

31

170

DECLASSIFIED

31a

✓ Bundy

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

43
Action

SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED:
4/14/65, 9:10 A.M.
HMR

VV MJA 102SPA 139
OO RUEKCR
DE RUMJIR 788A 14/0906Z
O 140903Z ZEA ZFF

1 1 6 8 4

FM ANEMBASSY SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY 1965 APR 14 AM 4 42
TO RUEKCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC

I M M E D I A T E

BT
~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 3373 INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 1995 CITE
140903Z FROM SAIGON APRIL 14, 5 PM

L I M D I S

JCS 009012 TO CINCPAC

I HAVE JUST LEARNED BY THE REFERENCE JCS MESSAGE TO CINCPAC THAT
THE IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE TO BIEN
HOA-VUNG TAU HAS APPARENTLY BEEN APPROVED. THIS COMES AS A COMPLETE
SURPRISE IN VIEW OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN WASHINGTON
THAT WE WOULD EXPERIMENT WITH THE MARINES IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY
CFN 3373 1995 140903Z 14 5 PM 009012 JCS 173RD BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 788A ~~TOP SECRET~~
ROLE BEFORE BRINGING IN OTHER U.S. CONTINGENTS. DURING THIS
TEST PERIOD WE WOULD. HOWEVER, MAKE THE NECESSARY LOGISTIC PREPARA-
TIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT U.S. REINFORCEMENTS. THIS DECISION
SEEMED SOUND TO ME AT THE TIME AND CONTINUES TO APPEAR SO.
I RECOMMEND THAT THIS DEPLOYMENT BE HELD UP UNTIL WE CAN SORT
OUT ALL MATTERS RELATING TO IT.

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:48 AM 4/14/65
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 5:00 AM, 4/14/65
CORRECTION PASSED: WH, DOD, CIA AT 9:15 AM 4/14/65
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 9:15 4/14/65

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority State 17 1/4/78
By MJE NARS, Date 4/11/78

32

171

~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

32a

1 4 7 7 7

C849/14/CS278
 PHP440VV PAF132
 PP RUEKDA
 DE RUHKA 1694 14/0830Z
 PR 140831Z
 FM CINCPAC
 TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 INFO RUEKDA/JCS
 RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
 RUHPG/CG FMFPAC
 BT

CALL 53337
 FOR NMCC/MC
 SERVICE

4 14 10 39Z

~~TOP SECRET~~

EMPLOYMENT OF MEB IN COUNTERINSURGENCY (U)

- A. COMUSMACV MAC J3 11535/100430W
- B. CINCPAC 040212Z
- C. CINCPAC 270215Z FEB
- D. COMUSMACV MAC 1985/110545Z

1. THE MISSION YOU HAVE ASSIGNED THE MEB IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REF A EMPHASIZES THE SECURITY MISSION. I DID NOT INTEND THAT THE DIRECTIVE IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF REF B BE INTERPRETED AS PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE. AS I UNDERSTAND THE JCS DIRECTIVE, THE MARINES ARE TO ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS EARLIEST. THE MISSION AS OUTLINED IN REF A SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED BY DELETION OF THE LAST SENTENCE AND INSERTION OF A NEW SENTENCE ABOUT AS FOLLOWS: "IN ADDITION, UNDERTAKE IN COORDINATION WITH RVN I CORPS, AN INTENSIFYING PROGRAM OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO FIX AND DESTROY THE VIET CONG IN THE GENERAL DANANG AREA."

2. ASSUME YOUR DIRECTIVE TO DEPOY HMM TTO PHU BAI IS INTENDED TO BE AN HMM DETACHMET. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE AIRCRAFT MILITATE AGAINST SPLITTING THE DANANG BASE LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS.

INFO.....CJCS-2(1-2) DJS-3(3-5) SJCS-1(6) J1-1(7) J3-8(8-15) J4-2(16-17)
 J5-2(18-19) SACS-5(20-24) NMCC-2(25-26) SAMAA-1(27) SECDEF-5
 (28-32) ASD/ISA-9(33-41) W/HOUSE-3(42-44) STATE-1(45) CSA-2
 (46-47) CNO-2(48-49) CSAF-2(50-51) CMC-5(52-56) ASD/PA-1(57)
 FILE-1(58) (58)RLL/CL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD/IC 7/15/77
 By NJE, NARS, Date 4/10/78

PAGE 1 OF 2

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

3. I NOTE THAT PARAGRAPH 3B (5) OF REF A STATES "WHILE MEB IS ON STATIC DEFENSE, PRIORITY OF HELI LIFT WILL BE TO RVNAF." I ANTICIPATE THE MEB WILL NOT BE ON STATIC DEFENSE FOR VERY LONG. AS SOON AS THEY ARE INVOLVED IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, WHICH I ASSUME WILL BE VERY SOON, THE SQUADRON OF HELOS WHICH THEY BROUGHT IN WITH THEM SHOULD BE ASSIGNED PRIMARILY FOR SUPPORT OF THE 9TH MEB. THE SECOND SQUADRON OF HELOS WAS ASSIGNED TO YOU AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE 9TH MEB. IT SHOULD REMAIN SO. OF COURSE THE HELOS CAN BE DIVERTED TO LIFT ARVN FORCES IN EVENT OF A HIGH PRIORITY REQUIREMENT AS AN EXCEPTION.

4. REF D INDICATES THE OFFENSIVE PHASE MAY NOT BE REACHED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. IF I READ THE MESSAGES PROPERLY, THIS IS NOT WHAT OUR SUPERIORS INTEND. RECOMMEND YOU REVISE YOUR CONCEPT ACCORDINGLY.

GP-3

BT

REF A IS IN 11504
REF B IS IN 90961
REF C & D NOT IDENTIFIED
ADV CY TO CJCS DJS

PAGE 2 OF 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

33

172

CAP 65124

RECEIVED
WICA

08909

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

1965 APR 18 03 17

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

NODIS

W/D / 33a

APR 15 9 45 PM '65

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 2332

Info

FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR FROM McGEORGE BUNDY

NODIS

The President has just approved an important cable to you on future military deployments, and I believe you may find these personal comments helpful.

The President has repeatedly emphasized his personal desire for a strong experiment in the encadrement of U.S. troops with Vietnamese. He is also very eager to see prompt experiments in use of energetic teams of U.S. officials in support of provisional governments under unified U.S. leadership. These desires are the source of corresponding paragraphs in our message.

On further troop deployments, President's belief is that current situation requires use of all practicable means of strengthening position in South Vietnam and that additional U.S. troops are important if not decisive reinforcement. He has not seen evidence of negative result of deployments to date, and does not wish to wait any longer than is essential for genuine GVN agreement.

Drafted by: *BCT*
Text received from White House / *vah* S/S - Blaine C. Tueller
Clearance: 4/15/65

Authority *FRUS, Vol 2, # 257*
By *M* NARA, Date *4-4-14*

~~TOP SECRET~~

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NODIS

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Classification

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Classification

NODIS

President always intended these plans be reviewed with you and approved by Quat before final execution, and we regret any contrary impression given by our messages in recent days.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

NODIS

1 5 7 2 4

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

33b / 3

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 2/13 PRIORITY

Mar 27 5 21 PM '65

Info:

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

Authority State 10-6-78 letter

By iq, NARS, Date 3-23-79

We are considering major early statement which might again refer to SVN people determining own future in due course and might include passage along following lines:

"GVN with full US support will give most generous encouragement and opportunity to all who may have been brought by force or fraud into Communist service and to abandon that false yoke. Future of a peaceful free and independent SVN will be open to them as to their fellow countrymen. For them the choice of hope and peace and progress is to escape from clutch of aggressor and to commit themselves with confidence to true future of their land. Those who take this course may rely upon strength and generosity purpose and firmness of ~~people~~ not only of their own countrymen but of the generosity and good faith also of the US."

Without taking up such amnesty proposal at this time with Quat, what is your judgment his receptiveness and possibility his perhaps making prior

~~statements which would be considered as a basis for a decision on this matter~~

Drafted by: FE: W. P. Bundy/omm 3/27

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Gordon

~~SECRET~~

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Page 2 of telegram to Secul

~~SECRET~~

statement along these lines so that we could revise simply to endorse? Would also welcome your comments above wording.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA
V

33c

1965 APR 05 2A

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-5-79; NSC 8-7-79

By inf, NARS, Date 6-11-81

ZZ WTE10
DE WTE 29F

FROM: MCGEORGE BUNDY
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP65125

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

FOLLOWING ARE SAIGON CABLES WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH YOU:
DETEL 2532, DOD 152339Z (009164), EMBTEL 3419, DA 1614592,
EMTEL 3421, EMTEL 3422, EMTEL 3423 (TWO PART), EMTEL 3424,
EMTEL 3432, CAP 65120

FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY
NODIS

THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST APPROVED AN IMPORTANT CABLE TO YOU ON
FUTURE MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS, AND I BELIEVE YOU MAY FIND THESE
PERSONAL COMMENTS HELPFUL.

THE PRESIDENT HAS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED HIS PERSONAL DESIRE
FOR A STRONG EXPERIMENT IN THE ENCADREMENT OF U.S. TROOPS WITH
VIETNAMESE. HE IS ALSO VERY EAGER TO SEE PROMPT EXPERIMENTS IN
USE OF ENERGETIC TEAMS OF U.S. OFFICIALS IN SUPPORT OF PRO-
VISIONAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER UNIFIED U.S. LEADERSHIP. THESE DESIRES
ARE THE SOURCE OF CORRESPONDING PARAGRAPHS IN OUR MESSAGE.

ON FURTHER TROOP DEPLOYMENTS, PRESIDENT'S BELIEF IS THAT
CURRENT SITUATION REQUIRES USE OF ALL PRACTICABLE MEANS OF
STRENGTHENING POSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT ADDITIONAL
U.S. TROOPS ARE IMPORTANT IF NOT DECISIVE REINFORCEMENT. HE HAS
NOT SEEN EVIDENCE OF NEGATIVE RESULT OF DEPLOYMENTS TO DATE,
AND DOES NOT WISH TO WAIT ANY LONGER THAN IS ESSENTIAL FOR
GENUINE GVN AGREEMENT.

PRESIDENT ALWAYS INTENDED THESE PLANS BE REVIEWED WITH
YOU AND APPROVED BY QUAT BEFORE FINAL EXECUTION, AND WE REGRET
ANY CONTRARY IMPRESSION GIVEN BY OUR MESSAGES IN RECENT DAYS.
END

RUSK

THIS IS A JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE.

HIGHEST AUTHORITY BELIEVES THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN DETERIORATING AND THAT, IN ADDITION TO ACTIONS AGAINST THE NORTH, SOMETHING NEW MUST BE ADDED IN THE SOUTH TO ACHIEVE VICTORY. AS EXPERIMENTAL STEPS TO THAT END, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN:

1. EXPERIMENTAL ENCADREMENT BY US FORCES OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE GROUND TROOPS BOTH TO STIFFEN AND INCREASE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AND ALSO TO ADD TO THEIR FIRE POWER. WESTMORELAND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING A DETAILED PLAN AND SUBMITTING THROUGH CINCPAC TO JCS FOR FINAL APPROVAL. IT IS SUGGESTED HE DEVELOP TWO APPROACHES TO BE CARRIED OUT CONCURRENTLY, ONE INVOLVING INTEGRATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF US COMBAT PERSONNEL (E.G., 50) IN EACH OF SEVERAL ARVN BATTALIONS (E.G., 10) AND THE OTHER INVOLVING THE COMBINED OPERATION OF APPROXIMATELY 3 ADDITIONAL ARMY/MARINE BATTALIONS WITH 3 OR MORE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTALIONS FOR USE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS. (IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTALIONS USED FOR THIS PURPOSE ARE TRANSFERRED FROM A GENERAL RESERVE ASSIGNMENT, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO REPLACE THEM).

2. INTRODUCTION OF A BRIGADE FORCE INTO THE BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU AREA, BOTH TO ACT AS A SECURITY FORCE FOR OUR INSTALLATIONS AND ALSO TO PARTICIPATE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY COMBAT OPERATIONS. WESTMORELAND WILL DEVELOP AND SUBMIT TO CINCPAC AND THE JCS A PLAN FOR THE USE OF THESE TROOPS IN SUCH OPERATIONS.

3. INTRODUCTION OF BATTALION OR MULTI-BATTALION FORCES INTO 2 OR 3 ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS ALONG THE COAST, E.G., QUI NHON. WESTMORELAND WILL SUBMIT PROPOSALS AS TO NUMBER OF TROOPS REQUIRED AND LOCATION FOR ASSIGNMENT. THE PURPOSE OF THESE DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE TO EXPERIMENT FURTHER WITH US FORCES IN A COUNTER-INSURGENCY ROLE, IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE BASE.

ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 ABOVE ARE DESIGNED AS INITIAL STEPS TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNTER-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN.

THESE MOVES ARE SUCCESSFUL, THEY SHOULD BE FOLLOWED PROMPTLY BY REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL US FORCES.

4. A SUBSTANTIAL EXPANSION OF VIETNAMESE RECRUITING CAMPAIGN UTILIZING US RECRUITING EXPERTS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES. WESTMORELAND WILL WORK OUT WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEW RECRUITING GOALS AND DETAILED PLANS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THEM.

5. AN EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM PROVIDING EXPANDED MEDICAL SERVICES TO THE COUNTRYSIDE UTILIZING MOBILE DISPENSARIES. THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE ARMY IS BEING DIRECTED TO WORK WITH COMUSMACV TO DEVELOP A DETAILED PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE.

6. AN EXPERIMENTAL INTRODUCTION INTO THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE OF A TEAM OF US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL (OR SIMILARLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL) TO ASSIST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE GOVERNMENT IN THE PROVINCES AND TO INITIATE AND DIRECT THE NECESSARY POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROGRAMS. INITIALLY TEAMS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO 1 OR 2 PROVINCES. GENERAL PEERS IS BEING SENT TO WORK WITH COMUSMACV TO DEVELOP A DETAILED PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE.

7. AN EXPERIMENTAL PLAN FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD DIRECTLY TO REGULAR AND PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL AND/OR THEIR FAMILIES. GENERAL TIMMES IS BEING SENT TO WORK WITH COMUSMACV TO DEVELOP A DETAILED PLAN FOR THIS PURPOSE.

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR SHOULD DISCUSS ABOVE PROGRAM URGENTLY WITH QUAT, AND ASSUMING FAVORABLE REACTION, STATE AND DEFENSE WILL INFORM CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OF PROPOSED ACTIONS BEFORE THEY ARE UNDERTAKEN. WESTMORELAND SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS HIS PLANS FOR ITEMS 1, 2 AND 3 WITH GENERAL WHEELER DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN HONOLULU NEXT WEEK. SCP-1

34

173

FROM: DA 161459Z
TO: COMUSMACV, CINUARPC
INFO: CINCPAC, USAMBASSADOR SAIGON VIETNAM, CGUSARYIS OKINAWA RYIS
NR: DA 711581 161459Z APR 65

34a

FROM OCOFSA.

REF: DEF 009164 DTG 152339Z

1. MAJ GEN W.R. PEERS, 021366, ADCSOPS, DA, MAJ GEN CHARLES J. TIMMES, 029777, ODCSPER, BRIG GEN CONN L. MILBURN, JR. 020405, DEPUTY SURG GEN, AND PARTY OF TWO INCLUDING LT COL KARL T. RETTSTATT, 079047, ODCSOPS CA AND REPRESENTATIVE FROM USARPAC (TO BE DESIGNATED) WILL ARRIVE SAIGON 19 APR 65.

2. PURPOSE OF VISIT TO CONFER WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COMUSMACV, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF USOM, USIS, AND CAS CONCERNING PROGRAMS CONTAINED IN PARAS 5, 6, AND 7 OF REFERENCE MESSAGE.

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE CIVIL AFFAIRS EXPERIMENT, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, CONCEPT VISUALIZES DESIGNATION BY COMUSMACV OF A SENIOR OFFICER TO DIRECT OVERALL USACA EFFORT IN ONE OR TWO TEST PROVINCES. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL U.S. ACTIVITIES IN SELECTED PROVINCES WILL BE VESTED IN THE SENIOR U.S. ARMY SECTOR ADVISOR. APPROPRIATE MODIFICATIONS OF COMMAND AND INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS TO BE MADE AS REQUIRED TO INCLUDE REORGANIZATION AND AUGMENTATION OF SECTOR AND SUB-SECTOR ADVISORY ORGANIZATIONS IN SELECTED PROVINCES. TENTATIVELY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING VINH LONG AND BINH DINH.

4. MAJ GEN TIMMES PLANNING EFFORT WILL INCLUDE NOT ONLY FOOD, BUT HOUSING AND OTHER BENEFITS FOR THE DEPENDENTS OF ALL VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES INCLUDING REGIONAL, POPULAR AND OTHER PARA-MILITARY FORCES.

5. ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS:

DEPART FRIENDSHIP, 17 APR, 1500 HRS, TWA FLT 61
DEPART SAN FRANCISCO, 17 APR, 2030 HRS PAA FLT 841
ARRIVE HONOLULU, 17 APR, 2235 HRS, PAA FLT 841
DEPART HONOLULU, 18 APR, 0100 HRS, PAA FLT 841
ARRIVE SAIGON, 19 APR, 1045 HRS, PAA FLT 841
ALL TIMES LOCAL.

6. FOR CONUSMACV. REQUEST YOU INITIATE PRELIMINARY THINKING BASED ON INFORMATION IN REF MSG AND CONCEPT DESCRIBED ABOVE TO INCLUDE SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE PROVINCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS EXPERIMENT AT AN EARLY DATE. ALSO INITIATE THINKING AND ASSEMBLE DATA REGARDING SUPPORT OF MILITARY DEPENDENTS AND EXPANSION OF THE MOBILE MEDICAL DISPENSARY PROGRAM.

7. FOR CINCUSARPAC.

A. REQUEST QUALIFIED CA OFFICER, PREFERABLY LT COL RUSSELL JONES, G5 SECTION, USARPAC, TO JOIN PARTY AT HAWAII AND ACCOMPANY.

B. REPRESENTATIVE FORM ASIA SAF, OKINAWA, TO REPORT TO HEADQUARTERS, MACV MLT 19 APR 65, WITH ALL DETAILS OF PERSONNEL IN AUGMENTATION DETACHMENTS INCLUDING 97TH CA GP AND USB&VAPAC. PERSONNEL DETAILS MUST INCLUDE ALL DATA NECESSARY FOR DETERMINING TDY DEPLOYMENT TO VN OF PARTS OR ALL OF THESE UNITS, UNTIL PCS PERSONNEL CAN BE PROVIDED FROM CONUS.

8. REQUEST PLAY IN LOW KEY. NO PUBLICITY.
GP-1.

35

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16 April 1965

35a

FOR SECRETARY RUSK EYES ONLY
FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR EYES ONLY

PLEASE DELIVER OPENING BUSINESS SATURDAY MORNING.

REF. DA TO MACV DTG 161459Z.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD OF THE PEERS PART WHICH IS DUE
ARRIVE SAIGON 19 APRIL. CONTRARY TO THE FIRM UNDERSTANDING WHICH
I RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON, I WAS NOT ASKED TO CONCUR IN THIS
MASSIVE VISITATION. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, I DO NOT REPEAT NOT
CONCUR.

BASED ON THE LITTLE I KNOW OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL AFFAIRS EX-
PERIMENT, I AM OPPOSED TO BEGINNING AN EXTENSIVE PLANNING
EXERCISE WHICH, BECAUSE OF ITS CONTROVERSIAL AND DIVISIVE CONCEPT,
IS GOING TO SHAKE THIS MISSION AND DIVERT ITS SENIOR MEMBERS
FROM THEIR IMPORTANT DAILY TASKS. IF GVN GET WORD OF THESE
PLANS TO IMPOSE U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT FRAMEWORK ON THEIR
COUNTRY (AS THIS NEW CONCEPT SEEMS TO IMPLY), IT WILL HAVE A
VERY SERIOUS IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONS HERE.

WE ARE ROCKING THE BOAT AT A TIME WHEN WE HAVE IT ALMOST ON
AN EVEN KEEL. I RECOMMEND WE SUSPEND ACTION ON THIS PROJECT
UNTIL WE HAVE TIME TO TALK OVER ITS MERITS AND DECIDE HOW TO
PROCEED WITH ORDER.

TAYLOR

36

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM		RESERVED FOR COMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		DIST...CJCS-2(10-11) DJS-3(12-14) SJCS-3(15-17)	
TOP SECRET		J1-1(18) J3-8(19-26) J4-2(27-28) J5-2(29-30)	
TYPE MSG	BOOK MULTI SINGLE	DIA-4(31-34) NMCC-3(35-37) CSA-2(38-39)	
	X	CNO-2(40-41) CSAF-2(42-43) CMC-5(44-48)	
PRECEDENCE		SECDEF-5(49-53) ASD/ISA-9(54-62) RAIR-1(63)	
ACTION IMMEDIATE		WHITE HOUSE-3(64-66) FILE-1(1) #2-DACC	
INFO IMMEDIATE		#3 JB-C/B#4-CJCS #5 SECDEF #6DIA #7-CSA	
		#8-CNO #9 CSAF	
		DTG 170222Z APR 65	

36a

FROM	JCS	DECLASSIFIED	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO	CINCPAC	Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)	Distribution:
INFO:	CINCONAD	By <u>ip</u> , NARS, Date <u>4-5-78</u>	CJCS
	CINCUSARPAC		DJS
	CINCPACFLT	64	SJCS
	CINCPACAF		J-1
	COMUSMACV		J-3
	COMADC		J-4
	WHITE HOUSE		J-5
	STATE DEPT		<u>DIA</u>
			CSA
			CNO
			CSAF
			CMC
			SECDEF
			<u>OSD/ISA</u>

~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS 009296 JCS send.

Subj: Recommended Actions Concerning South Vietnam (U)

1. ~~(TS)~~ The JCS have been required to determine how we can increase the Viet Cong (VC) kill rate within the framework of our present posture in Southeast Asia (SEA). One likely possibility is in the area of more effective application of available tactical air assets. Therefore, the JCS desire that special attention be given to improving joint coordination of preplanned as well as on-call air strikes. Unless there are considerations of which the JCS are unaware, they believe that implementation of the following measures will improve our over-all performance:

DATE	TIME
16	210
MONTH	YEAR
April	1965
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	4

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	LCol J. E. Smith J-3	77254	J. A. Driscoll
RELEASER	TYPED (OR STAMPED) NAME AND TITLE	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
	D. A. DRISCOLL Lt. Colonel, USA	GP-4	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	
		GP-4	

DD FORM 173 1 NOV 63

~~TOP SECRET~~
REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 53 WHICH MAY BE USED.

ABBREVIATE JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

a. Increase the visual reconnaissance capabilities in all areas by providing continuous aerial surveillance. This will provide visual evidence of support to the rural population, harass the VC, impede his movements and operations, and, most importantly, will lead to identification and attack of the Viet Cong thereby allowing us to take the initiative.

b. Improve procedures to insure that usable reconnaissance information, from all possible aerial sources, flows to appropriate agencies, in particular, the appropriate tactical air control system.

c. Increase ground and air alert as necessary to insure rapid response to all valid requests for immediate strikes.

d. Provide air strikes for preplanned ground and helicopter operations, as required.

e. In order to improve immediate reaction capability for response to requests for air support, consider maintaining an airborne vehicle to provide a combination ASOC-CTOC air operations facility.

f. Streamline immediate air request procedures to minimize delays between initiation of request and delivery of strikes. Streamline air request procedures from the lowest levels in the field to actual

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 4	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION 009295	INITIALS SAD
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS GP-4			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION		
INFO		

launch of strike aircraft. Particular emphasis should be placed upon elimination of the military/political coordination delays at the tactical corps/province levels.

g. Modify, as required, the existing rules for fixed wing air strikes in RVN. For situations wherein friendly forces are engaged with VC or VC have otherwise been identified, no further approval would be required beyond the request for assistance by the friendly force and control of the strike by a FAC. For situations wherein air strike is contemplated against VC not actively engaging friendly forces, or not otherwise identified as VC, action required is identification of VC by province chief representatives, authority to strike from corps commander's representative, and control of the strike by a FAC.

h. In order to provide on-the-spot identification authority, use FAC teams composed of FAC, and province chief or corps commander representative, as necessary, who can identify force on ground as VC.

2. ~~ISY~~ As you are aware, the deployment of Army and Air Force 0-1 aircraft is being expedited to augment present in-country resources in order to accomplish the requirement for continuous aerial surveillance as recommended in subpara 1 a, above.

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		3	4	009296	SPD
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

3. ~~(TS)~~ Subject to your concurrence, CINCONAD will be directed to augment your current EC-121 force on Tainan by six aircraft to provide the aerial vehicles referenced in subpara 1 e, above. These aircraft, along with the five EC-121s in position, will provide a capability of mounting a single aircraft continuously over RVN in addition to supporting your present BIG EYE program. The EC-121, used as communications facility, has position for up to 14 persons in addition to the flight crew, thus could be used by an ASOC-CTOC operations team, as visualized in subpara 1 e, above.

4. ~~(TS)~~ JCS recognize political aspects of certain measures listed in para 1, above, and appreciate your need to secure support of Amb Taylor and GVN. In highest level discussions on 13 April, this need was noted and it was specified that all necessary support to obtain concurrence should be given.

5. ~~(S)~~ Request your recommendations concerning ^{any} additional assets required for implementation of foregoing, or comments on relevant problems facing you. Request information as to what progress has been made in persuading the RVNAF to adopt the air/ground operation system in use by US forces. GP-4

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SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY
O 170733Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2421
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~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 17

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 5 1979

By ing, NARS, Date 6-28-79

37a

EXDIS

FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR - EYES ONLY

INFO SECRETARY RUSK - EYES ONLY

PLEASE DELIVER DURING OPENING BUSINESS SATURDAY MORNING.

REF. DEPTTEL 232.

I AM GREATLY TROUBLED BY DOD 152339Z APRIL 15. FIRST, IT SHOWS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE FACT THAT, AS A RESULT OF DECISIONS TAKEN IN WASHINGTON DURING MY VISIT, THIS MISSION IS CHARGED WITH SECURING IMPLEMENTATION BY THE TWO MONTH OLD QUAT GOVT OF A 21-POINT MILITARY PROGRAM, A 41-POINT NON-MILITARY PROGRAM, A 16-POINT ROWAN USIS PROGRAM AND A 12-POINT CIA PROGRAM. NOW THIS NEW CABLE ENS UP NEW VISTAS OF FURTHER POINTS AS IF WE CAN WIN HERE SOMEHOW ON A POINT SCORE. WE ARE GOING TO STALL THE MACHINE OF GOVT IF WE DO NOT DECLARE A MORATORIUM ON NEW PROGRAMS FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS.

NEXT, IT SHOWS A FAR GREATER WILLINGNESS TO GET INTO THE GROUND WAR THAN I HAD DISCERNED IN WASHINGTON DURING MY RECENT TRIP. ALTHOUGH SOME ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES SHOULD PROBABLY BE INTRODUCED AFTER WE SEE HOW THE MARINES DO IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, MY OWN ATTITUDE IS REFLECTED IN EMBTEL 3384, WHICH I HOPE WAS CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

MY GREATEST CONCERN ARISES OVER PARA 6 REFTTEL WHICH FRANKLY BEWILDERS ME. WHAT DO THE AUTHORS OF THIS CABLE THINK THE MISSION HAS BEEN DOING OVER THE MONTHS AND YEARS? WE HAVE PRESUMABLY THE BEST QUALIFIED PERSONNEL THE WASHINGTON AGENCIES (STATE, AID, DOD, USIA AND CIA) CAN FIND WORKING IN THE PROVINCES SEVEN DAYS A WEEK AT PRECISELY THE TASKS DESCRIBED IN PARA 6. IS IT PROPOSED TO WITHDRAW THESE PEOPLE AND REPLACE THEM BY ARMY CIVIL AFFAIR TYPES OPERATING ON THE PATTERN OF MILITARY OCCUPATION? IF THIS IS THE THOUGHT, I WOULD REGARD SUCH A CHANGE IN POLICY (WHICH WILL GAIN WIDE PUBLICITY) AS DISASTROUS IN ITS LIKELY EFFECTS UPON PACIFICATION IN GENERAL AND ON US/GVN RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR.

), CAN'T WE BE BETTER PROTECTED FROM OUR FRIENDS? I KNOW THAT EVERYONE WANTS TO HELP BUT THERE'S SUCH A THING AS KILLING WITH KINDNESS. IN PARTICULAR, WE WANT TO STAY ALIVE HERE BECAUSE WE THINK WE'RE WINNING--AND WILL CONTINUE TO WIN UNLESS HELPED TO DATH. TAYLOR.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC (3420)

INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC 2017

RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 21

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~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 17

DEPT PASS WELLINGTON AS SAIGONS 21

EXDIS

WELLINGTON FOR LODGE

RE: DEPTEL 2326

WITH RESPECT TO THE MISSION AND LOCATION OF AUSTRALIAN BATTALION, WE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THIS FLEXIBLE AT THIS JUNCTURE. ALTHOUGH THE DA NANG AREA HAS ATTRACTIVE FEATURES, THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE AREAS OF DEPLOYMENT WHICH MIGHT BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO PARTIES
CFN 3420 2017 21 17 21 2326

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 998A ~~TOP SECRET~~

CONCERNED AND ENHANCE MILITARY VALUE OF UNIT. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT U.S. MISSION, SAIGON BE GIVEN MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO WORK OUT DETAILS AS TO LOCATION, TIMING, AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WITH AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR, SAIGON AND HIS MILITARY STAFF.

COMUSMACV IS EXPLORING INFORMALLY WITH AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS. MACV SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT BATTALION WITHIN 30 DAYS SINCE MAJOR LOGISTICAL PREPARATIONS ARE NOW BEING PUSHED AT AN ACCELERATED RATE.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN COMUSMACV MACV 30

NOTE: NOT PASSED WELLINGTON BY OC/T

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority State 112 11/4/78

By MJE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

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R 170785Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RSECSTATE WASHDC 3422
INFO CINCPAC 2018
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ APRIL 17

E X D I S

REF: (A) DOD 152339Z (B) EMBTEL 3423 (C) EMBTEL 3424

WHIT REGARD TO THE REQUIREMENT TO DISCUSS THE PROGRAM CONTAINED
IN REF (A) WITH QUAT, IT IS MY VIEW THAT IT WOULD NOT BE TIMELY TO
OPEN THE DISCUSSIONS OF PARAS IN 4 5, 6 AND 7 UNTIL THE SUPPORTING
PLANS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT ON THE US SIDE. UNTIL SUCH PLANS ARE IN
HAND, THERE IS LITTLE TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

I WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE UP THE MILITARY MATTERS OF PARAS 2 AND 3
WITH QUAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING GUIDANCE OF THE KIND
REQUESTED IN REF (B) .
TAYLOR.

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Authority State Sta. 12-19-77

By inf, NARS, Date 1-29-80

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3423
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~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 17 SEONE OPTWO

EXDIS

THIS MESSAGE UNDERTAKES TO SUMMARIZE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH I HAVE RECEIVED OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS WITH REGARD TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THIRD COUNTRY COMBAT FORCES AND TO DISCUSS THE PREFERRED WAY OF PRESENTING THE SUBJECT TO THE GVN.

AS THE RESULT OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS ON APRIL 1 AND THE NSC MEETING ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, I LEFT WASHINGTON AND RETURNED TO SAIGON WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE MARINES ALREADY ASHORE BY TWO ADDITIONAL BLT'S AND A F-4 C/N 3423 17 GVN 1 NSC DLT F-4

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1001A/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~

SQUADRON AND THE PROGRESSIVE INTRODUCTION OF 18-20,000 SUPPORT FORCES WERE APPROVED BUT THAT DECISION ON THE SEVERAL PROPOSALS FOR BRINGING IN MORE US COMBAT FORCES AND THEIR POSSIBLE MODES OF EMPLOYMENT WAS WITHHELD IN AN OFFENSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY ROLE. STATE WAS TO EXPLORE WITH THE KOREAN, AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND GOVTS THE POSSIBILITY OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF SIGNIFICANT COMBAT ELEMENTS IN PARALLEL WITH THE MARINE REINFORCEMENT.

SINCE ARRIVING HOME, I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND HAVE TAKEN THE INDICATED ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THIRD COUNTRY COMBAT FORCES.

APRIL 6 AND 8. RECEIVED GVN CONCURRENCE TO INTRODUCTION OF THE MARINE REINFORCEMENTS AND TO AN EXPANDED MISSION FOR ALL MARINES IN DANANG-PHU DAI AREA.

APRIL 8. RECEIVED DEPTEL 2229 DIRECTING APPROACH TO GVN, SUGGESTING REQUEST TO AUSTRALIAN GOVT FOR AN INFANTRY BATTALION FOR USE IN SVN. WHILE AWAITING A PROPITIOUS MOMENT TO RAISE THE MATTER, I RECEIVED DEPTEL 2287 DIRECTING APPROACH BE DELAYED UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS. NOTHING FURTHER HAS BEEN RECEIVED SINCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority NLS 84-86
By lls/ly, NARA, Date 4-4-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3423, April 17 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Saigon

APRIL 14. I LEARNED BY JCS 009012 TO CINCPAC OF APPARENT DECISION
CFN 18-20,000 6 8 GVN DANANG-PHU BAI 8 2229 GVN SVN 2287 14
JCS 009012

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1001A/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~
TO DEPLOY 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE IMMEDIATELY TO BIEN HOA-
VUNG TAU. BY EMBTEL 3373, DELAY IN THIS DEPLOYMENT WAS URGENTLY
RECOMMENDED BUT NO REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED. HOWEVER, PARA 2 OF
DOC 152339 APPARENTLY MAKES REFERENCE TO THIS PROJECT IN TERMS
WHICH SUGGEST THAT IS SOMETHING LESS THAN AS AN APPROVED IMMEDIATE
ACTION. IN VIEW OF THE UNCERTAINTY OF ITS STATUS, I HAVE NOT
BROACHED THE MATTER WITH QUAT.

APRIL 15. RECEIVED DEPTTEL 2314 DIRECTING THAT EMBASSY SAIGON
DISCUSS WITH GVN INTRODUCTION OF ROK REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM AND
SUGGEST GVN REQUEST SUCH A FORCE ASAP. BECAUSE OF QUAT'S ABSENCE
FROM SAIGON, I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO RAISE MATTER. AS MATTER OF
FACT, IT SHOULD NOT BE RAISED UNTIL WE HAVE A CLEAR CONCEPT OF
EMPLOYMENT.

APRIL 16. I HAVE JUST SEEN STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE DOD 152339
CITED ABOVE WHICH INDICATES A FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD SEVERAL
POSSIBLE USES OF US COMBAT FORCES BEYOND THE NSC DECISIONS OF APRIL 2.
I AM TOLD TO DISCUSS THESE AND CERTAIN OTHER NON-MILITARY MATTERS
URGENTLY WITH QUAT. THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS CABLE WILL BE ADDRESSED IN
A SEPARATE MESSAGE. I CAN NOT RAISE THESE MATTERS WITH QUAT WITHOUT
FURTHER GUIDANCE.

CFN 173RD BIEN HOA VUNG TAU 3373 NO 2 DOD 152339 NOT QUAT 15
2314 GVN ROK GVN ASAP QUAT NOT NOT 17 DOD 152339 NSC 2 QUAT NOT QUAT

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 1001A/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~
FACED WITH THIS RAPIDLY CHANGING PICTURE OF WASHINGTON DESIRES AND
INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THIRD COUNTRY (AS
WELL AS US) COMBAT FORCES, I BADLY NEED A CLARIFICATION OF OUR PUR-
POSES AND OBJECTIVES. BEFORE I CAN PRESENT OUR CASE TO GVN, I HAVE
TO KNOW WHAT THAT CASE IS AND WHY. IT IS NOT GOING TO BE EASY TO
GET READY CONCURRENCE FOR THE LARGE SCALE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN
TROOPS UNLESS THE NEED IS CLEAR AND EXPLICIT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 3423, April 17 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Saigon

LET ME SUGGEST THE KIND OF INSTRUCTION TO THE AMB WHICH IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO RECEIVE FOR USE IN PRESENTING TO GVN WHAT I TAKE TO BE A NEW POLICY OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN GROUND COMBAT.

QUOTE THE USG HAS COMPLETED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN SVN BOTH IN ITS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS AND HAS REACHED CERTAIN IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS. IT FEELS THAT IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN A SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE CHANGE IN THE OVERALL SITUATION AS THE RESULT OF THE AIR ATTACKS ON DRV, THE RELATIVELY SMALL BUT NUMEROUS SUCCESSES IN THE FIELD AGAINST THE VC AND THE ENCOURAGING PROGRESS OF THE QUAT GOVT. HOWEVER, IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT, IN ALL PROBABILITY, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE GVN AND THE USG OF CHANGING THE WILL OF THE DRV TO SUPPORT THE VC CFN GVN NOT GVN USG SVN DRV VC QUAT GVN USG DRV VC

PAGE 5 RUNJIR 1001A/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~

INSURGENCY CAN NOT BE ATTAINED IN AN ACCEPTABLE TIME FRAME BY THE METHODS PRESENTLY EMPLOYED. THE AIR CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY SIGNAL SUCCESSES AGAINST THE VC IN THE SOUTH BEFORE WE CAN HOPE TO CREATE THAT FRAME OF MIND IN HANOI WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE DECISIONS WE SEEK. TAYLOR.

BT

CFN NOT VC

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 3:57 a.m., April 17.

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 4:35 a.m., April 17.

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3423
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~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 17 SETWO OFTWO

EXDIS

QUOTE THE JCS HAVE REVIEWED THE MILITARY RESOURCES WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE IN SVN BY THE END OF 1965 AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT EVEN WITH AN ATTAINMENT OF THE HIGHEST FEASIBLE MOBILIZATION GOALS, ARVN WILL HAVE INSUFFICIENT FORCES TO CARRY OUT THE KIND OF SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VC WHICH IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR THE PURPOSES DISCUSSED ABOVE. IF THE GROUND WAR IS NOT TO DRAG INTO 1966 AND EVEN BEYOND, THEY CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO REINFORCE GVN GROUND FORCES WITH ABOUT 20 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS IN ADDITION TO THE CFN 3423 17 JCS SVN 1965 ARVN VC NOT 1966 GVN 20

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1001A/2 ~~TOP SECRET~~
FORCES NOW BEING RECRUITED IN SVN. SINCE THESE REINFORCEMENTS CAN NOT BE RAISED BY THE GVN, THEY MUST INEVITABLY COME FROM THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES.

QUOTE THE USG ACCEPTS THE VALIDITY OF THIS REASONING OF THE JCS AND OFFERS ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE GVN TO RAISE THESE ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING THE VC INSURGENCY TO AN END IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. WE ARE PREPARED TO BRING IN ADDITIONAL US GROUND FORCES PROVIDED WE CAN GET A REASONABLE DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION FROM OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES. IF THE GVN WILL MAKE URGENT REPRESENTATIONS TO THEM, WE BELIEVE IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE FOLLOWING CONTRIBUTIONS; KOREA, ONE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM; AUSTRALIA, ONE INFANTRY BATTALION; NEW ZEALAND, ONE BATTERY AND ONE COMPANY OF TANKS; PI, ONE BATTALION. IF FORCES OF THE FOREGOING MAGNITUDE ARE FORTHCOMING, THE USG IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE REMAINDER OF THE COMBAT REINFORCEMENTS AS WELL AS THE NECESSARY LOGISTIC PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT THE THIRD COUNTRY CONTINGENTS. ALSO IT WILL USE ITS GOOD OFFICES AS DESIRED IN ASSISTING THE GVN APPROACH TO THESE GOVTS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3423, April 17 (SECTION TWO OF TWO), from Saigon

QUOTE YOU (THE AMBASSADOR) WILL SEEK THE CONCURRENCE OF THE GVN TO THE FOREGOING PROGRAM, RECOGNIZING THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS SUCH AS COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT AND DISPOSITION OF FORCES MUST BE WORKED OUT SUBSEQUENTLY. UNQUOTE.
CFN SVN NOT GVN USG JCS GVN VC GVN PI USG GVN GVN

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1001A/2 ~~TOP SECRET~~
ARMED WITH AN INSTRUCTION SUCH AS THE FOREGOING, I WOULD FEEL ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED TO INITIATE WHAT MAY BE A SHARP DEBATE WITH THE GVN. I NEED SOMETHING LIKE THIS BEFORE TAKING UP THE PENDING TROOP MATTERS WITH QUAT. TAYLOR.
BT
CFN GVN QUAT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 4:10 a.m., April 17.
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 4:25 a.m., April 17.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC/3432
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~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 17

E X D I S

FOLLOWING ARE PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS OF ALEXIS JOHNSON WHICH HE REQUESTS BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCED MESSAGES:

"I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM SPENDING GREATER PART OF THREE DAYS IN FIELD, ONE DAY WITH PRIMIN QUAT IN PLEIKU (II CORPS) AREA AND TWO IN DANANG-HUE AREA. ON MY RETURN I HAVE SEEN DOD 152339Z AND RELATED MESSAGES AS WELL AS DRAFTS OF MISSION COUNCIL REPLY WITH WHICH I MOST HEARTILY AGREE, ESPECIALLY ON BASIS OF MY OBSERVATIONS IN FIELD.

~~CFN 3432-17 JOHNSON QUAT PLEIKU II DANANG-HUE DOD 152339Z~~

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1034A TOP SECRET~~

MY VISIT IN DANANG-HUE AREA INCLUDED EXTENDED VISITS AND INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH ALL OF SENIOR MARINE OFFICERS ASHORE, VISITING ALL FOUR BATTALIONS IN THEIR FIELD POSITIONS AND TALKS WITH OFFICERS DOWN TO COMPANY LEVEL.

I FULLY APPRECIATE CONSIDERATIONS BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO SVN WHICH IMPEL MOVE ON OUR PART TO BRING THIS WAR TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WITH THIS THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENCE OF VIEW. HOWEVER, I GRAVELY QUESTION WHETHER THIS RESULT CAN BE ACHIEVED AT THIS TIME BY MASSIVE INPUT OF NON-VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCE. AS WE HAVE LEARNED, WE ARE DEALING WITH VOLATILE AND HYPERSENSITIVE PEOPLE WITH STRONG XENOPHOBIC CHARACTERISTICS NEVER FAR BELOW SURFACE. WE HAVE THUS FAR DEPLOYED OUR MARINE BATTALIONS TO MINIMIZE DIRECT CONTACT WITH LOCAL POPULATION. THIS NOT ONLY FROM OUR CHOICE BUT THAT OF GVN, ESPECIALLY GENERAL THI. ON THIS I THINK THI IS RIGHT. A HASTY AND ILL-CONCEIVED DEPLOYMENT OF NON-VIETNAMESE FORCES

~~TOP SECRET~~

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By *ms/y*, NARA, Date *4-4-14*

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CORRECTION ISSUED 4/17/65 1 PM MRJ

-2- 3432, APRIL 17, FROM SAIGON - CORRECTED PAGE - 2

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1034A ~~TOP SECRET~~
IN COMBAT ROLES WHERE THEY ARE SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED WITH LOCAL POPULATION COULD BADLY BACK-FIRE ON US AND GIVE RISE TO CRIES BY BUDDHISTS (WHO ARE NOW MOVING IN VERY FAVORABLE DIRECTION) AND OTHERS TO "THROW OUT FOREIGNERS" AND "RETURN VIETNAM TO VIETNAMESE".

IN NEXT FEW WEEKS MARINES DEPLOYED IN DANANG AREA WILL BE TESTING DEGREE TO WHICH NON-VIETNAMESE FORCES CAN BE SUCCESSFUL IN: (1) ACTING AS REACTION FORCE IN SITUATIONS WHERE ARVN HAS ALREADY IDENTIFIED ENEMY AND DEVELOPED AN ENGAGEMENT AND (2) PATROLLING IN THINLY POPULATED VC HELD AREAS AND DEVELOPING ENGAGEMENTS AGAINST AN ENEMY WHO HAS ALWAYS SHOWN GREAT SKILL IN AVOIDING ENGAGEMENTS EXCEPT ON HIS OWN TERMS.

IN SPITE OF URGENCY OF SITUATION I VERY DEEPLY FEEL THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL NON-VIETNAMESE COMBAT FORCES INTO VIETNAM UNTIL BOTH WE AND VIETNAMESE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE, DIGEST, AND EVALUATE RESULTS WHICH MARINES ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE. IF MARINES ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (AS OPPOSED TO

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 1034A ~~TOP SECRET~~
THEIR STATIC SECURITY MISSIONS WHICH THERE IS NO DOUBT THEY CAN PERFORM WELL) THERE SHOULD BE CLIMATE HERE RECEPTIVE TO FURTHER NON-VIETNAMESE FORCES WHICH WILL BE ABLE TO APPLY LESSONS THAT UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE LEARNED FROM MARINE EXPERIENCE. IF MARINE EXPERIENCE IS NOT FAVORABLE PRESUMABLY OTHER FORCES WILL BE EQUALLY UNSUCCESSFUL AND WE MAY FIND OURSELVES CAUGHT IN A SITUATION IN WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN ON PRICE AND PROBLEMS (BOTH IN SVN AND ELSEWHERE) OF LARGE NON-VIETNAMESE COMBAT FORCE WITHOUT ACHIEVING AN OFFSETTING GAIN. ON OTHER HAND, IF WE WAIT REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, SAY 60 DAYS, UNTIL WE SEE HOW MARINES MAKE OUT WE SHOULD NOT LOSE GREATLY AND MAY GAIN MUCH.

WITH RESPECT TO PARA 6 OF DOD 152339Z IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF ANYTHING MORE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE THAN SETTING UP ANYTHING IN PROVINCES SMACKING OF US MILITARY GOVT. IF ANYTHING,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 3432, APRIL 17, FROM SAIGON

PROVINCE CHIEF IS ALREADY SMOTHERED WITH AMERICAN ADVISERS AND RATHER THAN INCREASING, WE SHOULD PROBABLY IN SOME CASES BE DECREASING THEIR NUMBER. HOWEVER, TO REDUCE AND BETTER TO COORDINATE

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 1034A ~~TOP SECRET~~

DEMANDS BY AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND AGENCIES ON PROVINCE CHIEF AND TO PREVENT ANY SUGGESTION OF COMPETITION BETWEEN THEM, THERE MAY BE MERIT IN CONSIDERING APPOINTMENT FROM PERSONNEL ALREADY IN PROVINCES OF SINGLE SENIOR AMERICAN REP AS CHANNEL FOR ALL AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH PROVINCE CHIEF. IN SOME CASES THIS MIGHT BE MILITARY OFFICER, AND IN OTHER CASES CIVILIAN OFFICIAL. IT CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT BE US MILITARY CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER IMPOSED ON TOP OF PRESENT AMERICAN STRUCTURE IN PROVINCES.

TAYLOR
BT

* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 17

E X D I S

REFERENCE: DOD 152339Z APRIL 15.

1. THE US MISSION COUNCIL HAS REVIEWED REFTEL AND SUBMITS THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS.
2. AS A GENERAL INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATION, THE COUNCIL WOULD FIRST CALL ATTENTION TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF PROGRAMS WHICH WERE APPROVED FOR CONSIDERATION OR IMPLEMENTATION FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR TAYLOR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY APRIL. THEY INCLUDE THE SO-CALLED JOHNSON MILITARY PROGRAM OF 21 POINTS, THE 41-POINT NON-MILITARY PROGRAM, THE ROWAN PROGRAM OF 16 POINTS AND THE CIA PROGRAM CFN 3424 17 152339 15 1 US 2 21 41 16 CIA

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 1002A ~~TOP SECRET~~
 OF 12 POINTS. IN THE AGGREGATE, THEY REPRESENT FAR MORE THAN THE GVN CAN DIGEST FOR MONTHS TO COME AND THUS HAVE REQUIRED A THOUGHTFUL PHRASING BASED UPON A CONSIDERATION OF PRIORITIES. ANY ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS WILL HAVE TO BE FITTED INTO THIS ELABORATE FRAMEWORK OF ACTIVITIES AT THE EXPENSE OF SOME OF LOW PRIORITY WHICH HAVE BEEN PRIVIOUSLY APPROVED.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE URGENCY OF THE MATTERS RAISED IN REFTEL, THE COUNCIL DOES NOT FEEL THAT THERE IS A PRESENT DETERIORATION IN SVN WHICH WARRANTS TAKING MEASURES WHICH ARE NOT CLEARLY SOUND AND NECESSARY. RATHER THAN A DETERIORATION, WE FEEL THAT MATTERS ARE GOING CONSIDERABLY BETTER SINCE EARLY FEBRUARY WHEN AIR ATTACKS IN THE DRV BEGAN, MORALE IS UP; ARVN PERFORMANCE IS UP; AND QUAT CONTINUES TO DO QUITE WELL. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT VICTORY IS IN SIGHT AND THE VC MAY NOT BE PREPARING A NEW OFFENSIVE. BUT WE HAVE NO FEELING OF GREAT CRISIS ARISING FROM PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS THAT REQUIRES US TO CAST ASIDE OUR PRESENT CAREFULLY THOUGHT-OUT PROGRAMS IN FAVOR OF CRASH PROJECTS OF DOUBTFUL VALUE.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3424, APRIL 17, FROM SAIGON

AS TO SPECIFICS, THE COUNCIL HAS GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE INDIVIDUAL ENCADREMENT PROPOSAL RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 1, REFTEL. THERE ARE BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIONS WHICH APPEAR OVERWHELMING, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE LIKELY/REPUGNANCE OF CFN 12 GVN 3 NOT SVN ARVN QUAT NOT VC NOT NO 1 NOT

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 1002A ~~TOP SECRET~~

THE PROPOSAL TO GVN. HOWEVER, WE WILL RESERVE FINAL COMMENT UNTIL GEN WESTMORELAND PREPARES A SPECIFIC PLAN. THE OTHER SUGGESTION IN PARAGRAPH 1 - THAT US AND GVN COMBAT BATTALIONS BE BRIGADED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS - MAY HAVE MERIT AND HAS BEEN UNDER INTENSIVE STUDY BY MACV IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY MEASURES OF PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3, ASSUMING THAT IT IS THE DECISION OF THE USG THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE A MAJOR PART IN THE GROUND COMBAT, THE COUNCIL CONCURS IN THE EXPERIMENTS SUGGESTED, PROVIDED GVN ACQUIESCES AND AFTER MACV HAS ORGANIZED THE NECESSARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

THE VIETNAM RECRUITING PROGRAM IS GOING WELL AS RESULT OF MONTHS OF EFFORT EXPENDED ON IT. ACCESSIONS IN MARCH AMOUNTED TO ABOUT 10,000, EXCEEDING THE GOAL OF 8,000 WHICH WE HAD BELIEVED TO BE THE HIGHEST FEASIBLE FIGURE THE GVN COULD ATTAIN. ALL THE NECESSARY RECRUITING GOALS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT AS WELL AS PLANS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THEM. US EXPERTS HAVE COLLABORATED IN DEVELOPING THEM. NO FURTHER ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED AT THE MOMENT.

CFN GVN 1 US GVN MACV 2 3 USG GVN MACV 10,000 8,000 GVN NO

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 1002A ~~TOP SECRET~~

THE COUNCIL FAVORS ANY PRACTICAL PROGRAM OF EXPANDED MEDICAL SERVICES AND WELCOMES THE COLLABORATION OF THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE ARMY IN ITS DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, USOM SEVERAL WEEKS AGO ENTHUSIASTICALLY ACCEPTED INFORMAL NOMINATION BRIGADIER GENERAL HUMPHREY OF USAF AS CHIEF, USOM PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION. IN VIEW PRIORITY ASSIGNED HEALTH EFFORT, WE REQUEST EARLIEST ARRIVAL HUMPHREY.

WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN PARA 6. WE HAVE IN EVERY PROVINCE TEAMS OF US MILITARY AND CIVILIANS WHO ARE THE BEST QUALIFIED PEOPLE THE USG HAS BEEN ABLE TO SEND AND WHO ARE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 3424, APRIL 17, FROM SAIGON

DEEPLY ENGAGED IN "THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE GOVT IN THE PROVINCES AND THE INITIATION AND DIRECTION OF NECESSARY POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROGRAMS". THIS QUOTED LANGUAGE DESCRIBES THE PACIFICATION MISSION WHICH IS THE MAIN BUSINESS OF ENTIRE US MISSION. THE COUNCIL SEES NO NEED FOR A LARGE DEPT OF THE ARMY PLANNING TEAM TO WORK WITH COMUSMACV, PARTICULARLY SINCE OTHER AGENCIES OF THE MISSION HAVE IMPORTANT PARTS OF THIS PROBLEM AND OUR CURRENT PLANS ARE BEING TD TO BE ADEQUATE.

AS TO PARA 7, WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY SPECIAL PROBLEM IN THE FEEDING OF REGULAR AND PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL; AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE SOLE PROGRAM FOR DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSISTENCE IN IN KIND TO DEPENDENTS HAS RECENTLY BEEN ABANDONED SINCE IT WAS ADMINISTRATIVELY UNMANAGEABLE AND A MONETARY SUPPLEMENT SUBSTITUTED
CFN GVN USOM USAF USOM NOT Y US USG US NO COMUSMACV 7
NOT

PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 1002A ~~TOP SECRET~~
THEREFORE. HENCE, THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR SENDING GENERAL TIMMES ON A PLANNING MISSION.

IN GENERAL, THE COUNCIL FEELS THAT THERE IS NO DEFICIENCY IN OUR MISSION PLANNING. THE WEAKNESS IS IN FIELD OF EXECUTION WHICH WILL NEVER BE BETTER THAN THE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF GVN. NOW PROGRAMS WILL NOT OF NECESSITY RAISE THAT LEVEL; UNLESS CAREFULLY SELECTED, THEY MAY HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT.

COUNCIL IS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT COMBINATION OF MEASURES PROPOSED REFTTEL WILL BE REGARDED BY VIETNAMESE AS A SHARP CHANGE IN POLICY AND BASIS FOR OUR JOINT EFFORT WITH VIETNAMESE AS INDEED IT APPEARS TO US. IF WE ARE TO BUILD A VIABLE INDEPENDENT NATION HERE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS AND PRO VIETNAMESE ON ALL FRONTS BUT REALIZE THAT IN FINAL ANALYSIS IT IS VIETNAMESE WHO MUST RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. COUNCIL FORESEES MANY ADVERSE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REPERCUSSIONS FROM EMBARKING ON MANY OF THE ACTIONS OUTLINED IN REFTTEL. WHEN THEY BECOME KNOWN, OUR BEHAVIOR WILL BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS A VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE IN QUAT GOVT AND WILL CONFIRM THE FEARS SOMETIMES VOICED THAT THE AMERICANS WANT TO TAKE OVER AND RUN THE AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRY WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE VIETNAMESE. TAYLOR
BT

CFN NO TIMMES NO GVN NOT NO QUAT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/SO 8:36 AM, 4/17/65.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 8:55 AM, 4/17/65.

* AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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*****ZZ RUMJIR
DE RUEPWW 138D 17/2235Z
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FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
TO AMEMB SAIGON
EXEC
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~~TOP SECRET~~ NODIS CAP65120
FROM MC GEORGE BUNDY TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR (DELIVER OPENING OF
BUSINESS 18 APRIL 1965)
SECRETARY RUSK AND I HAVE REPORTED YOUR CONCERNS TO THE
PRESIDENT IN TEXAS AND HE AS DIRECTED THAT ALL ACTIONS AND VISITS
BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER MCNAMARA'S MEETINGS WITH WESTMORELAND IN
HONOLULU.

WE HOPE YOU WILL GIVE WESTIE FULLEST ACCOUNT OF YOUR THINKING AND
WHEN MCNAMARA RETURNS HERE, THE PRESIDENT WILL REVIEW SITUATION
AGAIN AND CONSULT ONCE MORE WITH YOU.

MY OWN BELIEF IS YOUR VIEWS AND OURS CAN BE BROUGHT VERY CLOSE
TOGETHER IF WE WORK AT IT. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT WE WILL TRY TO
RESPECT YOUR HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE LARGE-SCALE
PROGRAMS YOU ALREADY HAVE ENTRAINED
BT

DTG: 180357Z APRIL 1965

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 4-19-78, NSC 6-21-78

By ip, NARS, Date 1-23-80

~~TOP SECRET~~ NODIS

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

April 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - I read you most of this.

The Demonologists look at the noise from Hanoi, Peking and Moscow

I have talked with Tommy Thompson and Ray Cline of CIA, and I have checked Foy Kohler's dispatches, and other internal comment. There is an astonishingly clear consensus as follows:

1. The threats of volunteers and the talk of increasing commitment still have many loopholes. As Kohler puts it, "Cautious formula on Soviet volunteers to North Vietnam seems to reflect continuing Soviet reluctance to move toward possible military confrontation with US." The Soviets put three conditions on these volunteers:

- a. If necessary;
- b. If North Vietnam requests it;
- c. If the US escalates the war.

The Chinese give essentially the same conditions, but in more violent language.

2. On negotiations and discussions, there are more interesting variations. The Chinese are violently opposed to "US imperialism's scheme about peace talks." Moscow and Hanoi regard our proposals as fraudulent, but they do not flatly reject discussions. Moscow is testing the possibility of a Cambodian conference, and Hanoi has an even more interesting formula: it lays down its terms of settlement (quite unacceptable to us, of course), and says that it would be glad to talk if its terms of settlement could be agreed upon as a basis for discussion. The State Department is not attaching any public importance to this way of stating it, but Thompson and Cline and I all agree that there is at least a hint of real interest from Hanoi in eventual discussions. I expect these "pre-discussion" statements to continue on both sides for a while and I think you are in a good position to manage the speed of the process.

3. Cline reports new U-2 pictures of the Hanoi area which show the same SAM site still under construction and not yet operational, together with markings elsewhere which may indicate additional SAM construction.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 78-592 CIA 11-2-82 letter
By jis, NARS, Date 11-9-82

Thompson continues to think that this will be a long, slow process and that Soviet operational crews are unlikely in the immediate future. Cline is a little more cautious. We all agree that if Soviet crews are installed, they will come under the guise of volunteers and will thus not engage Soviet prestige and pride as directly as if they were admittedly under orders from the USSR.

4. We all agree that the contest between Moscow and Peking remains the dominant quarrel for both of them, and that their statements are aimed as much at each other as at us -- although there can be no doubt that our air attacks and their lack of active response have been acutely embarrassing to both of them -- just as they have undoubtedly created increasing nervousness in Hanoi.

5. Finally, Thompson and Cline strongly agree that the Communist capitals greatly exaggerate the power of dissenting opinion in this country. They all agree that people like Lippmann, Morgenthau, Fulbright and marching students do great damage by creating false hopes in unfriendly breasts.

McG. B.

McG. B.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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OCI No. 1196/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
20 April 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Modernization of Viet Cong Armament

1. Evidence continues to come in showing that Viet Cong main force units are being re-equipped with modern automatic and semi-automatic weapons of Bloc manufacture as well as new types of heavier weapons.

2. A detailed study of the types and number of arms captured from the Viet Cong during 1964 showed that the number of arms of Bloc origin in the hands of the Viet Cong was increasing. It also indicated that Viet Cong main force units were receiving and standardizing on the 7.62mm family of weapons. This information was for the most part reproduced in the White Paper on Vietnam released in February 1965.

3. The mix of weapons captured from two Viet Cong main force units in Chuong Thien Province during an engagement with the 21st ARVN Division in early April also supports this conclusion. These included:

52 Carbines	Chinese Communist origin
20 SKS Rifles	Chinese Communist origin
11 AK Assault Rifles	Chinese Communist origin
2 AK Assault Rifles	Czech origin
4 Light Machine Guns	Chinese Communist origin

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SANITIZED

Authority RAC 23394

By mp/ly 4-9-14

~~SECRET~~

- 2 60mm Mortars Chinese Communist origin
- 1 75mm Recoilless Rifle Chinese Communist origin
- 3 RPG2 Rocket Launchers Chinese Communist origin
- 1 Light Machine Gun German origin (WWII)
- 1 US M-1
- 4 US Carbines

4. Over 90 percent of these weapons are of Bloc origin, and of these almost all are of Chinese Communist origin. Over one third of the small arms are of the newer 7.62mm family of automatic and semi-automatic weapons. This particular weapons mix is probably representative of most Viet Cong main force units at this time, but the sample is still very small.

5. A wheeled mount and two barrels for a Soviet type Goryunov heavy machinegun were also captured for the first time in this engagement. The origin of this weapon was probably Communist China, although this cannot be proved.

6. 

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INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

RUEKDA/DOD

RUEPIA/CIA

P 201158Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3458 19770

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ APRIL 20

DEPTEL 2346

WE FEEL THERE ARE DANGERS IN USING PERCENTAGE FIGURES OF DEGREE OF VIET CONG AND SVN CONTROL OVER POPULATION SINCE THIS IS AN INEXACT SCIENCE AT BEST AND ANY FIGURES USED BECOME A BENCHMARK FOR COMPARISON WITH THE PAST AND IN THE FUTURE. WE WOULD PREFER MORE GENERAL FORMULATION ALONG THE LINES THAT VC CONTROL A PART OF THE POPULATION, THE GVN A LARGER PART PARTICULARLY IN THE URBAN AREAS BUT WITH A LARGE BODY OF THE POPULATION CONTESTED BY BOTH SIDES. (MACV PIO ISSUES TO PRESS MAP SHOWING AREAS HELD BY VIET CONG ~~CFN 3458 20 2346 SVN VC GVN MACV PIO~~)

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1156A CONFIDENTIAL~~
WITH NOTATION THAT LESS THAN 25 PERCENT OF POPULATION LIVES IN THESE AREAS. COPY BEING POUCHED).

WE SEE NO INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM IN PROVIDING ESTIMATES SHOULD WASHINGTON DESIRE TO DO SO AND DOUBT THAT GVN WOULD REACT SHARPLY AGAINST USE OF SUCH ESTIMATES. HOWEVER, DEPT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT AMB HAS TESTIFIED BEFORE CONGRESS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION TO THE EFFECT THAT ABOUT 23 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IS UNDER FAIRLY CLEAR VC CONTROL, ABOUT 47 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IS UNDER FAIRLY CLEAR GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL, AND THE REMAINING 30 PERCENT ARE UNDER VARYING DEGREES OF CONTROL BY BOTH SIDES. FURTHERMORE THAT THESE RATIOS HAVE BEEN QUITE STABLE OVER RECENT MONTHS.

WISH TO ADD, MOREOVER, THAT USE OF SUCH FIGURES IN POLICY STATEMENTS COULD BE DANGEROUS AND MISLEADING. IF WE TALK TOO MUCH ABOUT VIET CONG CONTROL OVER ANY PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION (BE IT 25, 45, OR 50 PERCENT), WE ARE INDIRECTLY REINFORCING VIET CONG AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, AND ARE THUS UNDERCUTTING OUR OWN REFUSAL TO DEAL WITH THEM. WE COULD BE EASILY CONFRONTED WITH ARGUMENT THAT WE SHOULD PERMIT FRONT TO PARTICIPATE IN GOVT AND IN NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE FRONT CONTROLS (AND THUS PRESUMABLY REPRESENTS) LARGE SEGMENT OF POPULATION. JOHNSON.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: RAC 32821
By: 100/4, NARA, Date 4-4-74

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NODIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Attached Memorandum

I am enclosing the memorandum regarding a possible approach to Vietnamese settlement which we discussed this morning. I have dictated it hurriedly this afternoon in order to meet the schedule we agreed upon. For that reason, there are loose ends.

The memorandum suggests some moves that we might make to take advantage of what may well be a diplomatic opening provided by the North Vietnamese. I believe that Hanoi, in its answer to the 17 nation declaration, has put out a feeler--in its peculiar Oriental way--that we should not ignore.

I believe further that, if we are to settle this matter short of a major war, we must be prepared for a settlement that falls somewhere short of the goals we have publicly sated, but that still meets our basic objectives.

I would like to see us move on this promptly--certainly before any final decision for a 150 percent increase in our troop deployment in South Viet-Nam that would multiply our dangers and responsibilities while limiting your freedom of maneuver.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 11-10-78

By ij, NARS, Date 1-23-80

George W. Ball

~~TOP SECRET~~

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21 April 1965

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MEMORANDUM (Revised Text)

48a

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist and general world reactions to a US course of action in Vietnam, stated below, over the next six to twelve months.

ASSUMPTIONS

We assume that the scale and tempo of US air action against North Vietnam and against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam continues at present levels for the period of this estimate. We also assume that, within the next few months, additional US military forces are introduced into South Vietnam to bring the total US military present there to approximately 80,000 and that these forces will have, as part of their mission, ground combat against Viet Cong troops.. We also assume that approximately 5,250 Allied non-US combat forces are introduced.

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Present Situation. At present it appears that the DRV, with strong Chinese encouragement, is determined for the present to ride out the US bombardment. The Viet Cong, the DRV, and Communist

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED

~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Authority NLJ 84-111.

By luc pld, NARS, Date 11-14-85
100

China have hardened their attitudes toward negotiations, without categorically excluding the possibility under all conditions. They still consider that the tide is running in favor of the VC, despite the bombings in the South. They apparently calculate that the DRV can afford further punishment and that, in the meantime, US determination to persist will weaken because of the pressure of international and US domestic opinion, the threat of a broader conflict, and increasing DRV air defense capabilities.

2. The Soviets have exhibited increased concern about the trend of events, and Moscow has indicated a greater interest in negotiations than the other Communists involved. Nevertheless, the others have thus far rejected Moscow's efforts in this direction. In these circumstances the Soviets have been taking a series of steps, each of which increases their involvement and commitment, in an effort to vie with the Chinese as supporters of North Vietnam and the VC's "national liberation struggle." Soviet SAMs are almost certainly on the way, and the recent Soviet-DRV communique suggests that agreement has been reached on other forms of military assistance as well.

3. Non-Communist opinions are influenced primarily by two factors: fears that the war will spread beyond Vietnam, and judgments as to the relative chances of the two sides. On the first point, fears of a larger war are presently not high, but they lie fairly near

the surface and work largely against the US. On the second, most world opinion judges that political weakness in Saigon, the success of Viet Cong guerrilla tactics, and the ground predominance of China will eventually lead to Communist victory. Another factor, one which works in the US favor, is the priority which some governments, notably the UK and Australia, attach to maintaining solidarity with the US in Southeast Asia.

Reactions to A Continuation of Present Courses of Action

4. If present US policies continue without the introduction of large additional forces or increased US air effort, the Communists are likely to hold to their existing policy of seeking victory in the local military struggle in South Vietnam. They will try to intensify that struggle, supporting it with additional men and equipment. At the same time, DRV air defenses will be strengthened through Soviet and perhaps Chinese aid. So long as the trend in South Vietnam appears to the Communists to be favorable, however, we doubt that they will open new fronts in Indochina, launch an overt invasion of South Vietnam, or challenge the US in the air in the southern part of the DRV.

5. As to the course of the struggle in South Vietnam itself, in these circumstances we think it unlikely that the Viet Cong and its supporters will come to believe that they can no longer support

the war and must make concessions extending beyond the superficial in order to end it. They are more likely to believe that they are prevailing or at least holding their own.

6. If these estimates are correct, then some changes in world opinion are likely over the next six to twelve months we are here considering. Fears of a larger war would probably decline, but the conviction of ultimate Communist victory would be strengthened with the passage of time. Under these circumstances, therefore, the outlook is for a decline in support for the US, although the change might not be very great.

II. REACTIONS TO THE ASSUMED GREATER US INVOLVEMENT

7. The assumed US course of action would require the Communists to re-examine their estimates of US intentions. As the buildup of US and other foreign forces became clear, both Communist and non-Communist opinion would probably conclude that the US had taken a firm decision not to accept a military defeat in South Vietnam. Most of those who believed that US policy sought merely to create the minimal conditions for a face-saving withdrawal would abandon this belief. Many people, and in particular the Chinese, might believe that this US decision could be undone at a

later stage, but all would perceive at least a temporary reaffirmation and strengthening of the US commitment. However, as it became apparent that US operations against the DRV were still being conducted on a limited basis, without maximum use of air and naval power, the Communists would be likely to conclude that US determination to prevail had not yet overcome its concern to prevent a widening of the war.

Initial Communist Reactions

8. In the circumstances thus created, the Communists might reason that military victory would now become very difficult or perhaps even unattainable. They might think this, not because they expected the new enemy forces rapidly to reverse the tide of battle, but because they feared they would be unable to continue a series of successful local operations and thereby to maintain the morale of the Viet Cong in a prolonged struggle. Additionally, they might infer from the increased US commitment that, if a stalemate persisted, the chances of a subsequent US resort to more aggressive actions were greater.

9. Alternatively, the Communists might reason that the new enemy forces would serve only to postpone the ultimate Communist

victory. In this, they would be counting on such factors as the capabilities of the Viet Cong, the known aversion to "getting bogged down" in a land war in Asia, the political vulnerability of the Saigon Government, the pressures of world and domestic US opinion, and the evident unwillingness, at least thus far, of the US to expand the conflict by bombing northern North Vietnam.

10. Although there would be differences among them in general we believe that the Viet Cong, North Vietnam, and China would initially respond along the second of these lines of reasoning. Accordingly, they would probably try to offset the new enemy strength by stepping up the insurgency, reinforcing the Viet Cong as necessary with the men and equipment necessary. They would likely count on time being on their side and try to force the piecemeal engagement of US troops under conditions which might bog them down in jungle warfare, hoping to present the US with a de facto partition of the country. The Soviet Union would be more inclined to the first line of reasoning but, unless unforeseen events had in the meantime produced a major change in post-Khrushchev policy, the USSR would almost certainly acquiesce in a decision by Hanoi to intensify the struggle.

11. There is a third possibility: that Hanoi and Peiping would choose the arrival of major new US forces as the moment for a general showdown. This could involve a large-scale invasion of South Vietnam by DRV troops, movements of Chinese forces into the DRV, and movements of DRV and/or Chinese troops into northern Laos or beyond. We do not believe, however, that they would react in

this fashion, at least until they had had a chance to observe how the US intervention had affected the course of the war.

Communist Reactions at a Later Stage

12. Subsequent Communist reactions would depend upon the subsequent course of the struggle in South Vietnam. We cannot estimate how that struggle would evolve after new anti-Communist forces had arrived and the Viet Cong had in turn received new support. In general, however, we believe that the Viet Cong, the DRV, and China all rate the staying power of their side as inherently superior to that of their enemies. But the critical factor will be whether these beliefs are proved in combat validated in terms of the tides of battle, the casualties, and other indicators with US and SVN forces over another six to twelve months of fighting.

13. If the Communists concluded that the Viet Cong's military prospects had seriously worsened, in spite of the reinforcements noted in paragraph 10 as a result of the US intervention and military successes then they would face a choice between taking steps to interrupt the conflict or shifting to a large-scale ground offensive along the lines of paragraph 11. In weighing these alternatives, we think they would recognize that by committing ground forces to offensive operations, the US had acquired a greater stake in the war. Moreover, they would probably also recognize that the chances of overrunning South Vietnam in

overt military operations had receded, and that if they tried to do this against large US forces, the US probably would not accept defeat without expanding the war to the DRV and China, perhaps using nuclear weapons. Thus, we think that, if and when this point is reached, the chances are somewhat better than even that the DRV and China would resort to political moves would seek at least a temporary political solution for a time rather than launch a major ground invasion.

14. The USSR is less concerned than the other Communist states to defeat the US in South Vietnam. Its chief motive is to prevent such a defeat from redounding to Chinese credit and its own discredit, to uphold its claims to leadership of the "socialist camp" and the "national liberation movement." These concerns provide Hanoi with considerable leverage over Moscow, and the USSR would probably provide general support and specialized military assistance to the DRV in any of the various levels of conflict here envisaged. But we note that the present level of Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia is a recent policy departure which reverses Khrushchev's tendency toward disengagement, and it is therefore possible that a sharp increase in risk might cause the USSR to revert to a more aloof posture.

Initial and Subsequent Non-Communist Reactions

15. Perhaps the most important non-Communist reactions would be those of the South Vietnamese. These reactions would probably be somewhat ambivalent, that is, On the one hand they would be considerably encouraged on the one hand but tending by the increased US support; on the other, there would be some tendency, with the passage of time, to relax efforts on the other because someone else would now do the fighting. The introduction of large numbers of US troops might lend credence to charges that the US had colonialist ambitions in Vietnam and cause a rise in popular support for the VC. The key determinant, however, would be the effectiveness of the total US effort. If this produced a slackening of VC pressures, US-South Vietnamese working relations would be fairly smooth. If, on the contrary, the war looked as if it would drag on with no particular respite from DRV/VC pressures, South Vietnamese war weariness and anti-Americanism would probably begin to threaten the US political base in South Vietnam.

16. There would be wide variations, ranging from very positive to very negative, in the reactions of the other non-Communist nations to the US course of action assumed here. However, their declarations and moves would, for the most part, tend to be unimportant, since only a few can have, or even hope to have, any noticeable influence on the countries most directly involved in Vietnam. The ultimate

effect of developments in Vietnam on US relations with the bulk of these countries would continue to be determined by the eventual success or failure of US policy there and by the degree to which any individual country found itself becoming more deeply embroiled in the conflict.

17. Major NATO allies, such as Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, and Italy, which have heretofore largely supported US actions, would be almost certain initially to continue this posture. However, their concern at this further evidence of US willingness to enlarge its commitment, and at the implications for further escalation later on, would enhance existing desires for a negotiated settlement. While Rome and Bonn would be likely to remain passive, London and Ottawa would probably press Washington privately to show greater willingness to start talks with the Communists, while avoiding additional escalating actions, and also devise schemes for a de facto cease-fire or ultimate settlement. Nevertheless, both countries would go very far to avoid an open break with the US and to maintain their lines of communication to US policymakers.

18. Such allies as France and Pakistan, which are already negatively oriented to US policies in Vietnam, would deplore the

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assumed course of action, predict its failure, and step up their moves to mobilize world pressure, primarily on the US, but also on the Communists, to move to the conference table. India's reaction would be similar, though perhaps even more vocally hostile to the US. India and France might also seek to work out joint positions or even new initiatives with the USSR, but Pakistan may be more wary of such actions in view of Ayub's recent rebuff in Moscow and of the vulnerability of newly-established ties between Peiping and Karachi.

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4/27/65

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(copy of Vientiane 1712) April 21, 1965

During Southeast Asia Coordinating meeting, participants were briefed by MACV on JCS proposals for extensive new U. S. troop deployments in Southeast Asia. Since I believe execution of these proposals would have widespread reactions in all countries of this region, you may find it of some use to have my judgment re probable Lao reactions to these deployments.

First, as I have reported, Lao believe our methodical bombardment of North Vietnam is correct and will produce results. They are perhaps more optimistic than we that in reasonable period of time North Vietnam and Viet Cong morale will collapse and they will sue for peace on terms acceptable to us. They have taken great heart from our actions and have gained a new confidence in their own future.

If we, by proposed deployments, indicate we, on the other hand, have lost confidence in prospect that bombardment will produce results, Lao will rethink their own estimates. They will probably interpret our deployments as evidence of panic and this atmosphere can be very infectious.

Second, despite many earlier misgivings and in the face of Communist and French propaganda to the contrary, Lao accept the idea that we have no, repeat no, colonial or neo-colonial ambitions here. A massive occupation of South Vietnam by U. S. forces except in extremis would also cause this assumption to be re-examined.

The net result of these two factors would, in my judgment, be considerable diminution in Lao confidence re U. S. objectives and capabilities. The practical consequences would probably include much less active cooperation with us in our current military operations and a rather headlong rush to embrace French policy of "negotiated neutrality" for Southeast Asia.

SULLIVAN

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Authority State 10-10-78 letter

By if, NARS, Date 1-23-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 2379 IMMEDIATE

Info INFO: CINCPAC _____ "

Apr 21 4 04 PM '65

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND ADM SHARP FROM SECRETARY

McNamara today summarized Honolulu results at highest level meeting. Final decision deferred at least until tomorrow to await intelligence judgment likely Communist views and reactions. In meantime would welcome any further reflections you have developed on any aspect.

One further matter that gives us concern is question of locating ROK RCT at Quang Ngai in isolation from any major contingent of US forces. We recognize this is based on location being suited for possible later deployment ROK division, but believe that it could make ROK agreement much more difficult. Do you or MACV have any other thoughts where ROK unit might be located? We would not need to cover this point specifically in instructions to Ambassador Brown for preliminary approach Friday (assuming decision reached tomorrow) but ~~we~~ we might need to have our thoughts better developed if ROK turns out to be receptive and we instruct Lodge to follow up with more specifics.

RUSK

GP-3. Authority **DECLASSIFIED STATE letter MAR 5 1979**
By isg, NARS, Date 6-28-79 END

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

WPBundy/bmm 4/21

The Secretary

DoD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton

S/S -Mr. Hilliker

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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CONTROL: 18007
RECD: APRIL 21, 1965, 10:38PM
FROM: AMEMBASSY SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3477

4
51a

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPT PASS ROUTINE TO CINCPAC 2043 FROM SAIGON
CINCPAC PASS TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND
N O D I S
RE: DEPTTEL 2379

WE HAVE NO SPECIAL CONCERN OVER COMMUNIST REACTION IF ACTIONS CONSIDERED IN HONOLULU ARE APPROVED. USUAL PROPAGANDA ATTACKS MAY BE EXPECTED AND MOSCOW MAY ANNOUNCE NEW FORMS OF AID FOR DRV. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT SEE ANY EFFECTIVE REACTION TO OFFSET OUR NEW MOVES WHICH IS IN RISK RANG IN WHICH COMMUNISTS ARE LIKELY TO WAXT TO OPERATE.

WITH REGARD TO LOCATION OF ROK RCT AT QUANG NGAI, I PERSONALLY DO NOT FEEL THAT THIS LOCATION IS SO IMPORTANT AS TO REQUIRE INSISTENCE UPON IT AT PRICE OF POSSIBLE LOSS OF RCT. I SUGGEST THAT IN DISCUSSION WITH ROK ON THIS SUBJECT, THIS LOCATION BE INDICATED AS OUR FIRST CHOICE BUT THAT MATTER IS OPEN TO ADJUDICATION. I SUGGEST GENERAL WESTMORELAND SUBMIT HIS COMMENTS DIRECT TO DEPARTMENT.

TAYLOR

NOTE: PASSED CINCPAC FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND 4/21/11:15P WVC

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter MAR 5 1979
By ip, NARS, Date 6-28-79

52

191

DECLASSIFIED

✓ Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

22 April 1965

52a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. President

Operations in South Vietnam

We had a press report last night that US marines fought their first infantry clash with Viet Cong guerrillas. MACV has confirmed that the Viet Cong attacked a reconnaissance patrol of 41 Marines and 38 South Vietnamese in Binh Thai Village, nine miles from Da Nang Airbase. The Marines quickly replied to the fire and called for a rescue company. One Marine was slightly wounded. It is not known whether the Viet Cong suffered losses. Last reports indicate fighting has ceased.

Air Attacks Against North Vietnam

Twenty Navy strike aircraft conducted night reconnaissance missions of highway routes in North Vietnam on 21 April.

: Strike aircraft from USS Hancock conducted a night recon of Routes
: 101 and 102. The aircraft repeatedly flew the 122 miles of highway
: for one and one-half hours. Two separate vehicles with lights
: were attacked. In both instances the lights went out, but results
of the attacks are unknown.

Strike aircraft from the USS Midway conducted a night recon of Route 1A, covering approximately 200 miles. Ten trucks were estimated destroyed and eight damaged. Particularly significant on this mission was the sighting of a 15-20 truck convoy. The convoy was attacked with the aid of flares and six trucks were believed destroyed. Additional planes have been requested and approved for a strike on this target. Results are not yet available on the restrike.

Twenty two US and South Vietnamese strike aircraft, with 52 support aircraft, were launched for a strike on My Duc Highway Bridge and armed reconnaissance of Routes 8, 12, and 1A.

The strike on the bridge was successful and pilots report hitting and damaging 6 buildings on the route reconnaissance. One South Vietnamese aircraft crashed; details are not available at this time.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 2/18/77, NSC 3/18/77
By MJE, NARS, Date 4/10/78

A reconnaissance escort aircraft visually observed some PT type boats lying dead in the water about five miles off the coast. A special strike force of 18 aircraft was launched to destroy the boats. In-flight pilot reports indicate 5 boats were located. Two were hit with rockets, one of these is burning. Two large junks were also sighted and attacked. One was hit.

The Situation Room

53

192

April 22 65
4/22/65

TO: Ambassador Unger

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

The attached has McNamara's approval and mine, and the Secretary asks you to clear it directly with him as soon as you have looked it over.

*Approved
by [unclear]
4/22/65*

53a

~~TOP SECRET~~

4/22/65

53b

TO: AmEmbassy Saigon for Ambassador Taylor

FROM: Secretary Rusk

After Honolulu discussions McNamara has now recommended to the President the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 U. S. troops already in-country:

1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000	closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns	at Chu Lai	6,200	closing 5 May
1 Australian btn	at Vung Tau	1,250	closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000	closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn)	at Quang Ngai	4,000	closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces		11,000	already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level		7,000	already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions		16,000	not yet approved

Upon completion of these deployments, the U. S. forces would include 13 battalions and would have a total strength approximating 82,000 men, and the Korean and Australian forces would include 4 battalions with a total strength of 7,250 men.

For your wholly private information, and subject to private Congressional consultation, the President is inclined to favor McNamara's recommendations, but before making a decision on them he wishes to obtain the opinion of the GVN. We believe the best way to pursue matter with Quat at this stage would be for you to make an exposition of the situation as a matter of your own judgment and recommendation, in essentially the following terms:

~~TOP SECRET~~

(page 1 of 3 pages)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol II, # 271
By ly, NARA, Date 4-4-14

INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

"The Embassy has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat Government. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objectives of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency cannot be attained in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

Meanwhile the JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag indefinitely, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 or more battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these

reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from U. S. and third country sources.

The Embassy accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and subject to your views, I am prepared to recommend to the President that:

(1) The U. S. assist the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time.

(2) As part of this effort, the US bring in additional U. S. ground forces. If the GVN will make urgent representations at the appropriate time following a schedule agreed with the USG, we believe it may be possible to obtain contributions of the following order: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. I would propose that the US provide combat reinforcements of the order of 9 additional battalions distributed among points to be agreed upon, and the necessary logistic personnel to support the third country contingents. "

You ^{should} ~~will~~ seek to obtain the support of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out ^{after} ~~subsequent to~~ Presidential review of your recommendations. At your discretion, you may indicate to GVN officials that if your recommendations are accepted the total U. S. in-country strength would approximate 80,000.

(page 3 of 3 pages)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 5 1979

By if, NARA, Date 6-28-79

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: collect
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

53c

1 2 7 8 8

W 10

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Apr 22 10 52 PM '65

Origin
Info

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2397

EYES ONLY
FOR AMB TAYLOR FROM SECRETARY RUSK

~~XXXX~~ NODIS

After Honolulu discussions McNamara has now recommended to the President the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 U.S. troops already in-country:

- 1. US Army brigade (3 btn) at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau 4,000 closing 1 May
- 3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns at Chu Lai 6,200 closing 5 May
- 1 Australian btn at Vung Tau 1,250 closing 21 May
- 1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang 4,000 closing 15 June
- 1 Korean RCT (3 btn) at Quang Ngai 4,000 closing 15 June
- Augmentation of various existing forces 11,000 already approved
- Logistics troops for previously approved force level 7,000 already approved
- Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions 16,000 not yet approved

Upon completion of these deployments, the U.S. forces would include 13 battalions and would have a total strength approximating 82,000 men, and the Korean and Australian forces would include 4 battalions with a total strength of 7,250 men.

For your wholly private information, and subject to private Congressional consultation, the President is inclined to favor McNamara's recommendations,

Drafted by: SECRETARY McNAMARA

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

FE - Leonard Unger
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearance:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

White House: McGeorge Bundy

The Secretary (in draft)

S/S - Mr. Rattray AK

~~XXX~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

FORM 303 DS-322

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

but before making a decision on them he wishes to obtain the opinion of the GVN. We believe the best way to pursue matter with Quat at this stage would be for you to make an exposition of the situation as a matter of your own judgment and recommendation, in essentially the following terms:

INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

"The Embassy has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat Government. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objectives of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency cannot be attained in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

Meanwhile the JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag indefinitely, they consider it necessary

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 or more battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from US and third country sources.

The Embassy accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and subject to your views, I am prepared to recommend to the President that:

(1) The U.S. assist the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time.

(2) As part of this effort, the US bring in additional US ground forces. If the GVN will make urgent representations at the appropriate time following a schedule agreed with the USG, we believe it may be possible to obtain contributions of the following order: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. I would propose that the US provide combat reinforcements of the order of 9 additional battalions distributed among points to be agreed upon, and the necessary logistic personnel to support the third country contingents."

You should seek to obtain the support of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out after Presidential review of your recommendations. At your discretion, you may indicate to GVN officials that if your recommendations are accepted the

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

total U.S. in-country strength would approximate 80,000.

You must emphasize to Quat that it is of utmost importance there be no leak or public disclosure of these matters which are of highest military and security importance to North Viet Nam as well as to US.

You should also tell Quat that if he agrees with the proposed deployments it is not our intention to announce whole program now but rather to announce individual deployments at appropriate times.

GP-1

END

RUSK

54

193

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

54a

April 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a selection of Lodge's cables to date. There are so many that I have not tried to have them all copied, but I will if you wish tomorrow. You will see that he has had a friendly reception so far from Macapagal, from Holyoake and from the Australians. He has commitments of sorts from all three:

The Australian battalion (currently estimated at 1900 men);

A New Zealand agreement to consider sending "a small combat unit";

Macapagal's agreement to go ahead rapidly with his 2200 man Philippine force.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

55

194

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WA 55a
2

~~TOP SECRET~~ CORRECTED COPY ISSUED

4/23/65 12:30 AM

Action

////~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/////

CRF343VZCZCPHP317VV PAF895

Info

OO RUEHCR RUEKDA

DE RUHKA 2646 22/2149Z

O 222149Z

19090

FM CINCPAC- CORRECTED PAGE 1.

1965 APR 22 PM 6 33

TO RUEHCR/STATE DEPT

RUEKDA/CJCS

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK, GEN WHEELER AND GEN

WESTMORELAND FROM ADM SHARP

A. STATE 2379 TO SAIGON

B. SAIGON 3477 TO STATE

1. REF A ASKED FOR VIEWS CONCERNING THE ASPECTS OF LOCATING A ROK UNIT AT QUANG NGAI IN ISOLATION FROM ANY MAJOR CONTINGENT OF U.S. FORCES.

2. PROVIDED THAT ITS TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED, A ROK RCT OF ABOUT 3500 PERSONNEL PRESUMABLY WILL BE

PAGE 2 RUHKA 2646 ~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT

FULLY CAPABLE OF INDEPENDENT COUNTERINSURGENCY AND BASE SECURITY OPERATIONS OF THE SCOPE NOW ENVISAGED FOR SOUTH VIETNAM. LITTLE IF ANY TACTICAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER NATION GROUND FORCE WILL BE REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THIS RCT WILL REQUIRE MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES.

• MAINTENANCE NEEDS WILL INCLUDE THAT NECESSARY FOR ORDNANCE, AUTOMOTIVE AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. SUPPLY SUPPORT WILL INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR RECEIPT, STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION OF AMMO, FUEL AND RATIONS. THESE REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE MET IN PART BY ASSIGNMENT OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE ROK DIVISION LOGISTIC ECHELON WHICH SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE RCT U.S. LOGISITIC SUPPORT WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED.

4. THE ROK RCT COULD BE LANDED BY 15 JUNE. TIME OF LANDING THE REMAINDER OF THE ROK DIVISIONAL FORCE IS NOW PURELY SPECULATIVE. A DIVISIONAL SIZED FORCE MIGHT NOT BE MOVED TO SOUTH VIETNAM. THE ROK UNIT SHOULD THUS BE ATTACHED TO A U.S. FORCES POSSESSING CAPABILITIES WHICH WILL ENABLE IT TO RENDER REQUIRED LEVEL OF MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT. ROK RCT SHOULD BE CO-LOCATED WITH THIS FORCE OR ADJACENT TO IT IN AN AREA WHEREIN DEPENDENCE ON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 3/1/77, State 3/28/77 ~~TOP SECRET~~

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By MJE, NARS, Date 4/10/78

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 222149Z April 22, From CINCPAC

QUESTIONABLE LAND LOG WOULD NOT GENERATE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS OR DIFFICULTIES. A FURTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT SUPPORTING FORCES SHOULD

PAGE RUHKA 2546 ~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT
BE IN PLACE, OPERATING AND CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SUPPORT WHEN RCT IS LANDED.

5. U.S. FORCES HAVING MINIMUM CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO LOGISTICALLY SUPPORT THE ROK RCT ARE NOW IN PLACE AT DANANG AND AS PLANNED WILL BE IN PLACE AT CHU LAI AND VUNG TAU IN MAY. OTHER U.S. FORCES ARE NOW PLANNED TO ARRIVE AT QUI NHON/NHA TRANG AT APPROXIMATELY SAME TIME AS ROK RCT ARRIVES, ABOUT 15 JUNE. PRESENT SITUATION AT QUANG NGAI IS SUCH THAT IN-THE-STREAM UNLOADING AND OVER-THE-BEACH RESUPPLY BY LANDING CRAFT WILL BE REQUIRED UNTIL DREDGING OF APPROACHES TO PROPOSED LST SLIP, WHICH IS NOW PLANNED, HAS BEEN COMPLETED. PRESENT PRIORITY FOR THIS DREDGING IS LOWER THAN THAT FOR DANANG AND QUI NHON/NHA TRANG AREAS. ROUGH ESTIMATE IS THAT THIS DREDGING COULD BE COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ABOVE PRIORITIES BUT AT INDEFINITE FUTURE DATE.

6. THE MILITARY NEED FOR MORE GROUND FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AT AN EARLY DATE AND THE POLITICAL DESIRABILITY OF THIRD COUNTRY COMBAT FORCE COMMITMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM ARE FACTORS WHICH STRONGLY MILITATE AGAINST DELAYING A ROK FORCE COMMITMENT. ONCE LANDED THE UNITS CAN BE REDEPLOYED TO OTHER LOCATIONS WHEN REQUISITE U.S. SUPPORT CAPABILITIES EXIST.

7. THE ACTUAL SITE OF THE LANDING AND THE PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING U.S. LOGISTICS SUPPORT ARE MATTERS WHICH ARE NOW UNDER

PAGE 4 RUHKA 2646 ~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT
DETAILED STUDY BY COMUSMACV.

AS POINTED OUT IN REF B, WE SHOULD MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY AT THIS TIME IN ORDER NOT TO JEOPARDIZE COMMITMENT BY THE ROK.

8. A NUMBER OF ALTERNATE LANDING SITES ARE AVAILABLE. WE COULD SEND THE ROK UNIT ASHORE IN THE DANANG/CHU LAI AREA, AT VUNG TAU, QUI NHON, NHA TRANG, CAM RANH BAY OR QUANG NGAI. FINAL DECISION SHOULD AWAIT DETERMINATION OF BEST PORT AREA AND MOST EFFECTIVE AVAILABILITY OF U.S. SUPPORT. WE RECOMMEND THAT ROKS BE ASSURED OF U.S. SUPPORT, WITH SELECTION OF POINT OF ENTRY DEPENDENT UPON DETAILED EXAMINATION OF BEACH AREAS, INLAND ACCESS ROUTES, AND CURRENT LOCATION OF U.S. FORCES.

9. FOR COMUSMACV. PLEASE SHOW TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR.

GP-3.

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

56

195

F
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

56a

w/d

2

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 19411
RECEIVED: APRIL 23, 1965, 5:37 AM
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 3496, PRIORITY
DATE: APRIL 23

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

APRIL 23

Authority State Letter 10-6-78

NODIS

By ip, NARS, Date 3-23-79

FOR THE PRESIDENT

BECAUSE OF MY TRIP TO HONOLULU, I DID NOT SUBMIT TO YOU MY USUAL WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT. THE POINTS WHICH I WOULD HAVE PUT IN SUCH A REPORT ARE INCLUDED IN THE MATTERS CARRIED BACK BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND HIS PARTY FROM OUR MEETING.

DEPLOYMENT
ORDERS

IN THIS CONNECTION, I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR HOLDING UP ACTION ON ~~PAR 31-253-1011507~~ UNTIL WE COULD HAVE THE HONOLULU MEETING AND SORT OUT THE MANY IMPORTANT POINTS INVOLVED. BOB MCNAMARA HAS ALL OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS AND WE AWAIT YOUR DECISIONS TO CARRY THEM OUT WITH ALL OUR ENERGY.

UPON MY RETURN, I GAVE A GENERALIZED ACCOUNT OF MY TRIP TO QUAT. AS REPORTED IN EMBTEL 3491, HE WAS NOTICEABLY RETICENT ABOUT DISCUSSING THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS. WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF POSSIBLE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING HIS ACCEPTANCE OF SOME OF THE TROOP PROJECTS WE ARE CONSIDERING.

TAYLOR

ATTACHED AT (A)

LAST NIGHT'S

OUTGOING AT (B)

~~SECRET~~

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RUEP1A/CIA
P. 2331247 ZFA

LC 107

~~FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON~~
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY (3491)
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC PRIORITY 2049
STATE GRNC

~~Edg. B. J.~~

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~E~~

APRIL 23

L I M D I S

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALEX JOHNSON AND I CALLED ON PRIMIN QUAT 22 APRIL TO REPORT IN GENERAL TERMS ON MY VISIT TO HONOLULU. I EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS OF CERTAIN MATTERS BEGUN DURING MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON EARLY IN APRIL. THESE MATTERS RELATED PRIMARILY TO WAYS AND MEANS OF IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IN-COUNTRY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VIET CONG AS WELL AS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF COASTAL SURVEILLANCE OF INFILTRATION.

~~GEN 3491 2049 23 QUAT 22~~

~~PAGE TWO RUMJIR 1269A TOP SECRET~~

I REPORTED THE CONCERN WHICH WAS FELT OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW VIET CONG OFFENSIVE GROWING OUT OF THE PRESENT PERIOD OF RELATIVE QUIET. US CHIEFS OF STAFF CONSIDERED IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT THE IN-COUNTRY VIET CONG MIGHT BE JOINED BY UNITS OF THE PAVN AND TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THE NORTH. ALSO, WE SAW SOME SIGNS OF POSSIBLE VIET CONG OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS NORTH OF SAIGON. OUR CHIEFS CONSIDERED THAT IN ORDER TO REVERSE THE TREND IN SVN THE ARVN NEEDED AS MANY AS 20 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO OBTAIN THIS ADDED STRENGTH. IF ASKED QUAT WHETHER HE CARED TO COMMENT ON THESE MATTERS.

POINTEDLY AVOIDING ANY DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF US TROOPS TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION, QUAT HELD FORTH AT LENGTH ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS WHICH HE HOPED TO MAKE. HE IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF MANY OF HIS OFFICERS. HE THINKS THAT MANY COMMANDERS DO NOT PAY ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF THEIR MEN AND THUS PROVIDE A CAUSE FOR DESERTION. HE HAS GIVEN THOUGHT TO RAISING NUNG CONTINGENTS WHICH HE BELIEVES ARE AVAILABLE UP TO 30,000 MEN. LIKEWISE, HE WANTS TO ROOT OUT THE OFFICERS WORKING AT NON-MILITARY TASKS IN THE SAIGON MINISTRIES AND SEND THEM TO THE FIELD.

~~GEN PAVN SVN ARVN 20 NOT 30,000~~

I TOLD HIM THAT ALL THESE MEASURES WERE EXCELLENT AND THAT WE SHOULD EXPLOIT ALL MEANS TO INCREASE ARVN STRENGTH. HOWEVER, THERE WERE LIMITS TO WHAT COULD BE ACHIEVED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SHORTAGE OF LEADERS WOULD ALWAYS BE A CONTROLLING FACTOR. I ALSO SUGGESTED THAT HE DISCUSS WITH GENERALS THIEU AND MINH THE REDUCED STRENGTH OF THE GENERAL RESERVE OF WHICH FIVE BATTALIONS ARE NOW PINNED DOWN IN BINH DINH PROVINCE.

WHILE ACCEPTING MY POINT THAT TIME WAS PRESSING AND THAT WE NEED IN-COUNTRY SUCCESSES TO PARALLEL THE EFFECTS OF BOMBING ATTACKS ON THE NORTH, QUAT STEADILY AVOIDED THE MENTION OF ANY FOREIGN REINFORCEMENT. JOHNSON AND I WERE IMPRESSED THAT HE DID SO IN COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WE WERE THINKING AND DISPLAYED A RETICENCE WHICH REINFORCED OUR CONCERN FOR THE GVN REACTION TO ANY FORMAL PROPOSAL TO BRING IN FURTHER US FORCES.

WE MENTIONED THE TWO DOCUMENTS BEARING ON SEA SURVEILLANCE WHICH AMB JOHNSON HAD LEFT WITH HIM ON APRIL 19 (EMBTTEL 3442). HE SAID THEY WERE NOW BEING STUDIED BY HIS STAFF AND THAT HE WOULD RESPOND TO THEM SHORTLY.

~~CFN ARVN THIEU MINH BINH DINH GVN US 19 3442~~

I INFORMED HIM OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S VISIT ON 28-29 APRIL, MENTIONING THAT IT WAS CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MOMENT. HE EXPRESSED PLEASURE AND ANTICIPATION AT PROSPECT OF SEEING LODGE SOON.

IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL WORD ON GENERAL KHANH BUT PROMISED TO CLARIFY HIS FIGURE FOR US SOON. TAYLOR
BT

57

196

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Sent to [unclear]
4/26
Bundy
5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL: 20418
RECEIVED: APRIL 23, 1965, 11:49 P.M.

Info FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3504

57a

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

APRIL 24

Authority STATE letter MAR 5 1979

N O D I S

By [signature], NARS, Date 6-28-79

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA

REF. DEF-009653 231859Z.

I WOULD LIKE TO AMEND THE STATEMENT OF MY VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT DATED APRIL 21 IN TWO RESPECTS.

A. II, PARAGRAPH 1. QUOTE THIS IS BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT WILL COME AS MUCH OR MORE FROM VIET CONG FAILURE IN THE SOUTH AS FROM DRV PAIN IN THE NORTH AND THAT IT WILL TAKE MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, PERHAPS A YEAR OR TWO, TO DEMONSTRATE VIET CONG FAILURE IN THE SOUTH. UNQUOTE.

COMMENT: THIS STATEMENT SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY TAKE A YEAR OR TWO TO BREAK THE WILL OF HANOI TO CONTINUE THEIR PRESENT COURSE. EVEN IF WE CONTINUE OUR BOMBING AND INTRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL U.S. FORCES. MY VIEW IS THAT A FAVORABLE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FROM A COMBINATION OF CONTINUED AIR ATTACKS AND BY THE INTRODUCTION OF SUFFICIENT U.S. AND THIRD COUNTRY FORCES TO DEMONSTRATE TO HANOI THAT THE VIET CONG HAVE NO ULTIMATE CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THIS PROCESS WILL PROBABLY TAKE MONTHS; HOW MANY IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE.

B. II, PARAGRAPH 2. QUOTE ALL OF THEM ENVISIONED A STRIKE PROGRAM CONTINUING AT LEAST SIX MONTHS, PERHAPS A YEAR OR TWO, AVOIDING THE HANOI-HAIPHONG-PHUC YEN AREAS DURING THAT PERIOD. UNQUOTE.

COMMENT: I SUBSCRIBE TO THIS STATEMENT LESS THE PHRASE QUOTE PERHAPS A YEAR OR TWO. UNQUOTE

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

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58

197

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

58a

6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

FE 00 RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 1354A 24/0441Z

Info 0 240425Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

20419

SS TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3505

G INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2053 155 APR 23 PM 11 52

SP STATE GRNC

IMMEDIATE

SAH ~~TOP SECRET~~

L

NSC APRIL 24

DECLASSIFIED

INR CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Authority State 10-10-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 1-23-80

RMR REFERENCE: DEPTTEL 2394

FONMIN SIGNED NOTE TO AMB TODAY CONTAINING EXACT TEXT WE PROPOSED FOR GVN REQUEST TO USG RE SEA SURVEILLANCE. AMBASSADOR'S NOTE IN REPLY CONTAINING US GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE REQUESTED WILL BE SENT TODAY.

FONOFF INTENDS TO PREPARE SIMULTANEOUSLY CIRCULAR NOTE (CONTAINING EXACT TEXT APPROVED BY DEPTTEL 2352) FOR CIRCULATION TO COUNTRIES WITH WHICH GVN MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, GVN DECREE PROVIDING LEGAL GROUND FOR ACTIONS COVERED BY PARA 2 OF CIRCULAR NOTE, AS SUGGESTED IN DEPTTEL 2280, AND PUBLIC COMMUNIQUE. FONOFF HOPES ACCOMPLISH ALL THESE TODAY. WE WILL FORWARD TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

URGE NO ANNOUNCEMENT BE MADE IN WASHINGTON AND NO FURTHER NAVAL ACTIONS TAKE PLACE UNTIL WE CONFIRM NOTES EXCHANGED AND GVN HAS MADE NECESSARY ANNOUNCEMENTS HERE. TAYLOR

BT
CFW 2352 GVN GVN 2 2280 NO GVN

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 11:55 P.M. APRIL 23
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 12:01 A.M. APRIL 24

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27076

A539/23/JCS276
PHB606VV PAF944
PP RUEKDA RUEPCR
DE RUHKA 2718 23/0415Z
P R 230423Z
FM CINCPAC
TO RUEADK/CINCSTRIKE
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUHKR/CINCUSARPAC
RUEPCR/DA
RUECCR/COMSTS
BT

S

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

423 13 59Z

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By ip, NARS, Date 4-5-78

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY BRIGADE TO RVN TO REPLACE 173D ABN BDE (S)

- A. JCS 009012/140051Z
- B. CINCSTRIKE 410/65/142250Z
- C. COMUSMACV 12609/181314Z
- D. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-PL 7519/172112Z (NOTAL)
- E. HONOLULU CONFERENCE OF 19-20 APR

1. REF A DIRECTS CINCPAC TO DEPLOY 173D ABN BDE AND NECESSARY SUPPORT ELEMENTS TO BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU AREA, DIRECTS CINCSTRIKE TO PROVIDE CONUS REPLACEMENT BRIGADE AND AUTHORIZES DIRECT COORDIN-

INFO: CJCS-1(1) DJS-3(2-4) SJCS-1(5) J1-1(6) J3-8(7-14) J4-2(15-16)
J5-2(17-18) SACSA-5(19-23) NMCC-2(24-25) SAMAA-1(26)
SECDEF-5(27-31) ASD/ISA-9(32-40) ASD/PA-1(41) DIA-4(42-45)
WHITEHOUSE-3(46-48) STATE-1(49) CNO-2(50-51) CSAF-2(52-53)
CMC-5(54-58) FILE-1(59)SO/J

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ATION. REF B FURNISHES CINCSRIKE PROPOSED BRIGADE ORGANIZATION AND REQUESTS CINCPAC TO IDENTIFY REQUIRED SUPPORT ELEMENTS, SPECIFY DESIRED TRANSPORT MODE AND COMMENT ON PROPOSED ORGANIZATION. REFS C AND D PROVIDED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE IN DISCUSSIONS DURING CONDUCT OF REF E. THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO REF B.

2. CURRENT PLAN FOR MOVEMENT OF CONUS ARMY BRIGADE FOLLOWS:

A. DEPLOYMENT OF BRIGADE IS CONTINGENT UPON COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR AND DEPLOYMENT OF 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE TO BEIN HOOA/VUNG TAU AREA.

B. DEPLOYMENT BY SURFACE MEANS SHOULD COMMENCE SO AS TO CLOSE CONUS BRIGADE IN RVN WITHIN 60 DAYS OF EXECUTE ORDER FOR MOVEMENT OF 173 ABN BDE.

C. AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE ORGANIZATION, SHOWN IN PARA 3 BELOW, IS PREFERRED BECAUSE OF ITS ADDED PARACHUTE-ASSAULT CAPABILITY. A NON-AIRBORNE INFANTRY BRIGADE ORGANIZED AS PROPOSED IN REF B IS ACCEPTABLE. SUPPORT ELEMENTS ARE IDENTIFIED IN PARA 4. THIS MSG.

D. AN ADVANCE PARTY OF CONUS BRIGADE SHOULD MOVE BY AIR TO RVN AFTER CLOSURE OF 173D ABN BDE TO COORDINATE RELIEF OF 173D. COMUSMACV WILL ADVISE CINCSRIKE INFO CINCPAC, DESIRED DATE FOR ARRIVAL OF ADVANCE PARTY.

E. WITH CINCSRIKE CONCURRENCE, CINCARSTRIKE AND CINCSARPAC WILL EFFECT DIRECT COORDINATION TO DETERMINE FEASIBILITY, EXTEND AND DETAILS OF EXCHANGE OF COMPATIBLE EQUIPMENT BETWEEN CONUS BRIGADE AND 173D ABN BDE UPON RELIEF OF 173D. ANTICIPATE CONUS BRIGADE WILL DEPLOY WITH FULL TOE. DOUBLE HANDLING COULD BE AVOIDED FOR SOME HEAVY ITEMS SUCH AS VEHICLES, HOWITZERS AND ENGINEER EQUIPMENT IF CONUS BRIGADE UNITS FELL IN ON 173D EQUIPMENT DURING RELIEF. AND CONUS BRIGADE SURFACE TRANSPORT WAS LOADED TO ACCOMODATE EXPEDITIOUS EXCHANGE.

F. EARLY DESIGNATION OF CONUS BRIGADE CAN PROVIDE TIME FOR ORIENTATION, AREA AND SITUATION STUDY BY SELECTED UNIT PERSONNEL WITHOUT COMPROMISE OF INFORMATION. THIS PREPARATION IS CONSIDERED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO A CONTINUITY OF U.S. EFFECTIVENESS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE III CORPS AREA IN RVN.

G. CONUS BDE ACCOMPANYING SUPPLIES SHOULD INCLUDE 5 DAYS OF CLI&V.

3. THE PREFERRED AIRBORNE BRIGADE ORGANIZATION IS SHOWN BELOW. IN EVENT AN INFANTRY BRIGADE, WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE, IS DEPLOYED ITS ORGANIZATION SHOULD PARALLEL THAT SHOWN FOR THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE:

UNIT	TOE	APPROX STRENGTH
A. BDE, HQ, & HQ CO, ABN	57-042E	167
B. 3 INF BNS, ABN	7-035E	2,454

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C. 1 FA BN, ABN (105 TWD)	6-215E	450
D. 1 CAV TRP, ABN	17-077E	142
E. 1 ENGR CO, CBT, ABN	5-027E	143
F. 1 MP PLT, ABN	19-067E	40
G. SIGNAL PLT, FWD AREA SIG CEN	11-218E	26
H. AVN DET (AVN BN)	1-055E	55
I. CHEM DET, CBR ABN TM JA	3-500E	5
J. MIL INTEL DET, ABN BDE	30-014E	32
K. ASA DET, ABN BDE	32-057F	48
L. PROV SPT BN (NOTE 1)	29-105E	630
	TOTAL	4,192.

NOTE 1: ORG TO INCLUDE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF DIV SPT COMD (I.E., PROV ADMIN DET, MED CO, SUP-TRANS CO, AND MAINT CO) TO BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING FIELD MAINTENANCE DUPPORT FOR ALL BDE ORGANIC EQUIP.

4. SUPPORT ELEMENTS ARE DIVIDED INTO DIVISIONAL AND NON DIVISIONAL UNITS:

A. DIVISIONAL SUPPORT: A BRIGADE SLICE OF THE NORMAL DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND ORGANIZED IN A PROVISIONAL SUPPORT BATTALION AS SHOWN IN NOTE 1 TO PARA 3 ABOVE IS APPROPRIATE.

B. NON DIVISIONAL SUPPORT: LOGISTIC SUPPORT UNITS FOR BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU INCLUDED IN PACKAGE A AND B DEVELOPED DURING HONOLULU CONFERENCE 9-11 APR AND FURNISHED CINCSTRIKE BY CINCPAC LTR 000137 OF 14 APR ARE ADEQUATE. ARRIVAL OF THESE UNITS IN VIENTAM IS CURRENTLY EXPECTED TO PRECEDE CONUS BRIGADE ARRIVAL BY SEVERAL WEEKS.

5. SUMMARY:

A. A THREE BATTALION CONUS ARMY BRIGADE SHOULD MOVE BY SURFACE SO AS TO CLOSE IN RVN 60 DAYSS FOLLOWING THE EXECUTE ORDER FOR DEPLOYMENT OF 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE.

B. ADVANCE PARTY ARRIVE IN RVN TO COORDINATE RELIEF. COMUSMACV WILL ADVISE CINCSTRIKE OF DESIRED ARRIVAL DATE FOR ADVANCE PARTY.

C. AIRBORNE BRIGADE IS PREFERRED; INFANTRY BRIGADE IS ACCEPTABLE. STRENGTH WILL APPROXIMATE 4000.

D. DIVISIONAL AND NON DIVISIONAL SUPPORT ELEMENTS ARE REQUIRED. UNITS ARE IDENTIFIED IN PARA 4.

E. PREPARATION OF UNIT PERSONNEL FOR MISSION TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WITHOUT COMPROMISE IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL.

GP-4

BT

REFS: B IS 15909
C IS 20665
D NOT IDENTIFIED

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

60a

Mr. President 2

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Action CONTROL: 20562
RECEIVED: APRIL 24, 1965, 5:57 AM
Info FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 3511, IMMEDIATE
DATE: APRIL 24,

The guts of this is on page 3.

DECLASSIFIED
STATE letter MAR 5 1979

Authority By *if*, NARS, Date 6-28-79

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EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY RUSK FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

N O D I S
DEPTEL 2397.

attached

this page describes his presentation of my which you already know

ALEX JOHNSON AND I CALLED ON QUAT THIS MORNING 24 APRIL TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL.

I LED OFF BY INFORMING THE PRIME MINISTER THAT I HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO RAISE IN MORE SPECIFIC TERMS SOME OF THE MATTERS DISCUSSED AT THE RECENT HONOLULU CONFERENCE. THE PRIMARY SUBJECT WHICH I WANTED TO TALK ABOUT WAS THE OLD QUESTION OF SHORTAGE OF TRAINED MANPOWER DURING THE COMING MONTHS AND WAYS AND MEANS OF OFFSETTING THIS DEFICIENCY.

I STRESSED THE FACT THAT OUR JCS, IN COLLABORATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND HIS STAFF, HAD REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES BEYOND THE PRESENTLY APPROVED MOBILIZATION SCHEDULE WHICH GENERATES 31 ADDITIONAL ARVN BATTALIONS BETWEEN JULY 1965 AND MARCH 1966. EVEN IF THIS SCHEDULE IS KEPT (AND WE ALL KNOW THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED HEREIN), THE RESULTING GROUND FORCES WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO OFFSELE THE RISE IN VIET CONG STRENGTH WHICH WE CONSIDER POSSIBLE. WE BELIEVE THAT ADDED FORCES ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT AGAINST VIET CONG SURPRISES WHICH MAY EVEN NOW BE IN PREPARATION; TO GIVE ADDED SECURITY TO SUCH PLACES AS BIEN HOA AND THE NEW AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION AT CHU LAI; AND TO INCREASE THE FORCES IN GENERAL RESERVE WHICH, BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO REINFORCE BINH DINH PROVINCE, HAVE NOW BEEN REDUCED TO ABOUT FOUR BATTALIONS. BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THERE IS THE OVERALL NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES TO CONVINCHE HANOI OF THE

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-2- SAIGON 3511, April 24.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ULTIMATE VICTORY WITHIN SVN AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE STRUGGLE WITH THE VIET CONG WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO DRAG OUT INTERMINABLY. FOR ALL THESE PURPOSES, THE JCS CONSIDER THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO REINFORCE THE GVN GROUND FORCES WITH ABOUT 20 OR MORE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

THE U.S. EMBASSY ACCEPTS THE VALIDITY OF THIS REASONING, I SAID, AND NOW WISHES TO CONSIDER HOW TO OBTAIN THESE ADDITIONAL FORCES. IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO INCREASE THE NATIONAL MOBILIZATION EFFORT TO THE MAXIMUM, BUT FOR VARIOUS REASONS, WE DOUBT THAT MUCH CAN BE DONE BEYOND THE 31 BATTALION PROGRAM. HENCE, WE SEE NO WAY OF GENERATING THE NECESSARY FORCES EXCEPT BY AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, TO WHICH THE U.S. AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WOULD CONTRIBUTE. FOR OUR PART, WE COULD CONCEIVE OF AT LEAST DOUBLING OUR CONTRIBUTION WHICH NOW AMOUNTS TO WELL OVER 30,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL. AS AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE FIGURE, WE MIGHT CONSIDER BRINGING IN AROUND NINE BATTALIONS WITH NECESSARY LOGISTICAL TROOPS FOR A TOTAL OF OVER 40,000 ADDITIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL. WE WOULD HOPE TO GET ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES AMOUNTING TO PERHAPS FORU BATTALION EQUIVALENTS. WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO SUCH A SUGGESTION AS MIGHT ALSO NEW ZEALAND, KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES. IN COMBINATION, AN INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF ABOUT 12-13 BATTALIONS, BECAUSE OF THEIR SIZE IN COMPARISON WITH THOSE OF GVN, WOULD APPROXIMATE THE INCREASE FELT NECESSARY BY THE JCS.

this is more of his instructions

AS TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE TROOPS, I EXPLAINED THAT THEY COULD BE INITIALLY USED GENERALLY ON THE MODEL OF THE MARINES AT DANANG. THEY COULD SECURE SUCH SENSITIVE POINTS AS CHU LAI, QUI NHON AND BIEN HOA AND SERVE AS RESERVE STRIKE FORCES, PERHAPS IN AN INTENATIONAL CONFIGURATION, IN REGIONS SUCH AS DANANG AND BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU. THEY COULD BE INTRODUCED IN BOUT A MONTH AND A HALF, TO TWO MONTH.

THE FOREGGING WERE PRESENTED AS THE EMBASSY'S VIEWS BASED UPON THE DISCUSSIONS IN HONOLULU. I INDICATED I WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A RECOMMENDATION ALONG THESE LINES TO MY GOVERNMENT IF THE CONCEPT APPEALED TO THE PRIME MINISTER. WOULD HE CARE TO COMMENT?

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 3511, April 24.

PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE GROUND WORK WE HAD LAID IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF THIS SUBJECT, QUAT RECEIVED THE FOREGOING EXPOSE CALMLY AND IN COMPLETE RELAXATION. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING IN PRINCIPLE THE NEED FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE INTERNATIONAL FORCES. HE WAS NOT, HOWEVER, SATISFIED WITH THE NATIONAL EFFORT AND HOPED THAT IT COULD BE IMPROVED. HE WOULD DISCUSS OVER THE WEEKEND WITH GENERALS THIEU AND MINH BOTH THE NATIONAL EFFORT AND THE PROPOSAL TO INTRODUCE FOREIGN FORCES. THEREAFTER, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A SECOND MEETING WITH US EARLY NEXT WEEK, AT WHICH TIME HE WOULD GIVE US A FINAL ANSWER.

I REMINDED HIM OF THE NEED TO OBSERVE TIGHT SECRECY IN DEALING WITH THIS MATTER AND TO HOLD TO A MINIMUM THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS INFORMED. IF THIS MATTER SHOULD LEAK PREMATURELY, I POINTED OUT, IT WOULD RUIN EVERYTHING. QUAT EXPRESSED HIMSELF IN COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING.

COMMENT: QUAT'S INITIAL RECEPTION OF THIS PACKAGE WAS MORE FAVORABLE AND MORE FORTHCOMING THAN ALEX JOHNSON AND I HAD ANTICIPATED. I THINK IT IMPORTANT NOT TO PUSH HIM TOO FAST AND TO ALLOW HIM AMPLE TIME TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER WHICH IS OF SUCH CAPITAL IMPORTANCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. I WOULD RECOMMEND NO FURTHER DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT UNTIL WE HAVE HAD OUR NEXT MEETING HERE.

SUGGEST DEPARTMENT INFORM CINCPAC.

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~