITH THE STATEMENT THAT "THE FEDGOV IS OF
CIA THE VIEW THAT THE LIMITED MEASURES TAKEN BY THE US IN RESPONSE
NSA TO THE UNPROVOKED ATTACK IN THE GULF OF TONKIN WERE TAKEN IN ACCORD
OSD WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW". HE WENT ON TO ADD THAT THE FRG HAS FOLLOWED
MY HOPES THE SITUATION WILL SOON RETURN TO NORMAL AND THAT A WIDENING
NAVY OF THE CONFLICT WILL BE AVOIDED. PINTING TO THE REPLY OF CHANCELLOR
AIR ERHARD, TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER, THE SPOKESMAN NOTED THAT ERHARD
NIC HAS EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE US REACTION AND CONFIDENCE IN
RMR THE US POSITION.

WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF FRG AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM, THE
SPOKESMAN REPLIED THAT A FINAL CABINET DECISION ON THE NATURE AND EXT
OF THE ADDITIONAL AID HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED. THIS DECISION WILL DE
PEND "TO A CERTAIN EXTENT ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS". HE
ADDED THAT A GERMAN MILITARY HOSPITAL OR HOSPITAL SHIP WERE NO
LONGER BEING CONSIDERED. INSTEAD, IT WAS PLANNED TO PROVIDE AID IN
THE FORM OF GERMAN DOCTORS FOR THE MEDICAL FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF HUE.

COLONEL VIERIG, THE MOD PRESS OFFICER, WAS ALSO PRESENT TO ANSWER
PRESS QUESTIONS ON MILITARY SUBJECTS. HE ANNOUNCED THAT FRG WAS NOT
CONSIDERING DIRECT MILITARY AID TO VIETNAM, AND THAT THE DEVELOPMENTS
IN SOUTH EAST ASIA HAVE AS YET HAD NO REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE BUNDEWEHR
SUCH AS THE CANCELLATION OF LEAVES OR DECLARATION OF A "STATE OF PRE-
PAREDNESS".

SPD PRESS SPOKESMAN BARSIG ALSO ISSUED A STAEMENT YESTERDAY, EXPRESSI
THE HOPE THAT THE US WILL SUCCEED IN ITS EFFORTS TO SURMOUNT AS "ACHT
CRISIS". "IN ORDER TO PROTECT PEACE IN THE WORLD AND PREVENT A WIDENI
OF COMMUNIST AGRSSION". HE ADDED THAT THE SPD HAS CONFIDENCE IN THE
LEADERSHIP OF THE US, AND, IN A BARB AT THE CDU, EXPRESSED REGRET THA
FRG ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM IS STILL THE SUBJECT OF CABINET PRO
CRASTINATION. MCGHEE

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STN FM AMEMBASSY (NEWDELHI)
Info TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
SS STATE GRNC

G BT
SP UNCLAS ACTION IMMEDIATE (DEPT 398) INFO USUN 37 FROM NEWDELHI
PE FIFTH

NEA EMERGENCY COMMITTEE OF CABINET, GOI, MET AFTERNOON AUGUST 5,
TO ACCORDING UNI RELEASE, TO "CONSIDER COMMUNICATION RECEIVED BY
RSC PRIME MINISTER LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON."
INR IMMEDIATELY AFTER CABINET MEETING MEA SPOKESMAN RELEASED FOLLOWING
CIA STATEMENT:
OSD

(KMR) "THE GOVERNMENT OF (INDIA) HAVE BEEN DISTRESSED TO LEARN ABOUT THE
LATEST SERIOUS CLASHES BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. NAVAL
UNITS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN FOLLOWING EARLIER INCIDENTS IN THE
SAME REGION BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAMESE TORPEDO BOATS AND THE U.S.
SHIP MADDOX ON AUGUST 2.
CFN 398 37 5 2

PAGE 2 RUDSND 208B UNCLAS
"THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAVE LEARNT FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S
BROADCAST THIS MORNING ABOUT THE ACTION UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S.
FORCES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE TORPEDO BOATS AND CERTAIN SUPPORTING
FACILITIES. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ALSO RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON THE SUBJECT. THESE INCIDENTS HAVE CAUSED
GRAVE CONCERN.

"THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED AT THESE DEVELOP-
MENTS AS THEY THREATENED PEACE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. THEY HOPE THAT
THE EXPLCSIVE SITUATION CREATED BY THESE INCIDENTS WILL NOT BE
FURTHER AGGRAVATED. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AT LEAST THE UNEASY
PEACE WHICH PREVAILED IN THIS AREA BEFORE THESE INCIDENTS WILL
IMMEDIATELY BE RESTORED. THEY TRUST THAT CONSIDERATION OF THIS
SITUATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH IS MEETING WITHIN
A FEW HOURS WILL HELP TO PREVENT FURTHER CLASHES AND INCIDENTS."
BOWLES
BT

NOTE: PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE, 12:15 P.M., 8/5/64; ADVANCE
COPY TO S/S-O, 12:04 P.M., 8/5/64.

(J)

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8-5-64

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~~SECRET~~

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FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

(India)

003171

1964 AUG 5 AM 10 51

~~SECRET~~ IMMEDIATE 397 AUGUST 5, 7:15PM

EXDIS

DEPTEL 266 AND EMBTEL 388

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 22831
By 102/4 NARA, Date 3-28-14

AS SOON AS NEWS OF NAVAL ENGAGEMENT AND PRESIDENT'S TV STATEMENT ARRIVED I CALLED ON SWARAN SINGH, MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND GAVE HIM PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRIMIN SHASTRI AND ALL FACTUAL INFO WE HAVE. I THEN ADDED FOLLOWING COMMENTS.

- 1. USG WILL DO EVERYTHING IT REASONABLY CAN TO KEEP CONFLICT FROM SPREADING.
- CFN 397 5 7:15 EXDIS 266 388 TV SWARAN SINGH SHASTRI 1 USG

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 204 ~~SECRET~~

- 2. HOWEVER, IT IS SAFE TO ASSUME THAT CHINESE WERE THEMSELVES DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION, AND SINCE THEY KNEW WE WOULD REACT SHARPLY, THEY MAY HAVE FURTHER ACTS OF AGGRESSION IN MIND AS REACTION TO OUR REACTION.
- 3. FOR USG THIS IS ONE MORE EPISODE IN LONG STRUGGLE SINCE 1949 TO CONTAIN CHINESE AGGRESSION IN ASIA. ALTHOUGH WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT CHINESE WILL NOT CHOOSE TO ESCALATE PRESENT FIGHTING WE ARE PREPARED FOR WHATEVER MAY DEVELOP.
- 4. INDIANS THEMSELVES HAD TASTE OF CHINESE AGGRESSIVENESS IN 1962 AND AT THAT TIME WERE GIVEN EVIDENCE OF OUR DEEP COMMITMENT TO DEFEND ASIAN COUNTRIES THAT BECOME TARGETS OF PEKING GOVT.
- 5. USG AND GOI ARE FACING COMMON DANGER AND IN DEFENDING SOUTH VIETNAM WE ARE IN EFFECT DEFENDING INDIA. WE ARE HOPEFUL THEREFORE THAT GOI WILL BE HELPFUL IN EVERY WAY IT CAN IN REGARD TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

SWARAN SINGH WAS CONSIDERABLY SHAKEN UP BY SITUATION. HE AGREED
• This copy must be returned to RM, central files with notation of appropriate

ACTION	ATTACK ON PART OF VIET MINH GOVT SINCE THEY HAD BEEN MADE AWARE	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS
ASSIGNED TO			TO RM/REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
NAME OF OFFICER			PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICE SYMBOL			

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- 397, AUGUST 5, 7 PM, FROM NEW DELHI

OF CONSEQUENCES.

CFN 2 3 USG 1949 4 1962 5 USG GOI GOI SWARAN SINGH VIET MINH

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 204 ~~SECRET~~

HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR TONE OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRIMINIST WITH ITS ASSURANCE THAT WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING WE REASONABLY COULD TO KEEP SITUATION WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS. HE ASKED TO BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED AND SAID HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME IF ANY NEW DEVELOPMENT OCCURRED FROM INDIAN END.

BEFORE SEEING SWARAN SINGH I HAD ALSO ASKED FOR DATE WITH PRIMIN AND MEETING IS TENTATIVELY SET FOR TOMORROW MORNING WHEN PRESUMABLY I SHALL HAVE MORE TO DISCUSS. SWARAN SINGH IMPLIED THAT THIS MEETING WAS NOT RPT NOT NECESSARY. WHETHER HE TOOK THIS POSITION TO PROTECT HIS OWN NEWLY WON PREROGATIVES AS FOREIGN MINISTER OR TO PROTECT STILL AILING SHASTRI, I DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW.

IN ANY EVENT, WHEN I SEE SHASTRI I SHALL DISCUSS BROAD IMPLICATION OF CHINESE ACTIONS IN ASIA, LONG US ROLE IN COUNTERING IT, INDIA'S STAKE IN SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORT AND OUR HOPE THAT WE MAY EXPECT NOT RPT NOT ONLY SYMPATHY BUT SUPPORT FROM GOI IN WHATEVER MAY LIE AHEAD.

IGP-3. BOWLES

BT

CFN US GOI GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 11:25 AM, 8/5/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 11:32 AM, 8/5/64.

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

73

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Control: 7:25
Rec'd: AUGUST 10, 1964
1:24 P.M.

FROM: NEW DELHI
ACTION: SECSTATE 457
INFO: MOSCOW 31
LONDON 156
SAIGON 12
DATE: AUGUST 10, 8 PM.
REF: EMBTELS 425 AND 438.

NEA

India

DELETED

DURING GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH MEA WESTERN DIVISION DIRECTOR SANYAL ON OTHER MATTERS HE MADE POINT OF STATING WHAT HAS BECOME STANDARD LINE WITH MINISTRY OFFICIALS, NAMELY

(R)

SANITIZED
Authority State Ltr. 4/1/78
By hua, NARS, Date 8/8/78

GP-3.

BOWLES

DHD

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(2)

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJBI 287A 06/0900Z
P 060845Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

Authority State Wa-6/10/78
By Chw, NAIS, Date 8/8/78

P R I O R I T Y

004015

1964 AUG 6 AM 5 23

TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY 223~~

AUGUST 6, 4 PM

(Indonesia)

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

USIS WAS FIRST WITH DISTRIBUTION PRES JOHNSON STATEMENT (AP, UPI COMMUNICATIONS GARIBED) WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON LOCAL TIME. ALSO DISTRIBUTED WAS EXCELLENT QUESTION-ANSWER VIET NAM TALKING PAPER FROM WIRELESS FILE SAME DATE. NEWS OF DEVELOPMENTS HOWEVER SLOW GETTING AROUND. AT RECEPTION BY PAO FOR NEW PRESS OFFICER IN EVENING, NINE OUT OF TEN GUESTS UNAWARE OF EVENTS AND EAGERLY ACCEPTED USIS PRINTED MATERIALS ON HAND.

INITIAL REACTION AMONG INDOS PRESENT (INCLUDING FOROFF SPOKESMAN GANIS HARSONO, EDITORS, JOURNALISTS): QUERY WHETHER ACTION INSIDE OR OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS NO VIETNAM AND WHETHER SERIOUS; NO ACCUSATION US AGGRESSION; SOME CONCERN WAR DANGER IN ASIA HEIGHTENED; GENUINE PUZZLEMENT DRV MOTIVATION IN PT BOAT ACTIONS, INDICATING ACCEPTANCE FACT DRV ATTACKED FIRST; CONCERN OVER PEKING ROLE, REACTION; GRUDGING ADMISSION "PAPER TIGER REALLY HAS TEETH;" ACKNOWLEDGEMENT "REAL ANSWER RESTS IN PEKING." REACTION CANADIAN, NEW ZEALAND, JAPANESE, ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL PRESENT SUMMED UP BY BRITISH INFO OFFICER COMMENT "THANK GOD YOU AT LAST GRASPED NETTLE." YUGOSLAV REP OF TANJUG SAID "ALL PROGRESSIVE SOCIALISTS SUPPORT YOU."

THURSDAY MORNING PRESS REACTION PREDICTABLY UNFRIENDLY. (SEE EMBTEL 221. SEE ARMA CX-103 FOR MILITARY REACTION.)

ALL MISSION PERSONNEL INVOLVED CIRCULATING FACTS AS FAST AS WE RECEIVE THEM IN SUPPORT INCREASED USIS DISTRIBUTION MECHANISM.

FOR USIA: NEED DRUM HOME FACTS US WARSHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, REPRESENTING NO THREAT EXCEPT POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS; PROOF PT BOATS WERE DRV; DRV ATTACKED, US REACTED; US RESPONSE LIMITED, FITTING.

GP-3. GALBRAITH

Note: Passed USIA at 6 a.m., August 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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4, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 75

Action RR RUEHCR RUEHDT RUMJIR
DE RUQMVL 304 06/0829Z
SVN R 050815Z ZEA
Info FM AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
SS STATE GRNC
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3992

1964 AUG 6 AM 4:54

ISRAEL

NEA LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION DEPT 137 INFO SAIGON THREE USUN
IO 39 JERUSALEM 43 AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS LONDON PARIS UNN
P FROM TELAVIV

USIA AUGUST 6, 10:15AM

NSC DEPCIRTEL 221

*YOL 27 VIET 5
AR POL 33-1 VIET N-25
AR DEF 6 US*

CIA WHEN TEXTS DELIVERED TO FONMINISTRY DIRGEN YAHIL ON 5TH, HE
NSA READ THEM CAREFULLY AND SAID GOI "APPRECIATES SERIOUSNESS THIS
OSD SITUATION AND APPRECIATES REASONS WHY YOU REACTED TO ATTACKS AS
A "MY YOU DID." NOTING THAT ISRAEL IS SOMETIMES CRITICIZED FOR
NAVY "INSTRUCTING ITS SENTRIES TO SHOOT BACK", YAHIL CHARACTERIZED
AIR SE ASIA SITUATION AS FATEFUL. BARBOUR
RMR BT
CFN 137 39 43 221 5TH

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YAHIL

2

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

76

51 CONTROL: 5942
Action REC'D: AUG 7, 1964, 3:44 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

SS FROM: ROME
Info

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By JD, NARS, Date 4-22-76

Handwritten initials

ACTION: SECSTATE 368 PRIORITY

DATE: AUG 7, 8 PM

Italy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS PIERCE ARROW

REF: DEPCIRTEL 218

FOL IS TRANSLATED TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM ITAL PRIME MIN ALDO MORO TO PRES JOHNSON WHICH WAS GIVEN TO US TODAY BY PM'S OFFICE. ORIGINAL WILL BE DELIVERED BY ITAL EMB IN WASHINGTON.

"ROME, AUGUST 6, 1964.

"MR. PRESIDENT:

"I AM EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COURTEOUS MESSAGE OF AUGUST 5 CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

"I GREATLY APPRECIATED THE TIMELINESS OF YOUR COMMUNICATION WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO SET FORTH TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ITALY'S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION DURING THE DEBATE ON CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVT OVER WHICH I PRESIDE.

"YOU WILL ALREADY BE AWARE OF MY STATEMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH, UNDER MY INSTRUCTIONS, WAS SENT TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN ROME AS SOON AS I HAD DELIVERED IT TO THE CHAMBER. BELIEVE ME, CORDIALLY, ALDO MORO."

PM'S OFFICE CONFIRMED THAT THIS EXCHANGE CORRESPONDENCE WILL NOT RPT NOT BE RELEASED.

GP-4

MELOY

CFN 218 6, 1964 5 4
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8/7/64-6:28PM

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NAME OF OFFICER: <u>W Quinn</u>	DATE: <u>8/10</u>	TO RM/R: <u>8/10</u>
OFFICE SYMBOL:	ACTION:	

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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IN DATE: COLLECT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification
VERBATIM TEXT

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO 4/13

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

AUG 12 7 51 PM '64

Info:

INFO: CINCPAC
Amembassy SAIGON 4/16
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

By SIB, NARS, Date 4-22-76

EXDIS

Japanese Embassy today delivered following reply, marked "Confidential", by Prime Minister Ikeda to President Johnson's August 5 message on Tonkin Gulf attacks:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

Mr. President:

I have received through Ambassador Reischauer on August 5 your message, along with the text of your statement to the people of the United States, concerning the attacks by communist Vietnamese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high seas and the response your government has taken thereto.

As I have closely followed developments in the Vietnamese situation, which has direct bearings on the peace and security of Southeast Asia, I fully appreciate the circumstances under which you have been compelled to take the limited and fitting response against the North Vietnamese forces. I am gratified to note that your government has already referred the incident to the United Nations. It is my sincere hope that the situation will be stabilized at an early date without

Drafted by:

FE:EA:RAFearey/pmh 8/12/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EA - Robert A. Fearey *RAF*

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Green *WJ*

S/S - Mr. Mills *EFM*

White House *Mr. Smith*
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

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Classification

FORM DS-322
8-63

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

assuming serious proportions.

Respectfully,

Hayato Ikeda

END VERBATIM TEXT.

Department officer commented appreciatively on forthright tone of reply. Embassy officer observed GOJ able to express support of U.S. Tonkin Gulf actions in private communication which Japanese political situation prevents it from expressing publicly.

GP-4

END

RUCK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

78

~~SECRET~~

41

Action

SS

Info

DE RUALOT 95D 06/0718Z

Z 060714Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

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1964 AUG 6 AM 3 59

~~SECRET~~ FLASH 470 AUGUST 6 4PM

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS PIERCE ARROW.

Authority RAC 17033 (Japan)

REFDEPTEL 348, EMBTEL 458.

By ~~ie~~ NARA, Date 5-18-98

FOREIGN MINISTRY STATES TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR TAKEUCHI REPORTS SECRETARY TOLD LATTER U.S. HAD CARRIED OUT "PRIOR CONSULTATION" WITH JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REGARDING MOVEMENT NAVAL VESSELS FROM JAPAN.

EMBASSY WAS INFORMED THROUGH NAVY CHANNELS AUGUST 5 THAT COMBAT VESSELS OF 7TH FLEET IN JAPANESE PORTS WOULD BE LEAVING PORT FOR UNKNOWN DESTINATIONS AT SEA. THIS INFO PASSED CFN 470 348 40 5 7TH

PAGE 2 RUALOT 95D ~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN MINISTRY BUT NO "CONSULTATION" OR APPROVAL SOUGHT. 7TH FLEET IS NOT RPT NOT BASED IN JAPAN AND EMBASSY DOES NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE QUESTION OF "PRIOR CONSULTATION". ARISES.

FOREIGN MINISTRY REQUESTS CLARIFICATION SECRETARY'S REPORTED REMARKS. URGENTLY DESIRES CORRECT ANY IMPRESSION THAT "PRIOR CONSULTATION" WAS HELD OR THAT GOJ "APPROVED" REDEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES.

AS REPORTED EMBTEL 458, IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS DEPTEL 348, AMBASSADOR INFORMED PRIM IN TRANSFER F-105 SQUADRON FROM JAPAN TO THAILAND BUT DID NOT "CONSULT" OR SEEK APPROVAL.

GP-1. REISCHAUER

BT

CFN 7TH 458 348 F-105 GP-1

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 3:59 a.m., August 6

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 4:04 a.m., August 6

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~~SECRET~~
Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO

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Info

EXDIS

PIERCE ARROW.

Embtel 470

Embassy and FONOFF correct in their understanding that movement naval vessels from Japan did not involve "prior consultation" and approval GOJ not rpt not required and not sought. Secretary ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ used word "consult" in ~~XXXXXXXX~~ conversation with Takeuchi where he intended to say GOJ had been notified of movement. Request Embassy clarify at once to FONOFF.

GP-1

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 17034
By is NARA, Date 5-18-98

RUSK

Drafted by:

RAF
FE:EA:RA Fearey/pmh 8/6/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

BR
S - The Secretary
FE Mr. Barnett

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Christensen *PC*

~~SECRET~~
Classification

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FORM DS-322 8-62

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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41

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 2708

Rec'd: AUGUST 5, 1964

4 AM

SS

FROM: TOKYO

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 458 IMMEDIATE

DATE : AUGUST 5, 4 PM

Japan

EXDIS

PIERCE ARROW

REFERENCE: CIRCULAR 221, 223, DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 348

AMBASSADOR DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO PRIMIN IKEDA 3:15 PM, AUGUST 5, TOKYO TIME. ALSO HANDED PRIMIN TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND INFORMED HIM OF TRANSFER F-105 SQUADRON FROM JAPAN TO THAILAND AND OF SIMILAR SQUADRON FROM CONUS TO JAPAN.

PRIMIN SAID HE APPRECIATED MESSAGE AND HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE PREVENT EXPANSION OF CONFLICT. AMBASSADOR STATED US SHARED THIS HOPE AND THAT ACTIONS BEING TAKEN WERE FOR THAT PURPOSE.

GP-3.

REISCHAUER

UMT.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 4:16 AM AUGUST 5, 1964

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 4:25 AM AUGUST 5, 1964

PASS DOD (ONLY) PER S/S-0 AT 4:43 AM AUGUST 5, 1964

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec. 7/5/78
By [Signature], NARA, Date 3-28-14

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Depart* *nt of State*

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Action RR RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 06E 06/0825Z
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Info FM AMEMBASSY (SEOUL)
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
SS BT

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1954 AUG 6 AM 6 08

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SP LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (122) AUGUST 6, 5PM

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KOREAN PRESS REACTION TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT US ACTION UNANIMOUSLY FAVORABLE. DETAILS SENT VIA USIS CHANNELS. PRESH ALSO FEATURING PRESIDENT PAK'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT, WHICH WAS RELEASED AUGUST 6 WITH PREAMBLE REFERRING TO RECEIPT TEXT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT BUT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO PERSONAL MESSAGE. DOHERTY
CFN 122 6 5PM US USIS 6

RMR

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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CONTROL: 3427
RECD: AUGUST 5, 1964, 1:49 PM

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FROM: SEOUL
ACTION: SECSTATE 118 PRIORITY
DATE: AUGUST 5, 9 PM

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SEOUL 118 8-5-64

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VERBATIM TEXT

EMBTTEL 115

DEPTEL CIRCR 223

1. FONOFF HAS GIVEN EMBASSY TEXT FOLLOWING MESSAGE BEING SENT PRESIDENT BY ROK PRESIDENT PAK CHONG-HUI:

QUOTE MR. PRESIDENT,

IT IS MY PLEASURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE SIGNIFICANT MESSAGE YOU HAVE SENT ME TODAY. IN READING THE STATEMENT YOU MADE WITH REGARD TO UNWARRANTED ATTACKS ON U.S. VESSELS BY THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE, I WAS ENCOURAGED TO SEE THAT YOU HAVE TAKEN POSITIVE RETALIATORY MEASURES AGAINST THE COMMUNIST ATTACKERS. THE PEOPLE OF KOREA JOIN ME IN WELCOMING AND SUPPORTING YOUR STATEMENT WHICH UNEQUIVOCALLY DISPLAYS U.S. DETERMINATION TO SAFEGUARD AT ALL COSTS THE SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AGAINST RENEWED ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS. I HOPE THAT YOUR RESOLUTE RESPONSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REGIME WILL FORCE THEM TO DISCARD THEIR POLICY OF INFILTRATION AND AGGRESSION AND PAVE THE WAY FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA.

RESPECTFULLY,

PARK CHUNG HEE END QUOTE.

WHILE IN SERVICE

1

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-2- 118, AUGUST 5, 9 PM: FROM SEOUL

2. FOROFF INDICATED ABOVE MESSAGE WOULD BE RELEASED
AUGUST 3 FOR AFTERNOON KOREAN NEWSPAPERS. HOPED STATEMENT
WOULD BE HELPFUL TO U.S. PURPOSE. FORMAL TRANSMITTAL
OF LETTER WILL BE MADE BY ROK EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

CFM 115 225 1. 2. 6

DOHERTY

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:14 PM, AUGUST 5.
PASSED WHITEHOUSE AND USUN AT 3:24 PM, AUGUST 5.

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POL 33-6 US-Viet

83

53-51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1964 AUG 6 PM 5 52

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RR RUEHCR
DE RUJTLN 106C 06/1635Z
R 061549Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON)
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALALUMPUR
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 606 INFO KUALA LUMPUR 15
SAIGON 21 BANGKOK 17 CINCPAC 18 FROM LONDON AUG 6 5PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

VERBATUM TEXT PIERCE ARROW

MALAYSIAN HICOM HAS SENT NOTE SAYING MALAYSIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON
HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
JOHNSON FROM TUNKU.

QUOTE THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE CONVEYED TO ME THROUGH YOUR
AMBASSADOR. I WISH TO ENDORSE WHOLEHEARTEDLY THE ACTION TAKEN
BY YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT IN CARRYING OUT THOSE FITTING
MEASURES IN RETALIATION AGAINST UNJUSTIFIED ATTACKS ON UNITED
STATES NAVAL VESSELS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THIS HAS ALL
ALONG BEEN THE COMMUNIST METHOD TO PROVOKE PEACEFUL NATIONS,
AND THAT (SIC) HE ONLY LANGUAGE THEY CAN UNDERSTAND IS AS
YOU SAID'.....ACTS OF VIOLENCE....MUST BE MET NOT ONLY WITH
ALERT DEFENSE, BUT WITH POSITIVE REPLY'.

A SMALL NATION LIKE MALAYSIA WHICH IE BENT ON PEACE FEELS
GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THE FITTING ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT. IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE THAT THE FREE WORLD WILL
GIVE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ALL SUPPORT FOR ITS ACTION
WHICH IS NOT ONLY JUSTIFIED BUT ALSO NECESSARY IF PEACE IS
TO BE RESTORED AND RESPECTED IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. UNQUOTE.

GP-3. O'SHAUGHNESSY
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8/6/64, 7:50 PM

microfilmed by RM/R

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Authority NSC 4-29-77 State 541-78
By 12/14, NARA, Date 3-28-14

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-AUG 6 9 07 PM '64

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KUALA LUMPUR 137

Info:

Amconsul SINGAPORE - 61
Amembassy DJAKARTA - 136
Amembassy LONDON 920

Text of message from the Prime Minister of Malaysia to President Johnson re Vietnam crisis. QUOTE - Thank you for the message conveyed to me through your Ambassador. I wish to endorse wholeheartedly the action taken by you and your Government in carrying out those fitting measures in retaliation against unjustified attacks on United States Naval vessels in international waters. This has all along been the Communist method to provoke peaceful nations and that the only language they can understand is as you said '....acts of violence... not must be met/only with alert defense but with positive reply'. A small nation like Malaysia which is bent on peace feels greatly encouraged by the fitting action of the United States Government. It is my earnest hope that the Free World will give the United States Government all support for its action which is not only justified but also necessary if peace is to be ~~xxx~~ restored and respected in Southeast Asia. - UNQUOTE.

Classified by 6828

5

END.

Drafted by: FE:SPA:ADMoscotti:dg 8-6-64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Marshall Green

Clearances: SPA - Mr. Cuthell
S/S - Mr. Christensen

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POL 27 VIETS

XR POL 33-6 US-VIETN

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

85

Action
SVN

NNNNZCZOMJA643KLA529
RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJKL 51A 05/1010Z
R 051008Z ZEA

(Malaysia)

002880

Info

FM ANEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

1964 AUG 5 11 0 14

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 138 AUGUST 5, 6PM

POL 27 VIETS

33-6 US-VIETN

Jul 22 1964

XR DFC 6 US

REF: DEPCIRTEL 223

DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO TUN RAZAK 4:00 PM LOCAL TIME TODAY AUG 5. HE THANKED ME FOR THE MESSAGE AND SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD NECESSITY FOR FIRM ACTION AT THIS TIME. TOLD HIM TUNKU RECEIVING SAME MESSAGE VIA OUR EMBASSY LONDON. RAZAK ASKED TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS. ASSURED HIM WE WOULD KEEP HIM FULLY INFORMED.

GP-3. MCCUE

BT

CFN 138 5 6 223 4:00 PM 5 3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE at 9:46 A.M.,
AUGUST 5, 1964

RECOPY

Microfilm by RMA

2

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Authority RAC 82834
By [signature], NARA, Date 3-28-74

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Kuala Lumpur 100
8-5-64

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

86

33

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Action

Control: 6726
Rec'd: August 8, 1964
2:39 p.m.

SVN

FROM: Bamako

Info

SS ACTION: Secstate 73

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SP

DATE: August 7, 7 p.m.

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PASS USIA

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Reference: EMBTEL 68.

IO

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USIA

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NAVY

AIR

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RMR

Malean news media coverage North Vietnamese situation, which originally devoted approximately equal time both versions affair, has become considerably less favorable to US. Turning point was carefully-phrased communique issued by US-RDA Politbureau claiming that US security had not been involved in conflict with North Viet Nam and calling for convocation second Geneva conference uniting same participants as in 1954 (EMBTEL 70).

Simon Malley article, which broadcast midday newscast August 6, published in its entirety "L ESSOR" August 7. Piece is a vicious attack on USG and President Johnson which follows Communist line without wavering and puts entire blame for situation on US.

Simon Malley article was broadcast radio Mali midday newscast August 7. It equally bad. Same Communist thesis dominant throughout: i.e., US entirely to blame for situation and entire world disturbed by US aggressive actions. In addition, claimed SECGEN U Thant seen President Johnson in order force him to cease unprovoked hostilities against North Viet Nam.

Finally, coverage situation in Mali State Information Agency News Bulletin August 7 entirely devoted statement by CHICOM, North Vietnamese, and Soviets with no balancing presentation Western views.

KING

JTC

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

87

PMR

Pol 27 Viet 5

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~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 5707
RECD: AUG 7, 1:22 P.M.

FROM: THE HAGUE
ACTION: SECSTATE 113 IMMEDIATE
DATE: AUG 7, 5 P.M.

~~SECRET~~

LIMDIS
PIERCE ARROW EMBTEL 110

Pol 27 Viet 5

Netherlands

FONOFF AUGUST 7 TRANSMITTING THROUGH EMBASSY WASHINGTON PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

OPERATIVE SENTENCES: "THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT SHARES YOUR VIEW THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HOSTILE ACTION COULD NOT RPT NOT GO UNANSWERED, AND THAT YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED AND FITTING."

"THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT SINCERELY HOPES THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL PREVENT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS FROM TAKING A MORE DANGEROUS COURSE."

GON RPT GON HAD NOT RPT NOT FOR PRESENT PLANNED ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT BUT AT EMBASSY URGING THAT POSITION BE MADE PUBLIC, FONOFF PRESS OFFICE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RESPOND TO ANY INQUIRIES FROM PRESS ALONG LINES OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

CFN: 110 7

HOPE

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 1:45 PM, 8/7/64.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 1:50 PM, 8/7/64.
PASSED USUN AT 1:59 PM, 8/7/64.

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88

Control:
Rec'd: 3811
August 5, 1964
9:46 p.m.

FROM: Wellington
ACTION: SecState 77 Priority
DATE: August 5, 7 p.m.

New Zealand

EXDIS

Flash Circular 223

Pierce Arrow

I delivered President's message with statement and Pentagon release personally to Prime Minister August 5 at 6:30 p.m. He expressed appreciation for President's message; said he could well understand that some measures would have to be taken and that he could not understand the Communists motives.

GP-3

POWELL

LM

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 11:30 p.m., August 5
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 11:35 p.m., August 5

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By les/ly, NARA, Date 3-28-11

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OFFICE SYMBOL			

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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PP RUEHC
DE RUMJAG 27 07/0300Z
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P 070245Z
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUABSG/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUHPA/CINCPAC FOR POLAD
STATE GRNC

1964 AUG 7 AM 5 57

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UNCLAS PRIORITY ACTION DEPT 81 INFO SAIGON 8 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC
FOR POLAD 6 FROM WELLINGTON SEVENTH
VIETNAM

FOLLOWING IS OFFICIAL TEXT STATEMENT MADE BY PRIME MINISTER
HOLYOAKE IN PARLIAMENT NIGHT AUGUST SIX ON VIETNAM SITUATION:
QTE MEMBERS WILL BE AWARE OF THE PATTERN OF RECENT EVENTS AND
I NEED DO NO RPT NO MORE THAN SKETCH THEM IN. LAST SUNDAY AN
AMERICAN DESTROYER CRUISING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS SOME THIRTY
MILES OFF NORTH VIETNAM WAS ATTACKED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE PATROL
CRAFT WITH BOTH TORPEDOES AND SHELLS. THE ATTACKERS WERE
CFN 81 8 6

PAGE TWO RUMJAG 27
DRIVEN OFF AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SUBSEQUENTLY MADE
IT PLAIN IN A PROTEST TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT THAT
GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WOULD RESULT FROM ANY FURTHER UNPROVOKED
MILITARY ACTION AGAINST UNITED STATES FORCES. DESPITE THIS
WARNING, ON TUESDAY NIGHT NORTH VIETNAMESE TORPEDO BOATS
LAUNCHED A SECOND ATTACK ON UNITED STATES WAR SHIPS IN THE
GULF OF TONKIN, THIS TIME SOME SIXTY FIVE MILES FROM
THE NEAREST LAND, THE ATTACK WAS REPULSED AND AT LEAST TWO
OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VESSELS WERE SUNK. IN RESPONSE TO
THESE DELIBERATE AND UNPROVOKED ATTACKS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES ORDERED THAT LIMITED RETALIATORY ACTION BE TAKEN
AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE GUN BOATS AND CERTAIN SUPPORTING
FACILITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM. OTHER PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES HAVE
BEEN TAKEN.

QTE THERE IS NO RPT NO DOUBT WHERE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE
DEVELOPMENTS LIES. AMERICAN WARSHIPS SAILING ON THE HIGH SEAS
WERE VICTIM OF DELIBERATE AND UNPROVOKED ATTACK. THESE AMERICAN
VESSELS WERE OPERTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH RIGHTS GUARANTEED
BY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO VESSELS OF ALL NATIONS, RIGHT TO WHICH WE
IN NEW ZEALAND ATTACH IMPORTANCE. THE UNITED STATES

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-2- 81, AUGUST 7, PRIORITY FROM WELLINGTON.

PAGE THREE RUMJAG 27

HAS RESPONDED TO THOSE ATTACKS. EVERY STATE, WHETHER GREAT OR SMALL, HAS THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST ATTACK AND THIS RIGHT IS EMBODIED IN ARTICLE FIFTY ONE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE HAS BEEN LIMITED TO ENSURE THAT IT WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER SUCH ATTACKS AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES SEEKS NO RPT NO WIDER WAR.

QTE AS A SMALL NATION, NEW ZEALAND IS CONSCIOUS OF THE RESTRAINT GREAT STATES MUST DISPLAY IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR POWER. IN NO RPT NO CASE IS THIS CALL FOR RESTRAINT GREATER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES, AND IN NO RPT NO CASE HAS THAT COUNTRY'S AWESOME MILITARY MIGHT BEEN USED IN A RECKLESS WAY OR IN DISREGARD OF THE LESS POWERFUL. BUT SMALL NATIONS ALSO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF GREAT POWERS ARE NOT RPT NOT SUBJECTED TO IRRESPONSIBLE OR ARBITRARY CHALLENGE. SMALLNESS IS NO RPT NO PLEA FOR IMMUNITY FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF FOOLISH OR ILLEGAL ACTIONS. THE RECKLESSNESS IN THIS CASE IS ALL ON THE SIDE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. THIS IS ONLY ONE OF THEIR MANY PROVOCATIONS BUT IT IS THE MOST DRAMATIC. IN PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WORDS, AGGRESSION BY TERROR

PAGE FOUR RUMJAG 27

AGAINST THE PEACEFUL VILLAGERS OF SOUTHERN VIETNAM HAS NOW BEEN JOINED BY OPEN AGGRESSION ON THE HIGH SEAS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE LIMITED RETALIATORY ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AS JUSTIFIED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

QTE THEREIN, OF COURSE, NO RPT NO DENYING THAT THIS DIRECT ARMED CLASH BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM CONSTITUTES A DANGEROUS SITUATION, BUT THE DANGERS ARE INHERENT IN ANY APPLICATION OF THE SANCTION OF FORCE, A SANCTION UPON WHOSE EXISTENCE THE MAINTENANCE OF A JUST PEACE INESCAPABLY RESTS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THESE DANGERS, AND HAS TAKEN URGENT STEPS TO BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND DISCUSSIONS ARE ALREADY TAKING PLACE THERE CONCERNING MEASURES WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO AVOID ANY EXTENSION OF THE CONFLICT.

QTE IT IS NOT SOUTH VIETNAM AND ITS FRIENDS WHO ARE PROMOTING AN ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE GRAVE RISK OF THIS EXISTS AS THE EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO DAYS HAVE MADE MANIFESTLY CLEAR. BUT THE SOLUTION LIES IN THE HANDS OF THE COMMUNISTS, AND IT IS FOR THEM TO MEASURE THE IMPLICATIONS

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-3- 81, AUGUST 7, PRIORITY FROM WELLINGTON.

PAGE FIVE RUMJAG 27

OF THE WARNING LESSON THAT HAS BEEN GIVEN.

QTE I SHOULD PREFER TO DEAL WITH THIS WHOLE QUESTION AT THE
SUBSEQUENT DEBATE WHICH WE HAVE AGREED SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN
A FEW DAYS. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRESENT INCIDENTS WILL HAVE
BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL THEN HAVE DISCUSSED
THE MATTER. WE IN NEW ZEALAND ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE GREAT
BURDEN OF DEFENSE WHICH IS BORNE BY THE UNITED STATES,
ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN AREA AND INDEED IN THE WHOLE
PACIFIC REGION. ALONG WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION,
NEW ZEALAND BENEFITS FROM AMERICAN DEFENSIVE STRENGTH AND FROM
AMERICAN EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND TO ENSURE THAT COMMUNIST
AGGRESSION DOES NOT SUCCEED IN ENGULFING THOSE COUNTRIES WHO
WISH TO PRESERVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM. I AM SURE THAT
SHOULD THIS MATTER BE VOTED ON IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE
MAJORITY WILL SUPPORT THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES.

UNQTE
POWELL

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 7:42 A.M., 8/7/64.

PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 8:05 A.M., 8/7/64.

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31
Action

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CONTROL: 3024
RECD : AUGUST 5, 1964, 8:22 AM
FROM : OSLO
ACTION : SECSTATE 79 PRIORITY
DATE : AUGUST 5, 1 PM

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Authority State 6-1-78, NSC 2-29-80
By sig, NARS, Date 7-23-80

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW.

DEPCIRTELS 218 AND 221.

(Norway)

IN ABSENCE PRIMIN GERHARDSSEN ON VACTION UNTIL AUGUST 17TH I HANDED FONMIN LANGE (ACTING PRIMIN) AT 11:15 TODAY PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGES TOGETHER WITH TEXTS OF STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT, SECDEF MCNAMARA AND ASST SECDEF SYLVESTER.

LANGE THANKED ME STATING THAT MESSAGE AND TEXTS WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP TO GON. HE READ ALOUD AND SEEMED IMPRESSED BY PRESIDENT'S SENTENCE "THE RESPONSE WE ARE MAKING IS, HOWEVER, LIMITED AND FITTING" BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT.

UNDERSEC BOYESEN WAS PRESENT AND AID NIELSEN (GON PERMDEL UN) WHO IS NOW IN NEW YORK IS KEEPING FONMIN INFORMED. LANGE REMARKED THAT SINCE NORWAY IS PRESIDENT SECURITY COUNCIL FORMONTH OF AUGUST AND IN VIEW OF PENDING CYPRUS QUESTION NIELSEN HAD RETURNED NEW YORK AND WOULD KEEP IN CLOSEST TOUCH WITH STEVENSON ON VIETNAM.
GP-3.

WHARTON

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 11:15 A.M., 8-5-64.
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 10:35 A.M., 8-5-64.

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Department of State

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91

Action

Control: 5374

Rec'd: August 7, 1964
8:35 a.m.

SVN

Info

FROM: Oslo

SS

ACTION: Secstate 85

G

SP

INFO: USUN 6

EUR

Paris 18

FE

Copenhagen 19

IO

Stockholm 20

NSC

INR

DATE: August 7, 1 p.m.

RMR

PASS USIA.

PARIS FOR USRO.

Foreign Ministry comment on Viet-Nam.

Norwegian Foreign Minister and Acting Prime Minister issued following official statement to press August 6:

"I have received number requests to make statement on Government's view on situation in Southeast Asia. Government shares deep concern which has been expressed in so many quarters over acts of aggression which have taken place. It hopes that Security Council treatment of matter may prevent further acts of aggression, and eventually lead to stabilization of situation in the area.

"The Foreign Ministry is in constant contact with our delegation in United Nations, which will do its utmost so that Security Council discussions can have positive results. Norway this month holds responsible and difficult function as President of Security Council. In view of this I do not think it will be appropriate at the present time to make any further political comments on the situation."

/ Foregoing is

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Stamp: NORW
Stamp: 33
Stamp: 91
Stamp: 05/10

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-2- 85, August 7, 1 p.m. from Oslo.

Foregoing is consistent with known views of GON towards Viet Nam as stated by Lange in his conversation with me, (EMBTTEL 665) and his statement in spring Foreign Affairs report to Storting May 28.

WHARTON

MBK-18

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 at 10:50 a.m. August 7, 1964
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA at 10:25 a.m.,
August 7, 1964.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

34

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Action

OO RUEHC RUMTBK
DE RUFJKP 306 06/1110Z

SVN

ZNR

Info

O 061109Z ZNH
FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI

SS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

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RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

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UNCLAS ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE (260) INFO LONDON 65 BANGKOK SIX
FROM KARACHI SIXTH

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VIET NAM

NEA

IO

1. APP QUOTES BHUTTO TODAY AS SAYING PAKS HAD "SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES" IN SEA REGION AND FOR THIS REASON, FURTHER DETERIORATION DUE TO CLASHES BETWEEN US AND DRV OBVIOUSLY "CAUSING GREAT CONCERN AND ANXIETY." BHUTTO SAID AYUB HAD SAID MORE THAN ONCE THAT "WE ARE CONCERNED AND DISTRESSED OVER THE GROWING CONFLICT IN SEA." BHUTTO REPORTEDLY CONCLUDED COMMENTS WITH OBSERVATION THAT PAKS STOOD FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT THROUGH NEGOTIATION UNDER GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND THAT PRESENT SITUATION
CFN 260 65 1.

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PAGE TWO RUFJKP 306 UNCLAS
REINFORCED NEED FOR EXPEDITIOUS AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

2. MASIHUR RAHMAN (NAP), DEPUTY LEADER OF OPPOSITION IN NA, CONDEMNED US ACTIONS AS "CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY AND INSULT TO UNO" IN STATEMENT. HE CALLED ON GOP TO PROTEST AGAINST "THIS INHUMAN ATTEMPT START ALL OUT WAR ON ASIAN SOIL" AND QUIT SEATO. MCCONAUGHY

BT
CFN 2.

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 August 6 at 8:03 a.m.
Passed White House, DOD at 8:30 a.m., CIA, USUN
at 8:40 a.m.

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41
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Rec'd

2812 *NEA*
AUGUST 5, 1964
6:12 AM

SS

FROM: KARACHI

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 252 IMMEDIATE

DATE : AUGUST 5, 2 PM

(Pakistan)

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Authority *State Dec. 7/5/78*
By *Shu/hj*, NARA, Date *3-26-14*

PIERCE ARROW

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 136; DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR 210

1. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RECEIPT DEPCIRTEL 210 (APPROXIMATELY NOON TODAY), I DELIVERED PERSONAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO PRES AYUB (WHO IS NOW IN RAWALPINDI), ALONG WITH PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE AND MCNAMARA'S STATEMENT TO FONSEC AZIZ AHMED WHO WAS SENIOR GOP OFFICIAL PRESENT IN KARACHI. AZIZ AHMED SAID HE WOULD CONVEY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT AYUB.
2. ON HEARING MY DETAILING OF FACTS ABOUT SECOND NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACK ON US NAVAL VESSELS AND ON READING TEXT PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO AMERICAN PEOPLE AND SEC MCNAMARA'S STATEMENT, FONSEC FULLY GRASPED GRAVE SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION CREATED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE TORPEDO BOAT ATTACKS. HE WAS SHOCKED AND SURPRISED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTION AND ASKED SEVERAL TIMES WHAT NORTH VIETNAMESE MOTIVE COULD BE IN ATTACKING US NAVAL CRAFT. HE RAISED NO QUESTIONS REGARDING OUR MILITARY RESPONSE COMMENTING ONLY THAT PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT RESPONSE WILL BE "LIMITED" WAS "VERY WISE, VERY SENSIBLE". FONSEC'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN REMAINED MOTIVATION FOR COMMUNIST ACTION. IN THIS CONNECTION HE ASKED WHAT TERRITORIAL WATERS NORTH VIETNAMESE CLAIMED AND REFERRED TO PAST CHINESE COMMUNIST EXPRESSIONS OF DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF VIETNAMESE ISSUE.
3. WE AGREED TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH ON VIETNAMESE SITUATION. I TOLD FONSEC I WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE PRES AYUB ON THIS

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-2- 252, AUGUST 5, 2 PM FROM KARACHI

MATTER IN RAWALPINDI IMMEDIATELY IF PRES DESIRED BY THAT
IN ANY EVENT I AM HOPING TO SEE PRESIDENT AT END OF THIS
WEEK OR EARLY NEXT WEEK TO REVIEW WITH HIM MY RECENT
CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON.

GP-3.

MCCONAUGHY

UMT

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PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 6:35 AM AUGUST 5, 1964

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United States
Information Agency

POL 27
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MANILA
Lomas
8-5-64

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Classification

SD 689

Action 00 RUEHC
IAF DE RUMVC 596 05/1350Z
Info. ZNR
I/S-2
IRS 0 051342Z
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IOP/I FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
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IBS TO SECSTATE WASHDC
I/R STATE GRNC

AUG 5 10 45 AM '64

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CIA UNCLAS IMMEDIATSTOUSI UNN FIFTH
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NSC JOINT EMBASSY-USIS MESSAGE
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[Philippines]

HEREWITH PORTION VERBATIM TEXT OF REMARKS PRES. MACAPAGAL RELATING TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON RADIO STATEMENT OF WEDNESDAY:

QUOTE WE ARE HEARTENED BY THE DETERMINATION EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO RESIST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, ESPECIALLY SO AS IT IS CLOSE TO OUR SHORES THAT IT HAS UNDERTAKEN ITS ADVENTURE. IN THE LEADERSHIP THAT THE UNITED STATES EXERCISES, IN THE POWER AND THE STRENGTH THAT IT CAN BRING TO BEAR TO FRUSTRATE THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSOR, LIES THE HOPE OF THE COUNTRIES WHOSE FREEDOM IS NOW THREATENED UNQUOTE.

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PAGE 2 RUMVC 596 UNCLAS

HEREWITH VERBATIM AP ACCOUNT FONSEC MENDEZ REMARKS RELATING TO
PRESIDENT JOHNSONS STATEMENT OF WEDNESDAY:

QUOTE FOREIGN SECRETARY MAURO MENDEZ SAID WEDNESDAY US PRESIDENT
JOHNSON QUOTE HAS TAKEN A STEP CONSISTENT WITH THE SITUATION
UNQUOTE IN HIS ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING ATTACKS ON US NAVY VESSELS
IN THE TONKIN GULF. MENDEZ SAID JOHNSONS STATEMENT WAS QUOTE NOT
AGGRESSIVE. VERY MODERATE UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, AFTER CONFERRING WITH
PRESIDENT DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET,
MENDEZ SAID THERE WOULD BE NMCOMMENT ON THE TONKIN GULF INCIDENTS.
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID QUOTE WE HAVE TREATY OBLIGATIONS WITH
THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER ALLIES AND WE ARE READY TO STAND BY
THOSE COMMITMENTS. QUOTE BUT WE FEEL THAT WE ARE NOT CALLED UPON
TO MAKE A COMMENT ON EVERY INCIDENT AND WE FEEL WE ARE NOT CALLED
UPON TO COMMENT ON THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT UNQUOTE.

ESTERLINE

BT

NOTE: Advance copy given to I/S and IAF. on 8/5/64.

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002885

1964 AUG 5 AM 7

DE RUMJMA 21A 05/1120Z
Z O 051110Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (MANILA)
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMALC/13TH AIR FORCE
STATE GRNC
BT

(Philippines)

~~SECRET~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 244 INFO FLASH BANGKOK 46
SAIGON 35 TOKYO 47 IMMEDIATE TAIPEI 23 VIENTIANE 12
CINCPAC 13TH AIR FORCE UNN FROM MANILA AUG 5, 7PM

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW

DEPTEL 203.

I FURNISHED MACAPAGAL WITH INFO CONTAINED REFTEL AT
CONCLUSION CREDENTIALS CEREMONY THIS AFTERNOON. HE
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID WE HAVE HIS WHOLEHEARTED
SUPPORT. ALSO GRATEFUL FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER AND
COPY. PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

GP-3.

BLAIR
BT

CFN 244 46 35 47 23 12 5 7PM 203 GP-3

Note: Passed to White House, DOD, & CIA at 7:40 a.m. 8/5/64
Advance copy to S/S-0 at 7:33 a.m. 8/5/64

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NARA, Date 3-26-74

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

POL 27 VIET S

XR - 96

POL 33-6 US-VIET N

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30 Action

SVN Info

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RR RUEHC
DE RUMTBK 097K 05/1358Z
ZNR
R 051350Z
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUFJKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMVC/AMEMBASSY MANILA

RUMJAG/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
RUMJAG/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
STATE GRNC
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U N C L A S ACTION DEPT 146 INFO CINCPAC UNN KARACHI FIVE
LONDON 18 PARIS EIGHT MANILA 2 CANBERRA THREE WELLINGTON
TWO FROM BANGKOK FIFTH

SEATO •

FOLLOWING IS TEXT STATEMENT RELEASED TO PRESS BY SEATO SECRETARY-
GENERAL AUG 5 IMMEDIATELY AFTER SPECIAL MEETING OF SEATO
COUNCIL REPS:

"THE SEATO COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE UNITED STATES,
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR GRAHAM MARTIN, TODAY INFORMED A SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE SEATO COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES THAT IN VIEW OF
CFN 146 18 32 5

PAGE TWO RUMBK 097K UNCLAS
REPEATED AND DELIBERATE NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS ON AMERICAN
NAVAL VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES ORDERED AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES TO TAKE ACTION IN
REPLY. ACCORDINGLY, ACTION WAS TAKEN THIS MORNING BY UNITED
STATES AIRCRAFT AGAINST GUN BOATS AND CERTAIN SUPPORTING
FACILITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM WHICH HAVE BEEN USED IN THESE
HOSTILE OPERATIONS.

AMBASSADOR MARTIN STRESSED THAT THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE
TO THIS ACT OF AGGRESSION BY NORTH VIETNAM IS LIMITED AND
FITTING; THAT THE UNITED STATES IS AWARE OF THE RISKS OF

003232

1964 AUG 5 AM 11 43

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13 August 1964
8-5-64

13 AUG 1964

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UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 146, AUGUST 5, FROM BANGKOK

SPREADING CONFLICT; AND THAT THE UNITED STATES SEEKS NO WIDER WAR. HE POINTED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT THAT THIS NEW ACT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THAT AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT THE FULL COMMITMENT TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE REDOUBLED BY THIS OUTRAGE.

THE UNITED STATES, AMBASSADOR MARTIN ADDED, IS IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH ALLIED POWERS ON ANY FURTHER STEPS REQUIRED TO MEET THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA."

MARTIN

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:10 PM, AUGUST 5.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 12:30 PM, AUGUST 5.

UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

100 27 VIETS

XR POL 33-6 US-VIETS

30

Action

SVN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED

97

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JTB, NARS, Date 4-22-76

003250

Aug 5 PM 12 04

8-5-64

..... EKQSA423V KGAS20

RR RUEHCR RUEHDT

DE RUQSKH 054A 05/1335Z

R 051300Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY (KHARTOUM) Sudan

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUEHDT/USUN WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 44 INFO USUN TWO FROM KHARTOUM AUGUST 05, 4PM

DEPCIRTEL 221 - POL 24 VIETS

XR POL 33-6 US-VIETS
XR DEF 6 US

TEXT PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT DELIVERED FONOFF DEPUNDERSEC OSMAN ABDULLAH. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD NOT SPREAD AND EMPHASIZED ONLY DESIRE SEE PEACE IN THAT PART WORLD. SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE UNDERSTOOD NECESSITY IS REPLY TO UNPROVOKED ACT "COLD-BLOODED" ATTACK. HOPE MATTER COULD BE HANDLED UN SECURITY COUNCIL AVOIDING NEED FURTHER US MILITARY RESPONSE.

GP-4

RECKNAGEL

BT

CFN 44 05 47:21

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:56 PM, AUGUST 5.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 2:55 PM, AUGUST 5.

RECEIVED COPY

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

POC 27 VIETS

KN POC 33-6 US-VIET N

55

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DEF 6-2 US

Action

Control: 4663
Rec'd: August 6, 1964- 98
2:21 p.m.

FE

FROM: Stockholm

Info

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USIA

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AIR

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RMR

ACTION: Secstate 129
Oslo Unnumbered
Copenhagen Unnumbered

DATE: August 6, 6 p.m.

Circular telegram 224 and 221

Vietnam

1) Early fifth statements President and Secretary Defense given senior officer present Foreign Ministry. Pertinent items European wireless file fourth and fifth promptly distributed key officials and editors over my card in selected cases. Press reaction to date reported TOUSI 23 and 25. Excellent "questions and answers" special most helpful.

2) Press reactions to date reported TOUSI 23 and 25 are not unfriendly nor do they reflect sense on imminent crisis. However, for Swedes Hanoi obviously more distant than Capetown and most comments have detached quality which also quite unresponsive to our persistent output on basic issues and vital US and free World interests involved.

Last evening Embassy picketed by small group demonstrators headed by well known Commie front type who left statement their views and then gave up after drenching cold rain. Swedish TV played them in main newscast there being no other domestic items.

4) I called on acting Foreign Minister Palme noon sixth with additional material and for exchange views. Palme unable fathom why North Viets chose attack Seventh Fleet twice, interested in speculation as to motives, prospects. He assumes VIETCONG will step up warfare on ground where advantages more with them. He sensed in Sweden no foreboding comparable time Cuban confrontation or Korean war. Swedish eyes obviously on USSR

reaction but
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3

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STOCKHOLM-187

DEFENSE
OFFICE
STOCKHOLM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-129, August 6, 6 p.m., From Stockholm

reaction but Palme said he though since earlier crisis surer touch had developed on both sides for avoidance inextricable situations and Soviets probably not eager salvage Sino/Vietnamese position present episode. By implication Palme's attitude sympathetic and understanding US actions but he avoided explicit comment. Talk afforded opportunity for me go into Vietnamese/Laos situations in some depth. It appears to me that both at Government and popular level episode in Tonkin Gulf will barring further complications help in long run to increase understanding in this country of SEA problem and our position.

I also told Palme that in yesterday afternoon tabloids here there had been tendency claim US motivated by domestic elections upcoming and that I would deplore it if such gross misconception developed on matter where vital national interest and free World principles obviously dominating.

PARSONS

NAR/12

Note: Paragraphs numbered as received

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: COLLECT
PAGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

02985
99
AUG 6 6 52 PM '64
FOR OC/IT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON 911

Info:

EXDIS

(United Kingdom)

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

Please deliver following message from me to Butler Friday morning:

QUOTE. Dear Rab: I just wanted you to know how much we have appreciated the splendid support you gave us in the Gulf of Tonkin affair. Your Government's prompt and forthright statements to the press, and the position you have taken in the Security Council have been of great help to us, and we very much appreciate it. /sgd/ Dean. UNQUOTE.

GP-3

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: State ltr. 6/1/78
By: Shaw, NARS, Date 8/8/78

RUSK

Drafted by: EUR:WRT/ler
S:DRusk:fr

8/6/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

DR [signature]
The Secretary

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Bundy WB [signature]

S/S - RDavies [signature]

~~SECRET~~
Classification

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: COLLECT
PAGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

99a

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON

Info

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 6/1/78
By Chen, NARS, Date 8/8/78

Please deliver following message from me to Butler Friday morning:

QTE Dear Rab: I just wanted you to know how much we have appreciated the splendid support you gave us in the Gulf of Tonkin affair. Your Government's prompt and forthright statements to the press, and the position you have taken in the Security Council have been of great help to us, ^{and we very much appreciate it.} ~~and have made it clear once again to the world that in the hour of clear and present danger our two countries are always to be found side by side.~~ The position you took has also helped to bring home to the people in Peking that any adventure of this kind can only be undertaken at their peril. I believe that their realization of this fact is essential if we are to succeed in our efforts to bring about conditions which will permit a peaceful and just solution in Southeast Asia. While it is too

Drafted by: EUR:WRT/ver:mt
8/6/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary WTB

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Bundy WTB

S/S

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~~SECRET~~
Classification

Early to tell, preliminary indications of the reaction in Peking and Hanoi justify the hope that this crisis will also have been a lesson for the future. /sgd/ Dean. UNOTE

END

GP-3

~~SECRET~~
Classification

(Drafting Office and Officer)

Approved in S/AL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

100 11471

8/7/64

OK S. J. J. J.

Memorandum of Conversation

ORIGINAL/COPY TO RM/R FOR RECORDING & DISTRIBUTION

DATE: August 7, 1964

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam Situation

KK

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Denis A. Greenhill, Minister, Embassy of Great Britain

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large Department of State

COPIES TO: S/S IO
EUR
FE
S/VN
INR/OD
S/AL (3)

Mr. Greenhill asked me whether we would be able, in the United Nations, to establish the fact of the second attack on our destroyers. I said there was no question but what the attack did take place and I read him an excerpt from a reporting cable, but said that it was, of course, difficult to produce evidence which would be convincing. Mr. Greenhill said that in diplomatic circles around Washington, there seemed to be an assumption that the destroyers were escorting Viet-Nam vessels on raids. He said that he told anyone who talked to him about it that we had assured them that this was not the case. I said it was most unfortunate that a raid appeared to have been taken in the vicinity of the destroyers, but that this was simply an unfortunate coincidence and that the destroyers had nothing to do with that operation.

Mr. Greenhill asked if we had received any message from Khrushchev on the subject. I replied that none to my knowledge, but that I thought that we probably should now send a message to Khrushchev.

(2)

microfilmed by RM/R

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
NARA, Date 4-3-74

By ly

PROCESSING NOTE

On this date, Archives staff discovered that document #101 was missing from the file. A copy of the document was recovered from the University Publications of America microfilm and has been placed in the file.

Alexis Percle
April 21, 2014

National Security File, NSC Histories, "Presidential Decisions—Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, Volume 2, Tabs 14-17," box 38

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TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

O 061847Z ZNH

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

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out B
(United Kingdom)

INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK

RUABSS/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

STATE GRNC

✓ Bundy

BT

UNCLAS ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 522 INFO IMMEDIATE USUN 54 SAIGON
IMMEDIATE 22 FROM LONDON SIXTH

STATEMENT ISSUED FROM NUMBER 13 DOWNING STREET ON AUGUST 6.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. AS REGARDS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS ON U.S. NAVAL FORCES HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT MADE THEIR POSITION CLEAR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN THEY SUPPORTED THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE RECOGNIZED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THEY SHARE THE DESIRE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID THE RISK OF SPREADING CONFLICT. H.M.G. INTEND TO PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ARE DETERMINED TO DO WHAT THEY CAN TO ASSIST IN REDUCING THE INTERNATIONAL TENSION THAT HAS INEVITABLY RESULTED FROM THESE NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS. O'BRAUERNESSY

BT

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102

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CIRCULAR TELEGRAMS

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

01925

103

INDICATE: COLLECT
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR 224 PRIORITY

Aug 5 4 55 PM '64

FE

Info:

ALL AMERICAN ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ DIPLOMATIC POSTS
(Additional addressess)

SS

SVN

PIERCE ARROW

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SP

In lieu of not yet available detailed wrap-up of PIERCE ARROW

AF

ARA

operation, posts should ^{rely} ~~suby~~ on following items contained wireless file

EUR

for information and guidance:

NEA

IO

P

(a) McNamara's press conference morning August 5;

USIA

NSC

(b) McNamara's press conference scheduled afternoon or evening

INR

August 5;

CIA

NSA

~~for~~

OSD

(c) Stevenson speech before Security Council;

ARMY

(d) Presidential speech at Syracuse University.

NAVY

(e) Secretary's TV appearances evening August 5.

AIR

End

PARIS PASS USRO _____
CONGEN HONG KONG _____
CONGEN SINGAPORE _____

CINCPAC for POLAD _____ CINC^{DISK}SOUTH for POLAD _____
CINCEUR for POLAD ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ _____
CINCLANT for POLAD _____ CINCMEAFSA for POLAD _____

Drafted by:

FE:JMoore:ac 8-5-64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

P - Mr. Greenfield
(subs)

S/S - Mr. Davies

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104

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Aug 5 9 44 PM '64

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Origin
FE
Info.

ACTION: CIRCULAR 234

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USIA
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ARMY
NAVY
AIR

PIERCE ARROW

Top officials of Australian, New Zealand, Philippine, Thai, Korean, Japanese, GRC and Malaysian Embassies were called in separately today by Deputy Assistant Secretary Green for briefing on Pierce Arrow. He gave full back-ground and report of results of operation. Also discussed international reactions and possible DRV motivations behind attacks on our destroyers.

GP-3.

RUSK

END

TO:

CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
MANILA
BANGKOK
SEOUL
TOKYO

TAIPEI
KUALA LUMPUR

Drafted by:

FE: MGreen:ej 8/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - Marshall Green

Clearances:

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Aug 7 4 49 PM '64

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

57

Origin
SVN

ACTION: CIRCULAR 248

Info:

ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
(Additional addressees)

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

INFO TEL

TONKIN GULF.

1. First Tonkin Gulf Incident. On August 2 USS MADDOX on routine patrol in Gulf of Tonkin was attacked by three torpedo boats which fired both torpedoes and machine guns during course of attack. Maddox after firing three warning shots opened fire with 5 inch battery. In course of engagement two torpedoes passed within 100-200 yards of Maddox. One torpedo boat received direct hit from Maddox and others were damaged by aircraft from USS TICONDEROGA which responded Maddox call for assistance.

2. U. S. Warning. August 3 President made public instructions to Navy to continue patrols, to double patrol force and to provide air cover. President also made public orders to ships and planes to attack any force which attacked them in international waters and to attack with objective not only of driving off attacking force but of destroying it. At same time U.S. published protest

Drafted by:

S/VN:TJCorcoran/mlg 8/7/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: S/VN: Michael V. Forrestal

MVF

Clearances:

P -Mr. Wright(subs) FE - Mr. Green

IO - Mr. Sisco

DOD - Mr. Kamens (subs)

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against unprovoked communist North Vietnamese boats attack on Maddox on high seas. Protest cited traditional right to operate on high seas and stated U.S. ships would continue to do so taking whatever measures were appropriate to their self-defense. Protest stated US expected authorities North Vietnamese regime would be under no misapprehension as to grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against US forces. Maddox resumed patrol in international waters.

3. Second Tonkin Gulf Incident. Evening August 4 Maddox reported radar contact unidentified surface vessels whose action made attack by them appear imminent. At this time Maddox and Turner Joy were in international waters in Tonkin Gulf about 65 miles from nearest land. About one hour later Maddox made new radar contact with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. Ticonderoga then launched fighter aircraft to rendezvous with Maddox and Turner Joy. Shortly thereafter Maddox reported unidentified aircraft disappeared from screen and surface vessels remained at a distance. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived and began defensive patrol. At 9:30 pm additional unidentified vessels were observed on Maddox radar and began to close rapidly from West and South with intentions evaluated as hostile. At 9:52 pm destroyers reported they under

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continuing torpedo attack and engaged in intensive counteffire. Within next hour destroyers reported they had avoided number of torpedoes, that they had been under repeated attack and had sunk two of attacking craft. By midnight destroyers reported no hits or casualties and Ticonderoga aircraft illuminating area and attacking surface craft. Shortly thereafter they reported at least two enemy craft sunk. Turner Joy reported that during engagement she was fired on by automatic weapons while being illuminated by ^{search} ~~several~~ lights. After more than two hours under attack destroyers reported at 1:30 am that attacking craft had apparently broken off engagement.

4. U.S. Response. Deliberate and unprovoked nature of attacks at locations indisputably in international waters compelled President and his principal advisors to conclude that prompt and firm military response was required. Accordingly President decided air action should be taken against gun boats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which had been used in hostile operations. On Tuesday evening August 4 after consulting with Congressional leadership, he so informed American people. U.S. military response was carefully planned and effectively carried out. U.S. air strikes began approximately at noon Wednesday local time against North Vietnamese PT and gun boats, their bases and support facilities. These attacks carried out from 7th Fleet carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation were

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limited in scale, primary targets being weapons against which our destroyers had been compelled to defend themselves twice during preceding 72 hours. Our naval forces launched 64 attack sorties against four North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and their boats and against a major supporting oil storage depot. Our losses were two aircraft destroyed and two damaged.

5. Additional Precautionary Measures. Certain military deployments to Southeast Asia were begun as precautionary measures. These include: attack carrier group from Pacific coast to western Pacific; interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South Viet-Nam; fighter bomber craft into Thailand; interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from US to Pacific advance bases; anti-submarine force to South China Sea; alerting and readiness for movement of selected Army and Marine forces.

6. UN - On August 4 we requested convening urgent meeting of UN Security Council to consider serious situation created by deliberate attacks of Hanoi regime on U.S. naval vessels in international waters. ^{At meeting} ~~At meeting~~ held August 5, Amb. Stevenson made full report to SC on DRV aggression and US limited response.

7. Separate telegram summarizes foreign reaction to date.

END

PARIS PASS USRO _____
CONGEN HONG KONG _____
CONGEN SINGAPORE _____

CINCPAC FOR POLAD _____
CINCEUR FOR POLAD _____
CINCLANT FOR POLAD _____

CINCSO FOR POLAD _____
CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD _____

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

04229

INDICATE: COLLECT
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57

Origin
SVN
Info:

ACTION: CIRCULAR 258
ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

Aug 8 8 59 PM '64

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INFOTEL: (Additional Addressees)

Reaction to Tonkin Bay Incidents

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PRESS

USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

There have been no surprises in world press reaction. Our actions are generally seen as justified. Comment is generally sober, watchful and restrained. There is some criticism, but it is generally confined to Communist and neutralist papers (i.e. Baath and Indonesian).

Some consider us reckless, but most commentators find assurance in the limited nature of our response. There is some speculation that domestic politics may have motivated us. Considerable puzzlement is expressed over motives for attacks against U.S. ships.

The press is virtually unanimous in calling for a peaceful solution. Unfortunately, relationship between recent actions and continuing North Vietnamese aggression in SEA receives little attention.

Drafted by: S/VN:JMontgomery:caw

8/8/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Michael V. Forrestal - S/VN

Clearances: S/VN - T. Corcoran

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DIPLOMATIC

Reaction in this sphere has followed expected lines. The U.K., Australia and New Zealand have come forth with strong public support. The latter two have troops in Vietnam. France has withheld reaction to date, but DeGaulle called for an exposition of the true (sic) facts.

India has expressed grave concern and considerable interest in the details.

The Pakistanis even though members of SEATO have been cautious.

As in the press, virtually all countries have expressed hope that the conflict be limited and some are assured by President Johnson's statement to that effect.

RUSK

END

PARIS PASS USRO _____	CINCPAC FOR POLAD _____
CONGEN HONG KONG _____	CINCEUR FOR POLAD _____
CONGEN SINGAPORE _____	CINCLANT FOR POLAD _____

CINCSOUTH FOR POLAD _____
CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD _____

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1. Thomson
2. Return BKS

Department of State

107

WIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thomson #24
 est #18

Action

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Info

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 DE RUMTBK 092K 05/1025Z
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 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
 STATE GRNC
 BT

002848

1964 AUG 5 AM 7 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (141) INFO
 IMMEDIATE CINCPAC UNN FROM BANGKOK AUG 5, 5 PM

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW

003

DEPTEL 175

1. AT SPECIAL MEETING SEATO COUNCIL REPS, CONVENED AT MY REQUEST 1430 LOCAL TIME AUG 5, I DESCRIBED SITUATION, READING TEXTS US PROTEST NOTE TO NORTH VIETNAM, PENTAGON ANNOUNCEMENT, PRESIDENT'S RADIO/TV STATEMENT AND PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SEATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (WITH CAUTION LAST MESSAGE REMAINED CLASSIFIED UNTIL RELEASED BY ADDRESSEES).
 CFN 141 5 5 175 1. 1430 5

PAGE TWO RUMTBK 092K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. BRITISH COUNCIL REP (MACDERMOT) EXPRESSED INABILITY ASSESS DRV MOTIVES UNDERLYING SUCH "STUPID ACTION, WHICH PUT THEM ENTIRELY IN WRONG AND US ENTIRELY IN RIGHT". FRENCH REP. (CLARAC) SPECULATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTION INSTIGATED BY COMMUNIST CHINESE IN ATTEMPT FORCE USSR SIDE PUBLICLY WITH CHICOMS, NOTING USSR FORCED FACE UP TO THIS PROBLEM IN SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS.

3. MOST COUNCIL REPS EXPRESSED PRIVATELY THEIR SATISFACTION AMERICAN ACTION.

GP-3.

MARTIN
 CFN 2. 3. GP-3.

BT

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority RAC 17037
 By us NARA, Date 5-18-98

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 7:23 AM, AUGUST 5.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, AT 8:25 AM, AUGUST 5.

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108

FOREIGN REACTIONS SUMMARY



OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

✓
109

August 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: Initial Comment on U.S. Action in Gulf of Tonkin

Far East comment sees the situation in Viet-Nam as grave and there are indications of concern and some anxiety but nothing approaching panic. The only clearly critical comment on U.S. actions and official statements has come from Communist or left-wing sources. Editorial comment from Saigon and Kuala Lumpur justifies the U.S. position and considerable comment from elsewhere tends to hope for a negotiated settlement.

✓ In Japan, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suzuki released an official statement to the effect that President Johnson's order of appropriate counter-attack, within limits, was inevitable but that Japan hoped the situation would be settled before it entered a more serious phase. Although Kyodo news stated that Foreign Office sources were "shocked" no statement would be made until the full text of President Johnson's speech had been received. Japanese press comment has been limited but generally expresses concern along with hopes of an early settlement.

From Saigon, Prime Minister Khanh reportedly gave full support to the U.S. position and indicated that the second attack on U.S. vessels by the North Vietnamese confirmed the provocative attitude of North Viet-Nam and Communist China. Saigon press comment varies in its approach but generally concurs that provocation rests with the Communists.

Don Chu Mai regards North Vietnamese actions as probing U.S. intentions and a tactic designed to stir up world opinion in favor of an international conference. Tu Do, an independent paper, charges that the Hanoi puppets launched the provocations upon order of their Chinese masters and argues that conventional war against the North is the best tactic for retaliation.

The Straits Times in Kuala Lumpur clearly takes the position that the Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese view of the "paper tiger" thesis must be convincingly disapproved.

In Cambodia, the Depeche du Cambodge editorial took an almost pro-Communist line in a sarcastic attack charging that the "impudence and arrogance of the imperialists know no bounds."

The Indian Government is "deeply disturbed" by clashes between the United States and North Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Shastri has called an emergency cabinet meeting following receipt of your message about U.S. air raid retaliations. A spokesman for the Ministry of External Affairs said the clashes disturbed the peace of Southeast Asia and the Indian Government hoped at least that the uneasy situation that prevailed in the area previously would be restored.

Initial scattered comments indicate that most West European media view the American moves in Southeast Asia as retaliation against deliberate North Vietnamese attacks. The news of the President's speech and the concurrent measures taken by the U.S. reached Europe too late for inclusion in most morning papers. There was some factual comment on the second attack of North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

Rightist L'Aurore says: "This time it is no longer a question of an 'isolated' act but of a 'deliberate attack'." The paper finds the North Vietnamese provocation "unbelievable," but expresses concern, as do many other papers, over "an irremediable extension of the war in Southeast Asia." Vienna's independent Kurier headlined: "Vietnam: USA Attacks! After Second Attack on U.S. Destroyer: American Air Attacks in Progress." Die Welt, Hamburg, left no doubt as to whom it considered the definite aggressors when it headed its front-page: "New Attack on U.S. Destroyers."

Wide-circulation Tribune de Geneve writes:

"(The fact of the two attacks) legitimizes both the defense and the counter-attack. Without abandoning the principle of controlled response, the U.S. Government has crossed an important threshold. For the first time since the American undertaking to defend South Viet-Nam, military installations in North Viet-Nam are being targeted."

Paris press, television and radio are giving top attention to the subject. Editorials, which trail the most recent developments, express anxiety but take some comfort in your approach. Today's Le Monde runs a front-page editorial: "Firm but Prudent."

The Rio de Janeiro press gave banner headline treatment to news accounts of the new attack. Most papers went to press too early to publish reports of your television statement, but the influential Jornal do Brasil

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON

replaced its front page. The paper's account of the events carried the headline, "U.S. Vessels Suffer New Communist Aggression." Other papers ran such headlines as "Americans Sustain New Naval Attacks in Viet-Nam" and "Seventh Fleet Sinks Communist Vessels in North Viet-Nam."

The principal papers in Mexico City headline your "dramatic declaration," highlight your request for a U.N. Security Council meeting and state that "U.S. Airplanes Attack North Viet-Nam Base."

SUBJECT: Initial Comments on U.S. Action in Gulf of Tonkin

Far East comment sees the situation in Viet-Nam as grave and there are indications of concern and some **Carl T. Rowan** **Director** approaching panic. The only clearly critical editorial **Director** and official statements has come from Communist or left-wing sources. Editorial comment from Saigon and Kuala Lumpur justifies the U.S. position and considerable comment from elsewhere tends to hope for a negotiated settlement.

In Japan, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suzuki released an official statement to the effect that President Johnson's order of retaliatory sea-air attack, within limits, was inevitable but that Japan hopes the situation would be settled before it entered a more serious stage. Although Yomiuri news states that Foreign Office sources were "shocked" no statement could be made until the full text of President Johnson's speech had been received. Japanese press comment has been limited but generally expresses concern along with hopes of an early settlement.

From Saigon, Prime Minister Khanh reportedly gave full support to the U.S. position and indicated that the second attack on U.S. vessels by the North Vietnamese confirmed the provocative attitude of North Viet-Nam and Communist China. Saigon press comment varies in its approach but generally concurs that provocation rests with the Communists.

Don The Hoi regards North Vietnamese actions as proving U.S. intentions and a tactic designed to stir up world opinion in favor of an international conference. The Ho, an independent paper, charges that the North puppets launched the provocations upon order of their Chinese masters and argued that conventional war against the North is the best tactic for retaliation.

The Straits Times in Kuala Lumpur clearly takes the position that the Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese view of the "paper tiger" thesis must be convincingly disapproved.

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**SECURITY COUNCIL HEARS U.S. CHARGE OF NORTH
VIETNAMESE ATTACKS: Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson,
U.S. Representative in the Security Council, August 5, 1964¹**

I have asked for this urgent meeting to bring to the attention of the Security Council acts of deliberate aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States.

Naval vessels of my Government, on routine operations in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, have been subjected to deliberate and repeated armed attacks. We therefore have found it necessary to take defensive measures.

The major facts about these incidents were announced last night by the President of the United States and communicated to other governments at the same time I was instructed to request this meeting. I shall recount these facts for you, Mr. President, in chronological order so that all the members may have all the information available to my Government.

At 8:08 a.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 2, 1964, the United States destroyer *Maddox* was on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, proceeding in a southeasterly direction away from the coast about 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Vietnam. The *Maddox* was approached by three high-speed North Vietnamese torpedo boats in attack formation. When it was evident that these torpedo boats intended to take offensive action, the *Maddox*, in accordance with naval practice, fired three warning shots across the bows of the approaching vessels. At approximately the same time, the aircraft carrier *Ticonderoga*, which was also in international waters and had been alerted to the impending attack, sent out four aircraft to provide cover for the *Maddox*, the pilots being under orders not to fire unless they or the *Maddox* were fired upon first.

Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes, which the *Maddox* evaded by changing course. All three attacking vessels directed machinegun fire at the *Maddox*. One of the attacking vessels approached for close attack and was struck by fire from the *Maddox*. After the attack was broken off, the *Maddox* continued on a southerly course in international waters.

Now, Mr. President, clearly this was a deliberate armed attack against a naval unit of the United States Government on patrol in the high seas—almost 30 miles off the mainland. Nevertheless, my Government did its utmost to minimize the explosive potential of this flagrant attack in the hopes that this might be an isolated or uncalculated action. There was local defensive fire. The United States was not drawn into hasty response.

On August 3 the United States took steps to convey to the Hanoi regime a note calling attention to this aggression, stating that United States ships would continue to operate freely on the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law, and warning the authorities in Hanoi of the "grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces." This notification was in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva accords.

Our hopes that this was an isolated incident did not last long. At 2:35 p.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 4, when it was nighttime in the Gulf of Tonkin, the destroyers *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* were again subjected to an armed attack by an undetermined number of motor torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese navy. This time the American vessels were 65 miles from shore, twice as far out on the high seas as on the occasion of the previous attack. This time numerous torpedoes were fired. That attack lasted for over 2 hours.

There no longer could be any shadow of doubt that this was a planned, deliberate military aggression against vessels lawfully present in international waters. One could only conclude that this was the work of authorities dedicated to the use of force to achieve their objectives, regardless of the consequences.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 272-274.

My Government therefore determined to take positive but limited and relevant measures to secure its naval units against further aggression. Last night aerial strikes were thus carried out against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their support facilities. This action was limited in scale, its only targets being the weapons and facilities against which we had been forced to defend ourselves. Our fervent hope is that the point has now been made that acts of armed aggression are not to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any more than they are to be tolerated anywhere else.

I want to emphasize that the action we have taken is a limited and measured response, fitted precisely to the attack that produced it, and that the deployments of additional U.S. forces to Southeast Asia are designed solely to deter further aggression. This is a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that the United States cannot be diverted by military attack from its obligations to help its friends establish and protect their independence. Our naval units are continuing their routine patrolling on the high seas with orders to protect themselves with all appropriate means against any further aggression. As President Johnson said last night, "We still seek no wider war."

Mr. President, let me repeat that the United States vessels were in international waters when they were attacked.

Let me repeat that freedom of the seas is guaranteed under long-accepted international law applying to all nations alike.

Let me repeat that these vessels took no belligerent actions of any kind until they were subject to armed attack.

And let me say once more that the action they took in self-defense is the right of all nations and is fully within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The acts of aggression by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin make no sense whatsoever standing alone. They defy rational explanation except as part of a larger pattern with a larger purpose. As isolated events, the kidnapping of village officials in the Republic of South Viet-Nam makes no sense either. . . Neither does the burning of a schoolhouse—or the sabotage of an irrigation project—or the murder of a medical worker—or the random bomb thrown into a crowd of innocent people sitting in a cafe.

All these wanton acts of violence and destruction fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in Southeast Asia for the past decade and a half. So does the arming of terrorist gangs in South Viet-Nam by the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. So does the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of that nation. So does the fighting in Laos—and all the acts of subversion—and all the propaganda—and the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the Geneva agreements—and the deliberate, systematic, and flagrant violations of those agreements by two regimes which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice are bound by their provisions.

The attempt to sink United States destroyers in international waters is much more spectacular than the attempt to murder the mayor of a village in his bed at night. But they are both part of the pattern, and the pattern is designed to subjugate the people of Southeast Asia to an empire ruled by means of force of arms, of rule by terror, of expansion by violence.

Mr. President, it is only in this larger view that we can discuss intelligently the matter that we have brought to this Council.

In his statement last night, President Johnson concluded by emphasizing that the mission of the United States is peace. Under the explicit instructions of President Johnson, I want to repeat that

assurance in the Security Council this afternoon: Our mission is peace.

We hoped that the peace settlement in 1954 would lead to peace in Viet-Nam. We hoped that that settlement, and the supplementary Geneva accords of 1962, would lead to peace in Laos. Communist governments have tried aggression before—and have failed. Each time the lesson has had to be learned anew.

We are dealing here with a regime that has not yet learned the lesson that aggression does not pay, cannot be sustained, and will always be thrown back by people who believe, as we do, that people want freedom and independence, not subjection and the role of satellite in a modern empire.

In Southeast Asia we want nothing more, and nothing less, than the assured and guaranteed independence of the peoples of the area. We are in Southeast Asia to help our friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror, alien assassination, managed by the North Viet-Nam Communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese Communists from Peiping.

Two months ago, when we were discussing in this Council the problems created on the Cambodia-South Viet-Nam frontier by the Communist Viet Cong, I defined our peace aims in Southeast Asia. I repeat them today:

There is a very easy way to restore order in Southeast Asia. There is a very simple, safe way to bring about the end of United States military aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos. Let all states in that area make and abide by the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people's independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of Southeast Asia.

The people of Laos want to be left alone.

The people of Viet-Nam want to be left alone.

The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

When their neighbors decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in Southeast Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforceable terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in Southeast Asia as we have elsewhere.

That is what I said to this Council in May. That is what I repeat to this Council in August.

When the political settlements freely negotiated at the conference tables in Geneva are enforced, the independence of Southeast Asia will be guaranteed. When the peace agreements reached long ago are made effective, peace will return to Southeast Asia and military power can be withdrawn.

August 5, 1964

112

COVERAGE OF SECTION 2
OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION

1. Section 2 of the Joint Resolution would apply only to states which are members of the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Consequently, situations such as the Malaysia-Indonesia situation, or a threat to Burma, would not be within the coverage of the Joint Resolution.
2. Section 2 provides that action by the United States may be taken only at the request of a protocol or member state for assistance in defending its freedom. Thus, Cambodia would be excluded under present circumstances. Although Cambodia is a protocol state, its government has taken the position that it will not request assistance from the United States or the South East Asia Treaty Organization.
3. The South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty includes the following understanding of the United States of America:

"The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article 4, paragraph 1, apply only to Communist aggression"

This understanding with respect to "Communist aggression" excludes from the coverage of Section 2 of the Joint Resolution action to resist aggression which is not Communist in origin.

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AID TO SOUTH VIET-NAM

(In Millions of Dollars)

	<u>Economic</u>	<u>Military</u>
FY 1954	.1	0
FY 1955	325.8	0
FY 1956	216.3	167.3
FY 1957	281.1	110.5
FY 1958	188.8	53.2
FY 1959	207.1	41.9
FY 1960	180.5	70.9
FY 1961	144.6	65.0
FY 1962	159.8	176.5
FY 1963	170.0	211.5
FY 1964	245.0 (estimated)	180.7 (estimated)
FY 1965	265.5 (estimated)	203.0 (estimated)

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Authority State Cl. 6/1/78
By Shui, NARS, Date 8/8/78

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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Aug 3, 1964

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Origin

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK 282

Authority *State Lt. 6/7/78* a.m.

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Info

By *lhw*, NARS, Date *8/8/78*

AMBASSADOR

FOR/ STEVENSON ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

SS

SUBJECT: Security Council Meeting on Torpedo

SVN

G

Boat Incidents

SP

:

file - Tonkin Gulf

H

Following is general guidance and suggestions for SC

AF

meeting Wednesday morning. Additional memo on legal aspects in septel.

ARA

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FE

NEA

P

1. We are coming to the SC to report a threat to the peace, and to report the action we have felt necessary to take as a responsible member of the world community. Although an attack on a U.S. destroyer in international waters is clearly an armed attack on our nation within the meaning of Article 51, our case for UN concern rests more broadly on Charter doctrine that all governments have responsibility to refrain from aggression and armed attack. We are not angry, but sorrowful. It is not, (as one TV commentator tonight called it) "a drastic retaliatory action", but rather a measured response fitted precisely to the challenge

USIA

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

Drafted by: *HCleveland:pq*

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *The Secretary*
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

S/S - Mr. *Christensen*

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that produced it. Above all, it is not repeat not beginning of some/operation against ~~XXXX~~ ^{general} ^{DRV,} but a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that U.S. can not be diverted by military action from its obligation to help its friends establish ~~theixxx~~ and protect their independence.

2. We hope you can encourage other friendly members of SC to make appropriate statements of support. It seems to us that there are five clear votes (US, UK, GRC, Brazil and Bolivia) against any unsatisfactory proposition, but that seven votes are probably lacking for condemnatory res.

French, who as usual are swing vote, may take occasion to plug for Geneva Conference; desire to heat up atmosphere in order to get a Geneva Conference may indeed be one of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ^{DRV} Hanoi and Peking motivations in this affair.

3. In the event ~~Wx~~ North Viet-Nameese ask to be ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{heard,} suggest you not oppose but try to arrange so that they are heard under Rule 39 (under which SC "may invite...persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence".) In these circumstances,

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We recognize that resolution put forward by others would undoubtedly include even handed appeal to both sides to refrain from any action which might exacerbate situation. For this reason, we have included in suggested resolution paragraph along these lines which would be acceptable to us and avoids fixing blame on United States.

Text of resolution follows:

QUOTE The Security Council

Having considered the complaint of the United States, ~~against the~~
~~Democratic Republic of Viet Nam,~~

North Vietnamese have

Noting that the ~~DRV has~~ launched unprovoked attacks on American naval vessels in international waters,

Noting further the ~~severity~~ measures taken by the United States,
Concerned that the continuation of the present situation could lead to a serious threat to peace in the area,

Condemns the attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. ships;

Calls on the Hanoi regime to respect the freedom of use of the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations, and to cease and desist from any further hostile and provocative acts;

Calls on all concerned to refrain from any actions which might further exacerbate the situation. UNQUOTE

END

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ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON ~~EMERGENCY~~ FLASH

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335

file - Tonkin Gulf

Please hand
~~transmit~~ the following ~~USS Maddox~~ ~~protest~~ concerning the attack
~~USS Maddox~~ to the ICC with the request that ~~it~~ be passed
to the Hanoi regime:

QUOTE The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of the unprovoked attack made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on an American naval vessel, the USS Maddox, operating on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2.

United States ships have traditionally operated freely on the high seas, in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations. They will continue to do so and will take whatever measures are appropriate for their defense.

The United States Government ^{expects} ~~hopes~~ that the authorities of the regime in North Viet-Nam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces. UNQUOTE

END

after by: S/...:TJCorcoran/mlg 8/3/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary ~~Undersecretary~~

- Clearances:
- FE - Mr. Green
 - S/VN - Mr. Forrestal
 - L - Mr. Meeker
 - S/S - Mr. Christensen

- P - Mr. Greenfield
- ~~DOD: OSD/ISA~~
- M - Gov. Harriman
- LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The Under Secretary (in ~~draft~~)
White House - Mr. Bundy
SEA - Mr. Trueheart
DOD
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Text will be released in Washington at noon press
briefing August 4.

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Index

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK 282
AMBASSADOR
FOR STEVENSON ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

SUBJECT: Security Council Meeting on Torpedo
Boat Incidents

Following is general guidance and suggestions for SC meeting Wednesday morning. Additional memo on legal aspects in septel.

1. We are coming to the SC to report a threat to the peace, and to report the action we have felt necessary to take as a responsible member of the world community. Although an attack on a U.S. destroyer in international waters is clearly an armed attack on our nation within the meaning of Article 51, our case for UN concern rests more broadly on Charter doctrine that all governments have responsibility to refrain from aggression and armed attack. We are not angry, but, sorrowful. It is not, (as one TV commentator tonight called it) "a drastic retaliatory action", but rather a measured response fitted precisely to the challenge

Approved by [Signature]

2

Transmitted by: IO:HCleveland:pq

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

S/S - Mr. Christensen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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that produced it. Above all, it is not repeat not beginning
of some general operation against ~~DRV~~, but a single action designed
to make unmistakably clear that U.S. can not be diverted by
military action from its obligation to help its friends estab-
lish ~~thexxxx~~ and protect their independence.

2. We hope you can encourage other friendly members
of SC to make appropriate statements of support. It seems to
us that there are five clear votes (US, UK, GRC, Brazil and
Bolivia) against any unsatisfactory proposition, but that
seven votes are probably lacking for condemnatory res.

French, who as usual are swing vote, may take occasion to plug
for Geneva Conference; desire to heat up atmosphere in order
to get a Geneva Conference may indeed be one of ~~thexxxx~~ ^{Mano and Peking}
motivations in this affair.

3. In the event ~~NVx~~ North Viet-Nameese ask to be ~~granted~~ ^{heard,}
suggest you not oppose but try to arrange so that they are
heard under Rule 39 (under which SC "may invite...persons,
whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it
with information or to give other assistance in examining
matters within its competence".) In these circumstances,

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I believe Government of South Viet-Nam should also be invited to appear, not under Rule X 39 but as government of a non-member state concerned.

4. As in Cambodian border case, every occasion should be taken to emphasize (a) general context of Geneva Agreements violated by communists ~~XX~~ ~~XX~~ and (b) our desire for enforceable peace and assured independence as only motive our military assistance to SVN and our military activity in the area.

5. We do not see any need for seeking formal action of SC and would be satisfied to have SC conclude with no resolution. However, following is suggested draft resolution for possible tactical use in event hostile resolution proposed by Soviets or some other SC member. It is too early to make any definitive judgment as to whether, in absence of hostile resolution, it would be politically desirable to put forward such a resolution, since this would depend in part on amount of support we could get from other Council members as well as what counter-measures, if any, other side may take in response to our retaliation.

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[We recognize that resolution put forward by others would undoubtedly include even handed appeal to both sides to refrain from any action which might exacerbate situation. For this reason, we have included in suggested resolution paragraph along these lines which would be acceptable to us and avoids fixing blame on United States.

Text of resolution follows:

QUOTE The Security Council

Having considered the complaint of the United States, ~~and noting that~~

~~Democratic Republic of Viet Nam,~~

North Vietnamese have

Noting that the ~~forces~~ launched unprovoked attacks on American naval vessels in international waters,

Noting further the ~~several~~ measures taken by the United States,

Concerned that the continuation of the present situation could lead to a serious threat to peace in the area,

Condemns the attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. ships;

Calls on the Hanoi regime to respect the freedom of use of the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations, and to cease and desist from any further hostile and provocative acts;

Calls on all concerned to refrain from any actions which might further exacerbate the situation. UNQUOTE

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IMMEDIATE 353
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Authority: State ltr. 6/1/78
By: Shw, NARS, Date: 8/8/78

SC Viet-Nam.

1. SC decided August 5 to consult tomorrow on inviting representatives GVN and DRV take part in its consideration US complaint against North Vietnamese attacks on US naval vessels in international waters and our report on response thereto.

2. If for some reason DRV declines appear before Council, we believe GVN should follow suit and leave debate to Council members only. If, however, DRV comes to NY, we consider it imperative that GVN also participate, since we wish avoid appearance that current situation is one of confrontation between US and Hanoi alone. Stevenson in speech today stated DRV attacks made no sense in isolation but were on other hand easily explainable as part of larger pattern of North Vietnamese aggression throughout Southeast Asian peninsula, and in particular against GVN. President Johnson in speech at Syracuse University August 5 said re North Viet-Nam:

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:PMByrne;rsw 8/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/VN - Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

IO - Harlan Cleveland (in draft)
UNP - Mr. Buffum

WBF - William P. Bundy

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[QUOTE To the South, it is engaged in aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam. To the West, it is engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos. To the East, it has now struck out on the high seas in an act of aggression against the United States of America. UNQUOTE. Thus, absence South Vietnamese if DRV present in Council would be detrimental to public image and our joint cause.

3. Request Saigon urge Foreign Office accept any SC invitation decided upon if Hanoi does so andx thereupon accredit Duc immediately. Request also that Duc be instructed concert closely with USUN, which is ready assist in preparing GVN case. You should add we would expect DRV answer US charges by countercharging American-Vietnamese hostilities against the North and by broadening debate to accusations of general US aggression against people of both Viet-Nams. In reply, we would suggest GVN again recount xxxxy story of DRV terror, as it did in May during consideration Cambodian complaint, and stress these themes:

(a) US forces are in South Viet-Nam only in response GVN request for help to survive DRV onslaught.

(b) DRV has systematically and cynically violated Geneva Accords for entire ten years their existence with objective of taking over South.

(c) Geneva Agreements in essence ask only that neighbors leave each other alone; Communist adherence to this simple requirement would result

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in achievement GVN and US goal of peace in area.

4. GVN must also be prepared with rebuttal to inevitable DRV as accusations re July 30-31 attacks against offshore islands above 17th parallel.

5. In presenting foregoing to Foreign Office, request you discreetly get across idea we most willing aid Vietnamese in planning speech content strategy, and tactics for SC action.

GP-3

END

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By VRS, NARS, Date 4-22-76

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSYSAIGON
STATE GRNC
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 304 INFO SAIGON 37 FROM USUN
AUG 5, 9:35 PM

SUBJ: PARTICIPATION OF DRV AND GVN IN SC PROCEEDINGS

1. IN DISCUSSION AFTER SC MTG, NIELSEN (NORWAY, SC PRES) INDICATED INTENTION CONSULT INFORMALLY WITH SC MEMBERS RE ISSUE OF HAVING REPS OF DRV OR GVN PARTICIPATE IN SC DEBATE RE NORTH VIETNAM ATTACKS ON US NAVAL UNITS.
CFN 304 37 5 9:35 1

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 393 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. NIELSEN, WHO CLEARLY PREFERS NOT INVITE GVN PARTICIPATE AT THIS POINT, HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH MOROZOV (USSR) AND SEYDOUX (FRANCE) AFTER MTG. THEREAFTER, NIELSEN SUGGESTED TO US FORMULA WHEREBY DRV WOULD BE INVITED NOW PARTICIPATE IN SC PROCEEDINGS, WHILE INVITATION TO GVN WOULD REMAIN OPEN AND LIVE QUESTION BEFORE SC, TO BE DECIDED UPON ON BASIS OF COURSE THAT DEBATE TAKES IN FUTURE. WE SAID TELECON WITH DEPT THIS AFTERNOON MADE US DOUBT DEPT WOULD ACCEPT THIS; BUT IN RESPONSE NIELSEN REQUEST, AGREED TO PUT IT TO DEPT ANYWAY.

3. MOROZOV, NIELSEN SAID, HAD IMPLIED TO HIM THAT SOVS DO NOT REALLY EXPECT DRV WOULD ACCEPT INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN SC PROCEEDINGS. MOROZOV SUGGESTED TO NIELSEN THAT HE CONSULT MEMBERS SC INDIVIDUALLY, AND THEN TALK TO MOROZOV AGAIN.

4. WE KNOW FROM MEMBER NORWEGIAN DEL THAT DRAFT SOV RES UNDER WHICH SC WOULD INVITE DRV REP TO TAKE PART SC MTGS ORIGINALLY CONTAINED ADDITIONAL PROVISION (DROPPED FOR UNKNOWN REASONS) CALLING FOR "REP OF SAIGON REGIME" TO PARTICIPATE SC MTGS ALSO.

RMR

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(2)

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-2- 304, August 5, 10 p.m., from New York

5. WE INFORMALLY RAISED WITH NIELSEN ANOTHER POSSIBLE APPROACH WHICH HE FOUND QUITE ATTRACTIVE, NAMELY; IN REPORTING TO SC AFTER HIS CONSULTATIONS, NIELSEN WOULD SAY THAT ALL MEMBERS INSISTED SC CFN 2 3 4 5

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 393 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
RECEIVE ALL POSSIBLE INFO ON ISSUE BEFORE COUNCIL, AND THAT SC HOPES IT WILL BE PROVIDED. NIELSEN WOULD THEN NOTE IT HAS NOT BEEN SC PRACTICE TO INVITE REPS OF INTERESTED PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN SC PROCEEDINGS, BUT RATHER TO APPROVE ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS REQUESTS FROM SUCH PARTIES; THEREFORE, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO LEAVE INITIATIVE TO INTERESTED PARTIES. APPROACH OF THIS NATURE WOULD LEAVE DOOR OPEN FOR PARTICIPATION BY BOTH DRV AND GVN. BEFORE SUPPORTING IT, OF COURSE, WE WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE GVN WOULD NOT SEEK PARTICIPATION UNLESS DRV DID. OTHERWISE RESULT MIGHT BE GVN BUT NOT DRV PARTICIPATION WHICH, HOWEVER ATTRACTIVE TO US, WOULD HARDLY SIT WELL WITH COUNCIL IN VIEW OF NATURE OUR COMPLAINT.

COMMENT: INFO NOTED PARA 4 INDICATES SOVS MAY BE WILLING GRANT GVN PARTICIPATION WITHOUT TOO MUCH OF A BATTLE, AND WE HOPE BUTTRESS SUPPORT FOR IMMEDIATE GVN PARTICIPATION DURING INFORMAL TALKS WITH DELS OF SC MEMBERS TONIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, OUR FEELING SO FAR IS THAT CASE FOR GVN PARTICIPATION IN SC DEBATE AT THIS POINT IS NOT VERY CONVINCING TO MANY SC MEMBERS. IF IT BECOMES CLEAR WE CANNOT EXPECT SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION (I.E. HAVING BOTH GVN AND DRV REPS INVITED NOW), WE WOULD LIKE AUTHORIZATION FROM DEPT TO ACCEPT EITHER NIELSEN'S SUGGESTION (PARA 2) OR APPROACH OUTLINED PARA 5.

GP-4

STEVENSON

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 2:47 a.m., August 6
Passed White House at 3:08 a.m., August 6 (per S/S-0)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

1133 42 M/R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: The Secretary

August 5, 1964

THROUGH: *SA*

DECLASSIFIED

FROM: IO - Harlan Cleveland

Authority State ltr. 6/1/78
By Shu, NARS, Date 8/8/78

SUBJECT: Security Council Session on Tonkin Gulf Incident
and its Implications--ACTION MEMORANDUM

The first session of the Security Council dealing with the North Vietnamese attack on our vessels and our response could hardly have gone better today. After a procedural hassle in which the Deputy Soviet Representative, Morozov, made a pro forma protest at holding the session today without an opportunity to get instructions from Moscow, Ambassador Stevenson delivered the statement essentially as you approved it in the wee hours this morning.

Despite his allegation of unpreparedness, Morozov replied to Stevenson immediately at some length and introduced a resolution requesting the DRV be heard. While fairly long, the Soviet statement seemed largely improvised and based on press accounts. By normal Soviet standards, Morozov's statement was moderate. He pleaded lack of factual information about the incidents. He said, in general terms, that the Soviet Government expects the United States to put an immediate end to military activities against the DRV, adding that if this were not done, the United States "shall bear heavy responsibilities for the consequences." One almost had the impression that he was not defending a fellow Communist regime, or at least not his kind of Communist regime.

The only other speakers delving into the substance of the issue were the UK and China, who fully supported our action as justifiable self-defense within the UN Charter.

The French Representative professed inability to speak on substance at this point and merely supported hearing of the DRV. However, like several other Council members, he believed this could and should be arranged without a formal

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-2-

resolution such as the Soviets had requested.

Pursuant to your guidance, Ambassador Stevenson intervened a second time to say that the U.S. did not object to someone from Hanoi explaining their aggressive acts to the Council, but he pointed out that since these attacks were an extension of the war against South Viet-Nam, a representative of the Republic of Viet Nam should also be invited.

The session concluded when the Council President, Nielsen of Norway, found a consensus in favor of scheduling no meeting for tomorrow and permitting the day to be used for consultations both on the manner in which North and South Viet Nam would be invited, and on the date of the next meeting.

In the absence of further hostilities or serious Communist threats the Security Council deliberation will resume, probably on Friday, in less of a crisis atmosphere and with a possibility that the sessions will be extended over a long period. We now need to consider with you where we want to go in the UN forum from here on in. The debate will inevitably broaden-- particularly when and if representatives from Hanoi and Saigon appear. Now that we have discharged our reporting responsibility, we must reflect in longer range terms what if any UN action we can usefully seek to help cope with the vexing problems facing us in Southeast Asia. I very much hope that Ambassador Stevenson's presence here tomorrow will provide an opportunity for us to review this question with you.

Late Bulletin: In a corridor conversation after the Council meeting, the Soviets have displayed uncertainty as to whether DRV would accept the invitation to appear in New York, even if it is tendered. Apparently, this feature of the Soviet role today was also improvised.

IO:HCleveland:pq
IO:UNP:WBBuffum:jc
8/5/64

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Aug 6 5 45 PM '64

Origin
Info

ACTION: USUN, New York 299
INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 359
" LONDON 906

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State etc. 4/1/78
By Shw, NARS, Date 8/8/78

to DEPT,
Re: NY's 304 / DEPTTEL 353 to Saigon, rptd New York 292
Vietnamese Participation in SC Debate

1) DEPT endorses USUN suggestion contained PARA 5 URTEL, i.e. have Nielsen report to SC that consensus shows Council interested in receiving all pertinent info bearing on US complaint, but note it has not been SC practice invite non-members participate but approve requests for hearings; therefore initiative would be left to parties to request hearing.

2) We not RPT not prepared agree to ~~procedure~~ procedure suggested by Nielsen which involves invitation to DRV without at same time permitting appearance of GVN. We cannot understand reported attitude of some Council members to effect that GVN participation not required at this stage even though DRV is heard. As you know, our case rests on fact that this incident cannot be understood in isolation; it is part of larger picture and can only be discussed in that context. Moreover, Communists themselves have

3

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Drafted by: IO:UNP:WBBuf WB Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: IO - Joseph J. Sisco

Clearances: FE - Mr. Green (in draft) IO - Mr. Cleveland (draft)

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lumped SVN and US together in their descriptions of all actions relating to Tonkin Gulf incident. There can be no question but what if Hanoi appears, role of SVN will immediately be injected into debate and subsequently invitation would have to be issued for reasons of equity if nothing else.

GP-3

END

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *Ballin Cult*

DE RUEHDT 318 07/0100Z

By *TRB* NARS, Date *4-22-76*

Info

P 070030Z ZEA

P R I O R I T Y

FM USUN NEWYORK

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

SVN

INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

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ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 318 INFO SAIGON 40 FROM USUN AUG 6, 8:30 PM

L

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION IN SC

AF

1. NIELSEN (SC PRES) THIS AFTERNOON CONSULTED SC MEMBERS RE FOLLOWING FORMULA FOR VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION IN CURRENT SC MEETINGS. HIS PLAN (PROVIDED ALL AGREE) IS SIMPLY TO ANNOUNCE AT BEGINNING NEXT SC MEETING THAT FORMULA REPRESENTS GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SC MEMBERS:

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PAGE TWO RUEHDT 318 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
"SC, FOR ITS FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE COMPLAINT AGAINST DRV REFERRED TO IN THE LETTER DATED 4TH OF AUGUST 1964 FROM US PERM REP TO SC PRES, WOULD WELCOME SUCH INFO RELATING TO THIS COMPLAINT AS DRV WOULD DESIRE MAKE AVAILABLE TO COUNCIL, EITHER THROUGH TAKING PART IN DISCUSSION OF COMPLAINT IN COUNCIL OR IN FORM IT MIGHT PREFER. FURTHERMORE, SC WOULD RECEIVE IN THE SAME MANNER SUCH INFO RELATED TO THE COMPLAINT AS RVN WOULD DESIRE TO MAKE AVAILAB TO THE COUNCIL."

2. FRENCH (ARNAUD) TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT, IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, THEY WOULD OFFER NO OBJECTION TO GVN PARTICIPATION IN SC MEETINGS (ALONG WITH DRV). ARNAUD INDICATED FRENCH EVEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOMETHING "MORE FORMAL" THAN NIELSEN'S CONSENSUS FORMULA.

3. MOROZOV (USSR) HAS NOT YET TOLD NIELSEN WHETHER SOVS CAN ACCEPT FORMULA. USIS (VOA) OFFICER AT UN HEARD REPORT TO EFFECT MOROZOV DOES NOT EXPECT "TO HAVE WORD" RE NIELSEN FORMULA UNTIL MORNING AUGUST 7.

4. AFTER MEETING WITH NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SC THIS AFTERNOON, ALEGARD (NORWAY) SAID NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS ACCEPTED NIELSEN FORMULA, WITH CZECHS SAYING THEY AGREED IF US AND USSR ACCEPTED IT. IVORY COAST AND MOROCCO DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AS ACCUSED AND

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-2- 318, AUGUST 6, 8:30 PM FROM NEW YORK

SOUTH VIETNAM AS INTERESTED PARTY, BUT ONLY CZECHS PRESSED INITIALLY TO EXCLUDE SOUTH VIETNAM. ALL NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS SAID THEY BELIEVED NAMES USED BY COUNTRIES THEMSELVES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN STATEMENT, AND ASKED NORWAY TO IMPRESS THIS UPON US.
CFN 1964 2 3 4

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 318 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. NORWEGIANS ALSO SAID THEY HAD CONSULTED CHINESE WHO WERE PREPARED TO LIVE WITH STATEMENT, INCLUDING OFFICIAL TERMINOLOGY, BUT PREFERRED STATEMENT BE "GENERAL UNDERSTANDING" INSTEAD OF "CONSENSUS". WE TOLD ALEGARD THIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR US ALSO.

6. IN LINE WITH TELCONS WITH DEPT, WE TOLD NIELSEN WE WERE CONFIDENT DEPT WOULD ACCEPT TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 1 BUT HAVE NOT YET MADE COMMITMENT PENDING SIMILAR INDICATIONS FROM USSR. NIELSEN CONTINUES TO BE CONFIDENT USSR WILL ACCEPT THIS. HE PLANS 3:00 O'CLOCK MEETING FRIDAY AFTERNOON IF AGREEMENT REACHED, AND TELLS US CZECHS PLAN TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENT AT SUCH MEETING.

GP-4

PEDERSEN

BT

CFN 5 6 3:00 GP-4

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 10:53 PM AUGUST 6TH.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 11:10 PM AUGUST 6TH.

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file - Tonkin Gulf

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D) P R I O R I T Y

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Info FM [USUN NEWYORK]

By *VRS*, NARS, Date *4-22-76*

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SVN INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

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L FROM USUN AUG 6, 9 PM

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FE RE: VIETNAM - USUN'S 318

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SUBSEQUENT TO DRAFTING REFTEL NIELSEN (NORWAY) CALLED TO SAY HE HAD ANOTHER LONG CONVERSATION WITH MOROZOV (USSR). MOROZOV REITERATED AT FOUR POINTS USSR WISHED TO REACH AGREEMENT. NIELSEN EXPLAINED POSITION ELECTED SC MEMBERS TO HIM AND SAID US HAD NOT ACCEPTED DRV PHRASEOLOGY AND FELT LAST SENTENCE WAS TOO WEAK. TOLD MOROZOV THAT IF HE COULD ACCEPT TEXT IT WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND WITH US. AS RESULT CONVERSATION NIELSEN BELIEVES CFN 322 42 6 9 318

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 452 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MOROZOV REALLY NOW COMMITTED TO TEXT ALTHOUGH DID NOT USE THOSE PRECISE WORDS. TOLD NIELSEN WE CONFIDENT WE COULD GIVE HIM FIRM AGREEMENT IN MORNING ON CONDITION USSR ACCEPTED THIS TEXT WITHOUT CHANGE.

NIELSEN SAID HE HAD TOLD CZECHS WHEN THEY HAD INDICATED DESIRE TO SPEAK ON SUBSTANCE OF ISSUE TOMORROW AFTERNOON THAT THIS ALL RIGHT BUT PRES'S STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO STAND WITHOUT COMMENTS BY ANYONE.

GP-4
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file - Tonkin Gulf

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IMMEDIATE 32 INFO CINCPAC 156 FROM SAIGON AUG 6, 8 PM

DEPTEL 353 SC - VIET-NAM.

JOHNSON SAW FONMIN QUAT THIS AFTERNOON WHO, AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, AGREED TO DEPTS PROPOSAL.

QUAT FIRST TOOK POSITION THAT WHILE THEY SHOULD ATTEND IF DRV ATTENDED, THEY SHOULD LOBBY IN NEW YORK AGAINST DRV ATTENDANCE BECAUSE OF FEAR THAT IF BOTH DRV AND GVN ATTENDED, FRENCH AND SOVIETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO MANEUVER. SC PROCEEDINGS TOWARD GENEVA TYPE CONFERENCE. JOHNSON POINTED OUT THAT CONTEXT OF SC CFN 327 32 156 6 8 353

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 34A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONSIDERATION BEING OUR COMPLAINT AGAINST DRV, WE COULD NOT SUCCESSFULLY OPPOSE DRV ATTENDANCE AND THERE SHOULD NOT BE TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY IN BLOCKING ANY SOVIET-FRENCH MOVES TOWARD GENEVA TYPE CONFERENCE. POINTED OUT ADVANTAGES TO GVN OF OUR BEING ABLE USE SC FORUM FOR FOCUSING WORLD ATTENTION ON DRV AGGRESSIONS. ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE MUCH PULLING AND HAULING BETWEEN HANOI, MOSCOW AND PEIPING AS TO WHETHER DRV WOULD ACTUALLY ATTEND AND THIS TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

TAYLOR
BT

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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Authority *State 11/1/78*
By *Shaw*, NARS, Date *8/8/78*

Tonkin Gulf

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT (358) INFO SAIGON 46 LONDON 83
PARIS 51 CINCPAC 37 AUGUST 10, 7 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FURTHER SC DISCUSSION OF TONKIN GULF SITUATION

1. BOTH CHAI (SEC) AND NORWEGIAN DEL (WHOSE PERM. REP IS SC PRES) STATE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NO WORD FROM HANOI RE DRV'S PARTICIPATION IN OR PRESENTATION INFO TO SC ON TONKIN GULF SITUATION. (SC PRES, NIELSEN, SENT CABLES TO BOTH DRV AND GVN EVENING AUG 7 CONVEYING "GENERAL UNDERSTANDING" RE DRV AND GVN PARTICIPATION WHICH HE HAD ANNOUNCED AT OPENING SC MEETING AUG 7. SEE OUR 318 TO DEPT, NOTAL).
CFN 358 46 83 51 37 10 7 1 7 7 318

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 726 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. WE ASSUME DRV FON MINISTRY'S AUG 9 STATEMENT (AS REPORTED PRESS) CONSTITUTES REFUSAL TO APPEAR BEFORE OR MAKE INFO AVAILABLE TO SC, AND THAT UN MAY OR MAY NOT RECEIVE OFFICIAL REPLY. CONSEQUENTLY, HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING HERE WHETHER BEST US COURSE WOULD BE PRESS FOR FURTHER SC DISCUSSION OF TONKIN GULF SITUATION, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, SIMPLY DROP MATTER. WE FAVOR DROPPING MATTER.

3. FURTHER SC DISCUSSION WOULD, OF COURSE, PROVIDE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO EXPLOIT TWO THEMES: A) DRV, AS ACCUSED PARTY, HAS REFUSED COOPERATE WITH UN EVEN TO ELEMENTARY POINT OF PROVIDING INFORMATION TO SC; AND B) REFUSAL COOPERATE IN THIS SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BUT REFLECTION OF DRV'S GENERAL DISDAIN OF UN AND ALL IT STANDS FOR.

4. ON OTHER HAND, FURTHER SC DISCUSSION MIGHT WELL PLACE SOVS IN POSITION OF HAVING TO UTTER MUCH STRONGER CONDEMNATION

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-2- 358, AUGUST 10, 7 P.M. FROM USUN NEW YORK

OF US ACTIONS OF AUG 5 THAN HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING SO FAR. WOULD ALSO GIVE SOVS AND CZECHS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE POINTS WHICH, HOWEVER UNJUSTIFIED IN OUR EYES, MIGHT MAKE SOME IMPRESSION ON AAS. FURTHER SC DISCUSSION MIGHT ALSO ENABLE MOROCCO AND IVORY COAST (TAKING LEAD ALREADY HINTED AT BY FRANCE) TO CITE TONKIN GULF SITUATION AS PROOF OF NEED FOR RECONVENING GENEVA CONF, AND SERVE TO GENERATE MOVES FOR ADOPTION SOME TYPE OF RES.
CFN 2 9 3 4 5 3

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 726 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. WE BELIEVE THEMES NOTED UNDER PARA 3 CAN BE EFFECTIVELY EXPLOITED OUTSIDE SC, WHILE AT SAME TIME AVOIDING DISADVANTAGES NOTED PARA 4. WE HAVE IN MIND, AS EXTRA-SC ACTION, APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS TO PRESS BY PRESIDENT, SECRETARY AND PERHAPS STEVENSON.

6. IN ADDITION, GVN SHOULD BE URGED SUBMIT LETTER TO SC PRES EXPRESSING IN TERMS SWEET REASONABLENESS GVN'S DESIRE TO BE OF SERVICE TO SC IN ALL POSSIBLE WAYS DESPITE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON PART OF HANOI AND MAKING SHORT STATEMENT OF CASE AGAINST DRV (SHORT ENOUGH FOR SC MEMBERS TO READ IT) GVN WOULD HAVE MADE IN SC.

WE BROACHED LATTER IDEA WITH GVN OBSERVER MISSION AUG 9. THEY SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO IDEA, INDICATED THEY WOULD RECOMMEND IT TO SAIGON. IN MEANTIME, THEY PLAN FOLLOW GENERAL LINE RE COOPERATION OF UN IN STATEMENTS TO PRES.

7. WE DOUBT THERE WILL BE PRESSURE FOR FURTHER SC MEETING UNLESS THERE ARE MORE INCIDENTS IN TONKIN GULF. EVEN BEFORE CYPRUS CRISIS AROSE, THERE WAS GENERAL FEELING OF RELIEF AMONG DELS HERE THAT TENSION RESULTING FROM EVENTS IN TONKIN GULF HAD BEGUN TO SUBSIDE. WE DOUBT THERE ARE MANY WHO WANT TO RUN RISK OF ARRESTING EASING OF TENSION IN ANY WAY, INCLUDING FURTHER DISCUSSION IN SC.

GP-3. STEVENSON

BT

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NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 10, 10:03 P.M.

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By VB NARS, Date 4-22-76

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AUGUST 6, 8:35 PM

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1. DUC (GVN OBSERVER) CALLED ON US AUGUST 6 TO EXPRESS CONCERN ON TWO ACCOUNTS: (A) THAT DRV MIGHT BE ALLOWED PARTICIPATE IN SC MEETINGS WITHOUT SIMILAR RIGHT BEING EXTENDED SIMULTANEOUSLY TO GVN, AND (B) ONE IMPORTANT RESULT OF CURRENT SC DEBATE MIGHT BE GENERATION OF FURTHER PRESSURE FOR RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE.

2. RE (A), DUC FELT WORDING OF US COMPLAINT PROVIDED OBVIOUS BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION BY DRV, BUT WEAK BASIS FOR CFN 319 41 1 6 2 1

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 450 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GVN PARTICIPATION. HE HAD NO DOUBTS DRV WOULD WANT TO APPEAR BEFORE SC, SEEKING THEREBY TO INCREASE ITS INTERNATIONAL STATURE, AS WELL AS GAIN ACCESS TO FORUM FROM WHICH TO DENOUNCE US AGGRESSION AND VIOLATIONS OF 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT AND PRESS FOR RECONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH CLEARLY WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, DUC SAID GVN WOULD CONSIDER IT VERY IMPORTANT, IN ORDER TO OFFSET ADVANTAGES DRV WOULD GAIN FROM APPEARING IN SC, THAT DRV NOT BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN SC MEETINGS UNLESS SIMILAR PRIVILEGE EXTENDED TO GVN.

3. WE ASSURED DUC WE ARE WORKING FOR SOLUTION WHICH WOULD MEET HIS POINT. WE EXPRESSED OPINION THERE IS NO CHANCE SOVIET DRAFT RESO (WHICH WOULD HAVE SC INVITE ONLY DRV) COULD BE ADOPTED INASMUCH AS IT RAISES BY IMPLICATION QUESTIONS RE JURIDICAL STATUS OF DRV WHICH MOST MEMBERS OF SC ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID. WE THEN OUTLINED FORMULA WHICH NIELSEN (SC PRESIDENT) IS DISCUSSING WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF SC (SENT SEPTTEL) AND SAID WE WERE AWAITING DEPT'S REACTION THERETO.

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-2- 319, AUGUST 6, 9 PM, FROM: NEW YORK

4. RE 1 (B), WE AGREED RECENT EVENTS IN GULF OF TONKIN AND SC DISCUSSION THEREOF MIGHT GENERATE FURTHER PRESSURE FOR GENEVA CONFERENCE, BUT SAID WE WERE SURE US POSITION RE GENEVA CONFERENCE WOULD NOT BE CHANGED BY SUCH PRESSURE.
CFN 1954 3 4 1

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 450 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. WE ASSURED DUC WE WOULD KEEP HIM UP-TO-DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS AND HELP HIM IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY IF SITUATION DEVELOPS SO THAT GVN TAKES PART IN SC DISCUSSIONS.

6. THACH OF GVN OBSERVER MISSION CALLED THIS EVENING TO SAY DUC JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO REQUEST PARTICIPATION IN SC MEETING IF DRV MAKES SIMILAR REQUEST.

GP-4 PEDERSEN

BT

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ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 10:15 PM, 8/6/64.

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ACTION: ~~Ambassy~~ SAIGON 418
INFO: USUN NEW YORK 372
CINCPAC
Ambassy LONDON 1085
Ambassy PARIS 822

Aug 12 8 04 PM '64

CINCPAC FOR POLAD
REF: USUN's 358
SC Viet-Nam

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Authority State ltr. 6/1/78
By shw, NARS, Date 8/8/78

DEPT has ~~concluded~~ concluded that if DRV did not attend or submit information in accordance "general understanding," there should be no more SC sessions on Tonkin Gulf situation. We made our points August 5 and 7, we had no desire for formal SC action, and statements standing on record leave us in good position. Resumption SC debate would have all drawbacks cited REFTEL, and the only advantage of renewed meeting, i.e., propaganda exploitation of DRV contempt for UN, can be utilized just as effectively outside Council as within. We therefore concur in USUN's recommendation REFTEL:

We assume from Saigon's 327 that GVN's agreement to proposal contained DEPIEL 353 would, by extension, mean Vietnamese would be prepared let matters rest as they are with respect SC meetings per se. We also assume they would be eager get full value out of DRV stance vis-a-vis UN and therefore ready address letter to SC President along lines numbered paragraph 6 REFTEL; and we estimate such move would not stimulate resumption formal SC consideration Tonkin Gulf situation.

Drafted by: UNP: FMB:ma:eu 8/12/64	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/VN - Michael V. Forrestal
Clearances: S/VN - Mr. Coreoran FE - Mr. Bank Mendenhall	UNP - Mr. Baffum P - Mr. Wright IO - Mr. Sisco

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On timing, however, we believe GVN should defer communication with SC President for few days, perhaps until beginning next week, in order be certain DRV will not respond formally to UN. While DRV Foreign Ministry statement of August 9 asserting UNSC "has no right examine this problem" is probably only reply to be expected, we feel it prudent to delay GVN reply until we certain it will not precipitate issue further in SC.

believe desirable to

So far as our own press exploitation concerned, we ~~should~~ confine action ~~to~~ or time being ~~to~~ initiative to issuance voluntary statement at Department's regular noon press briefing. Department will concert with USUN on statement and timing.

FOR SAIGON: Request you discuss foregoing with Foreign Office and assist as appropriate in drafting relatively short GVN letter to SC President for transmittal next week. You should draw on paragraph 6 REPTTEL and on themes set out paragraph 3 DEPTTEL 353. END

GP-3

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

09073 July
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM, Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57

Origin ACTION: USUN NEW YORK 423
 IO
 Info INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 463
 SS " CINCPAC
 SVN " LONDON 1205
 G " PARIS 916
 SP CINCPAC FOR POLAD

AUG 18 11 03 AM '64

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Lt. 6/1/78
By Chew, NARS, Date 8/8/78

L SC Tonkin Gulf
 H
 EUR USUN's 394 and 404; DEPTTEL 418 to Saigon rptd USUN 372
 E
 P
 USIA
 NSC
 TNR
 LA
 ISA
 DOD

SC Tonkin Gulf
 USUN's 394 and 404; DEPTTEL 418 to Saigon rptd USUN 372

Now that GVN has submitted excellent reply to SC "general understanding" on participation debate or provision information re Tonkin Gulf situation (USUN's 421), we believe we should quit while we are ahead. US position was put on record in effective way in SC debate itself; DRV is on record in SC document as disdaining UN; and GVN is on record in SC document as being totally forthcoming and in same communication has made telling propaganda points for its case.

Consequently, we consider it best not send any US letter to SC President x in reply Soviet letter (USUN's 394) nor make any voluntary statement to press at regular noon briefing as earlier contemplated (DEPTTEL 418 to Saigon).

END

GP-3

RUSK

Filed by: UNP: FMByrne:eu 8/18/64 <small>Clearances</small>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	IO - Joseph J. Sisco FE - Mr. Green P - Mr. Wright
UNP - Mr. Buffum (in draft) S/VN - Mr. Corcoran (in draft) FE - Mr. Mendenhall (in draft)	REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ENDC

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-AUG 5 5 10 PM '64

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification

Origin

ACTION: US MISSION GENEVA TODIS 1552 PRIORITY

Info

~~SECRET~~

In case US reaction to hostile North Viet-Nam actions against US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin is raised at ~~(Discussions)~~ meeting, you should draw upon following in explaining US action: (1) Pentagon announcement of North Vietnamese attack on US destroyers carried wireless file August 4; ~~(sent Mission Geneva)~~; (2) President's statement carried Depcirtel 210 and (3) Ambassador Stevenson's statement to UN Security Council/tonight's wireless file.

POC 27 Viet S
POC 33-6 US-Viet W
DEF 6-3 US

END

Rusk
[2.3.7]
RUSK

Classified by Rusk

Drafted by: JAM
FE/RA: JAMendenhall:avm 8/5/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ACDA - Jacob D. Beam J.D. Beam

Clearances: UNP - Mr. Buffum WMS

S/S - Mr. Davies JMB

S/VN - Mr. Roberts JMB

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75
INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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KR Pol 33-6 US-VIET
129

UNCLASSIFIED

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FM US MISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
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UNCLAS ROUTINE DEPT DISTO 2012 SIXTH

004378

1964 AUG 6 AM 11 15

FOLLOWING IS TEXT (UNESSENTIAL WORDS OMITTED) TIMBERLAKE INTERVENTION RE VIET NAM TODAY'S SESSION: QTE REFERENCE HAS BEEN MADE THIS MORNING TO WANT HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST US SHIPS ON HIGH SEAS IN GULF TONKIN. WHILE ENDC IS NO PLACE FOR CONSIDERATION THIS SUBJECT AS DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE CANADA HAS ALREADY SAID, CANNOT IGNORE TOTALLY ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION THAT HAS BEEN GIVEN THESE EVENTS, ESPECIALLY BY REPRESENTATIVES SOVIET UNION, POLAND, RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

PAGE TWO RUFJBT 03 UNCLAS
THERE HAVE BEEN TWO ATTACKS AGAINST US SHIPS RECENT DAYS IN GULF TONKIN AREA. THESE UNPROVOKED AND DELIBERATE ACTS AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS HAVE BEEN MET BY US RESPONSE WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS DESCRIBED AS "LIMITED AND FITTING."
TEN YEARS AGO REPUBLIC VIET NAM ASKED US FOR ASSISTANCE DEFEND ITS FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE AGAINST AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION, DIRECTED AND IN PART SUPPLIED FROM NORTH VIET NAM. PEACE AND STABILITY WOULD PREVAIL VIET NAM TODAY IF RULERS HANOI WOULD LIVE UP TO EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND LET THEIR NEIGHBORS ALONE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, PRESIDENT JOHNSON SAID JUNE 23, 1964: QTE THERE IS DANGER SOUTHEAST ASIA. IT IS DANGER BROUGHT ON BY TERRORISM AND AGGRESSION. US INTENDS NO RASHNESS AND SEEKS NO WIDER WAR. BUT US IS DETERMINED USE ITS STRENGTH HELP THOSE WHO ARE DEFENDING THEMSELVES AGAINST TERROR AND AGGRESSION. WE ARE PEOPLE PEACE --BUT NOT WEAKNESS AND TIMIDITY. I REPEAT: OUR PURPOSE IS PEACE. UNQTE. TUBBY

BT
CFN 2012 23 1964

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL IMMEDIATE 157

SS

Info:

Aug 4 3 50 PM '64
DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By VB, NARS, Date 4-22-76

DELIVER DURBROW 8 a.m., AUGUST 5

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW

Re Popper-Farley telecon, you should call NAC meeting 3:30 pm August 5 to convey special report attack on US destroyers in Gulf of Tonkin. Guidance for your use in meeting follows.

Slug future telegrams this subject "PIERCE ARROW".

GP-4

END

RUSH

Drafted by: EUR:RPM:GWest:ilg 8/4/64
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - William R. Tyler

Clearances:
S/S - Mr. Hilliker
RPM - Mr. Popper

U - Mr. Anderson

/XXXXXXXX

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01458

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

132 Klein

51

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL 198 IMMEDIATE Aug 4 9 12 PM '64

55

Info

DELIVER DUSBROW 8:00 A.M. AUGUST 5

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW

In making statement to NAC re deliberate attack on US vessels on high seas in Gulf of Tonkin, you should make following points:
(1) state facts as contained in background info message being sent septel; (2) state US position as contained in President's statement being sent septel; (3) emphasize US will continue keep NAC fully informed of developments.

Slug all future messages this subject "PIERCE ARROW".

END

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr. 6/1/78
By lwu, NARS, Date 8/8/78

RUSK

~~EUR/RPM:DPopper;~~
~~EUR/RPM:GVest/hm 8-4-64~~ Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR - William R. Tyler

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Hilliker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1964 AUG 5 PM 6 20 36 30

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IMMEDIATE POLTO 203 AUG 5, 8 PM

FE

PIERCE ARROW

IO

REF: TOPOL 198

P

NSA

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RMR

AT SPECIAL NAC MEETING 3:30 PM AUGUST 5, ACTING US PERMREP MADE STATEMENT ON ATTACKS ON US NAVAL CRAFT IN GULF OF TONKIN IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL (COPIES POUCHED). BEGAN WITH BRIEF SUMMARY PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT AUGUST 4, COPIES OF WHICH HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ALL DELEGATIONS. CONTINUED WITH DETAILED ACCOUNT OF TWO ATTACKS DRAWN FROM MACNAMARA'S STATEMENT IN "DAILY RADIO BULLETIN" 217, INDICATING PURPOSE PRESENTING THESE DETAILS WAS TO REFUTE HANOI ALLEGATION THAT ATTACK NEVER TOOK PLACE. CONTINUED WITH FEW POINTS DRAWN FROM TALKING PAPER "DAILY RADIO BULLETIN" 217 DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE US RESOLUTION TO CONTINUE AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM, AWARENESS OF RISKS INVOLVED, AND DESIRE TO KEEP CONSEQUENCES ON LIMITED SCALE. CONCLUDED WITH ASSURANCE THAT COUNCIL WOULD BE KEPT INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ORDER PROVIDE FULL OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSULTATION.

STATEMENT WAS RECEIVED QUIETLY AND WITH LITTLE DISCUSSION. THERE WAS EVIDENT APPRECIATION OF PROMPT DISCLOSURE BASIC FACTS TO COUNCIL (NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, CANADA, AND SYG). UKIHAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT US REACTION TO UNJUSTIFIED ATTACK ON US NAVAL FORCES ON HIGH SEAS, WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH COMPLEX OF GENEVA ACCORDS.

NETHERLANDS ASKED (1) WHETHER NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD NAVAL UNITS OF ANY CONSEQUENCES IN GULF OF TON, AND (2) WHAT REASON THERE MIGHT BE FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE TO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS TACTICS ON LAND TO MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AT SEA.

BELGIUM EMPHASIZED NEED OF CONSULTATION AND HOPED FOR FURTHER INFO ON GENERAL SUBJECT.

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Authority RAC 17349
By is NARA, Date 5-18-98 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- POLTO 208, AUGUST 5, 8PM. FROM: PARIS.

CANADA SPECULATED, ON BASIS COMMENTS BY CANADIAN AMB MOSCOW, THAT ATTACKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN PROVOKED AS NOT ONLY TEST OF US FIRMNESS BUT ALSO TEST OF RUSSIANS, IN VIEW THEIR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE POLICY, TO SEE IF WOULD COME OUT STRONGLY AGAINST US ACTION; ATTACKS MIGHT ALSO BE CHINESE NEEDLE OF SOVIETS BECAUSE PRC NOT PARTICIPATING IN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE.

IN REPLY DUTCH QUESTIONS US SAID HAD NO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS, BUT DID NOT KNOW OF ANY LARGE NAVAL UNITS BELONGING TO NORTH VIETNAMESE AND DOUBTED THEY HAD ANY. POINTED OUT THAT CHINESE AND SOVIETS ARE ALWAYS TESTING WEST'S STRENGTH AND WILL, AND THAT ATTACKS PROBABLY DESIGNED TO REVEAL WHETHER WE WOULD STAND FIRM AS IN ACCORDANCE WITH RECENT STATEMENTS. ADDED THAT WE MUST REACT FORCEFULLY OR RISK LOSING SEA ALL TOGETHER.

SYG BROSIO SUMMARIZED CONVERSATION BY SAYING SITUATION MUST NOT BE DRAMATIZED, BUT PERHAPS NEW PHASE HAD BEGUN, AND WE MUST HOPE VIOLENT ACTION WILL SUBSIDE. NATO MEMBERS WOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT AND FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS WITH GREAT ATTENTION AND SPIRIT OF FRIENDLINESS TO US. IT WAS TOO SOON TO GUESS AT MOTIVATION, BUT REACTIONS IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT BE REVEALING. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT ATTACKS MIGHT BE SUBTLE EFFORT BY CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO PUT SOVIETS IN DIFFICULT POSITION ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY CANADIAN ABOVE. BROSIO ENDED BY EXPRESSING HIS APPROVAL OF PRES JOHNSON'S ACTION AS WELL AS HIS STATEMENT ON LIMITED AND FITTING RESPONSE, AND DESIRE TO SEEK NO WIDER WAR.

AFTER DISCUSSION OF WHAT MIGHT BE SAID TO PRESS, IT WAS AGREED THAT AS EXCEPTION TO GENERAL RULE THAT COUNCIL AGENDA NEVER MADE PUBLIC, IT COULD BE CONFIRMED TO NEWSPAPERS THAT US POSITION ON SEA HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO COUNCIL AT SPECIAL MEETING, BUT WITH NO COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE DISCUSSIONS.

NO DATE SET FOR ANOTHER MEETING. GP-1. DURBROW

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8/5/64, 623PM

Note: Passed White House, DOD, CIA 8/5/64, 640PM

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PROCESSING NOTE

On this date, Archives staff discovered that document #134 was missing from the file. A copy of the document was recovered from the University Publications of America microfilm and has been placed in the file.

Alexis Percle
April 21, 2014

National Security File, NSC Histories, "Presidential Decisions—Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, Volume 2, Tabs 14-17," box 38

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COURSE
 PAGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Aug 7 5 50 PM '64

ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS TOPOL 211
PIERCE ARROW
REF: POLTO 208 m.c.

80627 WETS 3-6 45-VIET-N
DE-FG 45

In reply to Dutch question NAC meeting August 5, you may inform Council members that at time of, Tonkin ~~axis~~ action North Vietnamese naval strength estimated to be: approximately 12 PT boats armed with torpedoes and light machine guns; approximately 30 motor gunboats (converted torpedo boat hulls armed with depth charges and 37 mm. and 20 mm. anti-aircraft); and various miscellaneous smaller craft.

END.

GP-4.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By 183 NARS, Date 4-22-76

RUSK

SECRET

1

RE: REM:GFR:EV 8/7/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by REM - David H. Poppo *DHP*

EUR - Capt. Freeman
G/PM - Coll. Lindjord (in subst)

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Form 05-322

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

IN RATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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135

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~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ~~XXX~~ BRUSSELS

IMMEDIATE 176

-AUG 7 1 32 AM '64

Info

EXDIS FOR HARRIMAN

Staff Summary No. 1

1. Viet-Nam - Italian Prime Min Moro told Chamber U.S. action simple act of self defense and that liberty of conspicuous number of Asian states depends on outcome this conflict and firm position U.S. Malaysian Premier has sent message to President wholeheartedly endorsing U.S. action as necessary if peace is to be restored in SEA. UK and Australian Embassies in Paris have detected Quai skepticism over accuracy U.S. sources, feeling U.S. has taken advantage DRV error, and belief Chinese taken by surprise by DRV action. Senior Quai official told UK Emboff Quai experienced considerable difficulty persuading deGualle not to issue statement critical of U.S. action.

2. Cyprus - Replying to Stikker Plan proposals Greek rep told informal group NATO reps GOG doing all it can to reach agreement at Geneva, can only give assurance on avoidance of hostilities if Turkey renounces intervention, unable as yet to respond to

Drafted by:

S/S-O Norman Getsinger

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/S-O N. C. McManus

Clearances:

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~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM 8-63 DS-322

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Authority RAC 000 14839
By ic/ly, NARA, Date 5-2-74

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Classification

proposes UN controls on importation arms and men, and regards ~~XXXXXX~~ reduction existing forces under UN control as impracticable and dangerous. Following presentation group decided that despite negative replies Greek and Turk reps, NATO efforts should continue.

Makarios message to SYG promises UNFICYP full freedom of movement except certain localities connected with defense where access possible after consultation between GOC and UNFICYP Commander. Gen Thimayya expects have UN post on Limassol docks.

3. Laos - Petty family feuding in coup atmosphere during night of August 4-5 appears temporarily at end. Primin's office statement Aug 6 said Phoumi and generals called on Primin after his return from Luang Prabang, told him of peaceful settlement of misunderstanding and renewed their unswerving devotion to head of government.

According French Mil Att, after visit to Khang Khay, Russian Mil Att reported PL morale very low as result T-28 strikes and PL feared other military moyes by RKG forces.

END

~~XXXX~~

GP-1

~~SECRET~~
Classification

POL 21 VIET
XR POL 22-14 VIETS

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

136

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action PP RUDTLN RUEHCR RUEHDT RUEHOT RUSBAE
 DE RUMJIR 10A 07/0900Z
 SVN P R 070859Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
 SS RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY SNEWDELHI
 G RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 SP RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK
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1964 AUG 7 AM 7 13

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ACTION PRITY DEPT (334) INFO LONDON 25 MOSCOW 6 NEWDELHI 10
 OTTAWA 7 WARSAW 8 USUN 32 FROM SAIGON AUG 7, 5:05 PM

CANADIAN ICC COMMISSIONER SEABORN AND POLAD HATHEWAY HAVE
 INFORMD EMBASSY OF FOLLOWING:

CABLE BEING SENT PAVN LIAISON MISSION HANOI WITH UNANIMOUS
 AGREEMENT ICC MEMBERS ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: ICC TAKES
 NOTE REPORTS SERIOUS EVENTS INCLUDING ARMED ATTACK IN BAY OF
 TONKIN AND TERRITORY OF DRV.
 CFN 334 25 6 10 7 8 32 8 6

RMR

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 10 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN EXPRESSING ITS CONCERN AT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND IN ORDER
 TO CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENING OF TENSION, ICC WISHES COMMUNICATE
 ITS IMMEDIATE READINESS TO GIVE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE WITHIN
 ITS POWER, AND IN LIGHT OF ANY INFO WHICH PAVN LIAISON MISSION
 MAY WISH TO FURNISH.
 CANADIANS ALSO CLARIFIED TO EMBOFF STATUS POSSIBLE ICC INVESTIGATION
 PAVN ALLEGATIONS THAT TWO ISLANDS OFF COASTINGHE AN PROVINCE
 WERE SHELLED BY US/GVN SHIPS JULY 30. (EMBTTEL 295) ON AUGUST
 4 MESSAGE SENT WITH UNANIMOUS CONSENT OF COMMISSION TO PAVN
 MISSION HANOI REFERRING TO THESE PAVN CHARGES AND PROPOSING
 IMMEDIATE ON-THE-SPOT INVESTIGATION BY ICC TEAM. ACCEPTANCE
 INVESTIGATION NOW UP TO PAVN WHICH CAN REQUEST IT FROM FIXED
 TEAM WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO COMMISSION. TAYLOR
 BT
 CFN 336295

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 7:52 AM, 8/7/64/
 PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 8:50 AM, 8/7/64.

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 Authority RAC00014816
 By 102/14 NARA, Date 4-2-14

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~~POL 27-14 VIET N~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Control: 8038
Rec'd: AUGUST 10, 1954
9:42 P.M.

FROM: NEW DELHI
ACTION: SECSTATE 459
INFO: SAIGON 13
VIENTIANE 11
LONDON 157
OTTAWA 7
WARSAW 5
MOSCOW 32

DATE: AUGUST 10, 8 P.M.

MEA WESTERN DIVISION DIRECTOR SANYAL TOLD EMBOFF TODAY THAT
GOI INSTRUCTIONS TO ICC CHAIRMAN RAHMAN IN SAIGON ON DRV COM-
PLAINT HAD BEEN DEBATED AT LENGTH OVER WEEKEND WITH DECISION
FINALLY REACHED TO TELL RAHMAN TO TAKE POSITION THAT ICC DID
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT

~~POL 27 VIET S~~
~~7R POL 33-6 US-VIET N~~
~~POL 27-14 VIET N~~

NEA - aircrew

62

DELETED
XGDS-1

SANITIZED
Authority State ltr. 6/1/78
By lhuv, NARS, Date 8/8/78

GP-3.

BOWLES

DLW



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(3)

Processed by RMR

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

IN DATE: COLLECT
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Classification

01517

139

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BANGKOK FLASH *175*

Aug-4 10 32 PM '64

Info

INFO: CINCPAC PRIORITY

EXDIS-PIERCE ARROW
FOR AMBASSADOR.

Re Deptel 171 sent NODIS

You should request immediate convocation of SEATO Council

Representatives to advise them of North Viet-Nam's deliberate attacks on
of

American naval vessels operating on high seas and ~~on~~ actions taken to

meet this situation. Text Presidential message and Pentagon announcement
and via USIS wireless file, respectively,
sent you septel/should be used for this purpose.

GP-3.

End.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr. 6/1/78
By Chw, NARS, Date 8/8/78

RUSK

Drafted by:

JAM
FE:RA:JAMendenhall:mk 8/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

6013
FE: Marshall Green

Clearances:

SEA - Mr. Trueheart (draft) *JAM*
S/S - Mr. Hilliker *AD*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

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FORM DS-322
8-63

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Action

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Info

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FE 140

MNNZCZCJJA618
00 RUEHCR
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

002848

1964 AUG 5 AM 7 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (141) INFO
IMMEDIATE CINCPAC UNN FROM BANGKOK AUG 5, 5 PM

EXDIS - PIERCE ARROW

DEPTEL 175

1. AT SPECIAL MEETING SEATO COUNCIL REPS, CONVENED AT MY REQUEST 1430 LOCAL TIME AUG 5, I DESCRIBED SITUATION, READING TEXTS US PROTEST NOTE TO NORTH VIETNAM, PENTAGON ANNOUNCEMENT, PRESIDENT'S RADIO/TV STATEMENT AND PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SEATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. (WITH CAUTION LAST MESSAGE REMAINED CLASSIFIED UNTIL RELEASED BY ADDRESSEES).
CFN 141 5 5 175 1. 1430.5

PAGE TWO RUMTBK 092K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. BRITISH COUNCIL REP (MACDERMOT) EXPRESSED INABILITY ASSESS DRV MOTIVES UNDERLYING SUCH "STUPID ACTION, WHICH PUT THEM ENTIRELY IN WRONG AND US ENTIRELY IN RIGHT". FRENCH REP (CLARAC) SPECULATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTION INSTIGATED BY COMMUNIST CHINESE IN ATTEMPT FORCE USSR SIDE PUBLICLY WITH CHICOMS, NOTING USSR FORCED FACE UP TO THIS PROBLEM IN SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS.

3. MOST COUNCIL REPS EXPRESSED PRIVATELY THEIR SATISFACTION AMERICAN ACTION.

GP-3.

MARTIN
CFN 2. 3. GP-3.
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-D AT 7:23 AM, AUGUST 5.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, AT 8:25 AM, AUGUST 5.

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SEA	CONFIDENTIAL	SEA	File
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION		
SEA [Signature]	8-5		
OFFICE SYMBOL			

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec 3.4

NARA Date 4-3-14

By: H

36

POL 33-6 US-VIET N
141

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

38

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Action

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUMTBK 198K 10/1155Z
P 101150Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

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Authority: State ltr 4/1/78
By: khw, NARS, Date 8/8/78

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY 170 AUGUST 10, 64

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FOR USE RESTRICTED SESSION COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES MEETING AUGUST 13 WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT 1) DRV MOTIVATION FOR ATTACKS ON US VESSELS AND 2) CURRENT AND EXPECTED DRV AND CPR REACTION TO PIERCE ARROW.

GP-3
MARTIN
CFN 170 10 6 234 13 1) 2) GP-3
BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 10:40 A.M., 8/10/64;
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 9:50 A.M., 8/10/64.

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