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 By isp, NARS, Date 3-26-79

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OUTLINE OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
 FOR INCREASED US MILITARY SUPPORT IN VIETNAM

- I. The reason for increased support is the same reason for which we have given support all these years. So that there may be no doubt, and because of legitimate public concern over this unhappy situation, let me repeat the factual basis on which we are operating.
- a) Whatever elements of a civil war exist in SVN today are heavily outweighed by the attempt by NVN to overthrow the established government of SVN.
 - b) Their attempt is to establish that a small revolutionary group can take over a country through brutal terror and assassination.
 - 1) The group is small. The Viet Cong constitute about 1% (?) of the population of South Vietnam. Whatever percentage of the territory of SVN is controlled by the VC, the important fact is that the highest responsible estimate of the percentage of population under VC control is 20% (?). This percentage includes their organized armed forces plus some 100,000 irregular supporters. The regular armed forces of the VC number about 75,000. 40,000 have been infiltrated from the North. Last year, 75% of those infiltrators were NV with no plur or reason for being in SVN except to wage war.

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- 2) The VC is not popular. From areas where they have destroyed the regular government and installed their own form of rule, some 350,000 refugees have fled to government controlled areas. The flow of refugees going the other way is in a ratio of 1 to 100 (?).
- 3) The VC relies on terror. The VC basic method of seeking to gain control has been assassination. In 1964, over 9,500 civilians and public officials assassinated, etc.
- 4) Both men and materials have been and are being supplied from the North. Long before we bombed NVN, it was actively fomenting and supplying this attack.
 - a) Troops -- in violation of Geneva Conventions of 1954, and 1962, NVN has put armed troops through Laos into South Vietnam. Facts and figures. Deals (uniforms, regular units, etc.)
 - b) Weapons -- stolen and captured weapons have helped, but this has been a minor part of weapons needs.
 - In a typical cache of weapons captured in April, of 101 weapons, 90% of the small arms and all heavier arms were of communist bloc manufacture, mostly Chicom.

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-/ During the last year, weapons are being standardized on a ___ caliber model which will not fire US ammunition, but all ammo must come from the North.

c) Direction and control. The fighting and the terror is being directed from NVN. Coded communications, etc., coming in every day. Enough messages to . . .
(review(again) how much we can say here)

5) If we pulled out, the war would go on anyway(?)

While the northern inspired VC can seriously disrupt the government of the South, the half-million men of the GVN armed forces will not quit. Even a complete US withdrawal would bring no promise of peace, only increased and prolonged battle, in which death and chaos would be only victors.

II. Our objectives remain limited. Increasing our effort must not be understood by anyone, friend or foe, as increasing our demands. This is not a war against change. It is designed to permit radical social change by the people of South Vietnam as they wish.

1) We are not fighting to gain colonial territory for the US or to give us military bases.

As when we went into Turkey and Greece, the US is prepared to leave -- and will leave -- if the Security

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Council of the United Nations so requests... and for this purpose we will not exercise the veto.

- 2) We are not fighting to preserve a particular group of generals or leaders as the government of South Vietnam.

Here we might make some statement of a GVN pledge on elections which would be specific enough to overcome skepticism, arising from Geneva Accords history.

- 3) We are not fighting against the unification of South Vietnam.

The government of South Vietnam has proposed trade and customs unions and negotiations looking toward a confederation. We are fighting to prevent conquest here, and the example that would set for all others.

- 4) We are fighting to prevent an outside government from overthrowing by force and violence the government of South Vietnam.

III. The build-up of US military forces is designed to accomplish two major objectives:

- a) To choke off the flow of men and arms from NVN.

Our air and naval efforts alone cannot do this job. They must be supplemented by direct measures on the ground. We shall continue to carry on our air and sea operations to the extent that we deem them effective.

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- b) To demonstrate to the VC that they cannot achieve victory in the South.

Our increased forces will be available not only to defend our own bases and to support the defense of major population centers, but also to help break up major VC concentrations in SVN. These actions will break the strength built up by past infiltration and make it possible for the people of SVN to settle their political future by political means.

As we increase our forces, we will not escalate our objectives. We are not trying to conquer North Vietnam or to defeat socialist or communist ideology by military means.

Without increasing our forces, the ~~xx~~ fighting might go on indefinitely. With this increased effort we can look forward to a day when the border has been clearly closed and the internal problem, if not ended, at least relieved to where it can be handled by the government and the people of South Vietnam.

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POINTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

1. I think many of the ideas included in my draft outline of June 12, but not used in the Rusk speech of June 23, might fit the present framework. I refer particularly to the parts dealing with:

- our basic goals in Asia
- the successive stages of the commitment and the similarity in the types of decision that have been faced at each stage
- the references to our political and economic measures (which could be further filled out)
- the reference to the attitudes of third countries
- the progressive sequence in Section VI.

I enclose that outline for your convenience.

2. On the one hand, we want to depict the present decision not as a new and separate escalation decision by the US, but as the essential response to increased VC strength and DRV involvement. But at the same time we do not want to indicate that we are simply responding, and we want to get in the theme that these decisions mean we are making ourselves ready to take initiatives but within South Vietnam. In this connection we have not made use in any speech of Giap's stages of guerrilla war, and we could use the theme that since December the other side has obviously been preparing to move, and in part is actually moving, to what its doctrine regards as the third and decisive stage,

conventional operations. We should dig up Giap quotes and, if we can find them, recent references to this end. We should also get the evidence that now establishes not only that individual DRV regulars started to enter SVN in the summer of 1964, but that at least parts of the 325th Division showed up in December and January. Here we have to frame it carefully, and check the dates at which we confirmed the presence of such units, while also making ~~clear~~ clear that subsequent evidence indicates the units were introduced in December or January, before we were ready to confirm them. One point is that, without underscoring it, we want to refute any contention that the 325th came in only after our bombing of the North.

3. The message needs to be quite blunt and specific on the present manpower ratio and GVN reserve shortage, which is going to be the core of the argument that additional forces are essential and that without them the situation will deteriorate seriously (Ford argument).

4. The Yarmolinsky draft omitted any reference to our bombing of the DRV. This must be included, and we must continue to justify the February decisions, and make the point that the air attacks remain an essential ingredient. The text on pages 18 - 20 of the June 12 outline cover it pretty well.

5. We naturally need to ~~fix~~ have something on the negotiating record, making clear that Hanoi remains obdurate on the clear reading of the record.

6. We must have a strong section on the economic aspect of our effort

drawing on the President's May 13

~~drawing on the President's May 13~~ speech and stressing that a major

element in the VC offensive has now become the attack on the whole economy -- transportation, rice supply, etc -- and that we also confront the problem of dealing with the refugees from the VC.

7. We need to underscore that the South Vietnamese themselves are still fighting strongly and doing their part. The ~~casualties~~ casualty figures should be used and the desertion rate discussed briefly, indicating that it is not at all the defection in "masses" depicted by Walter Lippmann. We should underscore that the government continues to have its officials in place throughout the country, and that these civilian officials continue to perform despite the savage terrorism directed against them. We should make clear that the political difficulties in Saigon have never meant a difference of opinion in resisting the VC, and that no significant figure, however disaffected, has ever gone over to the VC in recent years despite the obvious opportunity to do so.

8. In stating our peace objectives, we must again refer to Tran Van Do's four points and again add our own statement about a free popular determination on reunification. This could be put in the context of our basic world position in favor of self determination and refraining from the use of ~~force~~ force. (The Appeal of the Seventeen (attached) has a useful quote, and it would be particularly timely to refer favorably to the Seventeen at this moment.) Stevenson's last TV statement in London,

on the question of force, likening Korea to South Vietnam, also put this pretty well, and a quote from Stevenson would have a lot of appeal at this moment.

9. In the very concluding section, the statement should again --- as on April 7, and perhaps with quotes from that speech -- refer to the great work of economic and social progress as what we would really wish to do. This should be a reiteration of the development theme, and there has been some progress even since the Rusk speech on which the President could report ~~be~~ briefly. (We will provide material here.) In this ~~connection~~ connection, we should consider saying not only that we are ready for unconditional discussions on Vietnam, but that we look forward once this conflict is settled, to agreements (by implication including Communist China) that would stabilize the whole situation in Asia, remove the threat of aggression, and ~~make it possible~~ make it possible for the peoples of the area to work on their critical economic problems which exist in the Communist and non-Communist countries alike. We could refer specifically to the population problem and say that the solution to that problem ~~lies~~ lies in each nation concentrating on its own welfare and progress and not, as in the past, seeking to meet its problems by external aggression.

WPBundy/bmm June 23, 1965

D R A F T
W. P. Bundy/bmm
June 12, 1965

OUTLINE OF A MAJOR SPEECH ON VIETNAM

I. INTRODUCTION

The Administration has repeatedly explained its basic purposes in Vietnam, its view of the situation, and the actions being taken under the basic policy of assisting the South Vietnamese Government and people to preserve their freedom. The President particularly explained the three basic elements of our policy -- determination, readiness for discussions, and willingness to support peaceful development in the whole area -- in his major speech of April 7th.

Since then, developments in the military and political situation have naturally caused increasing concern and have led to further American actions. Hence, the time has come for ~~another~~ another report ~~to~~ to the American people dealing not only with the immediate situation but with the background of our commitment to Vietnam, the policy alternatives we have faced at each stage in the last eleven years, the policy alternatives we presently face, and the course that the government proposes to follow.

II. OUR BASIC PURPOSES IN ASIA

Our policy in Vietnam cannot be separated from ^{our} ~~all the~~ wider purposes in Asia, and indeed in the world. In Asia, as elsewhere, what we seek is that nations should be free to develop as they see fit without

interference from others. The tide of emerging nationalism is surely the great tide of contemporary history. We stand with that tide, believing not only that the freedom and self-determination of all nations, great and small, best meets the underlying desire of the peoples of the world for a ^{voice} ~~choice~~ in their destiny and their economic progress, but that only in such a world can we ourselves remain free from the threat of aggression and able to develop over time those deep and abiding relationships with other countries that will knit together a peaceful world.

In Asia, we thought that the defeat of the ambitions of militarist Japan in 1945 had ended the threat of domination by any one nation in that ^{looked} area. We ~~look~~ to the day ~~was~~ when colonial holdings would be ~~er~~ eliminated and we ourselves acted rapidly to fulfill our pre-war commitment to free the Philippines. Then, as now, we had no territorial ambitions in Asia and we stood ready to work with all nations striving to maintain their independence and to improve the lot of their peoples. For the outcome of the war had inevitably deepened the involvement of the United States as a ^{crucially} Pacific power, and had created a situation in which our help was ~~crucially~~ needed and wanted, and in which -- as we had recognized in the Pacific theater in World War II -- it was in our deepest national interest to provide that help.

Three events in the immediate post-war period set the stage for the type of problems we have been wrestling with in Asia, in a steady ~~and~~

and consistent line of policy, for at least the last twelve years.

a. Mainland China was unified and restored to independence, which had been a major objective for which Americans had lost their lives in World War II. But China came under the control of a regime virulently Communist and dedicated to the expansion not merely of Chinese influence but of Chinese domination through whatever methods might prove effective.

b. A Communist regime was established in a divided Korea, and that regime joined with the Soviet Union, and later with Communist China, in outright armed attack on the free nation of South Korea. The US joined with _____ other nations to repel that attack, and played the major role in the conflict, suffering _____ thousand casualties. The continuing threat of aggression had shown its face, but in this case it had been met. Time had been gained not merely in Korea, but in the other free nations, to consolidate their independence and to work out their future.

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c. The ~~relaxation~~ of colonial control proceeded on schedule in the Philippines, well in Burma and in what is now Malaysia, with some difficulty in Indonesia, but with its greatest problems and difficulties in what had been French Indochina. There, the promise of independence was delayed, and nationalist forces fell under the control of dedicated Communist leadership. The result was the effective expulsion of France as a power force in

the area, the creation of/Communist regime in North Vietnam, and the separation and separate national status of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Worn by war, with no recent experience in, and little preparation for, self-government, these newly emerged nations stood, together with Thailand, Malaya, and Burma, in a mainland Southeast Asia under the continuing threat of Communist Chinese expansion and also of North Vietnamese ambitions to control ~~the~~ at the least the whole of what had been French Indochina.

III. EVOLUTION OF THE US COMMITMENT

This was the situation that confronted the U. S. in the summer of 1954.

The first response was the formation of SEATO. Concluded in August of 1954, the SEATO Treaty was ratified by the Senate in October 1954 by a vote of _____. Under the treaty, each of the signatories, including the U. S. accepted the obligation to act to assist against conventional aggression not only ~~in~~ ^{and} other member of the Treaty, but also what were designated as "protocol states," including South Vietnam, if those nations so requested. ^{The US and most of the members of} ~~The individual nations in~~ SEATO have consistently recognized that, as the U.S. itself made explicit in the case of Thailand in 1962, the obligations of the Treaty applied to each nation individually. They have in fact been accepted and acted on by member nations in the assistance each has rendered to South Vietnam.

(Add highlight material from SEATO hearings and other ~~events~~ evidence of Congressional support).

The SEATO treaty dealt primarily with the threat of conventional aggression on the Korea model, ^{the it also referred to the subversive threat.} It necessarily left open the question of what each nation could do to assist the nations of the area toward stability and economic progress, and an adequate degree of military security, so that in fact the threat of aggression ^{in any form} would be deterred and prevented.

In the case of South Vietnam, the problem of such assistance became ^{acute} ~~clear~~ late in 1954. Though the new government of Diem has only begun to find its feet, it was already clear that there existed in South Vietnam elements of national unity -- even though there were many of division as well, even at that time -- and that there was above all a common bond of Communism resistance to rule by ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ or from Hanoi and a determination to seek a different political and economic structure in South Vietnam.

Accordingly, President Eisenhower in December 1954 made the decision to extend substantial economic assistance to South Vietnam. In so doing, he stated our basic ~~purposes~~ purposes in terms that still apply; (from Eisenhower).

At about the same time, President Eisenhower's Administration likewise decided, within the scope of the Geneva Accords of 1954, to extend military assistance to South Vietnam. A small military assistance contingent was established and the work of creating a military ~~force~~ force, designed solely for the ^{defense} ~~division~~ of the country and never possibly threatening

any other people, was begun.

Under our American system, the continuing programs of economic and military assistance that resulted from these decisions were subject ^{annual} to ~~annual~~ Congressional review and to Congressional appropriations making them possible. Beginning in 1955, the Congress has each year approved over-all economic and military assistance programs in which the continuation of major assistance to South Vietnam has been specifically ~~specified~~ explained and justified.

(Excerpts from appropriate hearings and statements)

By 1956 what had been accomplished in South Vietnam could well be considered, in the words of ^{many observers} ~~an academic authority~~ at the time, a "miracle". It was in any event a fact, that a new nation, recognized initially by 35 ^{had} and now by 56 nations as an independent state, ~~was~~ established itself. And in the period between 1954 and 1960, when aggression began in earnest, the new nation of South Vietnam, despite imperfections and even a degree of repression in its political system, accomplished, with our help, major gains in the spread of education, the beginnings of land reform, and the economic ~~xxx~~ wellbeing of its people.

In 1956, too, as this process was underway, the issue was faced whether North and South Vietnam ~~could~~ should be reunified, under the provisions of the Geneva Accords calling for free elections to this end. At that time, the U. S. Government took the position that, as in the case of other divided countries such as Korea and Germany, it was prepared for free elections

under appropriate international supervision. The South Vietnamese Government expressed the same view. Nonetheless, it was apparent to all impartial observers, and is amply demonstrated in their statements at the time, that the conditions for free elections did not exist in North Vietnam, and that North Vietnam was not in fact prepared -- or perhaps South Vietnam either, to be honest -- for anything that could have been considered a free ^{expression} election of the popular will without intimidation or coercion. Thus, the issue of reunification was deferred and continues to be deferred until such a free election becomes possible. Similar elections have been repeatedly rejected by the Communist side in Korea and in Germany and it remains to be seen whether the Communist regime in North Vietnam would ever be prepared for an action that might strike at the very basis of the Communist system of government.

In short, during the period 1954 to 1960, an independent South Vietnam had clearly emerged and was widely recognized as independent by virtually every substantial nation in the free world. And there had developed, through the SEATO treaty, the statements of President Eisenhower and other Administration officials, ^{and} ~~that~~ the actions of the Congress in ratifying the SEATO Treaty and in approving continuing appropriations to assist South Vietnam, a clear U. S. commitment to assist South Vietnam to maintain its independence and to improve the welfare of its people.

IV. THE AGGRESSION FROM NORTH VIETNAM

From the outset, Hanoi had envisaged that it would control all of Vietnam. It had supposed that it might gain its ends by collapse in the South, or perhaps by rigged elections in 1956. It may even have supposed it possible that, in the contest of competing political and economic systems, North Vietnam could become a model that would eventually attract the people of South Vietnam to a similar system.

By 1960, all of these hopes had been dashed. Though South Vietnam had major latent political problems, it must have appeared to Hanoi that these problems would sooner or ~~later~~ later be worked out by the people of ~~South Vietnam~~ *South Vietnam* ~~Hanoi~~ in their own way, and it must have been totally clear that the economy of South Vietnam was outstripping that of North Vietnam, despite the major assistance North Vietnam had received at various stages from Communist China and Soviet Russia.

Hanoi could not let this situation continue. Already in 1954, it had retained major political cadres in the South together with substantial caches of arms designed for use when the occasion arose. Beginning in late 1959, it began to send to South Vietnam ~~xxx~~ thousands of trained subversive and military leaders in order to build a systematic political and military effort to defeat and overthrow the Government of South Vietnam by force. The control of that movement was and is carried out from Hanoi through the Communist Party in North Vietnam and a separate branch of the Communist Party created in South Vietnam and led by key leaders from the North. The latter, in turn, controlled ~~control~~ then, and controls today, the so-called National Liberation Front,

which of course has the customary Communist front facade of alleged leaders not identified with Communism but which, in the words of a recent French observer, is simply a classic example of the type of organization created by a Communist movement to give the appearance of responsibility and broad support but in fact totally under Communist control at all times. (Here insert quote from recent Chaffard articles).

V. THE U. S. RESPONSE TO NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION

In the period up to late 1961, by far the greatest part of U. S. assistance to South Vietnam had been in the economic sphere. We had provided _____ billion of economic assistance, as against only _____ of military assistance. Even though this economic assistance had not always been wisely used, it reflected the basic principle that the welfare of the people is fundamental. That principle is still reflected in the heroic effort by the South Vietnamese themselves and by our own American assistance personnel, to carry on in the ^{face} ~~face~~ of the external difficulties and hazards created by Communist terrorism.

But by late 1961 it had become clear that increased assistance was required on the military front. Already, the evidence was abundant that North Vietnam had violated the non-interference provisions of the Geneva Accords in wholesale fashion and was seeking to take over the South by an ingenious and sophisticated campaign of subversion and terror amounting in every fundamental respect to outright aggression. The great burden of meeting

that campaign fell, as it falls today, on the South Vietnamese themselves. But ~~that~~ they needed and asked -- as they have done at every stage since -- for greater American help.

So, in December 1961, President Kennedy faced a decision essentially similar to those that your government has faced at every stage since then.

a. He could have withdrawn and disavowed the US commitment.

b. He could have sought to negotiate with Hanoi in circumstances where, then as now, it was clear that the only basis of negotiation Hanoi would have accepted would have been the admission of Communist leaders of the Liberation Front in the Viet Cong to leading positions in the Government of South Vietnam. Then, as now, it was clear that such a so-called "solution" would inevitably have meant ~~that~~ progressive and probably rapid Communist takeover in the South.

c. He could have let matters stand and accepted the virtual certainty of progressive deterioration and the taking over of the country by aggression.

At the other extreme, he could have sought to apply the full range of American military power against North Vietnam itself.

President Kennedy's decision chose none of these possible alternatives. His decision was that American military personnel should be introduced to assist the South Vietnamese military forces in every possible respect, through advice, air combat training, communications and supply, and providing mobility through helicopters and air transport aircraft. In short, he chose the course that has been the central thread of US policy right along -- the ~~measured~~ measured application of US military power, as and to the extent required by the pressures from North Vietnam, while leaving essentially to the South Vietnamese Government and people the principal responsibility, which they alone could bear, of defeating this particular type of subversive aggression disguised as a rebel movement.

In essence, while the assistance itself has necessarily been greater, this basic formula and thread of policy has been that which dictated US policy in the support of Greece and the Philippines in resisting similar, though much less sophisticated and dangerous, Communist subversive campaigns.

In taking his decision, President Kennedy ~~expressly~~ expressly stated what he was doing and why. (Excerpts from Kennedy statements of December 1961, and January 1962). The exact scope of the intended US effort was likewise made clear by senior officials of the Administration to the Congress, and was expressly supported in the Congress by appropriations action and by Congressional statements. (Appropriate citations).

* * * * *

The course of action thus ~~laid~~ laid out by President Kennedy, carrying out the basic commitment of long standing, remained the basis of American action from 1962 until February 1965. In this period, much progress was made through 1962 and the early months of 1963, and ~~it became~~ there began to be hope that the Viet Cong action could be brought under control ~~ix~~ with only this degree of US assistance. In the spring of 1963, the belief that this was ~~possible~~ possible was held not only by US officials on the spot, but by responsible third country observers. (Quotes if possible).

* ————— *

At this stage, two developments occurred to cause a persisting downward trend.

a. the Diem Government encountered serious political difficulties. It had become increasingly authoritarian and narrowly based, and, despite quiet American advice, had failed to renew and carry through various needed programs of political and economic reform. The resulting discontent, accentuated and played upon by VC propaganda and pressures, including the continued tactic of assassination of civilian officials ~~throughout~~ throughout the country, finally expressed itself in the Buddhist-led disturbances of the summer of 1963. When the Diem Government reacted by violent repression directed at the Buddhists and also at the student elements, its position finally became untenable and it was ~~overthrown~~ ^{overthrown} in November 1963.

It is useless at this point to try to decide whether this change was justified. It certainly had the wide support of articulate political sentiment in South Vietnam. In essence, ~~that~~ it represented a stage in the political evolution of the country, comparable to the stages through which many new countries have ~~passed~~ ^{passed} in the Far East and in other areas of the world. Had there been no Viet Cong pressure, the change would probably have meant a period of internal political ferment and the gradual emergence of a more broadly based framework of ⁱⁿ government in South Vietnam. ~~Something~~ Something like this has happened in such other newly emerged countries as Pakistan and South Korea.

But in the case of South Vietnam, the country did not enjoy the peace that was necessary if it was to find its own feet, overcome the legacy of inexperience and lack of training, and work out its own system of government. The relentless Viet Cong campaign immensely increased the ~~difficulty~~ difficulty of a process that could have been in itself normal and healthy. And the result has been the rapid changes in government of the past 19 ~~months~~ months.

But this too is not new; let us remind ourselves, that under similar Communist pressures, Greece in 1947-48 ~~went~~ went through no less than (7) changes of government, and yet

managed in the end to hold on and to defeat a very similar externally-supported Communist subversive effort. The remarkable thing is less that there has been political turmoil than that that political turmoil has not as yet prevented the army and people of South Vietnam from continuing to make a tremendous effort to beat back the Viet Cong and to retain control of their own affairs.

b. Throughout this period, the Viet Cong pressure was continued and intensified. We now believe that over 12,000 hard-core fighters and political leaders were introduced into South Vietnam in 1962, with the total dropping in 1963, but increasing greatly again in 1964. These figures, totalling at least 40,000 by the beginning of 1965, cannot be measured in standard ~~military~~ military terms or against the strength levels either of the Vietnamese forces or of the American military personnel who have been introduced to assist South Vietnam. Rather, their significance can be judged if we try to imagine a comparable infusion of dedicated Communist fighters to disrupt the whole political and social structure of a major country. In terms of the US population, these hard-core infiltrators would have amounted to roughly 500,000 saboteurs and fighters operating from secure and largely remote areas to strike above all at the mayors and officials of American cities and towns. In the face of such a campaign, where historic

experience in Malaya, in the Philippines, and Greece has indicated the need for ratios ranging from 7 to 1 to 20 to 1 in ~~vixixix~~ favor of government forces, there is no wonder that the Viet Cong have had successes or that the Government of ^SSouth Vietnam has been under constant strain in seeking to ~~defeat~~ ^{defend} its population, throughout the country with necessarily over-extended government forces. The governments ratio of forces has ~~necessarily~~ ^{usually} been in the vicinity of 5 to 1: by the end of 1964 and early 1965, this ratio had shrunk to about 4 to 1, even though the mobility, fire power, and air support, largely contributed by the US, served to offset somewhat the effects of this inadequate ratio.

* * * * *

The US response to these developments, under my Administration, has been to take every possible action to make the American supporting effort fully effective. We have taken the best men we could find for positions of responsibility in Saigon, and have chosen the pick of our armed forces for service in South Vietnam, often on a voluntary basis. Nor have we thought for one minute that the effort was military alone. Our Embassy and our economic aid mission have been staffed by the wisest and most dedicated

men we could find, and there can be no exaggerating the heroism of these men and women, particularly those who have gone into the countryside, day in and day out, usually unguarded, to work with South Vietnamese officials and to provide for the Vietnamese people the fertilizers, wells, pigs, school buildings, that symbolize not only their government's concern for the people of South Vietnam but also the continued hope of the United States Government for the improvement of the standards of living of the South Vietnamese people and of all the people of Southeast Asia. (Appropriate excerpts from President's speech of May 13.)

Concurrently, the assistance of other free world nations to South Vietnam has been greatly increased. Already in the spring of 1964 _____ other nations were contributing various forms of economic and military help. Since that time, the total has grown so that there are today (38) nations assisting South Vietnam in one form or another. In particular, the nations of SEATO -- acting in accordance with strong SEATO resolutions adopted at the meetings of 1964 and again this year -- have been acting under their Treaty obligations. Australia has already contributed a battalion, New Zealand combat forces will soon arrive in South Vietnam, and the Philippines are currently debating a decision for a 2,000-man force. Though Thailand and Britain are necessarily occupied, respectively, with the problems of the defense of Thailand itself and the difficult situation in ~~Malaysia~~ Malaysia, they too have strongly supported the Vietnamese effort.

In addition, other ~~Asian~~ nations have come forward with major help. South Korea has a contingent of 2000 men and may be in a position to contribute further forces in the near future. Japan and the Republic of China have contributed economic help and technicians. Malaysia has assisted in specialized training based on its experience in defeating Communist aggression.

In short, the free nations in the area most vitally affected by the threat of the Communist expansion have, with only a few exceptions, come forward in support of South Vietnam. They know, as we do, that if South Vietnam is over-run by Communist aggression, the threat to the rest of mainland Southeast Asia will be greatly increased, as will the threat to nations in the rest of Asia to the east, to the north, and to the west.

VI. THE EVENTS SINCE FEBRUARY 1965

Despite all these measures by the US and other nations, and the continued steadfast resistance of the South Vietnamese army and people, the situation in early 1965 was continuing to deteriorate. Moreover, it had become marked, since the spring of 1964, by specific attacks on American personnel and installations, designed to show that the US was not in fact prepared to carry through its commitment. Of course, the most dramatic example of such an attack had been the naval action by North Vietnamese forces against US ~~destroyer~~ destroyers in the international waters of the Gulf of ~~COCHINCHINA~~ Tonkin in August, 1964. That attack had been met by appropriate air attacks against North Vietnamese naval installations

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showing the North Vietnamese that the US was prepared to respond against North Vietnam itself if that became necessary.

The attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964 were also the occasion for an affirmation of US determination, expressed in the form of

the Congressional Resolution of August 1964 ^Under that Resolution, the Congress by an over-all vote of ⁵¹²502-to 2, expressed its support for actions by the Executive, "including the use of ^{ARMED}military force," to meet aggression in Southeast Asia, including specifically the aggression against South Vietnam. The inherent power of the Executive to commit US forces in defense of US interests was thus reaffirmed and endorsed specifically for the case of South Vietnam. The Resolution, and the Congressional debate, specifically envisaged that, subject to continuing Congressional consultation, ~~combat~~ the armed forces of the US might be committed in the defense of South ~~Vietnam~~ Vietnam in any way desired, including employment in combat. (Quotes from debate.)

Nonetheless, the Viet Cong ~~campaign~~ campaign of infiltration grew steadily in the closing months of 1964, terrorism and attacks on the South Vietnamese continued, and there were specific attacks on the American ^{at} ^{December,} air bases ~~at~~ ~~in~~ Bien Hoa and, in ~~the~~ the Viet Cong sabotage of an American officers quarters in Saigon. Plainly, the Viet Cong were engaged in an attempt to terrorize Americans and discredit the American role as a part of their total effort to undermine and take over the government and people of South Vietnam.

The climax came on February 7th. The Viet Cong engaged in a series of attacks on American and South Vietnamese installations, killing at Pleiku alone _____ Americans and wounding _____ others.

The United States was forced to another point of decision.

Although that decision expressed itself in an immediate response by air attack against North Vietnam, the decision was not sudden. It came against the background, for a year, of measured deliberation within the Executive Branch of exactly the same alternatives that had confronted President Kennedy in 1961. Again, as then:

- a. We could have withdrawn and abandoned South Vietnam to its fate.
- b. We or the South Vietnamese Government could have sought to negotiate what could only have been a Communist takeover.
- c. We could have taken no further action, ~~accepting~~ accepting the inevitable deterioration of the situation including the clear and present danger of continuing major attacks on Americans.
- d. We could have unleashed our full military power against North Vietnam.

Again, we chose none of these. Rather, your government decided, and I as President made clear on February 17, that we would engage in continued, measured, and fitting air action against North Vietnamese military targets directly related to the North Vietnamese effort in the South. From the military standpoint this effort was aimed to reduce North Vietnam's capacity to provide men and weapons to the South; we knew that it could not do so completely, but we expected, and the evidence has

shown, that we could make it far more difficult and costly.

From the political standpoint we knew that such attacks could not be expected in any short period to bring Hanoi to the required decision to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong and to permit South Vietnam to determine its own affairs without external interference. We knew that Hanoi was tough and that its aggressive campaign against South Vietnam represented a long and deeply held ambition. We believed that Hanoi would not give the word to desist as long as it thought it could succeed in the South. ^P But we believed equally that the air attacks on the North could become an essential ingredient in eventually bringing Hanoi to that decision, when it became clear that the costs of the effort in the South were in fact great and unending, and that the South Vietnamese Government and people, with our help, could not be ~~is~~ defeated. Without the air attacks Hanoi might have expected to fight to the end in the South without ~~its~~ ^{itself} suffering any harm. Such a concept of sanctuary had to be ended once and for all, not only for the sake of this conflict, but as an example of what would happen to other nations that might attempt similar types of aggression against other free nations that might call on the US, or any other nation, for support. ^P As I have said, the objective of the air attacks, and of all our actions to assist South Vietnam, was related to direct military need. But it was also ~~essentially~~ political in its purpose. In essence, by the continued and firm demonstration that the US would follow through, we were seeking to persuade Hanoi that it must accept a political solution. And we were seeking also, through the

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restoration of an independent South Vietnam and the restoration of peace to the area, to prepare the way for an Asian - initiated program of economic progress and development throughout Southeast Asia.

And so, after the pattern of air attack ~~that~~^{had} underscored our determination, I spoke to the nation and to the world on April 7 in order to spell out in unmistakable terms our threefold purpose -- determination, readiness for discussions, and willingness to assist in an international program of development for the whole area, including North Vietnam itself in conditions of peace. I made clear that our readiness for discussions was unconditional, and that I myself would go to any length to obtain an honorable political solution. Equally, I made clear that, even before peace had been restored, the US was prepared to further Asian initiatives for development. Through the United Nations and its Secretary General, ~~the~~ contacts with a number of Asian nations, and the supporting efforts of this government under the leadership of a distinguished American, Mr. Eugene Black, the effort is in full swing. ~~But~~ both to find a basic framework for long-term economic development in the area and to get ahead at once with ~~its~~ those projects that can be carried out under existing conditions.

Meanwhile, efforts to find ~~a~~ a peaceful solution had been made, and continue to be made, by the British Government, the 17 non-aligned nations, the Government of India, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and a number of other interested governments and parties.

I have asked the Department of State to prepare a summary of these initiatives and indeed of the whole record of negotiating activity by the United States in relation to Southeast Asia over the last 4 1/2 years. That record shows beyond a doubt how unrelenting has been the effort of this government to find honorable and constructive solutions.

Yet, at every turn, this effort for peace has been ~~twisted~~ thwarted. Hanoi, and even more, Peiping, has made it clear that the Communist side is not now prepared even for discussions without clearly unacceptable conditions. Hanoi has made it ~~clear~~ ^{clear} that it is ~~now~~ ^{not} prepared, either, to reduce its actions in response to such initiatives on our part as the pause in bombing in the middle of May, or to set in train a sequence of reciprocal actions that might turn out to be the best avenue to a solution. In short, Hanoi has made it crystal clear, by word and deed, that it is inflexibly set on achieving its objective of bringing about a Communist South Vietnam. Until Hanoi sees that it will not be allowed to attain this aim without unacceptable costs, I am afraid that the Hanoi position, as it has revealed itself in recent months and indeed for years, ~~cannot~~ cannot be expected to change.

Thus, the prospects for peace bring us inevitably back ~~xxx~~ to the issue of blunting and driving back the campaign of the Viet Cong in the South. In the ~~face~~ ^{face} of that campaign, and of Hanoi's attitude, ~~this~~ ^{your} government has had

no choice but to continue taking every necessary ~~xxxx~~ and feasible action to assist South Vietnam to maintain its elf and to drive back the Viet Cong.

As I have said earlier, the situation on the ground i South Vietnam remains in many respects favorable to the Viet Cong. Because of the inadequate ratio of government forces, the Viet Cong is in a position to strike selectively at villages and towns throughout South Vietnam, and also the threaten the key installations on which US supporting power is based.

To meet these needs, I have ordered a series of carefully located US Combat forces/ deployments to key areas in South Vietnam. These ~~xxxxxx~~ deployments began with the arrival of 9,000 Marines in the Da Nang area in (early April). In late April, the decisio was made to deploy forces to two other areas, the vicinity of the Bien Hoa airbase near Saigon and the are of Chu Lai in central Vietnam, south of Da Nang, in order to protect and permit the construction of an additional and vitally needed airbase in that location.

These deployments have x had as their basic purpose the protect of our air power in South Vietnam, which since March has been fully employed in attacks against the Viet Cong, far outweighing ~~xxxx~~ in actual numbers the aircraft employed for strikes against the North. The ~~xxx~~ primary mission of our combat forces -- which today numb er about 13,500 ground forces out of our total military strength of 53,500 in South Vietnam,

has been to provide security in these key areas. For this purpose, these ground forces are of course engaged in patrolling and securing action in the vicinity of the areas being protected. Their presence and their activity also serve to release for general combat duty South Vietnamese forces that would otherwise have had to be employed to protect the areas.

In addition, as had been foreshadowed to the press in Saigon and Washington since early in May, and as was made explicitly clear in the White House announcement of last week, General Westmoreland, our commander in the field, has the discretionary authority to employ these forces at the request of the appropriate South Vietnamese commander in support of South Vietnamese forces faced with attack and where other reserves are not effectively available. This is not a general combat employment of US forces; it does mean that they will not stand idly by and see South Vietnamese forces exposed to ^{dangers} ~~dangerous~~ and losses where the timely use of US forces could assist in preventing this, in an emergency.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ I come now to the question of additional ~~reinforcement~~ of US forces. In the last three weeks, it has become clear that the Viet Cong are engaged in a widespread offensive, taking advantage of the fact that the ~~monsoon~~ monsoon rainy season makes it more difficult for the South Vietnamese and ourselves to make full use of air mobility and air striking power. In this offensive, it is already clear that ~~XXXXXXXX~~

hard-core Viet Cong strength has been substantially increased during the winter months and now numbers an estimated _____ thousand hard-core combat forces, ~~xxxx~~ ^{another} _____ thousand hard-core military forces in supporting role, and an estimated _____ thousand militia and local part-time forces. These increases have come, ~~we~~ believe, largely through infiltration in the earlier part of the winter, ^{the extent of} which we and the South Vietnamese are normally not in a position to detect or confirm until the forces are actually employed. This growing infiltration now ~~exists~~ evident includes at least _____ confirmed regular battalions of North Vietnamese forces, and ~~xxx~~ it is probable that substantial additional regular elements are now present.

So ~~xxx~~ we face another decision. We continue to reject totally the possibility of withdrawal. We have tried all avenues of negotiation, and have found them closed on the Communist side. We could simply stay as we are and "hunker up," letting the South Vietnamese and our own forces take punishment and losses without doing more. And we could go much further than we have in the use of our military power against North Vietnam.

Once again, we reject all of these possibilities. Instead, we shall continue on the same basic line that has governed our policy since 1961, and indeed since 1954 -- taking those actions that the US can effectively take to assist the South Vietnamese in their primary responsibility

for the struggle.

To that end, as a result of careful reviews of the situation in the past two weeks, including consultation at length with Ambassador Taylor and with senior officials of the government, I have concluded that we should take the following additional actions:

(Description of decisions).

VII CONCLUSIONS

(This section would hit hard on the theme that our purpose was peace, that we seek no territory and threaten no one, and that we are prepared to help in the development and constructive effort which would become possible in conditions of security and peace.)

Possible Material for Conclusion

1. The stake in South Vietnam is the freedom of one small country to work out its own destiny. But it is more than that -- it is also the freedom of other countries to do the same, without the overhanging threat of Communist expansion that could only increase if aggression succeeds in South Vietnam. Defeat of Communist aggression in South Vietnam could open the way to ~~exp~~ a period in which the countries of Asia, Communist or non-Communist, could live together in peace. The success of that aggression can only encourage other ambitions by North Vietnam, and the more extensive ambitions of Communist China, to disrupt the balance of power in Asia and to bring about an Asia of sphere of domination. One is the path to peace and the chance for development in freedom; the other is the path to an Asia where small nations will live in fear and uncertainty, and even the larger nations will soon feel the threat. That kind of Asia could be the breeding ground of greater and greater conflict, and even of a general war.

2. The US commitment to assist South Vietnam was entered into because of that stake. The prospects for South Vietnam have varied since that commitment was made in 1954. But the stakes have not, and at every stage the commitment has been reaffirmed, under three Presidents and by six Congresses acting concretely to affirm and provide support for Executive actions. We have stood united as a government, and we still

stand united. And when Americans make a commitment, they stick with it.

3. The means used to carry out that commitment have been decided, by successive Presidents, in the light of the aggressive actions of the Communist side. Each decision has been weighed against its alternatives, and a deliberate and public choice made to carry through with those actions, and only those actions, necessary to preserve the freedom of South Vietnam.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Javits Resolution

I discussed the Javits Resolution (Tab A) with Senator Fulbright. His first reaction was that it was not likely to attract much attention and that he interpreted it as a basis for a speech on the subject with little other consequence. Since he is leaving for Arkansas tomorrow morning (because of the sudden death of his sister), I agreed that I would speak to Senator Mansfield about the handling of the Resolution after its introduction. Fulbright thought that the Resolution ought to be referred to the Foreign Relations Committee. Mansfield was not available this evening but I will call him early Thursday morning.

As far as the Javits Resolution itself is concerned, I would suggest the following conclusions:

(1) The Resolution carries the implication that the Joint Resolution of August 10, 1964 is no longer adequate to cover the scale of operations in which we are now engaged.

(2) The Javits Resolution would replace the August Resolution with an authorization to take steps to certain specific purposes set forth in Section 3 of his Resolution.

(3) The Javits Resolution would crystallize in the form of law U.S. objectives regarding Viet Nam with particular emphasis on a negotiated settlement and on the establishment of free institutions and the promotion of economic and social progress.

(4) His Resolution would express a strong U.S. interest in internationalizing our present responsibilities in Southeast Asia.

My recommendation would be that we urge that this Resolution be referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and consider it with the Senate Leadership for any further action on it if it is indicated.

There is enclosed at Tab B a brief analysis of points of similarity and difference between the Javits Resolution and the Resolution of August 10, 1964.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:
Resolution;
Analysis.

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Rec'd
Wed. 6/23/65
4:28 p.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 23, 1965
4:15 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for 5:30 Meeting

I attach an annotated agenda for our meeting at 5:30 this afternoon. The top sheet shows the bare outline of each subject and the names of those attending.

At Tab 1 is the agenda on Vietnam; at Tab 2, that on Berlin; at Tab 3, the Dominican Republic.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
Wednesday, June 23, 1965, 5:30 PM

1. VIETNAM

- (1) Rolling Thunder 20
- (2) Saigon's planned break of relations with France
- (3) Future use of B-52's
- (4) Soviet attitudes and what we should do about them
- (5) Prospects of Prime Minister Wilson's mission
- (6) Report on political programs of the Ky government

Present:

State Department

Secretary Rusk
Under Secy. Ball
Amb. Thompson
Asst. Secy. Bundy

Defense Department

Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secy. Vance
Asst. Secy. McNaughton

White House

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Busby
Mr. Cater

Central Intelligence Agency

Admiral Raborn
Mr. Richard Helms

2. BERLIN

- (1) The Helicopter problem

Present:

State Department

Secretary Rusk
Under Secy. Ball
Amb. Thompson
Asst. Secretary Leddy

Defense Department

Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secy. Vance

White House

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Busby
Mr. Cater

Central Intelligence Agency

Admiral Raborn
Mr. Richard Helms

3. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- (1) Progress report on OAS proposals
- (2) Review of troop levels
- (3) Report on planning for OAS meeting

Present:

State Department

Secretary Rusk
Under Secy. Ball
Under Secy. Mann
Asst. Secy. Vaughn

Defense Department

Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secy. Vance

White House

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Busby
Mr. Cater
Mr. Chase

Central Intelligence Agency

Admiral Raborn
Mr. Helms

VIETNAM~~SECRET~~

1. Rolling Thunder 20

Bob McNamara will have a chart and I think he and Dean Rusk will have an agreed position. You probably will not wish to discuss targets in detail, even with such a select group as this. Bob needs one good solid target, and I think he will have settled it with Dean before you come in. He already has my proxy.

2. Saigon's Breach of Relations with France

The new military government has apparently decided to break relations with Paris. We all think this is a mistake because of the French power of retaliation. There remains a slight difference of opinion as to whether we should say out loud it is a mistake. You will want to hear Rusk on this point.

3. Future Use of B-52s

Bob McNamara wants to go right on with the B-52s, and in principle, most of us agree. The real problem is not in the military decision but in the public relations handling. I have asked Doug Cater to study this one and he may have ideas.

4. Soviet Attitudes and What we Should do About Them

This is not an action matter, but I think it would be helpful for us all to hear Tommy Thompson's current thinking. The Soviets have just turned down the Wilson Peace Mission and in rather tough language. At the same time they are floating the notion that Tony Lewis picked up in the Times this morning -- even hinting that we can do anything we want as long as we do it in South Vietnam. It is worth a moment's discussion.

5. Prospects of Prime Minister Wilson's Mission

My brother Bill will have the latest on this one. We expect the British to move right ahead even though no Communists give them the time of day.

6. Political Progress of the Ky Government

I have put this one in to keep everybody's attention focussed on the fact that our problem is indeed as much political as military. My brother will be ready to comment.

~~SECRET~~

BERLIN~~SECRET~~

The Helicopter Problem

This is the matter of East German helicopters over West Berlin which I reported to you last week. Thompson has talked with McCloy and Acheson and other wise men and will be prepared to tell you how this problem now looks. The most interesting proposal yet made is that we might get some kites for the Berlin children to fly -- helicopters apparently hate kites. (Thompson's memo to me is attached).

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The Secretary, George Ball, the German boys, and I had a useful discussion yesterday with Dean Acheson and Jack McCloy on the helicopter problem in Berlin. There was no disagreement with the steps we are already taking, such as official representations in Moscow and/or the three capitals. It was also agreed that we should press the Germans to suspend negotiations between Airflot and Lufthansa relating this to the helicopter problem.

The main issue discussed was whether or not we should ourselves resume helicopter flights over East Berlin. The military are in general opposed to doing this at this time as they fear that linking these with the East German flights might end in our losing our right to fly over East Berlin. We probably have little chance of stopping the East German flights over East Berlin unless we take some very strong action, such as paralleling their flights along the sector border with flights of our own inside East Berlin. It is not certain that this would lead to cessation of their flights but if it did, we would probably end up by having to give up our own flights.

The general judgment of Acheson and McCloy was that we should maintain the legal position that all East German flights ^{in the Berlin situation} are a violation of quadripartite rules but that in fact we only act to prevent the East Germans flying over West ~~East~~ Berlin. They would go quite far in this connection even to the point of using force to bring down an East German helicopter over West Berlin.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 95-206

~~SECRET~~

By 48, NARA, Date 1-9-96

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The Secretary suggested we should investigate the "dirty tricks" department to see if we could not make the East Germans look ridiculous. The most hopeful idea which we are investigating is to encourage West Berlin youths to fly kites along the sector borders to harass the East German flights.

General Clay was not available but may be able to come down tomorrow.

Tommy

Llewellyn E. Thompson

1952 JUL 22 11 11 33

INFORMATION OFFICE

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602DOMINICAN REPUBLIC~~SECRET~~

1. Progress Report on OAS Proposals

Tom Mann will have the latest on this.

2. Review of Troop Levels

I think we should work on this one regularly and have asked Bob McNamara to be ready to speak.

3. Report on Planning for the OAS Meeting in Rio in August

This meeting is still somewhat uncertain, but it is none too soon for you to hear the shape of the problem, and Tom Mann will be ready on this one, too.

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Authority State Letter 12-15-78By JP, NARS, Date 3-26-79~~SECRET~~

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Rec'd
6-24-65
1:06p

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6/a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 24, 1965
1:05 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have talked with my brother Bill and with Dean Rusk and at their suggestion, also with George Ball. The Secretary is the least negative and Bill the most so.

The basic arguments against going to the Security Council now are three:

- a. that it would be unsettling in Saigon. This can be controlled, but not prevented.
- b. that it would require Moscow to take a harsh public line against us at a time when we still have some hope to engage them more usefully in negotiation.
- c. there is a danger that Hanoi would read this appeal as weakness.

Given these difficulties, I am inclined now to back away from this one. I think it would be wiser to take the position that if there should ever be a prospect of effective action in the UN, we would be the first to work for it. Language which might do that sort of thing follows and could be fitted in to the present draft quite easily, I believe.

If at any time there is a prospect of effective action for peace in Vietnam, through any of the agencies of the United Nations, the United States will be the first to work for UN action.

McG. B.
McG. B.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1965 JUN 24 PM 10 00

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Action
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INFO RUEKDA/DOD 547
RUEHEX/WHITEHOUSE 422
RUHKA/CINCPAC PRIORITY 2466
STATE GRNC
BT

Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~ JUNE 25

DOD FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA
WHITE HOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY
CINCPAC FOR ADMIRAL SHARP
E X D I S

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979
By *if*, NARS, Date 6-27-79

I HAVE JUST BEEN BRIEFED UPON ARC LIGHT II WHICH I UNDERSTAND HAS HIGHEST LEVEL APPROVAL. WHILE CONCURRING IN THE USE OF U.S. GROUND FORCES IN THIS KIND OF OPERATION IF THE TARGET IS PROMISING, I WOULD CONSIDER THIS EMPLOYMENT TO FALL OUTSIDE THE LANGUAGE OF THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF JUNE 9. I HAVE ASSUMED

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 1391A ~~TOP SECRET~~
THAT THIS STATEMENT HAS THE STATUS OF A DIRECTIVE FOR THE CONDUCT OF U.S. GROUND OPERATIONS IN SVN AND THAT IT DELIBERATELY OMITTS FROM AUTHORIZED MISSIONS THE INITIATION OF INDEPENDENT U.S. OR JOINT U.S./GRV GROUND OPERATIONS AS WELL AS CLEAR-AND-HOLD OPERATIONS INVOLVING TERRITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

THE AUTHORIZATION OF ARC LIGHT II RAISES QUESTION WHETHER THIS APPROVAL CONSTITUTES A BRADENING OF THE LANGUAGE OF JUNE 9 STATEMENT APPLICABLE TO FUTURE CASES OR IS AN EXCEPTION GRANTED ON THE MERITS OF THIS PARTICULAR OPERATION. APART FROM OUR NEED FOR GUIDANCE IN FUTURE OPERATIONAL PLANNING, AFTER THE EXECUTION OF ARC LIGHT II THE PRESS WILL CERTAINLY RAISE THIS QUESTION AND SEEK AN EXPLANATION REQUIRING COORDINATED REPLY.
TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 6/24/65, 10:10 p.m.
PASSED CIA, 6/24/65, 10:30 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

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~~SECRET~~

M. Smith

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Thursday, June 24, 1965, 4:35PM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S Aircraft encounter with MIGs

1. Four U.S. Air Force jet aircraft over the Son La military complex at 4:15 AM, EDT this morning were approached by two MIG-15s flying on a northwesterly heading. The four U.S. aircraft were flying in a high and low pair position and upon sighting the MIGs, broke formation in an attempt to trap the MIGs. The MIGs in turn split and with one MIG on each pair of our aircraft started firing 57mm and 37mm cannons. Our aircraft returned fire and the MIGs broke contact and fled to the North.
2. No damage to any of the aircraft involved.

White House Situation Room

John M. Guion
Briefing Officer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *OSD 2/17/77, NSC 4/11/77*

By *MJE*, NARS, Date *4/12/78*

Chaker

4:41 P.M.

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~~SECRET~~

June 25, 1964

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This should
be removed
it is 1964
BKS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your 6 PM Meeting with Taylor, Johnson et al

The main purpose of this meeting is to meet with Alexis Johnson before he leaves. His plane goes from Andrews at 10:30 AM tomorrow. The subjects are three: (1) Ambassador Taylor's basic directives; (2) Staff; (3) Your reassertion of basic policy.

(1) Ambassador Taylor's basic directive.

Attached at Tab A is a letter which is worth reading aloud before you sign it. What it does is to give Max full control over everything in South Vietnam. This is something the military never let the Ambassador have before, and now that we have a man whom the military cannot refuse, it is time to establish the principle. This letter represents Taylor's own desire and has been checked with State but not with McNamara.

(2) Staff.

Taylor and Johnson have been working on this very hard in the last 24 hours and can give their own report. The two key questions are: head man for AID and a new DCM.

(3) Basic policy.

If I understand your feelings correctly, the following is a possible outline of what you might want to say.

1. You want the strongest possible U. S. effort to move ahead within South Vietnam. Large-scale moves "to the North" are not the present answer, though we will be ready to consider new decisions at any time, as we did in the case of reconnaissance over Laos.

2. We all know that two things are needed:

- (a) an effective government in South Vietnam;
- (b) an absolutely first-rate team.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NLS 85-235

By ing, NARS, Date 11-13-85

We are now getting an absolutely first-rate U. S. team, for the first time since the situation became acute.

The first task of this U. S. team is to strengthen the effectiveness of Khanh and his colleagues, at every level, and by every means.

3. We have had plenty of plans and proposals; what we now need is execution. (This is what Taylor and Johnson want to hear.)

4. But there is still need for all the good ideas we can get. We count on initiative at every level. We shall send out our ideas for comment, and we shall expect energetic demands for support from the field. (This is what they are less eager about but need to hear from you. Today is not the day for a catalogue of new proposals.)

5. You particularly want the new team to get life and energy into Vietnamese efforts to bring other flags in. And the U. S. team too must show imagination and hospitality in making such allies feel welcome and useful. (Max Taylor is bearish on this and needs a spur.)

6. You also particularly want to carry out an information and propaganda effort twice as big as what Eisenhower has asked for.

7. But an ounce of real progress is worth a pint of propaganda and a peck of threats.

8. Washington will back you up.

9. The spirit of Taylor and Johnson, who said "Yes" at once, will be the spirit of the whole U. S. effort.

McG. B.

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June 25, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Retaliation for Restaurant Bombing

The President has raised the question of U. S. retaliation for the bombing of the floating restaurant in Saigon (latest casualty figures: 14 killed, of which 9 were Americans; 28 wounded of which 9 were U. S.).

My own view is that retaliation (i. e. tit-for-tat) is neither useful nor wise. State (Bundy, and I believe the Secretary) and Defense (McNaughton, and I believe the Secretary) fully subscribe to this view. It is based on two propositions:

(a) Against the background of Rolling Thunder, no particular bombing attack could be identified as a specific act of retaliation for the restaurant bombing unless we break out of the present pattern by hitting an industrial target or bombing Hanoi.

(b) But the attack on the restaurant, as dastardly as it was, will not be regarded by either the American people or those abroad as sufficient provocation to warrant U. S. planes hitting non-military targets in populated areas.

Chester L. Cooper

We all agree
We'll see what he says

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6ba

*The President has
seen*

C

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *RAC 24858*
By *ms/ky*, NARA, Date *4-11-14*

Received:

10:47 A.M SATURDAY 26 JUNE 1965

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DE WTE 63F

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO COL COOK FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP65362

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: ARC LIGHT II (NIGHT RUN)

*now cancelled
per cite CAP 65368
27 June 65*

A STRIKE ATTACK IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY SAC B-52 AIRCRAFT IS SCHEDULED FOR 7:30 PM EDT, SUNDAY, JUNE 27. THIS ATTACK WILL BE FOLLOWED UP WITH A SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION BY US AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS.

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

1. SAC ATTACK:
THIRTY B-52 AIRCRAFT, STATIONED AT GUAM, WILL BE USED; 30 KC-135 TANKERS FROM OKINAWA WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT.
THE AREA TO BE BOMBED IS APPROXIMATELY 25 MILES NORTH OF SAIGON; ABOUT 10 MILES NORTH OF BIEN HOA. THERE ARE TWO PARALLEL TARGET AREAS SEPARATED BY 1,640 FEET. TARGET ONE IS 3,280 FEET BY 13,120 FEET, TARGET TWO IS 1,640 FEET BY 13,120 FEET. BOMBS WILL BE RELEASED IN A TRAIN IN EACH TARGET AREA, APPROXIMATELY 400 FEET APART.
THE OBJECTIVE IS MAXIMUM SATURATION OF AN AREA BELIEVED TO BE ONE OF THE MAIN VIET CONG LOGISTICS AREAS FOR WAR ZONE "D"
2. GROUND EXPLOITATION
UPON COMPLETION OF THE B-52 STRIKE, TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIRBORNE BATALLIONS AND TWO BATALLIONS OF THE US 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE WILL BE MOVED INTO THE TARGET AREA. THEIR OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO SEARCH THE AREA THOROUGHLY AND DESTROY EVERYTHING FOUND.

THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATALIONS WILL OPERATE FROM THE CENTER OF THE TARGET AREA OUTWARD TO THE NORTHWEST AND NORTHEAST; THE TWO US BATALIONS WILL OPERATE IN THE SOUTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. THERE ARE NO FRIENDLY PERSONNEL WITHIN SEVEN KILOMETERS OF THE SOUTHEASTERN PORTION OF THE TARGET AREA, AND NONE OTHER LESS THAN 15 KILOMETERS FROM THE TARGET AREA.
2. LAUNCH TIME FROM GUAM WILL BE 1:30 PM EDT.
3. THE US 173RD AIRBORNE IS NOW LOCATED AT BIEN HOA.
4. IT IS PLANNED TO MAKE THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE B-52 STRIKE IN SAIGON AT 10:00 PM EDT. THE GROUND ACTION WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS SOON AS THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT IS COMPLETED.
5. THE B-52'S WILL OVERFLY THE PHILIPPINES WHILE RETURNING TO GUAM. STATE DEPARTMENT HAS INSTRUCTED THE EMBASSY TO NOTIFY MACAPAGAL ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.
6. A MAP DELINEATING THE AREA WAS SENT TO THE RANCH THIS MORNING FOR COLONEL COOKS ATTENTION

DTG: 261620Z JUN 65

~~TOP SECRET~~

67

336

67a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mae

The President
wanted you to
have this.

Jack V.

✓

June 26, 1965
12:45 p. m.

The President saw the following memorandum and asked Jake Jacobsen to "call it to Washington and tell them to bring it to the attention of Rusk, McNamara and Bundy".

The text follows:

Mr. President:

I had a long talk with Senator Church not only about your speech but about his Viet Nameese views. On Viet Nam, his views seem to form up as follows:

1. He 'feels in my bones' that escalation of the bombings in North Viet Nam will inevitably bring China into the war.
2. The solution to the Viet Nam problem lies in South Viet Nam and the focus of activity should be to suppress the rebellion.
3. The only activity that he can recommend to solve the situation is to continue putting in more ground troops in South Viet Nam as you are now doing. He hopes that if there is enough of this, eventually the North Viet Nameese will give up and permit the issues to be brought to the conference table.
4. He does not believe there is any specific response that can be made to such things as the bombings this morning. He says you are already making the response and he considers the bombings in North Viet Nam to be no longer 'a reprisal' matter but a 'continuing pattern' which concerns him lest it be escalated to the point of war.
5. He feels that some people will be disappointed that your speech here in San Francisco does not contain specific proposals, but that he himself thinks it is 'probably' best to defer specific proposals for the General Assembly meeting.

5. continued --

He and Senator Carlsson are both in a mood to say it is a fine speech.

6. Senator Carlson has no specific suggestions on Viet Nam but agrees you are following the right course.

GER

June 25, 1965

11:40 a.m. San Francisco

Dictation and transcription
by Mary Jo Cook, Office of
Marvin Watson.

69/

337

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-4-78; NSC 11-21-79

By ip, NARS, Date 2-4-80

SENT
WHCA

68a

OO WTE10
DE WTE 64F

1965 JUN 26 17 27

*Sent to Ranch
1:27 PM 26 June*

FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY
TO LBJ RANCH FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP65363

~~TOP SECRET EXDIS~~

~~TOP SECRET EXDIS~~

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MAX TAYLOR RECOMMENDS REPRISAL ACTION FOR THE EXECUTION OF BENNETT AND THE RESTAURANT ATROCITY. RUSK, MCNAMARA, AND I ALL DISAGREE WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IMPORTANT ESCALATION SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO A SINGLE EPISODE AT THIS STAGE. MCNAMARA AND I DO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IF TERROR AND EXECUTIONS CONTINUE, WE SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE WEIGHT OF ROLLING THUNDER ATTACKS, PROBABLY INCLUDING OIL SUPPLIES IN HAIPHONG AREA. RUSK IS LESS CERTAIN.

WE ARE CONSIDERING USEFULNESS OF LEAFLET DROPS ON HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA WHICH WOULD SAY THAT IF THESE OUTRAGES CONTINUE, NECESSARY FURTHER ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

MEANWHILE YOU SHOULD KNOW OF TAYLOR'S RECOMMENDATION IN CASE YOU WISH TO TAKE HIS JUDGMENT AND OVERRULE WASHINGTON DOVES.

TAYLOR'S MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

FROM: EMBASSY SAIGON NO. 4402

THIS IS A US MISSION MESSAGE.

VIET CONG EXECUTION OF SERGEANT BENNETT CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY MY CANH RESTAURANT ATROCITY BRINGS INTO SHARP FOCUS BLACKMAIL POTENTIAL VC AND HANOI POSSESS IN NUMBERS OF US HOSTAGES IN THEIR HANDS AND THE USEFULNESS OF THIS BLACKMAIL TO SUPPORT A STEPPED-UP TERRORIST CAMPAIGN. SINCE THEY WELL AWARE WE PLACE HIGHER VALUE ON HUMAN LIFE THAN DO THEY, HANOI/VC PREPARED USE THIS WEAPON TO OWN ADVANTAGE. THEY HAVE EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT EXECUTION OF US PRISONERS WILL BE VERY SENSITIVE ISSUE FOR USG, AND THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH HERTZ CASE IN WHICH THEY UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE THAT WE HAVE CUASED GVN TO DELAY EXECUTION OF HAI, MAY HAVE LED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT WE WILL PAY VERY HIGH PRICE TO PREVENT EXECUTION OF OUR PERSONNEL. THEY THUS HOPE TO CAUSE POLITICAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN US AND GVN, TO STIR UP US PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST VIET-NAM POLICY, TO DAMAGE US TROOP MORALE, AND ALSO RAISE MORALE THEIR TERRORISTS CADRE BY SHOWING THEIR ABILITY TO RETALIATE FOR GVN EXECUTIONS AND BY POSSIBILITY OF DELAYING HALTING FURTHER GVN EXECUTIONS. (WE UNDERSTAND 5 OR 6 CONVICTED VC TERRORISTS NOW AWAITING CARRYING OUT OF DEATH SENTENCE.)

TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH FIRST MADE OVER RADIO HANOI, A FACT WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE AS EVIDENCE OF ORIGIN OF THIS OUTRAGE, MAKES CLEAR THAT HANOI AND VC ARE HOLDING USG RESPONSIBLE FOR GVN ACTION IN EXECUTING THREE NAMED TERRORISTS. IN OUR RESPONSE TO THIS OUTRANGE WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WE LIKEWISE HOLD HANOI RESPONSIBLE. ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO MAKES CLEAR THAT SERGEANT BENNETT WAS EXECUTED ON ORDERS OF HANOI CLOAKED AS "ORDERS OF THE NLF SV CENTRAL COMMITTEE" BY THE COMMAND OF THE SOUTH VIET-NAM LIBERATION FORCES, APPARENTLY WITHOUT ANY PRETEXT OF A TRIAL. ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO TWICE MENTIONS POLICY OF NLF SV TOWARD

PRISONERS OF WAR AS "HUMAN AND LENIENT AND AS CORRECT AND HUMANE". IT MENTIONS PRISONERS OF WAR IN THREE CONTEXTS: EXECUTED TERRORISTS ARE REFERRED TO AS PRISONERS OF WAR AND ARE EQUATED WITH US DETAINEES; "REBEL SOLDIERS" (RVNAF) ARE REFERRED TO AS PRISONERS OF WAR AND IN OBVIOUS APPEAL TO VIETNAMESE OPINION, OFFER IS MADE TO RELEASE THOSE WHO HAVE "REPENTED"; US DETAINEES ARE CALLED US "WAR PRISONERS" BUT THEIR LIVES ARE SAID TO BE DEPENDENT ON ACTIONS OF US "AGGRESSORS". THIS IS FIRST USE OF TERM "PRISONERS OF WAR" IN ANY OF THESE THREE CONTEXTS TO OUR KNOWLEDGE.

WE CANNOT PERMIT OURSELVES TO BE PLACED IN POSITION OF PAYING BLACKMAIL FOR LIVES OF US PRISONERS IN FORM OF PREVENTING GVN FROM EXECUTING TERRORISTS WHO ARE TRIED AND CONVICTED OF VIOLATING VIETNAMESE CIVIL LAW. IF NOT STERNLY REPPRESSED, TERRORISM IS LIKELY TO BECOME A VC TACTIC OF INCREASE PROPORTIONS. EVEN IF WE WERE WILLING TO PAY BLACKMAIL REGARDLESS OF DIFFICULTIES WHICH IT WOULD CAUSE INTERNALLY FOR GVN AND FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH GVN, WE WOULD SOON FIND THE PRICE RAISED TO SOME OTHER EVEN LESS ACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

THE US MISSION TAKES THE GENERAL POSITION THAT (A) CONVICTED VC TERRORISTS MUST BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GVN LAW REGARDLESS OF POSSIBLE REPRISAL ACTIONS AGAINST US PRISONERS IN VC HANDS; (B), MUST HOLD HANOI RESPONSIBLE BOTH FOR TERRORISM AND FOR REPRISALS AGAINST OUR PRISONERS, AND (C), WE SHOULD OBTAIN MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA EFFECT IN CONDEMNING THE BENNETT AND MY CANH INCIDENTS IN COMBINATION AS INTERNATIONAL MURDER (THE TOLL OF DEAD SO FAR 27 VIETNAMESE, 13 US, 2 FRENCH, 1 SWISS, 1 FILIPINO; WOUNDED - 62 VIETNAMESE, 16 U.S., 1 SWISS, 2 GERMANS)

WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND

(1) THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF A BOMBING ATTACK IN THE HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA WITH AN APPROPRIATE STATEMENT OF THE REASON FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM THE ROLLING THUNDER PATTERN. THIS ATTACK TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY MAJOR LEAFLET DROPS IN NVN AND BY MAXIMUM EXPLOITATION BY VOA AND OTHER MEDIA.

(2) A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT VOICING SENSE OF OUTRAGE OF AMERICAN PEOPLE AT THESE WANTON ACTS OF MURDER AND ANNOUNCING THAT TARGET IN PRECEDING PARAGRAPH WAS ACCORDINGLY BEING ATTACKED TO SHOW USG WOULD NOT STAND FOR BLATANT VIOLATION OF ALL STANDARDS OF HUMANITY AND INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT.

(3) A GVN STATEMENT SIMILARLY DENOUNCING THE MY CANH ATROCITY AND THE WANTON MURDER OF SERGEANT BENNETT, CONTRASTING LATTER WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOLLOWED IN TRIAL OF TRAN VAN DANG, WHO WAS CAUGHT REDHANDED PREPARING TO BLOW UP BUILDING IN CITY OF SAIGON, CHARGED, TRIED BY COMPETENT COURT, AND CONVICTED UNDER ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF JUSTICE.

(4) GVN PROTEST TO ICC.

WE BELIEVE AND INTEND THAT ABOVE STEPS WOULD LEAD TO HEAVY PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF VC TERRORISM AND EXECUTION OF US PRISONER. IF HANDLED PROPERLY THIS SHOULD HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT TO THAT INTENDED BY VC OF STIRRING AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION IN SUPPORT OF US POLICY IN VIET-NAM.

WE FEEL THAT THE PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN SHOULD GET UNDERWAY AT ONCE AND THE OVERALL USG POSITION SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS. WE HAVE ASKED GVN TO MAKE NO STATEMENT FOR TIME BEING, BUT WE WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY KEEPING GVN QUIET IF MATTER DRAGS.
TAYLOR

DTG: 261658Z JUN 65

~~TOP SECRET EXDIS~~

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WTE10
DE WTE 68F

FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP65366

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
5:22 P.M. Saturday 26 June 65
Shown to the President

69a

1. RUSK, MCNAMARA, BALL, WHEELER, BILL BUNDY, AND I HAVE JUST MET FOR AN HOUR TO REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF POSSIBLE REPRISAL FOR RESTAURANT AND BENNET OUTRAGES.
2. WE CONCLUDED THAT IF REPRISAL IS ORDERED, BEST TARGET IS EITHER POWER PLANT OR POL DEPOT IN HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA. NO TARGET OUTSIDE THIS AREA IS SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO BE A NOTICEABLE DEPARTURE FROM PRESENT ROLLING THUNDER PATTERN.
3. IN ORDER TO STRIKE A TARGET IN THE HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA WITH MINIMUM INTERNATIONAL BACKLASH, WE ALL AGREE THAT WE MUST CONSULT MAJOR FRIENDLY NATIONS. ATTACK WITHOUT SUCH CONSULTATION COULD EASILY DRIVE WILSON AND OTHERS CLEAR OFF THE RESERVATION, AND WHILE THEY ARE NOT AS MUCH HELP TO US AS THEY THINK, WE WOULD NOT LOOK SMART IF A SINGLE ACT OF REPRISAL GAVE THEM AN EXCUSE TO JUMP SHIP.
4. THIS CONSULTATION WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO FAIRLY HEAVY ARGUMENT AGAINST ATTACK IN REPRISAL FORM. ALLIES COULD POINT OUT THAT REPEATED EXECUTIONS OF PRISONERS BY NAZIS IN WORLD WAR II WERE NOT USED TO JUSTIFY SPECIFIC REPRISALS. THEY COULD POINT OUT ALSO THAT ONCE WE MOVED TO MEASURED AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM AFTER PLEIKU WE AVOIDED SPECIFIC ACTS OF REPRISALS AS IN THE CASE OF THE EMBASSY BOMBING.
5. WE BELIEVE NEVERTHELESS THAT BY A STRENUOUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WE COULD PROBABLY KEEP MOST ALLIES WITH US, ALTHOUGH NOT HAPPY. BUT ONE CONDITION OF THIS EFFORT WOULD BE THAT WE EMPHASIZE MILITARY NEED FOR ATTACKS ON THESE TARGETS AND DOWNGRADE REPRISAL ASPECT. BUT IF WE ARE TO USE STRAIGHT MILITARY ARGUMENT WITH ALLIES, WE SHOULD USE IT WITH OUR OWN PEOPLE TOO.
6. AND THAT LEADS TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT WHICH SEEMS IMPORTANT TO ALL OF US -- NAMELY, THAT MAJOR NEW ACTS AGAINST THE NORTH SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN TERMS OF OUR WHOLE POLICY IN VIETNAM, AND NOT REPEAT NOT IN RESPONSE TO PARTICULAR OUTRAGES. WE DON'T ALL AGREE AS TO WHEN AND HOW IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HIT TARGETS IN HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA. WE DO ALL AGREE THAT THIS IS A MAJOR DECISION WHICH SHOULD BE MADE IN A WIDER CONTEXT THAN THESE ATROCITIES.
7. SECRETARY RUSK ALSO FEELS STRONGLY THAT GROMYKO/KOHLER CONVERSATION FORWARDED SEPARATELY SHOWS AT LEAST A HINT OF SOVIET READINESS TO WORK TOWARD SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. ATTACK IN HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA RIGHT AFTER THIS CONVERSATION MIGHT EASILY BE MISUNDERSTOOD IN MOSCOW.
8. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT ALEXIS JOHNSON IS REPORTED BY GEORGE BALL TO OPPOSE REPRISAL ACTION.
9. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS AND MESSAGES CAN BE USED TO MAKE CLEAR TO HANOI THAT AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE BOUND TO REACT WITH GREAT FORCE TO CONTINUED ATROCITIES. WE CAN AND WILL MAKE THIS POINT TO ALLIES AS WELL, SO THAT FURTHER OUTRAGES OF THIS SORT CAN BE USED TO LAY A BASE FOR SUCH ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACTIONS AS YOU MAY WISH TO AUTHORIZE ON OVERALL GROUNDS.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. III # 22
By NY, NARA, Date 4-4-74

10. NEXT FOLLOWING MESSAGE CONTAINS TEST OF STATEMENT AS ISSUED BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

THE REGIME IN HANOI AND THEIR PUPPET LIBERATION FRONT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EXECUTION OF SGT. BENNETT AND FOR THE BOMBING OF THE MY CANH RESTAURANT IN SAIGON, IN WHICH 44 PERSONS, VIETNAMESE, AMERICAN, FRENCH, SWISS, FILIPINO WERE KILLED AND MANY MORE PERSONS INJURED. THEY HAVE COMPOUNDED THEIR BRUTAL CONDUCT BY PUBLICLY BRAGGING ABOUT THEIR ACTION AND MAKING THREATS TO CARRY OUT EVEN MORE OUTRAGEOUS ACTS. WE IN AMERICA AND PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD CANNOT HELP BUT BE APPALLED AND REVOLTED BY THIS SHOW OF WANTON INHUMANITY. THESE COMMUNIST THREATS TO INTIMIDATE, OF COURSE, WILL NOT SUCCEED. OUR DETERMINATION TO HELP THE EMBATTLED PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM TO AVOID THEIR FALLING UNDER A REGIME WHICH IS CAPABLE OF SUCH BRUTALITY WILL ONLY BE STRENGTHENED.

HANOI'S RECENT STATEMENTS HAVE SURELY ALSO MADE IT CLEAR TO ANYONE WHO MAY HAVE HAD ANY DOUBT THAT IT IS THE POWER DIRECTING THE POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF THE VC, ITS INSTRUMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, AND MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE ACTS

DTG: 26/2256Z JUN 65

~~SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

W Bundy
70a

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Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 3056 IMMEDIATE

JUN 26 7 13 PM '65

INFO: CINCPAC _____ IMMEDIATE

~~EXDIS~~ EXDIS

Septel contains State Department statement issued here tonight.

You may of course call our statement to attention GVN, which may wish issue its own.

After careful consideration we have decided not rpt not to adopt your recommendations Embtel 4402 at this time. Reasoning will follow tomorrow.

Difficulties included problem of finding any target that was not civilian and fit plausibly to outrages, but above all question of raising ~~level of actions~~ level our actions another definite notch on reprisal basis for these incidents.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979
By ip, NARS, Date 6-27-79

Drafted by: <u>FE: WBundy/bmm 6/26/65</u>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <u>William P. Bundy</u>
--	--

S - The Secretary (substance)

S/S - Mr. Gordon

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

16318
✓ Bundy
mla

~~TOP SECRET~~

81
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON 3057 IMMEDIATE

JUN 26 7 14 PM '65

INFO: CINCPAC _____ IMMEDIATE

STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS

Authority STATE letter JAN 29 1979

~~REF~~ Ref: A. Embtel 4370

By if, NARS, Date 6-27-79

B. Embtel 3703

C. MACV 15182 DTG 080700Z May 1965

D. State/Defense ~~XX~~ 2812 5 June 1965

In light Embtel 4370 Ref A message, following reviews and sets

forth authority of COMUSMACV to employ US forces in combat role in Night Run. (Detailed press instructions and our comments on proposed press statement appear septel).

This reconfirms that COMUSMACV's authority and the concepts of operation and command and control for use of US forces in combat role in SVN are as outlined and proposed in reftels B and C and previously approved here by reftel D. We interpret this authority to permit COMUSMACV to commit US troops to combat, independently of or in conjunction with GVN forces in any situation in which the use of such troops is requested by an appropriate GVN commander and when, in COMUSMACV's judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces.

Drafted by: FE: WPBundy/bmm 6/26/65c Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: William P. Bundy

ISA/DoD - Mr. McNaughton

S/S - Mr. Gordon

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~~TOP SECRET~~

