

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 11, 2014

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 1

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
071a	cable	CINCPAC 100056Z - sanitized, 5/2012 dup., #5a NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Volume 28," Box 13	TS	1	[2/10/65]	A
71	cable	CINCPAC 050305Z dup., #5, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Volume 28," Box 13	TS	3	[2/10/65]	A
86	memo	to McGeorge Bundy - sanitized, 5/98 dup., #210, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Volume 28," box 13	S	3	2/12/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, NSC Histories**Folder Title** "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 1"**Box Number** 40

Restriction Codes

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Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 report	NSC top secret <i>open 8-4-81 if</i> Deployment of Major Forces to Vietnam 4 p	1965	A
#2 List	NSC top secret <i>original 8-4-81 if</i> Troop Deployment of US Forces <i>Open NLJ 98-25842 p 4-21-99</i>	1965	A
#77 memo	NSC secret <i>open 4-11-94</i> to Bundy from Cooper 2 p (duplicates #213 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 28)	02/11/65	A
#127 memo	NSC top secret 4 p decisions made by president with respect to Vietnam	04/05/65	A
		<i>open 8-4-81 if</i>	

52

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 1

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2 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#14 cable	<i>State 10-11-78 letter</i> state secret (gp 2) 1477 to Saigon	5 p	01/14/65 A
cable	state secret		
#16b	from Saigon 2159	1 p	01/15/65 A
#24 cable	state secret 2322 from Saigon	2 p	01/27/65 A
#26 cable	state secret (gp 1) 1548 to Saigon	2 p	01/27/65 A
#26a cable	state secret (gp 1) 2322 to Saigon response (duplicates #26)	2 p	01/27/65 A
#35 cable	state secret 2365 from Saigon	4 p	02/01/65 A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#75 cable	state secret (gp 3) 1676 to Saigon	1 p	02/10/65 A
#94 cable	state conf <i>sanitized open 4-11-14</i> 2542 to Saigon	1 p	02/13/65 A
#96 cable	state conf <i>sanitized open 4-11-14</i> 2543 from Saigon	2p	02/13/65 A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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3 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#8 cable	state top secret <i>open 1-29-80 ing</i> 2052 from Saigon 27 p	01/06/64	A
#10 cable	state top secret (gp 1) <i>open 5-27-81</i> 1419 to Saigon 4p	01/07/65	A
cable	state top secret <i>open 1-29-80 ing</i> #16a 2163 from Saigon 2 p	01/15/65	A
#18 cable	state top secret (gp 2) " 1509 to Saigon 4 p	12/21/65	A
#31a cable	state top secret " 1566 to Saigon 1 p	01/29/65	A
#41 report	state top secret <i>open 9/27/01 NLS 01-147</i> re: Vietnam <i>open 6-11-84 Sanitized State 7/9/74</i> (duplicates #112 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 27) 4 DOD 8/18/74 p	02/06/65	A
cable	state top secret <i>open 4-11-74</i> #82 2445 from Saigon 4 p	02/09/65	A
	(duplicates #104 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 28)		
cable	state top secret <i>open 1-29-80 ing</i> #84 2466 from Saigon 2 p	02/10/65	A
#88 cable	state top secret " 2530 from Saigon 3 p	02/12/65	A
#126 memo	Ball to President top secret 16 p	N.D.	A
open 7-23-86 NLS 83-76	State to McBundy from Ball <i>Sanitized 7-23-86 NLS 85-76</i> 16 p	02/13/65	A
#92 memo	state top secret <i>Sanitized</i> to McBundy from Ball (duplicates #207 and 207a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 28)		
#98 cable	state top secret <i>open 1-29-80 ing</i> 2552 from Saigon 1 p	02/13/65	A
#100 cable	state top secret (gp 1) <i>open 5-27-81 ing</i> 1718 to Saigon 5 p	02/13/65	A
#102 cable	state top secret <i>open 1-29-80 ing</i> 2583 from Saigon 3 p	02/14/65	A
#104 cable	state top secret (gp 1) " 1724 to Saigon 2 p	02/14/65	A

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4 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#106 cable	State top secret <i>open 1-25-80 ing</i> # 2588 from Saigon 3 p	02/15/65	A
#108 cable	state top secret " 2602 from Saigon 3 p	02/15/65	A
#			
#114 cable	state top secret (gp 1) " 5147 to Langham London 3 p	02/16/65	A
#114a cable	state top secret " draft #5147 to London 3 p	02/16/65	A
#12 cable	state top secret <i>SANITIZED STATE 1/2 7/79</i> 2116 from Saigon <i>open 4-11-79</i> 10 p	01/11/65	A

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





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5 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#20 cable	OSD top secret <i>OSD 10-18-78</i> for Amb. in Saigon 2 p	01/25/65	A
#71 cable	OSD top secret (gp 1) MAC J5 3404 3 p (duplicates #5 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 28)	undated	A
#71a cable	OSD top secret (gp 1) FM CINCPAC to RUMSMA/COMUSMACV 1 p (duplicates #5a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 28)	undated	A
	  <i>sanitized per AC 5/12 4-18-14</i>    		
#118 cable	OSD top secret (gp 3) <i>OSD 10-18-78</i> MAC J5 4614 2 p	undated	A
#124 cable	OSD top secret (gp 1) <i>OSD 10-18-78</i> MACJ3 4999 3 p	undated	A
#125 memo	OSD top secret <i>OSD 10-18-78</i> to president from McNamara 1 p	09/01/65	A
#126 memo	OSD top secret <i>OSD 10-18-78</i> to president from McNamara 2 p	09/22/65	A

16

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National Security File, NSC History
Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Vol. 1

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
██████████	Decisions per State 5-7-79 + OSD 6-19-78	██████████	██████████
#67 memo	OSD secret re: missile equipment <i>again 6-26-79 ins</i> 1 p	02/10/65	A
#69 chart	OSD conf costs and casualties in So. Vietnam 1 p	02/10/65	A
#128 memo	OSD conf to president from McNamara 3 p	04/26/65	A
#129b memo	OSD conf to president from McNamara <i>sanitizing</i> 6 p <i>open 5/4/98</i>	07/28/65	A

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7 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#90 cable	JCS top secret (gp 1) <i>Sanitized</i> 10-17-78 #005147 6 p <i>open 4-11-14</i>	02/12/65	A

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Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 1

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8 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO CIA FOR C ONSULTATION		
#39 memo	WH top secret <i>apron 4-11-64</i> to president from Smith 1 p (duplicates #108 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 27)	02/04/65	A
#86 memo	WH secret to McG. Bundy from Klein 3 p (duplicates #210 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 28) <i>sanitized, 4-11-64</i>	02/12/65	A

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9 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	78-583		
	TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONSULTATION		
#4 cable	WH top secret <i>open 9-2-80 ip</i> fr WH to EmbSaigon, 64375	4 p 12/30/64	A
#10a cable	WH top secret " to Amb. Taylor from president	4 p 01/07/65	A
#10c cable	WH top secret " to Amb. Taylor from the president	5 p 01/07/65	A
#14a cable	WH secret " for Amb. from president	3 p 01/13/65	A
#22 memo	WH secret " to president from McG. Bundy	2 p 01/27/65	A
#28 cable	WH top secret (gp 1) " 1549 to Saigon	3 p 01/27/65	A
#28a memo	WH top secret " to president from McG. B.	1 p 01/27/65	A
#28b memo	WH top secret " for amb. from president	3 p 01/27/65	A
#30 cable	WH top secret " for Gen. Taylor from McG. Bundy	3p 01/28/65	A
#30a cable	WH top secret " for Amb. Taylor from president	2 p 01/28/65	A
	██████████	██████████	██████████
#37a	draft for #37 <i>open 9-9-85 NLJ85-77</i>	9 p	A
#37 cable	WH top secret (gp 1) 1581 to Saigon <i>open 9-9-85 NLJ85-77</i> (duplicates #48 in NSF, IM&T, Bundy-Saigon, Vol. 2)	4 p 4 p 02/01/65	A
	██████████	██████████	██████████
#63 cable	WH top secret (gp 1) <i>open 9-2-80 ip</i> 1653 to Saigon	2 p 02/08/65	A
#65 memo	WH conf " to president from McG. Bundy	2 p 02/09/65	A

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10 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#83 cable	TO STATE DEPT. WH top secret (gp 1) <i>open 9-2-80 ip</i> 1653 to Saigon (duplicates #63) 2 p	02/08/65	A
#112a memo	WH top secret <i>open 9-2-80 ip</i> to president from McG. B. 4 p	02/16/65	A
#116 memo	WH secret <i>Open 1/22/85</i> to president from McG. B. 3 p (duplicates #204 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 28)	02/16/65	A

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Authority NSC 7-1-81 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 8-4-81

SUBJECT: Deployment of Major Forces to Vietnam -- July, 1965
(Note: The Department of Defense classified history of Vietnam has been sent with the President's papers to Austin.)

1. The Announcement of the Decision -- Opening a press conference on July 28, 1965, President Johnson said: "...I have asked the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs. I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments. After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. " (Tab 427)

2. The Decision -- President Johnson formally reached his decision on the troop deployment following an afternoon National Security Council meeting, the day previous, July 27. All attending that meeting recommended to the President the course of action he adopted. (Tab 426) That discussion was based on Secretary McNamara's Plan III (Tab 412, page 3).

In concluding the meeting the President summarized his views as follows:

The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating even though we now have 80 to 90,000 men there.

We have these choices:

- a. Use our massive power, including SAC, to bring the enemy to his knees. Less than 10% of our people urge this course of action.

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-2-

b. We could get out on the grounds that we don't belong there. Not very many people feel this way about Vietnam. Most feel that our national honor is at stake and that we must keep our commitments there.

c. We could keep our forces at the present level, approximately 80,000 men, but suffer the consequences of losing additional territory and of accepting increased casualties. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No one is recommending this course.

d. We could ask for everything we might desire from Congress -- money, authority to call up the reserves, acceptance of the deployment of more combat battalions. This dramatic course of action would involve declaring a state of emergency and a request for several billion dollars. Many favor this course. However, if we do go all out in this fashion, Hanoi would be able to ask the Chinese Communists and the Soviets to increase aid and add to their existing commitments.

e. We have chosen to do what is necessary to meet the present situation, but not to be unnecessarily provocative to either the Russians or the Communist Chinese. We will give the commanders the men they say they need and, out of existing materiel in the U.S., we will give them the materiel they say they need. We will get the necessary money in the new budget and will use our transfer authority until January. We will neither brag about what we are doing or thunder at the Chinese Communists and the Russians.

This course of action will keep us there during the critical monsoon season and possibly result in some gains. Meanwhile, we will push on the diplomatic side. This means that we will use up our manpower reserves. We will not deplete them, but there will be a substantial reduction. Quietly, we will push up the level of our reserve force. We will let Congress push us but, if necessary, we will call the legislators back.

We will hold until January. The alternatives are to put in our big stack now or hold back until Ambassadors Lodge and Goldberg and the diplomats can work. (Tab 426)

3. Discussion of the Alternatives -- The crucial discussion of U.S. troop deployments took place during meetings in the Cabinet Room on July 21. A preparatory meeting without the President took place at

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-3-

10:30. The meeting with the President was at 11:30. Under Secretary of State Ball, who dissented from the McNamara recommendations, was asked to state his case at an afternoon meeting. The group reassembled with the President at 2:30, listened to the "Ball Alternative", and debated the issues until 5:30 p.m. (Tab 407)

4. Background Leading up to the Decision -- The deployment decision grew out of developments during the first nine months of 1965. 7

a. 'U.S. forces in Vietnam totaled 23, 000 on January 1, 1965.

b. Ambassador Taylor, in a full analysis of the situation dated January 6, concluded that "we are presently on a losing track and must risk a change. ... To take no positive action now is to accept defeat in the fairly near future." The Ambassador was still of the opinion that the U.S. should not get into "this guerrilla conflict" with our ground units because such action would be more than offset by the resulting political liability. (Tab 3)

c. In late January, Secretary McNamara and McGeorge Bundy became "pretty well convinced" that our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat. President Johnson sent Mr. Bundy to Saigon to assess the situation. (Tab 10) His pessimistic report concluded by recommending a policy of "sustained reprisal". (Tab 22)

d. President Johnson on February 8 and on February 13 approved with modifications the December plan (Phase Two) for continuing action against North Vietnam on the basis of evacuation of U.S. dependents and the best government we can get in Vietnam. (Tabs 31 and 48)

e. Two Marine landing teams were approved for deployment to Danang on February 25, in a worsening security situation. (Tabs 60 and 88)

f. The measures taken did not arrest the deterioration in Vietnam and Army Chief of Staff General Johnson was sent to Saigon. Policy recommendations were made by him, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Bundy, and the Joint Chiefs. (Tab 100)

g. Ambassador Taylor, in a cable dated March 16, favored additions to the Marine Battalion but recommended against introducing a combat division. (Tab 109)

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

h. At the end of March, Ambassador Taylor came to Washington to discuss deployments ranging as high as a three-division force. (Tabs 127 and 132)

i. In April, two additional Marine battalions and an 18-20,000 man increase in U.S. support forces was authorized. (Tab 142)

j. Following a conference with military officers in Honolulu on April 20, Secretary McNamara recommended additional deployments calling for a total strength of 82,000, including 13 combat *battalions* ~~divisions~~, to meet the still deteriorating situation. (Tab 200)

k. In June, Saigon was informed that General Westmoreland had authority to authorize commitment of U.S. ground forces to action in combat support on the basis of operational coordination and cooperation with South Vietnamese forces. (Tab 265)

l. On June 7, General Westmoreland reviewed his need for additional U.S. troops. (Tab 269) The Chiefs of Staff made their recommendation on June 11. (Tab 291) (Note: Current U.S. strengths in country are given at Tab 288)

m. Secretary McNamara announced on June 16 the decision to deploy 15 battalions, bringing the total U.S. strength to 70-75,000. (Tab 301) (A full breakdown of the numbers is at Tab 320)

n. Planning for the deployment of the Air Mobile Division was begun in mid-June. (Tab 323)

o. General Ky told Ambassador Taylor on June 28 that the South Vietnamese needed additional U.S. ground combat forces. (Tab 347)

p. Recommendations as to further deployments were discussed with the President on July 1. (Tab 372)

q. Secretary McNamara went to Saigon to discuss troop deployments on July 8. (Tab 378) His report and recommendations were given to the President on July 20, calling for the deployment of 34 battalions or 43 battalions, if the Koreans fail to provide 9 battalions. On the basis of these recommendations, the President's decision was made. (Tab 396)

Browder Smith

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TROOP DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-258

2
Tab

	<u>Date</u>			
964	Dec. 3	TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: President	By <u>us</u> , NARA Date <u>4-21-77</u>	1
		Recommend against reprisal for the Brink bombing.		
965	Jan. 4	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy		2
		Views on Sol Sanders article in U.S. News and World Review, "Can U.S. Win in Vietnam ? An Inside Report"		
		Bundy comments on too much staff in VN, too much administration, rotation, etc., not enough action and speaks of McNamara's views on escalation.		
	Jan 6	TO: President FROM: Amb. Taylor		3
		Evaluation of present situation in SVN, causes of troubles, and what can be done.		
	Jan. 7	TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: President		4
		Reprisal policy, removal of dependents		
	Jan 11	TO: President FROM: Amb Taylor		5
		Deteriorating situation requires prompt action, stimulate pacification, raise public morale. Prompt passage into Phase II.		
	Jan 14	TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: Sec. Rusk		6
		Dependents to be withdrawn in near future prior to initiation of possible reprisals.		
	Jan 16	TO: Sec Rusk FROM: Amb. Taylor		7
		Agencies examining situation of rotation, evacuation of dependents.		
	Jan 21	TO: Amb Taylor FROM: Sec Rusk		8
		Points raised because of evacuation of dependents--alarm to the South Vietnamese--morale of employees.		
	Jan 25	Draft of msg to Amb. Taylor FROM: J. McNaughton		9
		Want to get on with evacuation of US dependents. Strong desire to avoid increasing number of US personnel in SVN--you have made request for 6000 additional military personnel.		
	Jan 27	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy		10
		Basic Policy in Vietnam---McNamara and I wish meeting with President and want to express our feelings on present policy.		
	Jan 27	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor		11
		Overthrow of Prime Minister Huong through alliance between Khan and Buddhist Institute Leadership.		

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-2-

Jan 27	TO: EmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk Mtg. of highest levels today concurred we should proceed immediately with evacuation.	12
Jan. 27	TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: President Dependents being removed from Saigon. Approval of McGeorge Bundy going to Saigon.	13
Jan. 28	TO: Amb Taylor FROM: McGeorge Bundy General Khanh is the principal present power. Details of McGeorge Bundy trip.	14
Jan 29	Embassy, Saigon FROM: George Ball Hold off informing Khanh of DESOTO.	15
Jan 30	TO: Amb Taylor FROM: McGeorge Bundy Re: Vietnam visit.	16
Feb. 1	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor Out meeting will include following topics: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Progress of struggle against Viet Cong- Stability of government- Extension of war beyond SVN- Other possible new courses of action- Evacuation of dependents- Third country programs- Shape of U.S. negotiating position- Contingency planning against unpleasant political or military developments	17
Feb. 1	TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: McGeorge Bundy Washington views on above-mentioned topics	18
Feb. 4	TO: President FROM: Bromley Smith Dir. McCone sent summary of President's discussion with him to McGeorge Bundy in Saigon. Bundy replied regarding prevention of continued deterioration in absence of "reasonably effective and stable government."	19
Feb. 6	" Graduated Reprisal Program to Stop DRV Intervention in SVN" (a suggested scenario) (AmEmb - Saigon)	20
Feb 7	Statement by the President "Following meetings with the National Security Council, I have directed the orderly withdrawal of American dependents from South Vietnam".	21

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-3-

Feb 7	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Memo describing situation, the stakes and the measures which McGeorge Bundy thinks should now be taken in Vietnam	22
Feb. 7	TO: McNamara and Vance FROM: McNaughton Theory of a graduated reprisal program discussed here (VN) at length by Bundy group.	23
Feb. 7	TO: Multiple addressee FROM: State One of four installations hit by U.S. aircraft.	24
Feb 7	TO: All Posts (minus 9) FROM: George Ball Attack of certain military targets.	25
Feb 7	TO: EmbSaigon FROM: George Ball Elements of U.S. and VN Air Force attacked four barracks and staging areas in southern NVN used for training and infiltration of VC personnel into SVN.	26
Feb. 7	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor Call on Acting Prime Minister Oanh at his residence. Discussed possible GVN/US reprisals against DRV targets.	27
Feb. 7	Circular Telegram FROM: Ball Presidential announcement: "Following meetings with National Security Council, I have directed the orderly withdrawal of American dependents from SVN."	28
Feb. 8	TO: General Westmoreland FROM: J. McNaughton Recent Physical Evidence of North Vietnam involvement in VC Insurgency	29
Feb. 8	Background Briefing at White House, George Reedy and McG. Bundy Mr. Bundy reported on his Vietnam trip.	30
Feb 8	TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: President Am now prepared to go forward with the best government we can get.	31
Feb. 9	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Received 1,500 telegrams concerning our action in Vietnam. This is a medium to heavy flow. They are running 12 to 1 against the Government action.	32
Feb. 10	Memo for the record Delivery of Surface-to-Air Missile equipment to NVN.	33

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

Feb 10	U.S. costs and casualties in South Vietnam	34
Feb 10	TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV MACV is preparing plan for possible reprisal air strike against DRV targets below 18 deg N. latitude	35
Feb 10	TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV Set up of military pressures against DRV	36
Feb 10	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: White House Decision taken proceed forthwith with reprisals proposed.	37
Feb 11	TO: Bundy FROM: Chet Cooper Tasks ahead on various facets of new approach to Vietnam; Projects in train; Projects which should be set in motion.	38
Feb 11	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Message to Pope Paul that trouble in Southeast Asia stems from persistent and ferocious aggression of Communists directed from Vietnam.	39
Feb 11	TO: The President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Two cables from Maxwell Taylor (1) basic recommendation for reprisal program; (2) his weekly report.	40
Feb 12	TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: David Klein The Soviet Side of Vietnam. Kosygin trip to Vietnam.	41
Feb 12	TO: SecState FROM: AmEmbSaigon Reprisals, we feel, should have following objectives in order of importance (1) the will of Hanoi leaders (2) GVN morale (3) physical damage to installations having some bearing on DRV ability to support Viet Cong.	42
Feb 12	TO: CINCPAC FROM: JCS Courses of action in Southeast Asia, first eight weeks.	43
Feb 13	TO: President FROM: George Ball (1) Discussion of probable risks inherent in program of gradually mounting military pressure on the North and (2) program of political action.	44
Feb 13	TO: SecState FROM: AmEmbSaigon Canadians have said there are rumors to the effect of a possible move by Chinese Communist troops into North Vietnam. Have seen no indications or reflections so far.	45

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-5-

Feb 13	TO: SecState FROM: AmEmbSaigon	46
	DRV propaganda machine has gained momentum. Widespread demonstrations by mass organizations, professional and educational institutions taking place. (Canadian source)	
Feb 13	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor	47
	Approval not yet received for deployment of tailored US military police battalion recommended by MACV.	
Feb 13	TO: AmbSaigon FROM: George Ball	48
	President approved: (1) intensification of pacification program in South Vietnam; (2) measured and limited air action jointly with GVN against DRV; (3) policy of measured action and will go to UN Security Council to make clear case that aggressor is Hanoi.	
Feb 14	TO: Amb Johnson FROM: Amb Taylor	49
	Will implement above (states some problems)	
Feb 14	TO: AmEmb Saigon FROM: George Ball	50
	Avoid leaks. Do not discuss text Presidential announcement. May state strikes would be jointly planned and agreed.	
Feb 15	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor	51
	Re: Presidential announcement, I welcome decision for US to take initiative in bringing question into UNSC	
Feb 15	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor	52
	Had meeting with Acting PM Oanh, Gen. Khanh and Gen. Thieu to obtain GVN agreement to U.S. program.	
Feb. 16	Wash. Post article on Gallup Poll figures on "VN Air Strikes get 67% U.S. Approval."	53
Feb. 16	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy	54
	Draft telegram to Taylor and a proposed one to Bruce for his discussions with Wilson on our exact position in Vietnam.	
Feb. 16	TO: Amb Bruce FROM: Sec Rusk	55
	For guidance in talking with Wilson--recommendations in air and naval action against NVN.	
Feb. 16	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy	56
	Some personal thoughts on Feb. 15 Vietnam decision.	
Feb. 16	TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV (: (for Adm. Sharp from Westmoreland)	57
	Concur JCS estimate DRV/CHICOM/USSR reaction. Question of relationship of deployments of US forces and philosophy of gradual reprisal program not too clear.	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-6-

Feb. 16 TO: CINCPAC FROM: JCS 58
Security situation in SVN--request by JCS of CINCPAC and MACV views on security in SVN with recommendations of possible force deployments to areas regarded as most vulnerable.

Feb 16 TO: SecRusk FROM: James L. Greenfield 59
The need for a public statement on Vietnam.

Feb 17 TO: JCS FROM: COMUSMACV 60
Security situation in SVN considered worsening. Purely military considerations and MACV operational requirements dictate following selection and priority of areas as objectives for future deployment of US combat forces

Feb 17 TO: JCS FROM: CINCPAC 61
Security situation in RVN

Feb 17 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Rusk 62
British Ambassador has informed us they have been approached by Soviet Foreign Office on UK-USSR co-chairmanship of 1954 Conference.

Feb 19 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 63
In view of events in Saigon this afternoon, I recommend cancellation of air operations against DRV scheduled for February 20. Gen. Westmoreland concurs.

Feb. 19 TO: Amb Taylor FROM: Sec Rusk 64
Your recommendation accepted and air operations scheduled for Feb. 20 cancelled.

Feb 19 TO: McG Bundy FROM: James C. Thomson 65
The Vietnam Crisis--One Dove's Lament

Feb 19 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 66
Comments on Vietnam for your newspaper visitor. "There is no secret and will be no secret about our policy. And nobody wants a peaceful settlement more than we do."

Feb. 19 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 67
Your meeting with Couve de Murville at 11:30 this morning.

Feb. 20 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 68
Recommend we carry next reprisal strikes on DRV during daylight Monday, February 22. Gen. Westmoreland concurs.

Feb. 20 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 69
Next operation should be ASAP. British conferring with Soviets.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 7 -

Feb 20 TO: AmEmbSeoul, Taipei, Manila, Vientiane FROM: Sec Rusk 70
Instructions of earlier telegram should now be carried out.

Feb 20 TO: AmEmbCanberra FROM: SecRusk 71
Informed Waller we prepared enter immediate staff talks to consider contingency plans for possible introduction significant ground forces northern SVN for security or pre-emptive purposes.

Feb 22 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 72
Recommend setting Feb. 24 as day for next strike.

Feb 22 TO: JCS FROM: Amb. Taylor 73
Gen. Westmoreland and I agree there is no need to consider deployment to SVN at this time except possibly for protection of airfield at Danang.

Feb 22 TO: JCS FROM: Amb Taylor 74
Analysis of pros and cons of placing any considerable number of marines in Danang area.

Feb 22 TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV (Gen. Westmoreland) 75
Not yet made personal reconnaissance of Danang area to study situation for deployment.

Feb 23 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 76
Seacoord met Saigon Feb 22, 23. Ambs. Taylor, Martin and Sullivan gave appraisals of general situation in their respective countries. U.S. Air Operations in and over Laos--Discussion of problems inherent in overflight of Laos by US/VNAF aircraft en route to targets in DRV. Use of Thailand bases to launch U.S. reprisal strikes against DRV. Discussion of possible increased logistics requirement in Muong Soui/PDJ -- Possible use of Udorn for some Oplan 34-A Air Ops -- US/Thai command relations implications if US forces category 3 and 4 of Plan-37 introduced into Thailand.

Feb 23 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 77
Noted that Project 22, bilateral Thai/US plan for defense across Mekong, when it is completed, may provide a rationale for temporary U.S. deployments. Discussion of vital installations in Thailand.

Feb 23 TO: President FROM: Amb Taylor 78
Views on new government, Commander-in-Chief, etc.

Feb. 23 TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV 79
Deployment of MEB to Danang.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-8-

Feb 23 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 80
Consensus of discussions in Seacoord meeting on DRV

Feb 23 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Rusk 81
Believe next strike should take place Feb 26

Feb 23 TO: President FROM: Sec Rusk 82
Att is paper on Vietnam from which Sec. Rusk spoke to the Pres---
Stable and unified govt. in SVN -- Increased efforts by the SVN --
US effort in SVN -- Strikes into NVN -- Political possibilities --
Reiteration of policy.

Feb 24 TO: JCS FROM: CINCPAC 83
Deployment of MEB to Danang. COMUSMACV concurred with JCS
recommendation.

Feb 24 TO: AmEmbLondon FROM: Rusk 84
Decided to go ahead with next operation Feb 26 unless there is
further political difficulty in Saigon.

Feb 25 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 85
Proposed establishment of a US naval base at Cam Ranh Bay.

Feb 25 TO: Multiple Addressees FROM: Sec Rusk 86
Probable text joint GVN/US announcement expected about 0200
Washington time Feb 26 -- "Republic of VN and US aircraft
today took further action against two coastal military instal-
lations"

Feb 26 TO: SecState FROM: Llewellyn Thompson 87
Kosygin's TV address

Feb 26 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 88
Decided to proceed to land at once MEB command and control
element, surface BLT, and one helicopter squadron.

Feb 27 TO: CINCPAC (Adm Sharp and Gen Wheeler) FROM: Westmoreland 89
Strength, armament and professionalism and activity of VC have
increased.

Feb 28 TO: SecState FROM: Saigon 90
Have decided to proceed. Will ask appointment with Quat at first
opportunity and raise matter of our concern over security of
Danang airfield and environs.

Feb 28 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 91
Weather reports again force postponement Rolling Thunder V
from March 1 to March 2. High level meeting Feb 26 produced no
decisions other than Marine deployment.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-9-

Mar 2 TO: AmEmbWellington FROM: Sec Rusk 92
Following invite to GOA to participate in contingency planning at CINCPAC on possible introduction ground forces into SVN and COA affirmative response, GNZ reconsidered and did accept.

Mar 2 TO: SecState FROM: Kohler in Moscow 93
Considering Kosygin's remarks to Indian Ambassador, Lapin's comments to me, and Kosygin's TV report, have concluded -- Soviets will make noises but not take decisive action in response to specific retaliatory strikes in Southern areas DRV. Sov military aid program in DRV is probably defensive in nature. Seems to be no possibility of change in present hard Sov posture. Major factor underlying Soviet position is conviction that in Vietnam situation we are almost alone among allies. Soviet failure move toward negotiations on any basis conceivably acceptable to USG also reflects DRV and CPR posture and Moscow's unwillingness control of territory they now hold. Major Soviet dilemma -- imperatives of commitment and position in Communist world vs. interest in developing relations with US and west.

Mar 3 TO: Sec State FROM: Amb T ylor 94
Gen. Westmoreland commenting separately on many military advantages in adhering to plan for introducing marine units into Danang rather than alternate indicated.

Mar 3 TO: President FROM: Amb Taylor 95
If we intend to move ahead with plans for international combat force in northern SVN, we keep SVN in step with us. Not good if SVN learns of such discussions from press, etc.

Mar 3 TO: President FROM: Amb Taylor 96
In meeting with PM Quat this morning, raised question of premature announcement of strike by Radio Saigon. He suspects Gen. Ky is responsible. PM Quat commented on rumors that US was behind Feb 19 coup and another coup is expected March 12.

Mar 3 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 97
Idea of international combat force in northern SVN is entirely in contingency planning stage and so understood by GOA and GVN. Have stressed to both that talks should be in low key and without publicity.

Mar 3 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 98
Highest authority continues to be gravely concerned by speed and completeness of public knowledge of operational details of military missions in Laos and NVN. If reporters persist in seeking out details, suggest you place environs of airfields off limits to unauthorized US citizens.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mar 4 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: William Bundy 99
Discrepancy in definition of mission was taken up with Minister Renouf today. Mission for international force included both security in northern part of SVN as well as pre-emptive deployment as envisaged in Phase II. Renouf said this would seem to square with his record of Bundy-Waller conversation.

Mar 6 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 100
Conclusions of Dean Rusk, McNamara, McG Bundy mtg on Vietnam: Propaganda and demonstrations are inevitable. We have not driven Soviets and Chinese together. Two of the three of us think that chances of a turn-around in SVN remain less than even. McNamara said that Pentagon and military have been going at this the wrong way from beginning--have been concentrating on military results against guerrillas when they should have been concentrating on intense police control from individual villager on up. Must continue to make every effort in the pacification area. Bring Amb. Taylor back and put Alex Johnson in charge. Must show our readiness for "talks" and plan for possible escalation.

Mar 6 TO: SecDefense FROM: Gen. Wheeler, JCS 101
Operation Plan 34A- Additional Actions

Mar 6 TO: SecDefense FROM: Gen. Wheeler, JCS 102
Elimination of Restrictions on Use of US Aircraft.

Mar 8 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 103
Current diplomatic activity by French and British tends to undercut our ability to convey meaningful signal to Hanoi of USG determination to stick it out.

Mar 8 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 104
Have a sense of urgent need for an agreed program for measured and limited air action against military targets in DRV.

Mar 9 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Chet Cooper 105
Military issues, Vietnam and Laos--two decisions regarding use of U.S. aircraft are up for immediate decision--Restrictions on use of U.S. aircraft, and Restrictions on FARMGATE aircraft. Barrel Roll problem discussed has been resolved. DOD has agreed to State's restrictions on frequency of flights, and number and type of aircraft. Issues still pending: Rules of engagement, SEA -- Use of napalm-- 34A-Air Strikes against NVN--Hot pursuit into Cambodia.

Mar 10 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: J. McNaughton 106
Outline on Action for SVN --- (1) U.S. aims (2) Deteriorating situation (3) Prognosis (4) Inside SVN (5) Courses of action (6) Program of progressive military pressure on NVN (7) Program of massive U.S. ground effort in SVN and SEA (8) Downgrade the attarent strikes (9) Concurrent negotiating track (10) Evaluation

~~TOP SECRET~~

-11-

Mar 13 Possible questions and answers on Vietnam for Press Conference. 107
Questions on negotiations, bombings, further landing of troops.

Mar 14 Assessment of situation in Vietnam. Recommended actions. 108

Mar 16 FROM: Saigon 109
Gen. Westmoreland has just sought concurrence in his recommendation for landing of third battalion of 9th Marine Embarked Batt. at Phu Bai for protecting 8th Radio Relay Unit and air strip there. Intends to move helicopters from Danang to strip.

Mar 16 MEMO for discussion FROM: McGeorge Bundy 110
Policy on Vietnam (1) Military actions (2) Political and civil action in South Vietnam (3) U. S. leadership in Saigon (4) Political and diplomatic position (5) Shape of an eventual settlement.

Mar 17 TO: SecDefense FROM: Gen. Wheeler 111
Report of Survey of Military Situation in the RVN.

Mar 18 TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV (Westmoreland) 112
Khanh visit with Westmoreland re reprisal strike against three targets selected by his planners and of special interest to him. Khanh made two points of interest (1) he felt it important that we have additional joint strikes in DRV soon since he feared another incident against Americans would provoke another reprisal. (2) Just learned in Binh that 140,000 people recently lost to VC and numerous bridges in area destroyed.

Mar 20 TO: Watson (for President) FROM: White House 113
Amb. Taylor return D. C. March 28 for one week, for purpose of maintaining our continuous consultation on work in Vietnam.

Mar 22 TO: Amb Taylor FROM: Sec Rusk 114
Press reports alleged interview by you "there is no limit to our escalation." Most anxious here to avoid speculation on how far we may go.

Mar 22 TO: Chester Cooper FROM: Allen (CIA) 115
Courses of Action in SVN. Three major problem areas---
(a) the growing lack of confidence among GVN leadership and the populace in ultimate success of counterinsurgency (b) relative military equilibrium achieved by VC (c) lack of political base for GVN to counter VC political and psychological superiorities.

Mar 23 TO: SecDefense, Special Asst to President for NS, Dir CIA, etc 116
FROM: William Bundy
Highlight conclusions of Far East Mission Chiefs' Conference.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-12-

Mar 23 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 117
Statement attributed to me (above) was lifted out of context)

Mar 23 SecState FROM: Amb Kohler 118
Today's Brezhnev speech seems opening gun in political and
propaganda campaign designed to undermine US position in VN
before world and alarm world opinion.

Mar 23 TO: Amb Taylor FROM: Rusk 119
Appreciate that context shows different light on your sentence about
limits to escalation. Nonetheless, statement has been picked up in
damaging fashion by Communist propaganda.

Mar 24 Proposed course of action regarding Vietnam 120

Mar 24 TO: SecState FROM: AmbTaylor 121
Press statements, made and not made.

Mar 25 Statement by the President 122
"It is important for us all to keep a cool and clear view of the
situation in Vietnam."

Mar 26 TO: Rusk, McNamara, McGBundy FROM: Wm. Bundy 123
Possible topics for discussion on Saturday morning: (1) actions
over the next 2-3 months (2) Issues of possible added ground
forces in SVN (3) Miscellaneous issues under ROLLING THUNDER
program, such as rules of engagement (4) Order of discussions
during Amb. Taylor visit.

Mar 26 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 124
Today's NSC mtg. should be devoted centrally to VN (550th NSC
Meeting).

Mar 27 TO: SecDefense FROM: Gen. Wheeler 125
Air Strike Program Against North Vietnam.

Mar 27 TO: AmEmbSeoul (Ambassador) FROM: Sec Rusk 126
Consider possibility introducing additional combat forces in SVN
for possible variety of missions that might include some degree
direct participation against Viet Cong. Current project under
study would involve one U.S. division, possible filling out of present
Marine units, and one ROK division. Noted Lee's apparent
receptiveness such ideas.

Mar 28 TO: Rusk, McNamara, McGBundy FROM: Wm Bundy 127
Major issues during Amb. Taylor's visit: (1) Need for US forces;
(2) "Negotiating" policy and tactics; (3) Tempo of Operations
against the DRV; (4) Non-military measures.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-13-

Mar 30 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Brown, Seoul 128
ROK combat forces for Vietnam. Sending these forces would require approval of National Assembly and wide free-ranging public discussion.

Mar 31 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 129
Pres. Mtg with Amb. Taylor this afternoon. Three problems on Amb. Taylor's mind: (1) timing and direction of attack on the North, (2) timing, size and mission of any US combat deployments to Vietnam, (3) terms and conditions of a political resolution of the problem.

Mar 31 Draft by Wm. P. Bundy 130
Key elements in strategy for SVN.

Apr 1 TO: SecState FROM: Saigon (Johnson) 131
Informed Quat that Washington seemed in agreement that tempo and rhythm of ROLLING THUNDER be raised. Quat indicated great satisfaction and asked whether future strikes would still be limited to targets below the 19th parallel.

Apr. 1 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 132
Key elements for discussion at April 1, 5:30 P.M. mtg. on Vietnam-- (1) Situation (2) Immediate International Moves (3) More general political posture (4) Actions within SVN (5) US and Third Country Combat Forces in SVN (6) actions against NVN and in Laos (7) A regional economic initiative.

Apr 1 TO: CINCPAC FROM: JCS 133
MEB deployment to Danang, to be accomplished earliest feasible after Amb Taylor obtains clearance from GVN.

Apr - TO: President FROM: John McCone 134
Remain concerned over limited scale of air action against NVN which we envision for the next few months. I feel we must conduct bombing attacks in a manner that will begin to hurt NVN where Hanoi will seek negotiations.

TO: SecRusk, McNamara, McGBundy, Amb. Taylor FROM: J. McCone 135
Apr. 2 Have reviewed paper to change mission of our ground forces in SVN from one of advice and static defense to one of active combat operations against VC guerrillas. Feel latter decision is correct only if our air strikes against the north are sufficiently heavy and damaging to hurt NVN.

Apr 2 TO: SecState FROM: Saigon (Johnson) 136
Commander 7th Fleet requested arrangements be made soonest to provide 7th Fleet ships participating in anti-infiltration surveillance effort may enter RVN territorial waters at will as required in connection with surveillance operations or in hot pursuit hostile

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-14-

Apr 2 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 137
Further study indicates need to broaden authorization sought of GVN to permit US Navy supplementation of coastal surveillance. List of actions we would like GVN to take.

Apr 3 Subjects for discussion with GVN 138

Apr 3 AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 139
High-level decision made here to deploy following units to RVN. (list of where units to be deployed.)

Apr 4 TO: SecState FROM: Saigon Emb (Johnson) 140
When seeing Quat, Toan Van Do and Bui Diem on another matter, I briefed them on strikes on DRV last two days. They were impressed and enthusiastic at results.

Apr 5 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Ball 141
In discussion with Quat it is considered more desirable to describe mission of Marines as engaging initially in counterinsurgency combat operations in vicinity of Marine bases.

Apr 6 NSAM No. 328 142
TO: Secs Rusk, McNamara, J. McCone FROM: McG Bundy
Presidential Decision: 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Amb Taylor March 31. General approval of Mr. Rowan's recommendation of March 16. Approved urgent exploration of twelve suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by DCI on March 31. Repeated earlier approval of 21-point program of military actions submitted by Gen. Harold K. Johnson on March 14 on aircraft and helicopter reinforcements being accelerated. Approved 18-20,000 man increase in US military support forces in logistics and supply. Approved deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated hqs. support elements. Approved change of mission for all marine battalions deployed in VN to permit their more active use under conditions to be established, etc., etc., etc.

Apr 6 TO: SecDefense FROM: Gen. Wheeler 143
Over-all appraisal of air strikes against NVN Feb 7 to Apr 4, 1965.

Apr 6 CIA Report - Communist Intentions in SVN 144

Apr 7 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: R. C. Bowman 145
Six weeks statistics from Counter-guerrilla actions in SVN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Apr 7 TO: President FROM: Amb Taylor 146
Bombing of US Embassy on March 30 was dominating event of week. Quat and his colleagues have continued to move ahead with concrete constructive measures in political field.

Apr 7 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: G. Ball 147
Conversation with Australian Minister have indicated strongly that Australia will, if we and GVN request, send infantry battalion to SVN. Unless you object, approach GVN to suggest they make formal request to GOA for battalion.

Apr 7 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Ball 148
Sec. McNamara stated about 18,000 more support troops of non-combat nature would be deployed to RVN and stated also that two remaining battalions of MEB and one Marine air squadron would be deployed to RVN.

Apr 8 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: J. McNaughton 149
Analysis of Mining or Blockade of DRV Ports.

Apr 8 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 150
Quat gave formal authorization today for introduction of additional marines for Danang and Phu Bai.

Apr 8 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 151
Text of draft press release concerning deployment of additional marine elements which we propose to GVN for issues here when authorized by Washington.

Apr 9 TO: SecState FROM: AmEmb Saigon 152
Status of our approach to GVN on increased US naval participation in anti-sea infiltration measures.

Apr 9 TO: SecState FROM: AmEmb Saigon 153
7th Fleet considers it important that US Naval vessels be authorized to patrol as close to Cambodian border as possible in connection with anti-infiltration operations.

Apr 9 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Ball 154
Air strikes against NVN.

Apr 10 TO: SecState, Sec Defense FROM: McG Bundy 155
President has directed me to emphasize again his continuing concern for more careful control of military info on operations in VN.

Apr 12 FROM: Saigon TO: SecState 156
Amb Taylor, to selected press reps, said he would give the high points of his recent Wash. discussions. His discussions mainly concerned three areas of difficulty--manpower for GVN, restraining of VC infiltration, and pacification.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-16-

Apr 12	TO: JCS FROM: Gen. Harold K. Johnson Actions designed to accelerate stability in SVN.	157
Apr 12	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor Have been following the logistic studies which are going on at PACOM and MACV in anticipation of possible introduction of several divisions into SVN.	158
Apr. 13	MEMO for the Record FROM: CLC Analysis of White House Mail on VN -- April 4-12. Pres. Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins brought sharp reversal in heavy flow of critical mail.	159
Apr 13	TO: President FROM: Amb Taylor Have completed another quite favorable week in terms of losses inflicted upon the VC. Feel that VC are regrouping in the Provinces.	160
Apr 13	TO: JCS FROM: CINCPAC Deployment of 173rd Airborne Brigade	161
Apr 14	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor Recent actions relating to introduction of US ground forces have tended to create impression of eagerness in some quarters to deploy forces into SVN. I believe that for both military and political reasons we should all be most reluctant to tie down Army/ Marine units in this country.	162
Apr 14	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy McNamara has draft cable on deployments which Amb. Taylor may question.	163
Apr 14	TO: State, Defense FROM: AmEmbSaigon Highest authority believes situation in SVN has been deteriorating and that, in addition to actions against North, something new must be added in South to achieve victory.	164
Apr 14	TO: CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE FROM: JCS Deployment of 173rd Airborne Brigade to Bien Hoa Vung Tau Area.	165
Apr 14	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor Authority for deployment of RB-66 TF was obtained at same times as that for marine reinforcements. With regard to the 18,000-20,000 Category A Force, I have deliberately not sought GVN approval for the package.	166

~~TOP SECRET~~

Apr 14 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 167
I sought and received authorization from Quat to introduce the Marine Corps elements specified. Gen. Westmoreland has reported that the Marine units which have landed include 155 and 8" howitzers and tanks in addition to those elements for which I have obtained authorization. This action is highly embarrassing to me and contravenes the decisions bearing on Marine deployments taken in Washington during my recent visit as I understood them.

Apr 14 TO: AmEmbPhnomPenh FROM: Amb. Taylor 168
Maximum air effort planned to be flown against main VC headquarters located in War Zone C in Western Tay Ninh Province.

Apr 14 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 169
Dept. will have noted AP file from Tokyo reporting Pham Van Dong's report to DRV National Assembly contained four point declaration. ✓

Apr 14 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 170
Have just learned by JCS message to CINCPAC that immediate deployment of 173rd Airborne Brigade to Bien Hoa-Vung Tau has been approved. This comes as complete surprise in view of understanding reached in Washington.

Apr 14 TO: COMUSMACV FROM: CINCPAC 171
Employment of MEB in counterinsurgency.

Apr 15 TO: Amb Taylor FROM: McGBundy 172
President has just approved an important cable to you on future military deployments.

Apr 16 TO: COMUSMACV, CINUARPC FROM: OCOFSA 173
High military (names listed) will arrive VN to confer with Ambassador, COMUSMACV, and reps of USOM, USIA and CAS.

Apr 16 TO: Sec Rusk, McGeorge Bundy FROM: Amb. Taylor 174
I do not concur with the Peers Party as it is contrary to understanding I received in Washington.

Apr 16 TO: CINCPAC FROM: JCS 175
Recommended Actions Concerning SVN.

Apr 17 TO: McGBundy FROM: Amb Taylor 176
Greatly troubled by message. It shows no consideration for fact that, as a result of decisions taken in Washington during my visit, this mission is charged with securing implementation by the two month-old Quat govt. of a 21-point military program, a 41-point non-military program, etc. We have best qualified personnel from the agencies, don't believe they should be replaced with military.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-18-

Apr 17 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 177
Respect to mission and location of Australian Battalion.

Apr 17 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 178
With regard to requirement to discuss program contained in Ref A with Quat, my view that it would not be timely to open discussions of certain paragraphs until supporting plans have been worked out on US side.

Apr 17 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 179
Summarized instructions which I have received over the last ten days with regard to introduction of third country combat forces and to discuss preferred way of presenting subject to GVN

Apr 17 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 180
Personal observations of Alexis Johnson which he requests be considered. Don't feel that US forces should be deployed to SVN en masse. Afraid that Buddhists and others might begin to utter cries of "throw out foreigners" and "return Vietnam to Vietnamese."

Apr 17 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 181
US Mission Council has reviewed recommendations and submits its comments. Large number of programs were approved but they represent far more than the GVN can digest for months to come.

Apr 18 TO: AmEmbSaigon (Amb Taylor) FROM: McGeorge Bundy 182
Have reported your concerns to President. He has directed that all actions and visits be suspended until after McNamara's meetings with Westmoreland in Honolulu.

Apr 20 TO: The President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 183
The demonologists look at the noise from Hanoi, Peking and Moscow.

Apr 20 CIA Intell Memo: Modernization of Viet Cong Armament. 184

Apr 20 TO: SecState FROM: AmEmbSaigon (Johnson) 185
Dept should be aware Amb. has testified before Congress in Executive Session to effect that about 23% of population is under fairly clear VC control, about 47% of population is under fairly clear governmental control, and remaining 30% are under varying degrees of control by both sides. These ratios have been quite stable over recent months.

Apr 21 TO: President FROM: George Ball 186
Memo on possible approach to Vietnamese settlement.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Apr 21 Estimate of Communist and general world reactions to a US course of action in VN over the next six to twelve months. 187

Apr 21 FROM: Amb Sullivan (Vientiane) 188
During Southeast Asia Coordinating mtg, participants were briefed by MACV on JCS proposals for extensive new US troop deployments in Southeast Asia. Lao reactions.

Apr 21 TO: Amb Taylor and Adm Sharp FROM: Sec Rusk 189
McNamara today summarized Honolulu results at highest level meeting. One further matter--question of locating ROK RCT at Quang Ngai in isolation from any major contingent of US forces.

Apr 21 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 190
Have no special concern over Communist reaction if actions considered in Honolulu are approved. Usual propaganda attacks may be expected and Moscow may announce new forms of AID for DRV.

Apr 22 TO: President FROM: Situation Room 191
MACV confirmed that VC Attacked a reconnaissance patrol of 41 Marines and 38 SVN in Vinh Thai Village, nine miles from Danang.

Apr 22 TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: Sec. Rusk 192
After Honolulu discussions McNamara has recommended deployments in addition to 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 U.S. troops already in-country.

Apr 22 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 193
Number of Lodge cables to date. He has had friendly reception so far from Macapagal, Holyoake and from the Australians.

Apr 22 TO: State Dept FROM: CINCPAC 194
A ROK RCT of about 3500 personnel presumably will be fully capable of independent counterinsurgency and base security operations of scope now envisaged for SVN. Little if any tactical support from other nation ground force will be required.

Apr 23 TO: President FROM: Saigon, Amb. Taylor 195
Quat reticent about discussing the introduction of foreign troops in Vietnam.

Apr 23 TO: SecState FROM: Saigon, Amb. Taylor 196
My view is that a favorable settlement should be possible with Hanoi from a combination of continued air attacks and by introduction of sufficient U.S. and third country forces. This will probably take months, how many is impossible to estimate.

Apr 23 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 197
Foreign Minister signed note to Ambassador containing exact text we proposed for GVN request to USG on sea surveillance. Ambassador's note in reply containing USgovernment's agreement to supply assistance requested will be sent today.

Apr 23 TO: CINCPAC FROM: CINCPAC 198
Deployment of U.S. Army brigade to RVN to replace 173rd ABN BDE.

Apr 24 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 199
In meeting with Quat, I raised matter of shortage of trained manpower during coming months and ways and means of offsetting this deficiency.

Apr 26 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 200
In cable from Amb Taylor, he differs from Sec. McNamara in that "we can probably get a favorable settlement in a matter of months rather than in a year or two if we keep up our bombing and introduce substantial U.S. and third-country forces."

Apr 26 TO: President FROM: Sec. McNamara 201
NVN government has had ample opportunity to negotiate a settlement with us.

Apr 26 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 202
Considering press problems which will arise as marines or other U.S. troops move to more active role against Viet Cong.

Apr 26 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 203
Text of Government of Vietnam announcement on PAVN presence of South Vietnam as released by semi-official VN press today. "Regular North Vietnamese Army present in Souty."

Apr 27 Special Memo FROM: Sherman Kent 204
Future Soviet moves in Vietnam.

Apr 27 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 205
Amb. Taylor's message on his conversation with Quat. Taylor recommends a 9-battalion decision. My view is that we ought to decide something more limited.

Apr 27 TO: CINCAL, CINC LANT, etc. FROM: OSD, Wash. D. C. 206
Sec of Defense news conference of April 26
Clandestine infiltration of personnel and material from NVN into SVN.

Apr 27 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 207
Measures decided upon to ensure security and defense of the territorial waters of Vietnam--because of infiltration by sea of VC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-21-

Apr 27	SecState FROM: Amb Taylor Alex Johnson and I went to see Quat regarding his thinking on introduction of international forces.	208
Apr 30	TO: CINCPAC FROM: JCS Deployment of combat forces to SVN.	209
Apr 30	TO: Saigon, Seoul, Bangkok, Manila FROM: Rusk Decision has been taken to deploy in early May three US battalion equivalents into Bien Hoa/Vung Tau and three US battalion equivalents into Chu Lai.	210
Apr 30	Special Memo FROM: Sherman Kent Current Trends in Vietnam.	211
Apr 30	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Douglas Dillon's views on Vietnam--possible pause.	212
May 1	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor Called on Quat to inform him of pertinent USG decisions on deployment of troops--Gen. Throckmorton was contacting Gen. Minh to work out with him the timing of arrival of units. Proposal that advance party of about 70 men of the Bien Hoa-Vung Tau Force (173rd Airborne Brigade) arrive by air on May 3, followed by main body arriving and closing in the period of May 5 - 7.	213
May 1	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor Washington announcement caught us unawares--detail of Coast Guard vessels to Seventh Fleet for surveillance operations.	214
May 3	Draft Presidential message to Congress -- "Congress adopt a resolution to express unity and determination of the American people to support freedom, to protect peace and to resist communist aggression in Southeast Asia."	215
May 3	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor Gen. Westmoreland mtg with Thieu and Minh. Officers were well-briefed on matters relating to additional US and Australian forces. Gen. Minh showed considerable sensitivity on matter of a possible combined staff.	216
May 3	TO: SecState FROM: Gen. Taylor Assessment of probable DRV/Viet Cong courses of action during next three months.	217
May 4	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor Quat is proceeding with plans for a reorganization of his Cabinet. Much press criticism of Quat's government with corruption and weak officials.	218

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 5 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 219
My talk with Senator Joseph Clark -- he feels we are our own enemies in the cold war -- we should go hard against Peking and Germany, not against Moscow. He is against our intervention in the DR.

May 6 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 220
Suggested press release in anticipation of marine landing at Chu Lai tomorrow.

May 7 Press Release -- Remarks of the President at signing of Supplemental Appropriations Bill -- "We will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of SVN from aggression." 221

May 7 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 222
Quat well understands primary mission of troops is defense and security of pertinent installations. Westmoreland filing message spelling out in greater detail operational concept and command relationships applicable to all U.S. forces deployed here.

May 8 TO: President FROM: Adm. Raborn 223
Fighting within VN. Two attachments from John McCone on same subject. Transmittal ltr. from Clark Clifford.

May 8 TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV 224
Concept for US/Allied combat operations in support of RVNAF.

May 9 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 225
MACV ltr. of instructions to III Marine Amphibious Force sets forth mission: "In general render combat support to RVNAF. . ."

May 10 TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: President 226
Make a bombing pause around Buddha's birthday. Do not announce, merely bring to attention of Moscow and Hanoi. See what response will be.

May 11 TO: Secs. Rusk, McNamara, Adm. Raborn, Wm. Bundy 227
FROM: McGeorge Bundy
President's unannounced pause.

May 11 TO: President from: Amb. Taylor 228
Alex Johnson and I called on Quat re. pause. Quat concurs in concept of pause from four to not more than five days, provided there is no public linking of this action with Buddha's birthday.

May 11 TO: President FROM: Amb. Taylor 229
Big event of week was voluntary dissolution of the Armed Forces Council by Generals who composed it. Quat wants to get rid of General Minh, now Commander-in-Chief. 173rd Airborne Brigade and Marine Battalions for the Chu Lai Airfield have arrived and are rapidly shaking down in their defensive positions. Considerable action under way in preparation of the municipal and provincial elections

May 11 TO: Amb. Taylor FROM: SecDefense 230
In order to observe reaction of DRV rail and road transportation systems, bombing of targets within DRV will cease for several days.

May 12 TO: President from: McGeorge Bundy 231
Conversation with John Hightower. I gave him for background use a pretty clear account of your view of the constitutional and political position with respect to the Southeast Asia Resolution and recent appropriations and the Korean war.

May 13 TO: CINCPAC FROM: G. Ball 232
Press guidance should be that operations being announced in normal fashion. No comment on operational factors. All personnel should be instructed to avoid speculation of any sort.

May 14 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: G. Ball 233
Deployment of U.S. combat units recommended by participants Honolulu Conference have been made with exception of one U.S. Army brigade to be deployed to Qui Nhon/Nha Trang.

May 14 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 234
Tri Quang told EmbOffs yesterday that he believed psychological lift from bombings of North and landing of US troops was wearing off. Feels anti-American sentiments will grow. Felt VC strategy was to hang on and persist. Feels US should try to win people away from VC by sound political action.

May 16 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 235
Inasmuch as GVN request for assistance with sea surveillance operations states that GVN reps will be assigned to US Navy ships executing such missions in GVN territorial waters, request rules be amended: "GVN reps will be assigned to all US ships operating in GVN territorial waters or in the contiguous zone to a distance of 12 miles, . . . "

May 17 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 236
Travel in Southeast Asia by four committee members of House Armed Services Comm. plus committee staff member and Army escort officer.

May 18 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 237
Have been briefed on MACV's concept of the development of a major field-type logistic base at Cam Ranh Bay costing about \$19,000,000 and 16 battalion months of construction.

May 18 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 238
Buildup of facilities for use of US military forces in Vietnam involved expenditures of large volume of piasters on airfields, access roads, land procurement, occupant resettlement, warehouses, cantonments, etc.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-24-

May 19 TO: SecState, CINCPAC FROM: Amb. Taylor 239
Logistic requirements for buildup U.S. and third country combat forces are creating problems for MACV. By end of June, combined U.S. and third country military population expected to expand up to 80,000. It will be necessary to expand logistic facilities in the Danang and Saigon areas.

May 19 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec State 240
Decision taken to deploy Army brigade to Qui Nhon/Nha Trang area closing main body around July 12. Request you secure agreement P.M. Quat to this deployment at earliest time possible.

May 20 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 241
Agreed text: "Prospect of expanded mission for US combat forces here has been discussed MACV spokesman two weeks ago pointed out that both marines and airborne brigade have combat support role"

May 22 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 242
Quat informed me there had been no further developments overnight in wake of Thursday's attempted coup. I mentioned matter of Army brigade to close in Qui Nhon-Nka Trang area. He was agreeable on all points.

May 24 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 243
Political aspects to the sensitive matter of US/GVN military command relations.

May 26 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 244
Use of Naval gunfire in support of land operations.

May 26 TO: President FROM: Arthur McCafferty 245
Air strikes in NVN. CIA indicates a third missile site around the Hanoi area.

May 26 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 246
Anticipate questions from press on wider combat mission for U.S. forces.

May 26 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk 247
Market Time operations. "Every effort will be made to assign GVN reps to all US ships operating in GVN territorial waters"

May 27 TO: DCI FROM: Gen. Earle Wheeler 248
Please prepare a Special NIE on Air Operations Against NVN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-25-

May 27	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor	249
	I concur to requirement for additional jet airbase and recommend the Cam Ranh Bay site.	
May 28	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Kohler	250
	Think essential any strike against Soviet SAM-sites and planes on ground proceeded by warning exercise in form letter from President to Kosygin through Dobrynin.	
May 28	TO: SecState FROM: Amb Kohler	251
	Arrival of Soviet IL-28s in DRV is indeed significant development.	
May 26	TO: AmEmbMoscow FROM: Sec Rusk	252
	Arrival Soviet IL-28s in NVN represents first time Moscow will have provided offensive weapons to Hanoi.	
May 31	TO: President FROM: McGBundy	253
	May talk with Joe Alsop--- he thinks we have underestimated Communist strength on the ground in northern SVN and thinks our bombing in North is limited and timid.	
June -	Q: Will we send U.S. combat units to fight in SVN?	254
June 1	TO: McGBundy FROM: Ben Read, S/S	255
	Comments of Maxwell Taylor and Alex Johnson on Acheson/Ball paper and the outgoing telegram to Saigon on their comments.	
June 1	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk	256
	Have reached a point in planning for successive ROLLING THUNDER operations where we must be clear as to precisely what we are trying to do. Two possible approaches.	
June 3	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor	257
	Do not see here that the line between the two possible approaches (above) is quite as sharp as it comes out in telegram.	
June 3	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor	258
	In recent ARVN battle with VC in the vicinity of Quang Ngai, consideration was given by I Corps commander to requesting U.S. Marine assistance, but request was not made. Situation may arise, however, where it will be operationally desirable to commit U.S. ground forces to action in support of RVNAF.	
June 3	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor	259
	Quat has given permission for development of logistic facilities and airfield at Cam Ranh Bay.	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-26-

June 4 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 260
Reuters item foresees stepped-up involvement of US combat troops, quotes unidentified "high-ranking U.S. spokesman." Who that?

June 5 TO: Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Amb Thompson, McGeorge Bundy 261
FROM: Bill Bundy
Possible topics for Luncheon discussion: VN -- Military matters; Political developments.

June 5 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 262
Gen. Depuy made statement quoted by Reuters.

June 5 TO: Sec State FROM: Amb Taylor 263
Estimate of the political-military situation in SVN as of June 5.

June 5 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 264
Dept. spokesman made following statement today: ". . . American troops have been sent SVN recently with mission of protecting key installations there. . . ." ✓

June 5 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 265
To confirm your understanding that COMUSMACV has the authority to authorize commitment US ground forces to action in combat support on basis of operational coordination and cooperation with RVNAF.

June 5 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 266
In answer to George Ball's cable to Amb. Taylor, they say essentially that they would like to maintain and increase pressure by air attacks as well as by efforts in the South. They would avoid Hanoi-Haiphong area.

June 5 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 267
Taylor telegram att. sets forth current estimate of Embassy Saigon on overall situation.

June 7 TO: SecState FROM: Alexis Johnson 268
Feel there is discrepancy between statement on combat mission for U.S. forces authorized in Deptel and statement made by Dept. spokesman on U.S. forces undertaking combat missions as required by circumstances. ✓

June 7 TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV 269
U.S. troop deployment to SVN.

June 7 TO: CINCPAC FROM: OSD/Wash D.C. 270
Text of Secretary of Navy Nitze on use of naval operations in relation to Vietnam.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-27-

June 8	TO: Amb Taylor (in Washington) FROM: Gen. Westmoreland Current ratios of allied battalions versus in-country VC/PAVN battalions.	271
June 8	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Rebuttal of Congressional attack on \$89 million for Southeast Asia.	272
June 9	Press release by George Reedy -- "There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in VN in recent days or weeks. ."	273 ✓
June 9	Press release by George Reedy --- Questions by press on "What date Gen. Westmoreland received authority to answer a call for help from South Vietnamese by sending American troops"	274 ✓
June 9	TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: J. Califano List of statements by Defense personnel concerning mission of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam.	275
June 9	Circular Telegram FROM: Sec. Rusk White House statement issued re. mission of US troops in Vietnam: "There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this respect to Gen. Westmoreland recently or at any other time"	276 ✓
June 9	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk Considering proposal to knock out IL-28s and SAM sites nearest completion through major single air strike including use of SAC B-52s.	277
June 10	TO: Cyrus Vance FROM: L. Niederlehner, Act. Gen. Counsel- Defense Dept. Answer to your question --- "Does the President have authority to commit troops, on the order of 18-32 combat battalions and 25 combat air squadrons, plus 50,000 - 60,000 men in logistic support units for use in supporting SVN military forces in whatever way necessary (incl. use as mobile reserve) to counter VC efforts to subvert the political institutions of SVN?" --- In the opinion of Office of General Counsel, President has complete authority to dispose of the listed US forces in any way necessary.	278
June 10	US options and objectives in Vietnam.	279
June 10	Reactions to a further U.S. buildup in South Vietnam.	280
June 10	TO: President FROM: Katzenbach (Attorney Gen) Whether further Congressional approval is necessary or desirable in connection with proposed deployment and use of troops in SVN.	281 ✓

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 10 TO: SecState FROM: Alexis Johnson 282
Not quite sure we lump IL-28s and SAMs into a single package. As far as offensive threat of IL-28s, some could get through to the northern part of SVN.

June 10 TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV 283
Attack on SAM sites in Hanoi area by tactical aircraft.

June 10 TO: Circular Telegram FROM: Sec. Rusk 284
Excerpts from television interview with Secy. for guidance on current U.S. posture on Vietnam. "Our men were sent there in the first instance to help the South Vietnamese. . . ." ✓

June 10 TO: SecState FROM: Alexis Johnson 285
Amb. Taylor had earlier authorized Gen. Westmoreland to seek GVN clearance for deployment of additional F-100 Squadron to SVN. Gen. Tran Van Minh approved entry of Squadron.

June 11 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Ben Read, S/S 286
Memorandum of Law from Leonard Meeker which examines the power of the President to commit ground and air forces to SVN, above the present total of approximately 52,000 to an anticipated total of 95,000, and to authorize the use of ground forces in combat.

June 11 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 287
State/INR and CIA have prepared coordinated intelligence comments on MACVs ref tel. "We agree with general thrust of MACV assessment on seriousness of current military situation. . . ."

June 11 TO: NMCC FROM: MACV 288
Current US strength in Vietnam.

June 11 TO: CSAF, CINCSRIKE/USCINCPACAFSA FROM: JCS 289
Alerting of additional fighter squadrons for deployment to SEASIA.

June 11 TO: CINCPAC FROM: JCS 290
Force Deployments.

June 11 TO: Sec of Defense FROM: Gen. E. Wheeler 291
US/Allied Troop deployments to SVN. --- JCS have reviewed US/Allied force requirements in SVN in light of recent developments in Southeast Asia and Republic of Vietnam. Findings and recommendations resulting from this review are set forth.

June 12 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: W. F. Raborn 292
NIE's and SNIE's put together on Vietnam situation.

June 12 TO: JCS FROM: CINCPAC 293
Concept of counterinsurgency operations in SVN.

June 12 TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV 294
Tactical employment of US/Allied ground forces in Support of RVN.

June 13 TO: White House FROM: NMCC 295
Msg. sent Gen. Westmoreland -- "You are the man on the ground and will have to weigh the pros and cons of committing the two battalions of the 173rd. Concur that you have the authority to commit them."

June 14 FROM: Gen. Westmoreland 296
Concept of Operations--Force requirements and deployments, SVN.

June 15 TO: AmEmbLondon FROM: Sec. Rusk 297
Request you urgently seek out Menzies and Wilson to inform them: "We have located key VC base area 40-50 miles northwest of Saigon-- Area densely covered and located in area in which there are no known population locations within the area itself and only very few scattered individual huts for several miles outside targets throughout area precludes well-defined aiming points essential for effective use tactical air have decided only effective method of hitting this vital military objective is through use of B-52 aircraft deployed from Guam. . . . Operation now planned for daylight Friday morning. . . ."

June 15 CIA Intell Memo -- Communist Bloc reaction to US statements on 298
the use of US ground forces in combat in SVN.

June 15 TO: SecState FROM: AmEmbSaigon, Amb. Taylor 299
With American troop involvement combat support increasingly possible, believe highly desirable undertake long-delayed back-grounder on command relationship in next few days. Australian battalion arrival constitutes additional factor creating correspondents interest this subject.

June 16 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 300
During call on Gens Thieu and Ky, I recieved governmental concurrence for the introduction of an additional F4B squadron in Danang area. Also verified their knowledge of Quat's agreement to introduction of a US brigade into Qui Nhon area. Also mentioned past procedure for receiving Prime Ministerial concurrence in ROLLING THUNDER operations. Will henceforth take up matter with General Ky in his role as P.M.

June 16 Robert S. McNamara News Conference 301
Two announcements -- I have today authorized the Army to organize a new division, the Air Mobile Division. --- To bring you up to date on our latest estimates of the strength of VC forces in SVN and strength of US combat forces deployed to that country to assist VN govt. in combating insurgency. ✓

~~TOP SECRET~~

-30-

June 16 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 302
Recent history of negotiating efforts in Southeast Asia.

June 16 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk 303
Do not agree with COMUSMACV message that we can avoid publicity
or comments on use of B-52s in SVN.

June 16 TO: Asst. Sec. State Douglas MacArthur FROM: David McGiffert, DOD 304
Congressional Travel to Vietnam.

June 17 TO: SecState FROM: James L. Greenfield 305
American Opinion on Vietnam, June 10-16.

June 17 TO: President FROM: Amb. Taylor 306
Sought out Quat, Thieu and Ky to find out meaning of action of
Quat Government in returning political power to the military. ✓
Chairman of ten-man National Leadership Council will be Thieu.
General Ky will become P. M.

June 17 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 307
Conflict on statements in regard to press release on use of B-52s.
I recommend that joint GVN/US mission release be made Saigon
on confirmation completion strike.

June 17 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 308
Have just seen text of Secretary McNamara's press conference
announcing early introduction into SVN of "six additional US
battalions plus additional logistic and other support. Info is
requested urgently as to identity of these six additional battalions and
computation upon which stated figures are based.

June 17 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk 309
Revised version of text in June 16 Deptel to Saigon.

June 17 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk 310
Delete from joint GVN/US Mission release phrase "greater bomb
carrying load and hence".

June 17 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 311
Six battalions referred to in a reftel are three maneuver battalions
of the Army Infantry Brigade scheduled for deployment in the
Qhi Nhon-Nha Trang-Cam Ranh Bay area and three maneuver
battalions of the Army Airborne Brigade originally scheduled to
replace the 173rd Airborne Brigade now in country.

June 17 CIRCULAR TELEGRAM FROM: Sec. Rusk 312
Joint US/Government of VN announcement on use of American B-52
aircraft to bomb Viet Cong stronghold in SVN has just been made in ✓
Saigon.

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 17 CIRCULAR TELEGRAM FROM: Sec. Rusk 313
Text of announcement issued by Dept of Defense: "We call your attention to the joint GVN/US Mission release just made in Saigon -- 'In continuation of zonal attacks upon VC concentrations in remote areas, at request of GVN, 29 B-52 aircraft based on Guam today bombed with non-nuclear weapons a VC concentration north of Ben Cat in Binh Duong province. B-52 aircraft were used because of their greater effectiveness . . .'"

June 18 TO: Sec Defense FROM: McGeorge Bundy 314
President desires that we find more dramatic and effective actions in SVN. Also desires a report on progress of his idea that we need more light planes for operations there. Also inquired whether we have enough helicopters.

June 18 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 315
It is Mission view that MACV in its message accurately presented its views of military situation. There was no intent in either to state or imply "that there is a serious danger of complete military collapse within relatively short period of time."

June 18 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 316
Procedure worked out with Quat for troop introductions has been that I obtain GVN approval for movement and later just prior to time of arrival of troops GVN issued statement saying that certain US units are landing for certain purpose. Had expected to follow this procedure for Qui Nhon Brigade which I mentioned to Quat. Washington press statement of June 16 upsets this arrangement. .

June 18 TO: President FROM: George Ball 317
Keeping the power of decision in the South Vietnam crisis.

June 18 TO: Bromley Smith FROM: Ray Cline, DDI 318
The Sino-Vietnamese effort to limit American actions in the Vietnam war.

June 19 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 319
Pros and Cons of a June pause.

June 19 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk 320
Further breakdown of troop deployments as described 9 entries above.

June 20 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 321
Profile of Ky's 'War' Cabinet.

June 21 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 322
Memo from Wayne Morse on U.S. policies in Vietnam.

June 22 Scenario for possible deployment of Air Mobile Division. 323

June 23 TO: President FROM: George Ball 324
United States commitments regarding defense of South Vietnam.

June 23 Military Program -- (1) complete deployments already announced; 325
(2) restrict combat role of American forces (3) continue bombing ✓
in the North but avoid Hanoi-Haiphong area.
Political Program.
A 'middle way' course of action in SVN.

June - Outline of public justification for increased US military support in 326
Vietnam.

June - Points for Presidential message -- Our basic goals in Asia; the 327
successive stages of the commitment and similarity in types of
decision that have been faced at each stage; the references to our
political and economic measures; the reference to the attitudes of
third countries; the progressive sequence in Section VI.

June 23 TO: President FROM: Sec. Rusk 328
The Javits Resolution --

June 23 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 329
Agenda for June 23 Meeting with President -- (1) Vietnam (2) Berlin
(3) DR. On Vietnam, the six points discussed will be: ROLLING
THUNDER 20, Saigon's planned break of relations with France,
Future use of B-52s, Soviet attitudes and what we should do about
them, Prospects of Prime Minister Wilson's mission, Report on
political programs of the Ky government.

June 24 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 330
Negative feelings at State about going to the Security Council now.

June 24 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 331
Question ARC LIGHT II language.

June 24 TO: President FROM: Sit Room Briefing Officer 332
U.S. aircraft encounter with MIGs.

June 25 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 333
For meeting with Ambs Taylor and Johnson -- (1) Amb Taylor's
basic directive; (2) staff; (3) reassertion of basic policy.

June 25 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Chester Cooper 334
Retaliation for restaurant bombing.

June 26 TO: President FROM: Situation Room 335
ARC LIGHT II (night run)

~~TOP SECRET~~

-33-

June 26 TO: President FROM: Senator Church 336
His Vietnam views.

June 26 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 337
Message from Amb. Taylor which recommends reprisal action for the
execution of Bennett and the restaurant atrocity.

June 26 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 338
Meeting held with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Wheeler, Bill Bundy,
McGeorge Bundy on review of aspects of possible reprisal for
restaurant and Bennet outrages. Feel major new acts against the
North should be undertaken in terms of our whole policy in Vietnam,
not in response to particular outrages.

June 26 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Rusk 339
Have decided not to adopt your proposal on retaliation to atrocities.

June 26 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Rusk 340
Authority to COMUSMACV to employ US forces in combat role in
Night Run. ✓

June 26 TO: JCS FROM: CINCPAC 341
Meeting with MCM Scherger of Australia. Inquiring whether we
would need more troops in Vietnam from Australia.

June - Draft statement by State Dept. spokesman concerning Bennet 342
execution and My Canh restaurant bombing.

June 27 TO: Sen. M. Mansfield FROM: McGeorge Bundy 343
Answers to three Mansfield memos to the President. Administration
versus Mansfield views on SVN.

June 28 TO: President FROM: Bundy 344
Message from EmbLondon as to reason PM Wilson did not choose
Ayub for Commonwealth Minister Vietnam mission.

June 28 TO: President FROM: R. McNamara 345
Deployment of B-52s in Western Pacific.

June 28 TO: Secs State, Defense, McGBundy, W. Bundy, McNaughton, Unger 346
FROM: George Ball
Plan for cutting our losses in SVN, summary. ✓

June 28 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 347
Met with Ky. Found him with Gen Thieu, Chieu, and Co. Ky spoke
of his need for additional US ground combat forces.

June 29 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Sec. McNamara 348
Since March 1965, number of light planes in SVN has increased from (cont'd)

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 29 228 to 327, 44%. Helicopters have gone from 383 to 539, 41%.
cont'd) With arrival of new forces, light planes will increase about 95%
since March, helicopters around 44%.

June 29 TO: Secs State, Defense, McGBundy, W. Bundy, McNaughton, Unger 349
FROM: George Ball
Full memo for cutting our losses in SVN. (see summary 3 entries above) ✓

June 29 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk 350
Understood that SLF (approx 2000 personnel) is off Qui Nhon at
this time. Advise CINCPAC urgently if concurrence obtained for
landing of "one Marine company," covers this whole unit.

June 29 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Rusk 351
Highest levels approved early deployment to Da Nang of two US
Marine BLT's. Understood BLT's can close SVN in 3 - 4 days.

June 30 TO: Secys Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Amb Thompson, McGBundy, 352
Amb. Unger FROM: William Bundy
"Holding on in South Vietnam."

June 30 TO: Sec of Defense FROM: McGeorge Bundy 353
Raising questions to your memo to President of June 26 on
"Program of expanded military and political moves with respect
to Vietnam." ✓

June 30 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 354
France in Vietnam, 1954; and the U.S. in Vietnam, 1965. A
useful analogy?

June 30 Comments on Secretary of Defense's June 26 1965 Memo, 355
"Program of Expanded Military and Political Moves with Respect
to Vietnam."

June 30 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Chester Cooper 356
Comments on Ball paper.

June 30 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 357
Ky seems serious about fulfilling his campaign promises. Am
awaiting indication of countervailing reasons which led to contrary
decision on reciprocity in restaurant bombing and execution of
Sgt. Bennet. Military activities picked up during week.

June 30 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 358
Concurrence obtained from Ky applied only to one Marine Company.
Gen. Westmoreland secured Gen. Co's concurrence in his MND
capacity for landing part or all of SLF subject only to spot coordina-
tion with RVNAF authorities in Qui Nhon.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-35-

June 30	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor Welcome decision to deploy two additional Marine Blts to Danang area.	359
June 30	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Martin, Bangkok Comments on VN military, political situation. Comments on SecState letter.	360
June 30	TO: President FROM: McGBundy Contingency Planning on Vietnam.	361
June 30	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk Need your quick assessment of local reactions to US forces presently in SVN.	362
June 30	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk Agree to procedures for landing of remainder of SLF as required and proposal for handling press announcements.	363
July 1	FROM: Sec Rusk "VIETNAM" (1) U.S. objective; (2) U.S. Commitments (3) Comment on the present situation (4) The risks (5) Main courses of action.	364
July 1	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk If asked whether SLF is part of six battalions announced by Sec. McNamara on June 16, answer: "No,"	365
July 1	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor In modification of MACV intent reported in reftel to land one company of Marines at Qui Nhon, Gen. Westmoreland has now determined that situation requires two companies at once.	366
July 1	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor Mission's quick assessment on presence of US forces in SVN.	367
July 1	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk Last sentence reftel should read: "If queried on whether this means a total of more than the fifteen battalions already in country <u>and announced coming</u> , answer should be 'Not necessarily, no final decision has yet been made on that. '"	368
July 1	TO: CINCPAC FROM: JCS Deployment of Marine Corps Elements	369
July 1	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk Deployment of USMC Forces	370

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-36-

July 1 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 372
Four documents for consideration at 11:00 mtg tomorrow:
(1) Dean Rusk's four-page statement of basic issues (2) George Ball's
paper on a compromise solution (3) Bob McNamara's recommenda-
tion for expanded military action (4) Bill Bundy's program offering
a middle course for next two months. 371 ✓

July 1 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 372
Ky happily acquiesced to plan for landing entire battalion of
Marines at Qui Nhon.

July 2 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 373
Amb. Johnson, Gen. Westmoreland and I met with Gens Thieu, Ky
and Co. GVN agrees to request introduction of two additional
Marine Battalions with appropriate supporting division and air
elements totalling approximately 8,000 personnel to arrive circa
July 4. Gen. Westmoreland discussed his deployment plan for the
two Battalions and rationale involved. He pointed out disproportionate
amount of U.S. combat strength in I Corps.

July 2 TO: CINCPAC FROM: COMUSMACV 374
Deployment of U.S. forces in SVN. Amb. Taylor has secured
in-country clearance for landing of two additional BLT's supporting
and associated combat, logistic support, Marine air and other
forces totalling approximately 8,000 personnel.

July 3 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 375
Appreciate considerations you put forward urging a retaliatory
strike against Hanoi-Haiphong area in response to execution of
Sgt. Bennet and bombing of My Canh Restaurant. Reasons for high-
level decision not to adopt your recommendations.

July 4 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 376
Lodge transition. Telegram to Amb. Taylor as to when and how
announcement of Lodge takeover should be made. Also, announcement
of McNamara visit to SVN.

July 5 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec Rusk 377
Thinking of announcing McNamara party visit on July 7. Point to
your departure in first days of August, with Lodge arrival roughly
week or ten days thereafter. Inclined to stick to 15th for McNamara
departure. Next critical deployment decision and announcements, if
approved as result of visit can probably be held till July 22.

July 7 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: SecDefense 378
Main purpose of our visit will be to receive from you and Westmoreland
recommendations for number of US combat battalions, etc (as above
with slight revisions).

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 8 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 379
Agenda for your meeting with Acheson, Bradley, Cowles, Dean, Lovett, and McCloy -- also Rusk, McNamara, Fowler, Ball and Tom Mann. (1) Balance of Payments; (2) Europe (3) Latin America (4) UN and Article 19 (5) India and Pakistan (6) Arms Control and Disarmament (7) Vietnam.

July 9 TO: AmEmbSaigon (Amb. Taylor) FROM: Sec McNamara 380
Tentatively plan arrival Saigon, July 16 and departure about July 20. Principal members of party -- Amb. Lodge, Gen. Wheeler, Bill Bundy, J. McNaughton, Art Sylvester, Gen. Goodpaster.

July 9 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Roswell Gilpatric 381
"My sense of how the thinking of most of us assigned to VN panel". ✓

July 10 TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: OSD 382
Decision made to deploy approximately 10,400 logistics and other support personnel required to support US/Allied military structure at current level of commitment and to receive Airmobile Division, if deployed.

July 11 TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor 383
An estimate of the situation in SVN as of July 11. -- Political Situation--prospects for the government; The potential opposition breaks down as follows; Military situation; PAVN troops in RVN; Battle-worthiness of ARVN units; Prospects of RVNAF expansion in 1965; Availability of RVNAF general reserve; Estimate of economic situation; Over-all assessment; Two particular areas of concern should be noted; Psychological situation; Assessment of rural reconstruction program; Estimate of VC capabilities in urban areas.

July 11 to: Sec State FROM: Amb. Taylor 384
In meeting with U.S. press reps for background session, Amb Taylor commented on some of the important achievements of the past year. He said he thought the most significant development was the adoption of sound strategy for the conduct of the war.

July 13 TO: Sec State FROM: Amb Taylor 385
Alex Johnson and I discussed schedule with PM Ky this afternoon. I pointed out that, on US side, trip was in large part response to Ky's expression to US of desire for additional American forces and major questions would be what forces, where, how to be employed and what GVN expected to do on its side. Ky mentioned their Cabinet meeting on visit, and there was decision to seek "conference" with visitors on three broad general areas: (1) political (2) military (3) economic questions.

July 13 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: John McNaughton 386
Draft on "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam" -- composition
of US forces, present and future.

July 15 TO: DCI FROM: Sec Rusk 387
"In order to assist us in making contingency plans for possible
increases in US forces in SVN, I should appreciate it if you could
provide an assessment of major reactions to a substantial increase
in our force structure in SVN. Believe this assessment should be
made by an interagency group reporting to USIB. . . ." "U.S.
forces would be increased from their present level of approximately 75,000
men to 175,000 by Nov. 1."

July 15 TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Sherman Kent 388
CIA Special Memo -- Soviet tactics concerning Vietnam.

July 15 TO: SecState FROM: Amb Taylor 389
MACV informs that presence full 101st Regiment with three infantry
battalions and regimental hqs. confirmed; presence 18th Regiment
probably; presence 95th Regiment possible. All these regiments
part of 325th PAVN Divn.

July 17 FROM: William Bundy 390
Checklist of Actions -- Possible timetable; Congressional actions;
The UN; Action with respect to the American public; Notification
to key countries.

July 17 TO: Deputy Sec of Defense FROM: L. Niederlehner, Gen Counsel, DOD 391
Vietnam build-up -- Legislative situation.

July 17 FROM: William Bundy 392
Draft Scenario -- Congressional actions; Notification to key
countries.

July 19 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 393
The reasons for avoiding a billion dollar appropriation in Vietnam.

July 19 TO: AmEmbBangkok FROM: W. Bundy 394
This is to alert you to decisions and actions on VN that might be taken
following return of Sec. McNamara and to request your comments and
suggestions on best way of handling vis-a-vis RTG and SEATO.

July 19 TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy 395
Sec. McNamara will return from trip, you will want to speak with
him. Vance has gone ahead with planning for the reserve call-up,
the extension of tours, and increased draft calls which are fore-
shadowed in military planning. The planned reserve call-up will
be one Marine Division and six Army Reserve Brigades (a total of
27 battalions).

~~TOP SECRET~~

-39-

July 20	TO: President FROM: Sec. McNamara Recommendations for additional deployments to Vietnam.	396 ✓
July 20	TO: President FROM: H. C. Lodge My present views concerning our future course as regards Vietnam.	397 ✓
July 20	TO: USIB FROM: Joseph Seltzer, NE/CIA SNIE on Communist and free world reactions to a possible US course of action.	398
July 20	TO: Sec of Defense FROM: Chester Cooper Observations on your draft report --- contemplated US force build-up, etc.	399 ✓
July 20	TO: Chester Cooper FROM: Gordon Jorgensen Comments on Vietnamese highlands concept.	400
July 20	TO: President FROM: Adm. Raborn Views on SVN, present and future.	401
July 20	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor Unconfirmed reports indicate possibility of DRV troop concentrations in DMZ.	402
July 20	TO: NMCC FROM: MACOI Departure statement of Sec. McNamara.	403
July 20	TO: Sec. McNamara FROM: Leonard Unger Additional deployments to Vietnam and subsequent developments.	404
July 21	TO: Mr. Bundy FROM: CLC Discussions noted two possible military outcomes resulting from a substantial increase in US forces: (1) VC main forces will be forced by US forces into reverting to guerrilla warfare; (2) VC main forces will choose not to confront our units head-on and voluntarily revert to guerrilla actions.	405
July 21	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Timing of decision and action in Vietnam.	406 ✓
July 22	Memo for the Record FROM: Chester Cooper Meetings on Vietnam, July 21, 1965	407
July 22	TO: Mr. Bundy, FROM: Henry Rowen, BOB Alternative methods of call-up of Reserve Forces.	408
July 22	TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Ben Read Meeting of Foreign Affairs Consultants. Report on Vietnam---(cont'd)	409

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-40-

July 22	Stakes and objectives in SVN; Increase of combat forces in SVN;	
cont'd)	Policy on bombing of the DRV; Negotiating and international actions; prognosis of the situation; specific suggestions.	
July 22	Possible items for discussion -- Vietnam.	410
July 23	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Reasons for avoiding a big military appropriation in Vietnam.	411 ✓
July 23	FROM: Robert McNamara Deployment of forces to SVN -- three plans.	412 ✓
July 23	TO: Sec State FROM: Amb. Taylor In discussions during Sec. McNamara's visit, question arose as to actual growth of armed forces and police during the last year. Summary of RVN military and paramilitary forces.	413
July 23	TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: Ben Read Actions agreed on at Special Meeting of the Assistant Secretaries --- Need for secrecy; Schedule; General circular announcing the nature of Presidential decisions; Presidential and special messages.	414
July 23	TO: Secretary of State FROM: Thomas L. Hughes, INR Giap's third phase in prospect in SVN.	415
July 24	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: George Ball Expect that early next week highest levels will be making statement announcing program for expansion US military effort in Vietnam along lines discussed with McNamara group during visit there.	416
July 24	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy History of recommendations for increased US forces in Vietnam. Paper attached by Sec. McNamara on his meeting with William Bundy, J. McNaughton, Amb. Taylor, Gen. Wheeler, Adm. Sharp and Gen. Westmoreland in Honolulu on April 20, 1965. Deployment of 33,500 US troops in addition to 2,000 Korean troops.	417 ✓
July 25	TO: SecState FROM: Amb. Taylor Amb. Taylor's view as requested.	418 ✓
July 25	TO: Circular Telegram FROM: Sec. Rusk Message to foreign heads of state on our increasing forces in SVN but that we will continue to make every effort to negotiate.	419
July 26	TO: McGeorge Bundy FROM: R. C. Bowman Analysis of population control in SVN.	420

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-41-

July 26	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Agenda of noon meeting -- (1) SAM site problem (2) Position at UN (3) general plan of Congressional consultation and public announcement (4) Further consultation with Saigon Government.	421
July 26	TO: Sec State FROM: W.W. Rostow, S/P Hitting Hanoi targets.	422 ✓
July 27	TO: President FROM: William Bundy Response to Presidential messages on Vietnam.	423
July 27	TO: SecState FROM: AmEmbSaigon Secretary McNamara's visit to Saigon: Meeting with GVN, July 16.	424
July 27	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Progress on Vietnamese diplomatic front.	425
July 27	Summary notes of 553rd NSC meeting on Deployment of Additional U.S. Troops to Vietnam.	426 ✓
July 28	The President's News Conference -- Report to the Nation following a review of U.S. policy in Vietnam.	427 ✓
July 28	TO: CINCLANT, etc. FROM: OSD, Washington, D. C. Sec of Defense background briefing to reps of news media --- more money and troops to Vietnam.	428 ✓
July 28	TO: President FROM: McGeorge Bundy Call to Jack McCloy and Arthur Dean to give them a fill-in on background of final decisions on Vietnam.	429 ✓
July 28	TO: CSA, CINCSTRIKE FROM: JCS Deployment of U.S. Army forces.	430 ✓
July 28	TO: AmEmbSaigon FROM: Sec. Rusk Following approved deployments of U.S. forces to SVN directed by JCS today ---	431
July 28	TO: President FROM: Situation Room Briefing Officer Reaction from abroad to your statement today on Vietnam.	432
July 28	TO: President FROM: Amb. Taylor Comparative lull settled over military front this week. Ky and his associates agreed on all points of principle of our reinforcing US military effort here. Montagnard situation came to the fore again this week.	433
July 29	TO: SecState FROM: Richard I. Phillips, P American opinion on Vietnam, July 22-29. American Opinion Summary attached.	434

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-42-

August 3	TO: President	FROM: Alex Johnson	435
	Last week was amazingly quiet both on political and military fronts.		
Aug 27	TO: Sec of Defense	FROM: Gen. Earle Wheeler	436
	Concept for Vietnam.		✓
-	Elements in a program of continuing action against North Vietnam.		437
-	Chronology of Presidential Decisions -- Feb 24 to July 28		438
			✓

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 7-25-80 letter

By NSC, NARS, Date 9-2-80

✓ Copy sent Rusk

Bundy

As sent Copy

CO RUMJIR
DE RUEPWW 374D 33/2010Z
O 301615Z DEC. 1964
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
TO AMEMB SAIGON
EXEC
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NOBIS - LOR

~~TOP SECRET NOBIS~~ CITE CAP64375 FOR AMB
TAYLOR ONLY AT OPENING OF BUSINESS DAY FROM THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. I TALKED AT LENGTH WITH DEAN RUSK AND MAC BUNDY ABOUT YOUR RECOMMENDATION OF REPRISAL FOR THE BRINK BOMBING. WHILE I FULLY RECOGNIZE THE FORCE OF YOUR FEELING, WHICH WAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF GOOD MEN HERE, I MYSELF CONCURRED WITH DEAN RUSK AND BOB MCNAMARA, WHO FOR OVERLAPPING REASONS FELT THAT WE SHOULD NOT NOW MAKE AN AIR REPRISAL IN NORTH VIETNAM. IN REACHING THIS DECISION, WE WERE GUIDED BY A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS PECULIAR

PAGE 2 RUEPWW 374D ~~TOP SECRET NOBIS~~
TO THIS EPISODE. FIRST AND FOREMOST, OF COURSE, IS THE CONTINUING POLITICAL TURMOIL IN SAIGON. IF WE OURSELVES WERE UNCERTAIN FOR SEVERAL DAYS ABOUT THE SOURCE OF THE BRINK'S BOMBING, WE CANNOT EXPECT THE WORLD TO BE LESS UNCERTAIN. I KNOW THAT "THE LIBERATION FRONT" HAS CLAIMED THE CREDIT, BUT WE ALL KNOW THAT RADIO CLAIMS ARE NOT THE MOST PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE OF WHAT HAS ACTUALLY HAPPENED. THIS UNCERTAINTY IS JUST ONE SIGN OF THE GENERAL CONFUSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH MAKES ME FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE ARE NOT NOW IN A POSITION WHICH JUSTIFIES A POLICY OF IMMEDIATE REPRISAL.

2. WHAT I WANT TO DO IN THIS MESSAGE IS TO SHARE MY OWN THINKING WITH YOU AND TO ASK FOR YOUR FULL COMMENT SO THAT WE CAN LAY A BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING THAT WILL GIVE US A BASE-LINE NOT ONLY FOR PROMPT REPRISALS BUT FOR OTHER ACTIONS, MAINLY WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH CAN HELP TO TURN THE TIDE.

3. I CONTINUE TO FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE WIDENING THE BATTLE UNTIL WE GET OUR DEPENDENTS OUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM. I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE NOT AGREED WITH THIS VIEW IN THE PAST, AND I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE SOME

PAGE 3 RUEPWW 374D T O ~~S E C R E T N O D I S~~

AGENCIES WHICH MAY FACE RECRUITING DIFFICULTIES IF DEPENDENTS ARE REMOVED, BUT NO ARGUMENT I HAVE YET HEARD OVERRIDES THE FACT THAT WE ARE FACING A WAR IN SAIGON AND THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING ACTIONS WHICH MAY BRING STRONG COMMUNIST REACTION, IF NOT BY AIR, AT LEAST BY A CONCENTRATED VC EFFORT AGAINST AMERICANS; THIS LAST IS ESTIMATED BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS THE VERY LIKELY ENEMY REACTION TO A REPRISAL LIKE AIR ATTACK ON TARGET 36.

IN THIS SITUATION I SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IT IS HELPFUL TO HAVE WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE BATTLE ZONE, AND MY OWN READINESS TO AUTHORIZE LARGER ACTIONS WILL BE VERY MUCH GREATER IF WE CAN REMOVE THE DEPENDENTS AND GET OURSELVES INTO REAL FIGHTING TRIM. NEITHER THIS NOR ANY OTHER PART OF THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED AS AN ORDER, BUT I DO WISH YOU TO UNDERSTAND THE STRENGTH OF MY FEELING AND THE FACT THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN PERSUADED BY ARGUMENTS I HAVE HEARD ON THE OTHER SIDE.

4. I ALSO HAVE REAL DOUBTS ABOUT ORDERING REPRISALS IN CASES IN WHICH OUR OWN SECURITY SEEMS, AT FIRST GLANCE, TO HAVE BEEN VERY WEAK. I NOTICE IN YOUR LAST TALK WITH HUONG THAT HE SEEMS TO HAVE THE SAME WORRY. I DO NOT WANT

PAGE 4 RUEPWW 374D T O ~~S E C R E T N O D I S~~

TO BE DRAWN INTO A LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM SIMPLY BECAUSE OUR OWN PEOPLE ARE CARELESS OR IMPRUDENT, THIS TOO MAY BE AN UNFAIR WAY OF STATING THE MATTER, BUT I HAVE NOT YET BEEN TOLD IN ANY CONVINCING WAY WHY AIRCRAFT CANNOT BE PROTECTED FROM MORTAR ATTACKS AND OFFICER QUARTERS FROM LARGE BOMBS.

5. I AM STILL WORRIED, TOO, BY OUR LACK OF PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATING SENSITIVELY AND PERSUASIVELY WITH THE VARIOUS GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. I RECOGNIZE THE VERY GREAT PROBLEMS WHICH WE FACE IN DEALING WITH GROUPS WHICH ARE IMMATURE AND OFTEN IRRESPONSIBLE. BUT I STILL DO NOT FEEL THAT WE ARE MAKING THE ALL-OUT EFFORT OF POLITICAL PERSUASION WHICH IS CALLED FOR.

IN PARTICULAR, I WONDER WHETHER WE ARE MAKING FULL USE OF THE KIND OF AMERICANS WHO HAVE SHOWN A KNACK FOR THIS KIND OF COMMUNICATION IN THE PAST. I DO NOT WANT TO PICK OUT ANY PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL BECAUSE I DO NOT KNOW THESE MEN AT FIRST HAND. BUT I DO THINK THAT WE OUGHT TO BE READY TO MAKE FULL USE OF THE SPECIALIZED SKILLS OF MEN WHO ARE SKILLFUL WITH VIETNAMESE, EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT ALWAYS

PAGE 5 RUEPWW 374D ~~TOP SECRET NO DIS~~

THE EASIEST MEN TO HANDLE IN A COUNTRY TEAM. IN THIS, AGAIN, I RECOGNIZE THAT YOU MUST HAVE THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SELECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF YOUR COUNTRY TEAM, AND I AM GIVING NO ORDER BUT ONLY RAISING A QUESTION WHICH IS INCREASINGLY INSISTENT IN MY OWN MIND.

TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE THE MOST SENSITIVE, PERSISTENT, AND ATTENTIVE AMERICANS THAT WE CAN FIND IN TOUCH WITH VIETNAMESE OF EVERY KIND AND QUALITY, AND REINFORCED BY ENGLISHMEN, AND BUDDHISTS, AND LABOR LEADERS, AND AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS, AND OTHER FREE MEN OF EVERY KIND AND TYPE, WHO MAY HAVE SKILLS TO CONTRIBUTE IN A CONTEST ON ALL FRONTS. I JUST DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD LEAVE ANY STONE UNTURNED, AND I DO NOT HAVE THE FEELING THAT WE HAVE YET DONE EVERYTHING THAT WE CAN IN THESE AREAS.

6. EVERY TIME I GET A MILITARY RECOMMENDATION IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT CALLS FOR LARGE-SCALE BOMBING. I HAVE NEVER FELT THAT THIS WAR WILL BE WON FROM THE AIR, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT IS MUCH MORE NEEDED AND WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IS A LARGER AND STRONGER USE OF RANGERS AND SPECIAL FORCES AND MARINES, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE MILITARY STRENGTH ON THE GROUND AND ON THE SCENE. I AM READY TO LOOK WITH GREAT FAVOR ON THAT KIND OF INCREASED AMERICAN EFFORT, DIRECTED AT THE

PAGE 6 RUEPWW 374D ~~TOP SECRET NO DIS~~

GUERRILLAS AND AIMED TO STIFFEN THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF VIETNAMESE MILITARY UNITS UP AND DOWN THE LINE. ANY RECOMMENDATION THAT YOU OR GENERAL WESTMORELAND MAKE IN THIS SENSE WILL HAVE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FROM ME, ALTHOUGH I KNOW THAT IT MAY INVOLVE THE ACCEPTANCE OF LARGER AMERICAN SACRIFICES. WE HAVE BEEN BUILDING OUR STRENGTH TO FIGHT THIS KIND OF WAR EVER SINCE 1961, AND I MYSELF AM READY TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS IN VIETNAM IF IT IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THIS KIND OF FIGHTING FORCE AGAINST THE VIET CONG.

7. I AM NOT SAYING THAT ALL THIS HAS TO BE DONE BEFORE THERE CAN BE ANY REPRISALS. INDEED, AS I SAY, I AM NOT GIVING ANY ORDERS AT ALL IN THIS MESSAGE. BUT I AM INCLINED TO OFFER THIS SUGGESTION:

I WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU MOVE MORE STRONGLY IN FOUR DIRECTIONS:

- (1) THE REMOVAL OF DEPENDENTS
- (2) THE STIFFENING OF OUR OWN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO PROTECT OUR OWN PEOPLE AND FORCES
- (3) A MUCH WIDER AND MORE VARRIED ATTEMPT TO GET GOOD POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH ALL VIETNAMESE GROUPS
- (4) AN INTENSIFIED U. S. STIFFENING ON-THE-GROUND BY

PAGE 7 RUEPWW 374D-T 6 2 ~~SECRET~~ NODIS
RANGERS AND SPECIAL FORCES AND OTHER APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS.
IF YOU CAN GIVE ME EITHER PROGRESS OR PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS
ON THESE MATTERS, I WOULD LOOK WITH FAVOR ON THE
EXECUTION OF IMMEDIATE AND AUTOMATIC REPRISAL AGAINST TARGETS
LIKE NO. 36 IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER ATTACKS. I MYSELF BELIEVE
THAT SUCH REPRISALS SHOULD HAVE A VIETNAMESE COMPONENT
WHenever POSSIBLE, BUT I HOPE THAT THE NECESSARY CONSULTATION
FOR SUCH A COMPONENT CAN BE KEPT DOWN TO A VERY FEW HOURS SO
THAT WE COULD REACT WITH A SPEED WHICH WILL SHOW BEYOND
ANY QUESTION WHAT CAUSED OUR ACTION.

3. LET ME REPEAT ONCE MORE THAT THIS WHOLE MESSAGE IS INTENDED
TO SHOW YOU THE STATE OF MY THINKING AND TO ASK FOR YOUR
FRANKEST COMMENTS AND RESPONSES. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE THE MAN
ON THE SPOT AND I KNOW WHAT A VERY HEAVY LOAD YOU ARE CARRYING.
I AM GRATEFUL FOR IT AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW IN TURN THAT YOU HAVE
MY COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN THE BIGGEST AND HARDEST JOB THAT WE
HAVE OVERSEAS. BUT IN THIS TOUGH SITUATION IN
WHICH THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY IS MINE AND THE STAKES ARE
VERY HIGH INDEED, I HAVE WANTED YOU TO HAVE THIS FULL AND
FRANK STATEMENT OF THE WAY I SEE IT.

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This was Mr. Bundy covering memo on that
Newsweek article (or was it U.S. News and World
Report?) that you read the end of last week.

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January 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The attached report has the ring of truth to me, all the way through. The most important thing it says is that our personnel policies in Vietnam are wrong. The Army is running it in a regulation way, and that means that we have too much staff, too much administration, too much clerical work, too much reporting, too much rotation, and not enough action. (I was an Army staff officer for three years, so this is not just imagination.)

Taylor and Westmoreland are probably the ablest regulation officers we have, but that is not what we need, and in any case much of the trouble is here in Washington, which sets the policy on rotation and reporting and ~~more~~ other forms of paper work.

For reasons that are not clear to me, Bob McNamara has always been hesitant about going behind the regulations on this side of the matter. But today I found him more responsive than ever before.

It may be that a real push from you would produce quite new results on the military side now.

✓ It is true that Bob is very much opposed to larger U. S. forces. But when I asked him why, it turned out that what he is against is more of the overhead and administration and general heaviness that the attached report describes. I think he would be responsive to an instruction to develop a new plan for volunteer fighting forces that would proceed with a minimum of overhead and a maximum of energy in direct contact with the Vietnamese at all levels. At the very least it is worth asking him. We plan to have a meeting with you on Wednesday on this subject.

McG. B.
McG. B.

CAN U. S. WIN IN VIETNAM?

AN INSIDE REPORT

U. S. is getting in deeper and deeper in the Vietnam war. Yet victory seems further off than ever. Why?

Sol W. Sanders of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report" has covered that jungle war for years, and has been a close observer of U. S. involvement. He has just returned to Washington, where he was interviewed by colleagues on the magazine's news staff.



—USN&WR Photo

Q Just what's gone wrong in Vietnam?

A To start with, people ought to stop talking about what is wrong with the Vietnamese, because we know what is wrong with the Vietnamese.

If it weren't wrong with them, we wouldn't have to be out there in the first place. The American job is to get the Vietnamese to do what they have to do to win the war and save themselves.

We have announced from the roof tops for five years that South Vietnam staying non-Communist is essential to U. S. security. If so, the job has to be done no matter what the odds.

It's not really a question of how much money we spend or how many American soldiers we send out there. It's a question of where we spend the money and what kind of Americans we have there.

Q Then what is meant when the President and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the Ambassador, say that the Vietnamese are the ones who must win this war?

A Just this: Unless you are prepared to go into Vietnam with unlimited American divisions and march them north, drop bombs wherever you have to, use atomic weapons wherever you have to, take on the Chinese if necessary, and so on—then you've got to depend on the Vietnamese to win their own war.

After all, the guerrillas are Vietnamese, too. So there ought to be no reason why our side couldn't fight as well as their side. Anyway, beyond a certain point, the American presence in Vietnam is probably a minus rather than a plus.

Q What do you mean?

A Inevitably, the more Americans you have in Vietnam, the more weight it gives to the big argument of the Communists—namely, that the Americans have come to Vietnam to replace the French, that they want control of this territory. This is the strongest political line the Communists have, and it is one reason they can keep young men fighting.

My guess is that of the 23,000 American military that are now in South Vietnam, probably 15,000 to 20,000 are in the Saigon area. Are they really necessary in that location?

If you go to Da Nang, only a few miles from Communist North Vietnam, you find that the PX there has an assortment of stereo high-fidelity sets as elaborate as any you're

likely to find in any small shop in the United States. Is that really necessary?

Now, you can argue that the American soldier is being sent out to die, perhaps, in the rice fields of South Vietnam and you ought to make it as good as you can for him. But that is not the way you're going to win a war. It is a mean, cold, cruel world and you win wars by sacrifice.

Q Just who is General Khanh? Is he for or against the U. S. role in Vietnam?

A Khanh is one of the most experienced military officers in the Vietnamese Army. He was a paratroop commander even under the French, as far back as 1950—and that means a lot in an officer corps that has largely been put together since the country was partitioned and the French withdrew in 1954. He is ambitious—thinks of himself as a politician, a sort of De Gaulle of Vietnam. But he has even less of a political base than most Vietnamese politicians. He is largely dependent on the support of the younger officers and his wife's political connections—she is a Northerner and he is a Southerner, very important factors in Vietnam.

I have had fairly long talks with Khanh. He certainly knows that, without the U. S., he and South Vietnam are doomed. But he also knows that being considered too much of an American stooge can be the kiss of death out there. That's why he shows off his independence.

Also, there is a good-sized feud between Khanh and our Ambassador, General Taylor. It started with Khanh's belief, whether right or wrong, that Taylor preferred Khanh's arch-rival, Gen. Duong Van Minh—the man who led the coup against Diem last year—to Khanh. It got further aggravated last summer when Khanh kept calling for strikes against the North, and Taylor kept knocking the idea down. Also, Khanh is bitter about Taylor and the Americans denying his charges last summer that regular Northern units were infiltrating into South Vietnam. Khanh feels that the American denials were politically motivated, and told people last summer that he knew "Johnson had an election to win, but I have a war to win."

Q What is General Taylor trying to do?

A Taylor feels that a military government can't win the war in Vietnam, that you have to rally the population to the

(continued on page 46)



CAPTIVES: guerrillas taken by South Vietnamese. Says Mr. Sanders: "One reason the Communists can keep young men fighting" is the Reds' claim that "Americans have come to replace the French."

—Pix Photos

WHAT WAR IN VIETNAM IS COSTING U.S.

COST IN LIVES:

239 Americans killed and 1,511 wounded through 1964.

COST IN DOLLARS:

\$3.3 billion in aid since 1954.

HOW U. S. GOT INVOLVED:

Pre-1954—U. S. had small group in Vietnam overseeing military and economic aid to French in anti-Red war.

1955-1960—With French departure, several hundred U. S. advisers started working directly with Vietnamese.

1961-1965—Entire U. S. effort stepped up sharply, with thousands more U. S. troops sent to Vietnam in buildup that still is growing.

THE COMMITMENT NOW:

23,000 U. S. servicemen in South Vietnam. Aid of \$520 million promised this year.

U. S. AIMS:

- To maintain U. S. position of power in Asia that Americans established at great cost in World War II.
- To prevent an eventual Communist Chinese take-over of all Southeast Asia.
- To preserve credibility of U. S. as protector of anti-Communist nations in rest of world.



CASUALTIES: South Vietnamese are aided by a U. S. marine. "Between 1,000 and 1,500 Vietnamese—South and North—are killed every month. This has gone on for years."

VICTIMS: the peasants. "They just want to be left alone. They're tired of being bombed by Government planes and assassinated by Communist terrorists."



... "80 per cent of peasantry doesn't care who rules in Saigon"

Government's side with a civilian regime. He believes that Khanh proved that last summer, when the Buddhists were able to pull the rug out from under Khanh when he tried to impose a Gaullist constitution. And he believes, apparently, that would be the same fate of a military government—or even a civilian government dominated by the Young Turk officers who pulled the December coup.

Q Many Americans wonder if the Vietnamese themselves are really trying to win the war—

A You've got to remember one thing: Between 1,000 and 1,500 Vietnamese—South and North Vietnamese—are being killed every month, and this has been going on for years.

All right, it's not World War II or even the Korean War. But it's a war in which everybody is getting it in the neck. Even if you're a Vietnamese living in Saigon, you have relatives who have been knocked off. You've got young sons in the Army. It is a demoralized, fractured society you're talking about here.

Out in the country, I'm convinced, 80 per cent of the peasantry doesn't care who rules in Saigon or in Hanoi. They just want to be left alone. They're tired of being bombed by Government planes, and they're tired of being assassinated by Communist terrorists.

In Saigon, the politically literate Vietnamese may care who wins. But they're not convinced that the United States will stand firm, come what may.

Q Even after the assurances given by the President and General Taylor?

A This may be a little hard for us to understand, but here is a population which saw the Japanese come in as conquerors in 1941 and make a deal with the French. It saw the Japanese pull out in 1945. It saw the Communists come in and take the cities, then be pushed back into the countryside. It saw the French come back and install Bao Dai as Emperor. It saw the French, and Bao Dai, pull out in 1954. It saw Ngo Dinh Diem set up what looked like a stable government in 1955—then be ousted and murdered in 1963.

The Vietnamese would be out of their minds to accept our assurances at face value.

IMPROVING U. S. WAR EFFORT—

Q What about our military techniques? How good are they for the war being fought in Vietnam?

A You've got 20-odd U. S. generals in our headquarters in Saigon. I would argue that they are not really operational. Their main job is reporting the war back to the Joint Chiefs in Washington. Some military men have suggested to me that what you really need in Vietnam for the Americans is one brigadier general and a few colonels who are actually operational.

Incidentally, I don't think it is an insignificant fact that the American command sits three miles away from the Vietnamese Joint High Command. If an American general is there to advise a Vietnamese general, it ought to make more sense for them to sit in the same office—or, at least, in the same building.

A certain kind of mentality seems to thrive in that setup. For instance, let me tell you about one highly placed American general who went out to visit a province chief.

You have to understand the background. A province chief is likely to be a Vietnamese 25 or 35 years old. He's grown up in war. He's probably had part of his family killed, one way or another, in the last 20 years of war with the Japanese, the French, the Communists. Intuitively, he knows all sorts of things about the situation in Vietnam. Sure, he may

be a crook. He may be overly ambitious. He may be incompetent. He may be all sorts of things—but he does have this "feel" for the situation.

Well, anyway, this American general arrives and meets the province chief. Then the American says to the interpreter: "Tell the province chief that we've got to get in there and root out this Communist infrastructure." The interpreter translates to the province chief. Then the general tells the interpreter: "Remind the province chief that the mission of the police is to be a friend of the people."

I don't know what the province chief thought at that point, but I would doubt that he had a very high opinion of the Americans running the war in Vietnam.

AMERICANS: GOOD AND BAD—

Q Do we need a different type of American soldier for this kind of war?

A I think so. We need more dedicated persons. We need more improvisation on the scene. We need longer tours of duty. Actually, I think we could get a large part, if not all, of our Vietnam force from volunteers who would stay long enough to do some real good. As it is now, an American is rotated out of Vietnam in a year, just when he might be learning what the job is and how to do it right.

In each of the 43 provinces we have a young American officer as adviser to the province chief. We have taken bright, young American officers and they have performed very, very well—considering the fact that they have had no training, that they have hardly been briefed before coming to their jobs, that it takes six to eight months to understand the problems they're up against, and by that time their term is coming to an end.

Q What kinds of problems?

A It all gets down to very detailed and primitive factors at the local level.

You've got to know, for instance, that the chief in district B is a narcotics addict and you can't go over his head because his uncle is a cabinet minister in Saigon. So you have to find some other way to get around him.

You've got to know that family X and family Y have been fighting over five acres of land for the last 200 years, and that a young juvenile delinquent in family X went off into the jungle to join the guerrillas, so that now family X is pro-Communist, but family Y is anti-Communist.

You've got to know that there was a bridge five miles up the canal over which all the bicycles and the hand carts and the bullock carts had to pass with the rice that is coming to market, and that bridge was blown up eight months ago, and, for one reason or another, it hasn't been rebuilt, so the whole district is going Communist.

That's the level at which this war is being fought. It won't be fought with books on counterinsurgency published by big foundations in the United States. It won't be won by great theories born in the Pentagon. It's got to be fought and won right there on the ground—at the district and local levels.

Q But can't Americans learn to deal with these problems?

A Certainly they can. Let me give you one example, because if this man could do it, we ought to have no trouble in finding enough to do the same kind of job.

This fellow, a major, was an adviser in one of the worst provinces in the country. It is a province where the Communist Party was first organized in French Indo-China. Between 1945 and 1954, the French never reoccupied it.

In 1954, when the Communists agreed to withdraw north of the seventeenth parallel, the province became part of

... "This is a civil war in which families are divided"

South Vietnam, so 45,000 young men and boys went north with the Reds. Well, about three years ago we sent in this officer as an adviser. He was a tobacco-chewing infantryman who had got his commission on the battlefield in Korea.

There was nothing in his career to prepare him for the job, and Lord knows that Saigon and Washington weren't very helpful in telling him what he had to do. But he went in there with something I've seen in a lot of these young American officers—a kind of missionary zeal. It was his province, and he was really going to do a job.

He did a great job. It involved all sorts of things. It involved diplomatic handling of the province chief—coaxing him, threatening him, somehow getting him to do what had to be done. It involved straightening out the American military advisers who, at the drop of a hat, wanted the Vietnamese Army to shell or bomb a village which might or might not be in Communist hands. In this war, the Communists always try to push the civilians into your line of fire so that you whack a lot of civilians over the head and they join the Communists, too.

This major found out that a clandestine Communist newspaper was being circulated in the province. He went down to Saigon and got the U. S. Information Service to help him with the province chief in putting out a newspaper to counteract the Reds.

Well, to make a long story short: This major was very successful. Everybody thought he was successful. The Vietnamese thought so. Our military men in the field thought so. Our diplomats thought so. The foreign press thought so.

What happened? When his term was up, he went back to Saigon. He made a one-hour speech on what he thought had to be done. Everyone thought it was wonderful. Then he was sent off to his new post in Arizona without even seeing his replacement. And, as far as I know, that is the last he ever had to do with the American effort in Vietnam.

MORE EFFICIENCY NEEDED—

Q Are there many such Americans in Vietnam?

A A great many. It is interesting how many of them who are really committed, for example, learn rather quickly to speak the local language.

You know, we could organize a "machine" that could win this thing in Vietnam. But we have to get down to details, and make the best use of our men and money.

I'm thinking now of a very important Vietnamese administrator who has all kinds of metropolitan problems to contend with. Instead of giving him a really good political type as our adviser, we've given him an artillery officer—who is no good to him at all. This Vietnamese told me: "What I really need is somebody who knows something about trade-unions, and can help me with the strike I've got."

Here's another illustration of what I mean: There was a Vietnamese division commanded by a young officer who is now in his early 30s, maybe. He doesn't have much formal military training, but he has been wounded five times. He is courageous, he has come up from the ranks, and he is popular in his home province.

Now, we have had some problems with this officer. He is 'wild' and ambitious, and he has associated with some politicians that we'd rather he didn't associate with.

We wanted to advise this young man. So what did we do? We sent along an American officer in his middle 50s, nearing retirement, and at least 30 or 40 pounds overweight. The American's offices were on one floor, those of the Vietnamese general on another. They saw each other by appoint-

ment, usually. At the day's end, the American went home to his air-conditioned room and refrigerator, and the Vietnamese officer went off on his own.

This young officer is one of the men who participated in the December *coup d'état*.

Obviously, this is not the way to operate. I'm sure we have the same kind of ambitious and courageous young American officer who could teach this Vietnamese officer something, and learn something from him, too. It isn't a simple problem of the American going in and saying, "Do this, do that." The Vietnamese very often is aware of his problems. He may even know what to do about them, but he hasn't got the resources or, perhaps, the detailed skills, or he hasn't the weight to swing in his own bureaucracy.

DIEM... IN RETROSPECT—

Q Politically, what's our trouble in Vietnam?

A First, I'd say we played a role there in 1963 which does not redound to our credit. Instead of using more patience and more subtlety in trying to persuade the Diem regime to change its ways, we decided to change the Government.

Whether or not you think the Diem regime was as bad as it was said to be—that is not the point. The real point is that it was irresponsible for us to go along with the ousting of the regime without knowing what was coming in its place. And our officials did not know what they were going to put in its place. Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu once told me: "Whoever follows us will have to be even more authoritarian." That has turned out to be true.

You have to understand the real situation. Superficially, Saigon looks very good—wide boulevards lined with trees, telephones that work, good restaurants, and so on. But all the time in that city Communist agents are operating covertly. It is never easy to find out who they are because this is a civil war in which families are divided. One brother may be Hanoi's Ambassador to East Germany, and another brother is one of General Khanh's top aides in Saigon. You are never absolutely sure who is on whose side.

In that situation, it is extremely naïve for Americans to believe that a government can run the country without using secret police or repressive measures on occasion.

Q Have Americans changed their thinking since Diem's murder?

A It had to change. I remember one American official who complained bitterly to me in 1963 that we should not permit the Diem regime to continue using strong-arm methods against Buddhist demonstrators. The Government had said it could not permit sit-down strikes in the streets—if you had 500 women sitting in front of a Government building, it was an occasion for the Communist terrorists to throw a grenade in there, then blame it on the Government.

A few months later, this same American was complaining just as bitterly because the Khanh Government would not discipline the student demonstrators when the whole country seemed to be falling apart. Today, the present Government is back to the position that it won't tolerate violence in the streets.

Sure, we've changed our thinking, but the ousting of Diem was an expensive lesson. Some of my anti-Communist friends are saying things like this to me: "Now you want a 'strong' government. Last year we had one, and you helped bring it down." Or they say: "How many Vietnamese have to die before you Americans decide you're going to fight this war?"

Now that sounds pretty hostile, but you have to take into

(continued on next news page)

... "We can lose Vietnam in 1965 — and pay the price in 1970-80"

account other things—for example, the fact that Vietnamese troops are constantly being fired on from across the Cambodian border, and we won't do anything about it or let the Vietnamese do something about it.

It is common knowledge in Saigon that Communist supply lines, hospitals and rest camps operate in Cambodia and Laos. Yet we are continuing to pretend that this isn't true. We even announced that we were prepared to discuss the problem with Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, and there was not a single Vietnamese present at the discussion. Yet, we like to say that we don't interfere in the internal affairs of Vietnam or push the Vietnamese around.

ATTACKING RED BASES—

Q What about Communist bases outside Vietnam? Should we attack them?

A The answer to that question has to be decided by taking into consideration two things:

First, there's the military aspect. You have some very important targets that we could hit. For instance, I understand that we have aerial photographs of what we think is the general headquarters of the whole guerrilla movement, located on the Cambodian border. Or there is Haiphong harbor, which is the entry point for 75 or 80 per cent of the material going into North Vietnam. If you dropped aerial torpedoes in that harbor one night and sank 15 or 20 merchant ships, it would create quite a problem for the Communists, and we wouldn't be killing civilians.

However, every military person with any expertise I've asked about this admits that our past experiences do not indicate that bombing the Communists in the North or in Laos or Cambodia will stop the war. One officer says he doesn't think guerrilla activity would decline by more than 10 per cent over a sustained period if we sealed off the borders completely—which would call for far more than bombing on our part.

That gets you down to the psychological effect if we carried out something like that. There's a feeling that the South Vietnamese then would know that we were going to do whatever was necessary to win the war, even at the risk of Chinese intervention.

Q There's a lot of talk now about a political settlement with the Communists to end the war—

A The Communists might very well buy that. Why not? They want the Americans out, because they know that without us there will be no resistance in Vietnam. They'll be prepared to give us all kinds of face-saving devices to get us out.

Actually, I don't think the Communist strategy is to try for a dramatic military victory. That might just stir up the "crazy Americans" and bring them into an all-out war against the Reds. Sure, the French pulled out in 1954 after losing Dienbienphu. But the French weren't militarily beaten in Indo-China. We have to assume that the Communists are trying to drag out the war, make it as mean and ugly as possible so that the Americans will become disgusted and go home.

I can assure you of this: If we decide to pull out next spring, every anti-Communist I know in Vietnam will try to get out as fast as he can. Many of them already are trying to get out, because they foresee an American withdrawal. If they leave, who will be left to oppose a Communist take-over of a "neutralist" or "coalition" government?

Q Can the country be "neutralized" and still be kept out of Communist hands?

A I think the odds are overwhelmingly against it. The

only really concrete proposal I have heard from French and Communist Vietnamese sources is called "the two-Germans solution." The Communists, according to these people in Paris, would be willing to call off the war if there were a government in Saigon which would "entertain normal commercial and cultural relations" with North Vietnam. But that's meaningless. The North needs rice and rubber from the South, but could provide nothing as payment in return, except some low-grade coal, which is more expensive to move than fuel oil from the Middle East. Normal cultural relations would mean the sending of Communist propaganda and agents to the South to further cripple any non-Communist effort.

Q Well, then, is there any real chance of winning the war out there?

A I don't think there are any easy or simple answers, and any real solution is going to take a long, long time. That has to be said over and over again when we're talking about Asia.

Pulling out isn't going to solve anything. We lost China in 1949, and we're paying the price now. We can lose Vietnam in 1965, and we'll be paying the price in 1970 or 1975 or 1980.

Here is an illustration of what I mean by that:

India has been politically stable because—in part, anyway—of the split in the Communist Party. But one of the most experienced men in Indian politics told me recently: "Americans cannot pull out of Vietnam. If they do, it will be enough to put the Communist Party together so they can take over India."

THE PRIZE: ALL ASIA—

Q Are you saying that once Vietnam falls the rest of Asia will go Communist?

A I don't see any other answer.

For instance, you still have the Chinese camped on India's borders. They've built a very elaborate system of roads in Tibet. Once the Chinese got to the Tibetan plateau, you see, they were only 2,000 or 3,000 feet below the Himalayan passes leading to India, and they had the advantages of a fairly dry climate. It was almost a downhill run by comparison with the job facing the Indians, who are having to build roads from sea level, almost, up to 17,000 or 20,000 feet—through torrential rains and slides much of the time.

Q Have the Chinese there pretty well neutralized India as a threat to their plans?

A I think so.

Q What about the Japanese?

A The Japanese are Asians. Suppose they see the Americans pulling out of mainland Asia—can the Japanese hold out? After all, they've already got an opposition group there that is large enough to veto any Japanese attempt to play a big role in the world, despite the fact that it's the fifth or sixth largest industrial nation. Many Japanese simply feel that Japan should not take any risks, and it is inevitable that this feeling will grow enormously if the Americans decide to leave Asia to the Communists.

This is the danger that is growing for us, really. Already there is the feeling, more and more, that inevitably the Chinese Communists are going to dominate Asia and that the Americans are going to have to pull out. That is why Cambodia is giving help to the Reds now, and why President Sukarno of Indonesia feels free to wage a war of nerves against neighboring Malaysia.

Q What is that trouble around Malaysia all about?

... "We're getting richer and Asians are getting poorer"

A Basically, Sukarno's trouble is that the creation of the new Federation of Malaysia put a time bomb right on his doorstep. You see, for years, Sukarno has been ruling the peoples and the islands of Indonesia pretty much as dictator of a highly centralized Government—building up a big Army, crushing all opposition, taking aid from America while getting chummy with Red China, and reaching out for more territory wherever he could get it.

Now comes the Federation of Malaysia, and it is everything that Indonesia isn't. First of all, it is a federation composed of Singapore, the old Federation of Malaya itself, and part of Borneo—all with a fair amount of freedom and autonomy which Indonesians don't enjoy.

Then the economic contrast makes Sukarno look silly. Indonesia has a controlled economy which is in a mess—the rupee now stands at something like 5,500 to the dollar, instead of the official rate of 45 to 1. The Federation, on the other hand, has a free economy which is just about the most prosperous in Asia, with the strongest currency.

Sukarno is always attacking the West and kicking foreigners around, while Malaysia has a British base in Singapore and co-operates with the West.

Another thing is that the sultans in the Federation come from families based in Indonesia, and the same Chinese families who control the business community in Malaysia have relatives who control the business community in Indonesia.

So, you see, this thing sits on Sukarno's doorstep, ticking away. He has to do something about it. Right now, it's mostly harassment of Malaysia by means of isolated attacks from paratroopers and that sort of thing, but if the Communists take over all of Vietnam, he'll feel free to make his big move, with the Communist blessing.

Q What is it that all these countries need from us?

A One thing, obviously, is time to build up a sense of nationalism so they will want to withstand the Chinese. That's a difficult job because, in most parts of Eastern Asia, you are talking with peasants who are 80 per cent illiterate and not interested in anything beyond the village.

FREEDOM'S FIRST STEPS—

Q What kind of government can we get in those countries?

A It's clear you are not going to have voting machines in South Vietnam, or many other places, for a long time. But you can get representative government. They have representative government and a free press in the Philippines. They have it in spite of a roaring increase in population, in spite of poverty, in spite of a Communist movement that once threatened to take over the country. Maybe Americans can take some of the credit for this in the 40 years they ruled the country.

Now we don't have 40 years in which to get a similar result in other countries. That's true. But we do have more resources for doing the job than we had when we came to the Philippines in 1900. Presumably we've learned something since then, too.

Q What are some of the problems that will have to be faced?

A To begin with, poverty—poverty the like of which doesn't exist anywhere else in the world, poverty so grinding that statistics on family income are meaningless.

Then there is technology. Here is one indication of what has to be done there:

Some Norwegians who are running a technical-assistance program on the southwest coast of India say that in Western

Europe no one has fished as these people do for more than 1,000 years. They fish from the shore. Their nets are terrible. They know next to nothing about fish habits. Yet, they live near some of the largest shrimp beds in the world.

In most of South Asia, peasants use a wooden plow which doesn't permit them to turn the soil to a depth that is necessary for good plant growth.

And here is a better example of what I'm talking about:

One American expert tells me that 75 per cent of the water used for irrigation in India is being lost. The water flows over farmland too fast because the land is graded too steeply. To correct that situation, you have to send a young man who knows a little bit about mathematics and has a couple of primitive surveying instruments so he can show every farmer how to regrade his land.

Well, fine. But how are you going to find enough young men who are going to visit something like 550,000 villages and stand in the hot sun day after day talking to ignorant and suspicious farmers?

A "CATASTROPHE" BREWING—

Q Do you come out of Asia with a hopeless feeling?

A The problems in India—and to some extent in Pakistan—are so bad I don't see how anybody can be optimistic. Some of the problems are getting even worse—language, for instance. India has 14 major languages, so the British-educated elite use English. But what has happened in the 17 years of independence is the growth of regional nationalism and the increasing use of local languages so that the level of competence in English is falling all the time.

Then you get into the population problem. The official estimate is that the population of India is increasing at about 2.2 or 2.3 per cent a year. But a good many Indian economists feel that it's closer to 3 per cent.

Only in rare instances has any country in the world had agricultural growth of 5 per cent a year. So you can see that improving the standard of living in India is extremely difficult. In fact, the Indians have had four years with no increase at all in food-grains production.

I don't think we have lived up to our responsibilities in Asia. We have known from the very beginning of all this effort at economic development that the two principal problems are food production and population. Yet, by and large, those are the two things that we permitted the Indians to ignore while financing their economic development.

Unless we can find some way to really help Asians, we're in trouble of the worst sort. We're getting richer and they're getting poorer. We're getting more educated, but illiteracy in India, for example, is growing, not declining. If we can't find some way to give these people a stake in the world, they're going to become even more embittered and more frustrated, and will try to find some way to get at us.

My own feeling is that America is heading for catastrophe unless there is a revolutionary change in our approach to the whole area.

Q What do you mean by that?

A Simply this: If we pull out, and if country after country is pulled into Red China's orbit, it is going to hasten the Chinese buildup for an explosion against the West. And that means America, principally.

Q Yet the Chinese have trouble at home—

A Look: The Chinese have not solved one basic problem that they had when the Communist regime took over in 1949. They can't grow enough food. But they are able to make an atomic bomb. There you have the perfect example

... "Communists haven't solved the basic problems in China"

of what we're up against in Asia. There will be no American security in a world where two thirds of the population is facing a steady decline in its living standards.

The population of China is growing at something like 20 million a year. The population of India grew by about 15 million last year, I believe. Now, these people are not going to be able to feed themselves. They are not going to be able to educate themselves. They are not going to be able to clothe themselves. In fact, the gap between their living standards and ours is growing year by year.

But if they have the kind of government that you find in China now, they will be able to do things which can threaten the security of the rest of the world. They're going to try to get what we have in one way or another.

The optimists here in Washington say: "All right, the Chi-



—Pix Photo

SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS—"You've got to depend on the Vietnamese to win their own war," Mr. Sanders believes

nese have an atomic bomb. But they can't deliver it." Well, just now, I can't foresee any way that they can deliver a bomb. I can't tell you how they might be able to deliver it 10 years from now. But it seems to me that it's pretty reckless optimism to believe that in 10 years' time they won't find a way to make themselves an effective menace to the United States itself.

Q What about our allies in that part of the world?

A Everyone will be trying to make a deal once they're positive that the Americans are on the way out.

Take a country like Thailand, for example. Right now, the Thai are carrying on virtually no trade with China. They don't want anything to do with Peiping politically—and the Chinese don't have much to offer them economically.

But if we pull out of South Vietnam, there'll be tremendous pressure in Thailand to try to get closer to the Chinese. And the Communists have a need for the food and other things that Thailand produces—so they'll try to exploit the Thai and the rest of Southeast Asia the same way that the Russians exploited Central Europe after World War II.

Q Is there fear of this happening in those countries?

A Of course. Many Indians, for example, have a very peculiar attitude toward the Chinese. They're afraid of the Chinese, they hate the Chinese, and they consider China their principal enemy—they don't forget the border war of two years ago.

At the same time, you find a grudging admiration in the

Indian middle class and in the Indian leadership for the fact that, while Red China may not have solved its real problems, it has recovered its self-respect and has made itself feared, if nothing else, by the rest of the world.

That feeling was evident even before the Chinese exploded their A-bomb. You find the attitude even more pronounced among the Pakistanis, who are supposed to be our allies.

Q Do Asians think Communism is going to solve their problems?

A No, and the more enlightened Communists are pretty realistic about it, too. I remember a Communist intellectual in Calcutta telling me once: "Communism has no answers for this city."

Again, however, look at China. There, they haven't solved the basic problems. But, with terror and discipline, they've been able to make China into a military power that the rest of the world must reckon with.

Q Are you saying that the Chinese hope to use the resources of Asia in a showdown with America?

A I would certainly think so. When you look at the area reaching from Hong Kong to the borders of India and south to Indonesia, you find it underpopulated by Asian standards. Those countries have surpluses of rice—though the productivity per acre, in countries like Thailand and Burma, is maybe one fifth or one sixth of the rate in Japan. In Burma, you could grow three rice crops a year, but nobody does it.

So the Chinese could throw immigrants into those countries in enormous numbers, solve some of their own population problem that way, and maybe solve a good part of their food problem, too.

I think it's estimated that, since the Chinese took over Tibet in 1951, they've pushed something like 20 million people from China proper into Tibet, and the areas just east of Tibet. Of course, colonization schemes can be very expensive and very difficult to organize. But colonization carried out by a Communist regime that doesn't care about human suffering wouldn't be terribly expensive, or difficult to organize. You just say to a number of villagers: "Go! With the clothes on your back!" If half of them die before they get to Thailand—well, even then, it is a net gain insofar as Red China's population worry is concerned.

Q Will the Chinese go to war in Southeast Asia to get what they want?

A I don't think it has to mean a Chinese conquest. What they want is to dominate Asia—build up a new colonial structure for their benefit.

"HOLD THE LINE IN ASIA"—

Q How long are we going to have to deal with this problem?

A A long, long time. Our only chance, it seems to me, is to keep the Chinese in the present condition of armed truce, if you can call it that, for two or three decades.

Maybe then we can find, or the Chinese people themselves will find, a way in which the growing population and the growing power of China can live peaceably in this world.

Until then, we're simply going to have to hold the line in Asia—and right now, that means in Vietnam. If the United States, with all of its intellectual resources and all of its technology, can't find a way to lick this problem in Vietnam, then it's pretty sure we're not going to be able to solve the 101 other problems facing us anywhere else in the world.

[END]

7

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

002 ⁸

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

NOTE

This is a Five Section Message.
Contains Cables No's 2052, 2055,
2056, 2057, 2058.

Info

CONTROL:
RECEIVED:

2366

JANUARY 6, 1964, 1:53 A.M.

Please put in safe:

IGON

CSTATE (2052) PRIORITY

JANUARY 6, 11 A.M. (SECTION ONE OF FIVE)

LBJ/vm
1-6-65

FOR THE PRESIDENT - SECTION I OF V SECTIONS

N O D I S - - L O R

REF A. CAP-64375.

B. POSITION PAPER ON SOUTHEAST ASIA ORIGINALLY DATED DECEMBER 2, LATER DECEMBER 7.

C. INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AS APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT DECEMBER 3, 1964.

C. EMBTEL 2010.

1. IN REPLYING TO YOUR CAP-64375, RATHER THAN TO COMPOSE A SINGLE CABLE WHICH WOULD BE OVERLY CUMBERSOME BY ITS LENGTH, IT HAS APPEARED PREFERABLE TO PREPARE A BASIC CABLE PRESENTING A COHERENT REPORT OF OUR VIEWS ON THE OVERRIDING ISSUES IN CAP-64375 AND TO SUPPLEMENT IT ADDITIONALLY BY FOUR SUPPORTING SECTION, EACH ADDRESSED TO ONE OF THE FOUR SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN PARA 7, REFERENCE A. THIS IS THE BASIC CABLE WHICH UNDERTAKES TO EVALUATE THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SVN, TO ANALYZE THE CAUSES OF OUR TROUBLES AND TO INDICATE WHAT WE CAN AND CANNOT DO TO ELIMINATE OR ATTENUATE THESE CAUSES AND CLOSES WITH OUR RECOMMENDATIONS. WE HAVE NOT REPEATED HEREIN OUR VIEWS CONTAINED IN THE RELATED CABLE, EMBTEL 2010.

DECLASSIFIED

STATE letter JAN 29 1979

Authority

By ip, NARS, Date 1-29-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2052, JANUARY 6, 11 AM, (SECTION ONE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

2. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION NEEDS LITTLE AMPLIFICATION BEYOND THE CONTENT OF EMB CABLES FILED SINCE THE MILITARY COUP DE FORCE (THE CURRENT PHRASE HERE) OF DECEMBER 20, READ AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE REPORT WHICH I MADE TO YOU AND SENIOR OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON IN EARLY DECEMBER. WE ARE FACED HERE WITH A SERIOUSLY DETERIORATING SITUATION CHARACTERIZED BY CONTINUED POLITICAL TURMOIL, IRRESPONSIBILITY AND DIVISION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, LETHARGY IN THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, SOME ANTI-US FEELING WHICH COULD GROW, SIGNS OF MOUNTING TERRORISM BY VC DIRECTLY AT US PERSONNEL AND DEEPENING DISCOURAGEMENT AND LOSS OF MORALE THROUGHOUT SVN. UNLESS THESE CONDITIONS ARE SOMEHOW CHANGED AND TRENDS REVERSED, WE ARE LIKELY SOON TO FACE A NUMBER OF UNPLEASANT DEVELOPMENTS RANGING FROM ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS, FURTHER CIVIL DISORDERS, AND EVEN POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS TO THE ULTIMATE INSTALLATION OF A HOSTILE GOVT WHICH WILL ASK US TO LEAVE WHILE IT SEEKS ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND HANOI. HOW SOON THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY OCCUR IS HARD TO ESTIMATE. SOME MIGHT TAKE PLACE TOMORROW--ANYTHING LIKE A COALITION GOVT IS UNLIKELY FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. IN ALL, HOWEVER, THERE IS A COMPARATIVELY SHORT TIME FUSE ON THIS SITUATION.

3. WHEN ONE LOOKS FOR THE CAUSES OF THIS UNHAPPY STATE OF AFFAIRS, THEY FALL GENERALLY UNDER THREE HEADS: LACK OF A STABLE GOVT, INADEQUATE SECURITY AGAINST THE VC AND NATION-WIDE WAR-WEARINESS. ALL THREE ARE INTERDEPENDENT AND REACT UPON ONE ANOTHER.

4. UNTIL THE FALL OF DIEM AND THE EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM THE EVENTS OF THE FOLLOWING MONTHS, I DOUBT THAT ANYONE APPRECIATED THE MAGNITUDE OF THE CENTRIFUGAL POLITICAL FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN KEPT UNDER CONTROL BY HIS IRON RULE. THE SUCCESSIVE POLITICAL UPHEAVALS AND THE ACCOMPANYING TURMOIL WHICH HAVE FOLLOWED DIEM'S DEMISE UPSET ALL PRIOR US CALCULATIONS AS TO THE DURATION AND OUTCOME OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SVN AND THE FUTURE REMAINS UNCERTAIN TODAY. THERE IS NO ADEQUATE REPLACEMENT FOR DIEM IN SIGHT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 2052, JANUARY 6, 11 AM, (SECTION ONE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

5. AT LEAST WE KNOW NOW WHAT ARE THE BASIC FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS TURMOIL--CHRONIC FACTIONALISM, CIVILIAN-MILITARY SUSPICION AND DISTRUST, ABSENCE OF NATIONAL SPIRIT AND MOTIVATION, LACK OF COHESION IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE, LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE CONDUCT OF GOVT. THESE ARE HISTORICAL FACTORS GROWING OUT OF NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND TRADITIONS, SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHANGE ONLY OVER THE LONG RUN. PERHAPS OTHER AMERICANS MIGHT MARGINALLY INFLUENCE THEM MORE EFFECTIVELY BUT GENERALLY SPEAKING WE AMERICANS ARE NOT GOING TO CHANGE THEM IN ANY FUNDAMENTAL WAY IN ANY MEASURABLE TIME. WE CAN ONLY RECOGNIZE THEIR EXISTENCE AND ADJUST OUR PLANS AND EXPECTATIONS ACCORDINGLY.

CFN I V A CAP-64375

B 2 7 C 3 1964 D 2010 1 CAP-64375 64375 7 A SVN 2010 2

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TAYLOR

RNL/1

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

002

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 2390
RECEIVED: JANUARY 6, 1965, 1:50 A.M.

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 2052 PRIORITY

DATE: JANUARY 6, 11 A.M. (SECTION TWO OF FIVE)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT - SECTION I OF V SECTIONS

N O D I S -- L O R

6. THE LACK OF SECURITY FOR THE POPULATION IS THE RESULT OF THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF THE VC SUBVERSIVE INSURGENCY FOR WHICH THE FOUNDATION WAS LAID IN 1954-55 AND WHICH HAS SINCE GROWN TO PRESENT PROPORTIONS OF AN ESTIMATED 34,000 MAIN GUERRILLA FORCE SUPPORTED BY SOME 60-65,000 LOCAL GUERRILLAS. NOT ONLY IS THIS A LARGE AND WELL-TRAINED FORCE BUT IT ENJOYS THE PRICELESS ASSET OF A PROTECTED LOGISTIC SANCTUARY IN THE DRV AND IN LAOS. I DO NOT RECALL IN HISTORY A SUCCESSFUL ANTI-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN WITH LESS THAN A 10 TO 1 NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OVER THE GUERRILLAS AND WITHOUT THE ELIMINATION OF ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.

7. OBVIOUSLY NEITHER CONDITION OBTAINS IN SVN. WITH REGARD TO RELATIVE MANPOWER, THE GVN MILITARY-PARANILITARY-POLICE FORCES DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS HAVE ENJOYED ONLY A LITTLE OVER A 5 TO 1 ADVANTAGE IN SPITE OF GAINING IN STRENGHT SOME 165,000 IN THE SAME PERIOD. THUS, IF THERE IS ANY VALIDITY IN THE 10-1 SUPERIORITY REQUIREMENT, IN SPITE OF HIGH LOSSES VC STRENGHT AND A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO INCREASE GVN FORCES, THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD OF REACHING A SATISFACTORY STRENGHT RELATIONSHIP NOW OR AT ANY TIME WE CAN FORESEE UNDER CURRENT PROCEDURES. NOR DOES IT SEEM REASONABLE OR FEASIBLE TO LOOK TO US OR THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES TO FILL THE MANPOWER GAP. (SEE SECTION V).

8. THE ABILITY OF THE VC TO REGENERATE THEIR STRENGTH AND TO MAINTAIN THEIR MORALE IS TO AN IMPORTANT DEGREE THE RESULT OF

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-2- 2052, JANUARY 6, 11 AM, (SECTION TWO OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

INFILTRATION FROM THE LOGISTICAL SANCTUARIES OUTSIDE THE AND FROM THE SENSE OF SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE THIS GIVES THEM. YOU HAVE DOUBTLESS SEEN THE RECENT STUDY OF INFILTRATION WHICH ESTIMATES A TOTAL INFILTRATION OF 34,000 SINCE FEBRUARY, 1960, AND POINTS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF 10,00 INFILTRATORS IN 1964. WHILE THERE IS MUCH CHANCE FOR ERROR IN SUCH FIGURES, INFILTRATION IS AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF VC RECUPERATIVE POWERS.

9. APART FROM INADEQUATE FORCES AND FRONTIERS OPEN TO INFILTRATION, THE INABILITY TO GIVE SVN ADEQUATE SECURITY IS A BY-PRODUCT OF THE WEAKNESS OF GOVT ALREADY DISCUSSED. EFFECTIVE PACIFICATION CALLS FOR AN INTRICATE BLENDING OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESOURCES WHICH, THUS FAR, HAS EXCEEDED THE CAPABILITY OF THE CHANGING SAIGON GOVTS. THE HOP TAC EXPERIMENT IS PRODUCING SOME ENCOURAGING RESULTS BUT THE COUNTRY-WIDE PACIFICATION PROGRAM AS A WHOLE HAS A LONG TIME TO GO--YEARS IN FACT--BEFORE WE CAN HOPE TO BRING SECURITY TO SVN BY PRESENT METHODS AND AT CURRENT RATES OF PROGRESS.

10. THE THIRD CAUSE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, WAR-WEARINESS, IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND. IT GROWS OUT OF 20 YEARS OF UNINTERRUPTED CONFLICT WITH THE JAPANESE, THE FRENCH, THE RELIGIOUS SECTS AND THE VC. IT HAS INCREASED AS THE RESULT OF DISAPPOINTED HOPES FOLLOWING THE OVERTHROW OF DIEM AND THE FAILURE OF THE HERALDED NEW REVOLUTION. IT EXISTS MORE IN THE CITIES AND AMONG THE INTELLECTUALS THAN IN THE PROVINCES AMONG THE PEASANTS AND SOLDIERS. THE ONLY CAUSE FOR SURPRISE IS THAT MORALE IS NOT WORSE THAN IT IS. THERE IS A TOUGHNESS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WHICH IS A VERY ENCOURAGING PHENOMENON. ONE CANNOT ESCAPE THE FEELING THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION HERE WHICH A FEW VICTORIES, MILITARY OR POLITICAL, COULD NOT TURN AROUND.

CFN 6 VC 1954-55 34,000 60-65,000 NOT DRV NOT 10 1 7 SVN
GVN 5 1 165,000 10-1 VC GVN NO V 8. VC 34,000 1960 10,000
1964 VC 9. SVN HOP TAC 10 20 VC

TAYLOR

RNL/1

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

002

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL: 2410
 RECEIVED: JANUARY 6, 1965, 3:00 A.M.

Info FROM: SAIGON

 ACTION: SECSTATE 2052 PRIORITY

 DATE: JANUARY 6, 11 A.M. (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT - SECTION I OF V SECTIONS.

N O D I S -- LCR

11. IF THESE ARE THE CAUSES--UNSTABLE GOVT, LACK OF SECURITY AND WAR-WEARINESS-- THE NEXT QUESTION IS WHAT WE CAN DO TO ELIMINATE OR MODIFY THESE FACTORS AND THUS CHANGE THE SITUATION FOR THE BETTER, BEARING IN MIND THAT WE HAVE LIMITED TIME. SOME THINGS WE CLEARLY CANNOT DO--CHANGE NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, CREATE LEADERSHIP WHERE IT DOES NOT EXIST, RAISE LARGE ADDITIONAL GVN FORCES OR SEAL POROUS FRONTIERS TO INFILTRATION. IF ONE ACCEPTS SUCH LIMITATIONS, THEN IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT IN THE TIME AVAILABLE WE CANNOT EXPECT ANYTHING BETTER THAN MARGINAL GOVT AND MARGINAL PACIFICATION PROGRESS WITH CONTINUED DECLINE OF NATIONAL MORALE--UNLESS SOMETHING NEW IS ADDED TO MAKE UP FOR THOSE THINGS WE CANNOT CONTROL.

12. THUS, WE ARE FACED WITH CONSIDERING WHAT WE CAN DO. WE CAN PROBABLY COMPROMISE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS IN A WAY WHICH WILL SALVAGE HUONG BUT WILL LEAVE HIM PRETTY MUCH UNDER MILITARY DOMINATION. IF HUONG GOES, HE WILL PROBABLY BE FOLLOWED BY SOME KIND OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT. IF IT IS CONTROLLED BY KHANH, WE WILL HAVE TO DO HARD SOUL-SEARCHING TO DECIDE WHETHER TO TRY TO GET ALONG WITH HIM AGAIN AFTER PREVIOUS FAILURES OR TO REFUSE TO SUPPORT HIM AND TAKE THE CONSEQUENCES--WHICH MIGHT ENTAIL ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL. IF WE CAN MISLAY KHANH AND GET A MILITARY CHIEF OF STATE LIKE CO OR DONG, WE HAVE A FRESH OPTION WORTH TRYING. BUT WHETHER A JERRY-BUILT CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER MILITARY DOMINATION OR A BRAND NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT, IT WILL NOT GET FAR UNLESS A NEW FACTOR IS ADDED WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO COALESCING THE POLITICAL FACTIONS AROUND AND WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THUS BOLSTER ITS POSITION.

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-2- 2052, JANUARY 6, 11 AM, (SECTION THREE OF FIVE),
FROM SAIGON

13. TO SPEED PACIFICATION, WE COULD CONSIDER INCREASING THE U.S. SUPPORT BY INCREASING THE ADVISORY EFFORT OR BY ADDING COMBAT UNITS. WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST POSSIBILITY DURING THE LAST YEAR WE HAVE ALREADY INCREASED OUR ADVISORY EFFORT BY 42 PERCENT. THE INCREASE HAS TAKEN PLACE AT SEVERAL ECHELONS AND HAS INVOLVED NOT ONLY THE MILITARY BUT USOM AND USIS REPRESENTATION AS WELL. IN THE MILITARY SPHERE, THE POSITIONING OF ADVISORY TEAMS AT DISTRICT (COUNTY) LEVEL AND THE AUGMENTATION OF BATTALION TEAMS ACCOUNT FOR MOST OF THE INCREASE. AMERICANS ARE NOW ADVISING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE REGULAR FORCES DOWN TO BATTALION AND A VERY LARGE PART OF THE PARAMILITARY FORCES. AMERICANS ARE ALSO FLYING ALL MANNER OF FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT, AND ARE OPERATING AN EXTENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. BY FEBRUARY 1 THERE WILL BE 23,700 OFFICERS AND MEN IN COUNTRY; AND, IN ADDITION, APPROXIMATELY 750 CIVILIAN ADVISORS. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR CAPABILITY TO STIFFEN FURTHER, BY ADVISORY MEANS, IS VERY LIMITED; INDEED, WE HAVE PROBABLY REACHED ABOUT THE SATURATION POINT.

14. THE INTRODUCTION OF U.S. GROUND UNITS TO HELP FIGHT THE VIET-CONG IS STILL ANOTHER QUESTION. TO TAKE THIS DECISION WOULD IN EFFECT CHANGE THE BASIS OF OUR CONDUCT OF THE WAR. THIS IS IN ITSELF NO ARGUMENT AGAINST SUCH A CHANGE, BUT FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED IN SECTION V, WE ARE STILL OF THE OPINION THAT WE SHOULD NOT GET INTO THIS GUERRILLA CONFLICT WITH OUR GROUND UNITS.

15. IN THE SEARCH FOR SOME COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WILL HELP PULL THE GOVERNMENT TOGETHER, STIMULATE PACIFICATION AND RAISE THE MORALE, I CAN FIND ONLY ONE WHICH OFFERS ANY CHANCE OF THE NEEDED SUCCESS IN THE AVAILABLE TIME. THIS IS THE PROGRAM OF GRADUATED AIR ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST THE WILL OF THE DRV, REFERRED TO IN REFERENCE B AS PHASE II. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH ATTACKS WOULD BE FOURFOLD: (1) CONVEY TO HANOI THE MESSAGE THAT IT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY COSTLY TO SUPPORT THE VC; (2) EVENTUALLY CREATE A SITUATION FAVORABLE TO TALKING WITH HANOI; (3) TURN SVN ATTENTION FROM INTERNAL FEUDING TO ATTACKING THE EXTERNAL SOURCE OF THEIR TROUBLES; (4) RESTORE U.S./GVN CAMARADERIE THROUGH A JOINT MILITARY EFFORT.

CFN 11 12 HUONG 13 42 1 23,700 14 15 (1) (2) (3) (4)

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TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

002

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 2409
RECEIVED : JANUARY 6, 1965, 2:58A.M.

Info

FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE 2052 PRIORITY
DATE : JANUARY 6, 11 A.M. (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT - SECTION I OF V SECTIONS

N O D I S - - L O R

16. I KNOW THAT THIS IS AN OLD RECIPE WITH LITTLE ATTRACTIVENESS BUT NO MATTER HOW WE REEXAMINE THE FACTS, OR WHAT APPEAR TO BE THE FACTS, WE CAN FIND NO OTHER ANSWER WHICH OFFERS ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THE OTHER CHOICES ARE TO CONTINUE AS WE ARE, MAKING MARGINAL IMPROVEMENTS AND HOPING FOR THE BEST, TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENEMY, OR TO WITHDRAW. NOBODY ON THE SPOT HERE BELIEVES THAT ANY ONE OF THESE WILL RESULT IN OUGHT BUT LOSS OF SVN AND EVENTUALLY OF SEA. IT IS TRUE THAT OUR RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION OFFERS NO CERTAINTY OF SUCCESS AND CARRIES SOME RISKS. WE ARE PRESENTLY ON A LOSING TRACK AND MUST RISK A CHANGE. HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE TO ARRIVE AT A DENOUMENT IF WE DO NOT CHANGE I CANNOT SAY BUT TO TAKE NO POSITIVE ACTION NOW IS TO ACCEPT DEFEAT IN THE FARLY NEAR FUTURE. FURTHERMORE, THE ACTION REQUIRED GOES BEYOND ANY MERE IMPROVEMENT, NECESSARILY LIMITED, IN WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING UP TO NOW. THE GAME NEEDS TO BE OPENED UP AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED FOR NEW BREAKS WHICH HOPEFULLY MAY BE IN OUR FAVOR. THE NEW BREAKS MAY ALSO BE UNFAVORABLE BUT SCARCELY MORE SO THAN THOSE WE HAVE BEEN GETTING THUS FAR.

17. I HAVE SHARED YOUR FEELING THAT A STABLE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON SHOULD BE A PREREQUISITE TO OUR UNDERTAKING OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST DRV. AS STATED IN REFERENCE C, THE MINIMUM CRITERIA OF PERFORMANCE WHICH SHOULD BE MET INCLUDE THE ABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SPEAK FOR AND TO ITS PEOPLE, TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN ITS PRINCIPAL CITIES, TO MAKE PLANS FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS AND ASSURE THEIR EFFECTIVE EXECUTION BY MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES COMPLETELY RESPONSIVE TO ITS AUTHORITY. THE PRESENT

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-2- 2052, JANUARY 6, 11 AM, (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE),
FROM SAIGON

HUONG GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REACH THIS STANDARD PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAIN RESPONSIVENESS OF THE ARMED FORCES TO ITS COMMANDS. WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT IN ADJUSTING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS TO ENCOURAGE LEGITIMATE PARTICIPATION BY THE ARMED FORCES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND AN ACCEPTANCE OF A DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT. WE HAVE SOME LEVERAGE ON THE GENERALS IN THE FORM OF THE INCREASED AID WHICH I WAS AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOVERNMENT UPON MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON LAST MONTH. THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE ITEM IN THE PACKAGE IS THE MATTER OF JOINT PLANNING IN CONTEMPLATION OF PHASE II OPERATIONS. MY PRESENT AUTHORITY PERMITS ME NOW TO INITIATE PLANNING FOR PHASE II WITH GVN WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE USG DOES NOT COMMIT ITSELF TO ANY FORM OF EXECUTION OF SUCH PLANS. ACTUALLY, BECAUSE OF THE RECENT CLIMATE OF OUR RELATIONS, WE HAVE NOT INITIATED THIS PLANNING AND SHOULD NOT UNTIL WE ARE Surer OF OUR FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION. IT WOULD BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE IN REACHING A COMPROMISE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IF I WERE AUTHORIZED TO STATE EXPLICITLY TO GVN LEADERS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE PHASE II OPERATIONS IN CASE THE NEW GOVERNMENT MEETS OR SHOWS REASONABLE PROMISE OF MEETING YOUR CRITERIA. WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IS UNDERTAKING A CONDITIONAL COMMITMENT THAT IF, IN THE U.S. JUDGEMENT, THE GVN REACHES A CERTAIN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE, THE USG WILL JOIN IN AN ESCALATING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE DRV. HOPEFULLY, BY SUCH ACTION, WE COULD IMPROVE THE GOVERNMENT, UNIFY THE ARMED FORCES TO SOME DEGREE, AND THEREUPON MOVE INTO THE PHASE II PROGRAM WITHOUT WHICH WE SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF BREAKING OUT OF THE PRESENT DOWNWARD SPIRAL.

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TAYLOR

RNL/1

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

002

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 2423
RECEIVED: JANUARY 6, 1964, 3:15 A.M.

Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2052 PRIORITY
DATE: JANUARY 6, 11 A.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT = SECTION I OF V SECTIONS

N O D I S--LOR

18. WITH REGARD TO YOUR FEELING THAT THIS GUERRILLA WAR CANNOT BE WON FROM THE AIR, I AM IN ENTIRE AGREEMENT, IF WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF THE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. AS I CONCEIVE IT, THE PHASE II PROGRAM IS NOT A RESORT TO USE BOMBING TO WIN DOUHET THEORY (WHICH I HAVE SPENT CONSIDERABLE PAST EFFORT IN EXPOSING) BUT IS THE USE OF THE MOST FLEXIBLE WEAPON IN OUR ARSENAL OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE WILL OF THE CHIEFS OF THE DRV. AS PRACTICAL MEN, THEY CANNOT WISH TO SEE THE FRUITS OF TENS YEARS OF LABOR DESTROYED BY SLOWLY ESCALATING AIR ATTACKS (WHICH THEY CANNOT PREVENT) WITHOUT TRYING TO FIND SOME ACCOMMODATION WHICH WILL EXERCISE THE THREAT. IT WOULD BE TO OUR INTEREST TO REGULATE OUR ATTACKS NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DOING MAXIMUM PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION BUT FOR PRODUCING MAXIMUM STRESSES IN HANOI MINDS.

19. THUS FAR I HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED REPRISAL BOMBING IN RESPONSE TO SOME MAJOR VC ATROCITY SUCH AS THE BIDN HOA ATTACK OR THE BRINK BOMBING. I GATHER THAT THE DECISION NOT TO REACT TO THE BRINK AFFAIR RESULTED FROM A COMBINATION OF CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS THE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN SAIGON AT THE TIME, THE INITIAL UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE JOB, THE FEELING THAT THE LOCAL SECURITY HAD LEFT SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED AND THAT, WHEN ALL CONSIDERATIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, TOO MUCH TIME HAD ELAPSED TO WARRANT MAKING A REPRISAL. WITHOUT UNDERTAKING TO DISCUSS EACH ONE OF THESE POINTS, I WOULD SAY THAT THE PROBLEM LOOKS QUITE DIFFERENT HERE THAN FROM WASHINGTON. IF WE ARE SO UNFORTUNATE AS TO HAVE ANOTHER ATROCITY WARRANTING

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-2- 2052, JANUARY 6, 11 AM, (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

CONSIDERATION OF REPRISAL BOMBING (AND I FEEL SURE THAT WE WILL), WE THINK THIS EVENT SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE DRV APPROPRIATELY WHICH SHOULD BE WELCOMED. IT WOULD NOT ONLY SIGNAL HANOI BUT WOULD GIVE THE LOCAL MORALE A MUCH NEEDED SHOT IN THE ARM AND SHOULD DAMPEN VC ENTHUSIASM FOR TERRORISM ESPECIALLY AGAINST AMERICANS AND THUS AID IN PROTECTING OUR PEOPLE. IF, AS IS USUAL, THE INVESTIGATION TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS TAKES SOME DAYS, THAT DELAY SHOULD BE NO BAR TO RETALIATION. OUR INTENT WILL BE PERFECTLY CLEAR WHEN WE ACT AND THE ADVANTAGES DERIVED THEREFROM WILL BE UNAFFECTED. WE THINK HERE THAT OUR POLICY SHOULD BE TO RETALIATE PROMPTLY AFTER RECEIVING PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL FOR EACH CASE. TO JUSTIFY A REPRISAL, THE STABILITY OF THE GVN (OR LACK THEREOF) AT THE TIME APPEARS TO US TO HAVE MUCH LESS IMPORTANCE THAN IN THE CASE OF THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OF PHASE II BOMBING.

20. THE MATTER OF THE EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS IS CLOSELY LINKED TO THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS. BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE AND YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST IN IT, I HAVE GIVEN IT SEPARATE TREATMENT IN SECTION II WHICH FOLLOWS. IN BRIEF, THE STUDY CONCLUDES THAT THE FLOW OF DEPENDENTS SHOULD BE STOPPED NOW. NUMBERS PRESENTLY HERE SHOULD BE REDUCED BY ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES BUT THE ORDER TO EVACUATE ALL DEPENDENTS, BECAUSE OF ITS POLITICAL IMPACT, SHOULD AWAIT A DECISION TO EXECUTE A RETALIATORY STRIKE AGAINST THE DRV OR TO INITIATE THE PHASE II PROGRAM.

21. IF THE FOREGOING REASONING IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED, THEN WE SHOULD LOOK FOR AN OCCASION TO BEGIN AIR OPERATIONS JUST AS SOON AS WE HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPROMISED THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN SAIGON AND SET UP A MINIMAL GOVT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE OF PARA 17. AT THE PROPER TIME, WE CAN SET THE STAGE FOR ACTION BY EXPOSING TO THE PUBLIC OUR CASE AGAINST INFILTRATION, AND BY INITIATING AGGRESSIVE DESOTO PATROLS. WE CAN BE READY WITH PROMPT REPRISAL BOMBING IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER VC TERRORISM. AS AN EARNEST OF OUR INTENT, WE CAN OPEN JOINT PLANNING WITH THE GVN AGAINST THE NORTH AND STOP THE FLOW OF OUR DEPENDENTS. WHEN DECIDED TO ACT, WE CAN JUSTIFY THAT DECISION ON THE BASIS OF INFILTRATION, OF VC TERRORISM, OF ATTACKS ON DESOTO PATROLS OR ANY COMBINATION OF THE THREE.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 2052, JANUARY 6, 11 AM, (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

22. IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD REQUEST AUTHORITY TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 17 IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A GOVT MEETING THE MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR JUSTIFYING THE EXTENSION OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST THE DRV IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PHASE II CONCEPT. IN THE MEANTIME, I WOULD HOPE THAT, REGARDLESS OF GVN PERFORMANCE IN RESPECT TO THE CRITERIA, THE USG WOULD BE READY AT ANY TIME TO APPROVE REPRISAL STRIKES TO RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE TO MAJOR VC TERRORISM.

AMB JOHNSON AND GEN WESTMORELAND CONCUR IN THIS CABLE.

TAYLOR

RNL/1

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 2448
 RECEIVED: JANUARY 6, 1965, 3:56 A.M.

Info

FROM: SAIGON
 ACTION: SECSTATE 2655 PRIORITY
 DATE: JANUARY 6, 2 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT - SECTION II OF V SECTIONS

N O D I S -- L O R

REF. PAR. 7(1) CAP-64375

I FULLY UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE PROBLEM OF DEPENDENTS. AS WE SEE IT HERE, THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS TO THIS -- FIRST, THE ACTUAL PHYSICAL DANGER TO THE DEPENDENTS THEMSELVES AND, SECONDLY, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS BOTH ON OUR FRIENDS HERE AND ON THE ENEMY OF A DECISION TO WITHDRAW THEM. ALTHOUGH NO ONE CAN EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY AT ANY TIME OF ACCIDENTAL OR DELIBERATE INJURY BEING INFLICTED UPON SOME OF OUR DEPENDENTS, FOR THE MOMENT I AM MOST CONCERNED WITH THE LATTER PROBLEM, THAT IS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON OUR FRIENDS AND ENEMIES.

IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE WOULD, I AM CERTAIN, BE INTERPRETED BOTH HERE AND IN HANOI AND PEKING AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS AND DESPERATION WHICH COULD RESULT IN PANIC AMONG OUR FRIENDS AND GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE ENEMY. (IT WOULD ALSO ADVERSELY INFLUENCE OUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE FROM OUR LESS STURDY FRIENDS.) HOWEVER, IF THE WITHDRAWAL IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO OTHER ACTION AGAINST THE DRV, IT CAN, IF PROPERLY HANDLED, BE USED TO REINFORCE THE TONIC EFFECTS SUCH ACTION WILL HAVE FOR OUR FRIENDS AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE THAT WE WILL DESIRE TO COMMUNICATE TO THE ENEMY. I HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN MIND THE SUCCESSFUL WAY IN WHICH WE USED THE EVACUATION OF OUR DEPENDENTS FROM GUANTANAMO DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS TO REINFORCE THE SIGNALS THAT WE WERE SEEKING TO

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-2- 2055, JANUARY 6, 2 P.M., FROM SAIGON

COMMUNICATE TO BOTH HAVANA AND MOSCOW.

AT THE SAME TIME, I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT UNTIL THE TIME COMES THAT WE WANT TO USE MANDATORY WITHDRAWAL OF DEPENDENTS TO REINFORCE WIDER ACTION WE ARE TAKING ELSEWHERE, WE SHOULD SEEK TO DO ALL WE CAN TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM. WE HAVE ALREADY DONE MUCH TO REDUCE THEIR NUMBERS BY VOLUNTARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION. FOR SOME TIME USOM HAS HIRED NO NEW PERSONNEL WITH SMALL CHILDREN. MACV HAS ALSO BEEN REDUCING THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS REQUIRING TWO-YEAR TOURS AND THUS, UNDER PRESENT DOD POLICY, THE PRESENCE OF DEPENDENTS IF DESIRED BY THEIR SPONSOR. ALL THE AGENCIES HAVE ALSO INFORMALLY DISCOURAGED THE BRINGING OF DEPENDENTS AND ENCOURAGED THE VOLUNTARY RETURN OF THOSE ALREADY HERE. HOWEVER, WE CAN, AND SUBJECT TO YOUR OWN THOUGHTS, I PROPOSE TO DO MUCH MORE.

WE COULD HAVE ALL AGENCIES IMMEDIATELY INITIATE A POLICY OF NOT PERMITTING NEWLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL OR THOSE RETURNING FROM HOME LEAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR DEPENDENTS. WE COULD ALSO INITIATE A POLICY OF ENCOURAGING THE ADVANCED DEPARTURE OF DEPENDENTS WHOSE SPONSORS ARE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE VIET-NAM PERMANENTLY OR ON HOME LEAVE ORDERS IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. ADDITIONALLY, ALL THE AGENCIES REPRESENTED HERE COULD TAKE A HARDER LOOK AT THEIR STAFFING PATTERNS TO SEE WHETHER STAFF MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH DEPENDENTS, COULD BE REDUCED WITHOUT IMPAIRING OUR EFFECTIVENESS. ALL OF THIS WILL INEVITABLY RESULT IN SOME PUBLICITY BUT I THINK THAT THIS IS MANAGEABLE.

WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINING DEPENDENTS, I WOULD PROPOSE THAT AT THE TIME WE INITIATE A RETALIATORY STRIKE AGAINST THE DRV OR INITIATE PHASE 2 ACTION AGAINST THE NORTH WE SIMULTANEOUSLY ANNOUNCE AND UNDERTAKE AN EVACUATION OF ALL REMAINING DEPENDENTS. I SUGGEST THAT SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY TIMED IN RELATION TO WHATEVER ELSE WE WILL PUBLICLY BE SAYING AT THE TIME. I BELIEVE THAT AN ORDERLY EVACUATION OF THE REMAINING DEPENDENTS COULD BE CARRIED OUT AT THAT TIME OVER A PERIOD OF SAY SEVEN TO TEN DAYS WITH MINIMUM PERSONAL HARDSHIP AND RISK TO THEM AND WITHOUT THE SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECTS OF DOING IT BEFORE THAT.

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-3- 2055, JANUARY 6, 2 P.M., FROM SAIGON

NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF AT ANY TIME CIVIL DISORDERS IN SAIGON OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTS INDICATE AN IMMINENT AND SERIOUS RISK TO DEPENDENTS, I WILL HAVE NO HESITANCY IN ORDERING THEIR IMMEDIATE EVACUATION.

ALL OF MY PRINCIPAL COLLEAGUES STRONGLY AGREE WITH THE FOREGOING VIEWS EXCEPT JIM KILLEN WHO, WHILE RECOGNIZING THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF IMMEDIATE EVACUATION, FAVORS A COMPLETE EVACUATION INITIATED NOW PHASED OVER PERHAPS A TWO-MONTH PERIOD.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* #5 W 10

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Action

Info CONTROL: 2519
 RECEIVED: JANUARY 6, 1965, 5:38A.M.

 FROM: SAIGON

 ACTION: SECSTATE 2056 PRIORITY

 DATE: JANUARY 6, 2 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT - SECTION III OF V SECTIONS

N O D I S - - L O R

REF. PAR. 7(2), CAP-64375.

SINCE RECEIVING YOUR CAP-64375, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND HIS STAFF HAVE MADE A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR GIVING MAXIMUM SECURITY TO U.S. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES BY UTILIZING U.S. GUARDS AND UNITS. HE ARRIVES AT THE STARTLING REQUIREMENT OF 34-BATTALION EQUIVALENTS OF ARMY OR MARINE INFANTRY, TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY LOGISTIC SUPPORT. HE CONSIDERS THAT THE TOTAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENT WOULD APPROXIMATE 75,000 U.S. PERSONNEL.

THE REASON FOR THIS HIGH FIGURE IS BASICALLY THE LARGE NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS IN WHICH WE HAVE IMPORTANT U.S. INTERESTS. THEY TOTAL 16 IMPORTANT AIRFIELDS, 9 COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, ONE LARGE POL STORAGE AREA, AND 289 SEPARATE INSTALLATIONS WHERE U.S. PERSONNEL WORK OR LIVE. ANY ONE OF THESE IS CONCEIVABLY VULNERABLE TO VC ATTACK IN THE FORM OF MORTAR FIRE OR SABOTAGE; AND ANNY ARE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK BY VC GROUND FORCES. TO KEEP MORTAR FIRE OFF ANY GIVEN POINT, ONE MUST SECURE AN AREA ROUGHLY 16 SQUARE MILES (A CIRCLE WHOSE RADIUS IS 4,000 YARDS, THE MAXIMUM RANGE OF 81MM MORTAR). THUS LARGE AIRFIELDS WOULD, IN THE OPINION OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND, REQUIRE UP TO 6 BATTALIONS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES.

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-2- 2056, January 6, 2 P.M., From Saigon

EVEN WITH SUCH A COMMITMENT OF U.S. FORCES, THERE WOULD BE NO ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE AGAINST CLANDESTINE SABOTAGE OR COVERT MORTAR ATTACKS. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED IN OR NEAR TOWN OR CITIES, OR IN HEAVILY POPULATED FARM LAND. IN MOST OF THESE AREAS, IT IS NEITHER PRACTICAL NOR POLITICALLY FEASIBLE TO CLEAR AWAY A 4,000 YARD-WIDE BELT THAT COULD BE CONTROLLED BY U.S. FORCES. CONSEQUENTLY, U.S. TROOPS WOULD BE FACED WITH DISCHARGE OF GUARD MISSION WITHIN POPULATED AREAS AND WOULD LACK THE AUTHORITY AS WELL AS ABILITY TO CONTROL THE MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION AND TO EXECUTE THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY SUCH A MISSION. IT IS LIKELY THAT SUCH AN EFFORT TO GIVE GREATER SECURITY TO OUR PEOPLE WOULD BRING US INTO GREATER CONFLICT WITH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT.

IN CONNECTION WITH GUARDING U.S. PERSONNEL BILLETS AND DEPENDENT QUARTERS, WE ARE PRESENTLY CONDUCTING A DETAILED SURVEY OF REQUIREMENTS. UNDER PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS, THE MAIN BURDEN FOR SECURITY RESTS UPON THE VIETNAMESE POLICE AND MILITARY SERVICES, AND WE BELIEVE THAT RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD REMAIN THEIRS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT AN ADDITIONAL U.S. MILITARY POLICE BATTALION IS REQUIRED IN SAIGON AREA TO AUGMENT THE VIETNAMESE IN ORDER TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF SECURITY PROVIDED.

OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS INITIATED OR HAS RECOMMENDED TAKING THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. AN INCREASE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES BY APPROXIMATELY 80,000 AND THE NATIONAL POLICE BY 10,000 IN 1965 IN ORDER TO PROVIDE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR THE PROTECTION OF U.S. INSTALLATIONS.

B. A LONG SERIES OF UNILATERAL U.S. MEASURES SUCH AS THE DISPERSAL AND REVENEMENT OF U.S. AIRCRAFT, THE PROVISION OF SANDBAG PERSONNEL SHELTERS WHERE APPROPRIATE, PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL AIR AND MILITARY POLICE FOR CLOSE-IN SECURITY OF U.S. AIRCRAFT ON MAJOR AIRFIELDS, THE AUGMENTATION OF MARINE SECURITY ELEMENTS TO REINFORCED COMPANY STRENGTH FOR CLOSE-IN-PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT AT THE DANANG AIRFIELD, AND THE EMPLACEMENT OF COUNTER-MORTAR AND GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR NEAR CERTAIN SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS.

C. PERSUASION OF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY TO TAKE COMPLEMENTARY STEPS, TO INCLUDE THE CLARIFICATION OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRBASE DEFENSE, THE EMPLACEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY AND MORTAR BATTERIES AT CERTAIN AIRFIELDS, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BETTER INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS, PARTICULARLY AROUND KEY INSTALLATIONS.

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-3- 2056, January 6, 2 p.m., From Saigon

WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT WHEN THE FOREGOING MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN, WE WILL HAVE CREATED COMPLETE SAFETY FOR OUR INSTALLATIONS AND FOR OUR PEOPLE.

HOWEVER, WE CONSIDER THAT, ON BALANCE, OUR PRESENT PLANS TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF VIETNAM, TO IMPROVE THEIR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, AND, IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN EXPANDED POLICE FORCE, TO MAXIMIZE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO PACIFICATION ARE PREFERABLE TO THE COMMITMENT OF A LARGE NUMBER OF U.S. SECURITY FORCES TO STATIC GUARD MISSIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT PROGRAM WILL, IN THE END, PRODUCE THAT DEGREE OF SECURITY WHICH IS REASONABLY ATTAINABLE.

(MESSAGE GARBLED . APPROXIMATELY TWO LINES MISSING).
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TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action CONTROL: 2472
RECEIVED: JANUARY 6, 1965, 5:10A.M.

Info FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2057 PRIORITY
DATE: JANUARY 6, 2 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

^{-LOR}
N O D I S FOR THE PRESIDENT

SECTION IV OF V SECTIONS

REF PAR 7(3) CAP-64375.

BECAUSE OF HIS WIDE QUALIFICATIONS, I HAVE LEANED HEAVILY ON ALEX JOHNSON, ASSISTED BY THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE EMBASSY, TO RESPOND TO YOUR COMMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE NEED FOR A MUCH WIDER AND MORE VARIED ATTEMPT TO GET GOOD POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH ALL VIETNAMESE GROUPS. IN HIS OPINION, THERE IS NO COUNTRY IN THE WORLD IN WHICH WE HAVE MORE EXTENSIVE OR DEEPER COMMUNICATION WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION AS WELL AS THE GOVT THAN HERE. BETWEEN THE EMB AND CAS OFFICERS, WE HAVE SOME 45 FRENCH-SPEAKING AND 10-VIETNAMESE SPEAKING OFFICERS WHOSE PRIMARY DUTY IS MAINTAINING SUCH COMMUNICATION. THEY HAVE LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF CONTACTS WITH EVERY IMPORTANT WALK OF VIETNAMESE LIFE. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NOT SUGGEST YOUR READING ITS ENTIRETY, I DO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE INTERESTING FOR YOU TO TURN THE PAGES OF EMBTEL 1836 TO GET AN IMPRESSION OF THE EXTENT OF OUR CONTACTS WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS.

IN ADDITION TO THE EMBASSY AND CAS CONTACTS, THROUGH OUR INTEGRATED USIS/GVN PROGRAMS, WE SPEAK BY RADIO, MOVING PICTURES, PAMPHLETS AND NEWSPAPERS TO THE BROAD MASS OF THE PEOPLE. THROUGH THE VOICE OF AMERICA, WHICH IS VERY EXTENSIVELY LISTENED TO HERE, PARTICULARLY IN TIMES OF CRISIS, WE COMMUNICATE SELECTIVELY THE VIEWS OF THE US AND THE WORLD PRESS.

ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE UNUSUAL ABILITY TO REACH THE ARMED FORCES OF VIETNAM AND PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS THROUGH THE HUNDREDS OF US MILITARY OFFICERS AND USOM FIELD REPS WHO ARE IN INTIMATE AND DAILY CONTACT WITH THEIR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS. THEY ARE

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-2- 2057, JANUARY 6, 2 P.M., FROM SAIGON

LINKED TOGETHER BY A US COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS US VERY QUICKLY TO PASS THEM APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE ON CURRENT MATTERS. WE HAVE BEEN USING THEM EXTENSIVELY IN THE CURRENT CRISIS TO MAKE KNOWN THE US POSITION.

ON THE WHOLE, THE QUALITY OF OUR PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM IS HIGH AND I BELIEVE THEY MEET PRETTY WELL YOUR DESCRIPTION OF "SENSITIVE, PERSISTENT AND ATTENTIVE AMERICANS." WE COULD PERHAPS IMPROVE ON OUR USE OF THEM BUT WE DEFINITELY DO NOT NEED MORE. THE VIETNAMESE MAY EVEN BE SOMEWHAT SMOTHERED NOW BY THE QUANTITY OF US CONTACTS.

IN OUR USE OF THESE CONTACTS, THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE WHICH WE MUST BEAR IN MIND--THE LONG TERM AND THE SHORT TERM. THE LONG TERM IS DIRECTED TOWARD INFLUENCING THE BASIC ATTITUDES AND CHARACTERS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE SHORT TERM IS DIRECTED AGAINST WORKING WITH THESE VIETNAMESE AS THEY ARE TODAY IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH OUR IMMEDIATE PURPOSES. NO AMOUNT OF PERSUASION OR COMMUNICATION IS GOING TO MAKE THEM OTHER THAN WHAT THEY ARE OVER THE SHORT TERM. NOTHING THAT ANYONE CAN SAY IN THE SHORT TERM IS GOING TO CHANGE THEIR DEEP-SEATED SUSPICIONS AND FEARS OF EACH OTHER, THEIR POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND THEIR LACK OF ANY TRUE SENSE OF NATIONHOOD. THE FRENCH BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION OF MOST OF THE ELITE HAVE CAUSED THEM TO ABSORB SOME OF THE LESS DESIRABLE FRENCH CHARACTERISTICS IN THIS REGARD AND, IN ADDITION, GIVE THEM A CERTAIN SCHIZOPHRENIA, BEING TORN BETWEEN THE NATIVE VIETNAMESE AND THE FRENCH CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS. THUS, THEY HAVE NO SINGLE FRAME OF REFERENCE IN WHICH TO REACT TO EVENTS -- HENCE THE SEEMING VOLATILITY OF THEIR ATTITUDE AND THE LACK OF FIRM PRINCIPLE TO GUIDE THEIR JUDGMENT.

WITH SUCH AN UNSTABLE AUDIENCE, THE QUESTION IS WHAT TO SAY IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THEM IN THE DIRECTION OF US POLICY. NO DOUBT WITH GREATER EXPERIENCE WE CAN BECOME MORE EFFECTIVE, BUT OUR OVERRIDING PROBLEM IS THE INABILITY UP TO NOW TO GIVE THEM ANY HOPE FOR AN EVENTUAL END TO THEIR TRIBULATIONS IMPOSED BY 20 YEARS OF WAR. IN THE ABSENCE OF A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL, THEY TEND TO BLAME US RATHER THAN THEMSELVES FOR THE CONTINUED DARKNESS.

I REALIZE THAT THE FOREGOING SOUNDS AS IF WE WERE SAYING THAT WE ARE DOING AS WELL AS POSSIBLE IN THIS VITAL AREA OF POLITICAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-3-, 2057, JANUARY 6, 2 P.M., FROM SAIGON

RELATIONSHIPS. RATHER I WOULD SAY WE DO NOT SEE HOW ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS WOULD HELP US TO DO BETTER AND THAT THIS IS NOT AN AREA IN WHICH LIKELY IMPROVEMENT OFFERS A HOPE OF REVERSING THE DECLINING SITUATION. THE GAINS HERE ARE LIKELY TO BE FOR THE LONG TERM WHEREAS OUR IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS TO CHANGE A SITUATION WHICH IS VERY MUCH WITH US NOW.

IN ORDER TO ASSURE YOURSELF THAT WE ARE MISSING NO REAL BETS IN THIS POLITICAL FIELD, WOULD YOU CONSIDER SENDING SOMEONE LIKE MAC BUNDY HERE FOR A FEW WEEKS TO LOOK AT THIS PARTICULAR FIELD? I THINK OF MAC PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF HIS PERCEPTIVENESS IN SUCH MATTERS AND THE FACT THAT HE HAS BEEN PHYSICALLY DETACHED FROM THE LOCAL SCENE AND HENCE WOULD HAVE AN OBJECTIVITY WHICH AN OLD VIETNAMESE HAND WOULD LACK. I CAN THINK OF NO ONE FROM THE OUTSIDE WHO COULD GIVE YOU A BETTER FIRST HAND REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

Info

CONTROL : 2635
RECD : JANUARY 6, 1965, 7:51 AM
FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE PRIORITY 2058
DATE : JANUARY 5, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT - SECTION V OF V SECTIONS

! N O D I S - - L O R

REF PARA 7(4) CAP 64375.

FOLLOWING IS AN ANALYSIS BY GEN WESTMORELAND AND HIS STAFF IN WHICH I CONCUR, REGARDING THE FEASIBILITY OF STIFFENING THE ARMED FORCES OF VIETNAM BY INTRODUCING U.S. AND POSSIBLY THIRD COUNTRY GROUND COMBAT FORCES (SPECIAL FORCES, RANGERS, MARINES, ETC.).

1. WITH REGARD TO AN INCREASE IN US ADVISORY EFFORT, WE HAVE GONE ABOUT AS FAR DOWN THE ADVISORY ROUTE AS IT IS PRACTICAL TO GO WITHOUT PASSING THE POINT OF CLEARLY DIMINISHING RETURNS. AT THE PRESENT, THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 5,100 MILITARY ADVISORS WITHIN RVN, EXTENDING THRU ALL ECHELONS FROM THE HIGH COMMAND DOWN TO BATTALION AND TO DISTRICT (COUNTRY) LEVEL. DURING THE PAST YEAR THE ADVISORY EFFORT MEASURED IN TERMS OF MANPOWER HAS INCREASED BY 42 PER CENT. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE AT PRESENT APPROXIMATELY 18,000 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN OPERATIONAL SUPPORT OF VARIOUS TYPES. ALTHOUGH CERTAIN INCREASES AND ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE PERIODICALLY REQUIRED, THE AIR, HELICOPTER, LOGISTIC AND COMMUNICATION SUPPORT PROVIDED OR PLANNED BY THE U.S. SERVICES IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE SIZE OF THE TOTAL FORCE. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME AREAS, TREATED LATER, IN WHICH INCREASED U.S. PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT ARE DESIRABLE.

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-2- 2058 (SEONE OF TWO) FM SAIGON CN 2635, JAN 5, 2 PM 1965

A. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT AREA WHERE IT APPEARS THAN AN ADDITION TO ADVISOR EFFORT MIGHT BE WARRANTED WOULD BE AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL. ADVOSORS ARE JUST NOW ARRIVING FOR THE LAST OF 113 DISTRICTS. INITIAL EVALUATION CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE DISTRICTS ADVISORY PROGRAM IS SOUND AND IS PAYING OFF. IF MEMENTUM CAN BE MAINTAINED ANOTHER 25 OF THE REGULAR FIVE-MAN TEAMS COULD BE USED BY EARLY SUMMER AND WILL BE REQUESTED.

B. OUR CURRENT THINKING IS THAT SPECIAL FORCES TEAMS MIGHT BE UTILIZED AS ADVISORS IN REMOTE AND LEAST SECURE DISTRICTS - PERHAPS UP TO 25 MORE IN ALL.

2. WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF U.S. OR ALLIED COMBAT GROUND FORCES BEYOND THE DEPLOYMENTS PROGRAMMED UNDER SEATO PLANS AND OTHER EXISTING WAR PLANS, SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED:

A. FIRST ALTERNATIVE:

CONCEPT: U.S. (OR ALLIED) AIRBORNE, MARINE AND INFANTRY BATTALIONS UNDER U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL TO PROVIDE RESERVE STRIKING FORCES CAPABLE OF QUICK REACTION TO VC ATTACKS AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST KNOWN VC FORCES AND BASES.

FORCES: WE CONSIDERED BOTH A HIGH AND LOW OPTION AND THE DETAILS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED FOR EACH. IN SUMMARY, THE HIGH OPTION WITH 25 BNS WOULD PROVIDE U.S. QUICK REACTION FORCES AT EACH OF THE 9 DIVISIONS AND CERTAIN GENERAL RESERVES. THE LOW OPTION WITH 8 BNS WOULD PROVIDE RESERVES IN EACH OF THE 4 CORPS ZONES. IN EITHER CASE, U.S. AIR FORCES AND LOGISTICAL TROOPS ARE INCLUDED. THE HIGH HOPTION WOULD TOTAL 60,000 TROOPS - THE LOW OPTION 20,000.

ADVANTAGES: REACTION TO VC ATTACKS WOULD BE UNDER DE FACTO U.S. CONTROL, THUS INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF RAPIDITY AND AGGRESSIVENESS. VC CASUALTIES WOULD INCREASE.

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-3- 2058 (SEONE OF TWO) FM SAIGON CN 2635 JAN 5, 2 PM 1965

DISADVANTAGES: U.S. WOULD BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN GROUND COMBAT. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT CASUALTIES WOULD OCCUR AMONG VIETNAMESE NONCOMBATANTS, THUS CREATING ADVERSE REACTION BY VIETNAMESE AGAINST U.S. WHICH VC WOULD STRONGLY EXPLOIT. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THE VIETNAMESE ARMY (ARVN) MIGHT TEND TO LEAVE THE TOUGHER PROBLEMS TO U.S. TROOPS AND THUS GRADUALLY ABDICATE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. U.S. CASUALTIES WOULD BE HIGH.

B. SECOND ALTERNATIVE:

CONCEPT: INTEGRATION OF GROUND COMBAT BATTALIONS INTO ARVN INFANTRY REGIMENTS.

FORCES: IN SUMMARY, 31 INFANTRY BATTALIONS PLUS COMBAT AND SERVICE SUPPORT TROOPS AS WELL AS U.S. FIGHTER AND TRANSPORT SQUADRONS WOULD BE REQUIRED. TOTAL FORCE WOULD APPROXIMATE 66,000 PERSONNEL.

ADVANTAGES: EACH ARVN REGIMENT WOULD HAVE A TRAINED HARDCORE U.S. COMBAT UNIT TO LEAD THE WAY AND SET THE STANDARDS.

DISADVANTAGES: U.S. TROOPS WOULD BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF VIETNAMESE OFFICERS. AS IN THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE U.S. TROOPS WOULD BE ENGAGED IN POPULATED AREAS WITH MANY POLITICAL PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM NONCOMBATANT CASUALTIES AND THE APPEARANCES OF A WHITE MAN'S WAR AGAINST THE BROWN. AGAIN ARVN COULD DEVELOP A TENDENCY TO HOLD BACK, LEAVING THE U.S. BATTALIONS TO DO THE BULK OF THE FIGHTING. U.S. CASUALTIES WOULD BE HIGH.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

Info

CONTROL : 2688
RECD : JANUARY 6, 1965, 8:28 AM
FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE PRIORITY 2058
DATE : JANUARY 5, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT

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C. THIRD ALTERNATIVE:

CONCEPT: ESTABLISH THREE COASTAL ENCLAVES AT LOCATIONS SUCH AS DA NANG, TUY HOA AND PHAM RANG DEFENDED BY US/GVN/MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES. THESE ENCLAVES WOULD BE LARGE ENOUGH FOR SECURITY OF PORTS, AIRFIELDS AND LOCAL POPULATION CENTERS. GVN FORCE THUS RELIEVED COULD BE AVAILABLE FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. AS A LAST RESORT THESE BRIDGEHEADS COULD BE HELD BY FREE WORLD FORCES AS SPRING BOARDS FOR PACIFICATION OR RECONQUEST AND, AFTER MASSIVE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, WOULD DEMONSTRATE ADVANTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH FREE WORLD AND GVN.

FORCES: THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE DIVISION WOULD BE REQUIRED IN EACH ENCLAVE. AIR SUPPORT, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND NAVY REQUIREMENTS FOR COASTAL PATROL WOULD GENERATE A TOTAL ALLIED STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY 75,000.

ADVANTAGES: PROVIDE BASIS FOR FREE-WORLD PRESENCE IN RVN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA; DEMONSTRATE VISIBLE CONTRAST BETWEEN FREE WORLD AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC SYSTEMS; FACILITATE APPLICATION OF FULL RANGE OF FREE WORLD MILITARY CAPABILITIES SHOULD SUCH BECOME NECESSARY; PROVIDE FUTURE CONNECTING LINK BETWEEN FREE WORLD AND PEOPLE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

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-2- 2058 SETWO OF TWO FM SAIGON CN 2688 JANUARY 5, 2 PM,

DISADVANTAGES: COMMITS U.S. AND FREE WORLD TO INDEFINITE DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH ASIATIC COMMUNISTS; COST IN U.S. RESOURCES AND FORCES IS UNPREDICTABLE; PROVIDES PRETEXT FOR COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CHARGES OF U.S. COLONIALISM; MULTINATIONAL SUPPORT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN OR SUSTAIN. IT MAY ALSO BE DIFFICULT TO CONFINED THE FORCE TO SUCH AN ENCLAVE IN THE FACE OF GUERRILLA ATTACKS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE EVER EXTENDING DEFENSIVE ACTIONS BEYOND THE PERIMETER DEFENSE.

D. FOURTH ALTERNATIVE:

CONCEPT: INCREASE U.S. OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO THE MAXIMUM IN AREAS WHICH INVOLVE THE LEAST POLITICAL LIABILITY. THIS WOULD INCLUDE:

AIR FORCES - IN-COUNTRY USE OF U.S. JET AIRCRAFT (INCLUDING USN) IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF GVN FORCES, INCLUDING THE USE OF CBU-2 MUNITIONS.

NAVAL SURFACE FORCES - COMMITMENT OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN COORDINATION WITH THE VIETNAMESE NAVY TO COASTAL PATROL AND BLOCKADE AS A MEANS OF DENYING SUPPLIES TO THE VIET CONG.

FORCES:

AIR FORCES: ONE SQUADRON EQUIVALENT OF U.S. JET AIRCRAFT IS NOW AVAILABLE. BASE LOADING COULD ACCOMMODATE ONE MORE SQUADRON ON RANDOM BASIS WITH REMAINDER OF SUPPORT AS REQUIRED FROM CARRIERS OF 7TH FLEET.

NAVAL SURFACE FORCES: SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY CINCPAC, ONE DESTROYER SQUADRON AND SMALL CARRIER FROM CAMBODIAN BORDER TO VUNG TAU; ONE DESTROYER DIVISION SOUTH OF DEMILITARIZED ZONE; AND ONE DESTROYER DIVISION AND SEA PLANE TENDER FROM DA NANG TO VUNG TAU.

ADVANTAGES: MINIMUM ADVERSE POLITICAL IMPACT. INCREASED OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS.

DISADVANTAGES: AN EXTENSION OF U.S. COMMITMENT AND INVOLVEMENT IN COMBAT OPERATIONS. NO ASSURANCE THAT THESE STEPS WILL HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE OVERALL SITUATION.

.3. IN WEIGHING THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES, ONLY THE LAST ALTERNATIVE APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTABLE BUT NONE IS RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

-3- 2058 SETWO OF TWO FM SAIGON CN 268, JANUARY 5, 2 PM 1965

A. IT MAY SEEM AS THOUGH WE HAVE WEIGHTED TOO HEAVILY THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF U.S. GROUND FORCES. HOWEVER, AFTER MUCH SOUL SEARCHING WE HAVE RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED THAT THEIR MILITARY VALUE WOULD BE MORE THAN OFFSET BY THEIR POLITICAL LIABILITY. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE THE MANPOWER AND THE BASIC SKILLS TO WIN THIS WAR. WHAT THEY LACK IS MOTIVATION. THE ENTIRE ADVISORY EFFORT HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO GIVING THEM BOTH SKILL AND MOTIVATION. IF THAT EFFORT HAS NOT SUCCEEDED THERE IS LESS REASON TO THINK THAT U.S. COMBAT FORCES WOULD HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT. IN FACT, THERE IS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD THE OPPOSITE EFFECT BY CAUSING SOME VIETNAMESE TO LET THE U.S. CARRY THE BURDEN WHILE OTHERS, PROBABLY THE MAJORITY, WOULD TURN ACTIVELY AGAINST US. THUS INTERVENTION WITH GROUND COMBAT FORCES WOULD AT BEST BUY TIME AND WOULD LEAD TO EVER INCREASING COMMITMENTS UNTIL, LIKE THE FRENCH, WE WOULD BE OCCUPYING AN ESSENTIALLY HOSTILE FOREIGN COUNTRY.

B. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS FOR OCCASIONS WHERE EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. GROUND FORCES WOULD HAVE BEEN DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE. WE HAVE FOUND SUCH INSTANCES TO BE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN. ON BALANCE, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO JUSTIFY THE PRESENCE OF U.S. UNITS, EVEN DISREGARDING THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

C. WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO RECOMMEND THAT U.S. TROOPS BE PLACED UNDER VIETNAMESE COMMAND AND THUS REJECT THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE.

D. WHILE THE MILITARY/POLITICAL ENCLAVES HAVE SOME ATTRACTIVE FEATURES THEY WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE IN LARGE MEASURE TO THE COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR AND COULD BE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL LIABILITIES.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. THAT WE ADHERE TO THE ADVISORY SYSTEM IMPROVING AND EXPANDING IT AS NECESSARY. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT ADVISORS WILL BE REQUIRED IF THE GVN PRESSES ON WITH THE WAR.

B. THAT THE U.S. CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ONLY OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ALONG CURRENT LINES AUGMENTED AND REINFORCED AS THE SITUATION REQUIRES.

CFN C 75,000 D CBU-2 7TH 3
A B C D 4 1" ?

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

9

4

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 1-29-79; NSC 11-19-80

By inf, NARS, Date 5-27-81

Department of State

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

ACTION:

Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE L419

NODIS -- LOR

For the Ambassador from the President.

1. First let me thank you for your 2092 and related messages. It is an exceedingly helpful and thoughtful analysis of the situation, and it gives me the clearest understanding I have had of the situation as you see it and of the reasoning behind your recommendations. We have discussed the matter at length here, and we have a large measure of agreement with your analysis.

2. We agree with your implicit assessment that strength and clarity of U. S. commitment and determination are of major importance in political and even military ~~in~~ balances in SVN.

3. We are inclined to adopt a policy of prompt and clear reprisal, together with a readiness to start joint planning and execution on future military operations both within South Vietnam and against the North, but without present commitment as to the timing and scale of Phase II.

4. We are convinced that it is better to remove dependents before reprisals begin, and we believe that by adoption and public indication of

Text from White House 1/7/86

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

FE - William P. Bundy

The Secretary (subs) DOD - Secretary McNamara (subs) S/S - Mr. Read
White House - Mr. McGeorge Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

reprisal policy we can provide the necessary demonstration that this act represents firmness, not weakness.

5. In the light of these conclusions, we propose for your consideration and comment the following course of action in the coming weeks. Specific timing would depend on timing and character of political truce now in sight.

(1) Public indication in Saigon of US/GVN decision to adopt a policy of prompt and fitting reply to Viet Cong atrocities, whether against Vietnamese or Americans. We would prefer that this indication be given by inconspicuous background briefings rather than formal public statement, but request your judgment whether necessary indication of firmness to cover dependent withdrawal can be achieved in this way.

(2) After firmness of reprisal policy is clear, but before reprisals, prompt and orderly evacuation of all U. S. dependents.

(3) Establishment of joint planning for execution of reprisal policy. Subject to your comment, we suggest following guidelines for such planning:

(a) Reprisal planning should include provision for action by forces of both U. S. and GVN.

(b) Targets should be in southern section of DRV.

(c) Reprisal plans should be subject to review and approval, before any given execution, by two chief executives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

(d) Reprisal planning should be based on premise that reply should be made within 24 hours unless circumstances of atrocity sharply modify normal presumption of VC guilt.

(4) At the same time that reprisal planning is initiated, we should press for closer cooperation in planning and execution of major military actions in SVN. Binh Gia action raises question whether we should not have arrangements which could prevent classical error of piecemeal commitment described in your weekly report. More affirmatively, we are sure that a few solid military victories achieved by use of U. S. military command judgment and energy would be worth all the rest of this program put together.

(5) We would inform top GVN leadership of our readiness to begin joint contingency planning for Phase II actions, but would make it very clear that decisions in this area would depend:

- (a) on experience in reprisal actions
- (b) on joint efforts to achieve victories within South Vietnam,
- and (c) on joint efforts to achieve political stability.

My decisions on Phase II will necessarily be affected by performance in earlier activities.

6. This program omits discussion of the enormous problem of political unity you will face even if truce is achieved. I have read your 2057 with great interest,

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON NODIS -- LOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

and I am considering whether to send someone for further discussions with you on this subject. This issue is connected in my mind with the related question whether our rules of assignment and rotation in all departments are bringing the best and most experienced Americans to Vietnam. I am asking State, Defense, CIA and AID to review this question in the light of prospective withdrawal of dependents and we will communicate further soon.

GP-1.

End.

2007

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 7-25-80 letter
By ing, NARS, Date 9-2-80

cc sent Wm Bundy
7:15 PM 1/7/65
for dispatch

~~TOP SECRET~~

Jan. 7, 1965

10a

TO: SAIGON FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NODIS - - LOR

1. First let me thank you for your 2052 and related messages.

It is an exceedingly helpful and thoughtful analysis of the situation, and it gives me the clearest understanding I have had of the situation as you see it and of the reasoning behind your recommendations.

We have discussed the matter at length here, and we have a large measure of agreement with your analysis.

2. We agree with your implicit assessment that strength and clarity of U. S. commitment and determination are of major importance in political and even military balance in SVN.

3. We are inclined to adopt a policy of prompt and clear reprisal, together with a readiness to start joint planning and execution on future military operations both within South Vietnam and against the North, but without present commitment as to the timing and scale of Phase II.

4. We are convinced that it is better to remove dependents before reprisals begin, and we believe that by adoption and public indication of reprisal policy we can provide the necessary demonstration that this act represents firmness, not weakness.

~~TOP SECRET - LOR~~

(1/7/65)

5. In the light of these conclusions, we propose for your
and comment
consideration_^ the following course of action in the coming weeks.

Specific timing would depend on timing and character of political truce
now in sight. —

(1) Public indication in Saigon of US/GVN decision to
adopt a policy of prompt and fitting reply to Viet Cong atrocities,
whether against Vietnamese or Americans. We would prefer that
this indication be given by inconspicuous background briefings
rather than formal public statement, but request your judgment
whether necessary indication of firmness to cover dependent withdrawal
can be achieved in this way.

(2) After firmness of reprisal policy is clear, but before
reprisals, prompt and orderly evacuation of all U. S. dependents.

(3) Establishment of joint planning for execution of
reprisal policy. Subject to your comment, we suggest following
guidelines for such planning:

(a) Reprisal planning should include provision for
action by forces of both U. S. and GVN.

(b) Targets should be in southern section of DRV.

(c) Reprisal plans should be subject to review and
approval, before any given execution, by two chief executives.

(d) reprisal planning should be based on premise that reply
should be made within 24 hours unless circumstances of atrocity sharply
modify normal presumption of VC guilt.

(1/7/65)

(4) At the same time that reprisal planning is initiated, we should press for closer cooperation in planning and execution of major military actions in SVN. Binh Gia action raises question whether we should not have arrangements which could prevent classical error of piecemeal commitment described in your weekly report. More affirmatively, we are sure that a few solid military victories achieved by use of U. S. military command judgment and energy would be worth all the rest of this program put together.

(5) We would inform top GVN leadership of our readiness to begin joint contingency planning for Phase II actions, but would make it very clear that decisions in this area would depend:

- (a) on experience in reprisal actions
- (b) on joint efforts to achieve victories within South Vietnam,
- and (c) on joint efforts to achieve political stability.

My decisions on Phase II will necessarily be affected by performance in earlier activities.

6. This program omits discussion of the enormous problem of political unity you will face even if truce is achieved. I have read your 2057 with great interest, and I am considering whether to send someone for further discussions with you on this subject. This issue is connected in my mind with the related question whether our rules of assignment and rotation in all departments are bringing the best and most experienced Americans to Vietnam. I am asking State, Defense, CIA and AID to review

~~TOP SECRET - LOR~~

- 4 -

(1/7/65)

this question in the light of prospective withdrawal of dependents
and we will communicate further. soon.

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~~TOP SECRET - LOR~~

108

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jan. 7, 1965

Mr. President:

This is my first cut at an answer to Max Taylor, for discussion at 4:30 this afternoon.

You can ignore the underlinings -- I sent a first and even sketchier draft to Rusk, McNamara, and Ball, and these underlinings are simply for their convenience in noting the suggested changes.

McG. B.
McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 7-25-80 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 9-2-80

1/7/65

~~TOP SECRET~~

DRAFT 2

(changes from draft 1 underlined)

10c

TO: AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NODIS -- LOR

1. First let me thank you for your 2052 and related messages.

It is an exceedingly helpful and thoughtful analysis of the situation, and it gives me the clearest understanding I have had of the situation as you see it and of the reasoning behind your recommendations. We have discussed the matter at length here, and we have a large measure of agreement with your analysis. We have a proposed course of action for the immediate future which is somewhat different from your recommendations and which is spelled out in this message for your comment.

2. We concur in your judgment that large new American forces are not now desirable for security or for direct combat roles. Analysis in your 2056 and 2058 seems persuasive. We continue to believe in importance of alertness on security and energy in combat advisory action at every level, and we assume that you do too.

3. We concur in your basic analysis that the situation in South Vietnam will continue to go downhill toward some form of political collapse unless new element or elements can be introduced.

4. We emphatically concur in your judgment that the situation could be sharply changed by a few military or political victories on the spot,

~~TOP SECRET LOR~~

and our recommended course of action has such victories within South Vietnam as its most important and immediate target. In your reply, we hope that any additions or subtractions you recommend will be designed specifically with regard to their effect on this central purpose.

5. We concur in your view that any action against the North should be designed for political and psychological results. We want to avoid destruction for its own sake and to minimize risk of rapid escalation.

✓ 6. We agree with your implicit assessment that strength and clarity of U. S. commitment and determination are of major importance in political and even military balance in SVN.

7. We are not certain that any course of action now open to us can produce necessary turn-around in South Vietnam in coming months, but we are convinced that it is of high importance to try.

✓ 8. We are ~~therefore~~ inclined to adopt a policy of prompt and clear reprisal, together with a readiness to start joint planning and execution on future military operations both within South Vietnam and against the North, but without present commitment as to the timing and scale of Phase II.

believe by adoption of public declaration of reprisal action

9. We are convinced that it is better to remove dependents before reprisals than after, and we believe that a clear statement of purpose can provide necessary indication that this act represents firmness, not weakness.

~~TOP SECRET LOR~~

- 3 -

10. In the light of these conclusions, we propose for your consideration the following course of action in the coming weeks. Specific timing would depend on timing and character of political truce now in sight.

Clarification background -

(1) Joint announcement in Saigon of US/GVN decision to adopt a policy of prompt and fitting reply to any major Viet Cong atrocities, whether against Vietnamese or Americans.

(2) Prompt but orderly evacuation of all U. S. dependents.

(3) Establishment of joint planning for execution of reprisal policy. Subject to your comment, we suggest following guidelines for such planning:

(a) Reprisal planning should include replies both in DRV and against Viet Cong strongholds in SVN if practicable.

(b) Reprisal planning should be aimed explicitly at political and psychological effect.

(c) DRV targets should be in southern section of that country.

(d) reprisal plans should be subject to review and approval, before any given execution, by the two ^{heads} of state.

(e) reprisal planning should be based on premise that reply should be made within 24 hours unless circumstances of atrocity sharply modify normal presumption of VC guilt.

~~TOP SECRET LOR~~

(4) At the same time that reprisal planning is initiated, we should press for closer cooperation in planning and execution of major military actions in SVN. ~~I am not wholly clear on nature of military advisory role,~~ but Binh Ghia action raises question whether we should not have arrangements which could prevent classical error of piecemeal commitment described in your weekly report. More affirmatively, we are sure that a few solid military victories achieved by use of U. S. military command judgment and energy would be worth all the rest of this program put together.

(5) We would announce to GVN our readiness to begin joint contingency planning for Phase II actions, but would make it very clear that decisions in this area would depend upon experience in reprisal actions and in joint efforts to achieve victories within South Vietnam. ~~I do not mean to say that we would not execute Phase II without success in these other areas, but only to point out that since it will come later in time,~~ ~~my~~ ^{Pop} own final decision on Phase II will be affected by performance in earlier activities.

efforts to think
Policy
Study 1

11. This program omits discussion of the enormous problem of political unity you will face even if truce is achieved. I have read your 2057 with great interest, and I am considering whether to send ~~Mae Bundy~~ ~~or someone else~~ for further discussions with you on this subject. This issue is connected in my mind with the related question whether our rules of

~~TOP SECRET LOR~~

- 5 -

assignment and rotation in all departments are bringing the best and most experienced Americans to Vietnam. I am asking State, Defense, CIA and AID to review this question in the light of prospective withdrawal of dependents and we will communicate further very soon.

12. Mac Bundy has reported your concern that CINCPAC be informed, and we agree that before final decisions are taken, he should be cut in. But recent leaks in Washington have redoubled my determination to make preliminary analyses and decisions privately, and for this reason this exchange of messages has been held in extraordinarily tight circle here. I want to hear your reactions before we enlarge the circle.

~~TOP SECRET LOR~~

11

5

Message in 4 parts distributed at
2:45 .m., 1/11/65 by S/S

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* *W H* *12*
2

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 6511
RECD : JANUARY 11, 1965, 10:55 AM

Info

FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE PRIORITY 2116
DATE : JANUARY 11 (SECTION ONE OF FOUR)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

N O D I S - L O R

REF. A. DEPTTEL 1419. *attached*
B. INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR DECEMBER 3, 1964.
C. POSITION PAPER ON SE ASIA DECEMBER 7, 1964.
D. EMBTEL 2655. *attached*

1. WE HAVE DRAWN MUCH SATISFACTION FROM YOUR MESSAGE (REF. A). WITH ITS INDICATION OF GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH OUR THESIS THAT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION HERE REQUIRES PROMPT ACTION TO PULL THE GOVERNMENT TOGETHER, TO STIMULATE PACIFICATION AND TO RAISE THE PUBLIC MORALE. ALSO, I HOPE I AM CORRECT IN ASSUMING AGREEMENT THAT THE ACTION REQUIRED INCLUDES A PROMPT PASSAGE INTO PHASE II OPERATIONS AGAINST THE DRV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THE ADOPTION OF A POLICY OF PROMPT AND CLEAR REPRISALS FOR WHAT HAS VARIOUSLY BEEN TERMED "AN UNUSUAL HOSTILE ACT" (REF. B) OF THE VC OR ANY MAJOR OR SPECTACULAR VC ACTION IN SVN WHETHER AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS OR NOT" (REF. C). HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR FROM YOUR MESSAGE THAT FINAL APPROVAL OF EITHER OF THESE COURSES OF ACTION, PHASE II OPERATIONS OR REPRISAL BOMBING, IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

2. IT IS THESE CONDITIONS WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS BECAUSE, FRANKLY, SOME OF THEM SEEM TO WORK AGAINST THE BROAD THESIS THAT IT IS TO OUR INTEREST TO ACT RAPIDLY ALONG THE TWO LINES INDICATED ABOVE. I THINK THAT I CAN BEST SET FORTH THE ISSUES BY DISCUSSING THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE FROM ANALYZING REF. A.

A. HOW TO ESTABLISH THE FIRMNESS OF A REPRISAL POLICY BY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT SO THAT THE VACUATION OF OUR DEPENDENTS WILL NOT APPEAR TO BE RUNNING.

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~~SECRET~~

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Authority FRUS, Vol. II, #22
By My, NARA, Date 4-4-101

~~SECRET~~ (NODIS)

-2- 2116, fm Saigon, CN-6511, January 11

(1) THE PROBLEM HERE IS HOW WE COULD GET OUR DEPENDENTS OUT BEFORE TAKING ANY RETALIATORY ACTION WITHOUT CREATING PANIC IN SVN AND CREATING MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR MOTIVES IN THE U.S., IN NORTH VIETNAM AND IN OTHER INTERESTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES. WITHIN SVN, THERE ARE THE REACTIONS OF THREE GROUPS WHICH WE SHALL HAVE TO CONSIDER, THE GOVERNMENT, THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND THE VIETNAMESE GENERAL PUBLIC. THE SUGGESTION IN DEPTTEL 1419 IS THAT WE GET ACROSS OUR INTENTIONS AND MOTIVES BY "INCONSPICUOUS BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS RATHER THAN BY FORMAL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT". WE ARE VERY DOUBTFUL HERE THAT ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT WITHOUT ACTION WILL CARRY CONVICTION TO ANY OF THE AUDIENCES MENTIONED ABOVE. WE ARE SURE THAT BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS ARE NOT AN ADEQUATE VEHICLE FOR THIS KIND OF COMMUNICATION. WHILE BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS ARE A WELL UNDERSTOOD AND MUCH TECHNIQUE IN THE U.S., THEY BY NO MEANS AS USEFUL WITH THE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALDOM OR PUBLIC. THE LATTER ARE SO ACCUSTOMED TO IGNORING, DISCOUNTING OR, ACCORDING TO THEIR MOOD, BEING ALARMED BY RUMORS AND HALF-TRUTHS PUBLISHED IN THE SCORES OF LITTLE SHEETS WHICH PASS FOR THEIR NEWSPAPERS. WE CANNOT EXPECT TO COMMUNICATE AN AUTHENTIC, CREDIBLE MESSAGE BY THIS TECHNIQUE TO THE VIETNAMESE WHOM WE WISH TO REACH. A FORMAL PUBLIC STATEMENT WOULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE EFFECTIVE BUT IT RUNS COUNTER TO OUR CONVICTION WHICH IS ALSO STRONGLY SHARED BY SOUVANNA PHOUMA IN VIENTIANE AND BY VARIOUS THAI LEADERS IN BANGKOK THAT IN DEALING WITH THE NORTH WE SHOULD ACT FIRST AND, IF NECESSARY TO TALK AT ALL, TALK LATER.

(2) THERE ARE ALSO CERTAIN DANGERS IN MAKING ANY ADVANCE STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF REPRISALS EVEN IF SUCH STATEMENT HAD A HIGH DEGREE OF CREDIBILITY. WE ARE NOT (APPROXIMATELY LINE MISSING) BUT THEY MIGHT UNDERTAKE TO PRESENT USGYYUU * A SERIES OXNLBEGQZ* AND AMBIGUOUS PROVOCATIONS TO WHICH WE WOULD NOT WISH TO RESPOND BUT TO WHICH WE WOULD BE PRESSED TO RESPOND BY PUBLIC OPINION AROUSED BY OUR BRAVE STATEMENT OF INTENTION. IN PARTICULAR, I AM SURE THAT WE WOULD BE UNDER CONSTANT PRESSURE FROM THE GVN TO TAKE ACTIONS IN CASES WHERE WE WOULD NOT FEEL REQUIRED* WARRANTED. IN SHORT, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A STATEMENT OF REPRISAL POLICY IN ADVANCE OF INITIATION IS THE BEST WAY TO COVER THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR DEPENDENTS.

TAYLOR

* Garbled

* As received; being serviced.

Omission also being serviced.

~~SECRET~~

W 18
2
INCOMING TELEGRAM CONTROL 6511

~~SECRET~~ (NODIS)

-2- 2116, Fm Saigon, CN06511, Jan 11, 1 of 4

CORRECTED PAGE TWO

CORRECTION ISSUED 1/11/65
WW

(1) THE PROBLEM HERE IS HOW WE COULD GET OUR DEPENDENTS OUT BEFORE TAKING ANY RETALIATORY ACTION WITHOUT CREATING PANIC IN SVN AND CREATING MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR MOTIVES IN THE U.S., IN NORTH VIETNAM AND IN OTHER INTERESTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES. WITHIN SVN, THERE ARE THE REACTIONS OF THREE GROUPS WHICH WE SHALL HAVE TO CONSIDER, THE GOVERNMENT, THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND THE VIETNAMESE GENERAL PUBLIC. THE SUGGESTION IN DEPTTEL 1419 IS THAT WE GET ACROSS OUR INTENTIONS AND MOTIVES BY "INCONSPICUOUS BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS RATHER THAN BY FORMAL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT". WE ARE VERY DOUBTFUL HERE THAT ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT WITHOUT ACTION WILL CARRY CONVICTION TO ANY OF THE AUDIENCES MENTIONED ABOVE. WE ARE SURE THAT BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS ARE NOT AN ADEQUATE VEHICLE FOR THIS KIND OF COMMUNICATION. WHILE BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS ARE A WELL UNDERSTOOD AND MUCH TECHNIQUE IN THE U.S., THEY ARE BY NO MEANS AS USEFUL WITH THE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALDOM OR PUBLIC. THE LATTER ARE SO ACCUSTOMED TO IGNORING, DISCOUNTING OR, ACCORDING TO THEIR MOOD, BEING ALARMED BY RUMORS AND HALF-TRUTHS PUBLISHED IN THE SCORES OF LITTLE SHEETS WHICH PASS FOR THEIR PRESS, THAT WE CANNOT EXPECT TO COMMUNICATE AN AUTHENTIC, CREDIBLE MESSAGE BY THIS TECHNIQUE TO THE VIETNAMESE WHOM WE WISH TO REACH. A FORMAL PUBLIC STATEMENT WOULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE EFFECTIVE BUT IT RUNS COUNTER TO OUR CONVICTION WHICH IS ALSO STRONGLY SHARED BY SOUVANNA PHOUMA IN VIENTIANE AND BY VARIOUS THAI LEADERS IN BANGKOK THAT IN DEALING WITH THE NORTH WE SHOULD ACT FIRST AND, IF NECESSARY TO TALK AT ALL, TALK LATER.

(2) THERE ARE ALSO CERTAIN DANGERS IN MAKING ANY ADVANCE STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF REPRISALS EVEN IF SUCH A STATEMENT HAD A HIGH ORDER OF CREDIBILITY. WE ARE NOT SURE HOW THE DRV WOULD REACT TO SUCH A STATEMENT, BUT THEY MIGHT UNDERTAKE TO PRESENT US WITH A SERIES OF FUZZY AND AMBIGUOUS PROVOCATIONS TO WHICH WE WOULD NOT WISH TO RESPOND BUT TO WHICH WE WOULD BE PRESSED TO RESPOND BY PUBLIC OPINION ARGUED BY OUR BRAVE STATEMENT OF INTENTION. IN PARTICULAR, I AM SURE THAT WE WOULD BE UNDER CONSTANT PRESSURE FROM THE GVN TO TAKE ACTIONS IN CASES WHERE WE WOULD NOT FEEL REPRISAL WARRANTED. IN SHORT, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A STATEMENT OF REPRISAL POLICY IN ADVANCE OF INITIATION IS THE BEST WAY TO COVER THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR DEPENDENTS.

TAYLOR

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

288

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 6633
RECD: JANUARY 11, 1965, 12:35 PM
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2116, PRIORITY
DATE: JANUARY 11, 8 PM (SECTION TWO OF FOUR)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

N O D I S - L O R

THERE IS NO GOOD WAY TO DO SO WHICH WILL AVOID CREATING SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES BUT, IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO WITHDRAW DEPENDENTS, I PERSONALLY WOULD PREFER TO BASE OUR ACTION UPON THE NEED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF NON-ESSENTIAL U.S. PERSONNEL TO EXPOSURE TO TERRORIST ACTIONS AND ON THE NEED TO CLEAR THE DECKS FOR THE ACCELERATED MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW THE TERMINATION OF THE RECENT POLITICAL CRISIS.

(3) I AM SORRY IF WE SEEM TO BE LABORING THE POINT OF THE TIMING AND MANNER OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR DEPENDENTS. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CHEERFULLY ABIDE BY WHATEVER DECISION IS MADE, BUT ALL OF US HERE DEEPLY FEEL THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THIS ACTION, FOR WHATEVER EXPRESSED REASON TAKEN, IS FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES. EVEN IF PRIOR WITHDRAWAL OF OUR DEPENDENTS HAD ONLY A MARGINAL EFFECT ON THE TOTALITY OF THE SITUATION HERE; OUR MARGINS ARE ALREADY TOO THIN TO WARRANT PARING THEM FURTHER. NONE OF US FEEL THAT THE PROGRAM SET FORTH IN EMBTEL 2055 SUBJECTS OUR DEPENDENTS TO UNDUE HAZARDS AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF MAKING AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION IN ADVANCE OF A REPRISAL, WE FEEL THAT OUR FORMER RECOMMENDATION (ZMBTEL 2055) REMAINS THE PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION.

B. HOW TO MAKE A REPRISAL WITHIN 24-HOURS AFTER THE PROVOCATION?

(1) I DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT THIS REQUIREMENT CAN BE MET, ALTHOUGH CERTAIN ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN TO REDUCE THE REQUIRED TIME BETWEEN THE PROVOCATION AND THE RETALIATORY STRIKE. WE CAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2116, JANUARY 11, 8 PM FROM SAIGON (SECTION 2 OF 4)

SUBMIT TO YOU AND PRIME MINISTER HUONG A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE TARGETS ASSOCIATED WITH INFILTRATION AND LOCATED WITHIN THE SOUTHERN DRV. SIX SUCH TARGETS HAVE ALREADY BEEN IDENTIFIED AND PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE TO EXPEDITE THEIR ATTACK. WITH PRIOR PRESIDENTIAL AGREEMENT BEFORE THE FACT TO THESE PLANS FOR THE STRIKES, WE WOULD THEN REQUIRE ONLY THE FINAL AUTHORIZATION FOR EXECUTION OF ONE OR SEVERAL OF THESE APPROVED PLANS.

(2) GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS OF THE OPINION THAT HE COULD ASSURE EXECUTION WITHIN 24 HOURS OF RECEIPT OF YOUR AUTHORIZATION TO STRIKE BUT THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO COUNT ON A SHORTER TIME. THE VIETNAMESE AIRCRAFT WHICH WOULD PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A STRIKE ARE NORMALLY INVOLVED IN OPERATIONS IN AREAS OFTEN REMOTE FROM THE BASES FROM WHICH THE REPRISAL STRIKES WOULD BE LAUNCHED. ALSO, ONE MUST ALWAYS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NEED FOR CREW REST AND THOROUGH BRIEFING. LIKEWISE, VARYING CONDITIONS DEPENDING ON THE TIME OF DAY AT WHICH THE ORDER TO EXECUTE MAY BE RECEIVED AND THE UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS OF WEATHER AT THE TIME MAKE IT UNREALISTIC TO BE OVERLY PRECISE IN FIXING A MANDATORY TIME OF REACTION.

(3) WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT GENERALLY SPEAKING THE FASTER WE GET OFF A RETALIATORY STRIKE THE BETTER, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE ARE STRONG ARGUMENTS TO AVOID FIXING A TIME OF REACTION WHICH MIGHT BECOME A SELF-IMPOSED AND UNNECESSARY STRAIGHT-JACKET ON OUR FREEDOM OF DECISION. A LAPSE OF EVEN SEVERAL DAYS WILL NOT PREVENT ESTABLISHING A CLEAR LINKAGE BETWEEN THE VC ACTION AND OUR REPRISAL AND UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE DESIRABLE TO PERMIT US TO TAKE ACTION UNDER THE MOST FAVORABLE CONDITIONS. LET US NOT HURRY OURSELVES IF IT IS NOT NECESSARY.

C. HOW TO INITIATE PHASE II ACTIONS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND UNDER AS FAVORABLE CONDITIONS AS POSSIBLE.

(1) WITH REGARD TO PHASE II OPERATIONS, YOU WILL RECALL THAT, BASED UPON THE AUTHORIZATIONS CONTAINED IN REFERENCES B AND C, I HAVE ALREADY BROACHED THE MATTER OF JOINT PLANNING FOR PHASE II WITH THE GVN SENIOR AUTHORITIES IN EARLY DECEMBER. AT THAT TIME, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND GENERAL KHANH DESIGNATED CHIEF

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 2116, JANUARY 11, 8 PM FROM SAIGON (SECTION 2 OF 4)

PLANNERS TO REPRESENT EACH SIDE AND REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE PLANNING. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL EVENTS, THEY AGREED TO DEFER FURTHER ACTION. KHANH HAS TRIED RECENTLY TO REOPEN THE MATTER WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND HAS ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WAS NOW READY TO PROCEED. AT MY INSTRUCTIONS, GENERAL WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE A FINAL ANSWER UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS.

(2) IN EMBTEL 2052, I ASKED FOR AUTHORITY TO GO SOMEWHAT FARTHER THAN MY DECEMBER INSTRUCTIONS AND, UPON RESUMPTION OF JOINT PLANNING, TO TELL OUR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS THAT WE DEFINITELY INTENDED TO INITIATE PHASE II OPERATIONS PROVIDED THE NEW GOVERNMENT REACHED THE CRITERIA WHICH WERE COMMUNICATED TO THEM FOLLOWING MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON. AS I READ DEPTTEL 1419, I AM NOT ENTIRELY SURE WHETHER THE EFFECT (PARAGRAPH 3 AND PARAGRAPH 5) IS TO EXTEND MY AUTHORITY IN THE WAY REQUESTED OR, ON THE CONTRARY, TO INCREASE THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO INITIATION OF PHASE II. I WOULD LIKE TO ASSUME THAT I CAN INDICATE MY INTENTION TO THE GVN WITH REGARD TO INITIATING PHASE II BUT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE IS NO PRESENT COMMITMENT AS TO TIMING AND OR AS TO SCALE. AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD LIKE TO INTERPRET THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH 5. AS ADDING NOTHING TO THE REQUIREMENTS PREVIOUSLY TRANSMITTED TO THE GVN IN DECEMBER.

~~CFN NO U.S. (3) 2055 2055 (1) HUONG DRV (2) 24 (3) NOT VC
NOT II (1) II II GVN KHANH KHANH NOW (2) 2052 II 1419 NOT
3 5 II GVN II NO 5 GVN~~

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

#2

~~SECRET~~

action

info

CONTROL: 6647
RECD: JANUARY 11, 1965, 12:51 PM
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2116, PRIORITY
DATE: JANUARY 11, 8 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

N O D I S - L O R

(3) IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE RECENT POLITICAL TRUCE, IN APPLYING THE CRITERIA FOR GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE, I AM SURE WE WILL HAVE TO USE MUCH COMMON SENSE AND GREAT LENIENCY IF WE ARE EVER GOING TO TAKE ACTION. THE WEAKENED CIVIL GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM THE POLITICAL COMPROMISE WITH THE GENERALS IS NOT GOING TO MAKE IN THE COMING MONTHS MUCH MEASURABLE PROGRESS TOWARD REAL POLITICAL STABILITY AND STRENGTH. IF WE ARE EVER TO GET INTO PHASE II AND, AS YOU KNOW, WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL DO SO, WE MAY HAVE TO BE SATISFIED WITH LITTLE MORE THAN THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF A GOVERNMENT IN WHOSE NAME WE CAN ACT AND TO WHOSE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WE CAN RESPOND. IF, AFTER GIVING ABOUT ANOTHER MONTH'S RUN TO OUR EFFORTS IN LAOS, THE HUONG GOVERNMENT IS STILL IN BUSINESS, MY FEELING IS THAT WE SHOULD BE READY TO EMBARK ON PHASE II OPERATIONS, IF ONLY FOR THE PULMOTOR EFFECT UPON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SVN.

D. HOW TO IMPROVE JOINT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE VICTORIES WITHIN SVN.

(1) GENERAL WESTMORELAND WOULD SAY THAT HE FEELS THAT WE HAVE GONE ABOUT AS FAR FORWARD IN INFLUENCING THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS AS THE ADVISORY CONCEPT WILL PERMIT. INHERENT IN THAT CONCEPT IS THE FACT THAT VIETNAMESE COMMANDERS MAKE THE FINAL DECISIONS AND ASSUME THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITIES. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT A GOOD ADVISER CAN INFLUENCE HIS COUNTERPART WITH RESPECT TO A DECISION ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF THE TIME. LESS EFFECTIVE ADVISORS WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE A LOWER BATTING AVERAGE. A FEW VIETNAMESE OFFICERS ARE NOT DISPOSED TO TAKE ANY ADVICE-- THESE WE USUALLY MANAGE TO HAVE REMOVED, BUT IT TAKES TIME.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ (NODIS)

-2- 2116 (SETHREE OF FOUR) fm Saigon CN 6647 Jan 11, 8 p.m.

(2) THE PROOF OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM IS THE EVIDENCE OF ITS RESULTS. A SUMMARY OF ACTIONS AND RESULTS IN 1964 INDICATES THAT SOME 7,000 MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF VIET-NAM WERE KILLED IN ACTION AS AGAINST ABOUT 17,000 VIET-CONG. OUT OF SOME 2,400 LARGE UNIT ACTIONS (THOSE MOST INFLUENCED BY U.S. ADVISORS), ABOUT 60 PERCENT MADE CONTACT WITH THE VIET-CONG. DURING THE LAST FOUR MONTHS (THE PERIOD OF KEEPING RECORDS IN THIS FORM) 1,539 LARGE AND SMALL ACTIONS WHICH MADE CONTACT WERE OBSERVED AND RATED BY U.S. OBSERVERS. OUT OF THESE ENGAGEMENTS, THE U.S. OBSERVERS CONSIDERED 1,377 OR APPROXIMATELY 90 PERCENT TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL.

(3) THE BINH GIA BATTLE HAS MADE RECENT HEADLINES AS I MENTIONED IN MY LAST WEEK'S REPORT TO YOU. THIS UNSUCCESSFUL ACTION WAS NOT THE FAULT OF AMERICAN ADVISORS, BUT RATHER THE RESULT OF THEIR DIFFICULTY IN GETTING TO THE SENIOR COMMANDERS WHO WERE PRE-OCCUPIED WITH POLITICAL MATTERS. UNFORTUNATELY, COMMANDERS HERE WILL NOT DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO THEIR SUBORDINATES SO THAT IN THEIR PHYSICAL ABSENCE IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO GET ANY DECISION. THIS WAS THE CASE AT BINH GIA WHERE KHANH DID NOT REALLY GET INTO THE ACTION UNTIL THE BATTLE WAS VIRTUALLY OVER.

(4) NOW THAT THERE IS A POLITICAL TRUCE, WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO GET THESE COMMANDERS BACK TO THEIR PRIMARY BUSINESS OF FIGHTING THE WAR. I THINK MOST OF THEM ARE PRETTY SICK OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENTS AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO TURN IN AN IMPROVED MILITARY PERFORMANCE, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE.

3. THE FOREGOING REPRESENTS THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS WHICH WE SEE ARISING FROM DEPTTEL 1419 AND OUR COMMENTS THEREON. WE ARE VERY GLAD TO KNOW THAT YOU ARE ASKING THE CONCERNED DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES TO EXAMINE THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSIGNMENT AND ROTATION OF OUR PERSONNEL IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROSPECTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF DEPENDENTS.

TAYLOR

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

298

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 6652
RECD: JANUARY 11, 1965, 12:58 PM
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2116, PRIORITY
DATE: JANUARY 11, 8 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

N O D I S - L O R

SEEN FROM HERE, WE FEEL THAT OUR SUPPORTING AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON HAVE DONE EXTREMELY WELL BY US IN TERMS OF THE QUALITY OF AMERICANS SENT HERE. THERE WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE CHANGES MADE IN THE RULES OF ASSIGNMENT AND ROTATION IF DEPENDENTS ARE WITHDRAWN.

4. AS A SUMMARY TO THE DISCUSSION PRESENTED IN THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS, I WOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND FOR YOUR APPROVAL THE FOLLOWING POLICY STATEMENTS TO SERVE AS GUIDANCE TO ALL INTERESTED AGENCIES OF USG:

A. IN CASE OF ANY MAJOR OR SPECTACULAR VIET-CONG ACTION IN SVN (TAB E, REF. C:) WHETHER AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS OR NOT, THE GVN/U.S. FORCES WILL EXECUTE A REPRISAL AIR ATTACK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AGAINST AN APPROPRIATE DRV TARGET UPON APPROVAL OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND GVN CHIEF EXECUTIVE. STARTING NOW, THE NUMBER OF U.S. DEPENDENCES WILL BE REDUCED BY ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AS DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE D. THE REMAINDER WILL BE WITHDRAWN IN AN ORDERLY MANNER FOLLOWING THE FIRST REPRISAL ATTACK.

B. IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE USG TO INITIATE PHASE II OPERATIONS AS SOON AS THE GVN MEETS OR SHOWS REASONABLE PROMISE OF MEETING THE CRITERIA BEING ABLE TO SPEAK FOR AND TO ITS PEOPLE;

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2116, JANUARY 11, 8 PM FROM SAIGON (SECTION 4 OF 4)

TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN PRINCIPAL CITIES; AND TO MAKE PLANS FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS AND TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE EXECUTION OF SUCH PLANS BY MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES OF SVN.

C. PHASE II OPERATIONS WILL BE INITIATED AND EACH SPECIFIC STRIKE THEREUNDER EXECUTED BY JOINT AGREEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE GVN CHIEF EXECUTIVE. U.S. DEPENDENTS WILL HAVE BEEN EVACUATED PRIOR TO INITIATION OF PHASE II OPERATIONS.

D. THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IS AUTHORIZED TO SEEK AGREEMENT OF THE GVN AS NECESSARY FOR THOSE ACTIONS IN SUBPARAGRAPH A, B AND C AND TO COMMUNICATE TO APPROPRIATE GVN OFFICIALS U.S. INTENTIONS AND RESERVATIONS.

E. THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE TO APPROPRIATE GVN OFFICIALS SUCH INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION AND OUR ACTIONS IN LAOS AS MAY BE HELPFUL.

CFN 4. USG A. SVN E C US GVN US US GVN US D B USG II GVN
SVN C II GVN US II D US GVN A B C GVN US E US GVN

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~14
06205

W K

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

PRIORITY 1477

JAN 14 6 27 PM '65

Info:

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS -- LOR

Authority State 10-11-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-23-79

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. Your 2116 provides us with a further helpful analysis of your situation as it relates to the various proposals for action we have had under review between us over recent weeks.

2. As a result of our study of your message here and after further discussion with the President /I can provide you with the following guidance with respect to the five recommendations (A through E) at the close of your telegram.

A. Your arguments concerning the relation between reprisal action, the withdrawal of dependents and public handling of these questions have been thoroughly weighed. We continue to be of the view that it would be far preferable if dependents could be withdrawn in the near future and prior to initiation of possible reprisals. The continued presence of dependents entails serious risks for their

Drafted by:

FE:Lunger:gm

1-14-65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:FE - Leonard Unger
~~INEXSECRETARY~~

Clearances

White House - Mr. Bundy (subs.) DOD - ~~Mr. McNamara~~ (subs.)

The Secretary (draft) FE - Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Read

Secretary McNamara

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

~~SECRET~~

safety which we should avoid if at all possible and their presence also can interfere with the carrying out of the military job at hand and imposes a burden on the US and Vietnamese authorities.

At the same time we agree that any action on dependents must be taken in such a way as to avoid serious risk of creating panic in South Viet-Nam, creating misunderstanding of our motives in the US and elsewhere in the world, or reducing the effectiveness of the US mission. Therefore, unless you see serious objection we would ask you to explore with Prime Minister Huong on a strictly personal and confidential basis the entire question of evacuation of US dependents and report his reaction and your recommendations for further action on this matter in the light of his views. After explaining why, from the US point of view, we consider it wise to take such action soon, you may tell Huong that simultaneous with evacuation the President would make a public statement which would remove any possibility of the evacuation being misinterpreted as a reduction or withdrawal of US support or commitment in any sense. We envisage a statement by the President along the following lines:

QUOTE I have asked Ambassador Taylor to arrange for the evacuation of the dependents of all official American civil and military personnel in South Viet-Nam. In taking this action I recognize the personal hardships that will be imposed on these loyal Government servants who are already working in what are

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON~~SECRET~~

trying circumstances. Nevertheless, I feel a personal responsibility for the safety of the wives and children involved and consider that they must be withdrawn in view of the ever-present danger of indiscriminate and irresponsible activities of Viet Cong terrorists. We continue to seek peace in South Viet-Nam as in all Southeast Asia, but as long as the Communists persist in their efforts to take over the country there will be dangers to Americans as, of course, there also are to the long-suffering Vietnamese people themselves. I also regard it as essential that American official personnel in South Viet-Nam be relieved of personal concern over dependents and of every duty or responsibility unrelated to the effective execution of aid to the GVN and also that ~~the GVN~~ and the American military authorities not be asked to bear any burdens of support or protection which are not absolutely essential. This evacuation therefore will begin at once and will, of course, be carried out in a manner to minimize hardship and difficulty for those immediately concerned. UNQUOTE

With respect to reprisals we propose the following steps:

(1) Immediately following the occurrence of a spectacular enemy action you would propose to us what reprisal action you considered desirable.

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Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

~~SECRET~~

(2) Following the President's decision and simultaneously with reprisal action he would carefully inform the American people and world of our actions and the underlying reasons.

(3) We continue to believe that reprisal must be undertaken as fast as possible following provocation and that this should not exceed 24 hours except when absolutely unavoidable.

B. It is not possible now for us to make any commitment on phase II actions going beyond our guidance of December 3. The criteria which you have set out are highly pertinent and relevant to the President's eventual decision but are not the only factors which must be considered.

C. We agree that when it is possible to authorize the initiation of phase II operations, this will call for the agreement of the President and of the GVN Chief Executive, as will each specific strike thereunder.

D. You are authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary for those actions in Subparagraph 4.A of your message 2116, in the light of the foregoing discussion of evacuation of dependents and reprisals. You are also authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary on a contingency basis for phase II actions on the basis specified in our previous message, paragraph 5(5).

~~SECRET~~

Page 5 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

~~SECRET~~

E. You are authorized to communicate to the appropriate GVN officials the pertinent information on Laos. However, before acting on this matter we would like to see a summary of the information you have in mind communicating and would like this summary also to be repeated to Vientiane; the message on this subject should not be in this highly restricted channel.

GP-2

END

RUSK

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 7-25-80 letter

By rip, NARS, Date 9-2-80

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DRAFT TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy SAIGON

PRIORITY

*This is draft
discussed in Sec State
Office J-13.*

NODIS--LOR

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE PRESIDENT

1. Your 2116 provides us with a further helpful analysis of your situation as it relates to the various proposals for action we have had under review between us over recent weeks.

2. As a result of our study of your message here I can provide you with the following guidance with respect to the five recommendations (A through E) at the close of your telegram.

A. We accept your arguments concerning the relation between reprisal action, the withdrawal of dependents and public handling of these questions. In the light of your arguments we propose the following steps:

(1) Starting now, reduction of dependents in South Viet-Nam to the maximum extent possible through voluntary and administrative measures, described in your telegram 2055, provided however this action be undertaken in such a way as to avoid stimulation of unmanageable rumors and reports of a change in US policy in SVN.

(2) Confidential briefing of remaining dependents on contingency basis to prepare them for possibility of mandatory evacuation so that their personal planning and preparations can quietly be got under way and proceed up to but not including

point

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~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

point where overt actions apparent to non-Americans would be entailed. If confidential briefing should leak, mission would comment that common prudence requires in type of situation we face in SVN that dependents be prepared to evacuate anytime it becomes clear their safety seriously threatened and their presence could interfere with military job at hand.

(3) Immediately following the occurrence of a spectacular enemy action you would propose to us what reprisal action you considered desirable.

(4) If reprisal should be approved jointly by me and GVN Chief Executive it would be understood that simultaneously or even just prior to initiation of reprisal action dependents remaining in SVN would be immediately evacuated. In this connection we question the requirement for seven to ten days to carry this out and would like you to consider planning for a considerable telescoping of this action so that our enemies within SVN are given the absolute minimum opportunity to act against dependents once the retaliation takes place.

(5) Simultaneous with reprisal action and evacuation I would carefully inform American people and world of our actions and the underlying reasons.

(6) We agree it may not be possible count on reprisal within 24 hours after provocation, but would urge you to gear operations to as fast reaction time as feasible.

B.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

B. It is not possible now for me to make any commitment^{on}/phase II actions going beyond our guidance of December 3. The criteria which you have set out are highly pertinent and relevant to my eventual decision but are not the only factors which must be considered.

C. We agree that when it is possible to authorize the initiation of phase II operations, this will call for agreement of the GVN Chief Executive as well as my agreement, as will each specific strike thereunder. If by this time any US dependents remain in SVN they must be evacuated prior to initiation of phase II operations.

D. You are authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary for those actions in Subparagraph 4.A. of your message 2116, in the light of the foregoing discussion of reprisals and evacuation of dependents. You are also authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary on a contingency basis for phase II actions on the basis specified in our previous message, paragraph 5(5).

E. You are authorized to communicate to the appropriate GVN officials the pertinent information on Laos. However, before acting on this matter we would like to see a summary of the information you have in mind communicating and would like this summary also to be repeated to Vientiane; the message on this subject should not be in this highly restricted channel.

GP-

FE:LUnger:hst 1-13-65

END

~~SECRET~~

15

7

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mac

Unger and I met with
reps DoD, AID, CIA USIA and
State Thursday to explain
problems of evacuation and
to seek recommendations for
lessening impact on families and
personnel. These recommendations
will be available Monday and
we will have a consolidated
package for review of principals
early in week. C.H.D.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL: 11650
RECD: JANUARY 15, 1965 10:26 P.M.

OK

Info FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 2163

DATE: JANUARY 16, 10 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NODIS

LOR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979

By *if* NARS, Date 1-29-80

FOR THE SECRETARY

I AM GLAD TO KNOW FROM PREVIOUS MESSAGES THAT THE CONCERNED DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES ARE EXAMINING THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO ASSIGNMENT AND ROTATION OF PERSONNEL IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION THAT WOULD EXIST AT SUCH TIME AS DEPENDENTS ARE WITHDRAWN.

WE ARE, OF COURSE, FACED BY TWO CONFLICTING CONSIDERATIONS. FIRST, OUR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DICTATE THAT OUR BEST AND MOST EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL SHOULD REMAIN HERE FOR EXTENDED TOURS. HOWEVER, EVEN WITH THE BEST WILL AND SPIRIT PROLONGED SEPARATION FROM FAMILIES RAISES SEVERE PROBLEMS OF MORALE AND REAL HUMAN HARDSHIP, ESPECIALLY FOR YOUNG FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN. A GREAT DEAL, OF COURSE, DEPENDS ON WHAT IS HAPPENING. PEOPLE WILL TAKE MUCH IF THERE IS INTENSE ACTIVITY WITH THE PROSPECT OF AN END IN SIGHT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SITUATION HERE CONTINUES INDECISIVELY TO DRIFT ALONG, THERE WILL BE REAL MORALE PROBLEMS IN THE LONG TERM.

MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT UNDER PRESENT PROCEDURES PERSONNEL OF THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN AT THE POST FOR NOT LESS THAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS BEFORE A TRANSFER OR BEING ABLE TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE TO VISIT THEIR FAMILIES, THE TIME BEING MEASURED FROM THEIR ARRIVAL AT THEIR POST. IN THE CASE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL THEY SERVE FOR ONLY ONE YEAR MEASURED FROM THEIR DEPARTURE FROM AND RETURN TO THE US.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2163, January 16, 10 ;a.m. From Saigon

ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE, WE WILL NEED TO WORK OUT SOMETHING THAT WILL GIVE US GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO MEET VARYING OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL NEEDS. FOR MOST OF OUR ROUTINE ADMINISTRATIVE AND CLERICAL TYPE POSITIONS, A TOUR OF EIGHTEEN MONTHS WOULD PROBABLY BE SATISFACTORY. HOWEVER, EIGHTEEN MONTHS IS TOO SHORT A TOUR FOR KEY EMBASSY (ESPECIALLY POLITICAL OFFICERS), USIS AND USOM OFFICERS WHO NEED MUCH IN THE WAY OF BACKGROUND AND CONTINUITY. FOR SUCH OFFICERS TWO YEARS WOULD PROBABLY BE THE OPTIMUM PERIOD. HOWEVER, THOSE ON SUCH TWO-YEAR TOURS AND SEPARATED FROM THEIR FAMILIES SHOULD BE GIVEN TRANSPORTATION TO THE US FOR A BRIEF LEAVE AT THE END OF ONE YEAR. I WOULD ALSO HOPE WE COULD HAVE AUTHORITY PROMPTLY TO GIVE TRANSPORTATION TO THE US AT ANY TIME IN ESPECIALLY COMPASSIONATE CIRCUMSTANCES.

I ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES LOOK INTO THE ADEQUACY OF THE SEPARATE MAINTENANCE ALLOWANCES THEY NOW AUTHORIZE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THEY ARE ON THE LOW SIDE, PARTICULARLY FOR JUNIOR OFFICER FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN AND THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF A THREE MONTHS WAITING PERIOD BEFORE ANY ALLOWANCE IS PAID CONSTITUTES A SEVER FINANCIAL HARDSHIP FOR THOSE WITH MODEST SALARIES. THERE MAY ALSO BE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE REGULATIONS ON SHIPMENT OF HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS THAT WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT.

I ALSO SUGGEST THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND BE GIVEN MUCH MORE IN THE WAY OF FLEXIBILITY ON TOURS OF DUTY TO MEET HIS VARYING NEEDS. IN MANY POSITIONS ROTATION AT THE END OF ONE YEAR IS ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE, IN OTHERS MUCH MORE IN THE WAY OF CONTINUITY IS DESIRABLE. ALSO, THE PROBLEM OF THE OFFICER IN AN ISOLATED POST OR HAVING ESPECIALLY HAZARDOUS DUTY IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF ONE NOT SO SITUATED.

GEN. WESTMORELAND AND MR. KILLEN CONCUR IN THIS CABLE. ZORTHIAN IS AWAY AND COULD NOT BE CONSULTED.

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TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W H Brundy

(2)

~~SECRET~~

168

CONTROL: 10564
RECD: JANUARY 15 1965, 4:30 AM
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2159 PRIORITY
DATE: JANUARY 15, 5 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Letter 10-11-78

By *if*, NARS, Date *3-23-79*

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE SECRETARY

N O D I S - L O R

REF. A. DEPTTEL 1477, PARAGRAPH 2. E. *attached*
B. DEPTTEL 1471. *attached*
C. EMBTEL 2158. *attached*

REFERENCE A WAS RECEIVED AFTER RETURN FROM MEETING REPORTED
IN REFERENCE C. HENCE I ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE B
RATHER THAN REFERENCE A.

TAYLOR

(This concerns what Taylor was to tell GVN about Laos air activity)

~~SECRET~~

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8

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Classification

9908

FOR CC USE ONLY

Origin

Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ IMMEDIATE 1509

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

NODIS AND LOR

Saigon's 2186

DECLASSIFIED
STATE letter JAN 29 1979
Authority
By if, NARS, Date 1-29-80

JAN 21
1. Bundy
2. Cooper
3. L. B. K.

(1) Since it remains our view that dependents should be withdrawn we have studied carefully points raised your reftel and are providing following answers and comments to enable you discuss this matter with PriMin Huong. It is recognized that withdrawal of dependents will precipitate speculation and could alarm both South Vietnamese Government and people and third country ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ^{nationals}. We believe, however, that as long as Presidential statement explains evacuation on basis need to concentrate all US efforts on assisting Viet Nam to resist Communist subversion, evacuation would be understood in constructive context. It will remain true of course that it will be our actions more than our words which will help maintain morale but if evacuation of dependents is seen as an action in support of efforts to assist Viet Nam, it may even have salutary effect. Questions you have posed concerning other Governments and non-official Americans

Drafted by:

FE-LUNger;hjh 12/21/65

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

William Bundy

Clearances:

White House - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Mr. Cooper
DOD - Mr. McNamara
Secretary Rusk

S/S - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Read

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are troublesome but we believe not insuperable.

(2) In discussion with Huong (in which you may include Vien) please use only substance of proposed statement (see below); also make clear we are seeking his reaction and that decision to evacuate not yet taken here.

(3) Text of proposed statement set out your reftel appears acceptable in substance, subject to comments which follow, but we believe that it must be made initially in Washington rather than in Saigon as your text appears to suggest. As for text itself, last two sentences Para 2 B appear unnecessary. With regard to first of those two sentences we are also concerned lest initial release might invite communists to press terrorist actions. We also feel that final sentence Para 2A suggests too passive an approach on our part; for this reason would prefer final phrase to read "desire of U.S. to maintain a posture of maximum readiness to take whatever action may be required in support of those efforts."

(4) With respect to points raised Para 4 your message the following guidance is provided:

(a) We agree that notification other friendly governments should take place here first and it would be in essentially same terms we have proposed to discuss question with Huong. Although evacuation our dependents will bring in its train closing down of facilities and termination arrangements which

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may raise difficulties for dependents of other governments, each is obviously free to make its own decision on this matter. We recall that when we evacuated our dependents from Laos in 1960, dependents of most other friendly governments remained and never were withdrawn.

(b) With regard to dependents of private Americans and tourist travel we would envisage issuance general notices objectively describing situation and leaving it for individuals to make their own decisions, taking responsibility on themselves for risks if they visit as tourists or if, as private Americans, they keep their dependents on hand. We would of course still have residual responsibility to help them with emergency evacuation if there were real and immediate threat to their safety.

(c) We agree that there is distinct possibility Pan Am may drop its commercial passenger service to Saigon although we would expect that both here and through U.S. Mission Saigon efforts will be made to keep them coming. For most part dangers which make necessary withdrawal dependents do not seriously interfere with airline operations.

(d) We can also foresee possible added difficulties to securing additional free world personnel, particularly non-military, ^{for service} outside Saigon. ~~Here again we~~ ^{We} have some reason

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to hope that ^{there will be cases where this will not be} ~~this may not be too serious a problem~~
problem.
~~each country will make its own decision in any case~~

(e) Taking as much as one month to execute evacuation appears acceptable, even though a longer period than we would have thought would be necessary, provided the very announcement of evacuation does not increase risks to dependent population and there is no evidence of stepping up terrorist activities. If need for reprisal should arise we would wish to see simultaneous with reprisal a very much stepped up evacuation of remaining dependents.

(5) With foregoing in hand assume you will now open discussions with Huong and Vien.

GP-2

END

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19

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DRAFT - 25 Jan 65
JTMcNaughton

TO: AMEMBASSY, SAIGON
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

NODIS LOR

REF: ENBTTEL 2252

Mr McGeorge Bundy - Bill.
Mac - one copy has gone to Bill.
This follows Bob's suggested
line (he is out of town). Cy 20
approves. John 1/25/65

1. We want to get on with evacuation of US dependents. We agree that it is important that evacuation should give correct impression of clearing decks rather than withdrawal.

2. There is strong desire here to avoid increasing number of US personnel in South Vietnam above present authorized strengths.

3. According to our records, you have requests in the pipeline for more than 6000 additional military personnel. This figure includes 2400 engineers, 2100 logistic personnel, 502 for airfield security, 446 advisors to complement the GVN force level increase approved 23 January, 422 Marines with the Hawk Battalion (minus), 419 MPs for Saigon, 96 for 39th Signal Battalion, 35 for the 10th TASS, and 18 for SOG. Your Embtel 2252 refers specifically only to the Hawk Battalion and MPs.

4. Balancing all considerations, we are prepared to authorize some additional US military personnel, on the theory suggested in your Embtel 2252, if you believe it necessary in order to achieve evacuation of the 1800 or so US dependents without serious negative psychological impact. We wonder whether deployment of 419 additional MPs in Saigon will give us the best combination of military utility and psychological impact. On the other hand, we believe that announcement of deployment of the Hawk Battalion (minus) involving 422 men would serve the purpose. Such

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Authority DSD 10-18-78 letter

By ef, NARS, Date 3-23-79

~~TOP SECRET~~

deployment is hereby authorized and you are authorized to time the announcement pursuant to your proposal in Embtel 2252. If you believe that announcement of something more, such as the 446 additional advisors or 419 additional MPs, is required to give the clearing of decks flavor to the evacuation of dependents, let us know.

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21

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22

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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January 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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Re: Basic Policy in Vietnam

Authority NSC 7-25-80 *letter*
By *inf*, NARS, Date 9-2-80

1. Bob McNamara and I have asked for the meeting with you at 11:30 in order to have a very private discussion of the basic situation in Vietnam. In a way it is unfortunate that we are meeting the morning after a minor coup, because that is not the present point. All of us agree with Alexis Johnson that nothing should be done on that until we have particular recommendations from Saigon (though at that point we may well want to urge Taylor and Johnson to make the best of the matter and not try to undo it).
2. What we want to say to you is that both of us are now pretty well convinced that our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat. What we are doing now, essentially, is to wait and hope for a stable government. Our December directives make it very plain that wider action against the Communists will not take place unless we can get such a government. In the last six weeks that effort has been unsuccessful, and Bob and I are persuaded that there is no real hope of success in this area unless and until our own policy and priorities change.
3. The underlying difficulties in Saigon arise from the spreading conviction there that the future is without hope for anti-Communists. More and more the good men are covering their flanks and avoiding executive responsibility for firm anti-Communist policy. Our best friends have been somewhat discouraged by our own inactivity in the face of major attacks on our own installations. The Vietnamese know just as well as we do that the Viet Cong are gaining in the countryside. Meanwhile, they see the enormous power of the United States withheld, and they get little sense of firm and active U. S. policy. They feel that we are unwilling to take serious risks. In one sense, all of this is outrageous, in the light of all that we have done and all that we are ready to do if they will only pull up their socks. But it is a fact -- or at least so McNamara and I now think.

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4. The uncertainty and lack of direction which pervade the Vietnamese authorities are also increasingly visible among our own people, even the most loyal and determined. Overtones of this sentiment appear in our cables from Saigon, and one can feel them also among our most loyal staff officers here in Washington. The basic directive says that we will not go further until there is a stable government, and no one has much hope that there is going to be a stable government while we sit still. The result is that we are pinned into a policy of first aid to squabbling politicians and passive reaction to events we do not try to control. Or so it seems.

5. Bob and I believe that the worst course of action is to continue in this essentially passive role which can only lead to eventual defeat and an invitation to get out in humiliating circumstances.

6. We see two alternatives. The first is to use our military power in the Far East and to force a change of Communist policy. The second is to deploy all our resources along a track of negotiation, aimed at salvaging what little can be preserved with no major addition to our present military risks. Bob and I tend to favor the first course, but we believe that both should be carefully studied and that alternative programs should be argued out before you.

7. Both of us understand the very grave questions presented by any decision of this sort. We both recognize that the ultimate responsibility is not ours. Both of us have fully supported your unwillingness, in earlier months, to move out of the middle course. We both agree that every effort should still be made to improve our operations on the ground and to prop up the authorities in South Vietnam as best we can. But we are both convinced that none of this is enough, and that the time has come for harder choices.

8. You should know that Dean Rusk does not agree with us. He does not quarrel with our assertion that things are going very badly and that the situation is unraveling. He does not assert that this deterioration can be stopped. What he does say is that the consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that we simply must find a way of making our present policy work. This would be good if it was possible. Bob and I do not think it is.

9. A topic of this magnitude can only be opened for initial discussion this morning, but McNamara and I have reached the point where our obligations to you simply do not permit us to administer our present directives in silence and let you think we see real hope in them.

Inc. 1.

McG. B.