

## ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 11, 2014

**LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET**

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
1a	letter	William Raborn to the President - sanitized per RAC 8/00 dup. #156, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Volume 37," Box 19		0		A

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**Collection Title** National Security File, NSC Histories

**Folder Title** "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 7"

**Box Number** 43

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**Restriction Codes**

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Initials



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#2a cable</del>	<del>state top secret</del> 200 from Saigon	07/20/65	A
<del>#4b memo</del>	<del>state top secret</del> to Sec McNamara from Unger	07/20/65	A
<del>#18a cable</del>	<del>state top secret</del> 265 from Saigon	07/25/65	A
<del>#31b cable</del>	<del>state top secret (gp 2)</del> 237 to Saigon	07/26/65	A
<del>#37a report</del>	<del>state top secret</del> re: Vietnam	undated	A

*open 7-18-79*

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FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History  
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 7

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#9b report</del>	<del>state <del>secret</del> [State Letter 11-2-78 Vietnam Panel 6 p</del>	<del>07/10/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#14a memo</del>	<del>state <del>secret</del> State Letter 11-2-78 to Bundy from Read 1 p</del>	<del>07/23/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#14b report</del>	<del>state <del>secret</del> <i>sanitized 8-30-79</i> 4 p Actions Agreed on at Special meetings of Asst. Secretaries</del>	<del>07/22/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#15b memo</del>	<del>state <del>secret (gp 3)</del> <i>open 5-16-79</i> to Secretary from Hughes 4 p</del>	<del>07/23/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#16a cable</del>	<del>state <del>secret (gp 3)</del> [State Letter 11-2-78 218 to Saigon 3 p</del>	<del>07/24/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#19a cable</del>	<del>state <del>secret (gp 3)</del> <i>sanitized 7-5-79</i> 5 p 128 Circular 128 for Amb. or Charge</del>	<del>07/25/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22a memo</del>	<del>state <del>secret (gp 1)</del> State Letter 11-2-78 to Secretary from Walt Rostow 1 p</del>	<del>07/26/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#23a memo</del>	<del>state <del>secret</del> <i>sanitized 5-16-79</i> 3 p to president from Bundy</del>	<del>07/27/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#24a memo</del>	<del>state <del>secret</del> <i>sanitized 5-16-79</i> 10 p <del>kw</del> Airgram A-66 from Saigon</del>	<del>07/27/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33a cable</del>	<del>state <del>secret</del> State Letter 11-2-78 for president from Amb. Taylor 2 p</del>	<del>07/28/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#35a cable</del>	<del>state <del>secret</del> [State Letter 11-2-78 364 from Saigon 3 p</del>	<del>08/03/65</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONSULTATION		
<del>#25a memo</del>	<del>WH <del>top secret</del> <del>open 7-22-80 up</del> to president from McG. Bundy 4 p</del>	<del>07/27/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32a memo</del>	<del>WH <del>secret</del> <del>Exempt per NSC 7-10-79</del> to president from Wm. Jay <del>open 8/1/96 NY 95-208 P</del></del>	<del>07/28/65</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#20a memo</del>	<del>NSC conf. <i>open</i> 7-21-80 <i>ip</i> to McG. B from Bowman</del>	<del>07/26/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#26a notes</del>	<del>NSC top secret <i>sanitized</i> 7-21-80 <i>ip</i> Summary notes of 553rd NSC meeting</del> <i>OPEN 2-20-98 NLS 93-475</i>	<del>07/27/65</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a letter	<p><i>more released, 8/10</i></p> <p>CIA secret <i>sanitized 9-28-79</i>            to president from Raborn 5 p</p>	07/20/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO OSD FOR CONSULTATION <i>All exempt per DSD NSC</i>	10-4-78 9-14-79	
<del>#7a memo</del>	<del>WH top secret Exempt for the record</del> <i>Open 9-7-83 10 p</i>	<del>07/22/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#17b memo</del>	<del>WH secret Exempt to president from McG. Bundy</del> <i>Open 9-7-83 p</i>	<del>07/24/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#21a memo</del>	<del>WH top secret Exempt to president from McG. Bundy</del> <i>Open 3-5-84 NLJ 83-230 1 p</i>	<del>07/26/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#21b agenda</del>	<del>WH top secret Exempt 7/26/65 meeting</del> <i>Open 3-5-84 NLJ 83-230 1 p</i>	<del>07/26/65</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM. OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#20b memo.	<del>JCS</del> <del>to JCS chairman from Manhart</del> <del>conf</del> <i>Open 3/22/79</i> <del>2 p</del>	07/23/65	<del>A</del>
#36a memo.	<del>JCS</del> <del>to Sec Def from Gen. Wheeler</del> <del>top secret</del> (gp-1) <del>12 p</del>	08/27/65	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#12a report</del>	<del>OSD top secret open 5-18-79 inf Plan I 5 p</del>	<del>07/23/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#13a cable</del>	<del>OSD conf open 4-21-81 inf #247 from Saigon 1 p</del>	<del>07/25/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>[REDACTED]</del>	<del>[REDACTED]</del>	<del>[REDACTED]</del>	<del>[REDACTED]</del>
<del>#26c memo</del>	<del>OSD top secret open 4-21-81 inf to president from McNamara 7 p</del>	<del>06/26/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#28a cable</del>	<del>OSD conf open 5-18-79 inf DEF 6980 from OASD(PA) 8 p</del>	<del>07/28/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#38a list</del>	<del>OSD top secret open 5-18-79 inf chronology of presidential decisions 5 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

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D R A F T  
7/20/65

~~SECRET~~

File  
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1a

Dear Mr. President:

It is clear that achievement of our military objectives in Vietnam -- a halting of DRV intervention and a reduction of the insurrection to manageable proportions -- would leave unsolved a number of broader problems in Southeast Asia. Even with the VC struggle tamped down or stopped, the construction of a viable government in South Vietnam will not be easy.

Reduction of the Communist threat may encourage the various religious and other factions to intensify competition and fighting among themselves. Here as in so many of the newly established nations the leadership elite seems far more aware of the privileges of independence than of its responsibilities. However, whereas in some parts of the world the skills of self-rule can be learned through the slow and painful process of trial and error, in Southeast Asia the proximity of a dynamic and aggressive Communist China, ever alert to exploit weaknesses and promote Communist subversion, tends to limit the room for error in such a learning process. It will take a fairly sophisticated government to counter skilled and persistent programs of Communist subversion, and such governments are not likely to spring full blown from the ashes of colonialism.

SANTIZED

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLS 018-043-2-1  
By lx NARA Date 4-9-14 (8/100)

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Post-crisis Vietnam will need substantial U.S. economic aid to rehabilitate its battered economy; railroads, highway bridges, power stations, etc., will have to be rebuilt and much of the mechanism of commerce and government economic activity will have to be reactivated and extended. Such economic aid will be useless -- even harmful -- however, if local corruption causes it to become spoils for politicians to fight over and to increase the gap between the many poor and the wealthy few. Thus a continuing primary problem for the US will be the promotion of a reasonably responsible and effective government in South Vietnam in order to preserve the fruits of military success.

This would require the provision of advice and guidance, selective aid with effective controls, and perhaps  influencing of elections, governmental appointments, and policies. It will, of course, be necessary at the same time to help the development of smaller and highly professional armed forces. We would probably want them to provide strategic security while the police and local forces maintain security against the recurrence of Viet Cong type terrorism.

~~SECRET~~

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-3-

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia there will be manifold other problems, all of them closely related to the viability of an independent South Vietnam. Indonesia is well embarked on a course that will make it a Communist nation in the reasonably near future unless the trend is reversed. Ethnic disputes threaten the disintegration of Malaysia. Burma is somewhat of a shell, with a very infirm domestic situation and an isolationist foreign policy all held together by the will of one man. Thailand is one of the brightest spots, where present domestic stability would presumably be reinforced by anti-Communist success in South Vietnam. Even here, however, economic problems loom large in the future, since the rising expectations of the people in the face of slow economic progress and conspicuous imbalances of wealth will provide receptivity to Communist blandishments.

In short, even if we are successful in our short-term aims in South Vietnam, Southeast Asia will continue to be plagued by suspicions and fears, political and economic problems, and various forms of Communist subversion.

While US economic aid, especially of the multi-national type such as the Mekong basin proposals, could be of

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considerable value in stabilizing the area, especially by increasing cooperation among the nations concerned, this is no panacea. No conceivable rate of economic progress can, by itself, wholly counter Communist claims that the poor of the area (who will remain many) would be much better off if "capitalist and imperialist exploitation" were replaced by an anti-imperialist people's regime. The radical promises of pie in the sky have found receptive audiences in nations whose people enjoy far more of the good things of life than the people of Southeast Asia are likely to enjoy for a long time to come.

In other words, we face a long-term strategic challenge in Southeast Asia, a nation-building and regional growth problem of fantastic proportions as well as of crucial importance to U.S. and Free World interests.

I <sup>invite</sup> call these rather obvious matters to your attention, Mr. President, because I believe it is not too early to focus on these long-term problems. I should like to suggest that you consider establishing at an early date a National Planning Task Force on

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-5-

Southeast Asia to study and report to you on the  
political and economic measures needed to consolidate  
the gains we hope to win by our efforts in South  
Vietnam.

W. F. RABORN  
Director

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*WSC*

3  
Action  
*SS*  
Info

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RR RUEHCR  
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INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC 118  
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1965 JUL 20 AM 6 30

*V Bundy*

031  
*36*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter FEB 27 1979

~~TOP SECRET~~ JULY 20

By *inf*, NARS, Date 7-18-79

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

RECENT UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE POSSIBILITY OF DRV TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN DMZ. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE TO CONFIRM SUCH REPORTS, AND NO INDICATION THAT DRV IS CONTEMPLATING SUCH ACTION, MISSION FEELS WE SHOULD NOW CONSIDER QUESTION OF HOW U.S. SHOULD ACT IF SUCH A BUILD-UP WERE TO DEVELOP, AND SHOULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF GVN ACTION IN ABSENCE OF U.S. RESPONSE.

SPECIAL NATURE OF ZONE HAS BEEN GENERALLY RECOGNIZED UNTIL NOW. ALTHOUGH WESTERN PORTION HAS LONG BEEN USED AS INFILTRATION ROUTE. PERMANENT ICC TEAM IN EASTERN PORTION HAS KEPT UP APPEARANCES BY REPORTING VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 1 AND 5 OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS IN EASTERN PORTION. DRV HAS PROTESTED VIOLATIONS, ESPECIALLY OF TIGER ISLAND WHICH DRV CLAIMS IS PART OF DMZ.

POSSIBILITY OF ANY U.S. OR GVN OPERATIONS AGAINST DMZ, IN RESPONSE TO ANY DRV BUILD-UP, RAISES SEVERAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS:

1. IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE REGARDED BY U.S. AND WORLD OPINION AS ESCALATION OF CONFLICT HERE.
2. IT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS STEP TOWARD FUTURE CROSSING OF 17TH PARALLEL BY GVN FORCES.
3. IT COULD PROVIDE PRETEXT FOR DRV AND GVN TO MOVE TROOPS TO DEMARCATION LINE AND EVEN PERHAPS FOR PAVN TROOPS TO MOVE OPENLY ACROSS BORDER.
4. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE CONDEMNED BY ICC AS VIOLATION OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS.

FOR THESE REASONS, MISSION BELIEVES NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN DMZ IN ABSENCE OF VERY FIRM EVIDENCE OF TROOP CONCENTRATIONS.

IN THE EVENT OF SUCH VERY FIRM EVIDENCE, WE BELIEVE WE MIGHT WELL

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 200, JULY 20, FROM SAIGON

HAVE TO CONSIDER URGENT ACTION AGAINST TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN DMZ IN ORDER TO FORESTALL DANGER THAT AREA COULD BECOME

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 996A ~~TOP SECRET~~  
SANCTUARY FOR ATTACKS AGAINST GVN, AND PROBABLY ALSO IN ORDER TO PREVENT INDEPENDENT ACTION BY GVN. WE WOULD HAVE TO PREPARE PUBLIC POSITION CAREFULLY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WERE TAKING THIS STEP RELUCTANTLY BECAUSE WE HAD BEEN FORCED TO DO SO, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK TO CANADIANS TO DO THEIR BEST TO OFFSET POSSIBLE ICC REACTION.

IF MILITARY MOVES AGAINST DMZ SHOULD BE REQUIRED, THERE ARE TWO PROCEDURES WHICH MIGHT BE FOLLOWED.

1. TO CONSIDER ENTIRE DMZ AS EXTENSION OF SVN, AND EXTEND U.S. AND GVN OPERATIONS IN DMZ UNDER SAME OPERATING CONDITIONS AS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
2. TO CONSIDER SOUTHERN PORTION OF DMZ UP TO DEMARCATION LINE AS EXTENSION OF SVN, AND EXTEND U.S. AND GVN OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN DMZ UNDER SAME OPERATING CONDITIONS AS IN SVN, AND TO EXTEND ZONE OF ROLLING THUNDER ARMED RECCE INTO NORTHERN PORTION OF DMZ DOWN TO DEMARCATION LINE AS EXTENSION OF DRV, GRANTING AUTHORITY TO ATTACK TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY.

FROM MILITARY STANDPOINT PROCEDURE 1 WOULD BE MOST RESPONSIVE SOLUTION. TARGETS IN DMZ ARE LIKELY TO BE OF FLEETING NATURE AND WOULD THUS REQUIRE QUICK REACTION. CURRENT IN-COUNTRY AIR STRIKE

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 996A ~~TOP SECRET~~  
PROCEDURES WOULD PERMIT SUCH QUICK REACTION. PROCEDURE 2 WOULD PERMIT QUICK REACTION IN SOUTHERN DMZ WITH GREATER DELAY IN REACTION TIME IN NORTHERN DMZ. EITHER PROCEDURE WOULD GIVE ADEQUATE US CONTROL OVER AIR OPERATIONS IN DMZ.

SUGGEST DEPARTMENT CONSIDER QUESTION SINCE WE ANTICIPATE SITUATION MIGHT ARISE IN WHICH WE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO ACT QUICKLY.  
TAYLOR

NOTE: HANDLED LIMDIS PER S/S-0

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Pres. 2074*

1965 JUL 20 12 54

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INFO CINCPAC  
BT

TUESDAY

*630  
20h*

'65 JUL 20 AM 8:58

*Burdy*

UNCLAS  
FOLLOWING IS OFFICIAL DEPARTURE STATEMENT OF SECDEF MCNAMARA  
HANDLED TO NEWSMEN ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON AT 201830H  
JULY. QUOTE: GENERAL WHEELER, AMBASSADOR LODGE AND I HAVE  
COMPLETED OUR FIVE-DAY VISIT TO VIETNAM DURING WHICH WE DISCUSSED  
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT THEIR PLANS  
FOR COUNTERING THE INTENSIFIED ATTACKS OF THE VIET CONG. WE  
REVIEWED WITH AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND THEIR  
APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION AND THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE  
UTURE. OVER-ALL, THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE SERIOUS. IN  
CERTAIN ASPECTS THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL DETERIORATION SINCE  
I WAS HERE A YEAR AGO. THE SIZE OF THE VIET CONG FORCES HAS  
INCREASED; THEIR RATE OF OPERATIONS HAS EXPANDED; THEIR  
DISRUPTION OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (ROAD, RAIL AND  
WATER) IS MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE; AND THEY HAVE INTENSIFIED THEIR  
CAMPAIGN OF TERROR TO INTIMIDATE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. BUT  
THE PICTURE IS NOT ALL BLACK. THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CONTINUE  
TO BE WILLING TO FIGHT AND DIE IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE. THE VIET  
CONG ARE SUFFERING INCREASINGLY HEAVY LOSSES, AND THE U.S. FORCES  
ARE ADDING SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE COMBAT POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT.  
BASED ON MY OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS HERE, I WILL BE MAKING  
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. MY RECOMMENDATIONS  
WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD FULFILLING THE COMMITMENT OF OUR NATION TO  
SUPPORT THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM IN THEIR FIGHT TO WIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE.  
UNQUOTE.

THE SECRETARY ADDED, QUOTE: AND NOW, BECAUSE WE  
HAVE NOT YET REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND BECAUSE  
WE DO NOT WISH TO ANTICIPATE HIS DECISION, I THINK  
I SHOULD LEAVE AND SAY GOODBYE AND THANK YOU FOR  
YOUR COURTESY DURING OUR TRIP. UNQUOTE.

BT

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✓ Bundy 3503

DEPARTMENT OF STATE REFERENCE SLIP	DATE VIII-13
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TO:	Name or Title	Organ. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1.	Mr. McGeorge Bundy	GEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE				
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						

1965 AUG 14 PM 12 24

Approval	Initial for Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	Necessary Action	Prepare Reply
Comment	Note and Forward	See Me
For Your Information	Note and Return	Signature

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

Mac-

Your comment last night about how things might end just me in mind of this memo which you may find of interest.

FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)	ROOM NO. & BLDG.	PHONE NO.
L. Unger		

FORM DS-10 2-64

GPO 883-615



Secretary McNamara

July 20, 1965

DECLASSIFIED

STATE letter FEB 27 1979

Leonard Unger

Authority

By isb, NARS, Date 7-18-79

Additional Deployments to Viet-Nam and Subsequent Developments

I concur in the military recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of your draft memorandum to the President.

If the recommended deployments are made in anything like the strength suggested, I believe that we will find that our future consideration of a settlement in Viet-Nam will be fundamentally affected by these deployments and we will find ourselves moving toward not so much a "settlement" (negotiated or tacit) as a truce or armistice arrangement, not too unlike Korea, which might last for an extended period.

In discussing a settlement (see paragraph 2 of your memorandum, for example), we have been thinking in terms of withdrawal of US combat forces and some minimum political concession about the future status of the VC/PA, hopefully short of granting them commanding positions in a coalition government. It seems increasingly clear to me that the friendly political structure in South Viet-Nam is and will remain dangerously fragile, that the armed forces will continue to have only a limited capability, and that the rural reconstruction (pacification) program has a long way to go before it will provide any significant security against VC guerrilla activity and terror. Therefore, I have little confidence that the South Vietnamese regime which would follow a settlement could for long resist take-over by the Communists. While in the past this might be a chance we would have been willing to take, once we have made substantial deployments of US combat forces in South Viet-Nam and taken the casualties that will inevitably follow, I do not believe the American public would permit a settlement which would risk our having made all that effort in vain.

My conclusions on this matter have also been influenced by a new line which I have heard from several ~~VC~~ leaders in conversations over recent days, as, for example, Foreign Minister Tron Van Do, former Minister and Buddhist lay leader ~~Phan~~, labor leader ~~Doan~~. These individuals have in one fashion or another expressed their satisfaction with the military state of affairs on the grounds that American presence, present and augmented, secures that the war will go all right. They are, however,

extremely apprehensive about any eventual negotiations and particularly about the peace that might follow. They appear quite persuaded that in the political combat that would come with peace, they would be the weaker adversary and that the Communists would win out.

It seems to me, therefore, that what we are heading for is not a settlement, but some kind of cease-fire or armistice, tacit or negotiated, which would come when the large scale VC/PAVN military threat in South Viet-Nam appeared to be under control. The principal changes in the situation which this would bring about would be an end to our bombing of North Viet-Nam and probably the withdrawal of PAVN units from the south and possibly an end to infiltration of cadres and munitions for the VC. In due course there could probably be successive withdrawal of US and other third country combat forces, but I would expect the need for a substantial number of such forces to continue for some time.

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July 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

The President invited alternatives to the McNamara proposal. What follows, however, is not an alternative but rather an ancillary approach.

This morning's discussion noted two possible military outcomes resulting from a substantial increase in US forces:

- a. The VC main forces will be forced by US forces into reverting to guerrilla warfare.
- b. The VC main forces will choose not to confront our units head-on and voluntarily revert to guerrilla actions.

Either way, it would appear that we and the GVN will be faced with the problem of guerrilla rather than positional warfare. The fact that this may mean that the VC cannot achieve a military victory offers small comfort; neither we nor the GVN have as yet demonstrated that we can win this kind of war. The idea of leaving "pacification" duties to the ARVN (while we defend our bases and come to the relief of besieged ARVN units) will not, in itself do the trick. In effect, the VC will be doing what it is best at. What is needed, if we are successfully to cope with the VC under the circumstances of widespread guerrilla warfare, is a political-economic-psychwar program as carefully developed and as massive in its way as the military effort envisaged in the McNamara proposal. In fact, it may well be that many of the US forces would be redundant under these circumstances and our hopes for "a favorable outcome" will be dependent on the success of our non-military efforts.

In brief, I would recommend that if the McNamara proposals are accepted, there be developed simultaneously a major non-military program to deal with the guerrilla phase of the war. In fact, I do not see how the McNamara approach can succeed without such accompanying non-military planning.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 21, 1965  
8:00 p.m.

(2)  
MR 7/21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Timing of Decision and Actions in Vietnam

Bill Moyers tells me we got through Wednesday with the White House press well enough, but I think the probability is that we will have rising pressure in the coming days. For this reason, I myself continue to think that the right time for your message -- or a fireside chat -- or both at once, is Monday. We really cannot get an orderly and well-considered decision made before that, but I doubt if we can hold the fort any longer.

I myself feel very strongly that we should not dribble out bits and pieces of this to the Press or to publishers before you make your final decision and announcement. The Press people we need most on this particular issue are the regular reporters, and the best thing we can do for them is to be sure they get the news straight, and from you, and on-the-record. If you didn't scare the meeting into silence today, I will be greatly surprised, and I think it makes good sense for your Government to deliberate for three days on an issue of this magnitude. On this basis, it seems to me that on Friday, or Saturday morning, we might announce that you are calling the Leadership to a meeting Sunday afternoon or Monday morning, and expect to go to Congress Monday noon or Monday evening.

I have an additional reason for proposing this schedule. Dean Rusk is going to the Bohemian Grove to give a speech on Saturday, and he has been hoping to take a day of rest in the bargain. He would like to leave Friday morning and return Sunday afternoon. Yet he should clearly be very much on hand when we meet the Leadership. The schedule I have suggested meets both objectives.

I have discussed this matter only with Bob McNamara, and I find that he concurs in this recommendation.

On a separate matter -- Bob is carrying out your orders to plan this whole job with only \$300-\$400 million in immediate new funds. But I think you will want to know that he thinks our posture of candor and responsibility would be better if we ask for \$2 billion to take us through the end of the calendar year, on the understanding that we will come back for more, if necessary. Bob is afraid we simply



cannot get away with the idea that a call-up of the planned magnitude can be paid for by anything so small as another few hundred million. Cy Vance told me the other day that the overall cost is likely to be on the order of \$8 billion in the coming year and I can understand Bob's worry that in the nature of things, these projected costs will be sure to come out pretty quickly, especially if he looks as if he was trying to pull a fast one.

I have not told Bob that I am reporting his worry to you; don't give me away.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

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July 22, 1965

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TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meetings on Vietnam, July 21, 1965

This is a summary of the discussion of Secretary McNamara's report and recommendations held in the Cabinet Room on Wednesday, July 21. There were three sessions: a preparatory meeting without the President at 10:30, a meeting with the President from 11:30 until 1:00, another meeting with the President from 2:30 until 5:30. A list of those present is attached at annex.

Preparatory Meeting - 10:30

Secretary McNamara noted that the only Section of his report which contained specific action recommendations and the only one fully coordinated with the principals (Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson, General Westmoreland, General Wheeler, and Ambassador Lodge) was paragraph 5. The four key recommendations follow:

1. The deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by October to 34 maneuver battalions (or, if the Koreans fail to provide the expected 9 battalions promptly, to 43 battalions). The battalions -- together with increases in other units, would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 175,000 (200,000 if we must make up for the Korean failure). ✓
2. Congress be requested to authorize the call-up of approximately 235,000 men in the Reserve and National Guard. This number would provide approximately 36 maneuver battalions by the end of this year. ✓
3. The regular armed forces be increased by approximately 375,000 men (approximately 250,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 25,000 Navy). This would provide approximately 27 additional maneuver battalions by the middle of 1966. ✓
4. A supplemental appropriation of approximately \$X for FY 1966 be sought from the Congress to cover the first part of the added costs attributable to the buildup in and for the war in Vietnam. A further supplemental appropriation might be required later in the Fiscal Year.

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

Authority NLJ 80-76  
By DCH/lw, NARS, Date 9/7/83



Although no attempt was made to coordinate the remainder of the paper, the comments of other members of the group were solicited. No attempt was made to resolve certain shades of difference, but Ambassador Lodge's concerns about early political moves to obtain a negotiated settlement (paragraphs 4c and 9) were recorded in footnotes.

Ambassador Lodge emphasized that his concern with respect to political moves was basically on the matter of timing. He also felt that channels of communication with the VC and DRV already exist.

McGeorge Bundy noted that such questions of the "liberation" of North Vietnam could be handled in our public utterances. As far as "negotiations" were concerned, third countries could be relied on to keep initiatives going. Secretary McNamara observed that the contemplated size of our forces and bases in South Vietnam could well give Hanoi the impression that we had the intention of "marching North." Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow should be made aware that this was not our intent.

In a response to a series of questions from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara doubted that the GVN could raise the necessary forces to counter increasing VC capabilities (the country team was more optimistic, but we would be prudent to take a pessimistic and skeptical view of the abilities of the GVN - "a non-government" - to push forward with any major program); morale of US forces was excellent. (General Wheeler heartily agreed); the monsoon offensive was under way and "there was more to come;" the VC lacked the capability to seize any of the major US bases, or Saigon.

In connection with VC logistics, Secretary McNamara indicated that, although there was little information available, VC supplies appeared to be adequate. Both he and General Wheeler felt that much of the VC supplies were coming in by sea. Our capability to interdict sea supply was inadequate. This, and the lack of tactical intelligence ("POW interrogations must be tightened up") were the two most important operational problems we faced.

The seeking out of VC main force units was generally regarded as a high priority matter. To a considerable extent this reflected the gaps in intelligence. General Wheeler pointed out that small US-ARVN "foraging teams" operating primarily in the Delta, attempt to locate VC units.

Secretary Rusk stated that, if the McNamara report was accepted, a scenario for Congressional and public actions would be desirable. There was a general feeling that the President would have to move ahead on statements to Congress and the public early in the week of July 26. Although there was already a widespread expectation that we would be expanding our forces in Vietnam, the key question involved calling up reserves.

Secretary Rusk felt that it was important that the new military proposals have civilian (i. e. , State Department) endorsement. He thought he should participate in the Congressional testimony. Mr. Bundy suggested that the Congressional presentation should be a DOD responsibility and that Mr. Rusk should participate in the follow-up presentation to the public. Mr. Ball pointed out the need to paint "a sombre picture" and to dispel any idea that the post-monsoon period would see us over the hump. Secretary McNamara felt that we should make it clear to the public that American troops were already in combat.

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Meeting with the President - 11:30

Mr. Bundy suggested an agenda for the discussion to follow:

1. The Action Recommendations (para. 5 of McNamara report)
2. The political situation and prospects in Vietnam
3. The basic diplomatic position
4. A scenario of action

The President stressed the need for utmost care to avoid any leaks or speculation on the subjects under discussion.

Secretary McNamara summarized his recommendations.

The President indicated that, when the time came to call up the reserves, he wanted a full statement of the situation in Vietnam which required additional US troops. What consequences are likely to flow from a call-up? (The McNamara paper gives no sense of victory, but rather of continuing stalemate.) Why can't we get more third country troops? What are the alternatives available to us? We could tell the GVN that we are leaving, but is this an option we wish to pursue at this time? If we pull out of Vietnam now, will we have to call up more troops and suffer more casualties



at some later date? We have explored all initiatives for a peaceful settlement, to an extent, perhaps, that we might already look weak. In short, what are our present options, why do we select the recommended number of troops rather than more or fewer? What will this increased force accomplish?

Mr. McNamara discussed the deterioration in the situation: the VC has greatly expanded its control of the country, populous areas are now isolated, both the VC and ARVN have been suffering heavy casualties. Unless the US steps in with additional forces, the VC will push the GVN into small enclaves and become increasingly ineffective. The VC now controls about 25 percent of the population (CIA Director Raborn estimated that the VC controlled about 25 percent of the population during the day and about 50 percent at night). A year ago, the VC controlled less than 20 percent.

The President felt that our mission should be as limited as we dare make it.

General Wheeler agreed, but felt that we should engage in offensive operations to seek out and fight VC main force units. Although this is difficult because of the lack of tactical intelligence, we know where these base areas are.

Director Raborn reported the CIA's estimate that the VC will avoid major confrontations with US forces and concentrate on destroying our LOCs and on guerrilla warfare, generally.

General Wheeler felt that the VC will have to "come out and fight" and that this will probably take place in the highlands where they will probably attempt to establish a government seat. Mr. Ball thought, however, that the VC might not "accommodate" us by moving in "Phase III" operations. Mr. McNamara felt that if the VC did not choose to fight in large units, the ARVN could proceed with pacification activities and consolidate its oil spots. We don't know what the VC will do when confronted with 175,000 US forces, but they probably will contrive to use their main force units in large concentrations until they get badly mauled (probably by the first part of 1966). At the moment, terrorism is low in terms of VC capabilities. US forces can engage guerrillas as well as the main force units.

Admiral Raborn believed that the VC/PAVN will attempt to achieve a decisive victory in the next six months. In response to the President's query as to the likelihood of this, Mr. McNamara stated that this was highly improbable.

The President asked if there were any dissents from the McNamara recommendations. Mr. Ball felt that we were engaged on "a very perilous voyage." He had grave apprehensions about our ability to beat the VC because of the nature of the terrain, the softness of the political situation and other factors. However, he would go along with the McNamara report. The President indicated that he was aware of the dangers, but wondered about other courses open to us.

Mr. Ball stated that he could not offer a course that would permit us to "cut our losses" easily. But we should weigh the costs of cutting our losses now as opposed to later. The pressures to move toward a larger war would be "almost irresistible." He based his views not on a "moral" position but on a "cold-blooded calculation." We will have to take the risk of Southeast Asia becoming Communist. However, he believed that the losses would be of a short-term nature.

The President felt that Mr. Ball clearly identified the dangers before us, but did not get the impression that Mr. Ball opposes the McNamara course. The President wanted to minimize the dangers of this enterprise but felt that he had no other choice. He would seriously like to explore other alternatives, now or as we proceed.

Mr. Rusk agreed that alternative options should be explored. He felt, however, that if we had met the challenge posed in 1961 by sending "50,000 men" to South Vietnam, Hanoi may have hesitated to proceed with its actions against the South.

Mr. Rowen indicated he would go along with the McNamara proposal, but was worried about the prospects for GVN stability (page 3 of the report). Unless we can achieve stability, our forces will be severely handicapped.

Mr. Lodge pointed out that we cannot count on stability in South Vietnam. Saigon has no roots in the countryside and needs peace to rule the country. In any case, if there were a strong stable government there wouldn't be a war. "We shouldn't take the Government too seriously." If the area is important to us, we must do what is necessary regardless of the Government.



The President asked Mr. Ball to present his alternative proposal in detail at a meeting in the afternoon.

Mr. McNamara proceeded to develop his option: In essence the VC now had the capability to push ARVN out of positions they now control with a consequent inevitable takeover of the Government. He would not recommend that we hold our forces at the present level. We should increase our forces or get out. General Wheeler pointed out that the ARVN strength had sharply declined because of casualties and desertions. With increased US forces we will have proportionately less casualties. He could not assure the President, however, that an additional 100,000 men would be sufficient.

In response to the President's query why Hanoi couldn't match US man for man, General Wheeler indicated that large-scale PAVN forces would be a favorable development for us. He felt that the PAVN would be unlikely to put more than 25 percent of its own forces into South Vietnam (Note: the PAVN consists of approximately 250,000 troops). Admiral Raborn stated that CIA's estimate was that Hanoi would send 20-25,000 PAVN troops into South Vietnam by the end of the year.

The President urged the DCI to increase CIA's capabilities for intelligence collection in the North. Anything that was needed to accomplish this would be made available. Mr. McNamara stressed the need to increase combat intelligence as well (CIA and MACV-J-2 were working on this problem).

The President indicated his deep concern about press stories from Saigon that US forces were bombing innocent civilians. These followed a general discussion on the overall press situation with the President urging State Department officials to work on the matter.

The President closed this session with a request to Messrs. Ball and McGeorge Bundy constantly to explore alternatives to proposed policies. The session adjourned at 1:00 p.m.

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Afternoon Session - 2:30

Mr. Ball developed the details of his policy alternative. He was basically skeptical of the ability of Westerners successfully to wage war on the terrain and in the political atmosphere of Vietnam. If the war

could be won in a year with reasonable casualties, he would not be so concerned. But he feels that it will take at least two years and the fact that we will have put in so much US manpower with no early definitive results, would be a sign of US weakness in the eyes of the world. The fact that our tactical intelligence is so poor indicates the unfavorable political atmosphere in Vietnam. We have underestimated the seriousness of the problem since we started there. And we are still underestimating the seriousness of the situation. "It is like giving cobalt treatment to a terminal cancer case." The least harmful way to cut our losses is to let the GVN decide it doesn't want us. He has no illusions about the consequences of this in Vietnam or in Southeast Asia. He reviewed these consequences in detail, but felt that in the long run they would be less serious than they might appear at first.

The President agreed that the situation is serious. He regretted that we were embroiled in Vietnam. But we are there. He believes the Vietnamese people want us there, despite the frequent changes of government. In response to the President's query, Mr. McNamara indicated his poor impression of General Ky, and his belief that the present GVN would be removed by the end of the year. General Wheeler stated that he had a good impression of General Thieu. He felt that the stability of the present government would depend on our support.

The President stressed his concern about the GVN's instability. He noted two basic problems:

1. Can Westerners engage in a war in Vietnam?
2. How can we fight a war under a government that changes so frequently?

Mr. Bundy agreed with the McNamara proposals. He felt that no government which could hold power is likely to be one that will invite us to leave. The basic lesson of Mr. Ball's view is that:

1. The post-monsoon season will not see us in the clear.
2. No single speech will be sufficient to reassure the American people.

We will have to face up to the serious, ominous implications of our new policy. This is not a continuation of our present approach. "We are



asking Americans to bet more to achieve less." We will have to engage in a much more massive political and economic effort. New organizational changes may be necessary in our mission in Saigon and in our governmental structure in Washington. There are no early victories in store, although early casualties are likely to be heavy.

Mr. Bundy did not believe that Mr. Ball's "cancer analogy" was a good one. Immaturity and weakness, yes. A non-Communist society is struggling to be born. Before we take our decision to the American people, Ambassador Taylor should go back to the GVN and get greater, more positive assurances. There will be time to decide our policy won't work after we have given it a good try. (Mr. Ball disagreed here, feeling that the larger our commitment, the more difficult would be the decision to get out. "We won't get out; we'll double our bet and get lost in the rice paddies.")

Mr. Bundy felt that the kind of shift in US policy suggested by Mr. Ball would be "disastrous". He would rather maintain our present commitment and "waffle through" than withdraw. The country is in the mood to accept grim news.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that the nature and integrity of the US commitment was fundamental. It makes the US stance with the USSR creditable. It would be dangerous if the Communist leadership became convinced that we will not see this through. It is more important to convince the Communist leadership of this than to worry about the opinion of non-Communist countries. He is more optimistic about the outcome of the war than some. The effects of our force increment will be to force the VC into guerrilla activity, to remove the capability of the other side to use major forces against the GVN. The VC must now be faced with difficult decisions. An increased US commitment does not change the nature of the war -- we have already gone a long way in the air and on the ground without escalating. Consequently, he wondered whether we should be too dramatic about the increase in US forces. (Mr. Bundy pointed out here that calling up the reserves will require a certain amount of "drama").

Mr. McNamara felt that Mr. Ball understated the cost of cutting our losses. He agreed with Mr. Rusk on the international effect of such an action at this time. Mr. Ball also overstates the cost of his (McNamara's) proposal. He agreed that it would take at least two years to pacify the country and we must be prepared to increase our forces by another 100,000.

General Wheeler said that it was unreasonable to expect to "win" in a year regardless of the number of US troops involved. We might start to reverse the unfavorable trend in a year and make definite progress in three years.

The President wondered whether we could win without using nuclear weapons if China entered the war.

General Wheeler felt we could in "Southeast Asia." He believes US forces can operate in the terrain of Southeast Asia. This is the first "war of National Liberation"; if we walk out of this one, we will just have to face others.

The President asked why, when we have been undertaking military efforts for 20 months, this new effort will be successful. General Wheeler felt that our additional forces will stave off a deteriorating situation.

Ambassador Lodge disagreed with Mr. Ball's approach. He felt, however, that it was essential to get a political/civil program going.

Ambassador Unger agreed with McNamara proposal. He found no unfavorable reactions in South Vietnam to an increase in US forces.

The President raised again the problem of getting more economic/political information into the press. State Department representatives promised to give this increased attention.

The President stressed his desire to get more third country troops into South Vietnam. He also raised the possibility of a Vietnam Task Force which would meet daily.

The meeting adjourned at 5:30.

CLG



ATTENDANCE AT VIETNAM MEETINGS

Wednesday, July 21, 1965

The President

State Department

Secretary Rusk  
Under Secretary Ball  
Mr. William Bundy  
Ambassador Lodge  
Ambassador Unger

Defense Department

Secretary McNamara  
Deputy Secretary Vance  
Mr. McNaughton

JCS

General Wheeler

USIA

Director Rowan  
Mr. Marks

White House

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Mr. Valenti  
Mr. Busby  
Mr. Cooper  
Mr. Clifford (afternoon)

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

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July 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Alternative methods of call-up of Reserve Forces

Legally the Reserves may be called up either by Executive Order or through legislative action. Regarding Executive Order action, 10 U.S.C. 673 authorizes the calling up of up to one million Reserves. However, the President must first declare a new national emergency. 10 U.S.C. 673 does not permit the extension of enlistments except for the Navy and Marine Corps. ✓

The Reserves may also be called up by the Service Secretaries "in time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law..." (10 U.S.C. 672). This was the route used in 1961 during the Berlin crisis when Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to "order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an Armed Force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months." This law also limited the number of Ready Reservists on active duty (other than for training) without their consent under this section at any one time. The law also authorized the involuntary extension of enlistments or other obligated service for not more than twelve months. The Resolution was followed by an Executive Order delegating to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments the authority conferred by the Joint Resolution.

This method of calling up Reserves seems far and away the best. It assures Congressional participation and support and avoids the problems involved in declaring a new national emergency.

Finally, in light of experience we should think about including limitations on the maximum number of Reservists to be called up and the duration of active service under a Congressional Joint Resolution.

*Henry*  
Henry S. Rowen  
Assistant Director

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

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July 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting of Foreign Affairs Consultants

Secretary Rusk has approved for submission to the President, the attached reports on the meeting on July 8 of his Panel of Foreign Affairs Consultants.

In view of your mention of the new format used in this meeting and the prospect for more frequent meetings in the future, I would be glad to have any comments you might have on our part in the preparations and the utility of this kind of report.

BJR

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Viet Nam
2. ~~Europe~~
3. ~~Latin America~~

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS Attachments



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

July 10, 1965

VIETNAM PANEL

DECLASSIFIED

July 8, 1965

Authority State Letter 11-2-78  
By ip, NARS, Date 3-26-79

This group consisted of Messrs. Bradley, Gilpatric, Kistiakowsky, Larson, and McCloy. It met with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Thompson, and Mr. William Bundy. The following are highlights:

1. Stakes and Objectives in South Vietnam

The group, with the possible exception of Mr. Larson, felt that the stakes were very high indeed. They concurred in the Administration judgment that Thailand could not be held if South Vietnam were taken over, and they thought that the effects in Japan and India could be most serious. They particularly felt that the effect in Europe might also be most serious, and that de Gaulle would find many takers for his argument that the US could not now be counted on to defend Europe.

They also felt that South Vietnam was a crucial test of the ability of the free world and of the US to counter the Communist tactic of "wars of national liberation", and that a US defeat would necessarily lead to worldwide questioning whether US commitments could be relied on.

It was the feeling of the group that these consequences would be accentuated if the US by its own decision withdrew from South Vietnam, or if the US suffered a military defeat there. On the other hand, the group felt that the consequences would not be much reduced if a Communist takeover took place as a result of a change in government in Saigon, as a result of which the US was asked to leave.

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Mr. Larson appeared to dissent from this assessment, in line with his over-all view that we should be seeking UN action or serious negotiations (see para 4 below).

2. Increase of Combat Forces in South Vietnam

In line with their view of the grave stakes, the group generally felt that there should be no question of making whatever combat force increases were required. Several members of the group thought that our actions to date had perhaps been too restrained, and had been misconstrued by Hanoi that we were less than wholly determined.

The group urged that, in connection with any decisions for further increases, there should be a full spelling out of the military situation and the facts making the increases necessary.

One or two members of the group asked whether it was possible to undertake the closing of the South Vietnamese border as a military operation. They appeared, however, to accept Secretary McNamara's statement that this would be a very fast, major operation of uncertain effect, and that the job had to be done within South Vietnam, including the possibility of major forces in the plateau area-- although this currently did not seem wise because of the fact that the main operation route (Route 19) was cut in several places and would have to be fully defended before forces could be sustained in the plateau other than by air supply.

3. The Policy on Bombing of the DRV

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, and Ambassador Thompson, laid out the various factors--particularly the question of Soviet reaction--that had led us not to hit Hanoi and Haiphong. The consultants appeared to accept these points, and none pressed for any early change in this policy. However, General Bradley did raise the



question whether we might not conduct individual raids on Hanoi and Haiphong in reprisal for specific outrages in the South. It was noted that this should not be done for outrages confined to Americans--but noted equally that most outrages were not likely to be of this character.

#### 4. Negotiating and International Actions

There was much discussion whether it would be useful to take the South Vietnam issue to the UN. Mr. Larson argued at length for this course, but much of his discussion related to whether it should have been done in 1961 before we went into the advisory build-up. At the present time, Mr. Larson said that his soundings indicated that there would be much support in the United Nations for a simple call for the convening of a Geneva Conference. Others doubted whether there would not be hookers such as a demand for the cessation of bombing. Mr. Larson himself did not see much use in convening the Geneva Conference, and appeared to have in mind that the UN itself might act to introduce forces or police a cease-fire. Others doubted very strongly that either of these was either practical or useful, and Mr. Acheson and Mr. Dean were vehement on the subject in the later plenary session. (Mr. Dean said that this was no time to "turn over our Far East policy to the UN".)

Mr. Larson's basic underlying view appeared to be grave doubt that we would get a truly viable and democratic Vietnam even by causing Hanoi to pull out, and he repeatedly queried whether what we might get as a "success" would be that much better than what we might get now. Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that the real difficulty might be the difference between a South Vietnam in which individuals now in the Viet Cong were free to engage in political activity--which would certainly have its difficulties--and a South Vietnam in which the Communist Viet Cong had become a part of a coalition government and were highly likely to take over. The matter was not really developed in detail, but it was clear that the group thought we needed to look hard at just what we did expect to come out in South Vietnam--



and equally clear that none of the other members of the group were prepared to buy Mr. Larson's basic thesis.

As to going to the UN, it should be noted that several members of the group, while clearly opposing Mr. Larson's line, thought that it might be useful at some time--perhaps in the context of increased military commitments--to do this, in order to make clear again that we were ready for negotiations. But the general feeling was that such a move at the present time would not be useful and would be a dangerous sign of weakness. (General Bradley particularly stressed this point.)

In the plenary session, Mr. Hoffman (who, like Mr. Larson, had apparently been having extensive personal contacts in the UN corridors) more or less backed Mr. Larson's thesis in favor of an early move in the UN. He thought it was essential to persuade the Afro-Asian countries we were not acting as imperialists, and that many of them did have this view. He specifically suggested a UN call for talks which would include the two Vietnams, the US/USSR/UK/France/Communist China, but also the Liberation Front. The plenary session did not pursue the question of dealing with the Liberation Front, but the matter had been raised in the Panel, and the Panel members appeared to accept Secretary Rusk's statement of the many strong reasons why this would be unwise and unproductive in terms of real negotiations, and seriously damaging to the whole view of the war on which our actions were based.

5. Prognosis of the Situation

Mr. McCloy spoke at some length--both in the Panel and in the later plenary session--on the degree to which he had been impressed during the discussion with the toughness of the situation. He thought that it was most unlikely that merely blunting the monsoon offensive would bring Hanoi to a negotiating mood, and that the situation would probably remain critical for a long time. He was particularly concerned that the Soviets might be brought

increasingly to what he called an "annealing" of the Sino-Soviet relationship, i.e., the Soviets competing with the ChiComs and acting on parallel lines, although with no necessary resolution of the basic policy differences between them.

While others did not express themselves at length on this question, it seemed clear that Mr. McCloy's views had many takers both in the Panel and in the plenary session.

In the plenary session, Mr. Dean said that he thought there was a great deal of sentiment in the country for doing whatever it took, if we were going to go on at all. Mr. Lovett made the point that it was not useful to talk about "victory", that what was really involved was preventing the expansion of Communism by force; in a sense, avoiding defeat. This view seemed to be generally shared.

#### 6. Specific Suggestions

The importance of local intelligence was particularly stressed by General Bradley, including the importance of Americans throughout the countryside.

Mr. McCloy and others stressed the great importance of the closest possible contact with our allies, and wondered if more could not be done particularly with the British, and, he thought, the Germans.

Mr. Larson thought that it would be useful for the government, particularly as it took further decisions, to spell out a number of points that had been bothering the public. He specifically mentioned the legal justification for bombing in the North.

Mr. Cowles thought that government sources had consistently painted too rosy a picture of the situation, and Mr. Lovett joined in this view.

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Mr. Cowles thought that one highly popular move in South Vietnam might be for the government to abolish taxes, with the US making up the deficit through increased economic aid.

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W.P. Bundy/bmm 7/10/65



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Possible Items for Discussion

July 22, 2:30 P. M.

1. How big a change in policy is this and how do we explain it -- in political and military terms?
2. How do we inhibit Chinese and North Vietnamese response by both carrot and stick?
3. How do we combine a peace offensive with stepped-up military action?
4. Is this policy justified in terms of Vietnam, Asia or U. S. national interests -- or all three?
5. How do we get a political and social effort within Vietnam that is equal in strength to the military effort?
6. What are our war aims? What is the answer to Walter Lippmann's question on this point?

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MR 7/23

11a

Friday, July 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reasons for Avoiding a big Military  
Appropriation in Vietnam

1. It would be a belligerent challenge to the Soviets at a time when it is important to do only the things which we have to do.
2. It would stir talk about controls over the economy and inflation -- at a time when controls are not needed and inflation is not that kind of a problem.
3. It would play into the hands of the Soviets at Geneva and elsewhere, because they could argue that it was a flagrant breach of the policy of "mutual example" on defense budgets.
4. It is not needed -- because there are other ways of financing our full effort in Vietnam for the present.

*McG. B.*

McG. B.

12

4/2

Deploy forces to South Vietnam in accordance with McNamara's paragraph 5a (a total of 34 U.S. battalions and 176,000 men will be "in country" by approximately 11/1); recreate the Strategic Reserve by calling approximately 90,000 men from the reserve and by activating new units; release the reserve personnel at the end of a 12-month tour, at which time the strength of the active forces will have increased by approximately 340,000 men; request immediately the legislative authority for the reserve call-up and for involuntary extension of tours of duty; request the Senate to amend the Defense Appropriations Bill by adding approximately \$2+ billion of the estimated \$5+ billion FY '66 cost of Phase I of this program, with the remainder of the cost to be covered by a January '66 budget supplement after further details have been developed.

A. Deployment by 11/1 at End of Phase I.

- 22 Army battalions
- 12 Marine battalions
- 31 helicopter companies
- 24 air squadrons (17 Air Force & 7 Marine)
- 175,000 total personnel

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 Authority OSD letter NOV 1 1978  
 By ip; NARS, Date 5-18-79

B. Re-creation of Strategic Reserve to cover Phase I Deployment.

	Bns	Call	Report	Ready
1. Call-up 6 Army brigades	18	8/15	9/15	11/15
2.a) Activate 1 permanent Army brigade	3		11/1	2/1
.b) Activate 2 permanent Army brigades	6		9/1	4/1
3. Activate 1 temporary Army division	9		10/1	6/30
	<u>36</u>			

C. Release at end of 12 months "reserve" units associated with Phase I.

Release 6 Army brigades 9/15/66 and replace by activating 6 Army brigades 2/15 to be ready by 9/15 or, alternatively, call-up 6 Army reserve brigades on 6/15.

D. Phase II.

Add to the total Phase I force the following:

- 24 battalions (18 Army & 6 Marine)
- 18 helicopter companies (including Marine)
- 7 squadrons & Marine Air Wing
- 100,000 total additional personnel

E. Action to take at a later date if it is desired to deploy Phase II forces.

1. Call-up and send to SVN, the 4th Marine Division-Wing; call on 1/15 for 4/15 closing or earlier for an earlier closing.
2. Send the 2d Air Mobile Division -- start conversion 9/15 for 4/15 closing.
3. Send the "New" permanent Army brigade -- ready for movement 2/1.
4. To re-create the Strategic Reserve depleted by items 2 and 3 above, call-up 1 Army reserve division and 1 Army reserve brigade on February 1 for May 1 or June 1 readiness.



PLAN II

Deploy forces to South Vietnam in accordance with McNamara's paragraph 5 a (a total of 34 U.S. battalions and 176,000 men will be "in country" by approximately 11/1); defer, until approximately 9/1, requests for legislative authority to call up the reserves, extend tours of duty, and supplement the FY 66 budget -- by that date detailed plans can be developed; initiate all necessary procurement actions associated with Plan I and finance these actions, prior to 9/1, by pulling forward funds appropriated for the remaining months of FY 66; announce now that: (a) additional forces are being deployed to South Vietnam, bringing the total U.S. strength to 28 battalions and 133,000 men, and (b) further increases in forces are anticipated and will be made as required.

A. Timing of public announcements of force deployments.

1. Announced June 16: 15 Bns, 70-75,000 men.	
2. To be announced July 26: 10 additional Bns, 133,000 total strength.	
1 BLT (temporarily ashore)	2.5
2 Bns of 173d (now in SVN)	4
Logistic's command (authorized and moving)	10.4
Miscellaneous (in SVN or moving)	9
Air Mobile Division - 8 Bns (moving to close 9/15)	27
2 BLTs plus 1 air squadron (authorize on 7/23 to close 8/15)	<u>5.5</u>
	Total 58 55.0
3. To be announced September 1:	
US support for ROK division (close 9/15)	1.5
4 fighter squadrons (close 9/1)	3.5
Additional Marine enclave support (ASP)	1.5
6 Bns of 1st Division (authorize 9/1 to close 10/1)	12.5
6 artillery Bns (authorize 9/1 to close 10/1)	3.8
13-2/3 helicopter companies (close 9/1 to 6/1)	5.3
4 CHINOOK companies (close 10/1 to 6/1)	1.0
2 HAWK Bns (close 10/1)	1.7
1 Marine HAWK Bn (close ?)	.5
Miscellaneous support forces (close ?)	15
9 attack fighter squadrons (close ?)	<u>8</u>
	Total 54.0

B. Inform the Congressional leaders 7/26:

1. Westmoreland has requested additional forces. We are moving units in accordance with his requests, as fast as he is ready to receive them.

2. We are announcing today that: (a) the approved forces, which on June 16 we stated totalled 15 Bns, 70-75,000 men, are being increased to 28 Bns and 133,000 men, including the Air Mobile Division, and (b) additional forces undoubtedly will be required and will be sent when requested.

3. The increased forces being assigned to South Vietnam will consume supplies at rates greater than planned. Procurement for such items will be increased as rapidly as the required quantities can be determined. Procurement funds already appropriated for FY 66 will be drawn forward and used for this purpose. As promptly as the effect of this action on the FY 66 budget can be determined, a budget supplement will be submitted to Congress -- we believe this can be accomplished by approximately September 1.

4. If the deployment program proceeds as we anticipate it will, it may become necessary to call up certain reserve forces and to extend tours of duty later this year. We are tentatively planning to request Congressional authority for such moves before the end of this session.



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C. The Congress and the public may be expected to direct the following criticism at Plan II.

1. A change in the character of the war, a change so great as to later require action by Congress, was made without consultation with the Congress.
2. The call-up of the reserve forces to replace the draw down in the strategic reserve has been imprudently deferred.
3. The effectiveness and safety of certain military units is being jeopardized because of the failure to rapidly increase end strength through extension of tours of duty.
4. The Administration is expending funds for procurement of additional equipment and supplies without proper Congressional authorization.

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PLAN III

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A program to meet the schedule for recommended deployments to SVN while minimizing the actions which might induce Communist China or the Soviet Union to take initiatives they might not otherwise undertake.

1. Deploy 176,000 men (Phase I force) by approximately 11/1.
2. Do not call up reserve force personnel and do not extend tours by new legislation.
3. Increase active duty strength of Air Force 40,000, Navy 35,000 and Marine Corps 30,000 as required to relieve strains of Southeast Asia activity -- extend tours for 4 months in Navy (20,000) and Marine Corps (6,500) to extent permitted by present law.
4. Increase Army strength 235,000 to relieve strain and to activate:

3 brigades (9 Bns)  
1 division (9 Bns)  
19 helicopter companies (incl. 4 CHINOOK)  
12 helicopter companies

Ready  
4/15; 5/15; 6/15  
7/1

5. Increase readiness of selected reserve units:

4th Marine Division/Wing (9 Bns)  
6 Army Brigade Forces (18 Bns)  
3 Army Division Force (27 Bns)  
9 Air Force Fighter Squadrons  
4 Air Force Reconnaissance Squadrons  
11 C-124 Air Force Reserve Squadrons

[Steps 4 and 5 will permit deployment of Phase II force in first half '66 (24 Bns including 18 Army and 6 Marine, 18 helicopter companies including Marine, 7 air squadrons plus Marine Air Wing, a total of 100,000) and the provision of 54 reserve Bns in a high state of combat readiness to act as strategic reserve offsetting the 58 Bns deployed in Phase II in SVN.]

6. Finance the increase in the personnel in the active force and increased Operations and Maintenance expenditures by use of authority in Sections 512 a and c.
7. Accept Senator Stennis' proposal to add a \$1 billion contingency fund for procurement and construction as an amendment to the FY 66 Appropriation Bill.
8. Develop a detailed statement of supplemental funding (\$6<sup>7</sup> billion) required for FY 66 and present a request for this amount to Congress in January '66.

RMcN  
7/24/65 - Rev #1

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PLAN III

A program to meet the schedule for recommended deployments to SVN while minimizing the actions which might induce Communist China or the Soviet Union to take initiatives they might not otherwise undertake.

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7/24/65 - Rev #1

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Authority OSD 11-1-78 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 4-21-81

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LIMDIS

IN DISCUSSIONS DURING SECY MCNAMARA'S VISIT, THE QUESTION AROSE AS TO THE ACTUAL GROWTH OF THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE DURING THE LAST YEAR. THIS MESSAGE UNDERTAKES TO SET FORTH THE SITUATION AS WE KNOW IT.

THE ACTUAL STRENGTH OF RVN MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES INCREASED BY 141,443 (FROM 445,351 TO 586,799) DURING THE PERIOD 1 JULY 1964 TO 1 JULY 1965. THESE INCREASES ARE INDICATED BY THE FOLLOWING AUDITED DATA WHICH REFLECT ACTUAL FORCE STRENGTHS

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1188A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
FINISHED BY J-1, RVNAF. READ IN 4 COLUMNS.

FORCE	1 JULY 64	1 JULY 65	DIFFERENCE
REGULAR	215,235	262,096	PLUS 46,861
REGIONAL	87,317	107,652	PLUS 20,335
POPULAR	99,611	149,029	PLUS 49,418
COASTAL	3,311	3,609	PLUS 298
CIDG	18,000	21,721	PLUS 3,721
NAT. POLICE	21,877	42,692	PLUS 20,815
TOTAL	445,351	586,799	PLUS 141,448

ASIDE FROM THE POPULAR FORCE, STRENGTHS OF ALL FORCES ARE INCREASING AT PLANNED RATE TOWARD ESTABLISHED END CY 65 GOALS. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS A SLIPPAGE IN THE CREATION OF NEW UNITS. ALTHOUGH THE STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR FORCES OVERALL IS IN ACCORD WITH THE PLANNED BUILD-UP, IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO DIVERT THE TRAINED MANPOWER DESTINED FOR 11 OF THE 31 PROGRAMMED INFANTRY BATTALIONS INTO EXISTING INFANTRY BATTALIONS WHOSE STRENGTHS WERE UNACCEPTABLY LOW. THIS MEANS THAT COMPLETION OF THE BATTALION ACTIVATION PROGRAM WILL BE EXTENDED FROM MARCH 66 TO APRIL 66 AND THAT ONLY 4 NEW INFANTRY BATTALIONS WILL BE ADDED TO THE EXISTING STRUCTURE IN CY 65.

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1188A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IF THE FOREGOING INFORMATION LEAVES UNANSWERED ANY OF THE STRENGTH QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN TROUBLING WASHINGTON AGENCIES, PLEASE LET US KNOW. TAYLOR.

BT

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Executive Secretariat  
1965 JUL 23 AM 10 47  
July 23, 1965

Date

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

For your information and  
files.

Enclosures:

Actions Agreed on Special Meeting  
5 p.m. July 22.

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~  
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State Letter

Authority \_\_\_\_\_  
By *if*, NARS, Date 3-26-79



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
July 22, 1965

EXDIS FOR PARTICIPANTS

Actions Agreed on at Special Meeting  
of the Assistant Secretaries  
5:00 p.m., July 22, 1965

Chaired by the Under Secretary.

- Participants: Under Secretary Ball  
 Under Secretary Mann  
 Assistant Secretary Bundy  
 Assistant Secretary Talbot  
 Assistant Secretary Williams  
 Assistant Secretary Leddy  
 Assistant Secretary MacArthur  
 Legal Adviser Meeker  
 ARA - Mr. Sayre  
 G/PM - Mr. Kitchen  
 FE - Miss Bacon  
 S/S - Mr. Read

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 Authority State Letter 11-2-78  
 By ig/s, NARS, Date 4-7-79  
3-26-79

1. Need for Secrecy

The Under Secretary stressed the paramount need to keep the discussions at the meeting secure and the knowledge limited to the fewest possible officers. Mr. Ball stressed that the President had not yet made any final decisions.

2. Schedule

The President's message to Congress on Viet Nam situation will go up at noon on Monday, July 26 or on Tuesday, July 27.

The President will meet with Congressional leaders at 4:30 p.m. on Saturday or on Monday to discuss the anticipated decisions and coming message.

3. Circular to the Field Today

FE will prepare a priority EXDIS circular to the field to go out tonight advising certain Ambassadors and Charges that they

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may need to reach the heads of state and/or foreign ministers in their capitals during the weekend and to report to the Department who the highest official who will be present this weekend may be if the chief of state is not available. The circular will go to the following posts:

<u>FE:</u>	Australia New Zealand Korea	GRC PI Thailand	Laos Japan
<u>EUR:</u>	UK FRG Canada Italy	France Netherlands Belgium USSR	Sweden
<u>NEA:</u>	India Pakistan UAR	Iran Turkey Athens	
<u>ARA:</u>	Brazil Mexico		
<u>AF:</u>	Ghana Ethiopia	Tunisia Morocco	

4. Bucharest Communist Party Meeting

EUR will wire Bucharest tonight asking the latest information on when the communist party convention is expected to be over and when it is anticipated that the Soviet and Chinese delegations will leave.

5. General Circular Announcing the Nature of the Presidential Decisions

FE will prepare a PRIORITY EXDIS SECRET general circular announcing the nature of the Presidential decisions on Viet Nam for transmission on Friday, July 23, and special instructions on time of delivery just before, concurrent with, or after, the Presidential message on Monday or Tuesday. The Ambassadors will be instructed to convey the information contained in the circular

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-3-

at the specified times to the foreign ministries in the countries to which they are attributed, with the exception of those states to which we are sending Presidential or other messages as noted below.

The circular and contacts in the field will eliminate the need for group or individual briefings of the Diplomatic Corps in Washington unless special circumstances make individual briefings seem desirable.

6. Presidential and Special Messages

(a) Presidential Messages - There will be two forms of Presidential message which will be drafted in each instance by the Bureau concerned to reflect any special problems in our relationships. The short form will simply advise the chief-of-state that the President has requested his Ambassador to inform him of the nature of his decision.

FE: Souvanna  
Sato  
Park  
Chiang  
Macapagal

EUR: Wilson\*  
deGaulle  
Pearson - Soviets? - LET to be consulted

NEA: Shastri  
Ayub  
The Shah  
Gursel\*

AF: Nkrumah  
Haile Selassie  
Tunisia\*  
Morocco\*

(b) Governor Harriman will be provided with a special message to Erhard which FE is drafting for transmission tonight.

\* Short form Presidential message.

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Special messages will be sent to Governor Harriman for delivery to Fanfani/Moro and Tito prior to his meetings with them.

(c) NAC Briefing - NAC will be briefed on the day of the Presidential message and as close as possible to a time concurrent with delivery of the message to prevent premature disclosures.

BR

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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~~SECRET LIMDIS ATTACHMENT~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

July 26, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Edward Streator *W.A. Henderson*  
Executive Secretariat *for*

The attached is a report  
to the Secretary for your  
attention.

~~SECRET LIMDIS ATTACHMENT~~

This document consists of 4 pages  
No. 1 of 10 Copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S *[initials]*  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *[initials]*

JUL 23 1965

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158

Subject: Giap's Third Phase in Prospect in South Vietnam?

At Mr. Bundy's request, we have examined the question of whether the Communists in South Vietnam are moving into the "third stage" phase of warfare as defined by General Giap. We conclude that their pattern of behavior in Vietnam to date and their probable expectations as to the future argue against the hypothesis that the Communists are preparing to enter the third stage.

General Giap's "Third Phase"

According to General Giap in his celebrated work People's War, People's Army, "The long-term revolutionary war must include several different stages: stage of contention, stage of equilibrium, and stage of counter-offensive." He characterizes the third stage as "a form of mobile war" which steadily increases the size of insurgent operations from platoon or company attacks to commitment of battalions or a regiment, then many divisions. Giap's fullest definition of the third stage noted, "Mobile warfare is the fighting way of concentrated troops, of the regular army in which relatively big forces are regrouped and operating on a relatively vast battlefield, attacking the enemy where he is relatively exposed with a view to annihilating enemy manpower, advancing very deeply then withdrawing very swiftly." He also attached some importance to "entrenched camp warfare" as an ingredient of this third stage.

We do not believe that the criteria established by Giap for the third stage -- size of unit, scale of operation, and nature of attack -- have been or are about to be met in South Vietnam. Our examination of Viet Cong capabilities, the campaign against GVN lines of communication, the Communist attack pattern, and the content of Communist propaganda, persuades us rather that the VC will continue to employ guerrilla tactics with only intermittent recourse to spectacular, multibattalion attacks against major ARVN targets.

The Capability Factor

While Viet Cong strength has steadily improved, we believe that their actual capabilities in firepower, logistics, manpower, and tactical organization are appreciably less than those of the Viet Minh forces during the late stages of the Indochina war, say 1953-54. A well-armed Viet Minh then had a military and a paramilitary force of about 270,000 while the French Union and Vietnamese forces totalled about 400,000. Today, Communist military and paramilitary strength is estimated at about 162,000, facing South Vietnamese forces totalling 550,000 as well as US ground forces. During 1953-54, Viet Minh forces were conventionally structured up to the division level; forces in

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Authority STATE letter JAN 12 1978

By ip, NARS, Date 5-16-79

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excess of regimental strength and occasionally up to a division strength were frequently committed. However, only on a few occasions in recent months have the Communists committed forces of regimental strength, with battalion-size attacks still the principal form of large-scale attack.

Moreover, during the earlier period of the war against the French, the Viet Minh had developed elaborate logistic lines and extensive supplies which permitted them to conduct protracted large-scale attack operations even though their tactical concepts remained oriented basically toward guerrilla rather than conventional or positional warfare. Communist forces in South Vietnam today do not have comparable logistic lines or supply; they are still essentially covert, partly because of the harassing capability of GVN and US forces. Even though the introduction of material from North Vietnam has increased, it is not open or massive, and the Communists still rely heavily on locally captured weapons. In short, we do not believe that the Viet Cong, even with recent PAVN reinforcement, are now capable of initiating a drastically different phase of warfare.

#### Interdiction of ARVN Lines of Communication

Communist interdiction of Route 19 has formed part of the reasoning behind the hypothesis that massive attacks in the Pleiku/Kontum area were in preparation. Ground action in the wake of the B-52 operation has not produced evidence of such preparations nor have there been any attempts to interfere with the reopening of Route 19. The isolation of Kontum/Pleiku has been a conspicuous feature of the VC campaign against LOCs. This prominence, however, may well have reflected the conspicuous lack of ground routes into this area more than a VC strategy envisaging this area as the ideal locus from which to embark upon stage three. In fact, the Communist campaign against LOCs has been countrywide, affecting virtually all major roads in South Vietnam and rendering the coastal railway essentially unusable. Both Communist statements and actual experience to date suggest that their LOC campaign is motivated to a considerable extent by the desire to interdict the movement of civilian supplies, particularly in order to bring the impact of the war to bear on hitherto relatively unaffected but politically volatile urban areas. The desire to isolate ARVN forces and reduce their ability to respond to VC attacks is undoubtedly also present. It does not follow, however, that the nature of VC attacks will change substantially or that, having reduced the possibility of effective ARVN ground reinforcement, the Communists will then resort to tactics that will substantially increase their vulnerability to air.

Propaganda Stresses Guerrilla Warfare

While both Hanoi and NFLSV propaganda continue to claim "bigger and bigger" victories for the "Liberation Armed Forces and Guerrillas" there are no indications that they have altered their traditional guerrilla strategy and tactics, despite occasional references to the development of conventional warfare in the South. In his annual article on the occasion of the July 20 anniversary of the Geneva Agreements, General Giap indicated that the "decisive factor of the outcome of the war is precisely the heroic struggle of the South Vietnamese liberation army and people," and stressed the successes that the "liberation forces" had achieved through guerrilla tactics. He indicated that the introduction of US forces into South Vietnam would not alter these tactics in the least, noting that US forces "are not used to the terrain and the climate of our country and still less experienced in coping with guerrilla warfare." Giap predicted that US forces in South Vietnam "will be bogged down more deeply, scattered in all parts, wiped out fragment by fragment," a clear indication that Communists still intend to rely on their traditional guerrilla tactics, if US ground involvement is confined to South Vietnam.

In his Geneva Anniversary appeal, which has been widely quoted by Front and DRV media, Ho Chi Minh stated that "we ... are determined to fight till final victory even if we have to go on fighting another 5 years, 10 years, 20 years or even longer," hardly suggesting that the DRV is pushing for an early victory by shifting to conventional warfare. A Liberation Radio commentary broadcast on July 14 acclaimed the successes achieved by the Viet Cong through cutting lines of communications and ambushing GVN forces; the NFLSV Geneva Anniversary appeal called on "Liberation Troops and guerrillas ... to develop the guerrilla war strongly and widely"; and a Front summary of military achievements over the last six months, issued on July 17, claimed that "guerrilla warfare continued to develop smoothly."

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### The Attack Factor

The role of attacks in Communist strategy in South Vietnam has been a steadily diminishing one. In 1962 there were 5,509 attacks; in 1963 there were 4,494; in 1964 there were 1,833. At the same time the incidence of acts of terror has increased markedly with 8,875 in 1962; 9,375 in 1963; and 18,656 in 1964. This pattern was accelerated in the first six months of 1965, with a total of 406 attacks as compared with 9,324 terror incidents, or roughly a better than 20 to 1 ratio of terror to attacks in the first six months of 1965, as compared to a roughly 10 to 1 ratio in 1964.

Moreover, although battalion-sized attacks have been more conspicuous in the first six months of 1965 than they were in the first six months of 1964 (28 as against 14), this is not a recent phenomenon. Rather the increase in battalion-sized attacks began in July 1964, when there were 12 (a number not yet exceeded), with the total for the second six months of 1964 mounting to 32.

The statistical record to date clearly fails to support the hypothesis that the Communists have abandoned the pattern of a relatively low but periodically peaking level of attacks, accompanied by a high and generally rising level of terrorism, harassment, and sabotage. Certainly, increasingly better-organized, more effective, and protracted attacks -- for which their capabilities have improved as ARVN offensive and defensive capabilities have declined -- have played an important part in their strategy. They are far from playing the key role, however. It seems unlikely that the Communists would now decide that the time had come for attacks to play such a role, on the basis either of their past experience or their expectation for the future.

With respect to their past experience -- in their advance toward controlling South Vietnam in the period 1962 through June 1965, the VC staged only 141 battalion-sized attacks. With respect to the future -- they have already experienced the effects on their casualty rates of the increasing use of air. And, even at this time when the impact of substantial US ground reinforcements is only beginning to be felt, it must be clear to the Communists that any prospects they may have had for a total military victory in South Vietnam have diminished, possibly to the point of disappearance. Under these circumstances, we cannot see them resorting to a strategy that would substantially increase their vulnerability to US power, except as an act of desperation in which they might take major risks in the hope of bettering their position for immediate negotiating purposes. We believe that they are still far from such a point of desperation, that they still see themselves as in a position of strength -- derived from the weakness and instability of the GVN as well as their own significant still unutilized forces, their ability to deny much of the countryside to the government, their capacity for surprise and evasion, and their ability to disrupt government lines of communication -- from which to wage a guerrilla war with the aim of eliminating all vestiges of GVN independence and authority and sapping US determination and morale.

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EXDIS

Expect that early next week highest levels will be making statement announcing program for expansion US military effort VN along lines discussed with McNamara group during recent visit Saigon, although final decision not yet made on many specific aspects of program. It will be essential to be able to say in such a statement that we have clear understanding with GVN that as we take measures to expand our effort they are likewise going to be doing everything possible to put their country on complete war footing and strengthen in every way the solidarity of the government and people of SVN in this critical effort.

Certain GVN assurances of a general nature will be useful in this connection but our objectives would be best served by as specific as possible commitments in following fields:

- (1) maximum efforts raise enlistments, step up training and reduce desertions;
- (2) public commitment by top officials to vigorous prosecution of Chieu Hoi program, accompanied by designation high ranking official to take charge of program;

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Authority: State Letter 11-2-78  
By: ip, NARS, Date 3-26-79

Drafted by: FE:LUnger/mlg 7/24/65	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy
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Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Mills

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(3) efforts in economic and financial field to control inflation and insure adequate supplies of necessities for population;

(4) halting of diversion of supplies to VC;

(5) concurrence in MACV concept for utilization US forces in SVN as presented by General Westmoreland to General Co;

(6) clearest acceptance by GVN that our common objective is assurance of freedom for SVN and that we are not seeking to change the regime in Hanoi or drive Communists out of NVN.

Need for some expression by GVN on these matters, which would in any event be essential accompaniment of US announcement of our expanded effort, made more necessary because of ambiguities introduced into picture by such expressions as:

(1) Ky's statement in July 18 "Face the Nation" interview with Cronkite referring to need for more allied troops to allow Vietnamese troops and GVN to "reorganize the rear",

(2) final paragraph of GVN proclamation on July 20 concerning freeing the North,

(3) General Thieu's informal talk on same date.

Please give your urgent consideration to most effective way of securing requisite GVN undertakings and best form to give them expression. We realize difficulty and sometimes futility seeking commitments from GVN and also that in many fields much more effective to push day by day for step by step performance than to get pious promises on which GVN has no

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serious intention to deliver. Nevertheless on matters mentioned above, and particularly where GVN statements leave room for suspicion that there is important difference in our positions, it is important to have clear expression from GVN, if not public at least in form which can be made public here if and as necessary.

Points mentioned above not necessarily complete list and you may consider it appropriate include others. Perhaps it will also be feasible cover some matters by specific reference to commitments already made as for example in Ky's 26 points.

Your suggestions required here, Sunday Washington time.

GP-3

End

BALL.

~~SECRET~~

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(L) 17a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Saturday, July 24, 1965  
8:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I enclose two memoranda. One is from Joe Sisco, and the other is a paper on the history of troop recommendations which you instructed me to prepare in our meeting yesterday.

I also had a talk with Sisco, and my own belief is that with further effort we can find a way, showing our readiness to go to the UN without exposing ourselves to much danger in the Security Council. We did it successfully at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin, and I think we can do it again. I believe that the public advantage of showing readiness to speak our peace in the Security Council outweighs the disadvantage of the Soviet response, and I also think that with appropriate pressures, we can keep at least 8 members of the Security Council on our side in keeping the focus sharply on the need for discussions. The members of the Security Council, for your information, are:

US, UK, France, Nationalist China, and  
the Soviet Union -- Permanent Members

The Netherlands, Uruguay, Bolivia, Jordan,  
Ivory Coast, and Malaysia -- Temporary Members

Sisco himself says we can get the US, the UK, the ChiNats, the Dutch, and the two Latin Americans. I believe that strong diplomacy would give us Jordan, the Ivory Coast, and Malaysia as well -- all three of them owe us a lot in different ways.

McG.B.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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178

Saturday, July 24, 1965  
8:15 p.m.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The History of Recommendations for Increased US Forces  
in Vietnam

This story relates almost entirely to 1965. When you became President, US forces in Vietnam totalled 16,000. On 31 December 1964, they totaled 23,000. Today they are between 75 and 80,000, and you are considering increases of another 100,000 between now and November.

In December and January, our attention did not focus upon increased ground forces. We were trying to get the Huong Government to pull up its socks, and we were preparing to authorize air strikes at the right moment. We had no recommendations from the military for major ground force deployments.

At the end of January, after Bob and I discussed with you our growing doubts, you sent me to Vietnam. During that trip, the attack on Pleiku occurred and in February, you put into effect the program of limited air strikes against North Vietnam, and unlimited air action in South Vietnam. It is in this connection that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and you approved, the deployment of Marines to Danang. Two battalion landing teams were approved for such deployment on February 25.

The bombing did not reverse the situation and we did not expect it would. In the first week of March, you sent General Harold Johnson to Vietnam. He returned with three basic recommendations:

First, a 21-Point program of small actions which was promptly approved;

Second, a deployment of a tailored division force either to the highlands or to certain bases; and

Third, a four division ground force to contain infiltration by land.

The last two recommendations were tentative in form and were not pressed to a decision. General Taylor, in an important dispatch on March 16 (Saigon 3003)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD ltr 4-23-76  
By clw NARS, Date 9/7/83



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-2-

weighed the pros and cons of a single US division and recommended that judgment be reserved.

At the end of March, General Taylor visited Washington and there was discussion of a possible three-division force, as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Taylor himself was skeptical and reported a similar skepticism in Prime Minister Quat. The Secretaries of State and Defense recommended that the decision be deferred and that instead we should approve deployment of two additional Marine battalions and an 18-20,000 man increase in other US support forces. This recommendation was accepted in the first days of April.

The study of ground-force deployment continued in April, and on Tuesday, April 20, McNamara, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharpe, Westmoreland, McNaughton, and William Bundy met in Honolulu. At that point there were 2,000 Koreans and 33,000 US troops in the country, and an additional 18,000 were already approved. After the Honolulu discussions, McNamara recommended additional deployments leading to a total strength of 82,000 -- including 13 combat battalions. Part of this recommendation was given formal approval on April 21; and other parts, on May 15. This set of recommendations was the most important between January and the present, and I attach McNamara's memorandum of April 21.

Early in May, you requested \$700 million for Vietnam, and our defense of this request and related statements made it clear that additional forces were being sent. On June 16, McNamara gave a full public exposition, announcing the planned deployment of 15 battalions, with a total military strength of 70-75,000.

Meanwhile, on June 11, after discussions with MACV and Ambassador Taylor, the Joint Chiefs recommended additional deployments to a total of 116,000. The most important element in this recommendation was the air-mobile division. On June 19 you gave approval to the necessary preparatory steps for these deployments, without deciding on the deployment itself.

On July 2, the Joint Chiefs produced a further recommendation for a total troop strength of 179,000, again in coordination with MACV and Ambassador Taylor. Before approving this recommendation, you sent McNamara to Vietnam. With marginal modifications, it is this recommendation which is now before you for decision.

The essence of this history, I think, is that initially we all had grave objections to major US ground force deployments. Even those in favor, (like my brother

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-3-

Bill), wanted to try other things first, and none of us was prepared to urge on Westmoreland things he was not urging on us.

Then when we got major bases of our own, largely for air action, we moved quite promptly to protect them. These deployments did not give us bad reactions, and it became easier for Westmoreland to propose, and for us to accept, additional deployments. Thus, between the end of March and the beginning of July -- a period of only three months -- we moved from recommended force levels of 33,000 to recommended force levels of 180,000. We also moved from the mission of base security to the mission of active combat in whatever way seems wise to General Westmoreland.

I have found this review instructive. It suggests to me that McNamara's Plan 3 is better than his other two plans. I think we should now approve the recommended deployments through November. I think that at the same time we should explicitly and plainly reserve decision about further major deployments. After all, we have not yet had even a company-level engagement with Viet Cong forces which choose to stand their ground and fight.

McG. B.

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16.31

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

21 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. William Bundy, Mr. McNaughton and I met with Ambassador Taylor, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland in Honolulu on Tuesday, April 20. Following is my report of that meeting:

1. None of them expects the DRV/VC to capitulate, or come to a position acceptable to us, in less than six months. This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from VC failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North, and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate VC failure in the South.

2. With respect to strikes against the North, they all agree that the present tempo is about right, that sufficient increasing pressure is provided by repetition and continuation. All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or more, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. There might be fewer fixed targets, or more restrikes, or more armed reconnaissance missions. Ambassador Taylor stated what appeared to be a shared view, that it is important not to "kill the hostage" by destroying the North Vietnamese assets inside the "Hanoi do-nut." They all believe that the strike program is essential to our campaign -- both psychologically and physically -- but that it cannot be expected to do the job alone. They all considered it very important that strikes against the North be continued during any talks.

3. None of them sees a dramatic improvement in the South in the immediate future. Their strategy for "victory", over time, is to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory. Ambassador Taylor put it in terms of a demonstration of Communist impotence, which will lead eventually to a political solution. They see slow improvement in the South, but all emphasized the critical importance of holding on and avoiding -- for psychological and morale reasons -- a spectacular defeat of GVN or US forces. And they all suspect that the recent VC lull is but the quiet before a storm.

4. To bolster the GVN forces while they are building up, they all recommend the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 US troops already in-country (including the 4 Marine battalions at Danang-Hue):

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Authority OSD Hr 3/1/77  
By MIE, NARS, Date 4/18/78

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
1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000	closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns	at Chu Lai	6,200	closing 5 May
1 Australian btn	at Vung Tau	1,250	closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn)	at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000	closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn)	at Quang Ngai	4,000	closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces		11,000	already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level		7,000	already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions		<u>16,000</u>	not yet approved
TOTAL: US 13 btns		82,000	
ROK & ANZAC 4 btns		7,250	

5. Possible later deployments, not recommended now, include a US Air-Mobile division (9 btns - 15,800) to Pleiku/Kontum, and I Corps HQ (1,200) to Nha Trang; and even later, the remainder of the Korean division (6 btns - 14,500) to Quang Ngai, and the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force (3 btns - 24,800) to Danang.

6. All agreed on the action to be taken to meet the seven points of the April 15 message: Def 9164 (see the attached Appendix I for a summary of the seven points and related action).

7. It is therefore recommended that you approve:

- a. A program of strikes against the North according to the principles stated in paragraph 2 above.
- b. The deployments listed in paragraph 4 above.
- c. The approaches to the governments of Korea and Australia implicit in those listed deployments.
- d. Instructions to Ambassador Taylor (see Appendix II), relating to his discussions of the proposed deployments with the GVN.
- e. Informing the Congressional leadership of:
  - 1) The contemplated deployments.
  - 2) The change in mission of US forces in Vietnam.
  - 3) The creation of an International Mobile Security Task Force, as mentioned in Appendix I.

  
Robert S. McNamara

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Appendix I  
Actions Relating to the 7 Points of Def 9164

A. Points 1, 2, & 3

The cable proposed the deployment to SVN of approximately 9 additional US battalions and suggested the possible encadrement, on an experimental basis, of a limited number of ARVN units.

At Honolulu, it was agreed that 9 US battalions should be deployed to SVN (see paragraph 4 above) but General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units is neither required nor feasible. He does plan, however, to assign Vietnamese liaison personnel to each independent US platoon and to "brigade" US forces with ARVN troops in counter-insurgency actions. Furthermore he proposes a plan for an International Mobile Security Task Force which will contain third country elements as well as ARVN and US forces. Westmoreland will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will pertain when US ground forces are engaged in offensive combat operations, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces.

B. Point 4

The cable suggested the use of US recruiting personnel and techniques to accelerate the expansion of the Vietnamese forces.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland stated the mission needs no additional expertise in this area, that the bottlenecks were not in obtaining recruits but (rather in training facilities, trainers and leadership.) These problems are being surmounted. They expect the strength of the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces, including police, to increase by 127,000 men in the next 12 months.

C. Point 5

The cable suggested an experimental program to provide expanded medical services to the countryside, utilizing the assistance of the Surgeon General of the Army.

Ambassador Taylor welcomes this proposal. The representative of the Surgeon General will be sent to Saigon immediately to work with COMUSMACV and USOM to develop a detailed program.

D. Point 6

The cable suggested an experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army civil affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel).

At Honolulu, it was agreed that it would be wise to experiment in three provinces with full and carefully selected US teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military initiative and advice. It was agreed that in these three provinces the US effort would be put under one person, and that in at least one of the three provinces the person would be a civilian. It is understood

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that the Ambassador may call on the Defense Department for whatever specialized personnel are required for these three provinces.

E. Point 7

The cable proposed an experimental program of food distribution direct to the families of military personnel.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland said that there is no evidence that the regular and paramilitary forces or their families are short of food. They said that an earlier food-distribution plan was abandoned because of corruption and difficulties in administration. It was agreed, however, that the mission would undertake a study to improve the fringe benefits for the forces and their families.

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Appendix II - Instructions to Ambassador Taylor

The USG has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat Government. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objectives of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency cannot be attained in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

The JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag indefinitely, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 or more battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from U.S. and third country sources.

The USG accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and offers its assistance to the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time. We are prepared to bring in additional U.S. ground forces and to work with the GVN in obtaining participation of third countries. If the GVN will make urgent representations at the appropriate time following a schedule agreed with the USG, we believe it may be possible to obtain contributions of the following order: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. The USG is prepared to provide combat reinforcements of the order of 9 additional battalions distributed among points to be agreed upon, and the necessary logistic personnel to support the third country contingents. Also, it will use its good offices as desired in assisting the GVN approach to these governments.

You will seek the concurrence of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out subsequently. At your discretion, you may indicate to GVN officials that the total U.S. in-country strength at the end of this phase will approximate 80,000.

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418

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State (1)

wire copy given Bundy

18a

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Action

SS  
Info

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Control: 17456  
Rec'd: July 25, 1965  
7:55 a.m.

FROM: Saigon

ACTION: Secstate IMMEDIATE 265

INFO: DOD IMMEDIATE 21  
JCS IMMEDIATE  
CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 152  
BANGKOK PRIORITY 77

DATE JULY 25

EXDIS

BANGKOK FOR AMBASSADOR JOHNSON EYES ONLY

Ref. JCS to CINCPAC 242232Z

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE letter FEB 27 1979  
By inf, NARS, Date 7-18-79

*Taylor's view  
He would hit Site 6  
promptly, & has some  
other ideas.*

Following are Ambassador Taylor's view requested in reference telegram. The loss of the F-4 on 24 July obliges us to assume that Hanoi is henceforth prepared to shoot down US a/c with SAM's whenever the opportunity presents itself. Thus these missiles have now become a serious potential obstacle to our future bombing and photo programs and must be destroyed or neutralized if these programs are to continue as planned. It is my view that henceforth when they are located, they should be attacked at once.

To find them is likely to be difficult. It is far from clear that they will ever occupy the prepared sites which we have located by photography. They will present a far greater problem to us if they remain in a mobile configuration, possibly moving into the prepared sites to fire and then withdraw. If this tactic proves costly, there is no known reason why they should ever use these sites if some loss of effectiveness is accepted. Clearly we need to embark on a very thorough intelligence campaign to bring all possible means to bear on finding

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 265 July 25 from Saigon

finding these missiles. Such a campaign could include the use of low-level photography, drones to trigger the missile radars, ELINT aircraft to locate the radars, and Intruders to stir up SAM activity. The Shrike missile, if ready, may have a role to play in the anti-missile strikes which should exploit promptly the intelligence effort.

If we accept the need for the foregoing long term anti-missile effort, it leaves unanswered the question of what to do now in response to the F-4 shoot-down. I would not, repeat not, recommend a simultaneous strike against all the missile sites because of the lack of evidence of occupation which prevails today. Such a strike would require a large number of aircraft and would run the risk of considerable loss particularly since some of our planes are likely to become involved with the MIGs. Internationally, it would be interpreted as an act of serious escalation with little justification since the third party observers would see little difference in principle between a plane downed by a missile and those which we have lost to flak in the past. Also the possibility of our catching a substantial number of Russians in a large surprise attack is a factor to be considered. But the strongest argument against the full strike is that we are likely to be attacking empty holes and getting nothing for our pains.

Although the chance of catching the missiles in site 6 (presumed guilty of the F-4 attack) is not good, I would support an attack at once on this site if only to show Hanoi how seriously we view this incident and to prepare political opinion for our subsequent anti-missile campaign. We should publicly announce this strike after the fact as the beginning of an open season on missiles and warn all bystanders, (especially Russians) to keep out of the way. At the same time, we should look over our future target list and see what bombing attacks should be expedited in view of the growing SAM threat. It will make little sense to leave open the sea and rail routes into Hanoi-Haiphong over which SAM equipment has been and will be introduced while we are trying to destroy the equipment already on hand.

TAYLOR

AJT

NOTE: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 8:01 a.m. Passed White House, DOD/JCS  
8:55 a.m. 7/25/65

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419

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

IN DATE:  COLLECT  
 PAGE TO

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Classification TEXT

19a

JUL 25 '65 14 11 '65

FOR DCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR IMMEDIATE 128

Info:

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

Authority NLS 85-234

earlier 128, NARS, Date 3-11-86

Message referred to in separate telegram is as follows:

QUOTE Dear Blank:

I have asked my Ambassador (Charge) to bring to you my frank  
the assessment of the situation in South Vietnam.

In recent months open aggression against the people and government  
of Vietnam has increased and very heavy strains have been placed upon the  
South Vietnamese armed forces and the South Vietnamese people.

In this same period, as you know, repeated and imaginative  
efforts by many governments including your own have been unsuccessful  
in moving this problem to the conference table because of determined and  
rigid opposition from Hanoi and Peiping.

I have been reviewing this situation during the last few days in the  
light of up-to-date reports from my most trusted associates. While final  
decisions have not been made here, I can tell you that it now appears it  
certain that it will be necessary to increase United States armed forces

in

Drafted by: FE:WPBundy:aws  
7/25/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances: 1213 FE - Miss Bacon WH - Mr. McG. Bundy 1213 X/S U - Mr. Ball  
NEA - Mr. Talbot 1213 EUR - Mr. Leddy ARA - Mr. Sayre  
S/S - Mr. Mills 1213

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Classification

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~~SECRET~~  
Classification

in South Vietnam by a number which may equal or exceed <sup>the</sup> 80,000 already there.

I want you to know that as we make this major additional effort we will also continue to make every political and diplomatic effort that we can to open way to a peaceful settlement.

We will also continue to use every care and restraint to ensure that <sup>the</sup> fires of war do not spread on <sup>the</sup> mainland of Asia. Our objective remains <sup>the</sup> end of external interference in South Vietnam so that <sup>the</sup> people of that country can determine their own future.

In this situation I must express to you my own deep personal conviction <sup>the</sup> at prospect of peace in Vietnam will be greatly increased <sup>the</sup> in <sup>the</sup> measure that <sup>the</sup> necessary efforts of <sup>the</sup> United States are supported and shared by other nations which share our purposes and our concerns. I know that your government has already signalled its interest and concern by giving assistance. I now ask that you give most earnest consideration to increasing that assistance in <sup>ways</sup> ~~way~~ which will give a clear signal to the world--and perhaps especially to Hanoi--<sup>the</sup> of solidarity of international support for resistance to aggression in Vietnam and for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

I have asked my Ambassador (Charge) to make himself available to you for consultation as to <sup>the</sup> types of additional assistance you might provide and for <sup>the</sup> liaison with <sup>the</sup> South Vietnamese Government.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

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1. Phrase in brackets is optional depending on position taken by host government.
2. Re last paragraph of Presidential message, EUR and other posts where reference to liaison with South Vietnamese Government may not be appropriate should substitute following for that paragraph: QTE I have asked my Ambassador (Charge) to make himself available to you for any consultation which you may wish on this matter. UNQTE
3. For ANKARA: In penultimate paragraph of message, substitute QTE offering assistance UNQTE for QTE giving assistance UNQTE and QTE offering additional assistance UNQTE for QTE increasing that assistance UNQTE.
4. For BERN and VIENNA: Substitute following for last sentence of penultimate paragraph of message: QTE I now ask that you give most earnest consideration to increasing that assistance in accordance with <sup>the</sup> great humanitarian tradition of your country. UNQTE
5. For BONN: In light Harriman conversation with Chancellor, <sup>changes</sup> following ~~changes~~ should be made in letter: (a) in first paragraph add: QTE I had already asked Ambassador Harriman to discuss this situation with you, but I wish you to have my own personal statement as well. UNQTE (b) After 4th paragraph, insert new paragraph: QTE In making this additional commitment, I shall be considering additional decisions, and my Ambassador will be in touch with you on these

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these as soon as they are developed. I want to emphasize, as Ambassador Harriman has already told you, that in any event there will be no degradation in our commitment to NATO. UNQTE

6. For ROME: Presidential message appears appropriate for delivery by Harriman in his call on Moro. If so, first paragraph may be appropriately revised, and similar additional paragraph as in Bonn instruction should be inserted concerning NATO commitment.

7. For BRUSSELS, LONDON, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, And THE HAGUE: You should add to message same paragraph as in 5 (b) above, omitting reference to Harriman.

8. For CANBERRA: Substitute following for last paragraph: QTE Our own plans are necessarily incomplete at this stage, but it is clear that we will have many hard decisions to make during coming days. I believe it is very important that we keep in close touch during this period, both directly and through your Ambassador here and my Charge d'Affaires in Canberra. I would greatly appreciate your own current assessment of <sup>the</sup> situation. UNQTE

9. Separate telegrams give additional ~~or alternate~~ instructions for Canberra, London, ~~Canberra~~, Wellington, Manila, Seoul, ~~XXXXXX~~ Ottawa; Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Taipei, ~~XXXXXX~~ and ~~XXXXXX~~

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10. For Ottawa, London, Tokyo: In addition to including bracketed phrase per paragraph numbered 1, you should add following to 5th paragraph of letter:

QTE In this connection, I want to reiterate my appreciation of the efforts of your government and of yourself personally. We shall continue to welcome constructive initiatives. UNQTE

~~RXX~~ GP-3

End.

SEND TO:

- BRUSSELS
- ✓ OTTAWA
- ✓ COPENHAGEN
- ✓ BONN —
- ✓ DUBLIN
- ✓ ROME
- ✓ THE HAGUE
- ✓ MADRID
- ✓ BERN
- ✓ LONDON —
- ✓ ANKARA

- ✓ CANBERRA
- ✓ TAIPEI —
- ✓ TOKYO
- ✓ SEOUL
- ✓ KUALA LUMPUR
- ✓ WELLINGTON
- ✓ MANILA
- ✓ ATHENS
- ✓ TEHRAN
- ✓ TEL AVIV

RUSK

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26 July 1965

MEMO FOR McG B

The attached analysis of population control in South Vietnam may be of interest.

*Diels*  
R. C. BOWMAN

6:00 Rush  
Arthur Goldberg

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC letter 6-18-79  
By JK (ig) NARS, Date 7-8-80

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

208

✓ 3842

Bowman

(B)



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 9-25-78 letter  
By if, NARS, Date 3-22-79

DJSM-851-65  
23 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Population Control in South Vietnam

1. (U) A consolidation of COMUSMACV's reports of rural population control for the period June 1962 to date is attached hereto.
2. (C) A gap in reporting occurred immediately following the second quarter of 1963. The non-reporting period includes the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 1963 and the first quarter of calendar year 1964. The reason for this gap is that at that time the entire report originating in the GVN was discovered to be highly inflated due to NHU's manipulation of the statistics. When the Diem coup occurred in November of 1963, COMUSMACV re-evaluated the entire program based upon a ground and air photo survey and developed new criteria for reports which would reflect the actual situation. This survey was completed in May 1964 and COMUSMACV started reporting population control figures again in June of 1964.
3. (C) It is interesting to note that the sum of the first two columns ("GVN Control" and "Undergoing Rural Reconstruction") for the end of second quarter 62 is 76% and for the end of second quarter 65 is 75%, while VC control has remained at 23%. If the statistics could be considered even reasonably accurate, it would appear that little or no progress has been made in three years of effort.

A. H. MANHART  
Major General, USA  
Vice Director

cc: File  
Staff  
SJCS  
RAIR  
SACSA

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMPARISON OF RURAL POPULATION CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

<u>Period Ending</u>	<u>GVN Control</u>	<u>Undergoing Rural Reconstruction</u>	<u>Not Controlled</u>	<u>VC Ctrl.</u>
2nd Qtr 62	5,800,000 47%	3,622,000 29%	137,000 1%	2,859,000 23%
3rd Qtr 62	6,071,000 49%	3,246,000 27%	717,000 6%	2,283,000 18%
4th Qtr 62	6,300,000 51%	3,331,000 27%	643,000 5%	2,069,000 17%
1st Qtr 63	6,724,000 54%	3,356,000 27%	609,000 5%	1,819,000 15%
2nd Qtr 63	6,766,000 54%	3,509,000 28%	626,000 5%	1,752,000 14%
2nd Qtr 64	4,232,995 33%	6,038,941 46%	115,740 .8%	2,542,237 19%
3rd Qtr 64	4,160,259 32%	5,759,523 44%	64,035 .5%	2,836,872 22%
4th Qtr 64	4,268,832 33%	5,444,814 42%	60,103 .4%	3,048,827 24%
1st Qtr 65	4,530,694 35%	5,141,941 39%	62,828 .5%	3,179,566 25%
2nd Qtr 65	4,897,632 38%	4,860,293 37%	165,916 1.2%	3,041,772 23.8%

\*During this period, leading up to and following the demise of the DIEM government, GVN reports by Nhu were found to be highly inflated. COMUSMACV required a complete re-evaluation of the program and developed new criteria which is reflected in the large difference in the 2nd quarter 1964 when reporting was resumed.

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