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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR MET WITH U.S. PRESS REPS ON JULY 9 FOR BACKGROUND SESSION. HE WAS ASKED TO COMMENT ON SOME OF THE IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAST YEAR. THE AMBASSADOR MADE A SHORT EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION AND A SUMMARY OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED FOR THE PAST YEAR. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE THOUGHT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT WAS THE ADOPTION OF SOUND STRATEGY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. THREE MAJOR ELEMENTS FORM THIS POLICY: 1) PRESSURE ON

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 545A
NORTH VIETNAM BY AIR RAIDS, 2) THE INCREASED EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED AND WE INTEND TO BLUNT AND BLOODY THE VIET CONG, 3) MAINTENANCE OF OUR ATTITUDE OF READINESS TO DISCUSS THE VIETNAM PROBLEM WITH ANYONE.

THE AMBASSADOR SAID THIS STRADEGY REACHED ITS PRESENT DIMENSIONS AFTER THE ATTACK ON PLEIKU. WE HAVE FIRMLY ADHERED TO IT THUSFAR AND IT WILL SUCCEED IF WE STICK TO IT. DESPITE THE CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT, IT IS NOTE WORTHY THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS HAD A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON WITH WHICH WE COULD WORK. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN IMPROVING RELATIONS AMONG GENERALS AND THE SITUATION IS BETTER THAN THAT OF A YEAR AGO, BUT IS STILL NOT IDEAL. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR NOTED AS A GAIN THE INCREASING INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM.

MILITARILY, THE PRESENT PROBLEM HAS BEEN TO REDRESS THE BALANCE OF STRENGTH. GVN ARMED FORCES HAVE INCREASED IN THE YEAR BY

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-2- 110, JULY 11, FROM SAIGON

120,000 MEN AND POLICE AND HAVE BEEN DOUBLED TO 42,000 MEN, BUT THE VIET CONG HAVE DEVELOPED STRENGTH AT A RELATIVELY GREATER RATE. U.S. AND OTHER FOREIGN FORCES ARE NOW BEING DEPLOYED TO HELP CLOSE THIS GAP. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR POINTED

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 545A

OUT THAT U.S. FORCES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE USED MORE AND MORE IN COMBAT AGAINST THE VIET CONG. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT WE REMOVED RESTRAINTS ON USE OF U.S. AIR POWER IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

IN RESPONSE TO SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS, AMBASSADOR MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

THE AMERICAN EFFORT IN SVN IS UNIFIED. THE DEPTH OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT IS NOW AN ACCEPTED FACT. IN THE PAST THE VIETNAMESE HAD DOUBTS CONCERNING U.S. DETERMINATION BUT THE AMBASSADOR DOESN'T THINK THEY FEEL THAT WAY NOW. REGARDLESS OF ACHIEVEMENTS, THERE IS STILL A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF WORK TO BE DONE. WE HAVE NOT TURNED THE MILITARY TIDE, THERE IS STILL POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND WE HAVE NOT BROUGHT HANOI TO ACCEPT DISCUSSIONS.

THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR MORE U.S. FORCES BUT WE CAN NOT PRESENTLY BE SURE OF THE END REQUIREMENT.

THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT EXPECT MORE RESULTS FROM THE BOMBINGS DOTAY BECAUSE THE LEADERS IN HANOI ARE THOUGH AND WE CAN'T EXPECT THEM TO SHOW WEAKNESS UNDER THE PRESSURE GENERATED THUS FAR.

THE AMBASSADOR SAW NO URGENCY TO ATTACK MISSILE SITES IN NORTH VIETNAM. THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING GREATER

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 545A

PRESSURE ON THE NORTH. THERE ARE MANY TARGETS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN HIT YET.

ASKED ABOUT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN U.S. AND VIETNAMESE FORCES, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THEY WOULD BE REGULATED IN ACC-

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-3- 110, JULY 11, FROM SAIGON

ORDANCE WITH SOUND MILITARY JUDGMENT. IN CASE OF A SPECIFIC VIETNAMESE REQUEST FOR U.S. FORCES, GENERAL WESTMORELAND WILL SAY YES OR NOT.

U.S. FORCES WILL PROBABLY NOT MOVE INTO THE CRITICAL CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AREA BAG AND BAGGAGE BUT THEY COULD BE USED THERE IF NEEDED.

THE WAR IS ESSENTIALLY A BATTLE OF ATTRITION. THE VC HOPE TO CHEW UP ARVN UNITS BUT THEY IN TURN ARE SUFFERING A SEVERE VC ATTRITION. TAYLOR
BT

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By if, NARS, Date 5-12-79

REGARDING SECOND PARAGRAPH REFTL, FOLLOWING IS LATEST INFORMATION ON PRESENCE PAVN UNITS IN SVN AND THEIR ENGAGEMENT IN COMBAT: AT PRESENT 101ST PAVN REGIMENT IS CONFIRMED. 18TH PAVN REGIMENT IS UNCONFIRMED, BUT PROBABLE. 95TH UNCONFIRMED BUT POSSIBLE. ACTIONS IN WICH ELEMENTS OF THE 325TH PAVN DIVISION ARE KNOWN TO HAVE PARTICIPATED ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 644A ~~SECRET~~

- 1) ATTACK ON TOU MORONG DISTRICT CAPITAL 25 JUNE -- RALLIER FROM 101ST REGIMENT GAVE WARNING THAT REGIMENT WOULD PARTICIPATE.
- 2) MEMBER OF A SPECIAL SABOTAGE TEAM FROM 18TH REGIMENT WAS CAPTURED FOLLOWING ATTACK ON DANANG AIRFIELD 1 JULY.
- 3) RALLIER FROM 18TH REGIMENT STATED THAT PART OF HIS REGIMENT TOOK PART IN AN AMBUSH IN EARLY JUNE IN PHU BON PROVINCE.
- 4) RALLIER FROM 2ND BATTALION OF 101ST REGIMENT STATED THAT HE TOOK PART IN AN ATTACK ON DAK LONG, KONTUM PROVINCE IN MARCH. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE ENTIRE REGIMENT PARTICIPATED IN AN AMBUSH ON OCTOBER 14 NORTHWEST OF KONTUM ON 3 JUNE.

YOU MAY WISH TO CONVEY ABOVE TO COUVE OR ALTERNATIVELY THE EMBASSY TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

TAYLOR

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 7/13/65, 10:28 A.M.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 7/13/65, 10:40 A.M.

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By *ib*, NARS, Date 5-17-79

DEPT PASS DOD FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA

L I M D I S

BTTEL 111

ALEX JOHNSON AND I DISCUSSED SCHEDULE WITH PRIME MINISTER KY THIS AFTERNOON. I POINTED OUT THAT ON US SIDE TRIP WAS IN LARGE PART RESPONSE TO KY'S EXPRESSION TO US OF DESIRE FOR ADDITIONAL AMERICAN FORCES AND MAJOR QUESTIONS WOULD BE WHAT FORCES, WHERE, HOW TO BE EMPLOYED AND WHAT GVN EXPECTED TO DO ON ITS SIDE. I ALSO NOTED THERE WAS BROAD

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 657A ~~SECRET~~
POLITICAL QUESTION OF WHAT WE WERE SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH. ON MILITARY SIDE I NOTED THAT MACV AND GVN WERE WORKING TOGETHER ON REQUIREMENTS AND HOPED THAT THERE COULD BE COMMON POINT OF VIEW.

KY SAID THAT THEY HAD HAD A CABINET MEETING ON VISIT THIS AFTERNOON AND THERE WAS DECISION TO SEEK "CONFERENCE" WITH VISITORS ON THREE BROAD GENERAL AREAS: (1) POLITICAL, THAT IS, GVN DOMESTIC POLITICAL PLANS AND TO HEAR FROM US SIDE US POLITICAL THINKING AND PLANS WITH RESPECT TO THE WAR; (2) MILITARY QUESTIONS AND (3) ECONOMIC QUESTIONS. DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO HAVE ALL MEMBERS OF THE "DIRECTORY" PLUS ECONOMIC MINISTER TON PRESENT AT SUCH A MEETING WITH AMERICANS WHICH THEY HOPED SOME THREE HOURS COULD BE ALLOTTED.

DURING COURSE OF DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT THE TIME ALLOTTED TO THE CALL ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON WILL BE DEVOTED TO GVN PRESENTATION WITH DISCUSSION CARRIED OVER AS REQUIRED TO MY SATURDAY NIGHT DINNER AND DINNER AT GIA LONG WHICH GENERAL THIEU WILL GIVE ON MONDAY, WITH ANY REMAINING FOLLOW-UP LEFT FOR FAREWELL CALL TUESDAY AFTERNOON. WE POINTED OUT THAT MCNAMARA MISSION WOULD NOT BE STAFFED OR PREPARED FOR ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 657A ~~SECRET~~

QUESTIONS BUT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE PLEASED TO LISTEN TO WHAT GVN HAD TO SAY. ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS, WE URGED THAT KY FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH QUAT, TRAN VAN DO AND BUI DIEM, NOTING POINTS OF AGREEMENT, OR DISAGREEMENT IF ANY, THAT THEY MAY HAVE. KY SAID THAT GENERAL THANG (J-3) WILL MAKE MILITARY PRESENTATION AND MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE TON WILL MAKE ECONOMIC PRESENTATION. JOHNSON IS SEEING BUI DIEM TOMORROW FURTHER TO CLARIFY EXACTLY WHAT GVN HAS IN MIND.

I KNOW THAT A LARGE MEETING AND SUCH PRESENTATIONS WILL PROBABLY NOT BE VERY PRODUCTIVE BUT I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT GVN BE GIVEN A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO SAY ANYTHING THAT IT DESIRES TO SAY.

I AGREED TO KY'S SUGGESTION THAT GENERAL CO ACCOMPANY PARTY ON TRIPS UP COUNTRY IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

KY SAID THAT HE DESIRED TO INVITE PARTY TO ATTEND MASS DEMONSTRATION TO BE HELD EARLY IN THE MORNING OF JULY 20 BUT WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS ONLY OPPORTUNITY FOR VISIT TO BIEN HOA BELIEVE THIS SUCCESSFULLY HEADED IT OFF. (WE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT KY WOULD UTILIZE THEME OF "NATIONAL UNITY" FOR JULY 20 EVENTS RATHER THAN THEME OF "NATIONAL

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 657A ~~SECRET~~

SHAME" ON WHICH KHANH HAD ORIGINALLY EMBARKED LAST YEAR.)

WITH RESPECT TO OTHER MATTERS, KY SAID THAT CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY FROM "LITTLE" MINH TO GENERAL CO AS CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF WILL BE HELD TOMORROW MORNING. MINH HAD REFUSED POSITION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR ARMED FORCES AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND WANTED JOB AS AMBASSADOR ABROAD BUT KY WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT MAKING MORE AMBASSADORS OUT OF GENERALS. HE SAID THEY WERE WORKING HARD ON QUESTION OF AMBASSADORS FOR WASHINGTON, TOKYO AND BANGKOK WHICH THEY FELT HAD TOP PRIORITY AND WERE CONSIDERING QUAT FOR WASHINGTON WHO WAS IDEAL CHOICE EXCEPT FOR HIS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH. THEY WERE CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF PRESENT VIETNAMESE CHARGE IN KOREA FOR TOKYO. HE INVITED OUR INFORMAL SUGGESTIONS FOR NOMINATIONS. WE SUGGESTED THAT HE LOOK OUTSIDE "POLITICIANS" TO OTHER MEN NOW IN PRIVATE LIFE AND SUGGESTED THAT HE CONSIDER TRAN VAN CHUONG FOR SOME POST IF THERE WERE NO POLITICAL OBJECTIONS. HE INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY POLITICAL OBJECTIONS TO CHUONG. TAYLOR
BT

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

NNNN

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July 13/65

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Mac —

Can I give you ties on
strictly personal basis?

See especially the "trial guesses"
in # # (E) and G.

↑
include parts
in speech

John

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
McGeorge Bundy

7/13/65 (1st draft)
McNaughton

468

ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

- A. Recommendation. I recommend that we introduce the added forces listed in para F with the object of "winning" as defined in para E. If it appears wise at some point, we should settle for a "compromise" (again see para E). The recommendation is based on the following judgments. *(Brief up to reference to A4, political effort)*
- B. US aims:
 - 70% - To preserve our national honor as a guarantor (and the reciprocal: to avoid a show-case success for Communist "wars of liberation").
 - 20% - To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from hostile expansive hands.
 - 10% - To "answer the call of a friend," to help him enjoy a better life.
 - ALSO - To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from the methods used.
- C. The situation. The situation is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few-months stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A hard VC push is on. The VC again have the initiative and, with large attacks (and at the cost of severe VC losses), are hurting ARVN forces badly. The US air strikes against the North and US combat-troop deployments have raised any South Vietnamese fears that the US forsake them; but the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory, fewer roads and railroads are usable, the economy is deteriorating, and the government in Saigon continues to turn over. Pacification even in the Hop Tac area is making no progress. The government-to-VC ratio over-all is now only 3-to-1, and in combat battalions only 1-to-1; government desertions are at a high rate, and the Vietnamese force build-up is stalled; the VC reportedly are trying to double their combat strength, largely by forced draft. There are no signs that the VC have been throttled by US/GVN interdiction efforts; indeed, there is evidence of further PAVN build-up in the I and II Corps areas. The DRV/VC seem to believe that South Vietnam is near collapse and show no signs of being interested in settling for less than a complete take-over.
- D. The issue: What is the optimum balance between various outcomes and efforts to get them?
 - 1. Outcomes.
 - (A) Win, defeating the VC (a la Malaya/Philippines).
 - (B) Compromise with the VC (a la Laos 1962/Vietnam 1954).
 - (C) Capitulate to the VC (a la Algeria).
 - 2. Efforts.
 - (1) More than 75,000 (probably 200-400,000+) US personnel.
 - (2) 75,000 US personnel (the "reserve-call-up break-point").
 - (3) 0 US personnel.

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Authority OSD 10-25-78; State 7-10-79
By msf, NARS, Date 10-24-79

E. Definition of "win" and "compromise." Sample "win" and "compromise" packages are outlined below. (Note that neither package requires an express agreement; indeed about the only thing one could expect from an express agreement at the outset would be clauses describing a "ceasefire" -- i.e., based mainly on items 1-8 in the "compromise" package below.)

Win (Package A)

Compromise (Package B)

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. VC attacks stop | 1. (Same) |
| 2. VC terror & sabotage at low level | 2. (Same) |
| 3. DRV/VC infiltration very limited | 3. (Same) |
| a. US eye-recce of NVN continues | a. US eye-recce of border areas continues |
| b. US naval screen only for verification | b. (Same) |
| c. "Rt 9 barrier" dampening infiltration(?) | c. (Same) |
| 4. US bombing of NVN stops (see 3a) | 4. (Same) |
| 5. Independent GVN (hopefully pro-US) | 5. Independent GVN ("nationalist") |
| 6. GVN functions in almost all of SVN | 6. GVN treats VC areas gingerly |
| 7. No major Red gains in Laos | 7. (Same) |
| 8. No significant Red gains in Thailand | 8. (Same) |
| 9. PAVN forces (not regroupees) withdrawn | 9. (Same) |
| 10. VC practically disbanded | 10. VC continue defensively only |
| a. Amnesty for VC | a. (Same) |
| b. VC taxation virtually stops | b. VC taxation only in VC areas |
| c. DRV-VC coded messages stopped | c. DRV-VC coded messages reduced |
| 11. US removes combat forces | 11. US reduces forces |
| 12. US continues AID to SVN | 12. (Same) |
| 13. DRV propaganda continues | 13. (Same) |
| 14. "Revolutionary" GVN domestic program | 14. (Same) |
| 15. Local & national elections promised | 15. Firm dates; NLF on ballots |
| 16. NLF permitted as political party | 16. NLF leaders permitted in government |
| 17. GVN & DRV members of UN | 17. (Same) |

F. Composition of US efforts. A 75,000 (present) and 180,000-man US effort would be made up of the following 34-battalion ground force (plus 10 3d-country battalions):

<u>PRESENT:</u>	Army 173d Airborne Brigade	Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	2 bn
	Marine III d MAF	Phu Bai/Da Nang/Chu Lai/Qui Nhon	9 bn
	Marine 1st MAF	Qui Nhon (SLF offshore)	1 bn
	(Australian/New Zealanders) (1250)	(Bien Hoa)	(1 bn)
	(Koreans) (2,100)	(Bien Hoa)	
	SUB-TOTAL US 75,000±		12 bn
<u>FUTURE:</u>	Army 101st Airborne Division (+4,200)	Don Ba Thin	+3 bn
	Army 1st Infantry Division (+16,500)	Bien Hoa/Cam Ranh	+9 bn
	Army Air Mobile Division (+27,800)	Qui Nhon	+8 bn
	Marine 1st MAF (+6,000) ??		+2 bn
	Misc. log and support (+50,500)		
	(Koreans) (18,500) (Chu Lai/Quang Ngai/Qui Nhon)		(+9 bn)
	SUB-TOTAL US (+105,000)		+22 bn
	TOTAL US (180,000)		34 bn
	TOTAL WITH 3D COUNTRY (200,000±)		44 bn

- G. The options: Assuming maximum ingenuity on the all-important political side, the estimated probabilities of the 5 combinations of outcomes/efforts are as indicated below. (Notice that, of the "tolerable options," only B1 looks promising.)

<u>Outcome/Effort Combinations</u>	<u>Probabilities of Success/Inconclusiveness/Collapse</u>		
	<u>By 1966</u>	<u>By 1967</u>	<u>By 1968</u>
A1 ("win" with 200-400,000+ US)	20/70/10	40/45/15	50/30/20
A2 ("win" with 75,000 US)	10/70/20	20/50/30	30/30/40
B1 ("compromise" with 200-400,000 US)	40/50/10	60/25/15	70/10/20
B2 ("compromise" with 75,000 US)	20/60/20	30/40/30	40/20/40
C3 (capitulate and withdraw)	0/0/100	0/0/100	0/0/100

- H. Outcomes/efforts/collapse costs. There has been no decision taken putting on the same value scale (a) desirability of various outcomes, (b) undesirability of various efforts, and (c) undesirability of having tried and failed. For example:

- Is a collapse at a 75,000 level worse than an inconclusive situation at a 200-400,000+ level? Probably yes.
- Is a 60% chance of a "compromise" better than a 40% chance of "winning"? Probably yes if the compromise is tolerable.
- Is a 40% chance of "compromise" in 1966 better than a 40% chance of "winning" in 1967? Query.

- I. Military actions. Specifically, the following military actions should be taken together with the other actions in paras J, K, and especially L (political):

- a. Deploy the forces listed in para F above.
- b. Pursue a morale-breaking strategy against the VC inside SVN -- react quickly and strongly in support of beleaguered friendly forces; cut the VC's LOCs; attack his bases by ground, artillery and air; use heavier bombs to blast tunnels; use delayed-action fuses to keep him jumpy; increase rate of fire and angle of dive of attacking aircraft; accompany night flares with bombs; reduce warning time by better radio security and avoiding circling of recce aircraft (at the same time, greatly increase the number of reconnaissance aircraft).
- c. Continue the campaign of bombing North Vietnam. Hit the infiltration routes hard, at least to put a "ceiling" on what can be infiltrated. The limit on targets, for the time being, should be just short (1) of population targets (2) of Chinese territory, and (3) special targets (e.g. SAMs) which might have special Soviet or Chinese escalatory implications.
- d. Call up selected reserves and extend tours of duty.
- e. Do not Quarantine North Vietnamese ports yet.

- J. Psychological-economic actions. Provide more radios to villages; instruct civilians to grow less food; explain the necessity of crop destruction and where civilians can get food; step up broadcasts and information programs about VC defeats and air attacks on VC; give civilians specific instructions of what to do when VC come into the area (to reduce civilian casualties and to obtain indications of VC presence); explain why the US is in Vietnam, what it is doing and its long-term purposes; tell population about VC "human wave" tactics and policy of burying dead anonymously; advertise powerful weapons we do (and they do not) have; fly B-52s lower so they can be seen over VC areas; establish a major and effective refugee program to deprive the VC of draft-age males; create an efficient VC-interrogation center.

- K. Defection program. To increase VC defections either to the government or "to the village," establish defector centers, with US personnel playing prominent managerial roles; give specific instructions by radio and leaflet on how to avoid the VC draft, where to go, what to do; the special Ministry of Chieu Hoi should be reestablished; the Chien Hoi program should be strengthened to make it more credible, and there should be greater US participation; give specific information to the VC on how to defect (e.g., how to do it quickly and how to avoid being shot); treat prisoners better; protect families of defectors (e.g., provide resettlement when properly taken); encourage VC to "defect" home to their villages.
- L. Political action. The following political actions should be taken, bearing in mind that meaningful negotiations are unlikely until the situation begins to look gloomier to the VC:
1. Announce the decision to deploy, to call up reserves, and to extend tours.
 2. Presidential speech putting the war in context and making clear that our objectives are no more nor less than those listed in the "win" column of para E. Put major emphasis on infiltration and terror; indicate that the form of government in South Vietnam, if not imposed by North Vietnam, is not a major concern of ours.
 3. Keep talking with Moscow -- not "with tongue out," but to avoid their imagining untrue horrors and to impress on them the seriousness of the matter, our resolution, and our desire to have them help and advice in working it out.
 4. Press allies, friends and UN to seek ways to settle the war.
 5. Press for a Geneva conference.
 6. Make contact directly (or have the GVN contact) the DRV and NLF to make clear our determination but readiness to settle the war.
 7. Let it be known that we are willing to try a "stoppage of bombing" of North Vietnam if it holds any promise of helping.
 8. Invite an international military force to police the infiltration routes.
- M. Laotian "wall." If US forces in excess of 75,000 are to be deployed to Vietnam, we should consider seriously investing in the construction of a barrier (a la Iron Curtain) across the Ho Chi Minh trail -- roughly from the DMZ, across Laos at Tchepone (Rt. 9), to the Mekong and Thailand at Savannakhet. The barrier, which might or might not be a highway, could be made of electrified fence and could be protected by mine fields. The building of such a barrier would of course "rock the boat" in Laos, probably upsetting what's left of the 1962 Accords; Souvanna might or might not go along with the proposal. Third-countries and international organizations should be willing to support a wall more than bombing of North Vietnam or even the fighting in South Vietnam. Thailand might make troops available to help build and protect the barrier. The barrier could not be expected to be water-tight at the start, but it might be made water-tight later and in a shorter period of time than it would take starting from scratch.
- N. Third-country (Asian) forces. A vigorous effort should be made to obtain Asian forces to fight in South Vietnam. Specifically, we should get the 1 division from Korea, 1 division from Thailand (especially if there is a "Laotian wall"), 1 division from the Philippines and perhaps even 1 division of Chinats. Money, except as the "purchase" of such forces is counterproductive politically, should be no object.

- O. Points of view. We must not delude ourselves into believing that everyone agrees with our assessment of the case in Vietnam; we must try to win more people over.
- We say that it is a simple case of one country (NVN) trying to conquer another (SVN) and to impose its way of life upon that other country by the deceitful technique of clandestinely arranging for the overthrow by force of that other's legally constituted government; NVN is doing this by providing critical increments of direction, supplies, organization, exhortation, leadership and even manpower to a disaffected rebellious indigenous minority in SVN which, but for DRV interference, could, should and would be put down by the majority of the people and the legal government of SVN. We take the position that we cannot allow this to happen to a treaty (protocol) ally who has asked for help; we cannot permit this method of aggression to succeed here for fear that it will spread elsewhere.
 - They say that it is a simple case of a single country (VN) and single people split artificially and kept separate by US force and by refusal to test the will of the people in the 1956 elections; they see the way of the future and the vital human forces as being on the side of the revolutionary VC (Communists) not on the side of the "reactionary" ARVN generals or "US puppets;" if the US would merely withdraw and allow these dynamic forces to follow their natural course, Vietnam could be a Garden of Eden. They believe that they have an obligation (a destiny) to deliver salvation to the South Vietnamese (and to prove the validity of Wars of Liberation).
 - Others in the world (except for Communists) are ambivalent. The merits in their minds turn on whether they are white, recently a colony, vulnerable to a "war of liberation," near to China, friendly to (or even counting on) the US, "socialist," and so on. The merits, in history, will be determined to a large extent by who wins.
- P. Soviet, Chinese and DRV reaction. Neither the Soviets nor Chinese are likely to intervene if do not strike China, do not quarantine the North Vietnamese ports and do not invade North Vietnam. The DRV, on the other hand (and possibly China), is likely to send up to several divisions of regular forces into South Vietnam to assist the VC. This will lead to pressures to "counter-invade" North Vietnam, and to extend the air strikes to population targets in the North; but, to contain the war, these pressures should be resisted.
- Q. Prognosis. The odds appear in para G but, even if "success," it is not obvious how we will be able to disengage our forces from South Vietnam. It is unlikely that a formal agreement good enough for the purpose could possibly be negotiated -- because the arrangement can reflect little more than the power situation. Most likely, in the case of "success," is a settling down into a "compromise"-like situation (see para E) with a large number -- perhaps 2 divisions -- of US forces required to stay for a period of years. During that period of time, any number of things can change the picture beyond prediction.

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By ip
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STATE letter
MAR 7 1979
NARS, Date 6-28-79

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July 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

In order to assist us in making contingency plans for possible increases in US forces in South Viet-Nam, I should appreciate it if you could provide an assessment of major reactions to a substantial increase in our force structure in South Viet-Nam. I believe this assessment should be made by an inter-agency group reporting to USIB, but with the participants limited to the absolute minimum for security reasons. This assessment would be separate from the wider project presented recently to USIB, and should have overriding priority so that it is available at the time of the return of Secretary McNamara's party.

The following should be the major assumptions for your assessment:

1. US forces would be increased from their present level of approximately 75,000 men to 175,000 by November 1.
2. In order to achieve this build-up without weakening our over-all force structure and deployment of forces, legislation would be requested to permit call-up of Reserves and extension of tours. Under this legislation, some 225,000 Reserves would be called up, and tours would be extended, at the rate of 20,000 a month cumulatively for a year (subject to review at the end of that period).
3. In order to permit release of Reserves and termination of extended tours, the regular strength of the Armed Services would be increased by 400,000 men over the next year. Draft calls would be increased by 100 percent.
4. A budget supplement of between \$2 and \$3 billion would be sought in order to support this build-up.

With respect to accompanying military actions against the DRV, it should be assumed, in the alternative, that (a) we continue present policy; (b) we extend our operations to hit selected military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas in the near future.

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
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In connection with ground force deployments, you should assume that the additional forces deployed to South Viet-Nam would remain under the mission guidelines of the White House announcement of June 9, but with the expectation that area-securing action and reserve use would in practice mean that US forces became engaged in an increasing share of the ground fighting, particularly in the central and northern areas of the country. You may further assume that forces would be based along the coast, or at least with no major grouping threatening or appearing to threaten the 17th parallel. However, we would be interested in any aspects either of the deployments or of their announcement and public discussion which might, in your view, significantly affect the key reactions you are assessing.

Similarly, you may assume that the announcement of these plans would be accompanied by statements reiterating our objectives, readiness for unconditional discussions, and other aspects of the stated Administration position. Again, however, we would be interested in any points which you believe might be particularly stressed in this area.

The major reactions covered by your assessment should of course stress primarily those of the North Vietnamese regime, Communist China, and the USSR. Apart from the over-all view these major Communist countries might take of the proposed course of action, we would be particularly concerned with the nature of their military responses, including their actions with respect to their own forces and deployments and the possibility of threats to the free world position in any area of the world. Most usefully, your assessment might state at the outset your view of the current attitudes of the major Communist countries, and then proceed to examine the degree to which these would be affected by the proposed course of action.

However, we would also be interested in your comments on the reactions of major Asian countries, our European allies, and such additional key countries as India, and whatever broad categories of other nations you think most useful.

Dean Rusk

FE:WPBundy:mk

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15 July 1965
RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
West Wing
White House

1965 JUL 15 PM 3 47

Dear Mac:

I believe that the attached Memorandum, prepared
in this office, will be of interest to you.

Sherman

SHERMAN KENT
Director
National Estimates

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA 9-29-80 letter
By WJ, NARS, Date 5-18-81

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

15 July 1965

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 13-65

SUBJECT: Soviet Tactics Concerning Vietnam

SUMMARY

The new Soviet-DRV economic and military aid agreement implies a stepup in Soviet arms shipments and will have the effect of deepening the Soviet commitment in Vietnam. Partly in order to contain the risks of this commitment, the USSR has of late intensified private approaches to the US, indicating continued interest in a negotiated settlement. At the same time, it has threatened in low key to make trouble in Berlin if the US remains unyielding in Vietnam. We believe that this combination of tactics is intended to deter further US escalation in Vietnam. It is also meant to prepare for the time when negotiations might become feasible and, the USSR can play a larger role in Vietnam.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-393
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-13-03

1. The USSR seems to have agreed to step up its arms shipments to the DRV. As announced by Hanoi on 12 July, a new economic and military aid agreement was recently signed in Moscow; among other things, it calls for the "strengthening of the DRV's national defense potential" and specifies the additional aid to be provided.

2. The signing of this agreement followed a month or more of public Soviet hints that something of this nature was impending. Departing from the usual formula on the subject, Pravda in mid-June, for example, declared that the USSR would give "the DRV government and the republic's armed forces all the assistance considered necessary by the DRV for the defense of the achievements of peoples rule and the repulse of aggression."

3. The Chinese seem to have agreed to the transshipment of additional Soviet arms. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping, for example, is reported to have told the Cambodian ambassador that China had recently given its agreement to let the USSR transport war material destined for North Vietnam across China. Similar statements have been attributed to other Soviet sources. Moscow's recent public emphasis on the failure of the Chinese to coordinate their Vietnamese policies with the Soviets suggests, however, that a permanent solution to the transshipment problem has yet to be found.

- 2 -

The New Soviet Aid

4. The extent of Soviet military aid program for the DRV is not, of course, spelled out in announcements of the new agreement, and it is not entirely clear to us what the Soviets have in mind. In general, however, we think the Soviets are likely to provide weapons of an essentially defensive nature. Specifically, under the terms of the new agreement, we think further deliveries of Soviet air defense equipment are likely: SAMs, AAA, radar, and fighters. The SAM system will probably be extended to cover more than the Hanoi area.

5. The USSR apparently agreed last spring to strengthen the DRV's coastal defenses; thus far, it does not seem to have done so. The new agreement may spell out this commitment, and for example, provide for the strengthening of the MTB fleet and perhaps the delivery of Komar missile boats and coastal defense missiles.

6. It is possible that more IL-28's will be delivered. The lack of a specific response to the delivery of eight of these aircraft in late May, together with the public airing of the issue in the US, may have convinced the USSR and the DRV that more of these aircraft could be safely delivered.

Soviet Approaches to the US

7. While increasing their involvement in the Vietnamese crisis, the Soviets have made it a point to keep in touch with the US. Gromyko told Ambassador Kohler in Moscow last month that it was "fundamental Soviet policy" to seek an improvement in US-Soviet relations. He also seemed to say that further overtures to the DRV should be made. Kosygin, in rejecting the British Commonwealth mission, was careful not to rule out negotiating and merely disclaimed any authorization to negotiate for the DRV or Viet Cong. A Soviet official in Vienna, who expected that his remarks would reach Washington, claimed on 1 July that his government foresaw an armistice as a possible basis for Vietnam negotiations. Most recently, the Soviets have agreed to early resumption of disarmament talks in Geneva, abandoning the line that Vietnam made such talks useless. This could have symbolic import as the first positive Soviet move in East-West relations after many months of deterioration.

8. In addition to these approaches, Ambassador Kohler has reported that on 27 June a Soviet official, privy to high level policy, told one of Kohler's diplomatic colleagues that the US and USSR had the same strategic aim in Southeast Asia -- to prevent the area from falling under Chinese domination. He said the most

feasible solution would be an independent, neutralized Vietnam, guaranteed by the US and USSR as in Laos. He added that negotiations were exceedingly difficult for the Soviets because they could not be kept secret and, if they become known, the Chinese would lambaste the Soviets for a sellout.

9. But this same Soviet official also stated that the policy choices for the USSR were becoming increasingly painful; if the situation continues along present lines, he said, the Soviets would be forced to "counterattack" in the area of the greatest US vulnerability, Germany. This pointedly declared warning is the first of its kind. Previous East German moves affecting West Berlin might have been partly intended to convey the same warning, though Soviet officials on the scene disavowed any intention of creating another Berlin crisis.

10. We continue to think that the Soviets want to avoid sharp crises on two fronts simultaneously. The new leaders have shown themselves willing, however, to put some pressure on West Berlin while the war continues in Vietnam. We believe that they will further develop the line that the US faces trouble in Berlin

if it remains unyielding in Vietnam, perhaps underscoring it from time to time with controlled harassments falling short of a major challenge to the Allied position there.

11. All these recent Soviet moves, in our view, illustrate and are explained by the major dilemmas of Soviet policy. The USSR naturally desires the victory of communism in Vietnam, yet it does not want to see such a victory as would magnify the prestige and power of Communist China. At the same time, in the circumstances of the Sino-Soviet controversy Moscow cannot afford to appear laggard in supporting the DRV and the Viet Cong. Yet it is highly apprehensive of the consequences of expanded war in the Far East, a major military confrontation between the US and Communist China, and the extremely dangerous world crisis that would result therefrom. Finally, the situation is one over which Moscow has little control; it cannot manage the DRV, or the Chinese Communists, or the US.

12. The feasible options open to Moscow are thus limited and unsatisfactory. It is giving more aid to North Vietnam because practically speaking, it cannot avoid giving such aid and because it wishes to strengthen its presence and influence in Hanoi.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

It is putting some pressure on the US through low-keyed threats about Berlin. Yet it is also keeping open its lines of communication with the US, endeavoring somewhat to soften the crisis, to keep alive the possibilities of negotiation at some future time, and to persuade the US not to carry military operations to a degree of extreme severity. We continue to believe that the Soviets desire a negotiated settlement, because such a settlement would bring least profit to the Chinese, would dampen the dangers of extended war, and yet would not necessarily surrender Communist objectives in Vietnam. At the moment there is little the Soviets can do to bring about negotiation. They can only temporize, and lay what foundations they may for the time when negotiations become feasible and they can hope to influence them.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

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By if, NARS, Date 5-17-79

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PASS DOD

L I M D I S

FOR GREENFIELD AND SYLVESTER FROM ZORTHIAN

✓ Bundy

EMBTEL 130

CV NOW INFORMS THAT PRESENCE FULL 101ST REGIMENT WITH THREE
INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS CONFIRMED;
PRESENCE 13TH REGIMENT PROBABLY; PRESENCE 95TH REGIMENT POSSIBLE.
ALL THESE REGIMENTS PART OF 325TH PAVN DIVISION. OUR LATEST
STATEMENT ON RECORD MADE BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA CITES CONFIRMATION

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 784A ~~SECRET~~
ONLY ONE BATALION WITH SOME EVIDENCE OF ADDITIONAL EIGHT.
BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO PLACE NEW CONFIRMATIONS
ON THE RECORD AND WILL SEEK TO DO SO WITHIN NEXT TWO OR THREE
DAYS UNLESS YOU WOULD LIKE TO SAVE FOR A SPECIAL OCCASION.
IF SO, BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE SOON SINCE THIS SORT OF INFORMATION
LEAKS QUICKLY AND WE GET NEGATIVE REACTION FROM CORRESPONDENTS
FOR KEEPING CONFIRMED INFORMATION UNDER WRAPS. ADVISE.

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

TAYLOR
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Authority DECLASSIFIED
STATE letter APR 27 1979
By ij, NARS, Date 5-17-79

~~SECRET~~

FE:WPBundy:mk
7/17/65

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CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS

1. Possible Timetable.

Secretary McNamara will return on the ^{8 AM.} 21st. There will be Executive Branch discussions leading to a final Presidential decision, perhaps the 26th. The President might make his major statement to a joint session of the Congress on the 28th. DOD is doing the first draft of a Presidential statement and will send it privately to Secretary McNamara for his personal review during his return trip. This first draft will come to State on Monday,

2. Congressional Actions.

a. Consultation with Leadership. Apart from the President's personal conversations, Mr. Vance will see Senator Russell Monday but will not see Mr. Rivers until after Secretary McNamara's return. Secretary McNamara may consult with other leaders about Friday, following his return.

b. Committee Presentation. It is now anticipated that the presentation will be made to the Armed Services Committees separately, but probably with the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees also participating. This would presumably start the day after the President's statement. It would be the occasion for major statements by Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk. Since the main thrust of the program concerns military actions, Secretary McNamara would lead off, with Secretary Rusk following up with a statement covering our political objectives, our negotiating hopes, and the present negotiating and international situation in detail. Drafts of these two statements will be the responsibility of the respective departments. In addition, DOD is currently preparing a draft speech which would amplify the President's statement and might be given by either one of the two Secretaries.

c. Preparation of Key Speeches. We need a speech-writing group early next week to start on draft speech materials for the use of Administration supporters in both Houses. Mr. McGeorge Bundy is seeing if Mr. Cater ^{or} Mr. Busby can be made available to take charge of this project. State should play a major supporting role, and we will need good draftsmen to cover several key topics and assemble materials.

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(Possible candidates might be Messrs. Jordan and Sieverts of P, Mr. Moore and others from FE, and Mr. Wilson of IO. Mr. Bundy will draw up a list of topics that should be covered both for the affirmative case and to meet possible points (such as use of the UN) that might be made by opponents of the program.)

DOD is preparing the necessary draft legislation for Reserves and tours of duty, and is examining the question of supplementary budget requests.

3. The UN.

We do not believe that we should take the issue to the UN for action at this time. However, we should make a careful and thorough statement to the Security Council, probably on the day after the President's statement. FE and IO should take responsibility for drafting this statement.

U Thant personally should be informed of our proposed actions, and our unchanged objectives, prior to the President's statement. The Secretary's conversation on July 19 may provide the opportunity for a general outline.

4. Action with respect to the American Public.

a. The White House is urgently considering the formation of a citizens committee. Mr. Arthur Dean is one candidate to head this.

b. FE and P will look urgently at the present draft "Questions and Answers", to see if release of this material would be useful in the public debate following the President's statement. Alternatively, this material could readily form part of a defensive debating kit assembled for Congressional use.

5. Notification to Key Countries.

a. Australia/New Zealand/UK. We have already told the Australians roughly what we have in mind and indicated that we may be suggesting to them similar mobilization/acceleration measures in their own military posture. We will make the same kind of pitch to New

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Zealand about the 19th or 20th, and will also inform the UK frankly at that time.

b. Asian Allies. We should give at least one or two days' notice to the following, with special reference to the effect of the program on what we may ask of them in the way of base use or additional forces:

Japan (both in Tokyo and here)
Korea (primarily in Seoul)
GRC (both ends)
Philippines (primarily in Manila)
Thailand (primarily in Bangkok)
Laos (primarily in Vientiane)

c. SEATO. Although we will be seeing most SEATO nations individually, it might help to call in the SEATO Ambassadors collectively in Washington, probably on the day of the statement, and to convene the SEATO Council the day after the statement, with the added note that we might underscore the last SEATO communique calling for additional measures by the members. This would add little in practice, but would be a useful invocation of the alliance.

d. Major European Allies. We should probably convene the North Atlantic Council on the day of the statement, perhaps even to coincide in time with the actual delivery. To the extent not covered in the statement itself, we would use this occasion to stress that the whole program was specifically designed to make sure that we would not reduce or weaken our NATO commitment in any way.

In addition, we should probably make a special effort, in advance of the statement, with:

West Germany
Canada
Italy

e. USSR. The second Harriman-Kosygin meeting on July 21 may be an excellent occasion for foreshadowing the possibility of major force increases and at the same time underscoring that these do not change our objectives but are solely to meet North Viet-Nam's increasing intervention.

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With such a general notice already made, we could probably wait until the morning of the statement to call in the Soviet Charge and inform him in greater detail.

f. Other Key Countries. The following, for various reasons, also appear to deserve special advance notice:

India

Pakistan (would be included in SEATO Ambassadors, but might also deserve private treatment)

Indonesia (here we have in mind Indonesia's fairly close ties to the Chinese Communists; it should be done in Washington, and the timing needs careful consideration in order to separate it from Ambassador Green's first appointment with Sukarno on the 26th)

UAR (a key Afro-Asian country, also having links to the Chinese Communists)

Sweden (again for an accurate reading that might reach the Chinese Communists)

g. Regional Groupings. In February, we called in the African and Latin American Ambassadors in groups. This would not appear wise prior to the statement, but might be a useful action on the afternoon of the statement.

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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

51a

17 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Vietnam Build-up -- Legislative Situation

In connection with your discussions on Monday, there are attached alternate redrafts of legislation in accordance with the conclusions reached this morning as follows:

Tab A -- Reserve call-up and extension of enlistments. Extension provisions follow the Cuba pattern.

Tab B -- Reserve call-up and extension, plus add-on to 412(b) authorization and a military construction authorization. (Amount blank)

Tab C -- Reserve call-up and extension of enlistments, plus military construction authorization. (Amount blank)

Tab D -- A combination waiver of 412(b), and waiver of military construction authorization, plus an appropriation in the pattern of the \$700 million supplemental approved in May 1965.

Note that Tabs A, B and C are authorizations only and do not carry appropriations.

L. Niederlehner
Acting General Counsel

Attachments -
Tabs A, B, C & D

cc: Mr. Hitch
Mr. McGiffert

JOINT RESOLUTION

To authorize the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 24 months, and for other purposes.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
2 States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any
3 other provision of law, until September 1, 1967, the President may,
4 without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, or any
5 member, of the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for
6 not more than 24 consecutive months. However, not more than 250,000
7 members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for
8 training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

9 SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until September
10 1, 1967, the President may extend enlistments, appointments, periods
11 of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated
12 service, or other periods of military service in any component of an
13 armed force or in the National Guard that expire before September 1,
14 1967, for not more than 24 months. However, if the enlistment, period
15 of obligated service, or other period of military service of a member
16 of the Ready Reserve who is ordered to active duty under the first section
17 of this Act would expire after August 31, 1967, but before he has served
18 the entire period for which he was so ordered to active duty, his enlist-
19 ment, period of obligated service, or other period of military service
20 may be extended until he has served the entire period for which he has
21 so ordered to active duty.

JOINT RESOLUTION

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16 of the Ready Reserve who is ordered to active duty under the first section
17 of this Act would expire after August 31, 1967, but before he has served
18 the entire period for which he was so ordered to active duty, his enlist-
19 ment, period of obligated service, or other period of military service
20 may be extended until he has served the entire period for which he has
21 so ordered to active duty.

1 SEC. 3. Funds are hereby authorized to appropriated for the use
2 by the armed forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft,
3 missiles, Naval vessels, research, development, test and evaluation
4 and construction: \$ _____; Provided, that funds made available
5 pursuant to this Act may be expended without regard to 10 U. S. Code
6 4774(d), 10 U. S. Code 9774(d), and 41 U. S. Code 12.

JOINT RESOLUTION

To authorize the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 24 months, and for other purposes.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
2 States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any
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7 members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for
8 training), ~~without their consent~~, under this section at any one time.

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10 1, 1967, the President may extend enlistments, appointments, periods
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12 service, or other ~~periods of~~ military ^{status} service in any component of an
13 armed force or in the National Guard that expire before September 1,
14 1967, for not more than 24 months. However, if the enlistment, period
15 of obligated service, or other ~~period of~~ military ^{status} service of a member
16 of the Ready Reserve who is ordered to active duty under the first section
17 of this Act would expire after August 31, 1967, but before he has served
18 the entire period for which he was so ordered to active duty, his enlist-
19 ment, period of obligated service, or other ~~period of~~ military ^{status} service
20 may be extended until he has served the entire period for which he has

1 SEC. 3. The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop in-
2 stallations and facilities which he determines vital to the security of
3 the United States and in connection therewith acquire, construct,
4 convert, rehabilitate, or install permanent or temporary public works,
5 including land acquisition, site preparation, pertinences, utilities,
6 and equipment in the total amount of _____ provided that authority
7 under this section may be exercised without regard to the provisions
8 of 10 U.S. Code 4774(d), 10 U.S. Code 9774(d), 41 U.S. Code 12, 40 U.S.
9 Code 255, and 31 U.S. Code 529.

EMERGENCY FUND

For transfer by the Secretary of Defense, upon determination by the President that such action is necessary in connection with the readiness of the Armed Forces, to any appropriation available to the Department of Defense for military functions, to be merged with and to be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as the appropriation to which transferred, \$ _____, to remain available until expended: Provided, That transfers under this authority may be made, and funds utilized, without regard to the provisions of subsection (b) of section 412 of Public Law 86-149, as amended, 10 U. S. C. 4774(d), 10 U. S. C. 9774(d), and 41 U. S. C. 12.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter APR 27 1979
By *[signature]*, NARS, Date 5-17-79

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DRAFT
FE:WPBundy:mk
7/17/65

DRAFT SCENARIO

284
D-Day, around which all else revolves, would be the day on which the President made a major statement to a joint session of the Congress outlining the situation and the proposed program. The following is a checklist of other actions and their possible relationship to D-Day.

1. Congressional Actions

M+1 ± President?

- a. Consultation with Leadership: D minus one.
- b. Presentation to the Armed Services Committees, but probably with the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees also participating: D plus one. This would be the occasion for major statements by Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk. Since the main thrust of the program concerns military actions, Secretary McNamara might lead off, with Secretary Rusk following up with a statement covering our political objectives, our negotiating hopes, and the present negotiating and international situation in detail.

In view of the fact that the President's statement would blanket the country, these statements by the two Secretaries to the Congress--which ✓ would also have wide publicity--seem preferable to any TV appearances or separate speeches by the two Secretaries.

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2. Notification to Key Countries

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a. Inner Circle. We have already told the Australians roughly what we may have in mind and indicated that we may be suggesting to them similar mobilization/acceleration measures in their own military posture. We could start early next week to foreshadow the program quite frankly to the UK and New Zealand.

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b. Asian Allies. We should give at least one or two days' notice to the following, with special reference to the effect of the program on what we may ask of them in the way of base use or additional forces:

- Japan (both in Tokyo and here)
- Korea (primarily in Seoul)
- GRC (both ends)
- Philippines (primarily in Manila)
- Thailand (primarily in Bangkok)
- Laos (primarily in Vientiane)

c. Major European Allies. We should likewise give one or two days' notice to the following, laying particular stress on the impact of the program in not reducing our NATO commitment:

West Germany (both ends)

France (both ends)

Italy (both ends)

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Netherlands

Belgium

Canada

Norway

Denmark

d. Other Key Countries. Same notice should be given, with appropriate overtones, to the following:

- India (both ends)
- Pakistan (SEATO member and also possible channel to the Chinese Communists)
- Indonesia (this should be done in Washington, separately from Ambassador Green's appointment on the 26th, and having in mind also that Indonesia might be a good channel to the Chinese Communists)
- UAR (a key Afro-Asian country, also having links to the Chinese Communists)
- Sweden (again for an accurate reading that might reach Chinese Communists)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, July 19, 1965
8:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Reasons for Avoiding a Billion Dollar Appropriation
in Vietnam

1. It would be a belligerent challenge to the Soviets at a time when it is important to do only the things which we have to do (like calling reserves).
2. It would stir talk about controls over the economy and inflation -- at a timewhen controls are not needed and inflation is not that kind of a problem.
3. It would create the false impression that we have to have guns, not butter -- and would help the enemies of the President's domestic legislative program.
4. It would play into the hands of the Soviets at Geneva, because they could argue that it was a flagrant breach of the policy of "mutual example" on defense budgets.
5. It is not needed -- because there are other ways of financing our full effort in Vietnam for the rest of the calendar year, at least.

Rewrite elementary

McG. B.

McG. B.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

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FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy BANGKOK 103 PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS

Authority STATE letter MAR 7 1979

Purpose of this message is to alert you to decisions and actions

on Viet-Nam ^{that might} ~~expected to~~ be taken following return of Secretary McNamara and to request your comments and suggestions on best way of handling vis-a-vis ~~RTG~~ RTG and SEATO. You will appreciate that specifics of decisions listed below are subject modification in line McNamara findings in Viet-Nam and further consideration here. Timing of various actions is also subject to change, particularly if it is ^{decided} ~~necessary~~ to negotiate commitments from GVN regarding parallel actions to be taken on their side.

Basic decisions ^{may} ~~expected~~ to be along following lines:

1) US forces to be increased from present level of 75,000 to 175,000 by November 1.

2) To achieve such buildup without weakening of overall US defense posture, legislation to be requested to permit call up of reserves and extension of tours of duty. Some 225,000 reserves would be called up and tours would be extended at rate of 20,000 a month.

OKP

Drafted by: FE:SEA:WCT Trueheart:cst 7/19/65
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: William P. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Rattray ^{AR}

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3) To permit release of reserves and termination of extended tours of duty, legislative authority to be requested to increase regular strength of armed services by 400,000 over next year.

4) A budget supplement will be sought to support buildup but not necessarily at this time.

5) It is not expected that there would be any change in current bombing policy and mission of US forces in SVN would remain unchanged, although it is expected that US forces would take on increased share of ground fighting.

6) Overall US objectives would remain the same. Buildup is necessitated solely by inability build up GVN forces rapidly enough to cope with Viet Cong at present and anticipated strength.

7) It is not anticipated that additional ^{US} forces would be deployed to Thailand, although additional base construction there (details not yet available) is expected. Also no action further stretching 1962 Accords on Laos is presently envisaged.

As to timing, McNamara will return July 21. Ensuing Executive Branch decisions might lead to final Presidential decision by 26th, followed by Presidential statement to joint session of Congress 28th. We have in mind notifying RTG of decisions day or two in advance of Presidential statement.

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It might be possible to authorize you to talk with RTG in more general terms prior to that, if you believe that this would serve important purpose in our relations with Thais. However, in that event, it is doubtful that we would be able to say much more than has already appeared in newspapers.

With regard to SEATO, we envisage presentation by you to Council Reps day after Presidential statement. We would refer to our action as being in accord with SEATO London communique and call for additional action by other members who subscribed to that communique.

~~XXXX~~ FYI We expect decision on MAP add-ons will have been taken prior your notification RTG of actions enumerated above. END FYI
~~XXXX~~

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END

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, July 19, 1965
8:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Planning at Close of Business, July 19

We currently expect Bob McNamara back at 8 a.m. Wednesday. We assume you will want to see him that morning -- or possibly that afternoon after he has had time to take a reading with Rusk and Vance. The attached cable from Cooper and Unger (TAB A) shows where they are at half time in Saigon.

Meanwhile, Vance has gone ahead with planning for the reserve call-up, the extension of tours, and the increased draft calls which are foreshadowed in the military planning. A first draft exists of a Presidential message and of the necessary legislation. The planned reserve call-up will be one Marine Division and six Army Reserve Brigades (a total of 27 battalions). Beyond this, there would be temporary additions to the active forces of 27 battalions (nine Marine and 18 Army), plus a permanent addition of nine more Army battalions. This makes a total addition of 63 battalions. (At TAB B is a one-page statement of current planning which Cy Vance regards as very tentative and which Bob McNamara has not had a chance to approve.)

In addition, my brother has drawn up an action checklist for Congressional and diplomatic steps. We will have appropriate messages for all foreign leaders. Some should go early in the game, as soon as you know your own mind. Others should wait until after public announcement of your plans -- presumably in a message to the Congress.

Indeed the timing of the message to the Congress is really the D-Day for the whole operation. If McNamara reports to you Wednesday, you probably do not wish to give an appearance of great haste in reaching a decision, and for that reason I would recommend against going to the Hill before the first of the week. But a delay beyond Monday would seem to me to create too wide a gap between McNamara's return and the point of decision. If you agree, we might tentatively plan that you would see McNamara Wednesday, see him again with a view to decision Friday, and talk with the Congressional Leadership either Friday or Saturday to get ready for a formal message on Monday.

At the same time, it is increasingly urgent that we get ahead with planning for public support. Doug Cater is ready to go ahead with plans to provide

speech materials to friendly Senators and Congressmen, and everyone is ready to go ahead with the Citizens Committee as soon as you give the signal. I continue to think that Arthur Dean would be an excellent choice for us, but he is by no means the only possibility.

I have suggested to Jack Valenti that Rusk and Vance and I have lunch with you tomorrow, or come in at any other time at your convenience to review the bidding on all these matters. I ~~will call in the morning to learn your pleasure.~~ *You have just agreed to this, & I have told Marvin.*

McG. B.

McG. B.

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Monday, July 19, 1965
5:30 PM

NODIS

(Text of Cable from Saigon #182 dated July 18, 1965)
Report of Cooper and Unger on McNamara Mission at half-way point.

Regarding: Military Situation-A briefing on the Government of Vietnamese plan for utilization of U. S. military forces was provided by General Thieu and the Vietnamese Army planning group. Briefly, the Government of Vietnam contemplates a U. S. force of 200,000 with 3 U. S. divisions to take over responsibility for the highlands in the II Corps and defense of major U. S. bases and installations throughout the country. The South Vietnamese would concentrate on pacification primarily in the populous sections throughout the country. The Government of Vietnam also unveiled a home guard plan with the sketchiest explanation.

MACV and the visiting team are disinclined to accept the Government of Vietnam's concept. The MACV concept will be reflected in the McNamara team and U. S. Mission recommendations now in preparation.

The team was given intensive briefings on the MACV strategic and tactical situation and logistic requirements. The biggest bottlenecks appear to be in sea interdiction. McNamara is formulating recommendations to break this and other binds. Thus far there has been little opportunity to discuss pacification/rural reconstruction with either the Government of Vietnam or MACV.

Regarding: Economic Situation-Excellent briefings by the acting U. S. Operations Mission chief and the Government of Vietnam Minister of Economic Affairs point up the danger of incipient inflation, shortages of key commodities (e. g. rice, building materials) labor scarcities, black market and transportation bottlenecks. Recommendations to deal with these and some major policy proposals to cope with over-all Government of Vietnam weakness will be incorporated in the team report (some suggestions will be forwarded to Washington prior to the team's departure.)

Regarding: Political Situation-A meeting with Thieu, Ky, et. al., subsequent informal conversations at dinner, additional sessions yet to come, and an intensive series of Unger-Cooper meetings with a cross-section of political

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Authority State 11-7-78, CIA 11-26-80, DSD [1-81]

By sig, NARS, Date 1-27-81

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types in and out of government should provide a reasonably good feeling of the political scene.

Initial, tentative impressions are: Thieu and Ky appear to take pains to present a collective front. Both make the right noises about solidarity, stability, revolution, Chieu Hoi, etc. Both convey a sense of sincerity and determination, although both (especially Ky) seem to be concentrating on the daily quick-fix and neither seems to have yet harnessed the resources, (if indeed they exist) to work out fundamental, solid plans for the longer term. Possibly excluding Co, other members of the Government of Vietnam's first team, especially the Economic Minister, seem quite impressive.

We have pressed the Government of Vietnam hard for their estimate of the reaction to introduction of large U. S. forces (no basic problem, but the same underlying worries regarding black market, etc.), the Chieu Hoi repatriation program (they say the right things, but see the more extensive report below), government stability (Ky and Thieu stress the reliance on support of the mass of citizens rather than individual groupings) and representation abroad (they are working on it, but no immediate progress seems in sight). In short, we want to probe more before coming to any firm conclusions.

Regarding: The Chieu Hoi-Ky claims he has given this program increased importance by combining it with rural reconstruction. He also claims that statistics of increased numbers of ralliers have been either inflated by provincial Chieu Hoi officials or are meaningless because the Viet Cong itself has used Chieu Hoi centers as "rest camps."

In a session with the Chieu Hoi investigation team (headed by Col. Jacobson) we got the impression that the program was not doing too badly despite the apparent massive indifference on the part of the Government of Vietnam. Jacobson is preparing tentative conclusions and recommendations for incorporation in the McNamara team report (a final report of the survey will not be available for a month).

Miscellaneous-Lodge and Cooper went to Cam Ranh Bay this morning and both were extremely impressed with the pace and scale of construction of the logistics base. Unger to Hue to get provincial impressions. Embassy morale is high, even inspiring.

Hertz Case. The CIA representative is more optimistic of release (perhaps this week) than at any time since February.

TAYLOR

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1. Purpose:
 - A. Reconstitute ASAP by calling up reserves substantially all elements of US ground combat forces introduced into SVN under 34+10 Bn Plan.
 - B. Make certain temporary and permanent additions to active ground combat forces (by draft increases, volunteers and tour extensions).

2. Combat Ground Forces Involved:

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OSD letter OCT 25 1978

A. Call-up of reserves (27 Bns):

Authority _____
By ib, NARS, Date 6-5-79

4th Marine Div, including air elements (9 Bns): combat ready in 60 days
6 Army reserve brigades (~~9 Bns~~): combat ready in 8-12 weeks
(18 Bns)

B. Temporary additions to the active forces (27 bns):

3 Marine Brigades, w/out air elements (9 Bns): combat ready in 4-6 mos.
3 Army Brigades (9 Bns): combat ready in 6-8 months
1 Army Division (9 Bns): combat ready in 8-10 months

C. Permanent additions to the Army (9 bns):

3 Brigades (9 Bns): combat ready at end of 3d, 4th, and 5th months respectively

3. Options provided: At end of one year, retain all, part or none of Army and/or Marine reserves on active duty, thereby reducing 63 Bns not at all or by up to 27 Bns (18 Army plus 9 Marine Bns).

4. Service end strength increases:

A. <u>Personnel:</u>	<u>If Reserves deactivated</u>	<u>If Reserves retained</u>
Army	250,000	350,000
Navy	56,000	56,000
Marines	86,000	131,000
Air Force	102,000*	102,000*
<u>Total</u>	<u>494,000</u>	<u>639,000</u>

* Includes 16,000 civilians for MATS augmentation.

- B. Units:
- Army - Shown above.
 - Navy - 17 Destroyers plus 24 combat support/supply vessels (plus undetermined number of private charters).
 - Marines - Shown above.
 - Air Force - 9 TFS (F-100); 6 Recce Sqdn (RF-84).

Note: Above figures and units are tentative and will be reviewed in light of actual decisions reached following Mr. McNamara's report. In addition, these figures have not been scrubbed and are merely rough planning estimates at this time.

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396

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396

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

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Authority OSD 10-25-78, State 7-10-79

20 July 1965

By isp, NARS, Date 10-24-79

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendations of additional deployments to Vietnam

1. Introduction. Our object in Vietnam is to create conditions for a favorable outcome by demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. We want to create these conditions, if possible, without causing the war to expand into one with China or the Soviet Union and in a way which preserves support of the American people and, hopefully, of our allies and friends. The following assessments, made following my trip to Vietnam with Ambassador-designate Lodge and General Wheeler, are my own and are addressed to the achievement of that object. My specific recommendations appear in paragraph 5; they are concurred in by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador-designate Lodge, Ambassador Johnson, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland. I have neither asked for nor obtained their concurrence in other portions of the paper.

2. Favorable outcome. In my view, a "favorable outcome" for purposes of these assessments and recommendations has nine fundamental elements:

- (a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.
- (b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact.
- (c) US/GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.
- (d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral).
- (e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.
- (f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.
- (g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam.

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-2-

(h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization.

(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.

A favorable outcome could include also arrangements, regarding elections, relations between North and South Vietnam, participation in peace-keeping by international forces, membership for North and South Viet nam in the UN, and so on. The nine fundamental elements can evolve with or without an express agreement and, except for what might be negotiated incidental to a cease-fire, are more likely to evolve without an express agreement than with one. We do not need now to address the question whether ultimately we would settle for something less than the nine fundamentals; because deployment of the forces recommended in paragraph 5 is prerequisite to the achievement of any acceptable settlement, and a decision can be made later, when bargaining becomes a reality, whether to compromise in any particular.

3. Estimate of the situation. The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few-months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A hard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul the army. The VC main and local forces, reinforced by militia and guerrillas, have the initiative and, with large attacks (some in regimental strength), are hurting ARVN forces badly. The main VC efforts have been in southern I Corps, northern and central II Corps and north of Saigon. The central highlands could well be lost to the National Liberation Front during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken. US combat troop deployments and US/VNAF strikes against the North have put to rest most South Vietnamese fears that the United States will foresake them, and US/VNAF air strikes in-country have probably shaken VC morale somewhat. Yet the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory as terrorism increases. Cities and towns are being isolated as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are usable and power and communications lines are cut.

The economy is deteriorating -- the war is disrupting rubber production, rice distribution, Dalat vegetable production and the coastal fishing industry, causing the loss of jobs and income, displacement of people and frequent breakdown or suspension of vital means of transportation and communication; foreign exchange earnings have fallen; and severe inflation is threatened.

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The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals. His government is youthful and inexperienced, but dedicated to a "revolutionary" program. His tenure depends upon unity of the armed forces behind him. If the directorate holds together and the downward trend of the war is halted, the religious and regional factions will probably remain quiescent; otherwise there will be political turbulence and possibly uncoordinated efforts to negotiate settlement with the DRV. The Buddhists, Catholics, out-politicians and business community are "wait-and-seeing;" the VC, while unable alone to generate effective unrest in the cities, can "piggy-back" on any anti-government demonstration or cause.

Rural reconstruction (pacification) even in the Hop Tac area around Saigon is making little progress. Gains in IV Corps are being held, but in I and II Corps and adjacent III Corps areas it has lost ground fast since the start of the VC monsoon offensive (300,000 people have been lost to the VC, and tens of thousands of refugees have poured out of these areas).

The Government-to-VC ratio over-all is now only a little better than 3-to-1, and in combat battalions little better than 1.5-to-1. Some ARVN units have been mauled; many are understrength and therefore "conservative." Desertions are at a high rate, and the force build-up has slipped badly. The VC, who are undoubtedly suffering badly too (their losses are very high), now control a South Vietnamese manpower pool of 500,000 to 1 million fighting-age men and reportedly are trying to double their combat strength, largely by forced draft (down to 15-year-olds) in the increasing areas they control. They seem to be able more than to replace their losses.

There are no signs that we have throttled the inflow of supplies for the VC or can throttle the flow while their materiel needs are as low as they are; indeed more and better weapons have been observed in VC hands, and it is probable that there has been further build-up of North Vietnamese regular units in the I and II Corps areas, with at least three full regiments (all of the 325th Division) there. Nor have our air attacks in North Vietnam produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that South Vietnam is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than a complete take-over.

4. Options open to us. We must choose among three courses of action with respect to Vietnam all of which involve different probabilities, outcomes and costs:

(a) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that

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-4-

can be arranged -- almost certainly conditions humiliating the United States and very damaging to our future effectiveness on the world scene.

(b) Continue at about the present level, with the US forces limited to say 75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks -- a course of action which, because our position would grow weaker, almost certainly would confront us later with a choice between withdrawal and an emergency expansion of forces, perhaps too late to do any good.

(c) Expand promptly and substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and maintain the military pressure against the North Vietnamese in the North while launching a vigorous effort on the political side* to lay the groundwork for a favorable outcome by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communication. This alternative would stave off defeat in the short run and offer a good chance of producing a favorable settlement in the longer run; at the same time it would imply a commitment to see a fighting war clear through at considerable cost in casualties and materiel and would make any later decision to withdraw even more difficult and even more costly than would be the case today.

My recommendations in paragraph 5 below are based on the choice of the third alternative (Option c) as the course of action involving the best odds of the best outcome with the most acceptable cost to the United States.

5. Military recommendations. There are now 15 US (and 1 Australian) combat battalions in Vietnam; they, together with other combat personnel and non-combat personnel, bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 75,000.

a. I recommend that the deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by October to 34 maneuver battalions (or, if the Koreans fail to provide the expected 9 battalions promptly, to 43 battalions). The battalions -- together with increases in helicopter lift, air squadrons, naval units, air defense, combat support and miscellaneous log support and advisory personnel which I also recommend -- would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam

* Ambassador Lodge states "any further initiative by us now before we are strong would simply harden the Communist resolve not to stop fighting." Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson would maintain discreet contacts with the Soviets, but otherwise agree with Ambassador Lodge.

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to approximately 175,000 (200,000 if we must make up for the Korean failure). It should be understood that the deployment of more men (perhaps 100,000) may be necessary in early 1966, and that the deployment of additional forces thereafter is possible but will depend on developments.

b. I recommend that Congress be requested to authorize the call-up of approximately 235,000 men in the Reserve and National Guard. This number -- approximately 125,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 10,000 Navy -- would provide approximately 36 maneuver battalions by the end of this year. The call-up would be for a two-year period; but the intention would be to release them after one year, by which time they could be relieved by regular forces if conditions permitted. ✓

c. I recommend that the regular armed forces be increased by approximately 375,000 men (approximately 250,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 25,000 Navy). This would provide approximately 27 additional maneuver battalions by the middle of 1966. The increase would be accomplished by increasing recruitment, increasing the draft and extending tours of duty of men already in the service. ✓

d. I recommend that a supplemental appropriation of approximately \$X for FY 1966 be sought from the Congress to cover the first part of the added costs attributable to the build-up in and for the war in Vietnam. A further supplemental appropriation might be required later in the fiscal year.

It should be noted that in mid-1966 the United States would, as a consequence of the above method of handling the build-up, have approximately 600,000 additional men (approximately 63 additional maneuver battalions) as protection against contingencies.]

6. Use of forces. The forces will be used however they can be brought to bear most effectively. The US/third-country ground forces will operate in coordination with South Vietnamese forces. They will defend their own bases; they will assist in providing security in neighboring areas; they will augment Vietnamese forces, assuring retention of key logistic areas and population centers. Also, in the initial phase they will maintain a small reserve-reaction force, conducting nuisance raids and spoiling attacks, and opening and securing selected lines of communication; as in-country ground strength increases to a level permitting extended US and third-

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-6-

country offensive action, the forces will be available for more active combat missions when the Vietnamese Government and General Westmoreland agree that such active missions are needed. The strategy for winning this stage of the war will be to take the offensive -- to take and hold the initiative. The concept of tactical operations will be to exploit the offensive, with the objects of putting the VC/DRV battalion forces out of operation and of destroying their morale. The South Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, by aggressive exploitation of superior military forces, are to gain and hold the initiative -- keeping the enemy at a disadvantage, maintaining a tempo such as to deny them time to recuperate or regain their balance, and pressing the fight against VC/DRV main force units in South Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them. The operations should combine to compel the VC/DRV to fight at a higher and more sustained intensity with resulting higher logistical consumption and, at the same time, to limit his capability to resupply forces in combat at that scale by attacking his LOC. The concept assumes vigorous prosecution of the air and sea anti-infiltration campaign and includes increased use of air in-country, including B-52s, night and day to harass VC in their havens. Following destruction of the VC main force units, the South Vietnamese must reinstitute the Program of Rural Reconstruction as an antidote to the continuing VC campaign of terror and subversion.

7. Actions against North Vietnam. We should continue the program of bombing military targets in North Vietnam. While avoiding striking population and industrial targets not closely related to the DRV's supply of war materiel to the VC, we should announce to Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow. The number of strike sorties against North Vietnam -- against fixed targets and for armed reconnaissance -- should increase slowly from the present level of 2,500 a month to 4,000 or more a month. We should be prepared at any time to carry out a severe reprisal should the VC or DRV commit a particularly damaging or horrendous act (e.g., VC interdiction of the Saigon river could call for a quarantine of DRV harbors, or VC assassination of a high-ranking US official could call for destruction of all of the major power plants in North Vietnam); the chances of our reprisal action leading to escalation is not large in such an instance. After the 44 US/third-country battalions have been deployed and after some strong action has been taken in the program of bombing the North (e.g., after the key railroad bridges north of Hanoi have been dropped), we could, as part of a diplomatic initiative, consider introducing a 6-8 week pause in the program of bombing the North.

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8. Other actions in South Vietnam. The military program cannot do the job alone. Among others, the following actions should also be taken in South Vietnam:

a. Continue doggedly to "strengthen the rear" by pressing forward with the rural reconstruction (pacification) program, realizing both that the program has little chance of meaningful success unless and until security can be provided, and that the program is fundamental to full success once security is provided.

b. Keep working with the government in Saigon to make it more effective and more stable. Consider using the deployment of the US troops as the occasion to lay down some terms -- e.g., regarding the presence and use of a US-controlled rice reserve, an effective US veto on major GVN military commanders, statements about invading North Vietnam, and so on.

c. Take steps to meet the economic shortages and disruptions. Especially, the recurring threat of rice inflation should be countered by the provision of an in-country US-controlled rice reserve.

d. Take informational actions to undermine VC morale by reference to VC defeats, to GVN/US weapon superiority, to air attacks on their bases, etc., and by encouraging VC to defect either to the government or "back home." In this connection, the Chieu Hoi program (to induce VC defections) must be revitalized immediately.

9. Expanded political moves.* Together with the above military moves, we should take political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork for a favorable political settlement by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communications. At the same time as we are taking steps to turn the tide in South Vietnam, we should make quiet moves through diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps the VC, looking first toward disabusing them of any misconceptions as to our goals and second toward laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe; (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military involvement and support of North Vietnam and from generating crises elsewhere in the world until the time when settlement can be achieved; and (c) to cement support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts may be unproductive until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should be made.

* Note footnote to paragraph 4 (c).

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-8-

10. South Vietnamese reaction to expansion of US forces. Three factors dominate the psychological situation in South Vietnam: (a) the military situation (i. e., the security problem), (b) the effectiveness of the government as a vehicle for dynamic leadership, and (c) the implications of the growing American presence. The deployments recommended in paragraph 5 run some risk of causing the Vietnamese to "turn the war over to us" and of generating an "anti-colonial" type resentment toward us. The GVN has requested the additional US forces urgently (indeed, they want 9 battalions more than the 44 recommended here). When Ky was asked about the popular reaction, he said, "We will explain it to our people." Thieu agreed saying, "They know that you are not here to make us a colony." Former Prime Minister Quat told me, "The only way to save Vietnam is to send a large number of troops." He added, "The people of South Vietnam will not object." The spectres of widespread adverse public reaction have been raised each time we deployed personnel in the past, and, while no deployment has been so massive as this one, no such reaction appeared. Furthermore, the key requirement for continued viability of the Vietnamese spirit in the short run is evidence that RVNAF/US/third-country forces can contain the VC/DRV monsoon offensive and reopen communications; in the longer run the requirement will be evidence of bringing the war to a satisfactory close.

11. Communist reaction to the expanded program. The Soviets can be expected to continue material assistance to North Vietnam and to lodge verbal complaints, but not to intervene otherwise. The Chinese -- at least so long as we do not invade North Vietnam, do not sink a Chinese ship and, most important, do not strike China -- will probably not send regular ground forces or aircraft into the war. The DRV, on the other hand, may well send up to several divisions of regular forces in South Vietnam to assist the VC if they see the tide turning and victory, once so near, being snatched away. This possible DRV action is the most ominous one, since it would lead to increased pressures on us to "counter-invade" North Vietnam and to extend air strikes to population targets in the North; acceding to these pressures could bring the Soviets and the Chinese in. The Viet Cong, especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to depend increasingly upon the PAVN forces as the war moves into a more conventional phase; but they may find ways to continue almost indefinitely their present intensive military, guerrilla and terror activities, particularly if reinforced by some regular PAVN units. A key question on the military side is whether POL, ammunition, and cadres can be cut off and, if they are cut off, whether this really renders the Viet Cong impotent.

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-9-

12. Evaluation. ARVN overall is not capable of successfully resisting the VC initiatives without more active assistance from more US/third-country ground forces than those thus far committed. Without further outside help, the ARVN is faced with successive tactical reverses, loss of key communication and population centers particularly in the highlands, piecemeal destruction of ARVN units, attrition of RVNAF will to fight, and loss of civilian confidence. Early commitment of additional US/third-country forces in sufficient quantity, in general reserve and offensive roles, should stave off GVN defeat.

The success of the program from the military point of view turns on whether the Vietnamese hold their own in terms of numbers and fighting spirit, and on whether the US forces can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a role in which they are only now being tested. The number of US troops is too small to make a significant difference in the traditional 10-1 government-guerrilla formula, but it is not too small to make a significant difference in the kind of war which seems to be evolving in Vietnam -- a "Third Stage" or conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate and attack the enemy.

The plan is such that the risk of escalation into war with China or the Soviet Union can be kept small. US and South Vietnamese casualties will increase -- just how much cannot be predicted with confidence, but the US killed-in-action might be in the vicinity of 500 a month by the end of the year. The South Vietnamese under one government or another will probably see the thing through* and the United States public will support the course of action because it is a sensible and courageous military-political program designed and likely to bring about a success in Vietnam.

It should be recognized, however, that success against the larger, more conventional, VC/PAVN forces could merely drive the VC back into the trees and back to their 1960-64 pattern -- a pattern against which US troops and aircraft would be of limited value but with which the GVN, with our help, could cope. The questions here would be whether the VC could maintain morale after such a set-back, and whether the South Vietnamese would have the will to hang on through another cycle. It should be recognized also that, even in "success," it is not obvious how we will be able to disengage our forces from Vietnam. It is unlikely that a formal

* Ambassador Lodge points out that we may face a neutralist government at some time in the future and that in those circumstances the US should be prepared to carry on alone.


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-10-

agreement good enough for the purpose could possibly be negotiated -- because the arrangement can reflect little more than the power situation. A fairly large number of US (or perhaps "international") forces may be required to stay in Vietnam.

The overall evaluation is that the course of action recommended in this memorandum -- if the military and political moves are properly integrated and executed with continuing vigor and visible determination -- stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a reasonable time in Vietnam.



Robert S. McNamara

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397

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority OSD 10-25-78, State 7-10-79 Saigon, July 20, 1965
By ij, NARS, Date 10-24-79

58

FOR: The President

FROM: H. C. Lodge *H.C. Lodge*

Following are my present views concerning our future course as regards Viet-Nam:

1. I concur in the specific recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of Secretary McNamara's Report. *Troop deployment*
2. Continue all activities against North Viet-Nam.
3. Make strong points of the great seaports, notably Danang, Cam Ranh, and Saigon and, possibly, some places in the interior which can be readily maintained.
4. From these strong points the Vietnamese, with our advice and help, should conduct their program of pacification by means of a true Revolution for a New Life, on which a start has been attempted in the Hop Tac area. With the ARVN and police providing security, this should be an affirmative, highly political oil spot procedure, never striving for flashy and misleading statistics, always seeking solid and durable gains, however small, however slowly achieved. My intended program of stationing a few carefully selected political coordinators in a few provinces, working directly under the Embassy, attempts to create such a procedure. Once we and the South Vietnamese

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learn how to do this, the oil spots will connect with each other and the Viet Cong military manpower pool will inevitably shrink. Neither bombing nor conventional ground warfare will reach the terrorist working as an individual and in small groups -- and they are the backbone of Viet Cong recruiting.

5. If the opportunity offers, U.S. troops can fight the pitched battle with large units of the Viet Cong -- as they attack our strong points, and possibly, in other places where they can be identified and where the circumstances are such that the outlook for destroying them is propitious. There may be good chances to open and secure roads. But U.S. troops should not be committed to prolonged "search sweeps" in the jungle or to being permanently stationed in the jungle.

6. No one can establish schedules or make predictions. As President Johnson has often well said of the American pioneers -- from Plymouth Rock to the Far West -- we must endure and, as we endure, we will learn and opportunities will come.

7. But our grandchildren will not live to see the day that a united China does not probe in Southeast Asia.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

This estimate is being given to you tonight in preparation for the meeting tomorrow morning. Admiral Raborn concurs in this estimate although the USIB has not formally considered it.

(2)
AR 7/20

20 July 1965
(DATE)

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TS#185875-a

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: SNIE 10-9-65: COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS
TO A POSSIBLE US COURSE OF ACTION

1. The attached draft estimate has been approved by the Board of National Estimates after consideration of it by the USIB representatives.
2. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the USIB meeting scheduled for 1500, Wednesday, 21 July.

Joseph Selzer
JOSEPH SELTZER
Executive Officer
National Estimates

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Authority NSA 5018-043-1-2 (6/04)
By ly NARA Date 4-8-19

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TS# 185875-d

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 July 1965

SUBJECT: SNIE 10-9-65: COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO A
POSSIBLE US COURSE OF ACTION

THE PROBLEM

To estimate foreign reactions, particularly those of the Communist powers, to a specified US course of action with respect to Vietnam.

ASSUMPTIONS

For purposes of this estimate, we assume that the US decides to increase its forces in South Vietnam to about 175,000 by 1 November. We further assume related decisions to call up about 225,000 reserves, to extend tours of duty at the rate of 20,000 a month, to increase the regular strength of the armed services by 400,000 over the next year, and to double draft calls.

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We further assume (a) that the increase in forces would be accompanied by statements reiterating our objectives and our readiness for unconditional discussions, (b) that US forces would be deployed so that no major grouping threatened or appeared to threaten the 17 th Parallel, and (c) that we might either continue present policy with regard to air strikes or extend operations to hit selected military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas in the near future.*

THE ESTIMATE

1. Communists and non-Communists alike would see in the increased US military involvement in Vietnam a strong indication that the US saw little hope of early negotiations. This would be particularly true if, at the same time, the US extended its air operations to include selected military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

* We take this to mean extension of the present level and type of bombing to Hanoi-Haiphong area, with, perhaps, the addition of SAM sites as targets.

I. VIET CONG AND DRV REACTIONS

2. At present the Viet Cong and DRV leaders appear confident that their course in South Vietnam promises ultimate and possibly early success without important concessions on their part. They seem to believe that they can achieve a series of local military successes which, sooner or later, will bring victory through a combination of a deteriorating South Vietnamese army (ARVN) morale and effectiveness, a collapse of anti-Communist government in Saigon, and an exhaustion of the US will to persist.

3. We do not believe that inauguration of the US policy here assumed would basically alter their expectations. The Viet Cong (VC) and the DRV probably have come to expect increased US commitments, and they probably believe that the VC, with increased North Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset the effect of larger US forces. Nor do we think that the extension of air attacks to selected military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas (as described in the assumptions) would significantly injure the VC ability to persevere in the South or persuade the Hanoi government (DRV) that the price of persisting was unacceptably high.*

* The representative to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, reserves his position on this paragraph.

4. In response to the US program, the Communists would almost certainly undertake measures to increase their own strength in South Vietnam for a higher level of struggle. They are already augmenting VC units and dispatching additional PAVN forces to South Vietnam; the assumed US actions would probably result in a speeding up of this process. By the end of 1965, the total of PAVN regulars in organized units in South Vietnam could reach 20,000 to 30,000 men. Although the Communists are aware of the dangers of concentrating their troops in large numbers, they might, during the next few months, attempt major assaults against GVN forces and positions, seeking to shatter ARVN before the increased weight of US strength could be brought to bear.

5. In coping with larger US forces employed in a more aggressive fashion, we believe that the Viet Cong would seek to avoid the kind of engagements which risked a serious Communist defeat. Instead, they would probably concentrate on harassments intended to bleed and humiliate US forces, trapping and destroying isolated units where possible. At a minimum, the Communists would almost certainly continue present efforts to cut land communications lines and would step up the dispatch of small, expendable teams

on sabotage and assassination missions designed to make the US look impotent or foolish. The Communists might also seek to increase their activities in Laos.

6. Over the longer run, the Communists' strategy will depend upon the actual course of combat and their estimates of South Vietnamese stability and US will to persist. They are predisposed to attach great weight to signs of disintegration in Saigon and to manifestations of domestic US opposition to Administration policies. These boost popular morale on the Communist side and reinforce the leadership's conviction that Communist staying power is inherently superior.

7. Should future military and political developments bring this conviction into serious doubt, the DRV might express increased interest in negotiations. However, they would endeavor to preserve their own freedom of action while laying inhibitions of US/GVN military operations, hoping to promote disarray in Saigon, and encourage US opinion in favor of withdrawal.

8. Faced with the buildup outlined in our assumptions, the DRV would probably request more air defense equipment from the USSR, including SAMs, fighters, technicians, and perhaps

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pilots, particularly if US air attacks were expanded. From the Chinese, Hanoi would probably request radar equipment, anti-aircraft artillery, and perhaps technicians in addition to a further increase in shipments of infantry arms and ammunition. In general, however, we believe that Hanoi would wish to maintain some limits on, and a rough balance between, Soviet and Chinese personnel.

9. Deployments on the scale here assumed would cause the DRV some concern about US invasion. This would be true even if US forces took up positions which were not suggestive of an invasion. We believe, however, that the DRV would not react to this concern by requesting the introduction of Chinese combat forces. It probably would make such a request only if actual invasion seemed clearly imminent.

- 6 -

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II. CHINESE COMMUNIST REACTIONS

10. The Chinese are probably even more convinced than the Vietnamese Communists that if the DRV/VC remain firm, in the end the US will be wholly defeated in Vietnam. Renewed US determination, evidenced by the buildup assumed in this estimate, would give the Chinese some pause but, in our view, not much. They would believe that the US measures were sufficient only to postpone defeat while magnifying its eventual effect.

11. We do not believe that the Chinese would react to the assumed US moves by overtly intervening in the military struggle with combat forces. They are already stepping up their military assistance and would give more if requested by the DRV. Moreover, they would try to increase alarm among non-Communists, especially the US public, by intensifying their propaganda and reiterating their willingness to accept hostilities if attacked by the US. They will probably continue to strengthen their forces in South China and may take some further overt steps toward mobilization.

12. If, in the circumstances described in paragraph 7, the Viet Cong and the DRV at some point wished to move toward negotiations, an important divergence might open up between Hanoi

and Peiping. The Chinese encourage the North Vietnamese to oppose negotiations. They are themselves not suffering direct military damage and fear that negotiations would give the USSR a chance to increase its role in Vietnam. Thus they will do all in their power to stiffen DRV resolve against talks.

III. SOVIET REACTIONS

13. The USSR hopes for an eventual Communist victory in South Vietnam, but it is more conscious than Peiping and Hanoi of the larger military risks. Moreover, the USSR wants to maintain or improve its influence over the DRV and in the world Communist movement generally; it does not wish the kind of Communist victory which would magnify the prestige and power of China. Unlike Peiping and Hanoi, Moscow is concerned with minimizing damage to East-West relations. In this situation, the USSR prefers a course of negotiations, but it cannot afford to appear laggard in supporting the DRV, and it is deepening its commitment to Hanoi's cause.

14. In the circumstances outlined in our assumptions, we believe that the USSR would see no alternative to continued support of the DRV and further expansion of its military aid. It

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would thus be likely to grant a DRV request for additional air defense equipment and personnel (see paragraph 8). It would probably feel compelled to comply promptly with DRV requests to provide replacements for air defense equipment destroyed by US attacks in the Hanoi area. The Soviet aid program might be hampered by Chinese restrictions on transit rights.

15. The USSR would probably indicate that, if the US remains unyielding in Vietnam, it faces trouble elsewhere in the world, as, for example, in Berlin. We do not think, however, that Moscow would confront us with a major challenge. Nor do we believe that the Soviets would wish to foreclose the possibility of negotiations at some future stage; indeed, they would probably work to keep this possibility alive on both sides.*

16. We believe that the US decisions considered here would produce important reactions in general Soviet policy. Moscow would almost certainly harden its general stance toward the US. For example, although the Soviets agreed to renewed disarmament talks partly in order to check the deterioration in

* The representative to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force reserves his position on this paragraph.

- 9 -

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East-West relations, the assumed US course in Vietnam would probably lead them to devote the talks entirely to attacks on the US or even break them off.

17. The assumed moves would carry total US military manpower above the 2.8-2.9 million total which we estimate for the USSR; they would also imply a reversal of the downward trend in US military spending which Kosygin cited in justifying the 1965 reduction in the overt Soviet military budget. We believe that the USSR's declared policy of restraining or even reducing military expenditures has been under attack by military spokesmen in recent months and is the subject of debate within the collective leadership. It is likely that the US moves, plus the worsening of general Soviet-US relations, would strengthen the position of those arguing for additional military appropriations. In these circumstances, the USSR probably would respond with an overt increase in its own military spending.

IV. NON-COMMUNIST REACTIONS

18. Most non-Communist nations have already realized that the US, already heavily engaged in South Vietnam, is likely to increase its commitment if necessary. The measures here considered

- 10 -

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would nevertheless cause rising alarm because, in combination with Communist statements in response, they would revive and fortify fears of increased cold-war tensions and even a much larger war. This might make some governments more reluctant to give public support to US policy; this would be particularly true for governments which are in political difficulty; [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Over the longer run, however, the more important reactions will depend on the subsequent course of the conflict.

19. In non-Communist Asia Japan offers the most serious problem. We believe the Sato government would maintain its policy of supporting US policy in spite of howls from the press and opposition forces. Sato's position would be made much more difficult, however, if Okinawa or, especially, Japan were to become a greatly expanded conduit for support of US forces in Vietnam. [REDACTED] Pakistan, hoping to continue to receive American aid while remaining on good terms with China, would reaffirm its neutrality and its non-involvement in Vietnam.

- 11 -

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V. REACTIONS TO THE MODE OF ANNOUNCEMENT

20. If the announcements were made in piecemeal fashion and with no more high level emphasis than necessary, the development of a crisis atmosphere might be mitigated. It is also possible that private assurances to the USSR that the US increase in overall military strength was directed solely toward the situation in Vietnam and not meant to improve the US position vis-a-vis the Soviets might soften the tone of the Soviet response. This avoidance of strident recriminations might in turn decrease somewhat the negative reaction of non-Communist countries. We believe, however, that the reactions of the Communist powers, particularly in the military field, would not be basically changed by the method of announcement. We also believe that there would still be increased apprehension among non-Communist countries.

- 12 -

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Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara

July 20, 1965

Chester L. Cooper

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD letter OCT 25 1978

By if, NARS, Date 6-5-79

Although I have had but a brief opportunity to read the draft report and do not have it available as I write, a few observations may be of interest.

The contemplated U.S. force build-up will, hopefully stop the erosion of security, at some later point push the VC back into the jungle, and, sooner or later, make them more amenable to a political settlement. But there are three worrisome problems here -

A. Will the President be able to settle for something less than a clear-cut military victory (or at least something that can be creditably passed off as one) after committing forces of the contemplated scale? Would a much larger force which provided a greater chance for a "military victory" be easier for him to live with than the contemplated force which might break the back of the main force, but not necessarily cut deeply into the VC capability for substantial guerrilla activity?

B. Should the report address the question of dealing with the guerrilla problem through a major political-economic psy war effort? I have a queasy feeling that, thus far, the kind and level of planning that has gone into the non-military sphere is vastly inadequate and would suggest that this problem be attacked as soon as possible with the kind of priority and drive that has been given to military planning.

C. Should the report explicitly state that the forces contemplated may well turn out to be significantly less than what may have to be committed not only in Viet-Nam but elsewhere, as we raise the ante here?

D. After the commitment of even the contemplated level of U.S. forces, will we be able to settle for a political settlement involving anything less than the VC's turning in their suits altogether.

On a different aspect of the problem, the matter of the deployment of U.S. forces, I am attaching a "devil's advocate" paper which argues the case for U.S. forces in the highlands.

Your paper points up the importance of Chieu Hoi and we might want to develop a separate set of recommendations later this week. Unger and I have had some useful talks with the Chieu Hoi survey team and with representatives of Rand and I spent this morning getting a first hand look at the Chieu Hoi situation in Long An. I also have a few suggestions on U.S. Forces-Vietnamese relations which I will submit in a separate paper.

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20 July 1965

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD letter OCT 25 1978
By if, NARS, Date 6-5-79

Has RSM seen this?

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Chester Cooper
SUBJECT: Comments on Vietnamese Highlands Concept

1. We have had brief reports on what transpired at Friday afternoon's GVN briefing for the Secretary of Defense. We understand that the GVN proposed that U. S. Forces assume primary responsibility for the highlands area (specifically Kontum-Pleiku--Pleiku Darlac) and the associated Zone C and Zone D areas north and west of Saigon, with ARVN Forces taking responsibility for the coastal plains and the delta. It would appear that the U.S. Marines operating inland from the mountains bordering Danang, and eventually extending toward the Lao border, would fit into this same concept. Presumably U.S. support and advisory roles for ARVN operations and for pacification and rural reconstruction efforts outside the highlands would, ~~continue~~, continue.

2. We recognize that some MACV officers and some members of Secretary McNamara's party were perhaps skeptical of this GVN proposal, feeling that the Vietnamese were trying to put one over on the U.S. by persuading the Americans to carry the brunt of the war, while the Vietnamese took life easy in pacification tasks in the lowlands. There may also have been some concern in both CINCPAC and MACV circles over the possibility of a Dien Bien Phu debacle should U.S. Forces be committed in the highlands without an adequate logistical infrastructure. Another unpleasant possibility is that the GVN concept might find U.S. Forces engaged in nonproductive sweeps of the sort that proved so frustrating in the past to ARVN and the French.

3. Despite the above caveats, we feel there is substantial merit in the GVN concept and would like to make the following points in support thereof.

a. The bulk of the enemy main force and PAVN Regiments in Central Vietnam are now deployed in the Highlands;

b. RVNAF lacks the capability to reinforce those units now deployed in the Highlands to the strength required to cope with these enemy regiments;

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c. U.S. Forces possess air cargo transport, tactical air support, troop helicopter lift, and engineer support means required to permit effective operations in the Highlands area;

d. U.S. ground combat forces are better capable of dealing with enemy main force units because of superior combat effectiveness, i.e. larger battalions, up-to-strength, heavier firepower, greater mobility, etc.;

e. The pacification task in ^{the} densely populated coastal plains for ~~which~~ ^{which} RVNAF would be responsible is best performed by Vietnamese rather than U.S. and Allied Forces for political and psychological reasons;

f. The sparsely populated Highlands region, on the other hand, is more suited to mobile action and intense air and artillery bombardments which would characterize U.S. operations;

g. What population there is, i.e. Montagnards, will rally to U.S. presence and leadership;

h. The GVN concept would simplify the combined command problem by giving U.S. Forces a definite area of responsibility and diminish the scope of troop-population frictions;

i. It would also apply a major U.S. force against vital GV infiltration routes into SVN and facilitate any necessary later military intervention in Southern Laos for the same purpose;

j. It is the clearest and most unmistakable signal the U.S. can give to the DRV that it means business.

4. It appears to us that the two major tasks now confronting the U.S. in Vietnam are essentially the military one of neutralizing or destroying growing enemy capabilities for large-scale, semiconventional combat operations, and the more complex political-military one of pacification. We are inclined to agree with the GVN that U.S. combat forces have considerable advantages over the RVNAF in the first task, while the converse is true with the second task. (One immediate additional political advantage not mentioned by the GVN is that a problem of gaining Montagnard support against the VC can only be resolved favorably if the U.S. rather than ARVN has primacy in the Highlands. The long-term problem of Montagnard relations with the Vietnamese would remain, although the Montagnards would probably emerge sufficiently strengthened to force the GVN to treat them seriously and thereby facilitate solution of the problem.) Concern that the U.S. may bear the brunt of casualties

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is not fully justified, since a major portion of GVN losses normally are sustained in small-scale actions associated with expanding or protecting areas under GVN control. The possibility of a Dien Bien Phu-like defeat of U.S. Forces is relatively remote at this stage, since current Viet Cong logistical potential in the Highlands is far weaker than ours, given their lack of motorable road connecting the Highlands through the panhandle with North Vietnam. Until a route is built which could move supplies on the order of 100 tons daily as at Dien Bien Phu, the VC would be patently incapable of sustaining siege operations on the scale of Dien Bien Phu. In the interim, we also would be developing our logistical infrastructure and conducting operations against Viet Cong base areas which could retard, if not prevent, development of their capabilities.

5. It is quite possible that this new concept, by physically reducing the area and the enemy strength for which the GVN will be responsible, and by permitting the concentration of all available GVN resources (the bulk of ARVN, RF, PF, Police and various CAS and other political action cadres) against this reduced target will, for the first time, produce something like the right mix of resources and methods as well as the right strength ratio for the successful conduct of both ^{the} military and ^{the} political aspects of pacification in those important portions of the country where the bulk of the population resides, including the population supporting the VC as well as the population supporting the government or neutral.

6. ^{the} A major additional consideration is the vital need to prevent Viet Cong from gaining complete domination of the highlands, which they could develop into a vast redoubt and base area contiguous to the Laos panhandle. This would present the Viet Cong with strategic advantages comparable to those enjoyed by the Viet Minh in the war against the French, when they the Viet Bac redoubt adjoining the Chinese frontier. With assured logistical support, the Viet Cong could operate from interior lines, striking out with main force regiments successively against coastal and Mekong delta regions, while softening the latter up with expanding guerrilla operations in the same way the Viet Minh softened the Red River delta. When the French reacted by attempting to penetrate the mountain redoubt from the exterior, the Viet Minh outmaneuvered them and either bottled them up in airheads or defeated them in detail. ~~The~~ The communists almost certainly view the highlands in the same role, and while considering the populace and the rice-rich delta areas as their main goal, also intend to gain control over the highlands and then draw US/GVN forces into the area under conditions in which we could be defeated piecemeal. The best means of preventing this situation from developing would be to establish ourselves in the highlands in strength now, and

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then carry the war to the Viet Cong to destroy their bases, block development of their lines of communication, and systematically eliminate their main force units. Unless ARVN forces in the highlands are soon reinforced, we stand an even chance of losing the remainder of Kontum Province in the weeks ahead, giving them a head start toward attaining their goal.

7. To conclude, we feel the GVN concept warrants full and careful consideration. If, for a combination of logistical and domestic political reasons, the USG finds it infeasible to adopt the GVN concept fully and promptly, we venture to predict that growing enemy pressures, inherent advantages of the concept as enumerated in paragraph one above, and our own vital interests in winning either the war or a negotiated peace will compell us to attempt to implement the GVN proposals later at much greater cost.

8. You may wish to bring this to the attention of Secretary McNamara or General Wheeler as the local station views. We recognize that we have not been consulted and it may well be that our views will not be acceptable. For your information, I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Ambassador Taylor. Mr. Colby says that he generally agrees with the views expressed above.

Gordon L. Jorgensen

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