

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

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The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 11, 2014

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
21a	cable	Saigon 3359 - sanitized, 4/2014 dup., #54, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "NODIS-LOR, Volume2A," Box 46	TS	3	4/13/65	A
45a	memo	Intelligence Memo - sanitized 8/98 dup., #198, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, Volume 32, Box 16	S	2	4/20/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, NSC Histories

Folder Title "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 3"

Box Number 41

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4/11/2014

Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#45a memo	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>CIA secret <i>Sanitized 11-14-85</i>; <i>Same sanitization 4/14</i> OCI no. 1196/65 2 p (duplicates #198 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)</p>	04/20/65	A
#48a report	<p>CIA top secret (gp 1) <i>Open 11-24-85</i> TS 185843-c 11 p (duplicates #120 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)</p>	04/21/65	A
#65a memo	<p>CIA secret (gp 1) <i>Sanitized 11-14-85 open 4-11-14</i> Special memo #11-65 7 p (duplicates #99 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)</p>	04/27/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

FILE LOCATION
 National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol 3

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#10a memo w/report	OSD top secret <i>Sanitized OSD etc.</i> to Bundy from McNaughton 6 p (duplicates #220 and 220a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	<i>7/15/77</i> 04/08/65	<i>put in this file 6/10/96</i> A
#13a cable	OSD top secret <i>open 9-2-80 inf</i> CINCPAC 091040Z part I of II 2 p	04/09/65	A
#14a cable	OSD top secret <i>open 9-2-80 inf</i> CINCPAC 091040z part II of II 1 p	04/09/65	A
#25a cable	OSD top secret <i>open 1-23-80 inf</i> DEF 009164 3 p (duplicates #157 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/15/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#73e report	OSD top secret <i>open 1-23-80 inf</i> re: Vietnam 9 p	04/25/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4a memo	<p>JCS top secret <i>sent to open 4/1/74</i> to SecDef from Gen. Wheeler</p>	<p>3 p 04/06/65</p>	<p>A</p>
#26a cable	<p>JCS top secret (gp 3) <i>open 6-28-79 in p</i> JCS 009012</p>	<p>2 p 04/14/65</p>	<p>A</p>

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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#11a cable	state top secret <i>open 4/11/74</i> 3290 from Saigon <i>sanitized</i> (duplicates #63 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	1 p 04/08/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#21a cable	state top secret <i>sanitized 6-11-81 info</i> 3359 from Saigon <i>sanitized, more released 4/11/74</i>	3 p 04/13/65	A
#27a cable	state top secret 3368 from Saigon <i>sanitized</i> (duplicates #34 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32) <i>open 4/11/74</i>	1 p 04/14/65	A
#28a cable	state top secret 3374 from Saigon <i>sanitized</i> (duplicates #29 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32) <i>open 4/11/74</i>	1 p 04/14/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#33a cable	state top secret <i>open 4/11/74</i> 2332 to Saigon (partial duplicate of #33c)	2 p 04/14/65	A
#33c cable	state top secret <i>open 6-11-81 info</i> re: Saigon cables	2 p 04/18/65	A
#37a cable	state top secret <i>open 6-28-79 info</i> to Bundy from Taylor	1 p 04/17/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#40a cable	state top secret <i>open 4/11/74</i> 3423 from Saigon (duplicates #15 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	5 p 04/17/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#41a cable	state top secret <i>[Duplicate of #18 NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 2, BV 416] open 4-11-74</i> 3432 from Saigon (duplicates #9 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	3 p 04/17/65	A
#43a cable	state top secret <i>open 1-23-80 inf</i> CAP65120 (duplicates #183 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	1 p 04/18/65	A
#47a memo	state top secret <i>open 1-23-80 inf</i> to president from Geo. Ball (duplicates #121a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)	1 p 04/21/65	A
#49a cable	state top secret <i>open 1-23-80 inf</i> copy of Vientiane 1712 (duplicates #97a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)	1 p 04/27/65	A
#50a cable	state top secret (gp 3) <i>open 6-28-79 inf</i> 2379 to Saigon	1 p 04/21/65	A
#51a cable	state top secret 3477 from Saigon	1 p 04/21/65	A
#53b memo	state top secret <i>open 4-11-74</i> to Taylor from Rusk (partial duplicate of #53c)	3 p 04/22/65	A
#53c cable	state] top secret (gp 1) <i>open 6-28-79 inf</i> 2397 to Saigon	4 p 04/22/65	A
#57a	state top secret <i>(gp 3)</i> XXXXXXXXXX 3504 from Saigon	1 p 04/23/65	A
#58a cable	state top secret <i>open 1-23-80 inf</i> 3505 from Saigon (duplicates #39 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)	1 p 04/23/65	A
#60a cable	state top secret <i>open 6-28-79 inf</i> 3511 from Saigon to Rusk from Taylor	3 p 04/24/65	A
#61b cable	state] top secret <i>open 1-23-80 inf</i> copy Saigon 3504 (duplicates #57a)	1 p 04/24/65	A
#66b cable	state top secret <i>open 1-23-80 inf</i> copy Vientiane 1712 (duplicates #49a)	1 p 04/26/65	A
#66c cable	state top secret <i>open 7-25-87 NLS 85-224</i> copy Saigon 3552 (duplicates #97b in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)	2 p 04/27/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#69a cable	state top secret , <i>open 4-11-14</i> 3552 from Saigon (duplicates #66c) 2 p	04/27/65	A
#71a cable	state top secret (pp 3) <i>open 1-23-80</i> 2468 to Saigon, et al 2 p (duplicates #51 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)	04/30/65	A
#74a cable	state top secret <i>open 4-11-14</i> 3606 from Saigon <i>sanitized 12-22-83</i> 2 p (duplicates #136 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/01/65	A
#77a cable	state top secret <i>open 2-28-79</i> 3552 from Saigon to Rusk from Taylor 1 p	05/03/65	A
#81a cable	state top secret <i>open 12-11-83</i> 3664 from Saigon 2 p (duplicates #113 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/06/65	A

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National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol 3

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7a cable	state secret State 10-6-78 3246 from Saigon 2 p	04/07/65	A
#12a cable	state secret open 1-28-80 ing 3267 from Saigon 1 p (duplicates #70 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/08/65	A
#15a cable	state secret (gp 1) open 1-25-80 ing 2259 to Saigon 2 p (duplicates #120 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/09/65 02*	A
#33b cable	state secret (gp 3) State 10-6-78 2113 to Saigon 2 p	03/27/65	A
#39a cable	state secret open 1-29-80 ing from Saigon to SecState #3422 1 p (duplicates #13 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/17/65	A
#23a cable	state secret open 1-29-80 ing 3384 from Saigon 2 p (duplicates #27 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/14/65	A
#46a cable	state conf open 4-7-74 3458 from Saigon 1 p (duplicates #3 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/20/65	A
#56a cable	state secret State 10-6-78 3496 from Saigon 3 p	04/23/65	A
#63a cable	state secret open 1-29-80 ing 3539 from Saigon 2 p (duplicates #22 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)	04/26/65	A
#64a cable	state secret (gp 3) open 1-29-80 ing 3529 from Saigon 2 p (duplicates #25 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 33)	04/26/65	A
#78a cable	state secret open 1-29-80 ing 3632 from Saigon 5 p (duplicates #120 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/03/65	A
#79a cable	state secret State 10-6-78 3645 from Saigon 2 p	05/04/65	A

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Vol. III
(147-220)

Tab.

- 142 NSAM 328 - Apr. 6, '65
- 41 non-military actions
 - Psy-war prog. (Rowan)
 - Cover actions
 - Repeats approval of 21-pt. mil. prog. (Gen. HK Johnson)
 - new forces - changed mission
 - 3rd nations, etc.
- see last para. "... gradual & wholly consistent with existing policy."
- 143 - appraisal of air strikes (JCS to SecDef) 6 Apr. 65
Feb 7. - Apr. 4 period.
"have not curtailed DRV mil. capabilities in any major way"
145. Statistical improvement (KIA, weapons, etc.)
Rolling Thunder began 2 Mar. 65
Jet air support in SVN " 19 Mar. 65
- 146 Mar. 30 bombing of US Embassy.
- Also Nat. Legislative Council announced Nat. Congress should be elected to write a Constitution.
- 148 McN tto Sen For Rel Comm of est. 25,000 increase
- 18,000 support + 2 Bns + 1 Mar. Air Sqrn.
- 149 Analysis of proposal to mine or blockade NVN ports. (Ellsberg)
- 151 GVN approves Marine supple. at Da Nang^{4 unit} / Phu Bai
- 155 MB memo (4/10) Pres. concerned abt. control over mil. info.
re FN.
- 156 Amb. Taylor's press backgrounder Apr. 12

PRESERVATION COPY

Tab.

- 158 Taylor urges faster logistics build-up & anticipates larger forces Apr. 12.
- 159 - Analysis of WH mail after Johns Hopkins speech - 4/13
- 161 - Apr. 13 - CINCPAC recommends deployment of 173 Airl. Brigade to Bien Hoa/Vung Tau
- 162 Amb. Taylor has reservations abt. add'l U.S. forces - 4/14
- 163 M.B. memo to Pres. - discusses ↑ Taylor reservations.
- 164 Joint State-Def. message to Saigon re experimental actions. 4/15
- 165 JCS to CINCPAC - order to deploy 173rd (after GVN clearance) 4/14
- 167 Taylor objects to Marines having 155mm & 8" howitzers.
- 169 - Pham Van Dong's 4 Pts - Saigon sees nothing new.
- 170 Taylor opposes deploy. of 173rd - 4/14
- 172 M.B. to Amb. Taylor re Pres. wishes
- 173 Plans for Gen. Peers party
- 174 Taylor opposes ↑.
- 176 " " CAffairs approach Apr. 17
- 179 " outlines instructions he needs to raise 3rd Country troops w/ GVN Apr. 17
- 181 Saigon Mission Council criticizes new programs. 4/17
- 192 Message to Taylor - Recommended increases - Get GVN concurrence 4/22
- 193 Lodge gets Aus, NZ + Phil agreement on troops - 4/22
- 197 GVN agrees to note on sea surveillance - 4/23

Vol. III

Tab

Checks

142 - Memo from Amb. Taylor dated 3/31/65
- includes 41-pt. program of non-mil. actions
approved by Pres. April 1.

- Memo - Dir. of CIA - dated 3/31/65
12 suggestions for covert action

- When was Johns Hopkins speech?

- Tuesday lunch mtg - Apr. 13, '65 (

157

Gen Johnson
memo for →

186 Ball Memo re approach to V-N settlement 4/21/65
(only covering memo in Tab 186)

(189) Top Level Mtg - 4/21 - McN summary of Honderhe

12

141

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

02614

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

2a

82
Origin

55
Info

ACTION: Amembassy Saigon ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ FLASH 9197

INFO: CINCPAC PRIORITY
DOD

Apr 5 8 32 PM '65

F
S

EXDIS

SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF: A. CINCPAC's 042058Z (Ambassador Taylor sends) and
B. Deptel 2184

In discussions with Quat it is considered more desirable to describe the mission of the Marines as engaging initially in counter-insurgency combat operations in the vicinity of the Marine bases (Da Nang and Hue-Phu Bai). Following acquisition of experience in those local counterinsurgency operations, the mission can be expanded into a strike role in coordination with ARVN operations, in wider areas as required by circumstances.

In amplification of last sentence second para refdeptel, report of conclusions reached at meeting between Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland (mentioned second para ref tel A) coupled with report of Amb Taylor's meeting with Quat this subject will be

satisfactory.

Drafted by: FE:JRDcleland:jmv 4/5/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Leonard Unger

Clearences:

DOD - Admiral Blouin

S/S - Mr. Bartley

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 12 1/4/78
By MJE NARS Date 4/11/78

~~TOP SECRET~~

satisfactory. Washington determination ~~is based on~~ ^{re approval} ~~of concept~~ ^{re approval} of concept
will be based on these reports.

Concur with approach outlined para 3 ref tel A.

GP-3

END.

BALL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

142

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9

3a

April 6, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 328

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

On Thursday, April 1, The President made the following decisions with respect to Vietnam:

1. Subject to modifications in the light of experience, and to coordination and direction both in Saigon and in Washington, the President approved the 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Ambassador Taylor in a memorandum dated March 31, 1965.

2. The President gave general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16, with the exception that the President withheld approval of any request for supplemental funds at this time -- it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA.

3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.

4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC declass list 10/14/77
By NZE NARS, Date 4/10/78

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U. S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

4

143



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

✓ Retn from President 4/9/65 (1102)

4a

CM-534-65
6 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam
7 February 1965 to 4 April 1965

1. Since 7 February United States forces have conducted 34 air strikes and South Vietnamese forces have conducted 10 air strikes in North Vietnam. These strikes used conventional weapons including napalm with the heaviest bomb being 1000 pounds. The targets included one naval base, two army supply depots, three ammunition depots, two army barracks areas, one airfield, nine radar sites, and three highway/railroad bridges and associated routes.

2. Until 3 April when a MIG damaged a U. S. aircraft, and 4 April, when two North Vietnamese MIGs shot down two U. S. planes, enemy reaction had been limited to anti-aircraft fire from weapons up to 57-mm caliber. The South Vietnamese have lost six planes with one pilot believed killed, and two missing. U. S. losses have been 25 planes with one pilot killed, two pilots captured, and nine missing.

3. The air strikes have not reduced in any major way the over-all military capabilities of the DRV. Damage inflicted on the Army supply depots and ammunition depots has, of course, reduced available supplies of certain military items, but these losses should not be critical to North Vietnamese military operations. Damage to the naval base, army barracks, the air fields and radar sites was not such as to hamper in a serious way DRV capabilities. We have no estimate of NVN casualties. I believe that the destruction of the railroad/highway bridges at Thanh Hoa and Dong Phuong and the Dong Hoi highway bridge is the most damaging military blow delivered to date. The loss of these bridges will slow down logistical support to the southern portion of the DRV. If we follow up as planned with additional strikes against railroad and highway bridges, railroad rolling stock trapped south of Thanh Hoa, and armed reconnaissance missions along the key highways south of the 20th parallel, we should be able to apply a serious stricture to DRV logistical support to the south, including that to Laos and to the VC in South Vietnam.

4. Prior to the recent strikes on the bridges, the economic effects of our attacks were minimal. No doubt the fishing industry has been harassed by maritime operations and armed reconnaissance flights along the coast.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. II, # 241
By lg, NARA, Date 4-4-74

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The line of communications strikes referred to above should apply increasing economic pressures as well as military logistic problems.

5. The air strikes have caused a build-up of AAA defenses and, coupled with the shore defenses including beach watcher units established by the North Vietnamese Government because of maritime operations, have the effect of increasing the number of regular military and para-military forces. In other words, manpower resources devoted to military activities have been increased at the expense of those available to the economy.

6. Any assessment of the impact of our air strikes on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese Government and people must be deduced from the small evidence available to the outside world from a closed Communist society. I believe that the following estimates are reasonable conclusions in the light of the evidence we have:

a. The military are keenly aware of the destructive potential of our forces. They are attempting to establish ground defenses to make us pay a good price for every target struck. The DRV Air Force exhibited considerable daring in its two clashes with our aircraft. The DRV Navy has dispersed and has issued instructions to its vessels not to open fire on hostile aircraft unless the aircraft actually initiate an attack against them.

b. There are indications that the North Vietnamese people are apprehensive of the future. One report highlights the difference in public attitude in Haiphong in January -- described as "exultant" -- and that in March described as "depressed and fearful."

c. Outwardly, the North Vietnamese government appears to be uninfluenced by our air strikes. The degree to which this official attitude is based upon a desire to reassure its own people, to influence world attitudes against the United States and to discourage us from continuing offensive actions is imponderable. Moreover, the North Vietnamese Government may believe that, with the support of Communist China and the USSR, VC successes in South Vietnam and world opinion will eventually give them the victory. In other words, they are willing to pay a price for South Vietnam. On the other hand, intercepted messages reveal that certain population centers have been partially evacuated, air raid shelters have been prepared and air raid drills conducted, and the government has increased military defenses.

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7. In summary, I think it fair to state that our strikes to date, while damaging, have not curtailed DRV military capabilities in any major way. The same is true as regards the North Vietnamese economy. The North Vietnamese people exhibit an understandable degree of apprehension for the future. The Hanoi Government continues to maintain, at least publicly, stoical determination.

8. At tabs A through F are more detailed discussions of specific areas.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

5

144

5a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1965

Mac:

You ought to read when you
have a moment.

CLC

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS#185834

v
5b

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 April 1965

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Communist Intentions in South Vietnam

1. Recent evidence bearing on Communist intentions in South Vietnam includes: (a) continuing indications of increasing Viet Cong (VC) military strength and capabilities, particularly in the northern provinces of South Vietnam which the Communists term Military Region V; and (b) a number of statements emanating from the VC-controlled National Liberation Front and from Hanoi, Peiping, Moscow, and Pyongyang which raise the spectre of large-scale war through the Indochina Peninsula.

2. There has been clear evidence in past months of an accelerated buildup of VC forces in Military Region V. There is recent evidence that this buildup may include one and possibly three ^{AVN} battalions in Western Kantum. This buildup in capabilities almost certainly indicates an intention to undertake offensive actions of greater scope and significance than hitherto attempted in this area. The security situation in this area has so deteriorated

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Authority CIA Hr 9/21/77
By MDE, NARS, Date 4/10/78

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that an accelerated sustained effort by the VC, or an attack on some key point, could have grave consequences for the GVN. Such an attack could come against any one of a number of places -- Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Qui Nhon, Pleiku, and possibly Da Nang. We cannot, however, estimate whether it is likely in the near future. The buildup has already been in progress for at least six months, and it may be that preparations for a major attack will continue for some time to come while smaller-scale activities are generally intensified.

3. The recent enemy statements -- National Liberation Front, DRV, Chinese Communist, Soviet and North Korean -- seem to be quite carefully worded to avoid commitments to direct intervention at this time. While the statements do commit the Asian Communists to arms support for the Viet Cong, the threat of "volunteers" -- whether foreign or the "regrouped" Southerners living in North Vietnam -- is made conditional on Viet Cong "need" and on further US actions. The statements issued so far appear to have been designed partially to bolster Communist morale, particularly in North and South Vietnam, and to bluff the US out of its position of firmness by generating and heightening international and domestic political pressures which the Communists

- 2 -

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almost certainly hope will force the US to cease and desist. Nevertheless, their willingness to go as far as to threaten intervention suggests that the Communists are prepared to take some further steps to fulfill their warnings, for example, with token numbers of "volunteers" from other Communist countries.

4. We continue to believe that DRV and Chinese Communist intentions are about as we have estimated in our recent SNIE's on this subject.

- 3 -

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7 April 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Six Weeks Statistics from Counter-guerrilla Actions
in SVN

The trends apparent in MACV weekly reports may be of interest. I have been watching these figures, and have placed them on the attached graphs.

These six weeks include the period of ROLLING THUNDER (which began on 2 March), and jet air support in SVN (which began 19 March, the results of which are not completely known). The following trends are interesting though not necessarily significant:

- a. The KIA ratio has steadily improved in favor of the RVN from almost 1:1 to better than 3:1.
- b. The missing/captured ratio has improved from over 4:1 in favor of the Viet Cong to approximately 1:1.
- c. The weapons loss ratio has improved from about 5:1 in favor of the Viet Cong to 1:1.

RCB
R. C. BOWMAN

*Staff Int. Man
m-11*

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC 5/2/77, OSD 1/24/77
By MJE, NARS, Date 4/10/78

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action CONTROL: 5293
RECD: APRIL 6, 1965, 11:08 PM

Info FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 3246 PRIORITY

DATE: APRIL 7, 10 AM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State 10-6-78 letter*
By *JP*, NARS, Date *3-23-79*

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

N O D I S

THE BOMBING OF THE EMBASSY ON MARCH 30 WAS THE DOMINATING EVENT OF THE WEEK. THE LOCAL PRESS, AND MANY VIETNAMESE PRIVATELY, EXPRESSED INDIGNATION AND OUTRAGE AT THIS ACT OF TERRORISM. WHILE THE BOMBING BROUGHT HOME ONCE AGAIN THAT THE VIET CONG CAN STRIKE IN THE HEART OF SAIGON, IT DID NOT SEEM TO DAMPEN THE IMPROVED MORALE OF THE VIETNAMESE. AMERICAN COMMUNITY IS ENTIRELY UNSHAKEN.

IN THE MEANTIME, QUAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE CONTINUED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIVE MEASURES IN THE POLITICAL FIELD. THE WEEK WITNESSED:

- A) AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL THAT A NATIONAL CONGRESS SHOULD BE CONVENED TO TAKE UP THE URGENT TASK OF DRAWING UP A PERMANENT CONSTITUTION, AND THAT THE CONGRESS SHOULD BE BASED ON DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE ORGANIZED IN SECURE ZONES.
- B) THE OPENING OF A PRESS CONGRESS TO DEVELOP A STATUTE GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE LOCAL PRESS.
- C) INDICATIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT THAT IT WOULD HOLD ELECTIONS EARLY NEXT MONTH FOR CITY AND MUNICIPAL COUNCILS.
- D) AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT IT IS 1) ESTABLISHING AN EMBASSY IN ADDIS ABABA, WITH AN INFORMATION CENTER TO SERVE ALL OF AFRICA; 2) DISPATCHING A DELEGATION, HEADED BY VICE PREMIER TUYEN, TO VISIT KEY AFRICAN CAPITALS; AND 3) OPENING COMPETITION TO FILL 20 VACANCIES IN THE VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE.

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-2- 3246, APRIL 7, 10 AM, FROM SAIGON

E) AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT QUAT WILL RESERVE THURSDAY AFTERNOONS TO MEET WITH MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC.

ANOTHER INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT, BUT ONE ON WHICH WE STILL HAVE ONLY TENTATIVE AND FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION, HAS BEEN THE EMERGENCE OF SIGNS OF BUDDHIST PROTESTS AGAINST VIET CONG DEPREDATIONS AGAINST BUDDHIST MONKS AND PAGODAS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTE HAS INSTRUCTED PAGODAS TO PRAY FOR A BUDDHIST MONK IN BINH DINH PROVINCE WHO REPORTEDLY BURNED HIMSELF TO DEATH IN PROTEST AGAINST SUCH VIET CONG ACTIONS. THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTE ALSO HELD A MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR THE AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE VICTIMS OF THE EMBASSY BOMBING. THESE ARE HEARTENING, IF STILL ISOLATED, SIGNS OF AN IMPROVED ATTITUDE IN BUDDHIST RANKS.

IN THE MILITARY FIELD, THE VIET CONG CONTINUED TO LIE LOW, THEIR ACTIVITIES REACHING A LEVEL EVEN LOWER THAN THAT RECORDED DURING THE LUNAR FESTIVAL PERIOD OF EARLY FEBRUARY. IN SPITE OF THEIR INERTIA, THEY TOOK HEAVY LOSSES IN ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN WHICH THE FRIENDLY TOTAL KILLED IN ACTION AMOUNTED TO 189 AGAINST 795 VIET CONG DEAD. THE ENEMY ALSO LOST 80 CAPTURED AND OVER 200 WEAPONS. WHILE THIS IS GOOD NEWS, WE STILL HAVE THE UNEASY FEELING THAT THE VIET CONG MAY BE PREPARING UNPLEASANT SURPRISES FOR US. DURING THE WEEK, WE ACQUIRED REASONABLY CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 325TH DIVISION HAVE BEEN IN SOUTH VIET-NAM SINCE FEBRUARY. THE PRESENCE OF ONE BATTALION IS CONFIRMED AND IT IS POSSIBLE ALL THREE REGIMENTS ARE OPERATING IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES WE ARE PRESSING ALL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO DETERMINE WHAT THE VIET CONG ARE UP TO.

REPORTS OF IMPROVED MORALE ARE NOW COMING IN FROM THE PROVINCES, INDICATING THAT THE RISE IN CONFIDENCE NOTED IN URBAN CENTERS IS BEGINNING TO SPREAD TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. WHILE MORE INDICATIONS WILL BE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THE EXTENT OF THE TREND, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN MONTHS THAT WE HAVE HAD SUCH ENCOURAGING REPORTS ON PROVINCIAL MORALE.

~~CFN 30 VIET CONG SAIGON NOT QUAT A) B) C) D) 1) 2) VICE PREMIER
TUEN 3) 20 E) QUAT VIET CONG BINH DINH VIET CONG VIET CONG
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 2229
INFO Amembassy CANBERRA priority 832 DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 851
SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV

EXDIS Ref CINCPAC's 030452Z April (Scherger-Phipps talks)

Reftel and conversation with Australian Minister here indicate strongly that Australia will, if we and GVN request, send infantry battalion to SVN. Unless you perceive objection, you should approach GVN to suggest they make formal request to GOA for battalion. You may inform Quat in general terms of results CINCPAC-Scherger talks, and of present thinking that Australian battalion would be deployed to Danang. FYI This could be base for possible ANZAC Force. NZ contribution subject SepTel.

~~FYI~~ In conversation Apr. 6 Unger asked Australian Minister to relay to GOA proposal, from General Johnson's visit to Saigon (ref.), that Australia take on responsibility for training Regional Forces. Min said he would relay request, but thought GOA would have trouble finding enough personnel in view expanded demands of conscription. Speaking for himself, however, he speculated that if infantry battalion were sent to SVN, some trainers -- perhaps 100 -- might be attached to it END FYI.

GP-3

End

BALL

Drafted by Josephine
FE: Maguire jd 4/6/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: THE ACTING SECRETARY

Clearence: DOD/ISA -A dm. Blouin (J3-Gen. Reaves)
FE - Mr. Green
S/S - Mr. Bartley
FE - Leonard Unger

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

Authority State 172 1/4/78
By NDE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE 2230

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EXDIS

In Executive Session with Senate Foreign Relations Committee today Secretary McNamara stated about 18,000 more support troops of non-combat nature such as engineers, would be deployed to RVN and in response to question stated that two remaining battalions of MEB and one Marine air squadron would be deployed to RVN. In response to question by Fulbright, Secretary McNamara indicated increase would be in order of 25,000 personnel and Senator Fulbright noted this was almost 100 percent increase. While session was classified there is always possibility of leaks and you should be aware and prepared for such eventuality.

In event leak does occur and you are queried re press stories this subject, you should indicate certain deployments under consideration; these not repeat not final and deployments will only be made if desired by GVN and after consultation with them.

GP-

End

BALL.

Drafted by:

FE: Lt. Col. JRD Cleland; jd 4/7/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

THE ACTING SECRETARY

Clearance:

P - Mr. Freeman (subs)
DOD/ISA - Lt. Col. K. Miller (subs)
DOD/PA - Cmdr. Thomas (subs)

H - Mr. White (subs)
S/S - Mr. Bartley

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Authority State 112 1/4/78
By NIE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

FORM 8-63 DS-322

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

8 April 1965

1-Copy
2-Rec PKS

MEMO FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

Here, for your information, is an outline analysis by Mr. Ellsberg of the proposal to mine or blockade DRV ports.

John T. McNaughton
John T. McNaughton

Attachment - 1

DECLASSIFIED
OSD ltr. 7/15/77
By *lw per amy* NARS, Date 6-10-86

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4/8/65

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ANALYSIS OF MINING OR BLOCKADE OF DRV PG. 3

1. NVN FOREIGN TRADE PATTERNS

- a. Import tonnages handled 65% through ports, 30% by rail, 5% by road; Export tonnages handled 80% through ports, 20% by rail.
- b. Haiphong Harbor handles 65% of imports, 55% of exports. Other ports handle--Cam Pha, Hon Gay--25% of export tonnage (coal), virtually no imports.
- c. Seaborne imports: 1750 tons per day; 400 tons POL, plus grain, foodstuffs, fertilizer, general cargo.
- d. Seaborne exports: 4000 tons per day; 60% antracite coal, plus pig iron, ores, miscellaneous.
- e. Rail imports: 600-750 tons per day; 500 tons coking coal or coke, plus metals, metal products, machinery, tractors, kerosene, food.
- f. Rail exports: Unknown tonnages (capacity 1200-1500 tons) of logs, lumber, bamboo, hogs and cattle.
- g. Principal traders: (in order) Japan, USSR, Chicoms.
- h. Merchant shipping: roughly 1/3 Communist Bloc, 1/3 UK, 1/3 other Free World (168, 177, 225 ships respectively in 1964; 32, 31, 35 so far in 1965).
- i. Free World shippers: after UK, Japan, Norway, Greece; lesser amounts Lebanon, Panama, Italy, Netherlands, West Germany, Liberia, Sweden, Denmark, Indonesia, France, Finland.
- j. Bloc shippers: Mainly USSR, Chicoms, Poland (virtually none of NVN registry). (Some Free World ships are under charter to or carrying cargo from Communist countries.)
- k. Coastal shipping: 55 NVN motorized junks, countless smaller craft plying between South China and DRV, and along coast of DRV.

2. MINING PROGRAM FOR HAIPHONG HARBOR

- a. Requirements: 26 A-1H sorties/73 acoustic and magnetic influence mines.
- b. Response time from decision: VNAF delivery (mines shipped from Subic), 6 days; USN delivery (mines/carriers prepositioned), 1 day.
- c. Damage threat: initial probability of at least light damage to ocean shipping; 30% with VNAF laying, 61% with USN laying (more accurate delivery).
- d. Reseeding (if CHICOMS sweep): 5 A-1H sorties/35 mines per month.

3. BLOCKADE OF DRV

- a. Requirements: 8-10 DDs, 6 patrol aircraft, one CVA task force (plus one more as backup), 4-6 minesweepers, one logistic support group.
- b. Alternative Concepts: (1) Cuba-type quarantine of prohibited cargo; only ships (suspected of) carrying prohibited cargo intercepted; clearance passes granted by US or US-authorized authorities required. (2) Total "classic" blockade, prohibiting all save "humanitarian" traffic with DRV.
- c. Possible transition phases (to ease psychological reaction, support necessity and appropriateness, by gradual approach to full blockade):
 - 1) SVN establishes a 12-mile "contiguous zone" along SVN coast within which it will (with US help) rigidly enforce its customs, immigration, sanitation and fiscal laws;
 - 2) SVN declares a "defensive sea area" of, say, 40 miles off SVN to interdict DRV supply to VC, including lightering from ocean ships;
 - 3) SVN extends zone of interdiction northward to include DRV coast, but applying only to DRV/VC shipping (free passage for third nation ships);

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Authority NLS 002-016-001-4
By pc/16, NARA, Date 4-4-14

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- 4) SVN/US quarantine of DRV ports for all incoming shipments of offensive or infiltration-associated materiel;
- 5) SVN/US establishes total blockade of NVN, supplemented by mining.
- d. Impact: For (1) selective quarantine, little effect, since prohibited materiel could come overland or via coastal shipping; for (2) total blockade, similar impact to effective mining of major DRV ports (below).
- e. Local threats to blockade forces: DRV/VC air attack, surface naval attack (PTs, SWATOWS), minelaying (particularly by CHICOMS, using Soviet mines). In view of air threat (particularly CHICOM), essential to be ready to neutralize DRV/CC air promptly given DRV/VC initiation of air attack.
- f. Other risks: 1) Deliberate challenges by neutral, allied, or "innocent" Bloc ships, posing dilemma of losing face or using "unwarranted" force.
2) Confrontations with Soviet merchant ships or warships, with risk of escalation.
3) Escalation possibilities in responding to DRV/CC air/naval attack on forces.
- g. Legal basis for selective quarantine of offensive war materiel and infiltration-associated materiel: SVN "self defense" against NVN armed aggression requires steps to halt flow of materiel into NVN and thence into coastal traffic to SVN; relatively plausible (like RT strikes against infiltration-associated targets).
- h. Legal basis for total blockade same as for mining: see below.

4. IMPACT OF MINING HAIPHONG HARBOR

- a. If mining continued and were fully effective, the DRV would have to find alternate routes for about 45,000 tons of imports per month.
- b. Alternate routes (using Chicom ports, where necessary):
 - 1) Railways could carry total tonnage (including POL), though this would compete with current rail shipments (including Nanning-Kunming traffic).
 - 2) Total tonnage could divert to other DRV ports, and clear from ports by highway.
 - 3) Highways could handle all but bulk POL, and also all POL if transported in package form from China.
 - 4) About 50% of import cargoes (except bulk petroleum and heavy equipment) might be lightered in by small craft from ocean ships anchored outside harbor, or transshipped from China in small coastal vessels.
 - 5) A combination of rail, road and coastal shipping from China could carry all imports.
- c. Countermeasures to alternate routes:
 - 1) Mine Cam Pha and Hon Gay Harbors: 11 A-1H sorties/44 mines, for 20% initial probability of at least light damage to ocean vessels.
 - 2) Destroy road and rail bridges on major routes from China: 112 strike sorties/180 total sorties for 85% probability of dropping one span on each of 3 key RR/highway bridges (Lang Son, Dap Cau, Viet Tri).
 - 3) To block lighterage or coastal shipping, lay shallow-water moored mines (currently in very limited supply) from small US/GVN craft and/or deploy coastal naval patrol.
- d. Damage to DRV: if alternate routes used with no countermeasures, increased transportation costs. If alternates were blocked, denying large proportion of imports, industrial construction projects would soon halt; most manufacturing could continue on stockpiles only 1-2 months before drastically curtailing production.
- e. Seaborne infiltration into SVN: No direct effect on shipment from DRV or China, in absence of shallow-water mining or coastal patrol of NVN; possible effects (like Rolling Thunder) on DRV will of threat to continue mining program plus offer to desist.

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5. LEGAL STATUS OF MINING

- a. Legal status (like practical effect) of mining is equivalent to that of total blockade of port(s).
- b. In both cases, (controversial) argument would be that "self defense" of SVN against DRV armed aggression requires measures of economic strangulation of NVN.
- c. Either would be unambiguously belligerent act, in traditional terms (unlike "novel" actions like Rolling Thunder or Cuba "quarantine"): thus raising such issues as Presidential authority and neutral rights.
- d. Legal issues more likely to be raised forcibly than with Rolling Thunder (or with highly selective quarantine) because: (1) Commercial interests of allies and neutrals directly involved; (2) issues of precedent important to some allies and neutrals; (3) possibility of sinking of "innocent" ship, evoking both legal controversy and moral revulsion.
- e. Like RT strikes against industrial/population/transportation targets, neither mining nor total blockade could claim discrimination and appropriateness relative to the infiltration/support threat, as can be claimed for RT strikes against infiltration-associated military or a selective, Cuba-type "quarantine."
- f. Alternative rationale (tacit): in spirit of retaliation (but without using term "reprisal" or announcing "tit-for-tat" principle), mining could be timed to follow a VC "spectacular," in particular one hurting SVN economically; this should strongly improve psychological, if not legal, acceptability.

6. POSSIBLE USES OF MINING IN CURRENT SCENARIO

- a. Supplement to later stages of Rolling Thunder, strongly enhancing economic impact of strikes against rail/highway routes from China and of strikes against industrial stockpiles.
- b. As "circuit-breaker" for Rolling Thunder, justifying/covering suspension or cutback of RT short of "flash points."
- c. Reprisal action -- less prone than some to "flash" -- for VC spectacular, including attacks on shipping, or mining of ports, or isolation of towns.

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7. PROS AND CONS OF MINING

a. Pros compared to Rolling Thunder:

- (1) Greater impact, stronger signal of US resolution than current targets.
- (2) Less chance (though not zero) of confrontation with DRV/VC MIGs than for some potential RT targets.
- (3) Simple to execute with limited resources.
- (4) Need not cause collateral damage or casualties, if passage is deterred.

b. Pros compared to Blockade:

- (1) Much less risk to US/GVN forces.
- (2) Requires fewer resources (main task within VNAF capabilities).
- (3) Shorter response time from "go" (1-4 days); better to implement in "hot blood."
- (4) Less challenge to CC/SU to produce confrontation of warships.
- (5) Less chance of rapid escalation following a "showdown."
- (6) Less chance of drawing CC air attack on US forces, requiring hot pursuit or strike on Chinese bases.
- (7) Compared to quarantine, greater impact on DRV; about the same as full blockade.
- (8) Less involvement of "face" on either side.

c. Cons compared to Rolling Thunder:

- (1) Directly infringes on commercial interests of allies and neutrals; will almost surely raise their violent protests on legal and "moral" issues of right and appropriateness, supported by widespread skepticism of justification.
- (2) Given impact and nearness to Hanoi/Phuc Yen, may be a "flash point" for DRV/CC.
- (3) Unlike current RT strikes, must claim to discourage rather than to prevent infiltration/support; lacks virtues of selectivity, control.
- (4) Like full blockade, traditionally connotes full belligerency, raising various legal/psychological associations.
- (5) Invites specific retaliation: mining of SVN harbors and coastline by small craft.
- (6) Could produce major confrontation with Soviets (ship sunk).
- (7) If "innocent" ship sunk, could produce widespread moral revulsion, with condemnation of "irresponsible, uncontrolled, indiscriminate" tactic (like strike on population target).

d. Cons compared to Blockade:

- (1) Compared to selective quarantine, has all drawbacks of full blockade: maximum friction with third-party shipping and governments, question of appropriateness or "over-reaction," issues of belligerency and neutral rights.
- (2) Compared even to full blockade, invites condemnation for lack of control, discrimination.
- (3) Given an attempt to challenge or run the barrier, a minefield runs the risk of destroying an "innocent," or allied, or Soviet or Chicom ship, or a warship, that a blockade would have let through or would have threatened, taken into custody, sent back or, at worst, disabled. The costs of the undeliberate sinking may be widespread revulsion (including US), or allied fury, or serious escalation.

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Recommendations on Mining and Related Actions:

1. Attacks on railroad/highway bridges cutting the Nanning-Hanoi-Kunming rail route should precede any mining operation:
 - a. These accomplish much of the effect of a blockade without any of the third-country repercussions or legal controversies.
 - b. They affect specifically trade with the Chicoms; and "incidentally" cut off a 100-train per month Chicom flow between Nanning and Kunming.
 - c. They make the threat (explicit or tacit) of later mining much more powerful, since mining would cut off the only remaining inflow (and could no longer be compensated by transshipment through Chicom ports).
2. At the same time or later, destroy the Hai Duong railway bridge between Haiphong and Hanoi:
 - a. This achieves much of the further effect of mining/blockade, by preventing cargo (in particular, POL) from being cleared from Haiphong by rail.
 - b. Again, neither third-country nor legal problems are raised.
3. Unannounced mining would be likely to trap merchant ships of friendly nations (particularly UK or Japan) in Haiphong Harbor; to avoid this, either "tactical warning" of intent to mine must be given or generalized warnings of the possibility, over a longer period of time.
4. Mining must be justified on the same basis as a total blockade (not a "selective quarantine," or "measured and fitting" strikes against infiltration-associated or purely military targets); careful preparation of the public position establishing the necessity and appropriateness would be necessary, especially if the action were taken in "cold blood."
5. In view of legal, precedent-setting, and third-country complications, alternative measures available, and strong possibility of DRV/VC retaliatory mining -- RECOMMENDATION:
 - a. Mining operations should not be added to attacks on rail bridges.
 - b. If mining is chosen, it should be done "in hot blood," as reprisal to (or in context of) major VC/DRV provocation.
 - c. Mining should be preceded, over considerable period, by indications of the possibility of and preparations for such action, if the US were sufficiently provoked.
 - d. The possible threat of mining should be kept in mind for specific deterrent purposes (especially after RR bridges hit).

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action PP RUENCR
DE RUNJIR 467A 08/1425Z
SS P R 0814140Z ZEA
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Info TO RUENCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
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ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 3290 INFO CINCPAC 1951 CITE 081410Z FROM SAIGON APRIL 8, 10 PM

L I M D I S

REF: (A) EMBTEL 3249 (B) EMBTEL 3267 (C) DEPTTEL 2229

QUAT GAVE FORMAL AUTHORIZATION TODAY FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ADDITIONAL MARINES FOR DANANG AND PHU BAI. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THEY WILL START ARRIVING SHORTLY AND WILL CLOSE IN ABOUT A WEEK. I SHOWED HIM THE PROPOSED TEXT RELEASE (EMBTEL 3267) CFN 3290 191 081410Z 8 10PM 3249 3267 2229 QUAT 3267

PAGE TWO RUNJIR 467A ~~TOP SECRET~~
AND HE AGREED THAT IT WAS APPROPRIATE AS THE U.S. STATEMENT. HE WAS DIRECTED BUI DIEM TO DRAFT A PARALLEL BUT NOT IDENTICAL STATEMENT FOR THE USE OF THE GVN. HE AGREED THAT BUI DIEM FOR THE GVN AND HANDFUL FOR THE MBASSY WOULD WORK OUT A SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE ONCE THE TWO TEXTS ARE IN FINAL FORM.

I DID NOT FEEL THAT IT WAS OPPORTUNE TODAY TO TAKE UP THE MATTER OF THE AUSTRALIAN BATTALION IN REF (C). QUAT HAS BEEN MOVING AT A VERY FAST PACE THE LAST FEW DAYS AND NEEDS A LITTLE TIME TO BREATHE BEFORE TAKING ON THE PROBLEM OF OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY REINFORCEMENTS.

TAYLOR
BT
CFN BUI DIEM (C)

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S/O 4/8/65 9:44 A.M.

PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 4/8/65 10:02 A.M.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority *RAC 23367*
By *ms/s*, NARA, Date *4-4-14*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 408A 08/0500Z
P 080250Z ZEA
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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
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P R I O R I T Y

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1965 APR 8 AM 12-13

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 3267 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC
1941 CITE 080250Z FROM SAIGON APRIL 8, 11 AM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E X D I S

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT PRESS RELEASE CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT
ADDITIONAL MARINE ELEMENTS WHICH WE PROPOSE TO GVN FOR ISSUE
HERE WHEN AUTHORIZED BY WASHINGTON:

QUOTE: AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIET-NAM, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO LAND IN THE DANANG
AREA THE REMAINDER OF THE NINTH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
CFN 3267 1941 080250Z GVN US

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 408A ~~SECRET~~
WHICH CONSISTS LARGELY OF ONE MARINE BATTALION LANDING TEAM
AND ONE SQUADRON OF F-4 AIRCRAFT. ALSO TO IMPROVE SECURITY
IN THE HUE-PHU BAI AREA, AN ADDITIONAL MARINE BATTALION LANDING
TEAM WILL BE INTRODUCED INTO THIS AREA. THESE REINFORCEMENTS
WILL BEGIN TO ARRIVE SHORTLY AND WILL CLOSE DURING THE COURSE
OF THE MONTH. UNQUOTE. TAYLOR
BT
CFN F-4 HUE-PHU BAI

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:31 A.M., 4/8/65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 12:42 A.M., 4/8/65.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 12-19-77, OSD 7-7-78
By inf NARS, Date 1-28-80

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RUEPIA/CIA
P 091040Z ZEA ZFF RUHKA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC
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Authority OSD 10-18-78, State 7-16-79, NSC 8-19-80
By JK (ing), NARS, Date 9-2-80

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ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 3303 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC CITE 091040Z
CINCPACFLT COMSEVENTHFLT UNN FROM SAIGON APRIL 9, 630 PM

CINCPAC PASS TO CINCPACFLT AND COMSEVENTHFLT FROM SAIGON UNN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: DEPTELS 2168 AND 2171

FOLLOWING IS STATUS OF OUR APPROACH TO GVN ON INCREASED US
NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-SEA INFILTRATION MEASURES.

BY FORMAL EXCHANGE OF NOTES DATED APRIL 1 AND APRIL 3 GVN
PERMISSION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FOR VESSELS OF TASK FORCE 71 OF
THE US 7TH FLEET TO ENTER PORTS OF RVN AS REQUIRED FOR LIAISON,
~~CFN 3303 959 091040Z 9 630PM 2168 2171 GVN 1 3 GVN 71 7TH~~

~~PAGE TWO RUMJIR 506A/1 TOP SECRET~~
LOGISTIC AND SIMILAR PURPOSES, WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION IF
NECESSARY (BUT WITH SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN CONFIRMATION).

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED DRAFT GVN NOTE WHICH WE PREPARED
PASS TO PRIME MINISTER QUAT IN ACCORDANCE EMBTEL 3190 AFTER
RECEIVING STATE/DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION.

BEGIN TEXT

COMPLIMENTARY OPENING

IN VIEW OF CONTINUING SUPPORT BEING PROVIDED VIET CONG THROUGH
SEA INFILTRATION, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
REQUESTS THE ASSISTANCE OF US MILITARY AIRCRAFT, VESSELS AND
PERSONNEL IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF MEASURES INTENDED TO PREVENT
SUCH ACTIVITY AND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE GOVERNMENT OF
RVN HEREBY:

1. REQUESTS ASSISTANCE OF US NAVAL VESSELS IN STOPPING,
BOARDING, AND SEARCHING VESSELS WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL
WATERS OF RVN.

2. REQUESTS ASSISTANCE OF US ^{NAVAL} ~~NWEAL~~ VESSELS, IN ORDER TO
ASSIST THE GVN IN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED RIGHT TO PROTECT
ITSELF AGAINST VESSELS ENDANGERING ITS INTERNAL SECURITY, IN
REF GVN 3190 1 2.

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INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC
RUHKA/T/CINCPACFLT
RUHKA/T/COMSEVENTHFLT
STATE GRNC

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Authority OSD 10-18-78 State 7-16-79 NSC 8-19-80

By JK (sig), NARS, Date 9-2-80

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ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 3303 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC CITE 091040Z
CINCPACFLT COMSEVENTHFLT UNN FROM SAIGON APRIL 9, 630 PM

CINCPAC PASS TO CINCPACFLT AND COMSEVENTHFLT FROM SAIGON UNN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: DEPTELS 2168 AND 2171

SEVENTH FLEET CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT US NAVAL VESSELS
BE AUTHORIZED TO PATROL AS CLOSE TO THE CAMBODIAN BORDER AS POSSIBLE
IN CONNECTION WITH THESE ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS. REQUEST
STATE/DEFENSE GUIDANCE BE PASSED TO SEVENTH FLEET ON LIMITS WHICH
~~CFN 3303 959 091040Z 9 630 PM 2168 2171~~

~~PAGE TWO RUMJIR 506A/2 TOP SECRET~~

SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON SUCH PATROLS IN ORDER TO AVOID INCIDENTS.
IN THIS REGARD MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER LIMITING PATROLS IN SEN-
SITIVE BORDER AREA TO VIETNAMESE NAVAL VESSELS, PERHAPS WITH
US ADVISORS ABOARD.

CINCPAC HAS RECOMMENDED TWO ADDITIONAL KINDS OF US ACTIVITY
IN RVN RELATED TO ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS AND INCREASED
NAVAL PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY. THESE ARE:

(A) SEA-LAUNCHED AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC IN WHICH
RVN TROOPS ARE TRANSPORTED TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA BY US AND/OR
RVN VESSELS.

(B) USE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT AND NAVAL AIR STRIKES AGAINST
ACTIVE INFILTRATION OPERATIONS AND AGAINST SELECTED VC TARGETS
(SUCH AS FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS, SUPPLY DUMPS, COMMAND CENTERS,
ETC.) IN SUPPORT OF US AND VIETNAMESE FORCES ASHORE. THIS WOULD
BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH REGULAR US/GVN LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS.

STATE/DEFENSE AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR MISSION 0 APPROACH
THE GVN (INFORMALLY, WITHOUT EXCHANGE OF NOTES, AS WAS DONE IN
THE CASE OF THE USE OF USAF JETS IN-COUNTRY) TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT IN
PRINCIPLE TO SUCH OPERATIONS AFTER WHICH THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SPECIFIC PLANS WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO MACV.

CFN (A) (B) US/GVN

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON
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Authority Act 12-19-77; USIA 7-7-78; OSD 7-7-78

By 128 NARS, Date 1-29-80

LIMDIS

Joint State-Defense-USIA message

Subject: Air Strikes Against North Viet-Nam

Viet-Nam Interagency Coordinating Committee has reviewed and approved in principle the following concept for psychological operations to be conducted on a regular but random basis as CINCPAC determines before air strikes against DRV by either VNAF and/or US Forces:

would
We ~~would~~ warn prior to a strike, either by leaflets dropped from the air and/or by radio, that certain categories of targets are considered as military objectives and the populace should be warned to evacuate all targets of these categories and remove themselves from the areas immediately adjacent to them.

By doing this we would gain psychological benefits. For example,
1) reinforce our international posture that although we are attacking installations we are concerned with possible civilian casualties;
2) increase the fears and tension among NVN civil and military personnel;
3) create dislocations with NVN administration by forcing it to devote time and energy to safeguarding civilian populations in areas in which

Crafted by: FE/VN:JFRafferty:jd 4/9/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Leonard Unger

Clearances

Defense/ QSD/ISA - Adm. Blouin USIA - Mr. Moore State/S/AH - Mr. Jordan
Jt. Stf Dir. - GenL Birchmal FE/VN - Mr. Corcoran

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leaflets have been dropped.

If Mission concurs with this concept, you are authorized begin implementation immediately.

GP-1

END

BALL.

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April 10, 1965

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MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense

The President has directed me to emphasize again his continuing concern for more careful control of military information on operations in Vietnam. The President continues to believe that it is very unhelpful to have detailed accounts of the size and strength of air operations against North Vietnam, and does not understand why it is not possible to avoid giving out accurate information on numbers of aircraft and the weight of bombs dropped.

The President is also dissatisfied with the rapidity of release of information respecting further troop reinforcements to () Vietnam and does not understand why there should have been an announcement on this subject from Saigon. This announcement seems to him inconsistent with the decisions reached on April 1 and reported in paragraph 11 of National Security Action Memorandum No. 329 dated April 6.

The President requests that the Department of State and the Department of Defense take further energetic action to improve our performance in these respects.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 4-19-78, NSC 6-21-78

By ijg, NARS, Date 1-23-80

(cc Pres)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ Bundy

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IN BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR SELECTED PRESS REPS AMBASSADOR TAYLOR SAID HE WOULD GIVE HIGH POINTS OF HIS RECENT WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS.

HIS DISCUSSIONS MAINLY CONCERNED THREE AREAS OF DIFFICULTY, HE SAID: MANPOWER FOR GVN, RESTRAINING VC INFILTRATION, AND PACIFICATION.

IN AMPLIFICATION, AND SAID GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAD RECOMMENDED INCREASES IN STRENGTHS OF ARVN, PARA-MILITARY FORCES, AND POLICE. THE GOAL OF 160,000 NEW MEN FOR THIS YEAR HAD CFN 3342 12 7 TAYLOR GVN VC WESTMORELAND ARVN 160,000

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 668A
ALREADY BEEN ANNOUNCED, HE SAID, AND HE FELT THIS FIGURE COULD BE REACHED WITH MAXIMUM EFFORT ON PART OF GVN. ON QUESTION OF INCREASED US MILITARY PARTICIPATION, AMB NOTED ANNOUNCEMENT OF INCREASES IN US MARINE STRENGTH HAD BEEN MADE YESTERDAY. IN ADDITION, GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAD RECOMMENDED CERTAIN INCREASES IN NUMBERS OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS TO ENABLE US FORCES ALREADY HERE TO FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY.

THREE SPECIFIC ACTIONS HAVE BEEN APPROVED. FIRST IS ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMY LOGISTICAL COMMAND HERE. THIS WOULD DRAW TOGETHER FIVE OR SIX CURRENT LOGISTICAL OPERATIONS UNDER ONE HEAD. IT WOULD MEAN ADDITION OF SEVERAL THOUSAND US TROOPS. SECONDLY IT WAS DECIDED TO INCREASE PROGRAMS OF IMPROVEMENT TO PORT FACILITIES IN CENTRAL REGION. THIS WOULD SERVE BOTH MILITARY AND LOCAL ECONOMIC NEEDS, ESPECIALLY THOSE ARISING FROM INCREASED NUMBERS OF REFUGEES IN CENTRAL CITIES. THIRD MEASURE IS AN INCREASED USE OF US SEVENTH FLEET TO ASSIST IN CONTROLLING INFILTRATION BY SEA. ALL THESE WERE MEASURES TO OFFSET VC STRENGTH, AND STRESSED.

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-2- 3342, APRIL 11, 7 PM, (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

IN ADDITION HE PARTICIPATED IN WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS ON US AIR ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM--HOW BETTER TO ORCHESTRATE STRIKES AND MAKE PROGRAM MORE EFFECTIVE. IT WAS GENERALLY FELT THAT CURRENT PROGRAM IS ABOUT RIGHT AS TO TEMPO. AMB SAID THAT NO CHANGE IN BEHAVIOR ON PART OF HANOI HAD BEEN NOTED SO FAR AS RESULT OF STRIKES, BUT IT WAS STILL TOO EARLY TO EXPECT ONE. THERE HAD BEEN VISIBLE RESULTS IN NORTH, HE SAID: CUMULATIVE MATERIAL ASPECTS OF STRIKES WERE MAKING COMMUNICATIONS MORE DIFFICULT IN SOUTHERN PART OF NORTH VIETNAM, WHERE ROAD MOVEMENT WAS HAMPERED, AND IT WAS FELT THAT ATTACKS WERE BEGINNING TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL LIFE OF NORTH VIETNAM.

AMB SAID SUBJECT OF PACIFICATION RECEIVED MOST ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON. US REALIZES, HE SAID, THAT PRESSURE ON HANOI FROM AIR ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. IF NORTH VIETNAMESE THINK THEY ARE ABOUT TO WIN WAR ON GROUND IN SOUTH, THEY MAY DECIDE TO ABSORB

PAGE 4 RUNJIR 668A

PUNISHMENT OF US-SVN AIRSTRIKES. WE MUST PROVE TO NORTH THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE CHANCE TO WIN AGAINST FORCES IN SOUTH. AMB CONTINUED THAT MANY PROGRAMS WERE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON AND THAT NO SINGLE SPECTACULAR PLAN WAS ADOPTED.

AS TO FINAL TOPIC DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, AMB SAID PRESIDENT'S JOHNS HOPKINS SPEECH AND STATE DEPT'S ANSWER TO 17 NON-ALIGNED NATIONS SPOKE FOR HIM.

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE CONTACTS WITH NORTH VIETNAM OR SIGNALS THAT NVN MIGHT BE RESPONDING TO OUR BOMBING, AMB SAID THERE ARE VARIOUS POINTS NORTH VIETNAM CAN USE FOR CONTACTS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES--THE UN OR PLACES WHERE THEY HAVE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION, FOR EXAMPLE, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY HOW THEY WOULD CHOOSE TO CONTACT US. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION, AMB SAID THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR PREPAREDNESS TO TALK ON SUBJECT OF VN, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT US WILL NOT ACCEPT

PAGE 5 RUNJIR 668A

CESSATION OF ITS BOMBINGS AS PRE-CONDITION FOR DISCUSSIONS. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY LESSENING OF VC ACTIVITY WHICH MIGHT BE SIGNIFICANT IN THIS REGARD, AND REPLIED THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANYTHING TO JUSTIFY REDUCTION IN BOMBING NORTH.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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AMBASSADOR SAID IN ANSWER TO QUESTION THAT PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT THAT US IS READY TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS WAS CLEAR AND STRESSED THAT DISCUSSIONS NOT SAME AS NEGOTIATIONS; NO STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE BY USG ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION AMB SAID WE ASSUME HANOI IS FREE TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF WITH REGARD TO COURSE OF WAR, BUT WE CANNOT BE SURE OF EXTENT OF POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON HANOI BY OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. QUESTION WAS ASKED WHETHER AMB WOULD REVISE HIS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT INTERVENTION BY SOVIET UNION OR RED CHINA;

0-23 2 RUMJIR 668A/2

AMB REPLIED IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MASSIVE SOVIET OR CHINESE INTERVENTION AT THIS TIME, BUT THAT SHIPMENTS OF ARMS OR OTHER SECONDARY KINDS OF ASSISTANCE MIGHT CONTINUE.

IN ANSWER QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD BE LEAVING HIS SAIGON POST BY SAYING NO. QUESTION WAS ASKED WHETHER FIGURE FOR 1965 INCREASE IN GVN FORCES WAS 100,000 OR 160,000, AMB REPLIED THAT FORMER FIGURE WAS MENTIONED BY SECRETARY MACNAMARA SOME TIME AGO, BUT SINCE THAT TIME HIGHER TARGET OF 160,000 HAD BEEN ADOPTED. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION WHETHER US PLANNING ON AN ESTABLISHMENT OF 350,000 US TROOPS IN VIETNAM, AMB REPLIED HE KNEW OF NO SUCH PLAN. ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN THOUGHT GIVEN TO ATTACKING AN IMPORTANT TARGET IN NORTH VIETNAM IN REPRISAL FOR SAIGON EMBASSY BOMBING, AMB REPLIED THAT AIR STRIKE PROGRAM CAREFULLY PLANNED AND NOT TIED TO SPECIFIC VC ACTIONS, SO HE HAD NOT CONSIDERED ANY SPECIAL MEASURE NECESSARY AS RESULT OF EMBASSY BOMBING. ASKED IF QUESTION OF HOT PURSUIT HAD COME UP AS RESULT OF MIG DOGFIGHTS, AMB REPLIED NOT TO HIS KNOWLEDGE. AMB ALSO REPLIED NO WHEN ASKED WHETHER US OR GVN GROUND ACTION WAS

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-2- 3342, April 12, 7 PM From Saigon (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 668A/2

PLANNED AGAINST NVN. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION WHETHER NAVAL BLOCKADE OF NVN WAS AMONG MEASURES CONTEMPLATED IN INCREASE OF SEVENTH FLEET SUPPORT TO VN WAR (MENTIONED ABOVE) AMB REPLIED IN HIS OPINION BLOCKADE OPERATION WOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE DUE TO COST, INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT WITH AIRFIELDS ON HAINAN ISLAND.

AMB WAS ASKED WHETHER ATTENTION WAS BEING GIVEN TO PROBLEM THAT US ALLIES CONTRIBUTE TO TRADE FLOWING THROUGH PORT OF HAIPHONG. HE REPLIED HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANYTHING BEING DONE AT THIS TIME, BUT IT WAS SOMETHING HE MIGHT NOT KNOW IN ANY CASE.

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION ABOUT DISPOSITION OF EMBASSY BOMBING TERRORIST HAI, AMB SAID PRIMIN QUAT KNOWS WE HAVE PROBLEM (REFERRING TO THREATENED EXECUTION OF GUSTAV HERTZ) AND WE KNOW HE HAS PROBLEM; AMB FELT NOTHING HASTY WOULD BE DONE.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 668A/2

AMBASSADOR WAS ASKED IN CONNECTION WITH PREVIOUS QUESTION AS TO WHETHER COUP WAS IMMINENT, WHETHER THERE WERE ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO PREVENT COUP IF WE WANTED TO. AMB REPLIED WE HAD NOT IN PAST BEEN ABLE TO FORESTALL COUPS; BUT THAT WE WOULD ALWAYS TRY; WHAT WAS REALLY NEEDED WAS MORE CONVICTION AMONG POLITICALLY ACTIVE VIETNAMESE THAT COUPS WERE HARMFUL.

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION WHETHER STATIONING US MARINES IN HUE WAS CHANGE IN POLICY, SINCE MARINES WERE NOT GUARDING MAJOR US INSTALLATION LIKE DANANG AIRBASE, AMB REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT OF MARINES IN HIS MIND, AND THAT THE HUE/PHU BAI AIRFIELD AREA WOULD BECOME MORE IMPORTANT --A SATELLITE OF DANANG AIRBASE. HE WAS ASKED WHETHER PHU BAI WOULD BE MADE INTO JET AIRFIELD, AND REPLIED NOT AT THIS TIME.

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-3- 3342, April 12, 7 PM From Saigon (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

QUESTION WAS ASKED WHETHER IF MIGS WHICH INTERCEPTED US PLANES YESTERDAY WERE CHINESE, AN ENTIRELY NEW PROBLEM IN WAR WOULD NOT FACE US AMB REPLIED HE HAD NO PROOF THAT MIGS WERE CHINESE, AND CPAO ZORTHIAN READ JUST-RECEIVED DOD STATEMENT ON INCIDENT.

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 668A/2

FINALLY AMB WAS ASKED WHETHER ONE OF US'S MAJOR PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM WAS NOT INSTABILITY OF POLITICAL LIFE HERE. AMB REPLIED YES, AND IN ANSWER TO QUESTION WHAT WE WERE DOING ABOUT IT, WENT ON THAT WE WERE TRYING TO MAKE OUR ADVICE AND HELP AVAILABLE TO GVN IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL STABILITY, AND THAT WE FELT THAT UNDER PRIMIN QUAT GVN WAS DOING WELL. TAYLOR

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

18a

12 April 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF U. S. AIR FORCE
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

SUBJECT: Actions Designed to Accelerate Stability in
South Vietnam.

Attached as an enclosure are suggested items to
discuss with the President on Tuesday, 13 April 1965.

HAROLD K. JOHNSON
GENERAL, USA
CHIEF OF STAFF

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22 APR 1965

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SUBJECT: Actions designed to accelerate stability in South Vietnam.

1. Any action undertaken in South Vietnam must start from the situation that currently exists; not from a fresh start with existing imbalances erased; not from the point of view of a cohesive, sophisticated society; not from the viewpoint of civilian-military relationships as understood in the United States; but from the backdrop of an unstable government that lacks an appreciation of the responsibilities of a central government and has no identifiable power center to direct government operations or to attract unreserved or uninhibited support of fragmented Vietnamese leadership.

2. Pacification operations must be conducted in full recognition of the possibility of continuing governmental instability and continuing power struggles between the civilian and military leaders and among the military leaders. A fundamental requirement for successful pacification is the continued unswerving intention of the United States to assist the Vietnamese in defending against aggression from without, and defending against overt military attacks designed to establish control over the territory of South Vietnam by hostile forces currently stationed within the boundaries of the country.

3. There are three basic requirements involved in providing security. These are:

- a. Find the enemy.
- b. Fix the enemy in place so that he can be engaged successfully.
- c. Fight and finish the enemy.

All of these actions are underway currently with varying degrees of success. Actions are underway to improve each of the categories listed above. The most essential.

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NARS, Date

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ingredient for successful pacification is time to intensify and to improve the quality of operations presently underway. As any single measure is judged to be successful, that measure can be expanded and exploited. As any single measure is judged to be nonproductive, that measure can be withdrawn or abandoned.

4. To kill more Viet Cong, these actions are required:

a. Find them. This is what we are doing:

(1) Providing a capability to saturate the countryside with aerial observers.

(2) Providing a target research and analysis center to analyze what the observers see and provide this information to the operational elements so that counter-action can be taken.

(3) Informer programs exist; the totality of this effort is unknown.

These actions can be taken, although time will be required to institute all of them and an appreciable time will be required to assess the effectiveness of the actions:

(1) Institute a system of reporting by an individual in each hamlet and village by radio to an overhead aerial observer indicating that all is well in his hamlet or village. When Viet Cong are present, no report will be made and a quick reaction force should then investigate.

(2) Concurrently, develop a simple, pre-coded transmitter that can operate unattended by sending a signal repetitively indicating some kind of Viet Cong activity in the hamlet or village. The agent handling this device must be able to pre-set the desired code and surreptitiously place the device so that it cannot be traced back to the agent.

(3) Explore the possibility of hiring more informers.

(4) Explore the adequacy of pay for informers.

b. Fix the Viet Cong in place until they can be

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engaged by an effective combat force. Alternatively, trail departing Viet Cong so that their location is known and they can be engaged by a combat force.

This is what we are doing:

- (1) Radios are in place in many hamlets and villages to report to district and province headquarters the presence of Viet Cong.
- (2) Local commanders, as well as division and corps commanders, have quick reaction forces of varying capability ready to move against Viet Cong incursion.
- (3) Subsector advisors have been provided to improve the quality of local defense at hamlet and village level and to work with local reaction forces that come to the aid of hamlets and villages under attack.

c. Fight the Viet Cong.

This is what we are doing:

- (1) Intensifying the recruiting effort in order to increase the strength of regular units.
- (2) Increasing the number of regular battalions.
- (3) Adopting measures designed to improve the morale of Vietnamese forces of all kinds and thus increase their willingness to fight.

These actions are underway:

- (1) Doubling the number of helicopters designed to provide mobility for reaction forces who will engage the Viet Cong when the Viet Cong are identified. Will arrive off the coast of RVN on 30 April 1965.
- (2) An intensified effort on improving training for local security forces.

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Additional actions that might be undertaken:

(1) Replace single shot weapons with cheap hand-held automatic weapons.

(2) Introduce anti-intrusion devices. Some tests are currently underway but the results are not yet known.

(3) Recharge the Open Arms program (Chieu Hoi) to increase the attractiveness of abandoning the Viet Cong and aligning with the government.

(4) Reorient the Vietnamese attitude toward prisoners and returnees.

(5) Introduce additional U. S. combat elements to assume responsibility for some geographic areas within South Vietnam.

5. Adequate time must be provided to the government to permit actions to take root in order to demonstrate effectiveness or lack thereof.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 3332 INFO CINCPAC PRIORITY 1976 CITE
120730Z FROM SAIGON APRIL 12, 4PM

L I M D I S

REF. CINCPAC TO JCS 062312Z.

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH INTEREST THE LOGISTIC STUDIES WHICH ARE GOING ON AT PACOM AND MACV IN ANTICIPATION OF THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF SEVERAL DIVISIONS INTO SVN. SEVERAL COMMENTS OCCUR TO ME WHICH ARE PASSED ON FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH.

THERE APPEARS TO BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE CFN 3332 1976 120730Z 12 4PM LIMDIS CINCPAC TO JCS 062312Z I HAVE PACOM MACV SVN TO NO

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 645A ~~TOP SECRET~~

18,000-20,000 LOGISTIC BUILD-UP (THE CATEGORY A FORCE) RECOMMENDED BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND. THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS FORCE HAS BEEN APPROVED AND SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS RAPIDLY AS THE ELEMENTS CAN BE MOVED AND MACV CAN ACCEPT THEM. I AM SURPRISED TO LEARN FROM MACV THAT MAY 1 IS THE EARLIEST DATE FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE ENGINEER ELEMENT WHICH PACES THE RATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE OTHER COMPONENTS. IF POSSIBLE, THIS DATE SHOULD BE ADVANCED.

THE CATEGORY A PACKAGE WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR ABOUT 50,000 US PERSONNEL IN-COUNTRY, I.E. THE PRESENT STRENGTH PLUS THE ADDITIONAL MARINES NOW LANDING IN THE DANANG-HUE AREA AND WILL PERMIT SOME PRELIMINARY WORK IN ANTICIPATION OF THE ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL US FORCES. TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LOGISTIC BASE TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL FORCES, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO BRING IN RAPIDLY ABOUT 5,000

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Lt 1/4/78
By MJE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-3332, April 12, 4 p.m. from: Saigon

MORE ENGINEERS (ABOVE THOSE IN CATEGORY A). MACV ESTIMATES THEY COULD ARRIVE ABOUT AUGUST 1 (IF THE CATEGORY A ENGINEERS ARRIVE ON MAY 1). I WOULD CONCUR IN THE DESIRABILITY OF THIS REINFORCEMENT, FEELING THAT THESE ENGINEERS CAN BE VERY USEFUL IN SVN WHETHER OR NOT WE EVER INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS.

CFN 18,000-20,000 CATEGORY A FORCE WESTMORELAND MACV I AM TO MACV MAY 1 CATEGORY A 50,000 US IN-COUNTRY, I.E. DANANG-HUE US TO 5,000 CATEGORY A MACV AUGUST 1 CATEGORY A MAY 1 I WOULD SVN OR NOT WE

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 645A ~~TOP SECRET~~

WITH REGARD TO THE IMMINENCE OF THE NEED FOR THOSE DIVISIONS, I DO NOT SHARE THE FEAR THAT THE I AND II CORPS AREAS ARE ABOUT TO FALL APART WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN SOME OF THE TRAFFIC BEARING ON THE LOGISTIC BUILD-UP. IN ANY CASE, IF A DEBACLE IS GOING TO TAKE PLACE IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, THE TIME FACTORS DEVELOPED IN THE LOGISTIC STUDIES INDICATE THAT VERY LITTLE ADVANCE LOGISTIC PREPARATION CAN BE MADE IN TIME. IN SUCH AN UNLIKELY CONTINGENCY, US COMBAT REINFORCEMENTS WILL HAVE TO DEPLOY CONCURRENTLY WITH THEIR LOGISTIC UNITS AND BUILD THEIR BASE AS THEY GO.

WHILE RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CURRENT STUDIES IN DEVELOPING THE LOGISTIC FACTS OF LIFE AS THEY BEAR ON THE REINFORCEMENT OF SVN, I HOPE THAT THEY DO NOT INTERFERE WITH ESSENTIAL WORK IN PREPARATION FOR LESS AMBITIOUS BUT MORE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING IN WASHINGTON THAT, IF THE MARINES DEMONSTRATE EFFECTIVENESS IN OPERATING OUT OF DANANG IN AN OFFENSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY ROLE, OTHER OFFENSIVE ENCLAVES MAY BE ESTABLISHED ALONG THE COAST AND GARRISONED WITH BRIGADE-SIZE CONTINGENTS FOR EMPLOYMENT SIMILAR TO THE MARINES. GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS VERY ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH SUCH A FORCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU AREA. QUI NHON IS TO I DO NOT I AND II CORPS TO US TO SVN I HOPE DO NOT DANANG WESTMORELAND TO BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU AREA QUI NHON

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 645A ~~TOP SECRET~~

ALSO WELL SITUATED FOR SIMILAR PURPOSES. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT LOGISTIC PREPARATIONS BE INITIATED AT ONCE TO PERMIT EACH OF THESE TWO AREAS TO RECEIVE A US BRIGADE. WHATEVER IS DONE FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL ASSIST IN ACCOMMODATING ANY LARGER

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-3332, April 12, 4 p.m. from: Saigon

FORCES WHICH MAY BE SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED. IT IS IMPORTANT
THAT THIS LESSER PROGRAM BE CARRIED OUT RAPIDLY ENOUGH TO MAKE
- A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SITUATION WHICH IS NOW UNFOLDING.
THIS REQUIRES RAPID ACTION.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN I WOULD TO US TO TO

Advance copy to S/S-0 at 3:25 a.m. 4/12/65

Passed to White House, DOD & CIA at 3:31 a.m. 4/12/65

~~TOP SECRET~~

20

159

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20a

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

April 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Analysis of White House Mail on Vietnam
- April 4 through April 12

President Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins brought a sharp reversal in the heavy flow of critical mail. Volume of mail on Vietnam slowed after the speech and shifted from 5 to 1 against the President to better than 4 to 1 in his favor. Telegrams which had been running 5 to 1 against the President are now running better than 4 to 1 in support of his Vietnam policy as outlined at Johns Hopkins.

From April 4 through 7, the White House received approximately 2,000 letters, 304 telegrams and 208 postcards.

From April 8 through 12, the White House received approximately 789 letters and 559 telegrams.

Letters now express general approval of the President's policies with specific endorsement of his offer of unconditional negotiations and a program of economic aid for Southeast Asia. Significant numbers of writers note the pride they felt in the President and the country while listening to the address. Others mentioned a new feeling of optimism and relief -- of new hope for the future. Several commended the President's choice of Eugene Black, and offered their services to the economic development and assistance effort.

Before the speech, mail which opposed the President's Vietnam policies urged an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal and a negotiated settlement. There were repeated requests that the UN be involved in any settlement. Other significant themes were: references to the economic development of the Mekong Delta and other opportunities for the U. S. to demonstrate a more positive image in Southeast Asia; expressions of shame and horror at the brutality of the war and the suffering of civilians; references to Goldwater and the charge that the President was pursuing Goldwater-like policies; confusion over U. S. aims; expressions of distaste for the use of napalm, gas and the bombing of North Korea.

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Before the speech, mail which supported the President's Vietnam policies stressed the need to halt the spread of communism and to stop Chinese expansionism.

After the speech, mail which opposes the President's Vietnam policies criticized the proposal for a \$1 billion aid program, arguing that the money be used for defense rather than "tribute" (the Dirksen term). Letters frequently called the speech a "disappointment". Some called for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations; some urged withdrawal; others demanded a firmer policy to stop communism with no extension of economic aid.

Telegrams now express strong approval of the President's policies, particularly the pursuit of a peaceful solution, the offer of economic aid, food surpluses, etc. There are expressions of gratitude and congratulation; support for the mention of a role for the United Nations; endorsement for the offer of unconditional negotiations.

Before the speech, telegrams which opposed the President's Vietnam policies urged the use of UN machinery and an immediate cease-fire. There were expressions of shock and anger, opposition to Goldwater-like policies, opposition to air attacks, gas and chemical warfare; support of economic development efforts.

Origins of mail - Where California and New York were clearly the principal sources of mail before the speech, there is more even distribution throughout the country now. There is also an almost even balance among men and women.

C
CLC

21

160

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓
2
Pres to
the President

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 13915
RECEIVED: APRIL 13, 1965, 9:23 A.M.

cy 3 det

Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 3359 PRIORITY
DATE: APRIL 13, 7 P.M.

2/a

~~TOP SECRET~~

NO DIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED ANOTHER QUITE FAVORABLE WEEK IN TERMS OF LOSSES INFLICTED UPON THE VIET CONG, 643 OF WHOM WERE KILLED IN ACTION TO 139 ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE. BINH DINH PROVINCE WHICH WAS CONSIDERED TO BE IN CRITICAL CONDITION TWO MONTHS AGO HAS NOW BEEN RESTORED TO WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED NORMALCY; THAT IS TO SAY, THE FEAR OF THE LOSS OF MAJOR TOWNS APPEARS TO BE PAST ALTHOUGH A LARGE PART OF THE PROVINCE REMAINS UNDER VIET CONG CONTROL. THE SUCCESS IN BINH DINH IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THREE FACTORS; A NEW AND AGGRESSIVE DIVISION COMMANDER, THE COMMITMENT OF FIVE GENERAL RESERVE BATTALIONS TO THE PROVINCE, AND THE IMPROVED MORALE GENERATED BY THE AIR ACTIONS IN THE NORTH.

WE STILL HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE VIET CONG ARE REGROUPING IN THE PROVINCES IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY AND ARE PROBABLY PREPARING SOME KIND OF OFFENSIVE ACTION. HOWEVER, THERE ARE A FEW INDICATIONS THAT SUGGEST THAT VIET CONG MORALE MAY BE DROPPING. THEY HAVE GIVEN UP FOUR MAJOR ARMS CACHES DURING THE MONTH WITHOUT A SUSTAINED FIGHT AND THE NUMBER OF DEFECTORS DURING THE WEEK (129 VIET CONG MILITARY PERSONNEL AND 23 POLITICAL CADRE) IS THE HIGHEST DEFECTION FIGURE SINCE WEEKLY STATISTICS WERE INITIATED IN JANUARY, 1964.

ON THE MANPOWER SIDE, UNAUDITED FIGURES INDICATE THAT GOVERNMENT MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES INCREASED BY SOME 15,000

~~TOP SECRET~~

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SANITIZED

Authority *FRUS, Vol. II, # 249*
By *A* NARA Date *4-9-14*

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3359, APRIL 13, 7 P.M., FROM SAIGON

DURING THE MONTH OF MARCH OF WHOM TWO-THIRDS WERE VOLUNTEERS. THIS RATE EXCEEDS THE TARGET OF 8,000 ACCESSIONS PER MONTH WHICH WE HAD CONSIDERED THE BEST THE GOVERNMENT COULD DO WITH A MAXIMUM EFFORT.

QUAT CONTINUED HIS PROGRAM OF PROVINCIAL VISITS, MAKING A TOUR OF THE DELTA AREA FROM WHICH HE RETURNED FULL OF NEW IDEAS AND BUBBLING WITH ENTHUSIASM. HE WAS QUITE IMPRESSED WITH THE SENIOR OFFICERS WHOM HE MET IN THE IV CORPS AND, AS ALWAYS, ENJOYED TALKING TO THE COUNTRY PEOPLE WHO ASSEMBLED TO GREET HIM.

HIS PRINCIPAL CONCERN REMAINS THE URRLY GENERALS AND THE CONTINUED EVIDENCE OF LACK OF UNITY IN THE SENIOR OFFICERS CORPS. YOU HAVE PROBABLY NOTED THE CASE OF INSUBORDINATION IN THE NAVY WHEREIN SEVERAL SENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS PETITIONED THE REMOVAL OF ADMIRAL CANG, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. QUAT IS HANDLING THIS MATTER ROUTINELY BY A BOARD OF INQUIRY BUT IS DISTURBED BY THIS NEW EVIDENCE OF LACK OF DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMED FORCES. IN HIS CAMPAIGN TO BRING THE 'GENERALS UNDER SOME KIND OF CONTROL, HE IS ABOUT TO TAKE THE STEP OF ABOLISHING THE POSITION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WHILE INCREASING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. THIS IS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT HIS TROUBLES WILL NOT END AS LONG AS THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE IS CLOUDED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL. QUAT IS FULLY AWARE OF THIS PROBLEM AND INTENDS TO RESOLVE IT, BUT SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY.

YOUR JOHN HOPKINS SPEECH AND THE REPLY TO THE 17-NATION OVERTURE ATTRACTED MUCH ATTENTION IN SAIGON WHERE THE REACTION WAS GENERALLY VERY FAVORABLE. AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, THE PHRASE "UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSION" BROUGHT FORTH CONSIDERABLE EDITORIAL COMMENT, BUT THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE TERM SUGGESTED NO REAL DIFFERENCE IN AIMS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. ON TWO OCCASIONS, I HAVE URGED QUAT TO SIT DOWN WITH ALEX JOHNSON AND ME TO DISCUSS VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION WHICH MAY REQUIRE CONSIDERATION DURING THE COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS. HE HAS NOT RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY TO THIS SUGGESTION APPARENTLY BECAUSE HIS OWN THOUGHTS ARE NOT YET IN ORDER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 3359, APRIL 13, 7 P.M., FROM SAIGON

THE MISSION HAS BEEN VERY BUSY SINCE MY RETURN WITH ALL AGENCIES REVIEWING THEIR PROGRAMS TO SEE THAT THEY ARE ALIGNED WITH THE RECENT DECISIONS TAKEN IN WASHINGTON. USOM DIRECTOR KELLEN HAS DISCUSSED THE 41 POINT NON-MILITARY PROGRAM WITH QUAT WHO HAS EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN SUCH PROJECTS AS RURAL ELECTRIFICATION, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, WATER SUPPLY AND SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION. THE ACTING CAS CHIEF, [REDACTED], IS GIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION TO THE 12 OUTLINE PROJECTS WHICH MR. MCCONE TABLED DURING OUR WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS AND WILL SOON HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR THE MISSION COUNCIL.

CFM 643 135 BINH DINH BINH DINH 129 23 1964 10,000 8,000
QUAT IV CANG QUAT QUAT 17 QUAT NOT NOT 41 12

TAYLOR

RNL/5

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

22a 14207

D61/JCS713/13TH R12
PHB 023
VV PAF092

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

IMMEDIATE

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OO RUEKDA
DE RUHKA 1565 13/2233Z
O 132235Z
FM CINCPAC
TO RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUHKA/CINCPACFLT
RUHKB/CINCPACFLT
RUHLCM/CINCPACAF
BT

S

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPLOYMENT OF 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE

A. CINCPAC LTR 3010 SER 000131 OF 10 APR 65

B. COMUSMACV MACJ3 11682/110825Z NOTAL

C. SAIGON 3332 TO STATE, 12 APR 4 PM NOTAL

1. REF A RECOMMENDED DEPLOYMENT OF THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE TO THE BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU AREA WITHOUT DELAY TO CONDUCT SECURITY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS.

2. REF B CONTAINS COMUSMACV RECOMMENDATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARMY BRIGADE TO THE BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU AREA AFTER THE MARINE BRIGADE CLOSES IN THE DANANG/PHU BAI AREA.

3. IN REF C AMBASSADOR TAYLOR RECOMMENDS THAT LOGISTIC PREPARATIONS BE INITIATED AT ONCE TO PERMIT ESTABLISHMENT OF BRIGADE SIZED

ACT....J3-8(1-8)

CJCS-2(9-10) DJS-3(11-13) SJCS-3(14-16) J5-2(17-18) SACSA-5(19-23)
SECDEF-5(24-28) WHITE HOUSE-3(29-31) STATE-1(32) CSA-2(33-34)
CNO-2(35-36) CSAF-2(37-38) CMC-5(39-43) FILE-1(44)YJS/S

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

JCS CY# 31

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 1A 7/15/77
By MJE, NARS, Date 4/10/78

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

FORCES IN BOTH THE BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU AND QUI NHON AREAS.

4. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE BE INITIATED AT ONCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REFS A AND B.

5. CONCURRENT ACTIONS SHOULD BE INITIATED TO PROVIDE FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE IN VIETNAM BY A CONUS BASED U.S. ARMY BRIGADE IN ORDER TO RECONSTITUTE THE PACOM RESERVE.

GP-3
BT

11682 IS 11366

ADV COPY TO NMCC

PAGE 20F 2 PAGES

JCS-14207

~~TOP SECRET~~

23

162

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

23a

46

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 815A 14/1230Z
P 141215Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

Authority *State 12-19-77, OSD 7-2-78*
By *NS*, NARS, Date *1-29-80*

1965 APR 14 AM 7:57

11900

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 3384 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 2002
(141215Z) FROM SAIGON APRIL 14, 8PM

041

LIMDIS

RECENT ACTIONS RELATING TO THE INTRODUCTION OF US GROUND FORCES HAVE TENDED TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF EAGERNESS IN SOME QUARTERS TO DEPLOY FORCES INTO SVN WHICH IN FIND DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. I SHOULD THINK THAT FOR BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL REASONS WE SHOULD ALL BE MOST RELUCTANT TO TIE DOWN ARMY/MARINE UNITS IN THIS COUNTRY AND WOULD DO SO ONLY AFTER THE PRESENTATION OF THE MOST CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE NECESSITY.

BEFORE THE MARINES HAD BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE DANANG-PHU BAI CFN 3384 2002 (141215Z) 14 8PM SVN DANANG-PHU BAI

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 815A ~~SECRET~~
AREA, THERE WERE AT LEAST FOUR REASONS FOR JUSTIFYING THE BRINGING IN OF US GROUND FORCES, AMONG WHICH WAS THE NEED TO ASSURE THE GVN AND DRV OF OUR DETERMINATION TO STAY IN SVN TO THE FINISH. NOW THAT THE MARINES ARE ASHORE, THAT REQUIREMENT IS MET AND, IN MY OPINION, NO MORE US FORCES ARE NEEDED TO MAKE THAT PARTICULAR POINT.

THERE REMAIN THREE ARGUMENTS FOR FURTHER REINFORCEMENTS: (1) THE NEED TO DO ESSENTIAL MILITARY TASKS WHICH GVN FORCES ARE UNABLE TO DO; (2) THE NEED TO DO ESSENTIAL MILITARY TASKS FASTER THAN THE GVN FORCES, UNASSISTED, ARE ABLE TO DO; AND (3) THE DESIRA-

BILITY OF MAKING PROVISION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE CRISES AND CONTINGENCIES. SINGLY OR IN COMBINATION, THESE ARGUMENTS COULD BE ADDUCED TO JUSTIFY ALMOST UNLIMITED ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF US FORCES IF SUCH DEPLOYMENTS DID NOT RAISE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS WHICH SOONER OR LATER OUTWEIGH THE THREE POINTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE. THE MOUNTING NUMBER OF FOREIGN TROOPS MAY SAP THE GVN INITIATIVE AND TURN A DEFENSE OF THE GVN HOMELAND INTO WHAT APPEARS A FOREIGN WAR. THE INCREASING PRESENCE OF MORE AMERICANS WILL GIVE PEKING GROUNDS TO PRESS MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS ON HANOI. FRICTIONS WILL

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 3384, APRIL 14, 8 PM, FROM SAIGON

GROW BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE AND THEIR WHITE ALLIES; IT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO STEER US AND GVN POLICY ON PARALLEL LINES.
CFN GVN DRV SVN NO (1) (2) (3)

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 815A ~~SECRET~~
THE NET EFFECT MAY BE NOT AN EXPEDITING OF VICTORY
BUT ITS RETARDATION.

I MENTION THESE COUNTERVAILING FACTORS TO MAKE THE POINT THAT IT IS FAR FROM AN UNMITIGATED ADVANTAGE TO BRING IN MORE US FORCES. A CONSIDERATION OF THE DISADVANTAGES CONVINCES ME THAT, WHILE LOGISTIC PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE NOW TO BE ABLE TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL FORCES, THE FORCES THEMSELVES SHOULD BE HELD OUTSIDE OF SVN JUST AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND UNTIL THEIR NEED IS UNCONVERTIBLE. FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, IT IS ESSENTIALLY WASTEFUL OF THE SPECIALIZED MOBILITY OF MARINES AND AIRBORNE TROOPS TO COMMIT THEM PREMATURELY TO RESTRICTED LAND AREAS. POLITICALLY, IT IS UNDESIRABLE TO SEEK AUTHORITY FOR THEIR INTRODUCTION UNTIL A CLEAR AND SPECIFIC NEED EXISTS WHICH ASSURES THEM AN UNRESERVED WELCOME FROM THEIR GVN HOSTS. TAYLOR.

BT

CFN NOT SVN GVN

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 8:45 AM 4/14/65
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 8:45 AM 4/14/65

~~SECRET~~

24

163

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob McNamara ^{may} ~~will~~ bring over a cable to Taylor this evening which will rack up a number of instructions to the field to carry out some of the things that were discussed at lunch yesterday. (The current draft is at Tab A.) My own judgment is that direct orders of this sort to Taylor would be very explosive right now because he will not agree with many of them and he will feel that he has not been consulted. He heard about the airborne brigade by a premature JCS message of yesterday and has already come in questioning it.

At Tab B is another cable from Taylor in which he gravely questions the usefulness of immediate additional ground deployments.

I am sure we can turn him around if we give him just a little time to come aboard, but I am not sure that you yourself currently wish to make a firm decision to put another 10,000-15,000 combat troops in Vietnam today. As Taylor says, we were planning when he left to use the Marines already on the scene in combat roles and see how that worked. It is not clear that we now need all these additional forces.

Your own desire for mixing our Marines with theirs is quite a different matter, and I think that should be pressed sharply.

The net of this is that I would strongly recommend that you hold up on Bob's telegram tonight and take time to talk it over with Rusk, McNamara and me either after the meeting with the Senators or tomorrow morning.

I have made an appointment for us

incl. B.
McG. B.

with you at 11:30 - subject to

your OK.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority State 4-19-78, NSC 6-21-78
By inf, NARS, Date 1-23-80

25

164

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD T-15-77, State 8-10-78

25a Bundy

By isp, NARS, Date 1-13-80
JOINT MESSAGEFORM 1-23-80

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ON
~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ (2)

RECEIVED

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DIST: ASD/ISA-5(10-14) SECDEF-5(15-19) CJCS-2(20-21) DJS-3(22-24) CSA-2(25-26) CSAF-2(27-28) CNO-2(29-30) CMC-2(31-32) DIA-4(33-36) FILE-1(1) (#25) DACC #3 ISA CB #4 TO CJCS #5 SECDEF #6 CSA #7 CSAF #8 CNO #9 DIA WHITE HOUSE-3(37-39) STATE-1(40)(40)

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION IMMEDIATE	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	OSD		
INFO		X				

FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

EXCLUDED FROM IMMEDIATE REGARDING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: AMEMB SAIGON
CINCPAC
COMUSMACV

Copies to:
CJCS
CofS, Army
CNO
CofS, Air Force
CMC
Dir/Joint Staff
DIA

~~TOP SECRET~~ DEF 009164

~~FROM SAIGON~~ THIS IS A JOINT

STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE. LIMDIS

Highest authority believes the situation in South Vietnam has been deteriorating and that, in addition to actions against the North, something new must be added in the South to achieve victory. As experimental steps to that end, we believe the following actions should be undertaken:

1. Experimental encadrement by US forces of South Vietnamese ground troops both to stiffen and increase their effectiveness and also to add to their fire power. Westmoreland will be responsible for developing a detailed plan and submitting through CINCPAC to JCS for final approval. It is suggested he develop two approaches to be carried out concurrently, one involving integration of a substantial number of US combat personnel (e.g., 50) in each of several ARVN battalions (e.g., 10) and the other involving the combined

Concurrences:
White House -
McGeorge Bundy
State - Rusk
Defense -
McNamara

39

ZFF-1
ZFF;4

DATE	TIME
15	
MONTH	YEAR
April	1965

WRITER'S USE ONLY	SYMBOL ASD(ISA)	SIGNATURE <i>J. T. McNaughton</i> TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE JOHN T. McNAUGHTON ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) DTG: 152339Z APR 65
	TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) John T. McNaughton, ASD(ISA)	
	PHONE OX-54351 PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 3	
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET TOP SECRET	

DD FORM 173 MAY 55

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

operation of approximately 3 additional Army/Marine battalions with 3 or more South Vietnamese battalions for use in combat operations. (It is recognized that if the South Vietnamese battalions used for this purpose are transferred from a general reserve assignment, it may be necessary to replace them.)

2. Introduction of a brigade force into the Bien Hoa - Vung Tau area, both to act as a security force for our installations and also to participate in counter-insurgency combat operations. Westmoreland will develop and submit to CINCPAC and the JCS a plan for the use of these troops in such operations.

3. Introduction of battalion or multi-battalion forces into 2 or 3 additional locations along the coast, e.g., Qui Nhon. Westmoreland will submit proposals as to number of troops required and location for assignment. The purpose of these deployments will be to experiment further with US forces in a counter-insurgency role, in addition to providing security for the Base.

Items 1, 2 and 3 above are designed as initial steps to increase the effectiveness of the counter-guerrilla campaign. If these moves are successful, they should be followed promptly by requests for additional US forces.

4. A substantial expansion of Vietnamese recruiting campaign utilizing US recruiting experts, techniques, and procedures. Westmoreland will work out with the South Vietnamese new recruiting goals and detailed plans for accomplishing them.

009162

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2

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3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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INITIALS


~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

5. An experimental program providing expanded medical services to the countryside utilizing mobile dispensaries. The Surgeon General of the Army is being directed to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan to accomplish this objective.

6. An experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army Civil Affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel) to assist in the establishment of stable government in the provinces and to initiate and direct the necessary political, economic and security programs. Initially teams should be introduced into 1 or 2 provinces. General Peers is being sent to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan to accomplish this objective.

7. An experimental plan for distribution of food directly to regular and paramilitary personnel and/or their families. General Timmes is being sent to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan for this purpose.

Ambassador Taylor should discuss above program urgently with Quat, and assuming favorable reaction, State and Defense will inform Congressional leaders of proposed actions before they are undertaken. Westmoreland should be prepared to discuss his plans for items 1, 2 and 3 with General Wheeler during their discussions in Honolulu next week. SPC #1

009164

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3NR OF
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3

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INITIALS




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165

26a

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET				DIST...CJCS-2(9-10) DJS-3(11-13) SJCS-3(14-16)			
TYPE MSG				BOOK		MULTI	
						X	
PRECEDENCE				J1-1(17) J3-8(18-25) J4-2(26-27) J5-2(28-29)			
ACTION				SACSA-5(30-34) SAMAA-1(35) SECDEF-5(36-40)			
INFO				ASD/ISA-9(41-49) ASD/PA-5(50-54) CSA-2(55-56)			
				CSAF-2(57-58) CNO-2(59-60) CMC-5(61-65)			
				WHITE HOUSE-3(66-68) NMCC-3(69-71) RAIR-1(72)			
				FILE-1(1) ADV COPY TO CNO(#4) CSAF(#5)			
				CJCS(#6) SECDEF(#7)...DACC-#2...CB(#3)			
				DTG 140051Z APR 65		COPY # 68	

FROM		JCS		IMMEDIATE		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO		CINCPAC CINCSRIKE/USCINCMCAFSA				Distribution	
INFO:		CNO /ZEN CSAF /ZEN COMUSMACV CINCPACFLT CINCPACAF CINCUSARPAC CINCARSTRIKE COMATS COMSTS DTMS AMEMB SAIGON WHITE HOUSE STATE DEPARTMENT				CJCS DJS SJCS J-1 J-3 J-4 J-5 SACSA SAMAA SECDEF ASD (ISA) ASD (PA) CSA CMC	
TOP SECRET		JCS 009012		JCS send		132235 IS JCS 14207	
Subj: Deployment of 173d Airborne Brigade to Bien Hoa-Vung Tau Area (U) DECLASSIFIED							
Ref: CINCPAC 132235Z		Authority JCS 9-13-78 letter		By <u>af</u> , NARS, Date <u>6-28-79</u>			
1. For CINCPAC:							
a. Following actions are to be accomplished earliest feasible after AMB Taylor obtains clearance from GVN:							
(1) Deploy 173d Airborne Brigade and necessary							
DATE		TIME		MONTH		YEAR	
14		0050Z		APR		1965	
PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES		1		2	

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	COL C. M. MOUNT, JR., USA Pacific Division, J-3		77921		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			
TOP SECRET		GP-3			

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

support elements to Bien Hoa-Vung Tau area with the initial mission of security of US installations and facilities.

(2) Expand initial mission to include engagement in counterinsurgency combat operations.

b. Timing and mode of transportation of forces involved in above deployments to be determined by CINCPAC. Request furnish JCS your schedule of deployments using AMB Taylor's clearance day (C-day) as a base.

2. For CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMCAFSA:

a. Concurrent with the above, initiate necessary action to provide for the replacement of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Vietnam by a CONUS based US Army Brigade with necessary support elements.

3. For BOTH:

a. Direct coordination authorized.

b. No public statements are authorized except as directed by OASD (PA) through public info channels. Deployment when made will be treated in low-key. GP-4

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2	009012	
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-4				TOP SECRET	

27

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

NSC
034/31
27a

~~TOP SECRET~~

11572

1965 APR 14 AM 1 35

2
Action
SS
Info

VV MJB428JIA341
PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 774A 14/0520Z
P 140515Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

P R I O R I T Y

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 3368 INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 1992
FROM SAIGON APRIL 14, 1 PM

L I M D I S

REF: A. DEPTTEL 2290, B. EMBTEL 3290. C. EMBTEL 3332.

AUTHORITY FOR DEPLOYMENT OF RB-66 TF WAS OBTAINED AT SAME TIMES AS THAT FOR MARINE REINFORCEMENTS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN REF. B.

WITH REGARD TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 18,000-20,000 CATEGORY A FORCE, I HAVE DELIBERATELY NOT REPEAT NOT SOUGHT GVN APPROVAL FOR THE PACKAGE. I HAVE REPORTED TO QUAT IN QUALITATIVE TERMS THE CFN 3368 1992 140515Z 14 1PM 2290 3290 3332 RB-66 TF B. 18,000-20,000 A GVN

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 774A ~~TOP SECRET~~
WASHINGTON DECISION TO BRING IN SOME THOUSANDS OF ADDITIONAL LOGISTICAL TROOPS AND HE IS ENTIRELY AGREEABLE. I HAVE DESCRIBED THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE TROOPS AS A CONTINUING STREAM ARRIVING OVER MANY MONTHS AND HE HAS STATED THAT SPECIFIC GVN APPROVAL IS UNNECESSARY FOR THESE NON-COMBAT FORCES. I WOULD EXPECT, HOWEVER, TO GIVE HIM PERIODIC REPORTS OF ACCRETIONS IN U.S. STRENGTH. IF WASHINGTON EVER INTENDS TO RELEASE THE FIGURE 18,000-20,000, I SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE SO THAT I CAN BREAK THIS FIGURE TO QUAT WHICH MAY BE SOMEWHAT BREATHTAKING.

TAYLOR
BT
CFN 18,000-20,000

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 4-14-65, 2:00 A.M.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 4-14-65, 3:10 AM.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority RA 23353
By coolh, NARA, Date 4-4-14

28

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

28a

~~TOP SECRET~~

6
Action
55
Info

NNNNVV MJB465JIA383B
OO RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 789A 14/0910Z
O 140905Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

11688
1965 APR 14 AM 4 47

I M M E D I A T E

~~TOP SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 3374 INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC
1996 (140905Z) FROM SAIGON APRIL 14, 5PM

LIMDIS

REF: A. DEPTTEL 2184 B. EMBTEL 3290

AS REPORTED IN REF B, I SOUGHT AND RECEIVED AUTHORIZATION FROM QUAT TO INTRODUCE THE MARINE CORPS ELEMENTS SPECIFIED IN REF A. GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS JUST REPORTED TO ME THAT, TO HIS SURPRISE, THE MARINE UNITS WHICH HAVE LANDED INCLUDE 155 AND 8" HOWITZERS AND TANKS IN ADDITION TO THOSE ELEMENTS FOR WHICH I HAVE OBTAINED AUTHORIZATION. THIS ACTION IS HIGHLY EMBARRASSING TO ME AND CONTRAVENES THE DECISIONS BEARING ON THE MARINE DEPLOYMENTS TAKEN IN CFN 3374 1996 (140905Z 14 5PM A. 2184 B. EWOP B QUAT A 155 8"

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 789A ~~TOP SECRET~~
WASHINGTON DURING MY RECENT VISIT AS I UNDERSTOOD THEM. APART FROM THIS FACT, THE INCLUSION OF THESE HEAVY WEAPONS INAPPROPRIATE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS WILL ENCOURAGE THE CRITICS OF U.S. POLICY WHO ARE SAYING THAT WE ARE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT FIGHTING RED CHINA THAN VIET CONG.

I WOULD HAVE OPPOSED THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS HEAVY EQUIPMENT HAD I KNOWN IT IN TIME. NOW THAT IT IS IN, IT WOULD COMPOUND THE MISTAKE TO REMOVE IT. I SHALL TRY TO EXPLAIN THIS AFFAIR TO QUAT IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO ENCOURAGE THE SUSPICION THAT WE ARE SLIPPING UNITS INTO SVN WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE. TAYLOR.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:56 AM 4/14/65
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 5:15 AM 4/14/65

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority RM 23352
By ms/8, NARA, Date 4-4-14

29

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

29a
034

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action SS OO RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 797A 14/0940Z
O 140930Z ZEA

Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

11770
1965 APR 14 AM 5 26

~~TOP SECRET~~ ACTION IMMEDIATE PHNOMPENH 409 INFO IMMEDIATE
DEPT 3376 APR 14, 6 PM

MAXIMUM AIR EFFORT PLANNED TO BE FLOWN AGAINST MAIN VC HEAD-
QUARTERS LOCATED IN WAR ZONE C IN WESTERN TAY NINH PROVINCE.
OPERATION WILL INVOLVE SYSTEMATIC SATURATION BOMBING OF AREA
OF POSSIBLY 2 KILOMETERS ON EACH SIDE BOUNDED BY COORDINATES
XT 2489, XT 2689, XT 2491 AND XT 2691. AREA BOUNDARIES MAY
CHANGE SLIGHTLY PRIOR TO STRIKE BASED ON NEW INTELLIGENCE
BUT NO TARGET CLOSER THAN 7 KILOMETERS TO CAMBODIAN BORDER.
STRIKE NOW PLANNED FOR APRIL 15 AND WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN
CFNBRPO (76 14 6 VC C TAY NINH 2 XT 2489 XT 2689 XT 2491
XT 2691 NO 7 15.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 797A ~~TOP SECRET~~
SINGLE DAY. SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS WILL BE TAKEN TO ASSURE NO
VIOLATION OF CAMBODIAN BORDER. WE WILL INFORM PHNOM PENH OF
TIME OF AIR STRIKE WHEN PROVIDED BY COMMANDER SECOND AIR DIVISION,

ABOVE INFO PROVIDED TO ALERT YOU OF EXTENSIVE AIR ACTIVITY
PLANNED FOR PROVINCE BORDERING CAMBODIA. IF DEPT CONCURS AND
YOU CONSIDER DESIRABLE NO OBJECTION YOU INFORMING CAMBODIAN
AUTHORITIES AFTER RECEIPT FLASH TELEGRAM INDICATING STRIKE
LAUNCHED.

TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 5:35 a.m., April 14, 1965

NOTE: Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 6:05 a.m., April 14,
1965

Handled as LIMDIS per SS-0

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority state 12 1/4/78
By MJE NARS, Date 4/11/78

30

169

30a

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

47

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

FE

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 808A 14/1148Z
P R 141055Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY/SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1965 APR 14 AM 6 58
11844

Info

SS

G

SP

SAH

L

H

P

USIA

NSC

INR

NSA

RMR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION DEPT 3382 INFO CINCPAC 2000 (141055Z)
FROM SAIGON APRIL 14, 7PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT WILL HAVE NOTED AP FILE FROM TOKYO WHICH REPORTS THAT PHAM VAN DONG'S REPORT TO DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONTAINED FOUR POINT DECLARATION WHICH, ACCORDING TO DONG, "IS THE BASIS FOR THE SOUNDEST POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM TODAY."

WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF QUERIES FROM PRESS ON STORY AND NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENT TOPPING HAS RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM WASHINGTON OFFICE SAYING THAT FEELING IN WASHINGTON IS THAT DONG'S STATE- CFN 3382 2000 (141055Z) AP PHAM VAN DONG DRV DONG TOPPING DONG

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 808A
MENTS ARE POSSIBLE STEP TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS.

WE SEE NOTHING IN DONG'S REPORT THAT DIVERGES FROM DRV POSITION AS ALREADY SET FORTH IN VARIOUS HANOI STATEMENTS AND BY HO CHI MINH HIMSELF (EMBTTEL 3316). TAYLOR.

BT
CFN DONG DRV HO CHI MINH 3316

NOTE: PASSED ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, AT 4/14/65 at 7:00 AM
WHITEHOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 4/14/65 at 7:00 AM

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