

22

242

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

22a

5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

OO RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 1137A 22/0730Z

SS

O 220714Z ZEA

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

021438

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3845

INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2235

STATE GRNC

BT

1965 MAY 22 AM 3 31

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 22

E X D I S

REF A) DEPTTEL 2633; B) EMBTEL 3678; C) DEPTTEL 2576; D) EMBTEL 3819

IN ROUND-UP OF MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS WITH QUAT THIS MORNING, HE INFORMED ME THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OVER NIGHT IN WAKE OF THURSDAY'S ATTEMPTED COUP. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS CONTINUES AND APPARENTLY HAS TURNED UP NO NEW MATTERS.

I MENTIONED MATTER OF ARMY BRIGADE WHICH IS TO CLOSE IN QUI NHON-NHA TRANG AREA ABOUT 12 JULY (REF A). AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN PERMISSION TO INTRODUCTION OF THIS BRIGADE, IT WAS ONLY NECESSARY TO TELL HIM GENERAL TIMING AND MENTION EVENTUAL NEED OF AN APPROPRIATE PRESS RELEASE. HE WAS AGREEABLE ON ALL POINTS.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1137A ~~TOP SECRET~~

I MENTIONED MY IMPENDING TRIP TO WASHINGTON AT END OF MONTH, USING IT AS DEVICE TO RAISE NEED OF DISCUSSIONS OF POLITICAL ITEMS CONTAINED IN LIST OF QUESTIONS GIVEN HIM (REF B).

I TOLD HIM THAT UNDOUBTEDLY MANY OF THESE MATTERS WOULD COME UP DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON AND OUR LEADERS WOULD BE ANXIOUS TO HAVE SOME INDICATION OF HIS THINKING. HE AGREED WITH IMPORTANCE OF THIS MATTER AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PROPOSE MEETING WITH US EARLY NEXT WEEK.

WITH REGARD TO USE OF GENERAL KHANH AS MISSIONARY IN LATIN AMERICA (REF C), HE IS NOT INCLINED PRESENTLY TO ENCOURAGE KHANH TO VISIBLE OR AUDIBLE ACTIVITIES. HE IS QUITE PLEASED WITH HIS SUCCESS IN QUIETING DOWN GENERALS AT HOME AND IS ANXIOUS TO DO NOTHING WHICH MAY STIR THEM UP. HE FEELS THAT ANY SPOT-LIGHT ON GENERAL KHANH AT THIS TIME WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW. I REMINDED HIM THAT KHANH BUSY MIGHT POSE FEWER PROBLEMS THAN KHANH IDLE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 23435
By *plw/ky* NARA, Date 4-4-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3845, MAY 22, FROM SAIGON

I MENTIONED APPARENT NEED FOR PROMULGATION OF ARREST AND DETENTION DECREE (REF D). HE APPEARED VAGUE AS TO ITS CURRENT STATUS BUT PROMISED TO LOOK INTO MATTER AND MOVE IT.

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1137 ~~TOP SECRET~~
QUAT INDICATED THAT LONG PREDICTED CABINET CHANGES ARE ABOUT TO BE MADE. HE HOPES TO HAVE CABINET MEETING TODAY WITH CHIEF OF STATE SUU PRESENT AND TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE CHANGES SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HE SAID THAT ALL ARRANGEMENTS WERE FIRM EXCEPT FOR FILLING OF ONE POST BUT DID NOT VOLUNTEER FURTHER INFO.

TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:37 A.M. MAY 22, 1965

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 5/22/65 - 3:54 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

23

243

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

23a

6

~~TOP SECRET~~

022206Z

Action

PP RUEHCR RUEHEX RUEKDA
DE RUMJIR 1170A 24/0925Z

1965 MAY 24 AM 5 42

SS

P 240905Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

Info

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3855

INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC

RUEHEX/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC 403

RUHKA/CINCPAC PRIORITY 2242

STATE GRNC

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 24

*F
S*

E X D I S

- REF : A. JCS TO CINCPAC 122 DTG 201806Z.
- B. MACV PAPER ON COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.
- C. DEPIEL 2635.

BECAUSE OF THE MANY POLITICAL ASPECTS TO THE SENSITIVE MATTER OF US/GVN MILITARY COMMAND RELATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ON SOME OF THE POINTS RAISED IN REF.

A. THE QUOTED PASSAGES ARE FROM REFERENCE A.

THE "SMALL COMBINED COORDINATING STAFF TO BE JOINTLY HEADED BY COMUSMACV AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF RVNAF" WOULD BE A USEFUL DEVICE FOR MILITARY COORDINATION AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE. IT SHOULD NOT BE PRESSED, HOWEVER, IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE WHICH HAS BEEN RENDERED UNFAVORABLE TO EVEN SO MODERATE A PROPOSAL BY PRESS EXCITEMENT OVER RUMORS OF IMPENDING JOINT COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. JOINT COMMAND TO THE PUBLIC HERE MEANS SUBORDINATION OF VIETNAMESE FORCES TO U.S. COMMAND AND IS OBNOXIOUS TO NATIONAL PRIDE. WE HAVE DENIED THESE RUMORS BUT SUSPICIONS PERSIST.

WHILE NO ONE CAN REASONABLY OBJECT TO PLANNING WITH RESPECT TO ANY PROBLEM, I MUST SAY THAT WE ARE FAR FROM READY TO PROPOSE TO GVN ANYTHING LIKE A "PLAN FOR A MORE FORMAL COMBINED COMMAND AUTHORITY WHICH WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED UPON THE INTRODUCTION OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL U.S. COMBAT TROOPS". IF MACV IS INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE SUCH A PLAN, IT WILL HAVE TO BE DRAWN WITHOUT GVN PARTICIPATION AND HENCE WILL NECESSARILY HAVE LIMITED VALUE. IF USG INTENDS TO TAKE POSITION THAT U.S. COMMAND OF GVN FORCES IS A PREREQUISITE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF MORE U.S. COMBAT TROOPS, THAT FACT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ADDITIONAL STRONG REASON FOR RECOMMENDING AGAINST BRINGING IN THE RE-INFORCEMENTS.

state 11-24-80
By DCB/lsp NARS, Date 1-6-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3855, May 24 from Saigon

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMBINED FIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS WHEN THE U.S. IX CORPS HEADQUARTERS DEPLOYS TO SVN IS AMPLY JUSTIFIED BY THE NEED TO CONTROL U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES IN THE NORTHERN COMBAT ZONE. THE INCORPORATION OF "ASSIGNED ARVN GROUND FORCES" AND THE COORDINATION OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS OF OTHER ARVN FORCES IN THE AREA" BY THIS U.S. HEADQUARTERS IS QUITE ANOTHER MATTER WHICH RAISES FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS AS TO WHO IS GOING TO RUN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY ON THE GROUND. IF THE ANSWER IS THAT THE U.S. WILL PROVIDE THE DIRECTION, THIS IS A HIGH LEVEL DECISION TO BE TAKEN IN FULL COGNIZANCE OF ITS EFFECT ON THE FULL RANGE OF US/GVN RELATIONSHIPS. IT SHOULD NOT BE REPEATED NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH RVNAF UNTIL USG APPROVAL IS OBTAINED--THEN THE APPROACH SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL.

GP-3. TAYLOR
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 6 a.m. May 24, 1965

Passed CIA at 6:20 a.m. May 24, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~

24

244

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

24a

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

RWN MJA801JIA927

P

PP RUEHCR

DE RUMJIR 1310A 26/0825Z

Info

P 260313Z ZEA

SS

FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)

G

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY [3839]

SP

INFO REGHLHQ/CINCPAC PRIORITY 2258

SAH

STATE GRNC

L

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 26

H

FOR GREENFIELD FROM ZORTHIAN

FE

NSC

PASS USIA FOR MOORE AND DOD FOR SYLVESTER

INR

NSA

RMR

YOU ARE UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE THAT USE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS BEGAN ON 15 MAY AND HAS OCCURRED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS SINCE THEN. WE INITIALLY HELD UP ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS ACTION IN ORDER TO PRESERVE SURPRISE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT AT THIS POINT THERE HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT INCIDENCIES OF USE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE TO ELIMINATE THIS ELEMENT AND TO JUSTIFY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS TYPE OF ACTION. NORMALLY, WE WOULD NOT REFER QUESTION OF

024460

1965 MAY 26 AM 5 04

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By *ip*, NARS, Date 4-5-78

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1310A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AUTHORIZATION FOR SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT TO CINCPAC OR WASHINGTON BUT QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED THROUGH CINCPAC CHANNELS IN THIS CASE BECAUSE OF SEVENTH FLEET INVOLVEMENT. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT DOD'S POSITION AT THIS POINT IS THAT ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD NOT BE MADE HERE. INSTEAD, USE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE IN SUPPORT WILL BE COVERED IN DEEP BACKGROUNDER HELD FRIDAY EVENING IN WASHINGTON.

BELIEVE THIS APPROACH CREATES NUMBER OF PROBLEMS. IN FIRST PLACE, OUR ANNOUNCEMENT HERE WOULD BE PRESENTED IN FRAMEWORK OF UTILIZATION OF ADDITIONAL TYPE OF ARMAMENT AND NOT AS A MAJOR NEW DEPARTURE IN U.S. COMBAT INVOLVEMENT. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO ANNOUNCE THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF MACV DAILY PRESS RELEASES. THIS TYPE OF APPROACH WOULD GET SOME HEADLINES BUT WOULD, I BELIEVE, DRAW LESS ATTENTION TO IT. WASHINGTON RELEASE OF INFORMATION MAY HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT BY INDICATING THAT WE CONSIDER IT IS SIGNIFICANT NEW ASPECT OF CONFLICT HERE.

SECONDLY, BELIEVE THAT DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT IN DEEP BACKGROUNDER WHICH WILL INEVITABLY FIND ITS WAY INTO PRINT WILL CREATE UNNECESSARY IRRITATION TO SAIGON BASED CORRESPONDENTS WHO WILL FEEL AGAIN THAT NEWS OF ON-THE-SCENE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IS BEING RELEASED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 3889, MAY 26, FROM SAIGON

WASHINGTON RATHER THAN SAIGON WHERE IT LEGITIMATELY BELONGS.

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1310A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IN SUM, RECOMMEND STRONGLY THAT BEST HANDLING OF SUBJECT WOULD
BE LOW-KEY LOCAL ANNOUNCEMENT TO GET IT ON RECORD. SUCH
ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE FOLLOWED UP BY WHATEVER BACKGROUNDERS AND
EXPLANATIONS ARE DESIRED IN WASHINGTON.

REQUEST YOU REVIEW MATTER URGENTLY AND ADVISE AS QUICKLY AS POS-
SIBLE ON THIS PROPOSED APPROACH SINCE AT LEAST ONE CORRESPONDENT IS
ALREADY AWARE OF STORY AND PROPOSES TO WRITE ABOUT IT WITHIN NEXT
DAY OR SO.

GP-4. TAYLOR.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 5:15 AM 5/26/65
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 5:30 AM 5/26/65
PASSED USIA AT 5:20 AM 5/26/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25

245

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25a


~~SECRET~~

May 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bundy

Following information received by telephone from CIA.

Photos from a recent recon flight indicate a third missile site around the Hanoi area. This one is approximately 13 miles East Southeast of the city.



Arthur McCafferty

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA, 3/23/77, O5D 5/24/77

By MIE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

~~SECRET~~

return
Wednesday, May 26, 7:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Air Strikes in North Vietnam

25b

1. Sixteen US Air Force F-105 aircraft attempted to attack Hoai An Ammunition Depot last night. The target area was obscured by weather and the strike aircraft were diverted to the Hon Matt Radar Site and to the Vinh Fuel Storage Area. Extensive damage was inflicted to the radar site, and four buildings were destroyed in the Vinh Fuel Complex. No enemy aircraft were sighted and all aircraft returned safely.

2. The Phu Van Supply Depot was attacked by four U.S. Navy aircraft yesterday. Reported results indicate seven buildings destroyed and nine damaged. All aircraft returned undamaged.

3. Preliminary information of armed reconnaissance missions flown last night by U.S. Navy aircraft revealed sightings of three heavily camouflaged PT type boats near the bank of a river near Thanh Hoa. Two 250 pound bombs were dropped but no hits were scored. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was reported. One U.S. aircraft was damaged but all aircraft returned safely. A special strike of nine A-4 aircraft were launched and inflicted damage to three PT type boats. At the present time, 6 U.S. Navy aircraft are being launched to further exploit this target.

White House Situation Room

Arthur M. Cafferty
Briefing Officer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *OSD 12 2/24/77*
By *MJE* NARS, Date *4/12/78*

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

14863

~~SECRET~~ VERBATIM TEXT

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CONFIDENTIAL
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

84

Origin ACTION: Anembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2702

Info. INFO: CINCPAC

May 26 3 49 PM '65

SS JOINT STATE-DEFENSE-USIA MESSAGE

G Ref Embtel 3820

SE Believe press handling wider combat mission for US forces will be
SAB more effective if we anticipate questions rather than wait to reply to
TE them. If you perceive no objections and GVN willing and able suggest
USIA you consider proceeding as follows:

NSC (1) GVN would lead off with brief comment on this question. We
INR would envisage GVN official, preferably civilian, making statement at
CIA regular briefing (perhaps in response to induced question on mission of
NSA recently arrived US combat troops) which would follow these lines:

QUOTE As you are well aware, my government requested the presence
of US combat forces. The USMC III Amphibious force and the US Army
173rd Airborne are here in response to that request to assist primarily
in the defense of certain key installations and to provide combat support
own in those areas such combat
to our/forces/if we request it. support would be provided in full
coordination with the appropriate RVNAF commanders. UNQUOTE

(2) If you consider it necessary GVN statement could be followed by
Mission spokesman statement on background along lines of ref Embtel.

Classified by: 5/25/65
Authority/FE:LUnger:gm
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: P - William J. Jordan

DD/PA - Cdr. Thomas (subs.) USIA - Mr. Tull
(in subs)

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~~SECRET~~

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Authority State 11-2-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 1-29-80

FORM 8-63 08-122

~~SECRET~~

If questioned in detail as to command relationships it should be stated that QUOTE the details of this coordination are being worked out. UNQUOTE. ^{said}
Re Embtel 3858 believe this is all that should be ~~work~~ on command relationships for the present.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

27

247

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

15177

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~ VERBATIM TEXT

27a

82
Origin
55
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON 2707 IMMEDIATE
INFO: CINCPAC

May 26 6 03 PM '65

EXDIS

SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV EXDIS

Ref: A. Saigon's 3776/ and B. CINCPAC 182230Z May

Recognize Market Time operations are another form of US assistance

to RVN and there is necessity for clear demonstration that we are in fact assisting and not commanding. Reftel B indicates CINCPAC's desire retain current guidance for Market Time operations. His reluctance to change shared by elements here. Believe amendment para 2 of guidance along following lines will satisfy problem of ship commander and at same time clearly demonstrate that we are in fact as well as name assisting GVN.

QUOTE Every effort will be made to assign GVN reps to all US ships operating in GVN territorial waters or in the contiguous zone to a distance of 12 miles, and to the degree feasible to ships operating in international waters beyond the 12 mile zone, to assist the commanding officer in the conduct of Market Time operations. The GVN rep, when aboard, will physically lead boarding and search parties as the representative of GVN and will be responsible for determining, in consultation with US ship commanders, whether a boat or ship which has been searched has violated or is preparing to violate the laws of the RVN or there are sufficient grounds for believing this has occurred. The GVN rep will recommend to the US

Drafted by: FE:JRDcleland;hjh 5/26/65
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - Leonard Unger

Clearances: DOD/ISA Adm. Blouin (Jt Staff-Brig. Gen. Reeves) L/FE - Mr. Salans (subs.)
S/S - Mr. Bartley

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DECLASSIFIED ~~TOP SECRET~~

FORM 8-63 DS-322 Authority: State Dec 11-24-80
By: [Signature] NARA, Date 4-4-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

ship commanders whether the boat should be detained or permitted to proceed on its way. Final determination as to detention will rest with US ship commanders. The presence of GVN reps aboard US ships in no way modifies the absolute authority and responsibility of commanding officers in the exercise of command over their ships. UNQUOTE.

Request your comments on above proposed amendment.

GP-2

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

28

248

28a

~~TOP SECRET~~

2265

27 May 1965

✓ Brandy

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

As we discussed over the phone, I should like to have prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate appraising the probable and possible Red Chinese, Soviet and North Vietnamese reactions to the military operations proposed in the attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Signed

Robert S. McNamara

Vietnam 381

Attachment JCSM-415-65 X2273

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES
Series B

Sec Def Cont No. X - 2910

29 May 65

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD H 9/7/77
By MTE, NARS, Date 4/12/78



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28b

JCSM-415-65
8 7 MAY 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U)

1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the introduction of an offensive bomber (IL-28) capability into North Vietnam adds a new dimension to the situation in Southeast Asia for it gives the DRV a markedly greater capability to undertake offensive air action against US forces and against all targets in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. (TS) Although the offensive bomber aircraft introduced are few in number, the threat they pose is significant when the potential targets, such as the airfield at Da Nang, are considered. As an example, an attack against the crowded Da Nang air base by the MIGs/IL-28s based at Phuc Yen, possibly staging through bases in southern North Vietnam, could destroy or damage on the order of 100 - 150 aircraft or cause up to 500 - 600 US casualties. Even though the enemy capability is limited, targets as far south as Saigon, as indicated in Annex B, could be struck. Such attacks, if successful, would enhance the communist cause, damage US prestige, make the achievement of US objectives more difficult, and render it difficult to explain why timely action was not taken by US political and military leaders to remove the threat of which we were well aware. Moreover, a failure to act could connote a weakening of US resolve to fulfill its commitment to defend Southeast Asia in the face of support of the DRV from the USSR. Conversely, US air attacks to eliminate MIG/IL-28 aircraft and SA-2 capabilities could cause intensification of domestic and foreign political controversy on US policy with respect to Southeast Asia, might tend to solidify USSR support for the DRV, could push the CHICOMs to more direct and overt support of the DRV, and thus would accelerate the extent of the US commitment to Southeast Asia.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

SENSITIVE

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

Copy 15 of 21 Copies each
of 3 pages series "B"

See DDF Form No. 2893

* SANITIZED
Authority NSJ 09-319 + JCS 16 2-23-77
By RL/g NARA Date 4-9-14 (12/08)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

3. ~~(TS)~~ Your memorandum of 19 April expressed the desire that you be kept informed of the readiness status of the surface-to-air missile (SAM) site 15 miles southeast of Hanoi. Within the past week, this site has attained a state of readiness whereby it can become operational at any time. If not neutralized, this SAM site, estimated to be the first of four-five (three sites are now identified) in an arc protecting the Hanoi-Haiphong complex, will become a threat to ROLLING THUNDER and US reconnaissance operations. The arc, if completed, would pose a serious threat to all air operations in an area approximately 80 x 125 miles around Hanoi. Of immediate impact is the denial of or risk to TROJAN HORSE flights and the intelligence which emanates from that photography, such as air order of battle, logistics information, and troop activities. Additional treatment of this matter is provided in Annex B.

4. ~~(TS)~~ Operational plans for neutralizing and eliminating these threats have been carefully developed. They provide for a night low-level B-52 attack, below the minimum altitude of the SA-2 capability, against Phuc Yen airfield. This attack would be followed the next morning by armed reconnaissance against airfields in the Hanoi/Haiphong area for the purposes of (a) eliminating any military aircraft which may have been flushed and dispersed to other airfields prior to the Phuc Yen attack and (b) completing the task of destruction at Phuc Yen itself if required. Simultaneous elimination of POL storage at these airfields should discourage, or substantially delay, deployment of additional combat aircraft to bases in the DRV. During daylight hours, immediately prior to the SAC night attack on Phuc Yen, or concurrent with the armed reconnaissance attacks the following morning, PACOM tactical aircraft would conduct an attack on the SAM site southeast of Hanoi. Briefs of the attack plans are contained in Annexes C, D, and E.

5. ~~(TS)~~ Loss rates in executing the aforementioned attacks should not exceed those experienced to date in ROLLING THUNDER operations, while continued US air operations northward, without eliminating the DRV MIG/SAM capabilities, will undoubtedly result in higher losses than we are now sustaining. The military advantages of eliminating the growing MIG/IL-28 threat to installations and forces in Southeast Asia are obvious.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

6. ~~(TS)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the neutralization and elimination of the IL-28/MIG threat and the SAM sites to be a matter of military urgency.

7. ~~(TS)~~ Regarding timing of the attacks against this threat, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it may be progressively more difficult to secure approval for such actions should there be evidence of increasing Soviet involvement in improving these DRV military capabilities. Thus far, the USSR has not committed itself in North Vietnam to the extent it did when IL-28s and IR/MRBMs were introduced into Cuba. Action should be taken prior to a more extensive and direct commitment of the Soviets to the overt defense of the DRV.

8. ~~(TS)~~ In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the political factors and policy considerations which might weigh against the US course of action discussed herein. They believe, however, that in this instance military considerations are clearly overriding and that the proposed air operations against the IL-28/MIG threat and the SAM site should be approved now in order to permit timely action. Accordingly, they recommend that you authorize dispatch of the message in Annex A.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

SECRET

ANNEX A

DRAFT

IMMEDIATE

FROM: JCS

Distribution

TO: CINCPAC
CINCSAC

SAC 221540Z
is
JCS IN 72596

SECDEF
CJCS
DJS
SJCS
J-3
NMCC
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC

INFO: CINCUSARPAC
CINCPACFLT
CINCPACAF
COMUSMACV
WHITE HOUSE
STATE DEPARTMENT
AMEMB SAIGON
AMEMB BANGKOK
AMEMB VIENTIANE
CIA
DIA/ZEN
NSA
ANMCC
NECPA
NEACP

CINCPAC 230353Z
is
JCS IN 73101
CINCPAC 202118Z
is
JCS IN 69620

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS JCS

JCS send.

Subj: Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U)

Refs: a. SAC 221540Z May 1965; b. CINCPAC 202118Z May 1965;
c. CINCPAC 230353Z May 1965

1. ~~(TS)~~ This is an execute message. The nickname SPRING HIGH is assigned this operation. 1 2
2. ~~(TS)~~ Addressees are directed to conduct a coordinated attack at the earliest date operationally feasible to: 3 4
 - a. Neutralize/eliminate the Phuc Yen IL-28/MIG threat. 5
 - b. Destroy the SA-2 site SE of Hanoi. 6
 - c. Destroy any military aircraft which may have deployed to other airfields in NVN as well as POL storage associated with the major jet capable airfields in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. 7 8 9 10
3. ~~(TS)~~ FOR CINCSAC: Employing B-52s from Guam, conduct attack of Phuc Yen Airfield (JCS Target No. 6, [redacted]) in accordance with reference a to neutralize/eliminate the IL-28/MIG threat. 11 12 13 14

3.3
(6)(1)(5)

4. ~~(TS)~~ FOR CINCPAC:


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a. In accordance with reference b, destroy the control equipment and missiles of the SA-2 site southeast of Hanoi [redacted] in daylight, either immediately prior to the SAC attack on Phuc Yen or immediately following the SAC attack, at your discretion.

3.3
(b)
(1)(5)

b. Following the attack on Phuc Yen conduct armed reconnaissance, in accordance with paragraph 2, reference c, on the following airfields:

<u>TGT #</u>	<u>NAME</u>
3	Hanoi/Gia Lam
6	Phuc Yen
7	Hanoi/Bac Mai
8	Haiphong/Cat Bi
9	Haiphong/Kien An



3.3
(b)
(1)(5)

5. ~~(TS)~~ FOR BOTH:

a. Should weather or other factors delay the attack, execution will be delayed in 24-hour increments until it can be executed within the designated time interval. CINCPAC will make the decision to execute or defer, keeping the JCS informed.

b. The specific timing of SAC's attack will be as agreed by CINCSAC and CINCPAC.

c. Collateral damage will be held to a minimum.

d. Advise details of plans including timing, number of sorties, weapons loading, and expected damage level for all targets.

e. Pre-strike reconnaissance will consist of TROJAN HORSE and BLUE SPRINGS only. Concurrent and post-strike reconnaissance is authorized. If CINCPAC considers low-level reconnaissance essential to successful attack of the SAM site, request JCS be advised. GP-3.

WRITER:

Col. F. B. Howes, USAF, J-3
Extension 54807

ANNEX B

INTELLIGENCE

IMPLICATIONS

DRV AIRCRAFT

1. ~~(S)~~ Since 15 May 1965, there have been approximately 1
60 MIG 15/17 (FAGOT/FRESCO) jet fighter aircraft at Phuc Yen 2
airfield in North Vietnam, nearly doubling the force deployed 3
there in August 1964. There are no fighter aircraft 4
permanently based at other fields. Approximately 70 to 80 5
per cent of these aircraft can be expected to be in an in- 6
commission status. 7

2. ~~(S)~~ For about seven months after the original deploy- 8
ment, the North Vietnamese Air Force (DRVAF) was engaged in 9
training. Subsequently and prior to its augmentation, it had 10
on two occasions engaged US strike aircraft over North 11
Vietnam. On a number of other occasions, the force has 12
apparently reacted to US missions although no engagement 13
occurred. These actions indicated a progressively improving 14
state-of-readiness to engage in air defense operations. In 15
May 1965, the fighter force was augmented. Only on one known 16
occasion have any fighters been deployed temporarily to 17
another base (four aircraft to Haiphong/Cat Bi). New 18
construction has been noted at five other airfields (Hanoi/ 19
Gia Lam, Haiphong/Kien An, Kep, Haiphong/Cat Bi and Vinh), 20
including construction of some jet-associated revetments. 21
This could indicate further deployments, the intent to 22
disperse and/or provide for staging/recovery of aircraft 23
at these fields from missions which could not return to Phuc 24
Yen. 25

3. ~~(TS)~~ On 21 May 1965, three IL-28 (BEAGLE) jet light 26
bombers arrived at Phuc Yen from the USSR. Two additional 27
arrived later, for a present total of five. The arrival of 28

3.3
(b)(U)

jet light bombers introduces a new element in the DRV - an 1
 offensive bomber capability. Some Soviet BEAGLES have been 2
 equipped for ELINT collection and/or ECM missions; however, 3
 normally, the BEAGLE is [REDACTED] and is 4
 capable of day or night bombing or reconnaissance missions. 5
 The IL-28 aircraft in North Vietnam are believed to be bomber 6
 configured. It cannot be established from the evidence at 7
 hand whether the appearance of these aircraft in the DRV is 8
 only a further demonstration of Soviet assistance or whether 9
 the DRV intends to initiate bombing missions against the 10
 RVN/US forces and facilities. Training of DRV aircrews in 11
 the Soviet Union has been reported and it is estimated that 12
 the DRVAF is capable of conducting offensive operations. 13

DRV AIR DEFENSE AND OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES 14

4. ~~(S)~~ Defensive: MIG 15/17: From Phuc Yen, the 60 jet 15
 day fighters could engage in daylight clear weather air 16
 defense and combat air patrol missions over North Vietnam 17
 and the northern half of South Vietnam. 18

5. ~~(S)~~ Offensive: 19

a. IL-28: Should the DRV elect to initiate bombing 20
 raids against South Vietnam, these light bomber aircraft 21
 could attack targets in the northern half of South Vietnam. 22
 With a substantially reduced bomb load, one-way missions 23
 or by recovery at airfields in the southern part of the 24
 DRV or Cambodia, these attacks could be extended to Saigon 25
 or beyond. There have been no known instances of communist 26
 reconnaissance-configured IL-28s with tip tanks being 27
 used as bombers, but their radius of 670 NM would cover 28
 Saigon. 29

b. MIG - 15/17: The MIGs at Phuc Yen have a limited 30
 offensive capability over the northern half of South 31

Vietnam. Using a high-low-high penetration tactic, in a guns-only configuration, the MIGs would be able to strafe Da Nang and return to bases in the Hanoi-Haiphong area or, if necessary, to Vinh Airfield. In an optimum air intercept (high-high-high) profile, the MIGs could be employed in an air combat role to a radius of 575 NM from Phuc Yen. A likely target for a surprise attack (day or night) would be Da Nang where the concentration of aircraft and personnel would provide a lucrative target for the bomber aircraft. An attack against Saigon or Bien Hoa would be spectacular, and although bomb load restrictions would occur, the results would be far out of proportion to the limited force employed. Attacks into Laos could also be made in retaliation for the T-28 effort, the BARREL ROLL or STEEL TIGER operations. (See Tab A).

6. (S) The capabilities of the IL-28 are estimated as follows:

IL-28 Radius of Action (NM)*

Type Mission	Bomb Load	Bomb Load	Bomb Load
High-High-High			
High-Low-High			
Low-Low-Low			

IL-28 Range (NM)

Type Mission	Bomb Load	Distance (NM)
High-High-High		

Air Line Distances

Phuc Yen - Saigon - Phnom Penh	725 NM
Phuc Yen - Saigon - Vinh	1090 NM

* On a reconnaissance mission with external tanks the radius can be extended to 670 NM

3.3
(b)(5)

Phuc Yen - Saigon - Ling Shui	. 1100 NM	1
Phuc Yen - Da Nang - Phuc Yen	690 NM	2
Phuc Yen - Da Nang - Vinh	555 NM	3

On a night mission, the IL-28 with a [REDACTED] 4

[REDACTED] 5

3.3
(b)(1)

On moonlight nights and in visual weather conditions, this altitude could be reduced to approximately [REDACTED] 6-7

Low level missions except when staged from a field in southern North Vietnam are not feasible (See Tab A). 8-9

SAM STATUS AND CAPABILITIES

7. ~~(S)~~ As of 24 May, the Hanoi SA-2 SAM site B17-2 (20-47-10
 OON/105-54-33E) 15 miles south-southeast of Hanoi appeared 11
 to be occupied with missiles and associated equipment, and 12
 it is estimated that it can attain an operational status at 13
 any time. (See Tab B for area coverage). All six launch 14
 revetments, the three missile hold revetments, guidance 15
 control revetment, and road pattern are complete. Two revet- 16
 ments are occupied and covered with tarpaulins or nets; a 17
 third revetment is occupied by an unidentified vehicle. The 18
 guidance control revetment appears occupied by an unidenti- 19
 fied object. No objects are visible in the missile hold 20
 revetments. 21

8. ~~(S)~~ The occupied SAM site is located in an area also 22
 defended by conventional AAA. There are three AAA sites 23
 within two miles of the SAM site: one site is occupied with 24
 radar controlled 57mm/85mm AA guns, one with 14.5/37mm AA 25
 guns, and one is unoccupied. 26

9. ~~(S)~~ The construction of a second SAM site, B-21, 11 27
 miles southwest of Hanoi (20-51-54N/105-45-18E), was con- 28
 tinuing as of 24 May. Five of the revetments were nearing 29
 completion and construction was beginning on the guidance 30
 control revetment. All revetments were unoccupied. 31

10. (S) A single SA-2 launch site can handle only one target at a time, therefore, several sites with overlapping coverage are needed around a defended area. It has been estimated that the Soviets probably will supply four-five sites to cover the Hanoi/Haiphong complex. (See Tab B for future coverage).


11. (S) The model of the radar employed for target tracking and missile guidance affects the system capabilities. The newer C-band system has about 10 nautical miles more range than the S-band equipment. Only S-band equipment has been given to other nations so far, although in Cuba C-band equipment was used while the SA-2 sites were in Soviet hands. When the Cubans took over the sites, the C-band radars were replaced with S-band equipment.

12. (S) The missile used with the S-band system reportedly can be kept ready to fire for about




3.3
(b)(1)

13. (S) Estimated Characteristics of the SA-2 Missile System:

	<u>W/C-band</u>	<u>W/S-band</u>
Maximum operational range		
Minimum intercept range		
Maximum effective altitude		
Minimum effective altitude		

11

14. (S) Minimum effective altitude greatly depends on the terrain and the size and speed of the target. Recent evidence indicates that there are modifications which can be made to the system which can make it effective at altitudes as low as about  The Soviets have demonstrated

3.3
(b)(5)

3.3
(b)(5)

that they are willing to commit SA-2 missiles against targets 1
flying considerably below [redacted] A missile dead zone 2
within two-five miles of the SAM site prevents engagement 3
of potential targets at certain angles of approach. 4

15. (S) The most critical piece of equipment in a SA-2 5
site is the FAN SONG radar. Loss of the FAN SONG would take 6
an SA-2 site completely out of action. The SPOON REST 7
acquisition radar is more vulnerable, but less critical, as 8
early warning information could be obtained from another 9
source. 10

16. (S) The destruction of the SA-2 missiles would 11
necessitate striking each revetted launch position. 12

EFFECTS ON INTELLIGENCE OF DENIAL OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

17. (S) If the two current SAM sites precluded US recon- 13
naissance flights into the area covered by the range of the 14
SA-2, a significant loss of intelligence on key Red River 15
delta targets would result. Also of great significance 16
would be the loss of photography covering jet-capable 17
airfields in the Hanoi area, the principal military air 18
base complex in the DRV. The 60 MIG 15/17 aircraft presently 19
in the North Vietnamese inventory are based at Phuc Yen and 20
photography is a primary source of intelligence concerning 21
them. It is unlikely that confirmed intelligence on 22
changes in numbers and identification of aircraft would be 23
available on a timely basis from any other source. In addi- 24
tion, all of the JCS targets in the Hanoi area such as AAA 25
defenses, military installations, radar, communications 26
facilities, LOCs, bridges and industrial complexes would 27
be SAM defended. Information concerning changes in defense 28
systems, installations and complexes is not usually available 29
from other sources. Hanoi, well within the protective ring 30
of the missile sites, is the hub of all rail movement 31

and major highways. Information on the current status of 1
 construction, maintenance and vulnerable points in the LOC 2
 systems such as bridges, rail yards, and airfields would 3
 effectively be denied without the results of photographic 4
 reconnaissance over the area. Photographic intelligence 5
 would be denied on 40 JCS targets from the present target 6
 list. 7

18. ~~(S)~~ If four or five SAM sites are constructed around 8
 Hanoi, the denial of photographic intelligence would extend 9
 over most of the Red River delta. In addition to the loss 10
 of information discussed above, denial of information on 11
 the Haiphong area would result from sites located east of 12
 Hanoi. This would deny the collection of current informa- 13
 tion on the Haiphong port, naval base, supply storage areas, 14
 and military installations. The Haiphong/Cat Bi airfield 15
 in addition to Phuc Yen are currently the only airfields in 16
 North Vietnam with facilities to support sustained jet 17
 aircraft operations. The loss of photo information would 18
 deny confirmed information on the deployment of additional 19
 aircraft. This would make development of a current defensive 20
 and offensive air environment pattern impossible. The 21
 further coverage provided by added SAM sites would deny 22
 information on additional LOC key features. The key bridge 23
 at Hai Duong, although covered at maximum range by the two 24
 present sites, would fall well within the coverage provided 25
 by a five-site defense. Sites to the north of Hanoi would 26
 effectively deny information concerning the condition and 27
 possible use of the two primary railroads from China except 28
 in the mountainous regions to the north and west of Hanoi. 29
 Information concerning the rail system between Hanoi and 30
 Haiphong would be unattainable. Photographic intelligence 31
 would be denied on 36 additional JCS targets or a total of 32
 76 JCS targets from the current list. 33

ESTIMATED COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS

19. ~~(S)~~ Communist: Communist reaction to US air strikes 1
 against Phuc Yen Airfield and the Hanoi SAM site probably would be 2
 limited largely to air defense measures and propaganda attacks. 3
 Some military reaction by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 4
 (DRV) and Communist China, however, cannot be entirely dis- 5
 counted. Immediate military reaction would be limited, in 6
 any event, by their limited capability to interfere with 7
 the operation or to reinforce the area immediately subsequent 8
 thereto. The reaction of specific countries is discussed 9
 below. 10

20. ~~(S)~~ DRV: DRV reaction would probably be limited to 11
 further propaganda attacks and attempts to enlist world 12
 opinion against the US effort. In this, they may be expected 13
 to play up the use of SAC forces. SAC, as an intercontinental 14
 strike force, would imply a greater degree of US effort than 15
 has been heretofore indicated. 16

Successful attacks would destroy the bulk of the 17
 DRV's combat air force and equipment for one SAM site. Any 18
 aircraft remaining might be dispersed to other airfields. 19
 Destruction of the SAM site could cause the DRV to dis- 20
 continue construction of formal sites, but would most 21
 likely lead them to revert to field-type employments with 22
 the mobile SA-2 missile equipment; such sites would be 23
 difficult to locate and engage. 24

The DRV would probably not launch a major military 25
 attack on the ground against South Vietnam as a result of 26
 the proposed air strikes. They could, however, increase 27
 Viet Cong actions and perhaps introduce more PAVN troops 28
 covertly. 29

21. ~~(S)~~ Communist China: The CHICOMs would probably be 30
 unable to react immediately to the US strikes and would 31

probably continue their policy of nonconfrontation. Intensive propaganda and offers to support the DRV with "Volunteers" or military forces, if requested, would be made. The introduction of SAC forces would cause increased concern on the part of the CHICOMs. With destruction of the DRV air capability, the Chinese would be under increasing pressure to provide for the air defense of the DRV. They may do so, but in view of the continued threat to Communist China, they would probably be reluctant to initiate such action.

22. (S) Soviet Union: Soviet reaction would probably follow their current policy of noninvolvement and be limited to propaganda and diplomatic pressures to seek to force the United States to cease its attack on the DRV. The loss of Soviet-furnished equipment is not likely to be used as grounds for direct Soviet intervention. Moreover, there is no indication at present that Soviet troops -- other than technical and advisory personnel -- will be provided to man the SAM sites. By providing Soviet personnel in the guise of "technicians," the USSR probably would be willing to accept the risk of losing technical and advisory personnel without changing their basic policy. US actions, however, could cause general Soviet policy around the world to harden against the United States. This would preclude moves to relax tensions and increase the USSR's verbal ugliness on other East-West issues. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would react by deliberately provoking a major crisis in some other area of the world.

The Soviet Union would probably use the United Nations as a forum for increased attacks on US policy and actions and might seek UN intervention even though the DRV and CHICOMs have opposed UN action in this area.

Attacks would probably be considered as another step in expanding the conflict by the United States. The use of SAC forces would cause them some concern and give them a new factor for applying propaganda and diplomatic pressures.

23. ~~(S)~~ North Korea: North Korea would add its voice to the other Asian communist countries' condemnation of the US strikes. While the North Koreans would intensify their anti-US propaganda and exhibit greater animosity towards the United States, it is unlikely that they would initiate a major military move against South Korea in retaliation.

24. ~~(S)~~ Free World: Free World reaction will follow much the same pattern as it has in regard to current programs. Those countries and elements within the Free World countries which support or sympathize with the communists will increase their clamor, while countries which have been supporting the United States and Republic of Vietnam will continue their support. The reactions of specific countries by regional groupings are discussed below.

25. ~~(S)~~ Western Europe: Some Western European nations, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, West Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the Vatican are officially generally sympathetic with the United States and feel that the United States must win in Vietnam. France, particularly President de Gaulle, on the other hand, has emphasized its hostility to US policy in Vietnam and has expressed strong doubts that US military actions will change the balance of power in the area.

The other nations of Western Europe, especially the Scandinavian countries, Belgium and Italy view any intensification of military action in North Vietnam with anxiety and fear. These countries want to see a peaceful solution to the problem.

26. ~~(S)~~ African Nations: There would probably be little serious African reaction to US air strikes against Phuc Yen and the SA-2 missile defense sites in North Vietnam. Some countries such as Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda will probably parrot the communist reactions as published in Moscow and Peiping press.

27. ~~(S)~~ Middle East: The Arab countries as a whole have shown public opposition to US policies in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Their press therefore could be expected to condemn US air strikes in the immediate Hanoi area. It is not believed, however, that such press attacks would necessarily be more virulent than those which have already been made. Egypt, which leads the radical Arab states in vituperation against US policies, has the capability of fomenting violent demonstrations against US installations, but, at the present time is trying to mend its fences with the United States.

Israel and Iran are generally in favor of strong US policies. Turkey has a more ambivalent position because of the Cyprus situation.

28. ~~(S)~~ Latin America: It is highly doubtful that any Latin American government -- Cuba excepted -- would officially condemn the US action. Senior military leaders in most countries would privately support such US actions.

The communists would attempt to exploit the resulting situation with anti-US demonstrations but would probably have difficulty in generating any additional protests over US involvement in Vietnam.

Cuban reaction would almost certainly be expressed by a higher level propoganda volume against the United States, and by a deep fear that a precedent had been set that could lead the United States to take similar actions against Cuba when the time was right.


29. (S) Asian Nations: For the most part, the Asian 1
nations would support the United States on the question of 2
air strikes against Phuc Yen and the SAM site. South 3
Vietnam would consider the US action a further step in 4
their favor and as removing a threat to their country. 5
Countries closely allied with the United States effort 6
such as Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines, Laos, 7
Republic of China and Republic of Korea will fully support 8
the effort as a reflection of US determination to support 9
South Vietnam. Countries leaning toward the communists, 10
Indonesia and Cambodia, would probably limit their activities 11
to propaganda outbursts. India would probably decry the 12
strikes and press for negotiations, as it has in the past. 13
Pakistan would be likely to seek to avoid becoming involved. 14
Non-aligned countries would limit their reaction to some 15
adverse press comments. Japan would be concerned but would 16
continue to support the United States. The major interest 17
of all nations will be centered on the US success or failure 18
in South Vietnam. 19

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3.3 (B)(5)

(15)

SAM CAPABILITY



ANNEX C

SUMMARY OF

SAC PLANNING FOR ATTACK
OF PHUC YEN AIRFIELD

(JCS Target No. 6)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- 1. ~~(TS)~~ FORCES - 30 B-52s-Guam
30 K-135s-Okinawa
- 2. ~~(TS)~~ TIMING - Strikes to be made during hours of darkness in target area.
- 3. ~~(TS)~~ METHOD OF BOMBING - Penetration and withdrawal from target area to be at low altitude (600' to 800'). Radar bomb runs made utilizing two well defined offset aiming points.

4. ~~(TS)~~ FLIGHT PROFILE SUMMARY

TOTAL DISTANCE GUAM TO GUAM- 5495 NM

TOTAL LOW LEVEL DISTANCE- 636 NM

TOTAL FLIGHT TIME - 13:05

GUAM TO SVN COAST- 5:24

GUAM TO LOW ALTITUDE POINT- 5:48

GUAM TO TARGET- 7:06

GUAM TO EXIT POINT- 7:58

AIR REFUELING- One 100,000# offload between Philippines and SVN, outbound

- 5. ~~(TS)~~ AAA - Within a 3 NM radius, there are 6 sites.

ANNEX D

SUMMARY OF
CINCPAC'S PLAN FOR AIR ATTACK
ON NVN SA-2 SAM SITE
(JCS Target No. 65)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. ~~(TS)~~ FORCES - STRIKE - 12 F-105s
MIG CAP - 8 F-104s
MIG SCREEN - 4 F-4Cs
ECM - 4 RF-101s
MISC - Tankers, SAR, BDA, and escort,
EW/GCI (EC-121 and/or E-1B plus
escort)
2. ~~(TS)~~ TIMING - In daylight, just prior to or subsequent to
attack of Phuc Yen.
3. ~~(TS)~~ METHOD OF BOMBING - Low level approach from bases in Thailand
through Laos utilizing terrain as feasible
for surprise. One low level pass over
target using napalm and CBU-2 or SNAKEYE.
SHRIKE may be used.
4. ~~(TS)~~ AAA - Within a 2 NM radius, there are 3 sites.

ANNEX E

SUMMARY OF

CINCPAC'S PLANNING FOR CLEAN-UP ATTACKS

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

1. ~~(TS)~~ FORCES - STRIKE - 4-8 A/C on each airfield
MIG CAP - 8
MIG SCREEN - 16
ECM - 2 EC-121
2. ~~(TS)~~ TIMING - In daylight following SAC night attack.
3. ~~(TS)~~ METHOD OF BOMBING - Successive, small, low-level strike forces will follow initial strike against Phuc Yen, Gia Lam, Bac Mai, Cat Bi, and Haiphong Kien An airfield to which DRV aircraft may have been flushed.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Info

1965 MAY 27 AM 12 00

VV HJA957JIA956.
 PP RUEHCR RUEKDA
 DE RUNJIR 1351A 27/0345Z
 P 270345Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3908
 INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC PRIORITY 523
 RUHKA/CINCPAC PRIORITY 2271
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 27

EXDIS

- REF. A. CINCPAC TO MACV 150648Z.
- B. MACV TO CINCPAC 260458Z.

BY REF. A CINCPAC ASKS FOR MY VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT, FEASIBILITY OF REAL ESTATE ACQUISITION AND SUITABILITY OF AREA FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A MAJOR JET AIRBASE. AFTER HEARING A MACV BRIEFING ON THE SUBJECT, I CONCUR IN THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN ADDITIONAL JET AIRBASE AND RECOMMEND THE CAM RANK BAY SITE GENERALLY FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN REF. B. COMPELLING ARGUMENT AGAINST THE TUY HOA SITE IS THE SECURITY PROBLEM.

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 12:20 A.M., MAY 27
 PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, 12:35 A.M., MAY 27

DECLASSIFIED
 State 11-24-80
 By DCH/ISP NARS, Date 1-6-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ NODIS

*Review only
to Rusk*

30a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Ball

May 28, 1965

*Thompson
in Dept.*

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

We are handling this as
a NODIS. It has not been
sent to the Defense Department.
Please handle it in a similar
manner.

*John P. Walsh
for*

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Letter 8-21-78

By if, NARS, Date 3-23-79

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

②
W/L
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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 27432
RECEIVED: MAY 28, 1965, 2:08 P.M.

FROM: MOSCOW
ACTION: SECSTATE 3586 FLASH

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 28

NODIS

RE DEPTTEL 3283 MAY 28

attached
INITIAL COMMENTS IN EMBTEL 3266, WHICH *attached* CROSSED REFTEL. THINK ESSENTIAL ANY STRIKE AGAINST SOVIET SAM-SITES AND PLANES ON GROUND BE PROCEEDED BY WARNING EXERCISE SUGGESTED EMBTEL (POSSIBLY IN FORM LETTER PRESIDENT TO KOSYGIN DELIVERED VIA DOBRYNIN). SOVIET REACTION COULD BEST BE ASSESSED IN LIGHT EXCHANGE THUS PROVOKED.

IF AIRSTRIKES TOOK PLACE WITHOUT WARNING EXERCISE, SOVIET REACTION WOULD BE VIOLENT. WE COULD EXPECT STEPPING UP DELIVERY OFFENSIVE WEAPONS PROBABLY MANNED BY SOVIET "VOLUNTEERS", AND RETALIATORY STRIKES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND AGAINST 7TH FLEET UNITS.

KOHLER

RNL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NW 88-203
By ip/ly, NARA, Date 4-8-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Action
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Info

~~SECRET~~

002

CONTROL: 27343
RECD: MAY 28, 1965, 1:05 P.M.

FROM: MOSCOW

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 3580

~~SECRET~~ MAY 28

NOBIS
REF DEPTTEL 3266

ARRIVAL OF SOV IL-28'S IN DRV IS INDEED SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT. AS POINTED OUT REFTEL, IT NOT ONLY REFLECTS SOV GOV DECISION ACCEPT NEW RISKS IN DRV; IT ALSO POSES SERIOUS AND IMMEDIATE POLICY PROBLEMS FOR US.

IF, AS I WOULD SUPPOSE, SOVIET PROVISION OF IL-28'S PASSES LIMITS OF WHAT WE PREPARED TOLERATE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT THIS IS CASE, THAT WE CAN AND WILL RESPOND IN AS MUCH FORCE AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT OUR POSITION IN VN, AND THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE HARD LOOK FOR WAY OUT OF SITUATION OF GREAT DANGER.

AT SAME TIME, ALTHOUGH SOVS THEMSELVES MAY NOT HAVE MADE ALL CRUCIAL DECISIONS COVERING CONTINGENCIES WHICH MAY ARISE OUT OF THEIR LATEST MOVE, WE MUST ASSUME (1) THAT THEY CANNOT AT THIS STAGE TOLERATE HUMILIATING PULLBACK; (2) THAT THEY PREPARED TO EXCALATE, EVEN IF AT COUITOUS RATE OF RESPONSE AND SHORT OF COMMITMENT TO MAJOR WAR; (3) THAT SOVS HAVE FACED IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR MOVE FOR SINO-SOV RELATIONS AND THAT CONTRARY TO REFTEL, ACTION WILL NOT ITSELF INTENSIFY COMPETITION RE VN.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND ASSUMING INFO REFTEL IS FORM, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER PROMPT DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

1. IF IL-28'S USED AGAINST US OR SVN TARGETS OR EVEN APPEAR IN SVN AIRSPACE, WE WILL ATTACK AND DESTROY PLANES AND BASES AS WELL AS MEANS OF SUPPLY OF SOV MILITARY HARDWARE TO DRV. WE WILL ALSONOT TOLERATE FURTHER BUILDUP OF SOV WEAPONS OR EQUIPMENT WHICH ARE OFFENSIVE IN NATURE AND THUS POSE THREAT TO US OR SVN.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 95-155
By wp/ly, NARA, Date 4-8-74

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3580, MAY 28, FROM MOSCOW

2. IF SOVS WISH TO MOVE AWAY FROM BRINK TOWARD WHICH THEY MAY BE HEADING, THEY SHOULD REASSESS THEIR SITUATION AND INTERESTS IN LIGHT OF US OFFER TO NEGOTIATE.

AS ALTERNATIVE TO WARNING AGAINST USE OF IL-28'S, WE MIGHT DEMAND WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, VIETNAM IS NOT CUBA AND I FEEL SOVS WOULD BE COMPELLED REJECT SUCH BLATANT CHALLENGE THEIR PRESTIGE, AND WE WOULD INEVITABLY MOVE INTO INCREASED CONFRONTATION AND LEVEL OF HOSTILITIES.

I AM NOT CONFIDENT THAT MOSCOW CAN NOW BRING HANOI TO NEGOTIATING TABLE ON BASIS ACCEPTABLE TO US, BUT BELIEVE POINT SHOULD BE MADE AS COROLLARY TO WARNING RE IL-28'S IN ORDER TO CLARIFY ALTERNATIVE S FOR SOVS.

CFN 3266 28 28 1 2 3 28 2 28 28

KOHLER

~~SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy MOSCOW

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LIMDIS

Authority | State Letter 8-21-78

By ip, NARS, Date 3-23-79

Following is summary INR Intelligence Note May 25:

1. Arrival Soviet IL-28s in North Vietnam represents first time Moscow will have provided offensive weapons to Hanoi, although Moscow will argue that purpose is defense of North Vietnam. While IL-28s have been supplied other bloc countries including China and to six non-bloc countries, they are aircraft which US designated offensive in 1962 in Cuba -- a designation Soviets implicitly accepted when they withdrew them along with MRBMs. Exact configuration of planes not yet known, however must be assumed they part of Soviet program involving supply of DRV Air Force with limited bombing capability, as well as deliveries of SAM equipment, armored cars, crated aircraft and other materiel, all designed reinforce Soviet commitment, bolster morale of North Vietnamese and counter Chinese allegations Soviets dragging feet.

2. Soviets almost certainly assume we aware of their action; at very least they probably attempting determine whether

INR/RSB: M Rothenberg: 5/26/65
H Sonnenfeldt: snm

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

H. Sonnenfeldt

Clearence:

EUR/SOV - Mr. Henry

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US prepared accept introduction offensive weapons, albeit of relatively modest capability, into North Vietnam. Beyond that, however, Moscow undoubtedly seeking impress US with seriousness its determination to help DRV and it may calculate that when scope their aid effort becomes generally known new pressures will be mounted on US to desist from military action against North. More specifically at current stage of US bombing of North, Moscow may be hoping that presence of Soviet planes on DRV's main military field may help deter US from bombing that field especially if Soviet personnel are involved.

3. While Moscow's prime purpose may be deterrence, IL-28s, like MIGs already in North Vietnam, clearly represent additional military resource for communists. Thus while even sizeable force of these bombers would be no match for more advanced aircraft available to US, their eventual use cannot be ruled out. In such case, we believe crews would not be Soviet (though ground personnel might be). We would not rule out use of aircraft against land targets, but think on whole that this would be unlikely since it would be relatively ineffective and invite retaliation against North Vietnamese airfields. A more likely use might be attempted strike against US naval targets, such as carriers in Tonkin Gulf. In particular, North Vietnamese might consider such action if bombing of North had become so intense that Hanoi felt it had little more to lose, or if Hanoi thought such an intensification of bombing were imminent.

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On balance, we believe, however, that Moscow, at any rate, does not at present contemplate such role for ~~the~~ aircraft and that in dispatching them it calculates that it can maintain substantial control over their use. Preferred role of aircraft in Moscow's view would be deterrence for time being. Disagreement over role of aircraft could thus be potentially thorny issue in Soviet-DRV relations.

But whatever Soviet calculations and expectations may be, by shipping IL-28s, Soviet leaders must be judged to have accepted substantial new risks to themselves, and certainly to US-Soviet relations.

4. In making commitment to DRV as concrete as they now have, Soviets are eroding their position that negotiations are in first instance matter between parties directly involved, i.e. US and DRV. Indeed, while Soviets may be expected to maintain this position, they may in fact be acquiring some new leverage of their own over Hanoi, although it remains moot point whether they can use this leverage should they want Hanoi to negotiate.

5. In granting permission for Soviet aircraft to transit its territory, Peiping may have decided that by its earlier tactics it had demonstrated with sufficient clarity to Hanoi and Moscow that Soviet deliveries can arrive only at Chinese sufferance. Peiping may also have felt that prolonged prevention of Soviet military deliveries was ^{world} damaging its position in/communist movement and angering Hanoi. At

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same time, Peiping must now face issue of whether to leave ~~the~~ supply of offensive as well as sophisticated defensive weapons to Moscow. We doubt this is its preferred choice. Conceivably it could offer some of its own IL-28s or crews to bolster Hanoi's effort. More likely, however, would be Peiping's offer of fighter protection from Chinese bases should US retaliatory strikes hit industrial and civilian complex of North Vietnam. In short, introduction of Soviet IL-28s may further intensify Sino-Soviet competition relative to Vietnam. END

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, May 31, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I told you briefly about my talk with Joe Alsop at noon today, but I think you may want to know more.

Joe is full of concern on two points: he thinks we have underestimated Communist strength on the ground in the northern part of South Vietnam, and he thinks our bombing in the North is limited and timid. He does not appear to know about some of the new developments around Hanoi, and his positive recommendations were limited to two: we should put the Marines in combat pretty soon; and two, we should go after the oil supplies in North Vietnam. He has been told by someone that these oil supplies are highly vulnerable and if we can get them, we can bring the DRV war machine to a halt.

I told Joe that we would certainly check and recheck our intelligence reporting, and that we shared his view that the coming contests in the northern part of South Vietnam were of high importance. I told him also that any difference between us on bombing was a matter of pace and judgment -- that he could be quite confident of your firmness. I did not tell him about the problem of keeping our liberal friends on board because he has no sympathy with that part of your job and would simply denounce us for neglecting a fire while seeking an unreal consensus. He obviously believes we can never keep the Times with us and might as well ignore it.

I think Joe is reflecting his exposure to some of the fighting troops and his own natural belligerence. But there is just a sniff of Embassy Saigon in what he says, and I think it is clearly important that we get General Taylor back for serious discussion just as soon as his own sense of the political crisis permits.

I have thought a little about whether Joe is likely to convert Mike Mansfield, and I must say I doubt it. He has no talent for persuasion and if he batters Mansfield, it will only make the Senator more determined in his own somewhat mousy stubbornness. I will keep looking for a better advocate to convert Mansfield.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
By DCH, NARA, Date 3-2-88

McG. B.

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Q. WILL WE SEND U.S. COMBAT UNITS TO FIGHT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM?

As is well know, reinforced battalions of U.S. Marines ~~8000 men~~ are already assigned as security forces for the protection of Da Nang Air Base near the 17th parallel. These troops were requested by the Government of South Viet-Nam in order to release South Vietnamese military forces from security duty so that they might directly engage Viet Cong insurgents.

Thus far South Viet-Nam has not requested American ground forces for utilization as combat troops. Any request in the future will be dictated by the extent of enemy infiltration from North Viet-Nam and subsequent operations by the Viet Cong in the South. Such a request by the Government of South Viet-Nam would be weighed with these factors in mind. As of this time, the primary role of the United States is the same as it has been since 1954: to provide advisers and equipment to South Viet-Nam's armed forces.

June, 1965

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS Attachment
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
June 1, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy ←
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *BHR*
Executive Secretary

Mac:

Here are the comments of Max Taylor and Alex Johnson on the Acheson/Ball paper and the outgoing telegram to Saigon on their comments.

Attachments:

1. Comments
2. 2685 to Saigon, copy 5

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS Attachment

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Fundamental Factors in a Political Settlement in South Vietnam

1. As a guide to present and future discussions of possible ways to settle the Vietnam question, it may be useful to list a few of the fundamental factors controlling the attitudes of the principal parties concerned.

a. DRV/VC

(1) The DRV/VC objective is to unite the two Vietnams under a Communist regime. They will not give up this objective until it becomes clearly unattainable in the foreseeable future. Even then, they will defer their efforts, not abandon them.

(2) The DRV/VC strategy is now based on accomplishing their objective in three stages stretched over a period of years-- first a negotiation between the NLF and some Government in Saigon for a coalition government; secondly, a take-over of that Government by the NLF; and lastly, an integration with the Hanoi regime. They believe they can attain their objective following this track. They cannot be talked or negotiated out of it until they are convinced it is a losing game, particularly since they feel that at Geneva in 1954 they were tricked out of accomplishing this objective which was then within their grasp. They are thus especially wary of "negotiating tricks".

(3) The DRV/VC expect that war-weariness, government instability, U.S. sensitivity to domestic and international pressures, and Vietnamese xenophobia will lead to a situation which will shortly permit them to accomplish the first stage, i. e., a coalition government.

(4) No amount of bombing of the North is in itself going to persuade the DRV/VC to abandon their strategy. They can be persuaded to abandon it only if they are convinced that the trend of events in the South is against them and the factors cited above are not panning out. They are not yet convinced that this is the case.

(5) The VC will never really disband their armed forces in South Vietnam until they are fully in control of the government. They might as a ruse "play dead" without giving up their arms - but that is all. By the same token no extended cease fire is practical.

(6) To the degree that we or the GVN seem anxious to negotiate from what the DRV/VC still estimate is a position of weakness on our side we encourage the DRV/VC to continue their present course. To the degree that we can impart to the DRV/VC a sense of calm confidence and willingness indefinitely to pursue our present course, the DRV/VC will be encouraged to look for ways out.

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By plp, NARA, Date 4/5/95

(7) At such time as the DRV/VC estimate that the tide has turned against them in South Vietnam it will be important to have a carefully thought out and agreed program that will further induce VC defections, facilitate DRV/VC acceptance of their defeat and "heal the nation's wounds" as promptly as possible.

b. Chiccom-USSR

(1) Neither country will go to war with the U.S. to save the VC. They will, however, take defensive precautions to see that the Communist regime in North Vietnam is not endangered. They will vie with each other vocally in condemning the U.S.

c. GVN

(1) The present government or its predictable successors will not tolerate recognition of N.L.F. or the inclusion of VC in the government.

(2) No solution is acceptable which does not assure the end of infiltration from DRV and the break-up of the VC military apparatus in South Vietnam.

(3) There will be no agreement to a withdrawal of U.S. forces until the conditions of paragraph 2 above are met.

(4) The GVN will resist violently any political solution to which they are not parties from start to finish.

2. Although the foregoing attitudes are deeply entrenched, they are not unmovable. They are susceptible to the leverage of such forces as the universal fear of expanded war, international opinion, U.S. military power, and U.S. political and economic support. Our negotiating task is to accommodate those attitudes which are compatible with U.S. objectives and to apply effective leverage on those which must be changed.

5/20/65

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Questions and Comments Relating to "A Plan for a Political Resolution in South Viet-Nam"

1. Why do we consider that the Viet Cong would offer the cooperation which is indispensable to the success of this plan?

Comment: We agree with the estimate expressed that the Viet Cong will be willing "to submit to heavy punishment rather than give up their long-sought objective of a Communist State covering the whole of Viet-Nam". We also believe that they consider that their present course of action will bring ultimate success. Hence it is hard to see why, under these circumstances, they would consider it advantageous "to move the conflict from the military to the political arena".

There is the suggestion (Part II. B.) that the DRV/VC will find the plan attractive because it will fatten the South Vietnamese sheep for the eventual enjoyment of North Vietnamese wolves at a later time. Also there is the implication that this "later time" might come to the Viet Cong as the result of exploiting the political advantages resulting from their infiltration of the South Vietnamese government. However, if this advantage is real enough to convince the Viet Cong that it is worth joining in a cooperative effort with the GVN to rebuild South Viet-Nam, the plan is probably too risky for us to engage in it.

2. Will the "carrots" contained in this package be more appealing to the DRV than those already suggested and thus far rejected by the DRV?

Comment: The President has made it fairly clear that the DRV could participate in many advantages if the leaders ceased their aggression against South Viet-Nam. This offer, coupled possibly with that of political recognition of Hanoi, might seem to be a more attractive package than the risks of cooperating with the GVN in the social and political reconstruction of the country. If such is not the case, we had better reconsider whether we are not risking too much in our own plan.

3. Why do we think that the promulgation of a new Plan for Social and Political Reconstruction would offer hope and credibility to either the South Vietnamese or the Viet Cong?

Comment: We have been engaging for several years in attempting the social and political reconstruction of South Viet-Nam, utilizing all the ideas and resources which the United States Government has been able to produce. From this experience, we have learned that the success of social, political and economic development is a function of security and effective government. Because of the security factor, conditions are favorable to development only in the cities and about 10 provinces; the conditions are spotty in about 22 provinces and

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are virtually impossible in about 12 provinces. As for the governmental factor, the record shows how feeble governmental performance has been since the fall of Dien. Performance is getting somewhat better now but still has a long way to go. Out of consideration of these two factors taken in combination, one can see little reason to hope that a newly promulgated program for social and political reconstruction will convince any large number of Vietnamese, north or south, that a new era is at hand and a new deal imminent which is too good to miss.

4. What is the precise purpose of the limited pause in military operations?

Comment: The paper (VII. A.) merely states the purpose as being "to assure that the other side gives serious attention to the plan". It is not clear whether, during the pause, the advantages to North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong would be spelled out specifically by GVN spokesmen. As indicated in the discussion of Question 1., the features of the plan which might be considered really attractive to the Viet Cong are such that one could hardly allude to them in public--certainly no GVN official could.

5. Under what circumstances during the pause would we revert to military operations? Specifically, if the DRV merely maintained their normal pattern of behavior, do we continue to respect the pause?

Comment: This question arises from the language in Paragraph VII. B. 3 and 4 and D. It seems quite likely that the Viet Cong would not change their pattern of conduct at least for a considerable time. Would this lack of favorable reaction invalidate the entire plan or is it considered feasible to carry on some parts of the plan even without Viet Cong cooperation? It would certainly not be satisfactory to the GVN (nor, we would suppose, to us) to cease offensive action both in South and North Viet-Nam if the Viet Cong adhere to their present level of aggression.

6. Under what circumstances and in what terms would we announce our willingness to withdraw U.S. forces?

Comment: This is a most sensitive subject for discussion within South Vietnamese hearing. There are always latent fears that the U.S. somehow will wriggle out of its commitment to South Viet-Nam. On page 12 of the reference paper, there is a reference to a withdrawal of forces "on a phased basis (assuming proper response from the other side)". We should be very clear in our own mind what would constitute a "proper response" before opening any discussion of this matter with our allies.

7. To what extent will Viet Cong or former Viet Cong be allowed to engage in political activities?

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Comment: At the present time, Viet Cong defectors under the Chieu Hoi program may take part as voters in local elections and, in principle, are not barred as candidates providing they are approved by the proper government authorities. If, however, unreformed Viet Cong are eligible to vote and run for provincial office and for delegates in a constituent assembly we would appear to be tacitly encouraging the eventual creation of the type of coalition government which, on past occasions, we have publicly equated to communization of South Viet-Nam. As we read the paper, we understand that under the amnesty Viet Cong who are willing to cease fighting will be offered full political privileges without renouncing Communism. If this is so, the point will be hard to sell to the GVN who have taken seriously our arguments against popular front governments.

8. How does the government go about seeking "to establish its presence with a minimum disruption of local administrative arrangements currently acceptable to local populace"? What functions would government officials attempt to perform in Viet Cong controlled areas?

Comment: Paragraph VI. C. seems to indicate that we would accept the status quo insofar as government control or lack of control of population and territory is concerned. On the other hand, in Paragraph VI. E. one contemplates at some point attaining a situation where "the government has effectively extended its authority throughout the country". As a practical matter, the Viet Cong will never allow government officials to operate in their areas of authority nor is it likely that we will find many government officials willing to try to enter Viet Cong bailiwicks unless amply supported by ARVN bayonets. Thus, if the thought is that government officials could at a minimum effect the registration of voters country-wide, we consider the possibility highly unlikely.

9. When, if ever, would there be a ceasefire and how would it come about?

Comment: By the time elections are taking place, presumably the shooting will have died down. We are not sure how this will have come about, whether by tacit agreement or by some more formal understanding. We do not see how we could have much confidence in the duration of a ceasefire if the Viet Cong have not been disarmed.

10. Under this plan, how do we ever assure the ending of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the dismantling of the Viet Cong military apparatus within South Viet-Nam?

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Comment: As for infiltration under this plan, we see no reason why North Viet-Nam could not continue the clandestine infiltration of men and equipment as has been done in the past. Similarly, we do not see how the plan disposes of the hundred thousand odd armed Viet Cong who constitute at present the principal threat to security in South Viet-Nam. In the absence of reasonable assurances on these two points, it is equally unclear how the United States government can ever free itself of its present obligations in South Viet-Nam.

11. Can this plan be sold to the GVN?

Comment: We can see little if anything in this plan which would appeal to the GVN. Local leaders will be quick to see the danger of a coalition government and of the failure to assure the end of infiltration and to liquidate the Viet Cong military threat within South Viet-Nam. If we mention U.S. withdrawal, they will shy even more. In its present form, it is highly unlikely that the GVN would accept the plan without a great deal of unpleasant arm-twisting on the part of the Americans—perhaps not then. Such pressure tactics could only be applied at a very substantial sacrifice of the present good relations existing between GVN and USG. If the GVN yielded to this pressure, it is entirely possible that a military-Catholic coalition would overturn the government.

May 20, 1965

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ROUTING TELEGRAM Department of State

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FOR AMBASSADORS TAYLOR AND JOHNSON FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY

Tom Ehrlich has given me a report of your comments concerning our proposal. These comments are extremely helpful and we will continue to work on the proposal pending Ambassador Taylor's return next week.

I think that we are in substantial agreement concerning the "Fundamental Factors In A Political Settlement In South Viet-Nam," except for some difficult questions of detail, emphasis, and -- perhaps most important -- timing. These questions can probably be best explored in discussions in Washington.

Our overall objective, of course, is to develop a strategy that provides a political supplement to our military effort, one that may enable us to move away from primary reliance on military force, with all the attendant risks and disadvantages of a military campaign of indefinite duration, and, at the same time,

that will

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Authority STATE letter MAR 21 1979

By *inf* NARS, Date 7-19-79

Dated at
FE:L Unger:hh 5/25/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

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OS/S - Mr. Read

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that will put us and the GVN in a stronger psychological, political, and propaganda position even if the Communists reject the overtures. We have tried to develop a statement of war aims and peace terms that can serve as a continuing offer--strengthening the GVN's political base for prosecuting the war until the Viet Cong is ready to accept.

For your consideration, we offer the following initial comments on your "Questions and Comments Relating To 'A Plan For Political Resolution In South Viet-Nam.'" We will, of course, want to explore these points further with Ambassador Taylor upon his return.

Question 1 -- In our judgment, this plan offers sufficient attractions to the Viet-Cong that/once they realize that the military struggle will be a long one because we are not going to quit--they/might be induced to accept it. The attractions we have in mind include temporary and tacit acceptance of the status quo at the local administrative level; the proposal to convene a constitutional assembly; participation of Viet Cong personnel in the constitutional assembly; and their participation as voters and candidates in elections for the National Government after the assembly. As we see it, those who participated in the Viet Cong insurgency would be permitted to take part in political life as individuals

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individuals or members of a party. The only prohibition would be on political activity by individuals or parties pledged to the overthrow of the Government in Saigon, i.e. no participation by the NLF or any other Communist party.

Question 2 == Our intent was to develop a plan that both sides could find more attractive than the present military track. This is, of course an indispensable element of any settlement short of unconditional surrender by one side. Although our plan contains new inducements to the Communists, as it must if they are to play, it would, I think, be ultimately more to our advantage than to theirs.

Question 3 == The Program for Social and Political Reconstruction should be more persuasive to the South Vietnamese people than previous plans to the extent that (a) the Government officials concerned are recognized as individuals who can and will work to carry out the Program and (b) the substance of the Program touches more realistically than in the past on matters that need attention. The Program could only be carried out, of course, in those areas where security permits.

Question 4 == The pause would permit time for considered evaluation by the Communists of our initiative and for decisions to be reached concerning their response. It would also allow time for these decisions to be

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to be communicated throughout the Viet Cong apparatus. The pause would also have the psychological purpose of bringing greater pressure on the Communists to respond and of removing any excuse that they cannot discuss or move toward a settlement as long as our bombing continues.

Question 5 -- The pause would continue throughout the two-week period unless it became clear that the other side was taking advantage of it in some major way such as a sharp increase in terrorist activities or the mounting of a significant military action against an important center. Even if the Viet Cong maintained their "normal pattern of behavior" we would probably continue the pause during the two-week period. After that, we would have to decide whether we could respond to their activities by actions in the South alone or whether bombing of the North would have to be resumed. Certainly, a catalog of possible responses would have to be assembled in advance.

Even if the Communist response during the pause period were completely unfavorable, the social and economic aspects of the plan would continue, as could the revised amnesty program.

Question 6 -- We would probably discuss "phased withdrawal" only in the general language that we have already used, always subject in our mind

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minimum concessions that would have to be made to the other side if the plan were to have any chance of success. There is obviously a big difference between ruling out a negotiated coalition government and permitting former Viet Cong to take part in the political life of the country as voters and candidates. We envisaged that whatever national assembly were eventually elected--at least a year from the Prime Minister's announcement--would probably have members who represented the NLF's views, though they would not bear the Front's label. But if the elections went as we anticipated, there would be no need for a coalition government or for the granting of Ministries to the NLF or its successor groups.

Question 8 -- We understand that today, in daylight hours, GVN officials visit all provincial and district towns. Outside of those places and other places where they now can circulate and do business, their future entry under the plan would have to depend on a case-by-case security ~~xxxxx~~ assessment. Their objective would be to circulate as quickly as possible into the area where Viet Cong control is not established, but Government control is also uncertain. We understand that the areas of undisputed Viet Cong authority (e.g. Viet Cong bases and war zones) are relatively

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are relatively few and limited in extent. These would be the last areas where Government officials would penetrate. Just as there would be a geographic progression into more and more difficult areas, so there would be a progression from simple presence to the exercise of more and more significant Government functions. Registration of voters would probably be the first.

This idea has not been advanced with any illusions about its ease of execution. It has the virtue, however, of permitting the GVN to bite off^{no} more than it can chew, and, at the same time, to maintain the position that it has the right to exercise authority throughout the country. In areas where the amnesty program is working well, the GVN could follow up by establishing and expanding its presence; elsewhere it would have to wait for an unstated period. We would not rule out the possibility that much later, even by the time elections are due, there might be some areas still under Viet Cong control. There would, of course, be no elections in areas where the VC prevented the free movement of Government officials.

Question 9 -- While a cease-fire could come about at any time--before, during, or after negotiations and certainly before elections could be held in

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held in any given area--we think its duration could be extended indefinitely even if never formally declared and even if all the Viet Cong could not be formally disarmed. Resumption of hostilities by the Viet Cong would threaten them with a resumption of United States-GVN actions in the North as well as in the South. Presumably, this would occur only if the chances of a quick victory were high, or alternatively, if the GVN threatened the total elimination of the Viet Cong through initiatives of its own.

Question 10 -- We cannot "assure" the total cessation of infiltration or the dismantling of the Viet Cong military apparatus in any way ~~xxx~~ other than the complete GVN occupation of every corner of South Viet-Nam. This does not appear feasible in the foreseeable future. But we can live with a ~~ix~~ low level of infiltration as well as a continuing Viet Cong military apparatus as long as we have not abandoned the GVN as "neutralized," disarmed, and alone in the face of the enemy. We would hope to whittle down the Viet Cong considerably from 100,000 through the amnesty and social-economic programs. Nevertheless, ^{we have} ~~xxxxxxx~~ _{assumed} ~~xxxxxxx~~ that with infiltration, support and direction substantially reduced, the GVN will be able to handle the problem without our massive military participation.

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Question 11 -- We agree that any such plan is feasible only if fully assumed, endorsed by the GVN. We/~~think~~ however, that the basic elements of this plan should be attractive to the GVN. While initial doubts and worries of the GVN would be entirely understandable, we/~~think~~ ^{assumed} they could be persuaded that it maximizes their chances of achieving a satisfactory outcome. If the Viet Cong does not accept, the military effort to suppress the Viet Cong throughout South Viet-Nam would, of course, continue. But if this occurs, the GVN would have lost nothing and we and they would be in a stronger position.

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Authority STATE letter March 21 1979

By inf, NARS, Date 7-19-79

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 2769 FLASH

Info:

TO AMBASSADORS TAYLOR AND JOHNSON ONLY FROM UNDER SECRETARY

NODIS

We have now reached a point in planning for successive Rolling Thunder operations where we must be clear as to precisely what we are trying to do.

In broad terms, there are two possible approaches to the Vietnamese struggle:

I. The major premise of the first approach is that the war must be won in the South. Under this approach, airstrikes in the North should be regarded as ancillary to our operations in the principal theater. Such air strikes should be designed to achieve three purposes:

A. To raise morale in South Viet-Nam and give credibility to our intention to stay the course.

B. To lower the morale of the North Vietnamese and to create concern in Hanoi that the USG might extend its bombing so

as greatly

Drafted by:

U:GWBall:vh/jt 6/1/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

THE UNDER SECRETARY *gure*

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Read *OR*

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[as greatly to increase the costs of trying to overrun SVN by military]
means.

C. To harass supply lines and reduce the ability of North Viet-Nam to conduct effective infiltration of men and materials.

II. The second approach places much greater emphasis on the total contribution of the air attacks in the North to the ultimate decision. Under this approach our air offensive would^{so} be designed ~~as~~ as to impose increasing pressure on the North Vietnamese until they stopped their action against the South even though we might not be winning the war in the South.

The distinction between these two approaches has direct relevance to the conduct of the air offensive. Since, under the first approach, it is assumed that the war must ultimately be decided in the South, we should avoid those North Vietnamese targets (such as those in the Hanoi-Haiphong area) that would be most likely to trigger a greater Chinese and Soviet intervention. If, as suggested in EMTEL 768, the tonic effect of bombing on South Viet-Nam morale is wearing off, do you believe that this effect would be heightened by intensifying the bombing of North Viet-Nam even though it might bring a larger Chinese and Soviet involvement?

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If on the other hand, we accept the logic of the second proposal, we should presumably be prepared to assume greater risks of Chinese and Soviet involvement in an effort to persuade Hanoi to stop. This means that we might logically proceed, within the relatively near future, to bomb the military installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Such an action would seek to achieve the ultimate US objective without the need to depend on victory in the South which would make the risks of a greater Moscow-Peiping involvement worth assuming.

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The relevance of all this to the present situation is obvious. Action against NVN by US-GVN forces has now reached a critical point. We must decide whether to proceed on one of the three following courses:

The first is to continue progressively to move northward in our air attacks, recognizing that any further movement nearer the Hanoi-Haiphong area poses grave danger of a serious encounter with MIGS that could draw us into attacks on MIG bases and SAM sites and the attendant possibility of greater Chinese and Russian involvement. In fact, the Rolling Thunder operations, for several weeks, have been in areas where the MIGS might easily have engaged. Their failure to do so (except once) may well be because they are waiting for the early activation of the SAM sites. Attacks on Haiphong and Hanoi could be expected to offer the same dangers as strikes on the MIG bases.

A second possibility is to move northward but keep far enough west of the Hanoi-Haiphong area to avoid the range of the SAMs. This would be on the assumption--not yet proven--that this course would offer less danger of escalation. We would like your comments on the validity of this assumption. Would the Chinese permit us

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to approach nearer their territory without reacting?

A third possibility is to expand the present rules to include industrial and other non-military targets that would not entail high civilian casualty rates. This course would permit a continuation of bombing south of the 20th Parallel without providing reactions appreciably different from attacks on the present target systems.

In order to make these decisions we need your answers to the following questions:

1. Do you believe that our best hope is to seek to win the war in the South while employing air attacks in the North for the ancillary purposes outlined in assumption I above maintaining approximately the same level and geographical scope of bombing as Rolling Thunder programs to date?

2. Do you now believe that, in view of the military and political difficulties in SVN we should begin to shape our air effort against the North more in the direction of assumption II above?

3. Do you believe that we would have a reasonable chance of persuading Hanoi to quit by increasing the destructiveness of our air attacks so long as the Viet Cong were winning or at least

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holding their own in the South? If so, do you believe that such pressure could be mounted without unacceptable risks to the United States from an enlarged Soviet/Chinese involvement?

4. Taking into account your answers to the above questions, how do you apply these answers to the requested authorization for Rolling Thunder 17 tomorrow morning? RT 17 includes suggested strikes on target 43, Qui Hau Ammo Depot, which is 12 NM farther north than target 47.11 in RT 16 program, 3 NM closer to Phuc Yen (47 NM) and same distance (40 NM) from Hanoi; target 82.11 Ben Thuy Thermal Power Plant; and target 71/18.17 Ben Thuy Port and Ferry with estimated civilian casualty loss of 59 persons.

Finally let us know how you feel about the method in which authorized strikes are carried out. Do you learn about targets sufficiently in advance? Do you favor existing authority to permit repeated restrikes of given target until given damage level achieved? Should strikes against north ^{be} run daily or intermittently?

Question of IL-28s is being given separate study here.

END

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

CONTROL : 2984
RECD : JUNE 3, 1965, 11:35 AM

Info

FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE PRIORITY 4035

SECTION ONE OF TWO

~~TOP SECRET JUN 3~~

N O D I S

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

RE: DEPTTEL 2769

1. IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTIONS, WE DO NOT SEE HERE THAT THE LINE BETWEEN THE TWO POSSIBLE APPROACHES SET FORTH IN REFTTEL IS QUITE AS SHARP AS IT COMES OUT IN THAT TELEGRAM. THE AIR CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH AND THE ANTI-VIET CONG CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH ARE, IN OUR THINKING, TWO PARTS OF A SINGLE COHERENT PROGRAM. THE AIR ATTACKS HAVE AS THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES THE TERMINATION OF HANOI'S SUPPORT FOR THE VC WHEREAS THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAS AS ITS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE VIET CONG MILITARY APPARATUS WITHIN THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION TO THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, EACH PROGRAM REACTS UPON THE OTHER. THUS, THE ANTI-VIET CONG EFFORT IS MADE EASIER BY ANY REDUCTION OF INFILTRATION, AND THE WILL OF HANOI IS SAPPED BY EVIDENCE OF FAILURE OF THE VIET CONG EFFORT IN THE SOUTH. VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT, THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF HOLDING BACK THE AIR STRIKES IN THE NORTH WHILE MAXIMIZING THE IN-COUNTRY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VIET CONG (APPROACH I) OR OF STEPPING UP THE AIR STRIKES TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE IN-COUNTRY PROGRAM (APPROACH II). RATHER, BOTH SHOULD BE MAXIMIZED CONCURRENTLY, NOT ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTAINING THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, BUT FOR THE COLLATERAL EFFECTS IN SUPPORT OF ONE ANOTHER.

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Authority STATE letter MAR 21 1979

By msg, NARS, Date 7-19-79

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-2- 4035, June 3 (Section One of Two), From Saigon

2. IN FURTHER COMMENT ON APPROACH II, WE SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY FEASIBLE AMOUNT OF BOMBING OF THE NORTH IS OF ITSELF LIKELY TO CAUSE THE DRV TO CEASE AND DESIST IN ITS ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH. SUCH A CHANGE IN DRV ATTITUDES CAN PROBABLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT ONLY WHEN, ALONG WITH A SENSE OF MOUNTING PAIN FROM THE BOMBINGS, THERE IS ALSO A CONVICTION ON THEIR PART THAT THE TIDE HAS TURNED OR SOON WILL TURN AGAINST THEM IN THE SOUTH. OBVIOUSLY THESE TWO CONDITIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MET AND OUR JOB IN THE COMING MONTHS WILL BE TO BRING THEM ABOUT. THIS MAY TAKE A LONG TIME AND WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT QUICK RESULTS. HOLDING THIS VIEW, WE DO NOT HERE SENSE THAT OUR ACTION AGAINST THE DRV BY US-GVN FORCES HAS YET REACHED A "CRITICAL POINT" IN THE SENSE THAT WE MUST SHARPLY CHANGE THE PATTERN AND OBJECTIVES OF OUR ATTACKS AGAINST THE DRV. WE DO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THE PATTERN SHOULD BE CONSTANTLY EVOLVING. OUR AIR ACTIONS AGAINST HANOI SHOULD ALWAYS BE ON AN ASCENDING SCALE EXPRESSED BOTH IN WEIGHT OF EFFORT AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF TARGETS. IT IS TRUE THAT THE LAST TWO ROLLING THUNDERS HAVE HAD SINGLE TARGETS PROGRESSIVELY SOMEWHAT CLOSER TO THE HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA, BUT IN GENERAL AFTER COMMENCING ROLLING THUNDER ATTACKS, WE QUICKLY REACHED A PLATEAU WHICH IS STILL BEING MAINTAINED. ALSO AS SET FORTH IN OUR EMBTEL 3753, WE FEEL THAT THE PATTERN SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE RANDOM. THIS THOUGHT WAS TO SOME EXTENT INCORPORATED IN ROLLING THUNDER 16 AND WEATHER HAS ALSO CONTRIBUTED BY FORCING ON US A MORE RANDOM PATTERN. WE UNDERSTAND THAT WEATHER WILL BE AN INCREASING FACTOR IN THE COMING MONTHS.

3. IF OUR ASSUMPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DRV REACTIONS ARE CORRECT, THERE IS NO STRATEGY THAT CAN BRING ABOUT A QUICK SOLUTION, BUT RATHER OUR STRATEGY MUST BE BASED UPON A PATIENT AND STEADY INCREASE OF PRESSURE FOLLOWING AN ESCALATING PATTERN WHILE MAKING MAXIMUM EFFORT TO TURN THE TIDE HERE IN THE SOUTH. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST "WIN" IN THE SOUTH TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN DRV ATTITUDES, BUT RATHER THE DRV MUST PERCEIVE THAT THE TIDE HAS TURNED OR IS LIKELY SOON TO TURN. HOPEFULLY AT THIS POINT THE DRV WILL SEEK TO FIND SOME WAY OUT, AND IF AND WHEN IT DOES, THERE COULD BE A "BANDWAGON" EFFECT THAT WOULD SO LOWER VC MORALE AND SO RAISE THAT OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS TO PERMIT BRINGING MAJOR HOSTILITIES TO A REASONABLY EARLY CONCLUSION.

4. IN EXTENSION OF THE FOREGOING OBSERVATIONS, WE WOULD ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

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-3- 4035, June 3 (Section One of Two), From Saigon

(A) QUESTION NO. 1 - WE DO NOT BELIEVE IN EMPLOYING AIR ATTACKS IN THE NORTH FOR PURPOSES PRECISELY AS EXPRESSED IN APPROACH I. IN PARTICULAR, WITH REGARD TO NO. I-3, WE WOULD NOT TAKE AS OUR PURPOSE TO "CREATE CONCERN IN HANOI THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT EXTEND ITS BOMBING SO AS GREATLY TO INCREASE THE COSTS OF TRYING TO OVERRUN SOUTH VIETNAM BY MILITARY MEANS". THIS STATEMENT SUGGESTS THAT A FEAR OF POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES ALONE IS OUR MAIN PURPOSE, WHEREAS IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE MUST BE ACTUAL PAIN INFLICTED BY ATTACKS AND, IN ADDITION, THE FEAR OF INCREASED PAIN IN ORDER TO HAVE MAXIMUM EFFECT IN CHANGING HANOI'S BEHAVIOR. OF COURSE, WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO RAISE MORALE IN THE SOUTH AND LOWER MORALE IN THE NORTH, BUT THESE BENEFITS ARE COINCIDENTAL TO THE DRIVE ON THE HANOI WILL TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE VIET CONG. ALSO, WE WOULD LIKE TO DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN THE HARASSMENT OF SUPPLY LINES TO REDUCE EFFECTIVE INFILTRATION, BUT WE RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ATTAINING THIS OBJECTIVE EXCEPT TO A LIMITED DEGREE.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action CONTROL : 2985
RECD : JUNE 3, 1965, 11:37 AM

Info FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE PRIORITY 4035

SECTION TWO OF TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~ JUN 3

N O D I S

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

RE: DEPTTEL 2769

(B) QUESTION NO. 2 - WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD RE-SHAPE OUR AIR EFFORT WITH THE IDEA THAT INCREASED BOMBING WILL COMPENSATE FOR LOSSES ON THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FRONTS IN THE SOUTH. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE WOULD NOT CEASE TO APPLY THE KIND OF MOUNTING PRESSURE DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. WHILE WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WIN ON BOTH FRONTS, NORTH AND SOUTH, WE SHOULD NOT LET UP IN THE NORTH BECAUSE THINGS ARE NOT GOING WELL IN THE SOUTH.

(C) QUESTION NO. 6S* - AS WE HAVE INDICATED ABOVE, THE CHANCE OF PERSUADING HANOI TO LAY OFF WHILE THE VIET CONG ARE WINNING OR HOLDING THEIR OWN IN THE SOUTH IS OBVIOUSLY NOT GOOD. HOWEVER, WE REPEAT THAT THIS FACT IS NO REASON TO LIMIT THE BOMBING EFFORT IN THE NORTH. IT SIMPLY MEANS THAT WE MUST TRY HARDER IN THE SOUTH WHILE BEARING DOWN ON THE NORTH. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY WHETHER ADDED PRESSURE WOULD CREATE UNACCEPTABLE RISKS OF AN ENLARGED SOVIET-CHINESE INVOLVEMENT EXCEPT IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC TARGETS. OBVIOUSLY, ANY EXTENSION OF THE PRESENT TARGET SYSTEM SHOULD BE EXAMINED CLOSELY FOR THIS POINT OF VIEW.

(D) QUESTION NO. 4 - IN CONSIDERATION OF OUR VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE, WE HAVE RECOMMENDED THE APPROVAL OF ROLLING THUNDER 17 (EMBTEL 4004).

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT AUTHORIZED STIKES, THE PRESENT PATTERN IS GENERALLY SATISFACTORY TO US. WE NEED APPROXIMATELY 48 HOURS, FROM RECEIPT OF THE EXECUTION ORDER TO BOMBS ON TARGET, FOR ME TO CLEAR WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND COMMANDER-

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-2- 4085, from Saigon, CN 2985, Section two of two

IN-CHIEF OF THE RVNAF. A TWO-WEEK PROGRAM IS PREFERABLE TO A ONE-WEEK PROGRAM. DESIRABLY, OPERATING UNITS SHOULD RECEIVE THE WARNING ORDER ONE WEEK PRIOR TO EXECUTION IN ORDER TO PERMIT ADEQUATE PLANNING. A TWO-WEEK PROGRAM WITH EXECUTION DELEGATED TO THE OPERATION LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN COPING WITH THE VAGARIES OF THE WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING IN-COUNTRY COMPETITION FOR SORTIES. WHETHER STRIKES ARE MADE DAILY OR INTERMITTENTLY WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE SIGNIFICANT, BUT EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT MORE FREQUENT STRIKES BY FEWER AIRCRAFT REDUCES LOSSES. ADDITIONALLY, VARIED AND REPEATED STRIKES SERVE TO COMPLICATE THE PROBLEM FOR THE DRV DEFENSES.

6. IN ADDITION TO ANSWERING YOUR QUESTIONS, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON TARGETING. DERIVED FROM THE THREE COURSES OF ACTION DISCUSSED IN REFTTEL. AS WE UNDERTAKE THESE THREE COURSES OF ACTION, THE FIRST INVOLVES A PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT NORTHWARD WITHOUT CONSIDERATION FOR THE SENSITIVITY OF THE HANOI/HAIPHONG AREA; THE SECOND MOVE NORTHWARD BUT SIDESLIPS TO THE WEST, AND PERHAPS TO THE EAST, TO AVOID THE SAM'S; AND THE THIRD CONFINES OUR EFFORTS SOUTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL BUT INCLUDES INDUSTRIAL OR NON-MILITARY TARGETS.

7. IN CONSONANCE WITH THE CONCEPT EARLIER EXPRESSED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CONSTANTLY ADD TO THE PRESSURE OF THE DRV. IF WE CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AS IN THE PAST, THE VERY REPETITION OF OUR ACTIONS DESIGNED TO DISRUPT AND MAINTAIN THE DISRUPTION OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS IS IN ITSELF A FORM OF ESCALATION. IN ADDITION, WHILE MAINTAINING THIS INTERDICTION PROGRAM, WE WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE VARIETY BY OCCASIONALLY STRIKING A TARGET ON A RANDOM BASIS OUTSIDE OF THE LOONC PATTERN, SUCH AS A POWER PLANT, MILITARY INSTALLATION, DAM SITE, SUPPLY AREA, INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, DAM SITE, BY SO DOING, WE COMPLICATE THE DRV DEFENSE PROBLEM AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE LIMITED TO NO SINGLE TARGET PLAN. THUS, NOTHING OTHER THAN POPULATED AREAS IS IMMUNE TO ATTACK.

8. UNDER THIS CONCEPT, WE WOULD AVOID THE SENSITIVE AREA OF HANOI/HAIPHONG EXCEPT FOR AN OCCASIONAL WELL SELECTED TARGET WITHIN THE AREA STRUCK TO SHOW THAT WE CAN PENETRATE AND THAT THERE IS NO SURE CANCTUARY. WE DO NOT FEEL THAT AN OCCASIONAL SELECTIVE INTRUSION INTO THIS AREA IS LIKELY TO INVOKE A CHINESE REACTION EVEN THOUGH WE TANGLE WITH MIG'S.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-3- 4085 from Saigon, CN 2985, Section two of two

9. THE NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT NON-MILITARY TARGETS BELOW THE 20TH PARALLEL ARE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN. IN FACT THERE ARE VERY FEW SUCH TARGETS OUTSIDE OF THE HANOI/HAIPHONG COMPLEX. WE AGREE THAT NON-MILITARY TARGETS SHOULD BE STRUCK AS A VARIATION FROM THE LOC PATTERN, BUT ONLY OCCASIONALLY AND SELECTIVELY, BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL.

10. IN SUMMARY WE RECOMMEND A BASIC PATTERN OF LOC TARGETS VARIED OCCASIONALLY BY OTHER KINDS OF TARGETS BOTH SOUTH AND NORTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL TO INCLUDE THE HAOI/HAIPHONG AREA. UPON THIS PATTERN, WE WOULD SUPERIMPOSE A PROGRAM OF FULL FLEDGED PSYWAR OPERATIONS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ROLLING THUNDER. THIS WOULD REQUIRE ONLY A SLIGHT INCREASE IN AIR EFFORT. LEAFLET DROPS SHOULD PRECEDE AND SOMETIMES ACCOMPANY STRIKES, HAVING THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF ROLLING THUNDER AND OF MAGNIFYING POPULAR ANXIETY.

11. WE APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS ON THESE IMPORTANT SUBJECTS.

TAYLOR

* AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED ON REQUEST.

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