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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEKDA/DOD WA WDC
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ACTION PRIORIL DEPT (2530) INFO DOD 446 WHITEHOUSE 355 CIA
336 CINCPAC POLAD 1511 SIOM SAIGON FEBRUARY 12 - SPM

E X D I S

REFERENCE A. DEPTTEL 1693
B. HGMSTEL 2445

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979
By *if*, NARS, Date 1-29-80

PARALLELING YOUR EXAMPLE, WE, TOO, ARE DEVELOPING A PROPOSAL FOR A
SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT OF REFERENCE B. WE
WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WILL NOT CLOSE YOUR BOOKS UNTIL WE HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE OUR CONTRIBUTION.

IN REVIEWING ~~THE~~ RATIONALE FOR CONCEPT OF GRADUATED REPRISALS,
WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT, IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, IT SHOULD HAVE THE
~~COPY 121303Z FEB 12 1968 2445~~

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FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES: (A) THE WILL OF HANOI LEADERS; B) GVN MORALE;
AND (C) PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO INSTALLATIONS HAVING SOME BEARING ON
THE DRV ABILITY TO SUPPORT VC. OF THESE THREE, FIRST APPEARS TO US BY
FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT, SINCE OUR EFFECTIVENESS IN INFLUENCING
HANOI LEADERSHIP WILL, IN THE LONG RUN, DETERMINE THE SUCCESS OR
FAILURE OF OUR EFFORTS IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. SECOND
OBJECTIVE, EFFECT ON GVN MORALE, IS ALSO IMPORTANT AND FORTUNATELY THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDING MORALE IN THE SOUTH ARE ROUGHLY THE SAME AS
THOSE FOR IMPRESSING HANOI LEADERS WITH THE RISING COSTS OF THEIR SUPPORT
OF THE VC. IN THIS CASE, WHAT IS BAD FOR HANOI IS GENERALLY GOOD FOR
SAIGON.
EFFECT OF THE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION OF MATERIAL OBJECTS AND INFLECTION
OF CASUALTIES WILL NOT, IN OUR JUDGMENT, HAVE A DECISIVE BEARING UPON
THE ABILITY OF DRV TO SUPPORT VC. HOWEVER, DEGREE OF DAMAGE
AND NUMBER OF CASUALTIES INFLECTED GAUGE THE IMPACT OF OUR OPERATIONS
ON HANOI LEADERSHIP AND HENCE ARE IMPORTANT AS A MEASURE OF THEIR
DISCOMFORT.

IF ONE ACCEPTS THE FOREGOING RATIONALE, ONE CAN THEN PASS TO A CON-
SIDERATION OF METHODS AND PROCEDURES APPROPRIATE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF
SUCH A CONCEPT. WE AGREE WITH THE DEPT THAT WE SHOULD KEEP OUR RESPONSE
~~OPN A B GVN C DRV VC GVN VC NOT DRV VC~~

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 965A ~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTIONS CONTROLLABLE AND OPTIONAL TO MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN ACT OR WITHHOLD ACTION WHEN AND AS WE CHOOSE. THIS NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY ARGUES STRONGLY FOR VAGUENESS IN DEFINING CRITERIA FOR SITUATIONS JUSTIFYING RETALIATION AND FOR RETENTION OF FREEDOM OF ACTION TO MAKE AD HOC DECISIONS IN LIGHT OF OUR INTERESTS AT THE MOMENT. BUT IN ANY CASE, COMPLETE FLEXIBILITY WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR AT LEAST TWO REASONS. FIRST, THE GRV MAY PERPETRATE AN UNTIMELY ATROCITY LIKE QUI NHON WHICH WE CANNOT IGNORE. SECOND, WE WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE FROM GVN MORE REQUESTS FOR RETALIATORY STRIKES IN EXCESS OF THE OPTIMUM TEMPO WHICH WE WISH TO GIVE THE OPERATIONS. TO TURN DOWN THE GVN TOO OFTEN WILL WORK AGAINST FACTOR OF MORALE WHICH WE MENTIONED AT THE OUTSET AND SOUR RELATIONS WHICH WE HOPE TO SWEETEN. WE SHALL HAVE TO TAKE THIS POINT INTO ACCOUNT.

ASSUMING THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED CONTROL AND FLEXIBILITY, WE WILL THEN NEED TO THINK OF THE TEMPO WHICH WE WISH TO COMMUNICATE TO THE RETALIATORY PROGRAM, WITH PRIMARY CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO EFFECT OF THE PROGRAM ON HANOI LEADERSHIP. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO US THAT THERE SHOULD BE A GRADUAL, ORCHESTRATED ACCELERATION OF TEMPO MEASURED IN TERMS OF FREQUENCY, SIZE, NUMBER AND/OR GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF THE REPRISAL STRIKES AND OF RELATED ACTIVITIES SUCH AS BARREL ROLL AND 34-A. AN UPWARD TREND IN ANY OR ALL OF THESE FORMS OF INTENSITY WILL CONVEY SIGNALS WHICH, IN COMBINATION, SHOULD PRESENT

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 965A ~~TOP SECRET~~

TO THE DRV LEADERS A VISION OF INEVITABLE, ULTIMATE DESTRUCTION IF THEY DO NOT CHANGE THEIR WAYS.

THE EXACT RATE OF ACCELERATION IS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT BUT WE CONSIDER, ROUGHLY SPEAKING, THAT EACH SUCCESSIVE WEEK SHOULD INCLUDE SOME NEW ACT ON OUR PART TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON HANOI. AS INDICATED AT THE OUTSET, WE ARE WORKING ON A PAPER WHICH WILL CONTAIN SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ALONG THESE LINES.

WE NOTE YOUR COMMENT WITH REGARD TO AVOIDING CONTACT WITH GVN PRIOR TO CONSULTING WASHINGTON. WE CAN SEE ADVANTAGE OF FIRST GETTING THE WASHINGTON REACTION BEFORE THAT OF THE GVN BUT WOULD POINT OUT THE DIFFICULTY, IF NOT IMPOSSIBILITY, OF OBTAINING VNAF PARTICIPATION IN A STRIKE DURING THE DAYLIGHT HOURS FOLLOWING A NIGHT ATROCITY WITHOUT STARTING THE VNAF WHEELS TURNING AS SOON AS RETALIATORY ACTIONS APPEARS LIKELY. THIS DIFFICULTY IS NOT AN OVERRIDING OBJECTION ~~85~~

BECAUSE, IN OUR VIEW, THERE IS AN OPERATIONAL NEED HENCEFORTH TO STAGGER OUR ATTACKS IN DRV IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING TRAPPED IN AN UNCHANGING PATTERN OF REACTION. THE THREE STRIKES WHICH WE HAVE EXECUTED THUS FAR HAVE ALL FALLEN BETWEEN 1400 AND 1600 OF THE FIRST DAY FOLLOWING THE ATROCITY. WE ARE BOUND TO INCREASE THE HAZARDS TO OUR PILOTS IF WE DO NOT VARY OUR SCHEDULE.

~~CEN DRV NOT GVN GVN NOT VNAF VNAF NOT DRV 1400 1600~~

~~PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 965A TOP SECRET~~

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR REPRISAL PROGRAM WILL LEAD THE GVN TO BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE TAKEN OVER THEIR WAR AND THAT THEY CAN REDUCE THEIR ANTI-VC ACTIVITIES. WE HOPE THAT THE OPPOSITE WILL BE THE EFFECT AND THE RETALIATORY ACTIONS IN THE NORTH WILL GIVE IMPULSION TO THE DEFENSIVE EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH. HOWEVER, THE DEPT'S FEAR CAN CERTAINLY NOT BE RULED OUT AND WE SHALL WATCH CLOSELY THE GVN REACTION TO THE PROGRAM AS IT UNFOLDS. TAYLOR

BT

~~W NOT GVN VC NOT GVN~~

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM		RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		DIST: CJCS-2(4-5)DJS-3(6-8)SJCS-1(9)J3-6(10-15) J4-2(16-17)SACSA-4(18-21)DIA-2(22-23)NMCC-3 (24-26)SECDEF-5(27-31)ISA-5(32-36)CSA-2(37-38) CSAF-2(39-40)CNO-2(41-42)CMC-2(43-44)RRA-1(45) FILE-1(1)(45)H/JPR	
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
PRECEDENCE		ADV TO CJCS/DJS/OSD/DIA/CSA/CSAF/CNO	
ACTION		050740Z JAN 15 72016 EX CY:DIR-4(48-51)SJS-2 (52-53) CJCS-2(54-55)	
INFO		EX COPY: CJCS-1(46) 17 FEB 65 (DAY) AGENDA 20 FEB 65	
		DTG 122140Z FEB 65 CY#2 CC, CY#3 CB	
FROM	JCS	EX CY: DJS-1 (ADM KIRN) (47)	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
		0 17 FEB 65	Limited Distribution
TO	CINCPAC		
INFO:	COMUSMACV	READ/IMMEDIATE/INFO/	CJCS
	NEACP	CINCSRIKE/CINCAFSTRIKE	DJCS
	NECPA	PER CDR RUST(NMCC)13FEB65	SJCS
	ANMCC		J-3
TOP SECRET	LIMDIS	JCS 005147	J-4
		J-3 sends.	SACSA
Subj: Courses of Action SEAsia - 1st 8 Weeks (S)			CSA
Ref: JCS 2339/169 (JCSM 100-65)			CNO
1. On 11 February JCS recommended to Secretary of Defense an eight weeks program of graduated military pressures against DRV. Along with continuing present operations, JCS recommended four air strikes (US/VNAF) per week against DRV targets south of parallel 19. One target, 89 of 94 target list also recommended is above parallel 19. Initially, strikes will be reprisals for continuing VC/DRV provocations.			CSAF
2. Deployments and alerting actions recommended are:			CMC
a. Deploy:			DIA
(1) Nine additional Tactical Fighter Squadrons from CONUS to WESTPAC.			OSD
DATE	12	TIME	1630
MONTH	FEB	YEAR	1965
PAGE NO.	1	NO. OF PAGE	6
TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE	
Lt. Col. E. J. Daley, USA Pacific Division, J-3	53049	<i>E. J. Daley</i>	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	TOP SECRET	REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS	GP-1

AGENDA 18 FEB 65
EX COPY: (56) (THOMPSON) 24 FEB 65: 01
DJS-4 (59-62) SJCS-2 (53-64) 1 MAR 65
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REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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 Authority NLS 018-040-1-2
 By JS, NARA, Date 4-4-14

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- (2) Thirty B-52 aircraft from CONUS to Guam. 7
- (3) One MEB (RLT/MAG) from Okinawa/Japan to Da Nang.
- (4) One US Army Brigade of 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to Thailand.
- (5) A fourth CVA to WESTPAC.
- (6) One MEB (RLT/MAG) from Hawaii to WESTPAC.
- (7) Necessary combat support and service support units outlined in 39-65 as appropriate, to support forces deployed above.

b. Alert:

- (1) 173rd Airborne Brigade for movement to RVN.

c. Maintain 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, minus, and 25th Inf Div, minus, in advanced state of readiness with amphibious/sealift prepositioned and airlift alerted.

d. Remaining forces in CINCPAC OPLANS 32-64 and 39-65.

3. Actions in paragraph 2 based upon following intelligence estimate:

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Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that DRV, Communist China and Soviet Union will make every effort through propaganda and diplomatic moves to halt US attacks. DRV also will take all actions to defend itself and open overt aggression in South Vietnam and Laos by DRV might occur. In addition, the mere initiation of new US policy almost certainly would not lead Hanoi to restrain Viet Cong; Hanoi would probably elect to maintain very intense levels of activity of past few days. However, if US persevered in the face of threats and international pressures, and as degree of damage inflicted on North Vietnam increased, chances of a reduction in Viet Cong activity would rise. Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Chinese Communists would be reluctant to become directly involved in fighting in Southeast Asia; however, as number and severity of US attacks against the DRV increase they probably would feel an increased compulsion to take some dramatic action to counter impact of US pressures. There is fair chance that Peiping would introduce

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limited numbers of Chinese ground forces as "volunteers" into North Vietnam, and/or northern Laos, intending to raise the specter of further escalation, to underline its commitment to assist North Vietnamese, and to challenge Soviets to extend corresponding support. Joint Chiefs of Staff further believe that probable Soviet response to these US courses of action would consist both of a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda effort to bring the US to conference table and provision of military support to North Vietnam. While extent and nature of the latter are difficult to predict, it almost certainly would include anti-aircraft artillery and radars. In order to provide a more effective defense against US air attacks, North Vietnam would probably press for surface-to-air missiles. Chances are about even that Soviets would agree to provide some SA-2 defenses, but they would do so in ways calculated to minimize initial risks to them. By providing necessary Soviet personnel in the guise of "technicians", the USSR could preserve option of ignoring any Soviet casualties. In the event,

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DRV and Communist Chinese openly undertake aggressive actions, the US and its allies can deal with them adequately. Two possible plans, 32-64 and 39-65 are available.

4. Request you examine, on a priority basis, the desirability and feasibility of carrying out major deployments additional to those in paragraph 2 above. Included in the examination should be deployments such as the following:

- a. 6 additional fighter squadrons.
- b. deployment of 1 or 2 US Infantry divisions into Northeastern Thailand, as proposed by the Chief of Staff, Army
- c. movement of a US division, possibly augmented by international forces, into a position south of the DMZ in South Vietnam. (Modification of CINCPAC 050740Z Jan, as appropriate).
- d. Requirements for moving and sustaining your total deployments required.

5. Among purposes to be served by such additional force deployments are:

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a. deterrence of DRV and ChiCom attack by showing our readiness to meet such attack. 7

b. effective defense operations against a thrust from the north, if such should occur.

c. getting forces of substantial size into forward areas in advance of expanded conflict, should such occur, thus reducing the burden on shipping at the moment of peak requirements.

6. Request the results of your examination be forwarded to JCS ASAP. GP-1

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91

44

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92

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

February 13, 1965

Dear Mac:

Attached is a revision of my paper
for the meeting with the President today
at 12:30.

Sincerely,



George W. Ball

*You will note that I have flagged on
page 10 what I take to be a basic difference
of view between you and Bob on the one hand
and Jimmy and me on the other. This
needs discussion before we talk
with the President.*

The Honorable
McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assistant
to the President.

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Authority NLS 85-76

By sig NARS, Date 7-23-86

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Authority FRUS, 64-68, Vol. II, item #113By JW, NARA, Date 4-30-98~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Viet-Nam

This memorandum has been discussed with Bob McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Thompson and has been revised to reflect their suggestions. Except for the major difference in positions set forth on page 10-7 it can be taken as representing the generally agreed views of all four of us.

The memorandum consists of two major parts.

Part I is a discussion of the probable risks inherent in a program of gradually mounting military pressure on the North. In spite of these risks, we are in general agreement on this program.

We have taken account of these risks in connection with the military actions already taken. As we move--step by step--up the scale of military action you will certainly wish to appraise the level of risk at each point--although admittedly your ability to control exposure to risk is likely to diminish as the scale and intensity of military pressure increases.

Part II of the memorandum is a program of political action. Such a program is an essential accompaniment to the military program. It is needed for several reasons:

a. To make

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-2-

- a. To make clear to the world that our objectives are peace and freedom;
- b. To minimize the danger of MIG engagement and Chinese and Soviet involvement, giving the Soviets an alternative to support of Chinese militancy;
- c. To pre-empt a probable peace offensive by the Communists;
- d. To enable you to opt for a political settlement at any point where you determine that the risks of further military pressure have become prohibitive in the light of our over-all interests.

PART I

THE RISKS OF OUR MILITARY PROGRAM

A. Nature and Objectives of the Proposed Military Program

The course of action we are now proposing to follow (subject to refinement by exchanges with Saigon and further staff work here) envisages continued air attacks, on a joint United States/South Vietnamese basis, against military targets directly related to North Vietnamese infiltration. It also contemplates attacks on targets such as railroad lines, in response to Viet Cong attacks on corresponding targets in the South.

We would continue to justify such air strikes as responses to Viet Cong action in the South. Viet Cong attacks on United States personnel and installations would call for practically automatic response. Other Viet Cong activities would be assessed continuously, and the criteria for response left as flexible as possible.

Since we

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-3-

Since we would seek to justify our attacks as responses to Viet Cong actions we might not be able fully to control their tempo. However, we would seek to keep as much flexibility as possible.

We envisage that the attacks would slowly increase in scale.

We propose to mount strikes at roughly weekly intervals unless our hand is forced by dramatic VC actions.

The fundamental objective of this program is to increase United States bargaining power, vis-a-vis Hanoi and Peiping, to the point where a satisfactory political solution becomes possible. Hopefully these attacks should also tend to improve morale and increase stability in Saigon while impairing the infiltration efforts of the North Vietnamese.

B. Risks of War with Communist China

1. We cannot long continue air strikes against North Viet-Nam without facing the likelihood of engagement with the 53 Chinese MIGs sent to Hanoi to defend North Viet-Nam. The danger of encountering these MIGs will increase as we strike targets closer and closer to Hanoi.

In our air strikes to date, we have hit targets up to sixty miles north of the 17th parallel. At some point--if we close the remaining gap of 250 miles to Hanoi--engagement by United States planes with the 53 MIGs sent to Hanoi will become inevitable. We recommend delaying the chances of MIG involvement by continuing for the next eight weeks to confine our strikes to targets below the 19th parallel. Such targets lie outside the effective range of the ground control center of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.

2. Once

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-4-

2. Once our planes have been engaged heavily by MIG aircraft, you will be compelled--in order to prevent unacceptable losses--to face the decision to mount an air effort to eliminate the major MIG base at Phuc Yen, near Hanoi. This base is heavily defended. Some parts of the base are near populated areas. Any effective strike against it would require a massive air effort.

2a. If we hit targets in or approaching the Hanoi-Haiphong area, it will be likely at some point to trigger a DRV ground force move South. The DRV can support an invasion of 125,000 troops (20-50,000 through the DMZ; balance through Laos). There is no current estimate of what US response would be needed to stop this action. It would clearly require substantial increases of US ground, air and naval forces.

3. Last November, the United States intelligence community unanimously agreed that, if the United States attacked above the 19th parallel, "Chinese Communist aircraft operating from Chinese bases would probably assist in defending North Viet-Nam against the United States attacks".* Perhaps the involvement by Chinese air would first take the form of "volunteers," but it might shortly be followed by direct engagement of Chinese planes operating from the sanctuary of Chinese territory. There are now approximately 350 Chinese jet fighters deployed in the Hainan area of South China--within striking distance of North Viet-Nam.

4. Once Chinese aircraft entered the conflict you would be under considerable pressure to order United States forces to knock out offending Chinese bases--and even to strike at Chinese nuclear production installations.

5. If Chinese air bases were hit, some of our intelligence experts believe it likely that China would move massive ground forces into North Viet-Nam, and subsequently into Laos, South Viet-Nam, and possibly Thailand. Other experts assess the chances as being lower. All agree that such a movement would be entirely possible.

6. If

* The Feb. 11 estimate is that this "might" occur.

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-5-

6. If Chinese ground forces were to move into Southeast Asia, we would be compelled to make a major effort to stop them. The only way that this could be done through conventional means would be by introducing substantial United States ground combat forces into South Viet-Nam. The magnitude of the required effort would almost certainly mean that you would have to call up reserves.

7. It is estimated that the Chinese have the logistical capacity to support 14 Chinese divisions and 8 North Vietnamese divisions in a movement into Laos, Thailand and South Viet-Nam (without taking account of United States and Allied interdiction operations). In order to counter this movement, we would be required to bring in 5 to 8 United States divisions with a total troop strength (including supporting elements) of 300,000 men.

8. The confrontation of Chinese ground forces by American ground forces would induce debate in the United States as the need to use nuclear weapons-- although DOD does not believe there would be a military requirement for such weapons. Recalling the Korean experience, some Americans would argue that United States ground forces should not be asked to fight large numbers of Chinese troops without resort to nuclear weapons, in which the United States has a clear advantage.

9. To use nuclear weapons against the Chinese would obviously raise the most profound political problems. Not only would their use generate probably irresistible pressures for a major Soviet involvement, but the United States would be vulnerable to the charge that it was willing to use nuclear weapons against non-whites only.

10. Peiping's

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10. Peiping's decision whether or not to intervene may well turn upon its estimate of the extent to which it can expect Soviet support. Unless we provide the Soviets with a political alternative they can support they will be in a weak position to bring pressure on the Chinese Communists to move toward a settlement. Without such a political option they will also find difficulty in resisting Chinese pressure to provide assistance in the event of a United States-Chinese military conflict. Such a political option is suggested in Part II of this paper.

C. Chances of Conflict with the USSR

We cannot be certain at this time what the Soviets will do if we continue our air strikes against North Viet-Nam--particularly if these strikes lead to direct conflict with the Chinese. The Soviets may want the Chinese and us to bloody our noses, but we doubt they would be in position to exploit this desire. In the last analysis, the Soviet stake is the leadership of the Communist Bloc. Competition for that leadership would probably force the USSR in the direction of increasing its aid and involvement. On balance, we think it highly likely that--if the war should continue and escalate--the Soviets would feel compelled to extend an increasing amount of assistance to the North Vietnamese and Chinese.

1. Kosygin's trip has already resulted in a commitment by the Soviets to give increased defense assistance to Hanoi. We do not know what form this increase will take. The United States Intelligence Community thinks "the chances are about even" that ground-air missiles--probably with Soviet missile crews--will be included. The likelihood of increased aid commitments will grow as our raids extend northward to Hanoi.

2. If we

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-7-

2. If we should become engaged directly with the Chinese, the Soviets would be faced with a painful dilemma. Under the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty (which is fifteen years old on February 14) the Soviets are obligated to come to China's assistance if China is attacked. The Soviet Union could avoid this commitment only by claiming that China's actions had caused the attack. Under existing circumstances, this would be tantamount to denouncing the treaty.

3. Since China is rich in manpower, the Soviets would probably seek to limit their contribution to advanced military equipment. But, again, the contribution of Soviet missile and other personnel or volunteers could not be excluded.

4. Soviet harassment of United States interests elsewhere might well be another step in this sequence of events. Ambassador Kohler pointed out on Thursday that "...the Soviets may be intrigued with possibilities inherent [in the] somewhat less than enthusiastic support of our policy in Southeast Asia by [the] majority [of] Western European countries and may think that by presenting them with [a] nasty flareup in central Europe and exerting pressure on us to temper actions in Viet-Nam, they have [a] real opportunity of causing serious intra-alliance friction."

5. At the very least, progress toward improvement of United States-Soviet relations would be severely set back. Moreover, we could look forward to a substantial deterioration in the evolution of the Bloc toward a reduction of tensions and the development of a system more compatible with that of the West.

C. Negotiating Pressures and World Reactions

1. In many major capitals there are already signs of deep concern at the present state of the conflict and the dangers of escalation. U Thant, the French,

and India

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-8-

and India have already called for some form of negotiation. The British have advised us that they are under public pressure to take a negotiating initiative. Labor back-benchers can be expected to increase this pressure with any rise in the intensity of military operations. The Canadians have also told us that they are considering proposals that would lead to negotiation, although both they and the Indians do not propose an immediate conference.

2. More generally, Ambassador Stevenson has reported that there is substantial sentiment in the United Nations favoring negotiation. This could conceivably lead to negotiating initiatives.

3. Any escalation--even the repetition of air strikes at the present level of intensity--will increase these pressures. If we found ourselves engaged with the MICs and particularly if we were compelled to strike Phuc Yen, the Soviets, Indians, Canadians, British, and others would almost certainly bring strong pressure for immediate negotiations. Many would call for an immediate conference with no pre-conditions--before we had built up sufficient bargaining power.

4. Up to this point, we have the public support of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. We have, at least, the understanding and acceptance of the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and our NATO allies generally--except for France. On the other hand, we must recognize that even such an ally as Japan has expressed its strong opposition to any systematic program of air strikes against the North.

5. Even the continuance of military pressure against North Viet-Nam at the present level would probably arouse sharp hostility among the Afro-Asian

nations.

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-9-

nations. Indonesia would be of particular concern, since by stepping up its actions against Malaysia it could create a two-front conflict. The general attitudes of Afro-Asian and neutralist nations need not be a serious drawback in themselves, but they would contribute to an over-all world atmosphere highly critical of our position.

PART II

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-10-

PART II

OUTLINE OF A POLITICAL PROGRAM

A. Our Objectives in South Viet-Nam

McNamara and Bundy differ from Ball and Thompson as to what the United States should realistically expect to achieve in South Viet-Nam and the degree of risk we should assume.

McNamara-Bundy Position

McNamara and Bundy believe that we must pursue a course of increasing military pressure to the point where Hanoi is prepared to agree not only to stop infiltration from the North, but effectively to call off the insurgency in the South and withdraw those elements infiltrated in the past. To achieve this objective, they would accept the risks of substantial escalation, including the acceptance of ground warfare with Red China--although they believe it likely that we can achieve the desired objective without such a war. This view is shared by Maxwell Taylor.

Ball-Thompson Position

Ball and Thompson believe that--short of a crushing military defeat--Hanoi would never abandon the aggressive course it has pursued at great cost for ten years and give up all the progress it has made in the Communization of South Viet-Nam. For North Viet-Nam to call off the insurgency in South Viet-Nam, close the border, and withdraw the elements it has infiltrated into that country would mean that it had accepted unconditional surrender.

Ball

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-11-

Ball and Thompson believe that Red China would be extremely reluctant to permit Hanoi to suffer such unconditional surrender since it would mean the collapse of the basic Chinese ideological position which they have been disputing with the Soviets. Peiping would thus be under great pressure to engage the United States on the ground as well as in the air.

Ball and Thompson believe that the Chinese decision to intervene on the ground would, in the final analysis, probably depend largely on the extent to which Peiping felt assured of Soviet support. There is no way that we can safely predict whether or not such support would be forthcoming. They are convinced, however, that the risks of Chinese ground intervention would be great and the costs of such intervention tremendous--particularly since the very taking of this step by Peiping would presumably imply substantial Soviet involvement, perhaps even to the point of a large-scale Soviet-US confrontation.

Ball and Thompson have supported the air strikes that have so far taken place and they would support a program of gradually increasing military pressure. They believe that only in this way can the United States achieve a bargaining position that can make possible an international arrangement that will avoid a humiliating defeat to the United States. They do not believe, however, that we can realistically hope for an international arrangement that will effectively stop the insurrection in South Viet-Nam and deliver the entire country south of the Seventeenth Parallel to the government in Saigon free and clear of insurgency. They consider that the most we can realistically expect from any international arrangement are measures to

stop

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TOP SECRET

-11a-

stop the infiltration so that we may be able, over time, to reduce our commitments. Hopefully the military actions preceding such an arrangement would have created a sufficient sense of unity in Saigon to make it possible for the South Vietnamese Government--with diminishing United States help--to clean up an insurgency that had become manageable by the shutting of the borders.

In all events, Ball and Thompson recommend that you must be prepared and alerted--whenever it appears that military conflict may have reached the level of intensity where Chinese ground intervention; seems likely--to accept a ceasefire under international auspices short of the achievement of our total political objectives.

B. Elements

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-12-

B. Elements of a Political Program

The political program we propose consists of four parts:

(a) The issuance of a joint US-South Viet-Nam statement of aims;

(b) Based on this statement, the submission of the South Vietnamese problem to the Security Council and full discussion in the Security Council of all aspects of that problem;

(c) Negotiation of the conditions for a conference to be conducted among a group of countries consisting of the United States, Great Britain, France, South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam, Red China and the Soviet Union; and

(d) Negotiations at the conference.

(a) Issuance of an Agreed US-South Viet-Nam Statement of Aims.

Ideally, the United States and South Viet-Nam should jointly issue a statement of war aims as a prelude to the submission of the South Vietnamese case to the Security Council. Because of the action of U Thant in issuing a statement of his own, we may find it necessary for the President to outline our objectives to the world over the weekend, without waiting for full South Vietnamese concurrence.

A joint US-South Vietnamese statement of aims would include these elements:

1. The two governments intend to continue to take all necessary military measures to stop the

Communist

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Communist aggression against the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

2. Our joint and sole aim is to secure and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of South Viet-Nam so as to permit it to develop its institutions and live in peace with its neighbors free from outside interference.

3. The independence of South Viet-Nam requires the cessation of the guerrilla activities in South Viet-Nam directed and supplied from the North, the stopping of infiltration from the North, and the withdrawal of Viet Cong cadres previously infiltrated into South Viet-Nam.

4. South Vietnamese independence, which is the birthright of every nation, large and small, should be internationally guaranteed.

5. Such a guarantee must be reinforced on the ground by peace-keeping machinery with enough strength and a sufficient mandate to assure that all parties to the agreement abide by their promises.

6. This machinery can best be established under the aegis of the United Nations.

7. Once these arrangements are carried out, the United States is prepared to withdraw its military forces from South Viet-Nam. [It must, of course, be made clear that any final arrangement should include the right of South Viet-Nam to call in assistance at a moment's notice if the United Nations' guarantee should prove inadequate.]

(b) Submission to Security Council

As soon as possible--and we do not think that this can be delayed at the most for more than a week--the

United

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-14-

United States should bring the Viet-Nam issue to the United Nations Security Council. Conditions at the moment are propitious since the Security Council has the most favorable composition in years--the five permanent members, plus Bolivia, Uruguay, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Jordan and the Ivory Coast.

1. In proceedings in the Security Council, the United States would:

(i) Present all available evidence to establish that the insurrection in South Viet-Nam is not an indigenous revolt but an insurgency imposed, directed, supplied, and inspired from North Viet-Nam. [The effective establishment of this proposition may require some compromise of existing intelligence. We should be prepared to do this.]

(ii) Call for the establishment of peace in South Viet-Nam under conditions that will assure its independence. These include the halting of infiltration and the stopping of the direction and encouragement of the revolt from the North.

(iii) Call for a meeting with representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, USSR, Communist China, North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam to discuss arrangements for a ceasefire, the cessation of infiltration, and the establishment of peace in South Viet-Nam.

(iv) Suggest that the Hanoi regime as well as the Republic of Viet-Nam be invited to join in the deliberations of the Council.

2. It

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-15-

2. It is unlikely that Hanoi would send representatives to New York. Most probably both Hanoi and Peking would scornfully reject the Security Council proceedings--at least in the first instance. But taking the problem to the Security Council and calling for peace negotiations--while stepping up our military efforts and our military buildup--would increase the pressure on the Soviets to help put an end to the crisis by joining in a call for a ceasefire and a conference.

(c) Preparatory Meeting of the Six Countries

The proposed preparatory meeting would provide the forum for really serious negotiations. By debating the conditions under which a conference might be called--while at the same time continuing our military activity--we might be able to push the other nations in the direction of our objective.

(d) The Conference

If we should ever get to a Geneva-type conference we would presumably have concluded most of the bargaining in the earlier proceedings. The conference could, however, be the mechanism for arranging for UN guarantees and a UN presence. Moreover, it would probably be desirable to include a Laos settlement in such a conference as well.

Need to Prevent Security Council Initiative

We must be aware that the Soviets may take the initiative to bring us into the Security Council as the defendant rather than the prosecutor. Moreover, the pressure on the Secretary General to call the Security Council into session under Article 99 of the Charter will also increase; so far, he is restrained from acting by his own caution and our negative advice. We cannot negotiate a settlement of this issue in

the Security

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-16-

the Security Council, because Hanoi and Peking would not be willing to do it there. But we can start the process there, and thereby secure the political initiative in our own hands.

George W. Ball
George W. Ball
Acting Secretary

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11648

Action

OO RUEHCR RUFHND
DE RUMJIR 726A 13/0545Z
O R 130537Z ZEA

1965 FEB 13 AM 1 13

SS

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUFHND/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUHPA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

IMMEDIATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (2542) INFO LONDON
166 MOSCOW 58 NEW DELHI 64 OTTAWA 35 WARSAW 22 HONG KONG 331
CINCPAC 1521 BANGKOK PHNOM PENH VIENTIANE UNN FROM SAIGON
FEB 13, 1PM

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: DEPTTEL 1707 (NOTAL)

WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATIONS OR REFLECTIONS OF ANY POSSIBLE MOVE
BY CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS INTO NORTH VIETNAM. CANADIANS HERE
HAVE TOLD US THAT THEIR REP IN HANOI (JACKSON) HAS REPORTED
CFN 2542 166 58 64 35 22 331 1521 13 1PM 1707 NO JACKSON

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 726A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THAT THERE ARE RUMORS TO THIS EFFECT IN HANOI, BUT HE GAVE NO
ESTIMATE OF THEIR VALIDITY. WE ARE UNABLE TO COMMENT ON
RELIABILITY OF REPORTS OR SOURCES. AS DEPT WILL RECALL, SIMILAR
RUMORS WERE CURRENT DURING LAST YEAR'S TONKIN GULF INCIDENTS.

CANADIANS HAVE ALSO INFORMED US THAT DRV REGIME LAST NIGHT
(FEBRUARY 12) CALLED IN JACKSON ALONG WITH HIS INDIAN AND POLISH
COLLEAGUES. ASKED ICC TO WITHDRAW FIELD TEAMS IN NORTH VIETNAM,
PRESUMABLY LEAVING ONLY HANOI OFFICES STILL FUNCTIONING. DRV
AUTHORITIES JUSTIFIED REQUEST BY CITING ALLEGED PERSONAL
DANGER IN CASE OF ATTACKS BY US FORCES. ICC DELEGATIONS MEETING
THIS MORNING IN SAIGON TO DISCUSS MATTER.

TAYLOR.
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:17 A.M. FEBRUARY 13
PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE/DOD/CIA AT 1:25 A.M. FEBRUARY 13

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 24765
By *acs/ly*, NARA, Date 4-4-14

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 727A 13/0605Z ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

R 130550Z ZEA
~~FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON~~
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
STATE GRNC
BT

11663
1965 FEB 13 AM 2 16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT 2543 INFO CINCPAC 1522
HONG KONG 330 MOSCOW BANGKOK VIENTIANE UNN FEB 13, 1PM
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CANADIAN DELEGATION HAS GIVEN US TEXT OF FEB 12 REPORT FROM
DAVID JACKSON, CANADIAN ICC REP IN HANOI. PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE.

FOLLOWING ARE SUBSTANTIVE EXCERPTS:

*DRV PROPAGANDA MACHINE HAS NOW GAINED MOMENTUM. WIDESPREAD
DEMONSTRATIONS BY MASS ORGANIZATIONS, PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS, HANDICRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, ARE TAKING
PLACE THROUGHOUT WAKING HOURS IN HANOI. ICC OFFICE HANOI IS
CFN 2543 1522 330 13 1PM 12 JACKSON ICC DRV NOW ICC

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 727A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INUNDATED BY PETITIONING DELEGATIONS. LACKADAISICAL DIGGING OF
NEW TRENCHES AND A FEW TROOP AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS HAVE
BEEN OBSERVED. PRESENCE OF SOVIET DELEGATION AND PUBLICATION OF
SOVIET, CHINESE AND NORTH KOREAN GOVT STATEMENTS HAVE OF COURSE
BEEN FULLY EXPLOITED. US STRIKES ARE BEING DESCRIBED AS PRE-
MEDITATED ATTACKS DESIGNED TO COINCIDE WITH BUNDY VISIT. CLAIMED
US AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN STRIKES HAVE NOW RISEN TO 12. MOOD OF
POPULATION, HOWEVER, REMAINS ONE OF COMPARATIVE UNCONCERN.

*TONE OF OFFICIAL REACTION SUGGESTS THAT CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER
PATTERN, REGIME IS NOT UNDULY IMPRESSED BY POSSIBILITY OF
GENERAL ESCALATION BY USA AND IS EXPLOITING EPISODE PRIMARILY
FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES AT HOME AND ABROAD. AS WITH INCIDENTS
LAST AUGUST, IN FACT, CERTAIN RESTRAINT IS BEING EMPLOYED. THIS
COULD MEAN THAT REGIME IS EXPECTING EVEN GREATER CHALLENGES AS
VIET CONG CAMPAIGN IS STEPPED UP AND DOES NOT WISH PREMATURELY
TO OVER-TAX POPULATION'S RESERVE OF FERVOR AND MORALE. OR IT
COULD MEAN THAT REGIME IS STILL UNSURE OF MEASURE OF MILITARY
SUPPORT IT CAN EXPECT FROM MOSCOW AND PEKING AND IS THUS NOT
YET PREPARED TO GIVE FULL OVERT ENDORSEMENT TO ESCALATION IN
SOUTH AS ADVOCATED IN SPECIAL FEB 7 APPEAL OF VIET CONG COMMAND
CFN US BUNDY US NOW 12 NOT USA NOT NOT 7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 24766
By WJA, NARA, Date 4-4-14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2543, February 13, 1 p.m., from Saigon

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 727A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
TO ITS FIELD FORCES TO "STRIKE HARD, VERY HARD AGAINST EMENY."

"HANOI MAY NOT HAVE EXPECTED INTENSITY OF STRIKE FOR IT TOOK SOME TIME TO ORGANIZE RESPONSE. EVEN SO, COINCIDENCE OF INITIAL PLEIKU ATTACK WITH VISIT OF SOVIET DELEGATION TO DRV AND COLLECTED AND APPARENTLY CALCULATED RESPONSE OF REGIME TOGETHER SUGGESTS THAT PLEIKU WAS INSPIRED WITH VIEW TO FORCING USSR TO COMMIT ITSELF WITH STRONGER EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT AND SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY AID.

"HANOI, INCIDENTALLY, HAS NOT TAKEN UP KOSYGIN'S SUGGESTION OF RECONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE AND REMAINS CHARACTERISTICALLY SILENT ON QUESTION." TAYLOR.

BT

CFN NOT PLEIKU DRV PLEIKU USSR NOT KOSYGIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Bundy
Cooper, in
checking

Action

CONTROL: 11727

Info

RECD: FEBRUARY 13, 1965, 4:12 AM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SEECSTATE PRIORITY 2552

DATE: FEBRUARY 13, 3 PM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979
By *ip*, NARS, Date 1-29-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE SECRETARY

NODIS - LOR

DEPT ALSO PASS CINCPAC AS SAIGON 1525

REF A. EMBTEL 2252

B. EMBTEL 2250.

I FIND THAT APPROVAL HAS NOT YET BEEN GIVEN FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE TAILORED US MILITARY POLICE BATTALION RECOMMENDED BY MACV AND INDORSED IN REFTELS. THE RISE IN TERRORIST ATTACKS ON US PERSONNEL FULLY JUSTIFIES THIS INCREASE IN MP'S WHO ARE INTENDED PRIMARILY TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF US BILLETS AND INSTALLATIONS. I URGE ONCE MORE ITS IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT BY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS.

CFN 1525 2252 2250

TAYLOR

DDC/AG

Not passed to CINCPAC per OCT

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0783

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

100

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 171 8 IMMEDIATE

FEB 13 6 54 PM

Info NODIS

The President today approved the following program for immediate future actions in follow-up on decision he reported to you in Deptel 1653. Feb 8

1. We will intensify by all available means the program of pacification within SVN.
2. We will execute a program of measured and limited air action jointly with GVN against selected military targets in DRV remaining south of 19th parallel until further notice. FYI. Our current expectation is that these attacks might come about once or twice a week and involve two or three targets on each day of operation. END FYI.
3. We will announce this policy of measured action in general terms and, at the same time, we will go to UN Security Council to make clear case that aggressor is Hanoi. We will also make it plain that we are ready and eager for "talks" to bring aggression to an end.

Drafted by:	Telegraphic transmission and
Text received from White House/verification approved by:	The Acting Secretary
Clearance:	2/13/65

FE - Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Read

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 1-29-79; NSC 11-19-80
By sig, NARS, Date 5-27-81

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. We believe this 3-part program must be concerted with GVN, and we currently expect to announce it by Presidential statement directly after next authorized air action. We believe this action should take place as early as possible next week.

5. You are accordingly instructed to seek immediate GVN agreement on this program. You are authorized to emphasize our conviction that announcement of readiness to talk is stronger diplomatic position than awaiting inevitable summons to Security Council by third parties. We would hope to have appropriate GVN concurrence by Monday if possible here.

In presenting above to GVN, you should draw fully, as you see fit, on following arguments:

a. We are determined to continue with military actions regardless of Security Council deliberations and any "talks" or negotiations that may ensue, unless and until Hanoi has brought its aggression to an end. Our demand would be that they cease infiltration and all forms of support and also the activity they are directing in the south.

b. We consider the UN Security Council initiative, following another strike, essential if we are to avoid being faced with really damaging initiatives by the USSR or perhaps by such powers as India, France, or even the UK.

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c. At an early point in the UN Security Council initiative, we would expect to see calls for the DRV to appear in the UN. If they failed to appear, as in August, this will make doubly clear that it is they who are refusing to desist, and our position in pursuing military actions against the DRV would be strengthened. ^{For} ~~the~~ same reason we would now hope GVN itself would appear at UN and work closely with US

d. With or without Hanoi, we have every expectation that any "talks" that may result from our Security Council initiative would in fact go on for many weeks or perhaps months and would above all focus constantly on the cessation of Hanoi's aggression as the precondition to any cessation of military action against the DRV. We further anticipate that any detailed discussions about any possible eventual form of agreement returning to the essentials of the 1954 Accords would be postponed and would be subordinated to the central issue.

For your private guidance, the following draft language is under consideration for Presidential announcement:

BEGIN QUOTE:

The aggression has continued. It has continued against the Vietnamese, and it has continued against Americans. In support of

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the independence of Vietnam, in the service of our nation, and in fulfillment of the solemn public obligation of our nation, and in our individual and collective self-defense, the Government of the United States, with the Government of Vietnam, has now decided that further action must be taken.

The actions we have agreed upon are three.

First and most important, we will continue and we will intensify still further our campaign against terror and ~~WILL~~ violence in South Vietnam itself. The establishment of civil peace and the disarming of the Communist forces are the first order of business for both our Governments. Our military and police actions will be increasingly energetic and effective. We will also strengthen and enlarge our efforts to move forward with the peaceful development of a society set free from fear. We will never make the mistake of assuming that there is any substitute for victory against aggression/~~WILL~~ ^{where} it shows its open face -- inside the borders of South Vietnam itself.

Second -- and at the same time -- we will carry out measured ^{actions} but effective/~~WILL~~ against military targets in North Vietnam. These actions will be reported to the United Nations Security Council under the Provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter --

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and each such report will include a full account of the continuing acts of aggression which make our actions necessary. These actions will stop when the aggression stops.

Third, we will press with urgency for talks designed to bring an end to the aggression and its threat to peace. I have today instructed Ambassador Stevenson to seek such action urgently, in the Security Council of the United Nations, and if that body should be hamstrung by any veto, we shall then press for talks in another appropriate forum. We believe that in any such talks the first object must be an end of aggression, and we believe that the government in Hanoi must be brought to the conference room. Our common purpose -- and our only purpose -- is to restore the peace and domestic tranquillity which others have so savagely attacked. END QUOTE.

GP-1

BALL

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

102

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL: 12262

Info RECD: FEBRUARY 14, 10:59 A.M.

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 2583 FLASH.

INFO: BANGKOK 498 PRIORITY

DATE: FEBRUARY 14, 11 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979
 By *af*, NARS, Date 1-29-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

NODIS -LOR

BANGKOK EXCLUSIVE FOR AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

REF. A. DEPTTEL 1718.
 B. EMBTEL 2572.

WE HAVE RECEIVED REF. A WITH DEEP ENTHUSIASM AND WILL RALLY ALL OUR RESOURCES TO CARRY OUR OUR PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM. MEANWHILE WE HAVE A FEW PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTRIBUTE AND WOULD WELCOME DEPARTMENT COMMENT AND GUIDANCE.

OUR FIRST PROBLEM HERE IS HOW TO OBTAIN AUTHENTIC GVN CONCURRENCE IN THE CONDITION OF VIRTUAL NO-GOVERNMENT WHICH EXISTS IN SAIGON TODAY. YOU CAN SEE FROM REF. B THAT QUAT PROBABLY HAS A CONSIDERABLE WAY TO GO TO FORM A GOVERNMENT AND, IN THE END, MAY BE NO MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN VIEN. HENCE, SHORT OF A MIRACLE, MY APPROACH TOMORROW MUST BE TO "JACK" OANH IN HIS CAPACITY AS A LAME-DUCK ACTING PREMIER WHO WILL PROBABLY NOT BE IN THE NEW CABINET AS IT SEEMS TO BE TAKING SHAPE. MY PRESENT THOUGHT IS TO SUGGEST TO HIM TO HAVE KHANH, THIEU AND VIEN PRESENT WHEN WE MEET. (IF QUAT HAS MADE REAL PROGRESS OVER NIGHT HE, TOO, MIGHT BE INCLUDED.) THUS, THE GVN CONCURRENCE WOULD BE A CONSENSUS OF THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER, VICE PRIME MINISTER, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND SECOND VICE PRIME MINISTER OF THE CARETAKER GOVERNMENT (AND PERHAPS THE NEW PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE). IN ANY NEW GOVERNMENT, KHANH WILL BE AT LEAST

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2583, February 14, 11 a.m. from Saigon

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; THIEU IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN VICE PRIME MINISTER; AND VIEN WILL, WE HOPE, HAVE SOME PLACE IN THE CABINET.

BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MATTER I SHALL RAISE, THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES MAY WISH TO CONSULT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL. I WOULD NOT AGREE TO SUCH CONSULTATION ON GROUND OF DANGER OF LEAKS.

THE PRESENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM IS SURE TO EVOKE MANY GVN QUESTIONS. ONE WILL BE THE DEGREE OF JOINT US/GVN AGREEMENT IN THE VARIOUS STEPS IN THE PROGRAM. FOR EXAMPLE, WILL GVN CONCURRENCE BE SOUGHT FOR PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT? (IS I READ REF. A, I AM NOT TO DISCUSS PROPOSED TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT AT THIS TIME.) WILL ALL STRIKES BE JOINT AND IS THERE A RECIPROCAL VETO RIGHT FOR EACH PARTY? WILL THE DECISION TO MOVE NORTH OF THE 18TH PARALLEL BE TAKEN JOINTLY? ANOTHER QUESTION, ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO ANSWER AMONG OURSELVES, WILL BE THE WAYS OF DETERMINING THAT HANOI HAS BROUGHT ITS AGGRESSION TO AN END. I HOPE I CAN MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WILL INSIST NOT ONLY THAT HANOI CEASE ACTIONS IN DRV IN SUPPORT OF VC BUT THAT HANOI COLLABORATE IN OBTAINING CESSATIONS OF VC INSURGENCY IN SVN.

IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO OBSERVE THE EFFECT OF OUR PROPOSAL ON THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION HERE. I WILL USE THE OCCASION TO EMPHASIZE THAT A DRAMATIC CHANGE IS OCCURRING IN U.S. POLICY, ONE HIGHLY FAVORABLE TO GVN INTERESTS BUT DEMANDING A PARALLEL DRAMATIC CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF DRV & V. NOW IS THE TIME TO INSTALL THE BEST POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT AS WE ARE CLEARLY APPROACHING A CLIMAX IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. THE U.S. MISSION AND THE GVN WILL HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS TO WORK OUR TOGETHER, MANY OF THEM COMPLICATED MATTERS IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHERE THE GVN MUST STRENGTHEN ITS PROFESSIONAL REPRESENTATION.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 2583, February 14, 11 a.m. from Saigon

WE NEED THE FIRST TEAM AND WE NEED IT FAST.

THERE IS JUST A CHANCE THAT THE VISION OF POSSIBLE VICTORY MAY DECIDE KHANH TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT AT THIS JUNCTURE. ALTERNATIVELY, IT MAY CREAT SOME MEASURE OF NATIONAL UNITY WHICH WILL FACILITATE THE TASK OF QUAT OR OF ANY OTHER PRIME MINISTER WHO SUCCEEDS IN FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT.

OUR COMMENTS ON THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE TACTICS RELATED TO IT WILL FOLLOW BY SEPARATE CABLE.

CFN 1718 2572 A GVN B QUAT NO VIEN CANH NOT KHANH THIEU VIEN
QUAT GVN KHANH THIEU VIEN GVN NOT GVN US/GVN GVN A NOT 18TH
NOT DRV VC VC SVN GVN GVN GVN GVN KHANH QUAT

TAYLOR

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON FLASH 1724

Info

FEB 14 3 03 PM '65

NODIS.

Ref A - Déptel 1718.

Ref B - Embtel 2583.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: STATE letter JAN 29 1979

By *if*, NARS, Date 1-29-80

1. Your proposed procedure Ref B approved. Stress avoiding leaks in strongest manner.
2. Do not repeat not discuss text Presidential announcement or even fact such announcement contemplated. Most you should say is that we expect to joint make/policy public in some manner probably following next operation.
3. You may state all strikes would be jointly planned and agreed. Avoid question of reciprocal veto if possible but if necessary make clear USG will retain veto including question when to move north of 18th Parallel.
4. As to coordination of diplomatic actions you should avoid getting into position that GVN would have veto our actions. If absolutely necessary, you could point out we have basic responsibility holding off international negotiating pressures and will have to be best judges of how do this, consulting fully with them wherever possible, and hoping for full joint participation.

Drafted by:

FE: WPBundy:mk 2/14/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Acting Secretary *me*

Clearances:

White House - Mr. McGeorge Bundy *me* S/S -0 - Mr. Coster *me*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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Form 1-65-22

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

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Classification

5. Re last sentence fourth para Ref B, slightly prefer formulation in sub-para b Ref A but effect appears to us exactly same.

6. While we agree climax may be approaching in next few months, hope you can continue stress vital importance maximum pacification effort under best possible government. Hard slugging is ahead in SVN no matter what we do outside and degree of progress made could have decisive impact on Hanoi willingness accept our basic objectives. In effect, progress in SVN is just as much part of total pressures on Hanoi, if not more, than proposed action program.

GP-1.

End.

BALL

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 12386
RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 15, 1965, 4:30 A.M.

Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2588 IMMEDIATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 15, 4 P.M.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979
By *if*, NARS, Date *1-29-80*

NODIS - LOR

REF: DEPTTEL 1718; EMBTEL 2583

FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS PROMISED EMBTEL 2583:

I WELCOME DECISION FOR US TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN BRINGING QUESTION INTO UNSC AND TO DO THIS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE BEFORE OTHERS TAKE INITIATIVE AWAY FROM US. HOWEVER, I AM CONCERNED, BOTH FROM POINT OF VIEW OF OVERALL NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS HERE, THAT THE FORMULATION IN LAST PARAGRAPH OF PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT MAKES US APPEAR IMPATIENT TO GET TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. SUCH EAGERNESS, EXPRESSED AT THE START IN THE UNSC, WOULD IN MY VIEW ONLY COMPOUND PRESSURE ON US FOR PREMATURE NEGOTIATION. THE IMMEDIATE SOVIET REACTION AND THAT OF MANY OF OUR ALLIES, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE TO CALL FOR RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE. IT SEEMS TO ME INSTEAD THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO DIVERT PRESSURE FOR NEGOTIATION FROM US TO HANOI AND ITS PARTNERS.

IF OUR REASONABLENESS AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IS PLAYED PROPERLY HERE IT COULD HAVE A POSITIVE POLITICAL EFFECT, PARTICULARLY IF AS WE HOPE WE HAVE A NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT HEADED BY QUAT. HOWEVER, ANY IMPRESSION OF GREAT EAGERNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON OUR PART FOLLOWING HARD ON THE HEELS OF EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS IS LIKELY TO BE INTERPRETED BY LARGE SEGMENTS OF VIETNAMESE OPINION AS CONFIRMING SUSPICIONS OF A US DECISION TO PULLOUT, DESPITE THE EXPRESSION OF OUR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE JOINT AIR STRIKES IN SOUTHERN PART OF DRV. IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN MY VIEW TO HOLD THE QUESTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2588, FEBRUARY 15, 4 P.M., FROM SAIGON

OF TALKS OPEN UNTIL WE HAVE WORKED OUT A COMMON APPROACH WITH THE NEW GVN.

I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT OUR ANNOUNCED HASTE TO GET TO CONFERENCE TABLE MAY SPARK UPSURGE IN VC EFFORTS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THE MAXIMUM NEGOTIATING ADVANTAGE, SINCE HANOI AND PEKING MAY INTERPRET OUR EAGERNESS AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. WE SHOULD REMEMBER THE EXAMPLE OF THE CHICOM ATTACKS IN KOREA JUST BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE ARMISTICE.

FINALLY, I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE LAO AND THE THAI SHOULD BE BROUGHT ON BOARD BEFORE WE SEEM TO BE INVITING REOPENING OF A GENEVA CONFERENCE. IF WE FAIL TO DO THIS, MUCH OF THE EFFECT OF OUR PRESENT COURSE OF ACTION WILL BE LOST ON THEM.

I RECOMMEND, THEREFORE, ELIMINATION OF ANY REFERENCE TO WILLINGNESS TO TALK IN FINAL PARAGRAPH OF PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OR IN OUR INITIAL PRESENTATION IN UNSC AND THAT WE PRESERVE BASIC APPROACH CONTAINED EMBTEL 2235, PARTICULARLY PARAGRAPH 14 RE HOW WE STATE OUR DEMANDS ON DRV AND NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS. OUR WILLINGNESS CAN WELL BE BROUGHT OUT IN UNSC DEBATE. WHILE SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATIONS IS OBVIOUSLY OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE AND UNSC DISCUSSION COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD IN MY JUDGMENT DIVERT AND FOCUS THESE PRESSURES FOR NEGOTIATION ON HANOI, PEKING AND MOSCOW AND MAINTAIN A POSTURE OF FIRMFNESS AND DETERMINATION.

I RECOMMEND FOLLOWING REVISION OF FINAL PARAGRAPH OF PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT:

"I HAVE TODAY INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR STEVENSON TO SEEK URGENTLY A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO EXPLAIN THE REASONS LEADING TO THE JOINT DECISION OF THE USG AND GVN AND TO INFORM THE UNSC MEMBERS OF THE HISTORY OF DRV AGGRESSION WHICH MAKES THIS COURSE OF ACTION NECESSARY. OUR COMMON PURPOSE--AND OUR ONLY PURPOSE--IS TO RESTORE THE PEACE AND DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY WHICH OTHERS HAVE SO SAVAGELY ATTACKED."

I ALSO RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CHANGES IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 2588, FEBRUARY 15, 4 P.M., FROM SAIGON

A) IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH, INSERT THE FOLLOWING NEW SENTENCE BETWEEN THE PRESENT THIRD AND FOURTH SENTENCES: "THESE ACTIONS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL LAWLESS ELEMENTS ARE EITHER DESTROYED OR DRIVEN FROM THE COUNTRY."

B) AT THE END OF THE SECOND "ACTION" PARAGRAPH ADD "AND NOT BEFORE."

CFN 1718 2583 2583 UNSC UNSC QUAT US DRV GVN VC UNSC 2235
14 RE DRV UNSC UNSC USG GVN UNSC DRV A) B) NOT

TAYLOR

RNL/AD

~~TOP SECRET~~

107

52

Rec'd of 15/19/75
Feb 15, 1975

108

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

#3

WH

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL 12646
RECD FEBRUARY 15, 9:22 AM
Info FROM SAIGON
ACTION SECSTATE 2602 IMMEDIATE
DATE FEBRUARY 15, 8 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

N O D I S

REF. A. DEPTTEL 1718.

B. DEPTTEL 1724.

DECLASSIFIED JAN 29 1979
Authority STATE letter
By *ip*, NARS, Date 1-29-80

THIS CABLE REPORTS MY MEETING WITH ACTING PRIME MINISTER OANH, GENERAL KHANH AND GENERAL THIEU FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING GVN AGREEMENT TO THE US PROGRAM OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3 INCLUSIVE OF REFTEL A. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND MR. MANFULL.

AT THE OUTSET, I INDICATED THAT I WAS APPROACHING THE GVN ON INSTRUCTIONS TO OBTAIN CONCURRENCE FOR A JOINT GVN/US PROGRAM IN EXTENSION AND REPLACEMENT OF THE ONE WHICH WE HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED ON DECEMBER 7 AND JANUARY 25. TO FACILITATE THE DISCUSSION, I DISTRIBUTED THE FOLLOWING TOP SECRET UNSIGNED MEMORANDUM:

"THE USG PROPOSES THE ADOPTION OF THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE ACTIONS:

"A. INTENSIFICATION BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS OF THE PROGRAM OF PACIFICATION WITHIN SVN.

"B. EXECUTION OF A JOINT GVN/US PROGRAM OF MEASURED AND LIMITED AIR ACTION AGAINST SELECTED MILITARY TARGETS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF DRV. AIR STRIKES UNDER THIS PROGRAM WILL BE JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2602, February 15, 8 p.m., From Saigon

PLANNED AND AGREED.

"C. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS POLICY OF MEASURED ACTION IN GENERAL TERMS AND PRESENTATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE CASE AGAINST THE DRV AS THE AGGRESSOR, ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDICATION OF READINESS TO DISCUSS WAYS OF BRINGING THE DRV AGGRESSION TO AN END."

FOLLOWING THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTELS, I THEN PROCEEDED TO COMMENT ON EACH ONE OF THE FOREGOING, THREE POINTS. WITH REGARD TO THE INTENSIFICATION OF PACIFICATION, I NOTED THE DANGER BOTH IN SVN AND IN THE US THAT THIS AIR PROGRAM WOULD BE REGARDED AS A CHEAP AND EASY WAY OUT OF THE PACIFICATION PROBLEMS IN SVN AND THAT IT DEHOODES BOTH PARTIES TO ALLAY THIS MISAPPREHENSION BY INTENSIFIED ATTENTION TO PACIFICATION AND BY STRONG STATEMENTS TO THE PEOPLE AND THE ARMED FORCES OF SVN THAT THE INCOUNTRY PROGRAM MUST BE CARRIED FORWARD WITH INCREASING VIGOR.

KHANH AGREED WITH THIS EVALUATION BUT CITED THE UNSPECTACULAR NATURE OF PACIFICATION OPERATIONS AND THE REQUIREMENT TO KEEP A STRONG CENTRAL RESERVE OF MILITARY UNITS TO COPE WITH POSSIBLE MAJOR ATTACKS BY VC ON PROVINCIAL CENTERS. HE ASKED MY OPINION

ABOUT THE NEED FOR A PARTIAL MOBILIZATION, TO WHICH I REPLIED THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO BE SURE THAT ALL NATIONAL RESOURCES WERE BROUGHT INTO PLAY AS WE APPEARED TO BE MOVING TOWARD SOME KIND OF CLIMAX.

WITH REGARD TO THE SECOND POINT, I STRESSED THAT ON OUR SIDE WE WOULD LIKE TO IMPART A VIGOROUS RHYTHM TO THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NORTH BUT THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE ABILITY OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ITS END. THERE WOULD BE MUCH MORE IN THE PROGRAM THAN THE MILITARY ASPECTS; IN PARTICULAR, THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR A PROMPT STRENGTHENING OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, THE UN DELEGATION AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES. OVERALL, THERE WAS THE PRESSING NEED FOR A STRONG, PERMANENT GOVERNMENT.

KHANH THEN ASKED WHAT WE MEANT BY THE PHRASE "SELECTED MILITARY TARGETS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF T N DRV"? I EXPLAINED THAT IT MEANT THE AREA IN WHICH WE HAD CONDUCTED OUR RECENT STRIKES AND WOULD EXTEND OVER, AT LEAST, AS MUCH OF SOUTH DRV AS COULD BE REACHED WITH SAFETY BY VNAF. I THEN MADE THE POINT THAT, NOT COVERED BY THIS PROPOSED AGREEMENT, WERE THE US AIR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 2602, February 15, 8 p.m.. From Saigon

OPERATIONS IN LAOS, THE 3A-A PROGRAM WHICH SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE CONDUCTED AS AT PRESENT, AND ANY CINCPAC OPERATIONS OF THE NATURE OF THE TONKIN GULF AFFAIR. I EXPLAINED THAT THE INITIAL LIMITATION OF STRIKES TO THIS SOUTHERN PART OF THE DRV WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE PERMANENT AS, IN THE COURSE T 58.3, WE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO EDGE NORTH TO GIVE SIGNALS TO HANOI OF INCREASING DANGER.

ON THE SUBJECT OF POINT THREE, THE APPROACH TO THE UN, I EXPLAINED THE NEED FOR PREEMPTIVE ACTION AND FOR TAKING THE INITIATIVE FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WHO MIGHT WISH TO CALL US BEFORE THE UN BAR AS THE GUILTY PARTY. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO PRESENT THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE CASE AGAINST HANOI AND WE MUST WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER THIS END. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AIR STRIKES THROUGHOUT THE DURATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH MIGHT LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. I CLOSED WITH A SUMMARY OF OUR OBJECTIVES WHICH ARE TO OBLIGE HANOI TO CEASE INFILTRATION AND ALL FORMS OF SUPPORT OF VC AND TO COLLABORATE IN OBTAINING CESSATION OF VC INSURGENCY.

KHANH AND OANH CONSULTED BRIEFLY AND KHANH INDICATED THAT THEY WERE COMPLETELY IN ACCORD WITH THE THREE-POINT PROGRAM.

I INDICATED THAT I WOULD REPORT GVN CONCURRENCE TO WASHINGTON. BEFORE WE BROKE UP, KHANH EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE STATEMENTS APPEARING IN THE WORLD PRESS WHICH SUGGESTED THAT OUR RECENT AIR STRIKES HAD BEEN IN RETALIATION SOLELY FOR US LOSSES ON US BASES AND INDICATED THAT THIS KIND OF TALK CAUSED HIM TROUBLE IN SVN. I TOLD HIM THAT WE APPRECIATED HIS DIFFICULTY AND WOULD ALSO LIKE TO STRESS THE MUTUALITY OF OUR DEFENSIVE ACTIONS. I REITERATED, AS I HAD IN MY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER HUONG ON JANUARY 23, THAT RETALIATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE WHETHER THE VICTIMS WERE VIETNAMESE, US NATIONALS OR BOTH. KHANH'S COMMENT IS A REMINDER TO US THAT IN ALL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE GVN PARTNERSHIP AND THE MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE NATIONALS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

LATER WHEN I QUERIED KHANH PRIVATELY AS TO WHETHER HE HAD CONSIDERED BRINGING QUAT INTO THE MEETING PER OUR SUGGESTION,

KHANH REPLIED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPROPER TO INCLUDE QUAT SINCE HE WAS NOT OFFICIALLY INSTALLED AS PRIME MINISTER. HOWEVER, KHANH SAID HE WOULD BRING QUAT UP TO DATE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING QUAT'S INVESTITURE. EARLIER WE HAD INFORMED QUAT WITHOUT MENTIONING SUBJECT OF MEETING THAT WE WOULD SUGGEST TO OANH AND KHANH THAT HE PARTICIPATE BUT OF COURSE DECISION RESTED WITH THEM.

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

109

53

The Gallup Poll

Viet-Nam Air Strikes
Get 67% U.S. Approval

By George Gallup

PRINCETON, N.J., Feb. 15. Two out of every three Americans who have followed the recent developments in Viet-Nam voice approval of the action taken by the United States in making retaliatory air strikes against North Viet-Nam.

In a special Nation-wide survey, completed Saturday morning, 67 per cent of those who have followed the situation said they approve of the action taken by the United States, 15 per cent expressed disapproval, while 18 per cent were undecided.

At the same time, a majority (64 per cent) believes that the United States should continue its present efforts there, but 18 per cent think the United States should withdraw its forces from Viet-Nam. Another 18 per cent are undecided.

All persons interviewed in the survey were first asked whether they had heard or read about the recent developments in Viet-Nam. About nine out of every ten persons, 91 per cent, answered in the affirmative.

Those persons who had followed the developments were then asked:

"Do you approve or disapprove of the action taken by the U.S. in Viet-Nam in the last few days?"

APPROVE OF U.S. ACTION IN VIET-NAM?

Approve 67%
Disapprove 15
No opinion 18

The next question:

"Should the U.S. continue its present efforts in South Viet-Nam, or should we pull our forces out?"

The results:
CONTINUE EFFORTS OR PULL OUT?

Continue present efforts 64%
Pull out 18
No opinion 18

When the 64 per cent who say the United States should continue its present efforts were asked if the United States should do so at the risk of nuclear war, about half — or 31 per cent — said "Yes," as follows:

"Should the U.S. continue its present efforts in South Viet-Nam, at the risk of nuclear war?"

U.S. CONTINUE EFFORTS AT RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR?

U.S. should continue efforts at risk of nuclear war 31%
Should not 21
No opinion 12

Per cent saying U.S. should continue efforts 64%

The reactions of Americans to the latest developments in Southeast Asia come at a time when the majority of people in this country had become pessimistic about the trend of events in Viet-Nam.

In an earlier survey, conducted before the latest developments, the American public, by a ratio of 4-to-1 among those who had followed developments, believed that the South Vietnamese were losing to the Communist Viet Cong.

However, prevailing opinion at that time held that the United States was right to have become involved in Southeast Asia.

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111

54

112

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/16/65

To: Marvin Watson

From: McGeorge Bundy

per our conversation.

112a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Authority NSC 7-25-80 letter

By mf, NARS, Date 9-2-80

SUBJECT: Telegram to Ambassador Taylor

1. The attached draft is based on your comments at our 1:30 meeting. It would be desirable to get it out to Taylor tonight, and also to get the same thing out to Bruce for his discussions with Wilson. As you will remember, you promised Wilson a memo on our exact position, and Wilson has been after Bruce to find out in more detail just what our thinking is. This telegram does not tell when the next military action would be, and I believe it is quite safe to let Bruce have it.

2. I call your attention to the alternative language in brackets at the bottom of page 2. You said "prompt and adequate and measured." I believe that for a policy of continuing action the words "adequate and measured and fitting" are better. "Fitting" is the word we used at the time of Tonkin Gulf, and if we are going to continue actions in a situation in which there is no spectacular outrage like Pleiku, I think "fitting" is a better word than "prompt." It may sound like mere semantics, but I think it is quite near the center of the problem of stating your desires precisely. Will you strike out whichever adjective you do not want?

mf. B.
McG. B.

OK for Taylor as revised ✓

OK for Bruce as revised ✓

Speak to me ✓

~~TOP SECRET attachment~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

2/16/65

TO: ~~An Embassy Saigon for Ambassador Taylor~~

~~In order to make sure that your understanding of current policy is precisely the same as ours, we are sending you the following guidance which is being distributed to State and Defense to control all actions and all public comments in the next two weeks. This guidance supersedes all previous discussions of our thinking:~~

Our thinking is as follows

1. We have recommended, and the President ^{we think} ~~has concurred in,~~ ^{will} continuing air and naval action against North Vietnam whenever and wherever necessary. Our thinking has been and continues to be that any such action shall be limited and fitting and adequate as a response to the continuous aggression in South Vietnam directed in Hanoi.

2. Within 24 hours after the next military action we expect to make a statement. Current plan is that this statement would come from Secretary of State, but decision is not final. This statement of policy ~~will be consistent with three points you have stated to Khanh, but for your guidance, following language more accurately states President's~~ ^{Our} ~~current thinking:~~ ^{will} ~~but~~ ^{will} ~~will~~ ^{will} reflect following elements of our thinking:

a. First and foremost, we shall intensify by all available means the program of pacification within South Vietnam. FYI. ~~The~~ ^{will} ~~President has directed that~~ every possible step be taken to find and attack Viet Cong concentrations and headquarters within South Vietnam by any ~~and~~ ^{and}

~~TOP SECRET~~

every

conventional means available to GVN and U. S. End FYI.

b. Execution of a joint program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets in the DRV. Air strikes

under this program will be jointly planned and agreed.

*promptly
We plan to present*

this program to our next Security Council tomorrow.

c. We plan detailed presentation to the UN Security Council

of the case against the DRV as the aggressor. We do not repeat not

~~currently~~ expect to *look upon* indicate readiness for talks or negotiations at

this time.

In execution of item c. above, Ambassador Stevenson will call for a meeting of the Security Council immediately after next military action against DRV and will there present a fully documented demonstration that the basic cause of the trouble in SVN is aggression from the North. Stevenson will keep focus on DRV aggression.

3. Careful public statements of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action ~~against the North~~ will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on aggression, not on military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be ~~prompt and~~ adequate and measured *and* fitting *to* aggression. Each new military action

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

2/16/65

will be reported at once to the Security Council, together with an account of continuing acts of aggression.

4. Concurrently with next military action, the US will inform major friendly governments as well as the Soviet government of our views as outlined above.

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113

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

2
W H 114

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE 5147

Info

NODIS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979

By if, NARS, Date 1-29-80

For Ambassador Bruce.

FEB 15 9 01 PM '65

For your guidance in talking with Wilson, our current thinking is as follows:

1. We have recommended, and we think the President will concur in, continuing air and naval action against North Viet-Nam whenever and wherever necessary. Our thinking has been and continues to be that any such action shall be limited and fitting and adequate as a response to the continuous aggression in South Viet-Nam directed in Hanoi.

2. Within 24 hours after the next military action we expect to make a statement. ~~Current plan is that this statement would come from the Secretary of State, but decision is not final.~~ This statement of policy will reflect following elements of our thinking:

a. First and foremost, we shall intensify by all available means the program of pacification within South Viet-Nam. Every possible step will be taken to find and attack Viet Cong concentrations and headquarters within

15746

1075

Drafted by: Text from Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House 2/16/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

FE -- William P. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Moose RM

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

South Viet-Nam by any and every conventional means available to GVN and US.

b. Execution of a joint program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets in the DRV. Air strikes under this program will be jointly planned and agreed. We presently plan to present this program to our National Security Council tomorrow.

c. We plan detailed presentation to UN Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor. We do not repeat not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time.

In execution of item c., above, Ambassador Stevenson will call for a meeting of the Security Council immediately after next military action against DRV and will there present a fully documented demonstration that the basic cause of the trouble in SVN is aggression from the North. Stevenson will keep focus on DRV aggression.

3. Careful public statements of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on aggression, not on military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be adequate and measured and fitting to aggression. Each new military action will be reported at once to the Security Council, together with an account of continuing acts of aggression.

4. Concurrently with next military action, the US will inform major friendly

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

governments as well as the Soviet Government of our views as outlined above.

In presenting this position you should emphasize to the Prime Minister the very high degree of secrecy attaching to this plan of action until final Presidential decision and orders have put it into operation.

GP-1.

End.

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979

Sent to
Wm Bundy
for copy

~~TOP SECRET~~

By if, NARS, Date 1-29-80

Feb. 16, 1965

114a

To: AmEmbassy London for Ambassador Bruce

NODIS

For your guidance in talking with Wilson, our current thinking is as follows:

1. We have recommended, and we think the President will concur in, continuing air and naval action against North Vietnam whenever and wherever necessary. Our thinking has been and continues to be that any such action shall be limited and fitting and adequate as a response to the continuous aggression in South Vietnam directed in Hanoi.

2. Within 24 hours after the next military action we expect to make a statement. Current plan is that this statement would come from Secretary of State, but decision is not final. This statement of policy will reflect following elements of our thinking:

a. First and foremost, we shall intensify by all available means the program of pacification within South Vietnam. ~~RE~~ Every possible step will be taken to find and attack Viet Cong concentrations and headquarters within South Vietnam by any and every conventional means available to GVN and US. ~~RE~~

b. Execution of a joint program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets in the DRV. Air strikes

~~TOP SECRET~~

2/16/65

under this program will be jointly planned and agreed. We presently plan to present this program to our National Security Council tomorrow.

c. We plan detailed presentation to the UN Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor. We do not repeat not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time.

In execution of item c., above, Ambassador Stevenson will call for a meeting of the Security Council immediately after next military action against DRV and will there present a fully documented demonstration that the basic cause of the trouble in SVN is aggression from the North. Stevenson will keep focus on DRV aggression.

3. Careful public statements of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on aggression, not on military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be adequate and measured and fitting to aggression. Each new military action will be reported at once to the Security Council, together with an account of continuing acts of aggression.

4. Concurrently with next military action, the US will inform major friendly governments as well as the Soviet government of our views as outlined above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

2/16/65

In presenting this position you should emphasize to the Prime Minister the very high degree of secrecy attaching to this plan of action until final Presidential decision and orders have put it into operation.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

115

56

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

116

~~SECRET~~

February 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam decisions

I have been brooding about our discussion of yesterday, and I think I am beginning to understand where the problem is.

1. I think that some of us -- perhaps mostly me -- have been confusing two questions. One is the firmness of your own decision to order continuing action; the other is the wisdom of a public declaration of that policy by you. Let me give you a little background and a recommendation.
2. Rightly or wrongly, those of us who favor continuing military action against the North do see it as a major watershed decision. However much it is based on continuing aggression in the South (as it should be), it amounts to a U. S. decision to mount continuing pressure against Hanoi by use of our air and naval superiority. This is not the same, in operational terms, as what we did last August. And it is not the same as a policy of episodic retaliation for particular attacks against large numbers of Americans. It is very different indeed, and the difference is just what we are counting on as the one possible means of turning around a desperate situation which has been heading toward a disastrous U. S. defeat.
3. Precisely because this program represents a major operational change and because we have waited many months to put it into effect, there is a deep-seated need for assurance that the decision has in fact been taken. When you were out of the room yesterday, Bob McNamara repeatedly stated that he simply has to know what the policy is so that he can make his military plans and give his military orders. This certainty is equally essential if we are to get the necessary political effects in Saigon. If we limit ourselves to reprisals for spectaculars like Pleiku and Qui Nhon, we leave the initiative in the hands of the Communists, and we can expect no good result.
4. Thus it seems essential to McNamara -- and to me too -- that there be an absolutely firm and clear internal decision of the U. S. Government and that this decision be known and understood by enough people to permit its orderly execution. That is one side of the problem.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC etc. 10/3/77

By rmg/pw NARS, Date 1/22/85
LW

Feb. 16, 1965

5. The other side of the problem, as I understand it, is that you do not want to give a loud public signal of a major change in policy right now. This is a position which makes a lot of sense on a lot of grounds. When I talked to Cabot Lodge yesterday, he told me that he had taped a statement for Dave Garroway's "Today" show in which he stoutly and firmly supported your decision not to make loud public statements. Lodge believes, as you know, that action speaks louder than words in this field. Russ Wiggins of the Post has just called me to try to make a luncheon date (I refused), and in the course of listening to him I learned that he too thinks it is right to act against the North and equally right not to boast about it, because such boasting only makes life harder for the Communists. Tommy Thompson also argues the virtue of not rubbing the Communist nose in this mess, at least at your level.

6. So in terms of public statement, I fully understand the forces which were leading you yesterday to suggest that any public comments might best be handled by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Stevenson. Most of the need for public utterance which led Bill Moyers and me to urge a Presidential speech last week can be met just as well by the Secretary, and there is real gain in keeping you out of the immediate military aspect of the matter at this stage.

7. Thus I think it is possible to reconcile the need for a clear decision within the Government with a need to avoid excessive public noise -- by a policy of Presidential decision and Secretarial exposition.

8. That leaves us only one problem: which is communication with our Allies. What we tell them is not likely to stay tightly secret, and yet I think it is crucial that they not feel left out or uninformed. In different ways this is as important for London as for Saigon, for Ottawa as for New Delhi, for Bonn as for Tokyo, for Paris as for Bangkok.

9. My solution to this problem would be to give a clear account of our private thinking, with appropriate emphasis for each capital, but without any indication of the size and frequency of planned actions, other than to say that they will be limited and fitting, and that any further escalation will be the fault of the enemy.

10. For this purpose, Taylor's phrasing of the new policy which he gave to General Khanh is just about right. He described it in the following language:

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Feb. 16, 1965

"A. Intensification by all available means of the program of pacification within SVN.

We will report and deter aggression by the

"B. Execution of a joint GVN/US program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets, ~~in the southern part of DRV.~~ Air strikes under this program will be jointly planned and agreed.

"C. Announcement of this policy of measured action in general terms and presentation to the United Nations Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor, accompanied by an indication of readiness to discuss ways of bringing the DRV aggression to an end."

11. In summary, what I think we need is internal clarity about the importance and scope of the decisions you are taking, and as much public calm and coolness as possible. For these purposes, Rusk is the ideal spokesman for policy, and Stevenson the ideal defender and explainer (which means, incidentally, that McNamara probably should not undertake a TV program proving that Hanoi is the aggressor -- this should be Adlai's job, though that is very unfair because it is Bob who has had all the necessary spade-work done).

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

57

118

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

28615

AGENDA) CJCS-2 (62-63) DJS-4 (64-67) SJCS-2 (68-69)
24 FEB 65. OT

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter
By JR, NARS, Date 3-23-79

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC J5 4614
PERSONAL FOR ADM SHARP FROM WESTMORELAND

- A. JCS '122140Z FEB.
- B. CINCPAC 130205Z FEB.
- 1. CONCUR JCS ESTIMATE DRV/CHICOM/USSR REACTION PER REFERENCE A. AIR STRIKE ACTIONS ENV SA36 ARE ESSENTIALLY CATEGORY II OPLAN 37 ACTIONS AND GROUND DEPLOYMENTS ROUGHLY HALF OF THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR CATEGORY III ACTIONS. IF LATTER PLAN IS BEING USED AS GUIDE, FEEL THAT PHASING OF STRIKE FORCES TO INCREASE PROGRESSIVELY PRESSURE ON DRV IS ADEQUATE.
- 2. QUESTION OF RELATIONSHIP OF DEPLOYMENTS OF US FORCES AND PHILOSOPHY OF GRADUATED REPRISAL PROGRAM NOT TOO CLEAR. THERE IS FINE POINT OF JUDGEMENT TO BE MADE ON TIMING OF DEPLOYMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT BRINGING MEB INTO DA NANG AREA IMMEDIATELY IS GOOD IDEA; BUT WE WOULD WANT TO CONFER WITH US MISSION, BANGKOK AND RTC PRIOR TO SUPPORTING BDE MOVE INTO THAILAND. CONCUR WITH

INFO...CJCS-2(1-2) DJS-3(3-5) SJCS-3(6-8) J3-6(9-14) J4-2(15-16)
SACSA-5(17-21) DIA-4(22-25) NMCC-2(26-27) SECDEF-5(28-32) ISA-9
(33-41) CSA-2(42-43) CSAF-2(44-45) CNO-2(46-47) CMC-5(48-52)
FILE-1(53)JRT/EC ADDED DIST: WHITEHOUSE-3 (15-17) (PER KERNY CJCS)

EX CY: DJS-1 (54) (LANE) 16 FEB 65. OT
EX COPY CJCS-2(55-56) DAY 17 FEB 65
EX COPY DJS-4(57-60) SJCS-2(61-62) CJCS-2(63-64) AGENDA 18 FEB 65
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

EX CY: CJCS-1 (57) 18 FEB 65. OT (MR. KEARNEY).
EX CY: CJCS-2 (58-59) (PFC ARGO) 19 FEB 65. OT
COPY: DJS-1 (60) 22 FEB 65
EX CY: DJS-1 (61) 24 FEB 65. OT (THOMPSON).

R-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

ALERT MEASURES PROPOSED IN REF. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE INSISTENCE ON INTRODUCTION OF LARGE US SURFACE FORCES IN SEASIA PREJUDICE OUR PROSECUTION OF GRADUATED REPRISALS. RELAIZE THIS POSITION A CALCULATED RISK, BUT FEEL STAKES ARE HIGH ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY RISK FOR NEAR TERM, SO LONG AS ENEMY RETAINS PRESENT RELATIVELY QUIESCENT POSTURE. HE HAS A LOT TO LOSE, TOO, IF HE STARTS COMING SOUTH INTO THAILAND OR SOUTHERN RVN.

3/ BELIEVE MEB SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO DA NANG NOW BECAUSE:

A. US/GVN INVESTMENT AT DA NANG AB KEYSTONE OF CURRENT COMBINED EFFOR' TO INCREASE PRESSURES ON DRV THRU REPRISALS, YANKEE TEAM, B. RREL ROLL AND BERAA OPS.

B. VULNERABILITY TO MAJOR DRV INFILTRATION EFFORT. DA NANG IS FIRST CHOICE OF OURSELVES AND RVNAF AS LIKELY TARGET FOR EXTRAORDINARY INFILTRATION/ATTACK EFFORT BY VC/DRV

C. QUESTIONABLE INTEGRITY OF SOME RVNAF TROOP ELEMENTS AS DEXMONSTRATED DURING RECENT PRE-TET PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-GVN, ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS.

D. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT RVNAF COULD REPEL ALL OUT VC/PAVN EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE BY INSURGENT TYPE ACTION DA NANG AB AND ITS US/GVN ASSETS.

4. FOREGOING RESPONS TO REF B.

GP-3

BT

REF A IS 5147
REF B IS NOT IDENTIFIED

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TO RUEKKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUMJTS/AMEMB VIENTIANE
RUMTE/AMEMB BANGKOK
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEKOR/STATE DEPT
RUEPIA/CEA

BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ LINDIS JCS 005311 JCS SEND.
SUBJECT: SECURITY SITUATION IN SVN (U)
REF: MACJS 4614 MACV TO CINCPAC.

✓ *Burby*

JCS REQUEST ASAP CINCPAC AND MACV VIEWS ON
SECURITY SITUATION IN SVN, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS RE-
GARDING POSSIBLE FORCE DEPLOYMENTS TO AREAS YOU
REARD AS MOST VULNERABLE IN ORDER OF PRIORITY.
WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS ON YOUR
RECOMMENDATIONS. GP-1

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 12/3/75
By MTE, NARS, Date 4/24/78

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711

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 18, 1965 *File*

FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith *S*
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *BR*
Executive Secretary

As per our conversation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

5/5
(711)

P

CONFIDENTIAL

February 16, 1965

122a

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: P - James L. Greenfield
SUBJECT: Viet-Nam and the Public

The public problem on Viet-Nam currently breaks down into two problems: One, the need for some public statement, either on a Presidential or Secretarial level, that reiterates the United States stake in Viet-Nam and sets the tone for public discussion in this country. Two, the more intricate, detailed and searching investigation by the press of future U.S. aims and actions. These questions are both legitimate and pressing, but at the moment they reflect journalistic rather than public pressure.

Within the government the tendency so far is to brush aside the general public statement on the excuse that it cannot include all the details demanded by the press. This argument is not valid.

The Public Statement

A public statement, either Presidential or on a high State Department level, should spell out some of the guidelines which will motivate our future actions in Viet-Nam. But this look into the future need not form the bulk of such a statement.

Instead, the statement should be dominated by a simple, direct restatement of U.S. policy. This restatement should outline the reasons why we are in South Viet-Nam, the nature of guerrilla warfare, the importance of the Pacific area to the United States, the alternatives that the U.S. faces and the consequences for both the U.S. and the free world that would occur if the United States did not carry out its commitment in Asia.

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Authority State 9/18/75
By NIE, NARS, Date 4/21/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To people dealing closely with the problem this is old-hat, even boring stuff. But it would not be to the American public.

The argument that we have said all this before -- and therefore should not repeat ourselves -- is equally invalid. The rationale for our actions during the past few weeks was almost entirely dropped from most of the stories that appeared after the first day of bombings. In ninety percent of the stories, the reasons for our actions fell victim to the more dramatic factual news of bombings, Americans wounded, statements, threats and counter threats.

People I am convinced, have lost sight of many of the past statements (and bits of statements) made in the past on Viet-Nam by the President and the Secretary. Our own two White House statements in the last ten days shifted emphasis without explanation. Almost no one remembers what the accords of 1954 and 1962 were all about, the rationale upon which they were based, or their applicability to the present situation.

Someone, therefore, should take them back through the essentials of our policy -- back through the accords, back through our mounting involvement as this new kind of warfare unfolded, back through our countless statements that we want no bases and no territory for ourselves. We should remind the public that a free Viet-Nam is worth the risks, both because of our obligations to the Vietnamese and to ourselves.

It is not enough simply to say that we are in Viet-Nam because Ike got us there or because the Vietnamese have asked us in, although both facts should be recalled.

Such a statement should end up by a clear declaration that what we seek is peace and as clear a statement as possible as to what we expect from the other side in order to gain that peace.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Such a statement will reassure the country, give it a common starting point to judge future U.S. actions.

The Questions of the Press

It will not, however, satisfy many of the questions being asked by the press such as those listed below. Many of them are currently unanswerable.

1. What is our objective in bombing the North?
 - Is it unconditional surrender?
 - Is it to drive the Viet Cong out of South Viet-Nam?
 - Is it a ceasefire?
 - Is it negotiations: if so with whom, what conditions, how arranged?
2. Why do we think the Viet Cong will give up if we bomb the North?

(Granted they are supplied and directed from Hanoi, but we acknowledge they have a strong local base and large measure of independence.)
3. Under what circumstances will we continue to bomb the North?
 - only if major attacks on U.S. facilities continue? (i.e., tit-for-tat: theme of February 8 statement)
 - at our discretion irrespective of specific attacks on U.S. personnel or installations? (White House statement of February 11)
4. What are we doing to prevent situation from returning to wasting guerrilla war that we haven't been able to win, with continuation of political instability in Saigon?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Any efforts going on to edge confrontation onto political track? What are circumstances under which we would talk to Hanoi, to Peking, to South Viet-Nam National Liberation Front and/or Viet Cong leadership?

If we won't talk do we have any objective other than complete withdrawal of Viet Cong to north of 17th Parallel?

Conclusion

Either the President or you should make a statement setting forth the fundamentals of our position and relating recent events to those fundamentals. If you hold a press conference you must be prepared to open with a full statement on Viet-Nam, since many of the questions you will get are unanswerable -- or better left unanswered.

P:JLGreenfield:tp

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 3-23-79

~~TOP SECRET~~ MACJ3 4999

- SECURITY SITUATION IN SVN(U)
- A. MACV 4614, 141412Z FEB 65
- B. JCS 161610Z FEB 65
- C. CINCPAC 161937Z FEB 65
- D. JCS 122140Z FEB 65

1. SECURITY SITUATION IN SVN MUST BE CONSIDERED AS WORSENING NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF RECENT SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED VC ATTACKS DIRECTED AT US PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF DETERIORATION OF ARVN CONTROL IN THREE OF FOUR CTZ'S; ONLY IV CORPS IS PRESENTLY HOLDING ITS OWN, INDEED IS GAINING SLIGHTLY. THESE TRENDS INDICATE THAT THE SITUATION VISUALIZED IN OPLAN 32 PHASE II (RVN) MAY BE APPROACHING.

2. PURELY MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AND MACV OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DICTATE FOLLOWING SELECTION AND PRIORITY OF AREAS AS OBJECTIVES FOR FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF US

ACT... J3-6(1-6)

- CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(9-11) SJCS-3(12-14) J4-2(15-16)
- SACSA-5(17-21) DIA-4(22-25) NMCC-2(26-27) SECDEF-5(28-32)
- ISA-9(33-41) CSA-2(42-43) CSAF-2(44-45) CNO-2(46-47)
- CMC-5(48-52) FILE-1(53)JMT/GAG

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

- EX COPY: CJCS-1 (54) MACGREGGOR) 17 FEB 65
- EX COPY: CJCS-1 (55) MACGREGGOR) 18 FEB 65

EX COPY DJS-4(56-59) SJCS-2(60-61) CJCS-2(62-63) AGENDA 18 FEB 65

EX CY: DJS-1 (64) (SGT THOMPSON) 19 FEB 65. OT

EX CY: DJS-1 (65) (THOMPSON) 24 FEB 65. OT

(AGENDA) CJCS-2 (66-67) DJS-4 (68-71) SJCS-2 (72-73) 24 FEB 65. OT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

COMBAT FORCES:

DA NANG

SAIGON/BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU COMPLEX

NHA TRANG/CAM RANH BAY

3. ACTION RECOMMENDED BY JCS IN SUB-PARA 2A (3) REF D WOULD DEPLOY MEB TO MOST VULNERABLE AND CRITICAL AREA: DA NANG. OUR REF A SUPPORTED THAT DEPLOYMENT. WHILE WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE CURRENT SITUATION NECESSITATES ANY ADDITIONAL OPLAN 32 PHASE II DEPLOYMENTS, WE ARE CONSIDERING RECOMMENDING, FOR VERY SPECIFIC REASONS, POSITIONING TWO ENGINEER BATTALIONS (ONE CONSTRUCTION AND ONE COMBAT) AND ONE INFANTRY BATTALION MIDWAY BETWEEN SAIGON AND BIEN HOA. IN ADDITION TO RAISING OWN CAMP, SUCH TASK FORCE COULD CONSTRUCT EXTENSIVE FIELD HEADQUARTERS FOR US MISSION AND MAJOR SUPPORT ELEMENTS NOW LOCATED IN POPULATED SAIGON/CHOLON AREA. A TASK FORCE OF THIS COMPOSITION, AND THUSLY LOCATED, WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY UP-GRADE THE SECURITY OF THE VITAL SAIGON/BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU COMPLEX AND PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT US COMBAT/CONSTRUCTION CAPABILITY, FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO HANDLE MOST PROBABLE CONTINGENCIES.

4. IN MORE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF IMPROVING THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND CLOSE IN PROTECTION OF US TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT IN PRESENT ENVIRONMENT THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN RECENT WEEKS:

A. 231 ADDITIONAL USAF AIR POLICE SPACES WERE REQUESTED AND APPROVED. OF THESE, 121 HAVE ARRIVED IN-COUNTRY.

B. 57 US ARMY MP'S WERE PROVIDED TO REINFORCE GUARDS OF US ARMY AIRCRAFT.

C. AN ADDITIONAL 128 US MARINES WERE DEPLOYED TO DA NANG TO REINFORCE SECURITY IN THOAT AREA.

D. EIGHT COUNTER MORTAR RADAR SETS AND THREE GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS WERE REQUESTED FOR CRITICAL AIRFIELDS. ONLY ONE AN/MPQ-4A AND ONE AN/T-S-33 WERE APPROVED BY CINCPAC AFTER DA AND USARPAC RECOMMENDED FIELD EVALUATION OF ONE SET OF EACH TYPE IN S/W PRIOR TO APPROVAL OF ENTIRE REQUEST. THESE TWO SETS CLOSED AT BIEN HOA 7 FEB AND ARE NOW OPERATIONAL. WE HAVE ENTERED STRONG RECLAMA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF REMAINING SETS ASAP.

E. A TAILORED MP BN HAS BEEN REQUESTED (APPROX. 400

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

JCS IN 31201

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SPACES). AD INTERIM HSAS, SUPPORTED BY USASCV AND 2ND AIR DIVISION, HAS PROVIDED MILITARY GUARDS TO STAND THOSE SECURITY POSTS IN GREATER SAIGON TO BE ASSUMED BY THE NP'S UPON THEIR ARRIVAL.

F. 134 ADDITIONAL INFANTRYMEN, ORGANIZED IN PROVISIONAL MG PLATOONS, HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO BOLSTER SECURITY AT OUTLYING AIRFIELDS WHERE US ARMY HELO UNITS ARE DEPLOYED.

G. SIMILARLY, AND BY SEPARATE ACTION, WE ARE REQUESTING AUGMENTATION TO RELIEVE US PERSONNEL RECENTLY DIVERTED FROM OPERATIONAL TASKS TO SECURITY DUTIES. THE NUMBER INVOLVED EXCEEDS 600.

H. IN ADDITION, A STUDY TO CONSIDER IN WIDE SCOPE ALL ASPECTS OF SECURITY US PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT IN SVN HAS BEEN INITIATED. FINAL RESULTS OF STUDY COULD VERY WELL GENERATE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS NUMBERING AT LEAST A DIVISION EQUIVALENT.

5. DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF AMBASSADOR, HIS VIEWS WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY. GP-1

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

JCS IN 31201

~~TOP SECRET~~

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NLJ 78-584, doc. #125

September 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Westmoreland has requested and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the movement of an additional increment of forces to Vietnam. This increment would be in addition to the 28 combat battalions, associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces--totaling 125,000--announced by you on 28 July. The request is for six additional combat battalions (making a total of 34), associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces--totaling 85,000 additional United States personnel.

I recommend that these additional forces be authorized for movement.

I further recommend that no announcement be made at this time of the decision to deploy additional forces, but that announcements be made only as forces arrive in the theater.

SIGNED

ROBERT S. McNAMARA

"DECLASSIFIED BY: ASD/ISA
DATE: 14 DEC 1978
PER: DOD Instruction 5200.1-R,
Chapter 4, Section 4,
Paragraph 4-400"

~~TOP SECRET~~

125

~~TOP SECRET~~

125

September 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Westmoreland requested and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the movement of an additional increment of forces to Vietnam. This increment would be in addition to the 25 combat battalions, associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces—totaling 125,000—announced by you on 28 July. The request is for six additional combat battalions (making a total of 31), associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces—totaling 85,000 additional United States personnel.

I recommend that these additional forces be authorized for movement.

I further recommend that no announcement be made at this time of the decision to deploy additional forces, but that announcements be made only as forces arrive in the theater.

Signed
ROBERT S. McNAMARA

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Authority AD/ISA 1214-78/NLS 78-584

By DCH NARS, Date 5-7-84

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classified properly*

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Page _____

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

126

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 Letter

22 SEP 1965

By CP, NARS, Date 3-23-79

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum outlines the basis for the increase in estimated US force requirements in South Vietnam from the 175,000 discussed in early July and mentioned in my July 20 recommendations to the 210,000 figure referred to in my September 1 memorandum to you.

You will recall that at your July 28 press conference you stated that you had ordered deployments which would raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately, that additional forces would be needed later, and that they would be sent as requested.

Prior to that date -- specifically, on July 24 -- the Joint Staff, as a result of MACV requests, had revised their total for 1965 deployment, increasing it to a little more than 195,000. I mentioned this higher figure to you at the time. At the August 2-6 Honolulu Meeting of General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, the 1965 "Phase I" requirements were refined to 210,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23 therefore made specific deployment recommendations totaling approximately 210,000.

Refinements continue to be made. For example, General Wheeler on September 4 listed an additional 3,000 for the 1965 Phase I (mainly three engineer construction/combat battalions); at the same time he indicated that approximately an equivalent number listed earlier (mainly helicopter personnel) will be arriving after the end of 1965. My prediction is that the final version of the 1965 Phase I requirement will end up exceeding 210,000 by a few thousand.

The differences between the 175,000 figure first mentioned in July and the 210,000 number now being discussed are primarily attributable to additional (a) air lift to move supplies around the country for both civilian and military purposes, (b) air defense, (c) artillery to support offensive operations and to provide immediate response to calls for help by villages under attack, (d) strike aircraft and associated support, (e) engineers, primarily to construct additional air bases, and (f) fleshing out, according to General Westmoreland's requests, of existing operational units and advisory and support elements (refugee relief teams, intelligence teams, communications, and security units, etc.).

You have authorized the deployment of 175,000 US personnel. I recommend that, at the present time, you authorize the movement of an additional

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Page 1 of 2 Pages

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35,000 men, bringing the total to 210,000. These deployments are essential to our effort. The authority will cover our requirements as they now appear although, as we have discussed before, forces in addition to the 210,000 may be needed later.

Robert S. McNamara

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 7-1-81 letter
By [signature], NARS, Date 8-3-81

127

April 5, 1965

DRAFT NSAM

SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On Thursday, April 1, the President made the following decisions with respect to Vietnam:

1. Subject to modifications in the light of experience, and to coordination and direction both in Saigon and in Washington, the President approved the 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Ambassador Taylor in a memorandum dated March 31, 1965.
2. The President gave general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16, with the exception that the President withheld approval of any request for supplemental funds at this time--it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA.
3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.
4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of

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SEC 8 - 1974

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March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in US military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC/slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken in ways that should minimize any

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

26 April 1965

1287
Aircraft Cases

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There have been repeated statements that we should pause in our bombing raids on North Vietnam to give the North Vietnamese Government an opportunity to accept your continued offer to discuss the situation in South Vietnam.

It is important, particularly in view of such statements, that we recognize that the North Vietnamese Government has had ample opportunity to negotiate a settlement with us. The actions of this country in the past — yours in particular — have clearly demonstrated that:

A. Before the Gulf of Tonkin Incident

On February 9, 1964, the Viet Cong exploded bombs under the bleachers during a softball game at Pershing Field in Saigon, killing 2 Americans and injuring 23 (including 7 women and 1 child). On February 16, 1964, the Viet Cong attacked a movie theater killing 3 Americans and wounding 35 (including 9 women and children). Viet Cong incidents of this kind persisted in South Vietnam throughout 1964. Throughout this period, we frequently indicated our willingness to seek a peaceful solution in South Vietnam and we took no action to retaliate for the acts of terrorism against United States personnel.

B. First Gulf of Tonkin Attack

On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese boats attacked the U.S. destroyer MADDUX in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. We took no military action against North Vietnam, but you issued a statement on August 3, indicating that we intended to pursue our right to be in international waters and ordering another destroyer to the Gulf of Tonkin.

C. Second Gulf of Tonkin Attack

North Vietnamese boats again attacked our destroyers on August 4, 1964. On August 5, U.S. planes retaliated in a limited fashion against naval bases which were the home ports of boats and the oil storage area at Vinh which supported them. At the time of this attack, you made it clear that our response was "limited and fitting" and that "we still seek no wider war". The U.S. retaliation did not extend beyond August 5.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 6-19-78, State 5-7-79

By isp, NARS, Date 6-25-79

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D. Post Gulf of Tonkin Negotiation Overtures (August 5 to November 1)

There were no U.S. attacks on North Vietnam between August 5, 1964, and February 7, 1965. During this period, you made our position clear. On October 11, 1964, in discussing Vietnam you said, "We are willing to go anywhere, any time, talk to anyone and try to reason together for peace. We would rather talk than fight." On October 28, 1964, in Los Angeles, specifically referring to the Gulf of Tonkin you said, "we can keep the peace, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, by reasoning together, by responsibility, by negotiation."

E. November and December Viet Cong Attacks

The Viet Cong answered your peace overtures with terrorism. On November 1, 1964, the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa airfield, killing 4 Americans and wounding 72. On November 18, 1964, they bombed a snack bar in Saigon wounding 18 Americans. On Christmas Eve the Viet Cong bombed the Brink Hotel killing 2 Americans and wounding 64. Nevertheless, we took no action against the North Vietnamese.

F. VC Attack on Pleiku

Finally on February 7, 1965, the Viet Cong attacked the barracks and airfield at Pleiku, killing 9 Americans and wounding 107. As a result, U.S. planes attacked the North Vietnam Army barracks at Dong Hoi and Chap Le again, a limited response to the Vietnam attack at Pleiku. As the White House statement you approved said on this date, "the response is appropriate and fitting. As the U.S. Government has frequently stated, we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors." The U.S. took no further action on February 8 and 9.

G. VC Attack on Qui Nhon Barracks

The Viet Cong persisted in their terrorist activities and on February 10, 1965, attacked the U.S. enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nhon, killing 23 Americans and 7 Vietnamese and wounding 21 Americans. Again, we responded in a limited fashion on February 11, 1965, by bombing the Vietnamese Army barracks at Chap Le and Chanh Hoa.

Then another extended period -- three weeks -- elapsed without any attacks on North Vietnam by our planes.

H. Continued VC Terrorism

Following February 11, VC terrorism continued unabated and, therefore, on March 2, 1965, we struck the Xom Bang ammunition depot and Quang Khe Naval Base in North Vietnam specifically limiting ourselves, as we always have, to military targets to avoid injuring civilians.

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Again we paused in our raids and no air attacks against the North were carried out during the next eleven days.

I. Further VC Terrorism

The Viet Cong persisted in their acts of terrorism. On March 4, 1965, they exploded a bomb in a bar frequented by U.S. personnel in Saigon, killing 2 Americans and 3 Vietnamese and wounding 5 Vietnamese. On March 12, Viet Cong terrorists attempted unsuccessfully to bomb U.S. barracks in Saigon. Therefore we conducted raids on the barracks at Hon Gio and Phu Qui ammunition and storage depot on March 14 and 15. There was a brief pause in our program. But Viet Cong terrorism persisted and on March 19 we conducted raids on North Vietnamese military depots at Phu Van and Vinh Son. Since then, the raids have been frequent, but so have our indications of a willingness to talk. And, unfortunately, so have the acts of Viet Cong terrorism.

On March 19 a bomb in a loaf of bread exploded wounding 4 Americans in Saigon. On March 30, 1965, Viet Cong terrorists exploded a 250 pound bomb in front of the U.S. Embassy killing 2 Americans (including one woman) and 14 Vietnamese, and wounding 48 Americans and 106 Vietnamese, many of them innocent bystanders. On April 4, a Viet Cong terrorist was apprehended at the Grand Hotel at Danang carrying a plastic explosive which he intended to use there. On April 14, 1965, Viet Cong terrorists exploded a bomb in an ammunition storage site at Qui Nhon, wounding 31 Americans. On April 19, 1965, a Viet Cong terrorist exploded a bomb in a bar frequented by U.S. personnel in Ban Me Thuot, wounding 4 Americans.

During this period your position has been abundantly clear. In a statement on Vietnam on March 25, 1965 you said, "As I have said in every part of the union, I am ready to go anywhere at any time, and meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an honorable peace." On April 7, 1965, at Johns Hopkins University, you again reiterated your willingness to negotiate. On April 8, in response to the 17 nation declaration of March 15, you said, "We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam." As recently as April 17, you said, "To those governments who doubt our willingness to talk, the answer is simple; Agree to discuss. Come to the meeting room. We will be there." And as you know, Secretary Rusk and I have on numerous occasions during this period indicated our hope for peaceful settlement in Vietnam and our willingness to negotiate with the North Vietnamese.

151

Robert S. McNamara

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 28, 1965

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Checked by Karlov

CONGRESSIONAL

Dear Mike:

I am enclosing a memorandum from Bob McNamara commenting on the first 18 points you raised in your memorandum to me. With respect to the 19th point, as I have often said, I consider Bob McNamara to be the best Secretary of Defense in the history of this country. Like myself, he is searching for the best solution to a very difficult situation.

Sincerely,

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

LBJ:JV:JC:ny

RECEIVED
AUG 9 1965
CENTRAL FILES

orig copy to Mrs. Ferrito

This should be confidential.

And he wants a photostat of it and the attachment to go to each one of these Senators ...

Russell, Fulbright, Sparkman, Aiken, Cooper -- by hand early in the morning.

MW/mf
7-28-65
11:00p

Mari: Done - + all is well - M. J. Cork

129a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday
July 28, 1965 - 8:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a note to Senator Mansfield for your signature enclosing a memorandum to you from Secretary McNamara commenting on 18 of the 19 points Sen. Mansfield raised in his memorandum. Since the 19th point was an attack on McNamara, I have tried to take care of that in your note to the Senator. Recommend signature.


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Attachment

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

28 July 1965

Original Please
129b

SECRET
JUL 30 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are my comments on the 18 points made by Senator Mansfield to you this morning regarding the Vietnam situation.

1. "The estimate of 100,000 men by the end of the year was probably short, that the more likely figure would be 150,000."

As you said at your press conference today, we will send troops so that the total number of Americans out there will be 125,000 almost immediately, and the figure will almost certainly go higher as additional forces are needed and additional decisions are taken. We will send no more men than are required to meet the valid requests of the military commanders.

2. "The Russians feel that they have an obligation to aid the North Vietnamese not unlike ours towards a Western European country which might be attacked and if we expect them to help in getting negotiations started before this situation gets out of hand we have to provide them with some basis for helping."

The problem is that it is very difficult "to provide them with some basis for helping" without losing the war. The Russians have repeatedly stated that they object to our program of bombing the North; but, we were in touch with the Soviets informally early during the past pause in the bombing program, and they did not come up with anything helpful. Nevertheless, I agree in principle with Senator Mansfield's point, and we are working hard to find ways to make it possible for the Russians to escape from their dilemma and to contribute toward some sort of acceptable settlement out there.

3. "The United Nations may be an important link in a way out of the situation but this possibility is clouded by the issue of Article 19; it may not be opportune to insist upon enforcement of the Article at this time; but heat is already being generated on the issue in the House and some prompt Presidential initiative on the point in public may be desirable."

You stated that you wrote Secretary General U Thant a letter, to be delivered this afternoon by Ambassador Goldberg, inviting him and the UN to use all of their creative ability to help solve the problem in Vietnam. I understand that you have talked to Ambassador Goldberg about the Article 19 question and that you think that we can work our way around that problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
DOD & State Dept. Guidelines
By *fwj*, NARA, Date *5-4-98*

4. "Bridges to Eastern Europe need to be kept open and continued encouragement of the evolution of these nations (Yugoslavia, in particular) towards full independence, political and economic, under their own unique forms of organization is of the greatest importance."

I agree with Senator Mansfield's point. We should vitalize this program by public discussion and actions within the Executive Branch by the agencies concerned. *See Vm Report of Pres and Miller Com. Report.*

5. "The Russians are deeply concerned that we are abandoning the policy of peaceful co-existence; some tangible reassurance that we are not, perhaps through the consular convention, is desirable."

One of the difficulties is that the Soviets tend to include in the phrase "peaceful co-existence" the right to inspire and feed "wars of liberation." Nevertheless, as we know, the Soviets have shown signs of reduced virulence in this area, and we want to keep them going in that direction. The United States has not abandoned its policy of moving ahead -- while disagreeing on many important things -- in peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union. The Consular Convention, which the Administration is supporting, is but one example of what we might do to be sure that all of our relations with the Soviets are not unpleasant ones. The Geneva meeting of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference is another example. I hope that somehow we can work out a non-proliferation agreement including the Soviets.

6. "The country is backing the President on Vietnam primarily because he is President, not necessarily out of any understanding or sympathy with policies on Vietnam; beneath the support, there is deep concern and a great deal of confusion which could explode at any time; in addition racial factors at home could become involved."

a group of our Dem. Senators to help in this respect...? Could you organize
 We must continue to explain our policies in Vietnam. You might consider setting up a Task Force to explain our policies to the American people. We should try to keep up the momentum built up during the public discussions last spring and early this summer. With respect to the introduction of racial factors into the issue, I think that the racial leaders throughout the country should be talked with, to make sure that they understand the danger of mixing Civil Rights and South Vietnam. We must bear in mind that Vietnam is a new type situation -- one the kind we have not faced before but which we will face many times in the future. The character of this new threat must come to be understood by the American people.

7. "The main perplexity in the Vietnamese situation is that even if you win, totally, you still do not come out well. What have you achieved? It is by no means a 'vital' area of US concern as it was described by Lodge at a hearing this morning."

South Vietnam is vital to the United States in the significance that a demonstrable defeat would have on the future effectiveness of

the United States on the world scene -- especially in areas where people are depending upon our guarantee of their independence. It is a vital US concern to maintain our honor as an ally and our formidability as an opponent. As for how the situation in Vietnam will ultimately come out, we cannot now know. But there is a range of outcomes -- many less than perfect ones -- that would satisfy American vital interests. Our objectives, after all, are quite limited in Vietnam. They are, first, to permit the South Vietnamese to be independent and to make a free choice of government and, second, to establish for the world that Communist externally inspired and supported wars of liberation will not work.

8. "There is reason for concern and irritation at Cao Ky's statement that we should fight on the perimeter while the Vietnamese military is organizing the rear."

General Westmoreland does not propose to use the US forces in that way. The Ky reference was not intended to be as bad as it sounded. As you know, it is in pacification operations carried out by the Regional and Popular Forces where the casualties are the heaviest. These operations are the ones which, ultimately, must be carried out successfully if South Vietnam is to remain an independent nation.

9. "The President was ill-advised to begin the bombing of North Vietnam in the first place and the error was then compounded by the limited character of the bombing."

The purposes of the program of bombing North Vietnam are, I think, being achieved. The purposes, in addition to reprisal (as was the case in the Tonkin Gulf and to a lesser extent after the Pleiku bombing), have been, first, to give us a better bargaining counter across the table from the North Vietnamese and, second, to interdict the flow of men and supplies from the North to the South. The evidence is that the program is valuable in both respects. It seems fairly clear that termination of the bombing program will be worth a good deal to the other side, and we have every reason to believe that the strikes at infiltration routes have at least put a ceiling on what the North Vietnamese can pour into South Vietnam, thereby putting a ceiling on the size of war that the enemy can wage there. A side effect of the program has been to convey to both North and South Vietnam in unambiguous terms the US commitment to see this thing through -- a matter as to which there was, unfortunately, some doubt out there on both sides last February. Neither of the purposes I have mentioned have so far required more extended bombing in North Vietnam. As for the value of the program as a bargaining counter in negotiations, that value depends upon there being, at about the same time, an improvement in our situation in the South; I do not believe that even a greatly extended program of bombing could be expected to produce significant North Vietnamese interest in a negotiated solution until they have been disappointed in their hopes for a quick military success in the South. We are of course sensitive to the

fact that a greatly increased program of bombing the North at any time would carry with it even more serious risks of confrontations with the Soviet Union and China -- something we have been trying to avoid.

10. "In clarification of what would follow a failure of the Goldberg-Rusk effort between now and January, it was pointed out that it would mean that we would probably have to add very substantially to manpower at that time."

I agree that if our efforts to produce negotiations fail, we can expect to have to send additional people. I do not expect Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Goldberg to be able in the short term to produce any miracle. It does not appear possible to achieve a settlement out there until it is fairly clear to the enemy that a victory for them is unlikely.

11. "The military concept of a greatly extended bombing in Vietnam is sound."

I agree that the extension of the bombing program in South Vietnam is a good idea. We propose to carry out such an extension. With respect to the bombing program against North Vietnam, I have made my comments in connection with Senator Mansfield's point 9.

12. "Another cessation of bombing of longer duration than the previous one might be desirable as a means of getting discussions under way."

If the time comes when another pause appears profitable, I would be prepared to consider recommending it to you.

13. "Underground contact might be sought not only with the Russians but with the Chinese as well; it could be particularly useful in bringing about talks in the event another pause in the bombing is attempted."

As Secretary Rusk has reported to you, there will be no short-ages of contacts with the Russians. It is more difficult with the Chinese, but we are making efforts to ensure that anything we or they have to say can be communicated to the other promptly and reliably. There has been no absence of channels of communication. The problem in the past has been that the Chinese are intent upon making their point in South Vietnam and have been impeding communications between ourselves and the Soviets and between ourselves and the North Vietnamese.

14. "France, who has the best contacts in Indochina, has been virtually ignored as a possible avenue of approach to negotiations."

France has been particularly difficult in this whole thing. She has not behaved exactly as a friend. She has caused trouble, pursuing a policy at cross purposes with ours; she has been less than frank in her

dealings with us; and there are occasions where we think she has failed to transmit communications intended to be given to us. Nevertheless, as you know, we have not excluded and do not intend to exclude France as an interested party or as a channel.

15. "The situation at Pleiku is highly dangerous; if the US garrison is attacked it could be another Dien Bien Phu and it could mean increased pressure for our deeper involvement."

There is almost no similarity between the situation in Pleiku and the situation that existed in Dien Bien Phu. Our capability to re-supply, to reinforce, and to augment with massive air-power is so great in comparison with Dien Bien Phu that a situation like Dien Bien Phu could hardly develop at Pleiku. The risk at Pleiku is one of a massive surprise attack supported by the unlikely good luck of a span of weather barring heliborne relief. This is a possibility, but a quite unlikely one, and our military leaders are aware of the possibility and are guarding against it.

16. "The French parliament, at no time, permitted conscripts to be used in Indochina."

The French lost the war in Indochina at least partly because the war had no support at home. The United States is at war in South Vietnam for reasons entirely different from those which motivate the French and for reasons which must command the support of the American people. In my judgment, it is therefore entirely proper that the United States use its regular armed forces, however they may have been raised, to fight for the United States interests in Vietnam.


17. "The Viet Cong are highly skilled and formidable fighters; the South Vietnamese forces are of dubious quality and larger and larger desertions can be anticipated."

The hard core Viet Cong are "highly skilled and formidable forces," as are the best of the South Vietnamese forces in even larger numbers. The South Vietnamese are fighting well and are dying at a rate greater than the United States has suffered in any war. Eighty thousand have been killed or wounded since 1960. Last year alone, the small South Vietnamese army suffered more casualties, in proportion to its size, than the United States incurred in the whole conflict in Korea. And still they fight on. The South Vietnamese desertions are high. The desertion rate tends to correlate with the tides of the war. But there have been no desertions of units or of major military figures. It is interesting to note that the Viet Cong apparently are suffering an increasing number of defections (for example, the so-called Chieu Hoi program, intended to stimulate defections to the Government, is now running at about 600 Viet Cong military personnel a month).

18. "The important thing in a situation like this which is clearly detrimental to us is to concentrate on finding a way out; a possi-

bility might exist in a combination of the coastal enclave-strategy, a cessation of aerial bombardment and the use of all possible contacts to get negotiations under way."

Everything reasonable is being done to find an acceptable solution. The exact combination of military and political action which will produce a settlement cannot be predicted now. As I said earlier, the first order of business is to make it clear to the enemy that an early victory is not in sight for them.


ROBERT S. McNAMARA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C.

129c

July 27, 1965

TO: The President
FROM: Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Meeting on Viet Nam

Subsequent to our telephone conversation, I met with the following Senators in my office at 3:30 this afternoon:

Russell	Aiken
Fulbright	Cooper
Sparkman	

I opened the meeting by reporting fully on the Leadership discussion of Viet Nam this morning. There was a general sense of reassurance that your objective was not to get in deeply and that you intended to do only what was essential in the military line until January, while Rusk and Goldberg were concentrating on attempting to get us out. A general desire to support you in this course was expressed. It was felt that one of the best ways this could be done would be by communicating the feelings of some of the senior Members of the Senate to you in this fashion.

Among the major points which were raised by various of the Senators in attendance during the discussions were the following:

1. The estimate of 100,000 men by the end of the year was probably short, that the more likely figure would be 150,000.
2. The Russians feel that they have an obligation to aid the North Vietnamese not unlike ours towards a Western European country which might be attacked and if we expect them to help in getting negotiations started before this situation gets out of hand we have to provide them with some basis for helping.
3. The United Nations may be an important link in a way out of the situation but this possibility is clouded by the issue of Article 19; it may not be opportune to insist upon enforcement of the Article at this time; but heat is already being generated on the issue in the House and some prompt Presidential initiative on the point in public may be desirable.
4. Bridges to Eastern Europe need to be kept open and continued encouragement of the evolution of these nations (Yugoslavia, in particular) towards full independence, political and economic, under their own unique forms of organization is of the greatest importance.

5. The Russians are deeply concerned that we are abandoning the policy of peaceful co-existence; some tangible reassurance that we are not, perhaps through the consular convention, is desirable.

6. The country is backing the President on Viet Nam primarily because he is President, not necessarily out of any understanding or sympathy with policies on Viet Nam; beneath the support, there is deep concern and a great deal of confusion which could explode at any time; in addition racial factors at home could become involved.

7. The main perplexity in the Vietnamese situation is that even if you win, totally, you still do not come out well. What have you achieved? It is by no means a "vital" area of U. S. concern as it was described by Lodge at a hearing this morning.

8. There is reason for concern and irritation at Cao Ky's statement that we should fight on the perimeter while the Vietnamese military is organizing the rear.

9. The President was ill-advised to begin the bombing of North Viet Nam in the first place and the error was then compounded by the limited character of the bombing.

10. In clarification of what would follow a failure of the Goldberg-Rusk effort between now and January, it was pointed out that it would mean that we would probably have to add very substantially to manpower at that time.

11. The military concept of a greatly extended bombing in Viet Nam is sound.

12. Another cessation of bombing of longer duration than the previous one might be desirable as a means of getting discussions underway.

13. Underground contact might be sought not only with the Russians but with the Chinese as well; it could be particularly useful in bringing about talks in the event another pause in the bombing is attempted.

14. France, who has the best contacts in Indochina, has been virtually ignored as a possible avenue of approach to negotiations.

15. The situation at Pleiku is highly dangerous; if the U. S. garrison is attacked it could be another Dien Bien Phu and it could mean increased pressure for our deeper involvement.

16. The French parliament, at no time, permitted conscripts to be used in Indochina.

17. The Viet Cong are highly skilled and formidable fighters; the South Vietnamese forces are of dubious quality and larger and larger desertions can be anticipated.

18. The important thing in a situation like this which is clearly detrimental to us is to concentrate on finding a way out; a possibility might exist in a combination of the coastal enclave-strategy, a cessation of aerial bombardment and the use of all possible contacts to get negotiations underway.

19. McNamara has been a disappointment in his handling of this situation, probably because he is being used in a way in which he ought not to be used.

It should be noted that there was obviously not a unanimity among the Members present on all of the points listed. But there was a very substantial agreement on many of them. Moreover, there was full agreement that insofar as Viet Nam is concerned we are deeply enmeshed in a place where we ought not to be; that the situation is rapidly going out of control; and that every effort should be made to extricate ourselves.